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From: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE (CombatDiv 7).
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander THIRD Fleet.
(2) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report of CTF 31, Commander Occupation Forces,
YOKOSUKA; Occupation and Securing of the YOKOSUKA Naval
Base and Airfield; Covering the period 19 August to 8
September 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFleet Ltr. 1CL-45 of 1 January 1945,

(B) Action Report, CTG 31.1, Flagship Group, U.S.S. IOWA.
(C) Action Report, CTG 31.2, Minesweeping Group.
(Two forwarded separately).
(D) Action Report, CTG 31.3, Fleet Landing Force and Task
Force Able, Sixth Marine Division.
(E) Action Report, CTG 31.4 - Transport Group.
(F) Action Report, CTG 31.5 - Screen.
(G) Action Report, CTG 31.6 - Yokosuka Naval Air Activities.
(H) Action Report, CTG 31.7 - Naval shore Activities.
(I) Action Report, CTG 31.8 - SOPA Administrator.
(K) Report of Seizure of H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO. P. 32
(L) Demands and Orders given to Japanese Commandant First
Naval District dated 27 August 1945. P. 44

1. Pursuant to instructions in reference (a), the Action Report
for Task Force THIRTY-ONE for the period 19 August to 8 September 1945,
incident to the occupation of YOKOSUKA Naval Base and Airfield is forwarded
herewith as enclosures.

O. C. BADGER.

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Authenticated:

I. G. SEGER
Flag Secretary. 139238
TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT
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PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

A. This action report covers the period from 19 August to 8 September 1945. YOKOSUKA Occupation Force, Task Force 31 was formed at 1400 (i) August 19, 1945 in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plan 10-45; Commander Task Force 31, Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, USN. The Task Force, consisting of units assigned from THIRD Fleet including Marine and Bluejacket landing forces, a British landing force detachment, and a Marine Combat Team consisting of 4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment, 6th Marine Division and attached units, entered TOKYO BAY beginning 28 August. On 30 August, landings were made at the YOKOSUKA Naval Base and the surrender of the base was received by Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, from the Commandant of the FIRST Naval District, Vice Admiral Totsuke. From 30 August to 8 September, Naval activities in the YOKOSUKA area were organized and administered by Task Force 31. Fleet Landing forces were relieved by the 4th Marines and reembarked from 4 to 6 September. Task Force 31 was dissolved on 8 September, its mission completed. Commander Fleet Activities YOKOSUKA and Commander Service Division 102 (SOPA Administrative) relieved Commander Task Force 31 and assumed respective control of all tasks assigned to Task Force 31.

PART II - PRELIMINARIES

A. Task Force THIRTY-ONE, operating as a part of the THIRD Fleet in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45, 11-45 and Commander Task Force 31 Operation Plan 1-45, included the following units; the composition of the force varying as units reported or were detached for special missions. The force was also supplemented as necessary by drawing on the facilities of the THIRD Fleet.

(a) T.G. 31.1 Flagship Group - Captain Wellborn.

IOWA (BB61) (FF) 1 BB
SAN DIEGO (CL53) (HFF) 1 CL(AA)

(b) T.G. 31.2 Minesweeping Group - Captain Loud.

T.U. 31.2.1 Minesweeping Unit ABLE.
ELLYSON (F)(DNS19) 7 DNS
HAMBLETON (DNS20) 2 DM
GERARDI (DNS30)
JEFFERS (DNS27)
MACOMB (DNS23)
HOPKINS (DNS13)
FITCH (DNS25)
GWIN (DNS3)
T.E. FRAZER (DNS4)

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T.U. 31.2.2 Minesweeping Unit BAKER
REVENGE (AML10) 6 AM
TOKEN (AML26) 2 ACM
TUMULT (AML27) 12 YMS
BEASTON (ACM6)
FOCHARD (AML75)
PICKET (ACM8)
SAHE (AML1)
REQUISITE (AML9)
YMS 177, 266, 276, 343, 362, 461,
371, 396, 415, 426, 441, 467.

(c) T.G. 31.3 Landing Force, Brig. General Clement (USMC)

T.U. 31.3.1 Marine Combat Team, Lt. Col. Beans
4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment
6th Marine Division 5400 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.2 Third Fleet Marine Landing Force,
Lt. Col. Lantz (USMC)
3 Battalions from TF 38 1635 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.3 Third Fleet Naval Landing Force, Comdr. Malone
2 Battalions Bluejackets 890 Officers and Men.
Fully equipped from TF 38.
Nucleus Crews 330 Officers & Men.
10 Units (33 Officers & men each).
5 Battalions Bluejackets 2000 Officers & Men.
Partially equipped from TF 38 in Reserve.

T.U. 31.3.4 British Landing Force, Capt. Buchanan (R.N.)
1 Battalion from TF 38.5 200 Naval Personnel.
250 Royal Marines.

(d) T.G. 31.4 Transport Group, Commodore Smoot.

T.U. 31.4.1 Fire Support Unit 10 LCI
LCI Group 46.

T.U. 31.4.2 Transport Unit ABLE, Capt. Moen.
GRINES (AP) (APL272) 5 AP
MARRIENHEATHER (APL203) 1 AKA
LUNIER (APL25)
NELLETTE (APL156)
ERLAXTON (APL138)
WLUKESHL (AKL84)

ENCLOSURE (A)
T. U. 31.4.2. Transport Unit BAKER, Capt. F. P. Williams.
   OZARK (LSV2) (THIRD Fleet Marine) 2 ISV
   MONITOR (LSV5) (TU 31.3.2) and Naval 1 APA
   GARRARD (APD84) (Landing Forces (TU) 3 ISD
   SH. J. WELL (LSD15) 31.3.3 Battalions,
   SAN MARCOS (LSD25) Beach Parties, Misc.
   CATAMOUNT (LSD17) Units embarked.

T. U. 31.4.4. Transport Unit CHARLIE, Capt. Kennaday.
   SLS (F) (APD50) (British Landing) 10 APD
   PAVILIC (APD70) (Force (TU 31.3.4) embarked.
   BARR (APD39) 3 Bomb Disposal Group,
   H. A. BASS (APD124) 1 Bomb Disposal Group,
   GOSSELIN (APD126) embarked.
   REEVES (APD52) Press personnel embarked.
   WINTUCK (APD125) 2 Bomb Disposal units, comm-
   1 Unification teams, 1 diver unit
   and 1 Demolition unit embarked.
   RUNEIS (APD85) 5 NUCLEAR crews embarked.
   W. J. PATTISON (APD104) 2 UDT teams,
   BEGGS (APD127) embarked.

T. U. 31.4.5 Transport Unit DOG, Lt. Comdr. W. K. Bradbury
   Com ISM Group 35 12 ISM
   ISM 252 (F) 208, 290, 292, 362,
   368, 371, 419, 488, 13,
   284, 71.
   Com ISM Group 86
   LST 587, 789, 1139, 1083
   4 LST
   FGM 16, 26, 32.
   3 PGM

(e) T.G. 31.5 Screen, Captain Carmichael.

DesDiv 106
   WEDDINGTON (DD684)
   TWNIN (DD540)
   STOCHAM (DD663)
   Y. R. NEILL (DD541)
   SOUTHERLAND (DD743)
   HALSEY POWELL (DD686)

(f) T.G. 31.6 Naval Air Activities, Captain Duckworth

CANNONS CASU
   WASP CASU

Advanced Air Base Assembly (embarked in LST 1139, 789).
   CB Units (in ISM's)
   Navy Base Maintenance Co. #4.

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(g) T.G. 31.7 Naval Shore Activities, Commodore Wobble.

CB Units (in LSM)
Navy Base Maintenance Cos. #1 and #3.
Miscellaneous Personnel and Units assigned.

(h) T.G. 31.8 SOFA Administrative, Commodore Smoother.

2 UDT Units (in APD 104, 127).
Nucleus Crew (when released from Landing Force)
Mobile Post Office (LST 567)
FIELDMONT (AD 17)
TAMALPAIS (AO 96)
DELTA (AR 9)
Personnel Assigned.

(i) T.G. 31.9 Submarine Demilitarization Group, Capt. Parks.

ComSubRon 20
PROTEUS (AS 19)
GREENET (LSR 10)

Units of the THIRD Fleet were drawn upon for all personnel requirements when Task Force THIRTY-ONE was activated. Rear Admiral Badger (ComBatDiv SEVEN) upon assuming his duties as CTF 31 brought his entire staff, including Captain J.M. Sweeney as Chief of Staff into the new organization, which was further supplemented by key personnel made available by Commander THIRD Fleet. Included among the latter were Commodore John F. Womble, Jr., USN, ComTaskFleet TWO, designated as CTG 31.7 (Commander Naval Shore Activities), Commodore Roland H. Smoother, USN, ComTaskFleet FOUR, designated as CTG 31.4 (Transport Group) as well as CTG 31.8 (SOFA Administrative) upon its arrival onshore. Commodore Joel T. Boone (MC), USN, joined the staff as Medical Officer from the staff of Com3rd Fleet, Capt. R.C. Lynch, Jr., USN, joined from the staff of ComBatRon TWO as Operations Officer. Captain Duckworth, USN, of the U.S.S. CONVERSE was made Commanding Officer of Naval Air Activities and Captain T.M. Dykema, USN, from the staff of CTF 38 was given the task of ordnance demilitarization. Brigadier General W.T. Clement, USMC, was designated CTG 31.3 and placed in command of all landing forces. Commander Johnson, (SO) USN, Commander J.J. Coppola, USN, Commander C.W. Chisholm, USNR, all headed of departments on the ODA were assigned corresponding positions on the staff of CTF 31. Commander F.P. Gilmore (MC) USN, Senior Medical Officer on ODA was assigned to CTF 31.7 staff. Other members of the staffs of CTF 31, the task groups, and landing forces were drawn from the battleships, carriers, and cruisers of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT.

B. Task Force THIRTY-ONE was formed on 19 August 1945 from units of the THIRD Fleet and operated until 27 August in an area approximately 250 miles southeast of TOKYO. During this period the unparalleled feat of assembling and organizing an amphibious force from ships operating at sea was accomplished. The ships assigned to Task Force THIRTY-ONE were assembled and the Task Force organization completed. Landing force units which had
been organized in the ships of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT were assembled and embarked in transports and staff personnel, nucleus crews, maintenance units and other components were likewise assembled in their appropriate units. This assembly and embarkation of the landing forces in transports at sea from the various ships of the THIRD Fleet was a job of major proportions. A highlight of the operation was the transfer of Task Group 38.4, bluejacket battalion of 400 men which was assembled on the MISSOURI to the IOWA. The transfer was required by the immediate departure of the MISSOURI from the area prior to the arrival of the assigned transport. Six slings were used simultaneously and the operation was completed within an hour without interruption or incident. Three hours later the battalion was transferred again from the IOWA to the MONITOR. Once the personnel had been assembled in the transports no reloading was required and the replenishment and distribution of supplies and landing force equipment was also completed during this period.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE shifted his flag to the SAN DIEGO on August 23. From August 24 to August 27 Admiral Badger was embarked on the MISSOURI to attend the preliminary negotiations between Commander THIRD Fleet and the Japanese Naval and Military authorities. At these conferences the Japanese emissaries were advised of requirements re minesweeping, disarmament and evacuation of personnel in the occupied areas, identification of all fortifications by display of white flags and markers and other demands essential to the security and success of the operation. During the period Commodore Womble was embarked in the SAN DIEGO and exercised Tactical command of Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

On August 27, after a delay of 24 hours due to storms in the vicinity, Task Force THIRTY-ONE arrived and anchored about 1600 (1) in the northeastern part of SAGAMI WAN in the shadow of Fujiyama.

The following day, 28 August, about 0900 the first United States Task Force consisting of SAN DIEGO (Flagship of CTF 31), GOSSELIN, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUIJIN, screened by WEDDERBURN, STOCKHOLM, TWINKING and preceded by the minesweepers ELYSSON and HAMELETON got underway and entered TOKYO Bay, anchoring about 1300 off YOKOSUKA. Remaining units of Task Force 31 entered TOKYO BAY 30 August. During the entrance Task Force 35 and Task Force 37 made a demonstration in force in SAGAMI WAN and stood by to provide fire support if needed. Air support was provided by Task Force 38, and air demonstrations were conducted in such force as to discourage any treachery on the part of the enemy. This was particularly important in view of the gauntlet of heavy guns that was the vanguard of Task Force 31 had to pass in order to enter TOKYO BAY. To this end combat air patrol, direct support aircraft and patrols of outlying airfield all were directed to funnel through populated areas at low altitude in order to make their presence most evident. At daybreak 30 August 1945 the first of the transports entered with Fleet Marines and landed on FUJITSU SAKI and Island Fort No. 2 to insure the neutralization of those fortifications prior to the entry of the main landing force.
Minefields guarding the entrance to TOKYO BAY had not been cleared by the Japanese. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and the entrance was made via the west channel which was check swept by our forces prior to the entrance. Failure of the Japanese to clear the minefields was attributed to a lack of minesweepers and the crudity of their methods which required about three times as long as our methods. Information supplied by the local Japanese authorities was very accurate, and Japanese pilots were embarked on all ships during the entrance.

Negotiations with the Japanese Naval authorities at YOKOSUKA were conducted aboard the SAN DIEGO on August 28 and 29. At 0800 on August 30, nucleus crews from the SOUTH DAKOTA embarked on the H. A. BASS (APD124) under the command of Captain T. J. FLYNN, U.S.N., boarded HMAS NAGATO, hauled down the Japanese colors, and hoisted the United States ensign, taking custody of this vessel in the name of the United States government.

Landing of the occupation forces began at 0930 the same day. The SAN DIEGO moved in and moored to the dock at YOKOSUKA at 1030. All landings and the occupation were executed smoothly on schedule and without opposition or incident. Surrender of the Naval Base was received at 1045 (1), 30 August in a ceremony on the dock alongside the SAN DIEGO. Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, received the surrender from Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of the FIRST Naval District.

Task Force THIRTY-ONE headquarters were established ashore immediately; the National Ensign and Admiral Badger's personal flag were hoisted over the Naval Headquarters building. In the afternoon an inspection tour by Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey was made.

All areas were secured, patrols established, Shore Activities, and S O P A (Administrative) were activated and the organization and operation of the base was undertaken. Minesweeping operations, support of Prisoner of War evacuation and demilitarization of ships and military installations, establishment of air operations at YOKOSUKA, clearing and reconnaissance of beaches at TATEYAMA for Army landings, clearance of dock areas at YOKOHAMA for Army forces were among important operations conducted. SAN DIEGO was relieved by the PIEDMONT on 1 September; on 2 September the surrender of the Japanese Empire was witnessed aboard MISSOURI by Rear Admiral Badger. From 4 to 6 September THIRD Fleet and British Landing Force Units were reembarked for return to their ships. On 3 September Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE was relieved by Commander Naval Activities YOKOSUKA and Task Force THIRTY-ONE was dissolved.

C. The mission of Task Force THIRTY-ONE as established in Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45 and 11-45 was to occupy and secure the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, clear entrance to TOKYO BAY and anchorages, seize and operate YOKOSUKA Airfield, establish communications including press, take over and demilitarize enemy ships present, support the release of allied Prisoners of War by Task Group 30.6, demilitarize enemy defenses, establish a port director, establish headquarters and facilities at YOKOSUKA for Task Force THIRTY-ONE forces and advance representatives of the Army of Occupation, institute sanitation and health measures and medical facilities, assist Army
forces to clear and prepare dock areas in YOKOSUKA - YOKOHAMA area for
disembarkation of troops, clear beaches and reconnoiter TATEMA Area for
landings by Army.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE Operation Plan 1-45 covers this opera-
tion and is based on the assumption that Japan had capitulated but the treach-
erous employment of any or all weapons in the TOKYO area was a distinct possi-
bility. Provision was therefore made to prevent and protect the occupation
force from any overt or treacherous actions by organized faction or indiv-
iduals. Air and gunfire support was provided by Task Forces of the THIRD
Fleet, minesweeping operations by Japanese were supervised and checked by
units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE. Disarmament and evacuation of Japanese mil-
itary and naval personnel from the occupied and contiguous areas, was re-
quired except for personnel necessary to provide information and assistance
in establishing control and operation of the base.

D. Task Force THIRTY-ONE consisting of units enumerated above were
supported by Task Force THIRTY-FIVE and Task Force THIRTY-SEVEN who staged
demonstrations in SAUMI WAT while Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT furnished air
support, cover, search and reconnaissance while operating in assigned areas
in empire waters adjacent to the TOKYO region. All units of THIRD Fleet
were also available to provide logistic support as required.

E. No enemy opposition was encountered at any time during the operation.
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PART III - CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

8 August 1945

Operating with Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, about 250 miles southwest of TOKYO, under tactical command of Vice Admiral J.S. McCain, CTF-38.


11 August

Rear Admiral Badger designated CTF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet despatch and authorized to issue warning orders to all THIRD Fleet commands. IOWA (BB61) designated flagship.

All ships in TF-38 alerted to organize bluejacket and marine landing force with arms, ammunition and rations.

Requested, through ComTHIRDFleet, that minesweeping officers and ships, UD Teams, and logistic ships be alerted by CinCPac (Advance). Initiated requests for temporary duty assignment for officers and men needed for staff. This included intelligence, interpreters, communications, clerical, CIC, AD, operational, war correspondents, and photographic personnel. Requested necessary maps, charts, and grids from CinCPac (Advance).

Requests were initiated for supplies essential to the evacuation of prisoners-of-war. These included clothing (men, women and children), toilet articles, candy, chewing gum, small luxuries, ambulances, medical supplies including blood and water transportation.

Brigadier General William T. Clement, USMC, nominated as Commander Landing Force by Commanding General, THIRDPhilCorps, with Regimental Combat Team from 4th and 6th Marine Divisions, all located and alerted at GUAM.

Started drafting Operation Plan.

12 August

Alerted all ships in TF-38 to organize Base maintenance companies; warning order issued to CTF-38 to form naval air activities organization to activate airfield. Requested CTF-38 to obtain vertical photos of occupation area. General Clement and Staff loaded in USS OZARK (LSV-2) at GUAM and sailed for rendezvous.

Requested APD's, APA's, AKW's, and necessary amphibious craft and Seabee maintenance unit be alerted in rear area.
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13 August

4th and 6th Division Marines loaded on 5 APA’s and 1 AKA at Marianas; UD teams loaded in APD’s at Guam.

Prepared demands to Japanese for cooperation, equipment and services.

Minesweepers (MinRon 20) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

14 August

First draft of Operation Plan completed, and discussed with ComTHIRDFleet on MISSOURI (BB-63). Coordination with fire and air support groups and POW rescue groups made firm.

Instructed to cease offensive operations against Japanese forces by CinCPA.

All ships present alerted to procure, by transfer at sea, small arms and equipment needed for landing force parties from ships not furnishing landing battalions.

CinCPA’s Op-Plan 12-45 put into effect for operations. Directs THIRD Fleet to occupy and control Tokyo Bay and coastal water in conjunction with Army Forces.

15 August

TransDiv 105 (5 APA’s, 1 AKA) departed Guam for rendezvous.

Requested CinCAPPac to direct Japanese to initiate minesweeping in Tokyo Bay and entrances.

Received report from Soviet of intense anti-invasion activity by Japanese along shores of SoCAMI Wan. Requested additional photographic coverage by TF-38.

Completed tentative operation plan with revisions indicated at conference on MISSOURI. Distributed to Task Group Commanders for planning purposes.

16 August

Operation Plan approved by ComTHIRDFleet at conference aboard MISSOURI. Held briefing conferences with Group Commanders.

17 August

Authorized interchange of landing force equipment between ships in order to fully equip landing battalions.
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Requested ComTHIRDFleet to fuel, replenish and ammunition all ships assigned to TF-31.

Minesweeping units (AM's and YMS's) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

Alerted all ships to organize nucleus crews to take over captured vessels.

Held conferences with Group Commanders firming up plans.

18 August

ComTHIRDFleet directed forming of TF-31 at 1400(I) 19th August as a separate tactical units to conform to movements of TF-38, remaining within TBS range of MISSOURI (Flagship, THIRD Fleet). TF-38 operating vicinity point Drink (32N - 143-30E), fueling and replenishing.

Alerted all ships to prepare to load landing battalions and other personnel in accordance with loading plan. Ordered typhus vaccine inoculations for personnel going ashore.

British landing force made available by ComTHIRDFleet.

Continued conferences re: operation plans of Group Commanders.

19 August

Commenced transferring personnel and equipment at sea, in accordance with loading plan.

Received storm warning indicating typhoon developing 300 miles to southeast.

1400(I), formed Task Force 31, in special cruising formation with transports and large amphibious ships in column, with circular screens composed of DD's, DMS's, and APD's. Following ships present: IOWA, SAN DIEGO, GRIFFES, BRAXTON, OZARK, MERRIVETH, WAKESHA, SHADWELL, LANIER, MELLETTE, GARRARD, DesDiv 106, MinRon 20, and TransDiv 105 plus WANTUCK.

Continued transferring personnel, fueling and replenishing.

20 August

REEVES, GOSSELIN joined up.

Received ComTHIRDFleet entrance plan for Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. Prepared and disseminated special entry formation.

Received despatch from ComTHIRDFleet that entry to Sagami Wan delayed until 26th August. CTF-31 alerted to board MISSOURI to meet Japanese emissaries morning of entry.
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20 August (cont'd)

In order to avoid typhoon all Task Forces directed by ComTHIRDFleet to proceed southwest toward "Temporary point" (30-30N - 142E). SoA 10 knots.

Continued to transfer personnel, refuel and replenish.

Distributed CTF-31 Operation Plan No. 1-45.

21 August

Continued replenishing, fueling and transfer of personnel at sea, vicinity of "Temporary Point".

SOUTHERLAND assigned and joined up; assumed ACI, FDO, and CIC(air) duties for TF-31.

Received ComTHIRDFleet Op-Plan 11-45 by despatch - added following task to TF-31, "Assist Army forces as necessary to clear dock areas, Yokohama, in preparation for disembarkation of troops of 3rd Phib Force on about 31 August and 13 September". Issued necessary changes to Op-Plan to comply.

22 August

Continued replenishing and fueling in vicinity of "Temporary Point".

LOVE Day (landing day) specified as 22 August by ComTHIRDFleet. Sagami Wan entry to be on LOVE minus Two day.

TF-31 directed to proceed and operate in area "Badger" (Lat. 32 to 33 N - Long. 142 to 143-30 E), typhoon having passed off to eastward.

23 August

Operating in area "Badger", engaged in fueling and replenishing.

CATAMOUNT and LST 1083 joined up.


Shifted Flag and Staff to SAN DIEGO.

Held conference of all Group Commanders and coordinated all operation plans. Following additional task assigned TF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet: "Clear water and beach approaches in TATSUMI Wan, and mark same in preparation for amphibious landing in that area about 2 September by THIRD Phib Force". CTF-31 Op-Plan 1-45 revised to comply.
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24 August

Continued fueling in area "Badger".

Minesweeping unit consisting of 7 AM's and 12 YMS's joined up. PATTISON and BEGON joined up.

25 August

Continued operations in area "Badger".

LSM Group 35 (12 LSM's) and PGM's 16, 26, 32 joined up.

IOWA and GOSELIN detached to join TG 30.1 (THIRD Fleet flagship group).


Commodore J.P. Womble, U.S.N., OTC for TF-31 in SAN DIEGO.

Received orders from ComTHIRD Fleet delaying all operations 48 hours. New LOVE day designated as 30 August.

26 August

Operating in area "Badger" topping-off and briefing of units.

ComTHIRD Fleet ordered initial entry (Sagami Wan) executed on 27 August (Love minus three day).

Alerted minesweeping groups to commence sweeping operations as soon as conference with Japanese emissaries disclosed current mine fields and channels.

Requested station tanker and tender be assigned to provide fuel, gas, water, and provisions for landing force and small craft.

Requested AF and hospital ship be made available to landing force as early as practicable to replenish force and provide services for repatriates.

Proceeded towards entrance route to Sagami Wan in accordance with ComTHIRD Fleet directive.

27 August

Proceeding to Sagami Wan along track specified by ComTHIRD Fleet.

Japanese emissaries boarded MISSOURI and were met by Rear Admiral R.B. Carney, U.S.N., (Chief of Staff, Third Fleet) and Rear Admiral O.C. Badger, U.S.N., (CTF-31). Demands were presented to Japanese and information obtained as to mine
fields and channels. Japanese pilots and interpreters were loaded on a des-
troyer and delivered to task unit guides of TF-31. Minesweeping units were
detached and proceeded on minesweeping tasks. Japanese channel into Tokyo
Bay was immediately check-swept with negative results. Japs had failed to meet
minesweeping demands made by SCAP, giving as their excuse the lack of minesweep-
ers in the locality.

Plans for entry to Tokyo Bay on the 28th were solidified, with arrangements
made for fire and air support, CAP, minesweeping, press coverage and berth
assignments. Seaplane tenders for accommodation of flights from rear area
added to ships making initial entry.

Logistic requirements for units engaged in occupation forces made firm with
Service Division, by arranging for Tender to berth at naval base on Love plus
one day.

Disseminated to Third Fleet co-ordinates of safe channel to Tokyo Bay as
derived from Japanese charts, pilots, and own check-sweep operations.

TF-31, loss minesweepers engaged in sweeping operations, anchored in
Sagami Wan at 1600(I).

Rear Admiral Badger (CTF-31) returned aboard SAN DIEGO and assumed tactical
command of TF-31.

28 August

Units of TF-31 anchored in Sagami Wan.

At 0900(I) the first U.S. Task Force to enter Tokyo Bay, under command of
Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger (CTF-31), got underway and proceeded through swept
channel. Force consisted of SAN DIEGO, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUISUN, and GOSSELIN
screened by WEDDELBURN, STOCKHLM, TWINING and proceeded by minesweepers ELLISON
and HMENTON. Force anchored off Yokosuka Naval Base, Tokyo Bay at 1300(I).

Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, Commandant First Naval District and
Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval Base, and staff reported aboard SAN DIEGO with
records, charts and answers to demands made on 27 August. Japanese were inter-
viewed by members of Staff of CTF-31. A list of further demands and instructions
were read and delivered to Vice Admiral TOTSUKA. (See Enclosure I).

Security requirements, including small boat patrols were set up.

Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages. Results negative.
Mine warning number one, Tokyo Bay, issued defining existing limits of Japanese
mine fields as correlated from Jap charts and interviews.
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28 August (cont’d)

All other units of TF-31 less minesweeping units remained anchored in Sagami Wan.

SOPA regulations for Tokyo Bay anchorages published.

Set up harbor entrance control ship with pilots, interpreters and charts.

29 August

Anchored as preceding day.

MISSOURI (Third Fleet Flag), IOWA, SOUTH DAKOTA, ANCON, (press ship), SAN JUAN (CTG 30.6 - Allied POW Rescue Group) BENEVOLENCE, with screening destroyers entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

CinCPacPOA broke his Flag in SOUTH DaKOTA.

Japanese staff members reported aboard SAN DIEGO and arrangements for surrender ceremonies at YOKOSUKA Naval Base and aboard MISSOURI made firm. Interviews with staff of CTF-31 continued regarding demilitarization, Naval Base facilities, location of Jap ships, dockage, dry docks, menace to navigation etc.

Requested tugs and salvage unit be sailed from rear area to clear docks of sunken Jap ships disclosed by interviewing Japanese Naval officers.

HOW Hour (landing time) set at 1000(I), 30 August.

Minesweeping units sweeping anchorages and landing beaches; results negative.

Set up a board to survey industrial facilities of YOKOSUKA Naval Base.

Changed operation plan to provide for landings, preceded by minesweeping and UDT teams at forts commanding entrance channel at HOW Hour minus 3 hours to ensure security of channel. Added new task to have prize crew seize NAGATO, HOW Hour minus two hours to ensure security of landing beaches.

Cooperated with POW Rescue Group in initiating evacuation and processing of released Allied prisoners.

30 August

Love Day. Proceeded with landing in accordance with Operation Plan. How Hour advanced to 0930(I). Harbour forts seized at 0730(I). NAGATO seized
30 August (cont’d)

At 0830(I), landing proceeded without incident.


1030(I); SAN DIEGO with Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, Chief of Staff, ComTHIRDFleet docked at berth in YOKOSUKA Naval Base; the first U.S. Naval ship to moor to a dock in Japanese Homeland.

1045(I); Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, guarded by Brigadier General W. T. Clement, U.S.M.C. (CTG 31.4 - Landing Force) surrendered the YOKOSUKA Naval Base to Rear Admiral Carney who accepted and receipted for same as delegate for Admiral Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet). Admiral Badger’s flag was raised over Naval Headquarters building, thereby establishing the first U.S. Headquarters on the Japanese Homeland. Headquarters and staff moved ashore and commenced operating from former Japanese Naval Headquarters.

Other units of Third Fleet entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

Released REEVES and GOSSELIN to CTG 30.6 (POW Rescue Group) to assist in repatriation work.

Fleet Admiral C.W. Nimitz (CinCPAC) and Admiral W.F. Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet) came ashore and inspected Naval Base.

31 August

Operating from headquarters ashore, ComTHIRDFleet's Operation Plan No. 11-45 put into effect CICO(2), 31 August.

Despatched UDT teams and minesweepers to clear and mark approaches at TATEYAMA WAN for 3rd Phib landing 3 September.

Continued demilitarization, surveys, research, intelligence, activating airfield and securing of occupational zone in accordance with Operation Plan.

Third Fleet units continued entering and anchoring Tokyo Bay as directed by ComTHIRDFleet.


Japanese commenced operations, in compliance with orders, to clear out anti-submarine nets and mine-fields in entrance channel to Tokyo Bay to be completed by 1600(I), 8 September.
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31 August (cont’d)

U.S. Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages in Tokyo Bay, YOKOHAMA and Tokyo Harbour. All results negative except 3 U.S. laid influence mines exploded off Tokyo entrance channel.

Re-embarked members of landing force received from ships departing area for U.S. Personnel from ships not in bay re-embarked in APA for transfer at sea.

Released APD’s and amphibious units not needed to POW rescue group for repatriation duty. Units proceeded to YOKOHAMA loaded with medical supplies, clothing and provisions.

1 September

Continuing operations from headquarters ashore in accordance with Operation Plan.

Japanese APD with Japanese troops from Marcus Island arrived Tokyo Bay, Directed to Yokohama where troops were turned over to U.S. Army. Japanese APD returned and moored with prize crew at Yokosuka Naval Base.

Completed plans for mass air display and preparations for formal surrender ceremonies on 2 September.

SAN DIEGO shifted to outside anchorage. PIEMONTE moored alongside dock and assumed service functions for forces ashore in accordance with plan.

2 September

Continuing operations from shore headquarters.

0900: Formal surrender ceremonies took place in MISSOURI (flying CinCPac-POA flag).

Released UDT teams to TF-35 for clearing of SAGAMI WAN beaches.

Completed sweeping Jap mine field by U.S.N. units. Total of 74 mines swept.

Furnished escorts, tugs and minesweeping vessel to TF-32 for landing at YOKOHAMA.

3 September – 7 September

Continued operations from headquarters ashore.
3 September - 7 September (cont'd)

Re-embarked Third Fleet Marine, Naval and British Landing Force. Loaded APA with personnel for ships not present, for transfer at sea.

Replaced shore units from ships attached to TF-31 with personnel from CruDiv 10, and permanent shore-based personnel.

Prepared KISARAZU airfield for activation by NATS.

ComTHIRDFleet shifted flag to SOUTH DAKOTA on 5 September.

Recommended that intelligence and technical experts be sent forward immediately to examine vast amounts of Japanese Naval equipment and material located in yard. Also recommended establishment of GCM at YOKOSUKA.

Continued furnishing ships, clothing and provisions to POW evacuation group.

8 September

0900(I) Task Force 31 dissolved. Relieved by Commander Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA (Commodore O.O. Kessing, U.S.N.) and ComSerDiv 102 (Commodore J.T. Acuff, U.S.N.) as SOTA Administrative.
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PART IV — Ordnance

PART V — Damage

PART VI(a) — Surface Gunnery Operations

Above parts not applicable to this report
PART VI

B. AIR OPERATIONS

1. General

With the gradual cessation of hostilities on the part of the Japanese, the primary objectives of carrier striking forces were no longer attacked. The carrier air forces thus released were made available for two primary objectives: to cover continuously every operational airfield in Japan, and, in direct support to TF 31 of cover the entrance to and occupation of the Tokyo Bay-Yokosuka area.

(a) COMBAT AIR PATROL

Combat air patrol of eight or more fighter aircraft was continuously maintained over TF 31 in Sagami Wan and in Tokyo Bay from 28 August to 5 September. No enemy airborne aircraft were encountered.

(b) DIRECT TROOP SUPPORT

Direct troop air support was furnished units landing on Futtsu Saki, at Yokosuka, Yokohama, and in the Tateyama Wan area. In addition, special air observer flights reporting directly to the Commanding General of the troops landing (CTG 31.3) were airborne continuously during landings on L and L plus 1 day.

In addition, aircraft strike groups on short notice were standing by in the carriers to furnish support as required.

(c) PRISONER-OF-WAR EVACUATION

In general support of the objective of clearing Allied Prisoners-of-war in the shortest possible time, carrier aircraft searched out and spotted POW camps and led sea-borne rescue parties.

(d) ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR FACILITIES AShore

In support of the general plan for air services and air evacuation, naval air facilities ashore were established at Yokosuka Naval Air Base by CTG 31.6.

2. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TF 31

18 August  CTG 31.6 reported Streamlined Air Base Assembly and Carrier Aircraft Service Unit (TG 31.6) ready for landing.
26 August  (L-4) TF-31 in company with TF 38. No air activity other than routine patrols and reconnaissance flights by TF 38.
27 August  (L-3 day) Routine day and night combat air patrol from TF 38 was maintained under control of TF 35 over fleet in Sagami Wan.
28 August  (L-2 day) DesDiv 106 (plus SOUTHERLAND), SAN DIEGO, GARRARD, CUMBERLAND SOUND and SUISUN entered Tokyo Harbor. Augmented combat patrol and air support groups maintained, under control of SOUTHERLAND.
30 August  (Love Day) Air observer services furnished by CTG 31.3 and CTG 31.6 while forces landed and took possession of Yokosuka Area. CTG 31.6 Airborne landed on Yokosuka Airfield and set up Streamlined Air Base.
31 August  (L plus 1 day) Eight plane combat air patrol maintained. Support from combat air patrol furnished to reconnaissance units at Tateyama Wan.
1. September (L - 2 day) continued 8 plane combat air patrol. 
2. September Conducted mass demonstration flight over MISSOURI after signing of Japanese capitulation. Conducted routine combat air patrol. 
5. September Kisarazu Field ordered activated by CTG 31.6 to handle large transports which YOKOSUKA could not handle due to short runways and high terrain surrounding field. 
8. September CTG 31.6 relieved of duty by Colonel J. C. MUNN, USMC who assumed duties of Senior Naval Aviator ashore at YOKOSUKA.

3. COMMENTS.

1. Continuous air cover is a most effective deterrent to treacherous action during the occupation phase after a surrender.
designated and equipped for the following tasks: Boat repair, Ordnance and Explosive Disposal, Boat Pool, Motor Pool, Artificer Group for machine carpenter, Electric and Metal shops and outside repair for communications, Power Plant operations, Evaporator Refrigerator and Air Compressor operation, Riggers, Locomotive operation and Diving. The boat repair and boat pool were combined to form a beach party, and since there was a separately organized boat pool their services were utilized by the Captain of the Yard. A bomb disposal was also embarked with the landing forces as well as divers unit and shortly after the landing they were being employed by shore activities for material maintenance and installation. The whole effort being to economize in the number of personnel sent ashore to lessen the burden of transport, messing and berthing. This is further exemplified by the planned changeover of the transport group commander and his staff to the SOFA Administrative Ashore in the Harbor Master's Office after the landing was secure.

The Fleet Landing Forces carried with them sufficient "K" ration for 9 meals plus five units of fire and were equipped with heavy marching order and all available landing force equipment.

(b) The Fourth Marine RCT originally designated as Task Force Able by HqThirdFibCorps, embarked at Guam on 15 August 1945, and rendezvoused with the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. The remaining units of TG 31.3 were embarked at sea from ships of the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. All troops landed on 30 August, commencing at 0538 when the Second Bn., Fourth Marines landed at Futtsu Sakl and continued through the day with the main landings taking place at YOKOSUKA commencing at 0929.

Shore Parties and Beachmasters were provided for from TG 38.3 but due to the small amount of cargo carried by the Fleet Landing Forces, they were not required to function as such and the Shore Party was more than adequately handled by the 4th Regiment S-4. By 1600 (I) of 2 September, all unloading for the entire task group was completed.

Fire support was planned for the entire operation utilizing the OBB's of Task Force 35 to cover the entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. In Tokyo Bay the SAN DIEGO and the destroyer screen were prepared to render counter battery fire and supporting bombardment as necessary. LCI(R) and LCS(L)(3) were requested and made available for close in fire support but were not able to arrive in time to cover the landings.

One of the two UDT's assigned to the task force cleared the beaches for the landing of 2nd Bn. Fourth Marines on Futtsu Sakl Island Port No. 2. The forts located there were demilitarized by the 2nd battalion. The second UDT accompanied the British Landing Force clearing the beaches at Saru Shima and Azuma Island, as required. They later did a tremendous amount of work clearing the dock areas in the Yokosuka Yard.

Due to the nature of this occupation and the excellence of the control and leadership of the engaged forces, there were no incidents of violence or casualties, although at the time of its inception it was not known that the landing would be a peaceful one and preparations were made for tending and evacuating casualties.

0.3.

In planning entry into TOKYO BAY, exact information on the location of enemy minefields was necessary as was the location of B-29-laid U.S. mines. The latter information was readily available and the location, type, and number of mines in each stick was obtained from CinCPac (Adv).
Certain areas in the approaches to TOKYO BAY had been declared restricted to shipping by the Japanese and it was reasonable to assume that mine had been laid in these areas. It was also possible that mines had been laid in other than these areas.

At the preliminary meeting with the Japanese emissaries at Manila, certain demands were made which included all information of location of enemy minefields. Also included were demands that the Japanese clear all minefields in their territorial waters. Preliminary reports received in Alpac 150 as a result of the early meeting with the Jap emissaries in Manila gave information on the location of the fields in the entrance to TOKYO BAY but this information proved incorrect by the minecharts supplied by the Jap emissaries off Sagami Wan.

Lacking definite information, plans were made to sweep and mark an entrance channel into the bay and upon completion of this task to clear the entire area of Uraga Suido. It was realized that these plans were subject to change for later information might disclose that the planned channel could not be opened due to obstructions, anti-submarine nets, shallow-planted chain-moored mines off shore-controlled minefields.

Sweeping operations were to commence on LOVE MINUS ONE day following the meeting with the Japanese emissaries which was to be held the previous day. Eventually, the above dates were advanced one day.

At the meeting, the Japanese supplied charts showing the exact location of their swept channels and the location of all minefields. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and were across the proposed entrance channel therefore necessitating a change in the sweeping plan. The shore-controlled minefields had been blown up according to their statements and this was later proved correct. All moored minefields were still in place. The Japanese had not carried out any of the sweeping which they had been ordered to accomplish prior to our arrival.

In lieu of sweeping, the proposed channel, it was decided to use the Japanese west swept channel for entrance of the forces into TOKYO BAY and accordingly, this channel was check swept to a depth of sixty feet with negative results before declaring the channel safe for entrance.

Sweeping efforts were concentrated on clearing all anchorage areas in TOKYO BAY prior to assigning ships to these berths.

Information received from the Japanese indicated that they had swept some of the B-29-laid magnetic and acoustic mines off YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA, but they had no knowledge of mines being laid in the TOKYO area. Concentrated sweeping in the YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA had negative results but three magnetic mines were swept off the entrance to TOKYO harbor.

The Japanese were ordered to clear the anti-submarine nets and the minefields in URAGA SUIDO. Operations were started on 31 August and completed on 8 September.

Investigation as to why the Japanese had not attempted to clear the minefields prior to the arrival of our forces disclosed that very few sweeps
were available to accomplish the task and in addition their sweeping methods are very crude. Our own sweeping forces could have accomplished the same amount of work in one-third the time.

Conclusions are that the best method of obtaining information on exact location of minefields in any particular area is to contact the local naval officials and make the necessary demands. The Japanese had destroyed, by burning, most of their official records. All information received from the local Japanese proved very accurate.

D. 2.

Task Force 31 communication channels afloat were used in the normal manner and were satisfactory. The change of flag-ships first from the U.S.S. IOWA (Captain Wellborn) to the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (Captain Wallan), and then to the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (Captain Robbins) was accomplished by establishing an overlap of about four hours on all Fox schedules and other circuits.

All communications remained on the flagship alongside the dock for the first day except for a temporary signal station established at the weather station at the entrance to YOKOSUKA KO which was used to relay visual traffic to ships in the anchorage.

Portable voice radio equipment furnished by ships of the Fleet to landing force parties for communication between their units and commands was found to be useless due to dead batteries. The 4th Marine RCT was able to replace most of this equipment with a similar type and satisfactory communications were maintained.

U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DD-732) (Comdr, R.C. WILLIAMS) was designated as Task Force 31 CIC Ship, and performed as Task Force CIC throughout the period of occupation. In this capacity she controlled the Combat Air Patrol, Tokyo Area, directed support aircraft, air observers, transient aircraft and mass demonstration aircraft. The Naval gun fire control circuit with all support groups was set up and ready. For a protracted period she had full radar and air control responsibility for the entire Tokyo Area and for Task Force 31. Evaluated information was passed by radio voice direct to CTF 31 in the flagship. It is considered that her mission was accomplished in an outstandingly efficient manner, and one that reflected great credit on the ship and on her CIC organization.

On Love plus one day a visual station using two 12-inch signal lights was established on a hill in back of the Task Force Commander's Headquarters building. All ships in the anchorage were in visual range of this station. Later a Japanese 24-inch signal searchlight was moved to this signal station and put in operation. The signal station was connected by field telephone direct to the TF communication center. Portable radio equipment was set up at the communication center in the Naval Headquarters building and all voice circuits were used from there.

Coding work was done on the flagship (SAN DIEGO, later PIEDMONT) and traffic was delivered to the TF communication center by officer messenger. A private field telephone line was established between the CWO on the flag-
ship and the CWO at the TF communication center.

The 4th Marine RCT signal section established telephone service between CTF 31 Headquarters and all units and commands ashore. The use of this telephone circuit immediately cut down the amount of voice radio traffic necessary.

Japanese radio transmitters and receivers located underground in back of the TF Headquarters were checked and set up on various naval frequencies and keying lines run to the communication center. It was decided no to use these circuits because the coding room and equipment were not moved ashore from the flagship.

Communications in all phases were satisfactory in spite of the many obstacles encountered in an amphibious operation. None of the communication personnel used in this operation except the 4th Marine RCT have had any previous experience in amphibious communications.

D. 6.

The tentative logistic planning for the occupation of the Naval Shore Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, began on 10 August 1945. After thorough consideration of the many elements involved both ashore and afloat, it was decided to support all forces ashore from units afloat utilizing the existing organization of the U.S.S. FIEDMONT (AD17) (Captain F.L. ROBINS, USN). This plan proved highly successful. Warning orders were transmitted to Commander Task Group 30.3 (ComServRon 6) (Rear Admiral D.B. BEARY, USN) advising the anticipated support required and to the U.S.S. FIEDMONT (AD 17) in order that this ship could plan and be prepared to assume the duties of RepServPac in accordance with the Logistic Plan.

The provision for an adequate supply of water, food, and berthing facilities for the landing force, plus gasoline and lubricants for aircraft, rolling stock, and small boats, presented a major problem. In addition to these difficulties, provision had to be made to insure the delivery of all supplies in the face of enemy resistance. These items were essential for the support of the occupation, but a problem of equal or greater importance concerned the availability of an ample supply of special foods, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, medical supplies, and sundry items for all Allied Prisoners-of-War expected to be liberated in the Yokosuka Area.

Although the responsibility for handling these Repatriates was later assigned to Commander Task Group 30.6 (Commodore R.W. Simpson, USN), the planning and foresight in providing these supplies enabled Commander Task Force 31 to render substantial and immediate aid to the evacuation group in the form of food, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, tobacco, cigarettes, candy, and many other urgently needed items on short notice. These items were made available to 5000 persons under naval jurisdiction plus an additional 5000 Repatriates being serviced from the American Red Cross Canteens in the Yokohama area.

Upon the formation of CTF 31, all units were topped off with fuel and provisions at sea. The maximum possible levels were maintained prior to
entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay in order to avoid the necessity of fueling or replenishing at anchor during the initial stages of the occupation.

The Logistic Plan was followed in detail from the initial stages of this operation. RepServPac in the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD7) utilized the existing supply organization of the U.S.S. PIEDMONT, augmented by a Pel Officer assigned to the U.S.S. NECHES (AO67) (Comdr. H.G. HANSEN, Jr., USNR). This organization provided adequate and prompt support to the landing force in the form of food, water, clothing, and equipment necessary to establish messes ashore. Ten thousand POW outfits were assembled by the U.S.S. LESUTH (AKL25) (Comdr. B.H. BASSET, USNR) and the U.S.S. CYBELE (AKS10) (Lt. Comdr. J.H. CHURCH, Jr. USNR), and were made available to CTF 30.6 and the American Red Cross.

During the first two days of occupation, the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (CL(AA) 53) (Capt. W.E.A. MULLAN, USN) provided all emergency issues of food, clothing, water, and particularly cleaning materials which were urgently needed in policing and rendering office and living spaces habitable. A two-inch fresh water hose was run from the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO to the dock, providing an adequate supply of fresh water for replenishment of the landing forces.

All landing forces came ashore in an amphibious landing status. In order to provide hot food, the necessary galley and mess gear was issued on the second day. Through improvisation and ingenuity, this equipment was put to good use and hot meals were served in local messes on L-PLUS THREE day. Japanese messing facilities and equipment were either non-existent or exceedingly inferior to standard U.S. Navy equipment. The Japanese equipment encountered consisted of usually a charcoal range and a few rice kettles which were left in a depleted and unsanitary condition. The galley and mess spaces were filthy and no possible use. Extensive alteration and renovation would have been required plus the installation of new stoves, ovens, mixers, sinks, etc., before they would meet the minimum sanitary standards. In view of these conditions, and the pressing need for hot food, stoves were improvised in the open near the barracks. Bread was provided by the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO, U.S.S. OAKLAND, and U.S.S. PIEDMONT. The U.S.S. PIEDMONT provided one meal per day during the initial stages of occupation for 750 men and officers attached to the naval landing force.

Water ashore was rendered potable by chlorination, and it was not necessary to utilize the 4 million gallons of fresh water in the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS (AOW96) (Commander C.C. EDEN, USNR). However, the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS rendered valuable assistance to the support forces. Tokyo Bay is contaminated, thus preventing the distillation of drinking water in low pressure evaporators in ships at anchor.

Post Offices and a movie exchange were established in LST 648 (Lt. Comdr. C.L. RABELL, USNR) and LST 576 (Lt. S.W. HEARNS, USNR).

In general, it may be said that the execution of all details of this operation was facilitated by the advance planning and foresight given to the preparation. Sufficient quantities of all items were available when required and issued on schedule.
E. 1.

(1) **GENERAL PLAN** - Conforming to the basic premise that Task Force THIRTY-ONE was to occupy the YOKOSUKA Area for a very short time, using the minimum amount of personnel and gear necessary for the purpose from the component units of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, the basic intelligence plan was to have the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE locate as much information and material as possible within the limited time of operations, leaving analysis and study for the Intelligence Organization and Technical teams of the permanent occupation forces.

(2) **INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PLANNING AND ORGANIZING PERIOD.**

Owing to the fact that there was no adequate photographic and map coverage of the area of occupation, it has been necessary to procure new photography and reproduce existing photographs, and to have photographic interpretation reports based on such photography. These services were in the main furnished by Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT and the carriers in an unbelievably short time and were of the greatest help. In addition, the Commander Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT offered and made available the services of one of his staff photo interpreters who was of great assistance in processing late photographs as they were delivered. The sudden capitulation of the Japanese found us without grid maps and photo mosaics in quantity for the use of the landing forces, in going ashore for gunfire and aerial support. The Advance Intelligence Center, Guam, particularly the 64th Engineering Topographical Battalion and Interpreters TWO did a magnificent job in getting this material out in a period of 36 hours. Several conferences were held aboard ship while at sea between the Staff Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer for the landing forces. These proved to be of great value. It is regretted that a conference of all intelligence officers engaged in the operation could not have also been held, but it was prohibited by the heavy load on communications and ship to ship transportation incident to the unparalleled feat of organizing and assembling a large Amphibious Force and Naval Base from units of the Fleet while engaged in operations at sea. When Task Force THIRTY-ONE was organized, 3 intelligence officers, 1 Photo Interpretation Officer, 1 Language Officer, and 3 Yeomen were collected from different ships and brought to the Flagship. In addition, 20 Language Officers from the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor were distributed among the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE while at sea.

(3) **INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF OCCUPATION**

As soon as the landing began, two of the Staff Intelligence Officers went ashore and made a brief inspection of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, the Battleship NAGATO and the Japanese shipping craft present in the harbor. The day after the landings the Staff Intelligence Office was moved ashore. Intelligence activities of the Landing Force, Naval Air Activities, SOCA Administrative, Submarine Demilitarization Group, and Naval Shore Activities commenced immediately the huge task of locating all intelligence information and materials. Outstanding was the performance of the only Technical Intelligence Team in the area, a Technical Air Intelligence Unit, which uncovered much valuable information and equipment, especially of and concerning rocket and jet-propelled aircraft. In the same category was the work done by representatives of ComAnPac in securing information on Japanese mines and minefields. Splendid performances were also turned in by O-2 Section of TG 31.3 in locating Japanese forces, guns, and defensive installations, and in liaison activities with the Japanese, by
TG 31.8 on Japanese shipping, by TG 31.9 on Japanese submarines and by TG 31.7 on explosives and ordnance. One of the outstanding features of the operation from an intelligence standpoint was the complete absence of classified documents. The Japanese say these were destroyed prior to the occupation, but it has been noted that when pressed for information the Japanese produce it, stating they get it from the TOKYO Headquarters. It appears that most of their personal acquaintance with the facts can be produced for interrogation, which has thus far been quite productive of the desired information.

(5) RECOMMENDATIONS.
Owing to the necessity of getting ashore quickly it was not considered practicable to bring forward Technical Intelligence teams to go ashore with the landing forces, but it is recommended that all types of teams be sent immediately to analyze, examine, and report on the vast amount of all kinds of naval material located by the forces under Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

E. 2.

Completed information has been submitted in a special report, "Yokosuka Naval Base Confidential Survey Report," A17/CTF 31 Serial 01 dated 3 September 1945; a brief summary follows:

Industrial facilities, Yokosuka Navy Yard. This Navy Yard is a large shipbuilding and repair yard capable of the construction and maintenance of any class of naval vessel. At its maximum capacity, about 75,000 persons were employed in the yard, although this figure had been reduced to 40,000 during the past year. This reduction was occasioned by the cessation of all ship-building except midget submarines and a lack of ships to overhaul.

As to the physical plant, the following comments are made:

(a) There are fine shipways, one of which is large enough for a BB. All are operational except #4, of which the underwater ways are collapsed. For the past several months, the ways have been used exclusively for the fabrication and assembly of midget submarines.

(b) There are six dry docks, all of which are operational except #6. The main pump motors of this dock have suffered water damage, but can be repaired. All dry docks except #6 are empty and ready for use if desired. Dry dock #6 has been used as a building dock, and contains two partially completed DD's plus a large amount of miscellaneous materials.

(c) Bomb damage to yard is slight; capacity of yard is not affected.

(d) Maintenance of shop buildings and equipment is very poor. Also the outside areas of the yard are badly cluttered up with scrap, lumber, small sheds, miscellaneous equipment from heavy ships, and piles of rubble removed in digging caves.

(e) Waterfront and dockside cranes are adequate and in good condition.

(f) About half the light shop equipment necessary for production of midget submarines has been moved into underground shops.
All the time of the occupation, the following Japanese naval vessels were present:

1 - BB - NAGATO
1 - CA - FUJI
6 - DD - Second line vessels.
9 - SS -
6 - Numbered transports.
130 - SS (midget)
2 - Minelayers
1 - Collier - SOYA
Miscellaneous auxiliaries and small craft.

The NAGATO had suffered underwater and topside damage during the bombing attack of 18 July 1945, but only tentative steps had been taken for repairing her. The ship has not been docked, therefore, the extent of the underwater damage is not known. Three bomb hits topside demolished the navigating bridge and resulted in extensive damage to the superstructure and top hamper in the area of the mainmast and stack. The top of the mainmast and upper part of the stack had been removed preliminary to repairs.

The DD’s and miscellaneous vessels at the base were, for the most part, operational, but appeared to have been immobilized for some time. These ships had been demilitarized prior to the occupation.

All submarines had been demilitarized prior to the occupation and were taken over by CTG 31.9 without incident. The midget submarines were new, and were evidently being readied for use against any invasion fleet.

E. 3. SPECIAL COMMENT

While the occasion, fortunately, never arose for the use of force, it is noteworthy to mention that all preliminary planning was based on the well-known characteristic for treachery exhibited by the Japanese in past operations, and that strong opposition by organized military factions was likely.

Each operation was carefully covered by main battery, secondary battery and where applicable by small ship armament including rockets and automatic weapons. Air support, air reconnaissance, air photography and spotting were carefully planned for and co-ordinated. Heavy ship fire support from other Task Forces was also made available and alerted for the first sign of opposition.

Comment is also made here on the meticulous economy in the use of personnel. Forced by operating conditions to draw officers and men from ships at sea still engaged in alerted combat status, officers and men were assigned dual positions. They were initially assigned to tasks while afloat and in the approach and landing phases, and assumed other assignments as soon as the landing was established.
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PART VII - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel engaged in this operation was of highest order and in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service.

There were no casualties. No incidents of violence occurred which reflects the high standard of discipline and leadership during this occupation of enemy territory where various armed factions were present.
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PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

When it is considered that this operation was without precedent, unique in its conception; and that all planning and preliminary organization was done at sea, necessitating the transfer of personnel and material by breeches buoys and whips; the high order of the personnel performance is a credit to the ingenuity, tenacity and ability of officers and men of the U.S. Navy to overcome difficulties and handicaps imposed by the prevailing conditions.

There are no further recommendations.
EX-HIJMS NAGATO

5 September 1945.

From: Commanding Officer, Ex-HIJMS NAGATO.
To: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE (CombatDiv7).

Subject: Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO.

Reference: (a) CTF 31 (CBD 7) ltr., serial 2, of 29 August 1945.
(b) Memo to Condr. T. J. Flynn, of 29 August 1945.
(c) CTF 31 despatch 030925, of September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Roster of boarding party. P. 34
(B) Roster of Japanese aboard HIJMS NAGATO. P. 37
(C) List of ship's plans and papers. P. 38
(D) Ordnance and gunnery report. P. 39
(E) Engineering report. P. 41
(F) Damage and C&R report. P. 43

1. In accordance with orders contained in reference (a), I assumed command of the nucleus crews from the USS SOUTH DAKOTA (enclosure A), on 29 August 1945, for the purpose of taking possession and controlling HIJMS NAGATO moored in YOKOSUKA Inner Harbor, Japan. The crews were embarked in USS HORACE A. BASS (APD124), and were organized and briefed immediately for accomplishment of the task assigned.

2. In accordance with reference (b), the USS BASS went alongside the port side of the NAGATO at 0800, the ship being at general quarters. The ship's boats preceded the BASS for the purpose of cutting any telephone or other lines from NAGATO to shore. The boarding party boarded the NAGATO at 0805, 30 August 1945. Captain Sugino of the NAGATO, seven commissioned officers, three warrant officers, 13 enlisted men and one civilian Japanese interpreter (enclosure B), were formed in two ranks on the main deck of the NAGATO abreast Turret III. All were unarmed. Upon boarding, Captain Sugino stepped forward and saluted.

3. Captain Sugino was ordered to haul down the Japanese flag, and the U.S. ensign and jack were hoisted at 0810 with appropriate ceremony. The Japanese flag was delivered to Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

4. Guards were posted at various positions on the topside and inspection parties for turrets, magazines, engine spaces, lower decks, etc., proceeded with inspections immediately and were accompanied by at least one Japanese officer or man.

5. The captain was questioned as to the condition of the ship and with the help of various Japanese officers furnished the information indicated in the enclosures. Captain Sugino did not appear very familiar with the details of the ship and the other officers appeared vague. It is believed that the captain and officers listed were assigned to the ship after she was damaged with the exception of the Assistant Gunnery Officer and they may have been assigned merely for the purpose of turning over the ship. The enlisted men were familiar with the ship and furnished valuable information and aid.
5 September 1945.

Subject: Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO.

6. No opposition of any kind was encountered. At no time was any antagonism, resentment, arrogance or passive resistance encountered; both officers (including the captain) and men displaying a very meek and subservient attitude. It seemed almost incredible that these bowing, scraping, scared men were the same brutal, sadistic enemies who had tortured our prisoners, reports of whose plight were being received the same day. It is considered that the Japanese met all the terms given to them for the surrender of the NAGATO by Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE with the few exceptions noted, all of which are not considered serious. They have been very cooperative in furnishing information and assistance.

7. Ship's plans and other documents (enclosure (C)) were turned over to me and other unidentified papers were found later and retained. A tour of the ship was made in company with Captain Sugino after which he and 4 officers, 4 enlisted men and the interpreter (enclosure (B)) were sent ashore to the Naval Base, YOKOSUKA, under guard and turned over to Marine military police. The remainder of the Japanese were kept aboard for assistance in technical matters.

8. The USS BASS remained alongside the NAGATO up to date of this report and furnished berthing and messing facilities for the nucleus crew. The officers and crew of the BASS were very cooperative in furnishing technical assistance and material for carrying out the assigned task. Technical personnel from the USS IOWA was also furnished when requested. There were no engineering or QM Artificers with the SOUTH DAKOTA crews; such men being furnished by the BASS and IOWA.

9. On 4 September 1945, the ship got underway and was towed to Buoy #8, YOKOSUKA Harbor.

10. At 0800, 5 September 1945, I was relieved by the Commanding Officer of the USS DELTA, in accordance with reference (c). Ship's plans and other papers (enclosure (C)) were turned over to the commanding officer.

11. It is recommended that pending decision as to ultimate disposition of the NAGATO, a board be appointed to examine the ship in detail as to construction, ordnance and fire control and engineering.

/s/ T. J. FLYNN.

ENCLOSURE (K)
The following officers and men comprised the boarding party of the NAGATO:

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>T.J. Flynn</td>
<td>61363</td>
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### Officers and men of boarding party (cont'd)

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Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO
4 September 1945.

LIST OF JAPANESE ABOARD AT TIME OF BOARDING:

Officers:

Captain
# *Lieut. Comdr.
# *Lieut.
# *Lieut.
# *2nd Lieut.
2nd Lieut.
Ens.
# *Ens.
Warrant
Warrant
# *Warrant

S. Sugino
S. Okuda
O. Nakamura
S. Mine
M. Kuzuu
H. Kakuta
S. Nakamura
O. Sato
F. Fujino
K. Usui
Y. Kawati

Gunnery Officer.
Engineering Officer.
Electrical Officer.
Ass't. Gunnery Officer.
Main Engine Officer.
Communication Officer.
Boiler Division Officer.
Sub Communication Officer.
Paymaster
Electrician.

Enlisted Men:

K. Suzuki
S. Nakano
#S. Yamazaki
#K. Murakami
#A. Ishizawa
K. Aizawa
#S. Suwabe
#K. Nakamura
#S. Okushima
#H. Endo.
#D. Arai.
#N. Misono.
#S. Tahashima

Seaman.
Seaman.
Engineer
Seaman.
Seaman.
Engineer.
Seaman.
Engineer
Seaman.
Engineer.

Interpreter (Civilian)

Brought on board from Bass:

Shibata
$Murase

Interpreter.
Pilot.

* Retained on board. Others left ship under guard at 1100 on 30 August 1945.
# Left ship at 1500 4 September 1945.
$ Returned to USS Horace A. Bass.
EX - H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

The following is a list of papers and ship's plans turned over by the Captain of the Nagato. Other miscellaneous papers found upon inspection are not listed.

12 blue prints (arrangement of each deck, outboard and inboard profiles, sectional plans, principle dimensions).

Three catalogues of armament, list of medical supplies, report of damage, present condition of ship, and tactical data.
ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY REPORT:

1. The following is a synopsis of the condition of the ordnance and gunnery material aboard the Ex-H.I.J.M.S., NAGATO as reported and as verified by preliminary inspection.

MAIN BATTERY:

1. There are 8 - 40 centimeter guns aboard in four turrets. Firing locks have been removed from the guns, 15 being stowed below. In all other respects it is believed the turrets are operable, with minor exceptions.

2. Main battery ammunition is aboard as follows:

   Turret I    124 H.C. and 153 A.P. projectiles.
   Turret II   62 H.C. and 106 A.P.
   Turret III  80 H.C. and 138 A.P.
   Turret IV   111 H.C. and 122 A.P.

3. The H.C. projectiles are fitted with dummy nose plugs. The A.P. are fitted with dummy internal base fuzes.

4. There is no 40 centimeter powder aboard. There are approximately 20 boxes of primers aboard.

SECONDARY AND A.A. BATTERIES:

1. There are no secondary or A.A. guns aboard, having been removed in navy yard.

2. The battery consisted of 18 single 14 centimeter guns and 12, 12-7 centimeter A.A. guns in twin mounts.

3. There is no secondary or A.A. ammunition aboard.

Machine Guns:

1. There are 36, 25 millimeter guns in operating condition unmounted and stowed in starboard gun room frame 157.

2. One twin mount damaged is mounted above navigation bridge. Two triple mounts are located on top of turret two, badly damaged and rusted.

3. There are 16,561 rounds of ammunition for these guns located in two magazines:

   07301 (frame 85) 12873 rounds. (midships)
   07515 (frame 85) 3688 rounds. (port)

Directors:

1. One main battery director is aboard located above the
U.S.S. Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

DIRECTORS (Cont.)

"Navigation Bridge amidships.

2. One main battery director removed from top level of Pagoda structure.

3. One main battery director removed from after superstructure.

4. Six secondary battery directors are aboard, two badly damaged. Two A.A. (12.7) directors aboard are stripped. Seven 25 millimeter directors installed and operable.

PLOTING ROOM:

1. One main battery and two secondary battery plotting rooms apparently in operating condition.
U.S.S. Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945

ENGINEERING REPORT

The following is a synopsis of the condition of the engineering plant of the NAGATO as reported by the Japanese, and as verified by preliminary inspection:

1. The general condition of the engineering plant is good. Some electrical motors are out of commission, but all vital machinery seems usable.

2. Boilers: There are six small boilers and four large boilers arranged in four firerooms. The four large boilers are filled to steaming level and can be used. The firesides of small boilers are open. The tubes seem clean. The six small boilers are dry. Fireroom auxiliaries seem to be in good condition. Number ten boiler has been lighted off three times and has operated satisfactorily. An open type feed system is used with hot well and feed heater. The condensate and boiler feed system has been traced and used. There are 11,900 gallons of feed water in the main feed tanks. There are 11,300 gallons of water in auxiliary feed tanks of which 7000 are considered usable. Steam has been led to auxiliary loop to anchor engine from ten boilers. No major leaks have been discovered, but there are many minor steam leaks.

3. Electrical Power: There are four 250 kilowatt direct current turbo generators and one 200 kilowatt direct current 225 volt Diesel generator aboard. The Diesel generator has been running for light and power. Five hundred gallons of Diesel fuel have been received from the U.S.S. HORACE A. BASS, and there are now approximately 2200 gallons (of a capacity of 12,000 gallons) aboard. It is estimated that this will be sufficient for four days operation until suction is lost. The Diesel generator has never been run for more than two days continuously. Number two turbo - generator has been started and taken the whole load satisfactorily for one hour (400 amps), and also has been paralleled with the Diesel generator. Number one generator seems in good condition. Number three generator needs some drain line repairs to the turbine. Number four generator has no ventilation due to damaged trunk. The three distribution boards seem to be in good condition, and the majority of circuits on number one board (control) have been checked out. The voltage from Diesel generator has been controlled both locally and from number one distribution board satisfactorily. No difficulty is anticipated in running the generators or the electrical system. There are some A.C. boards supplied with power from motor generators (for L.C., fire control, etc.), which have not been checked out.

4. Main Engines: There are four main engines of 20,000 H.P. each. They are cross-compound Westinghouse turbines with air pumps carrying a vacuum of about 28". Maximum speed is 24.5 knots, (cruising speed 12 knots with fuel consumption of about - estimated - of 30,000 gallons per day. All engines are in good condition and probably can be run. The shafts do not seem to be out of line.

5. Evaporators: There are two sets of high pressure evaporators, maximum capacity of about 600 gallons an hour each. Work is underway, lighting these off.
6. **Fire and Flushing System:** There are ten electric pumps aboard, of which three are out of commission and would require extensive repairs. Five pumps would require repair work. Only two pumps are in satisfactory condition; it is possible to maintain a pressure of 70 psi on the fire main with two pumps. The fire main loop has been completely checked, and pressure is being maintained on all parts of the system.

7. **Fuel Oil:** It is estimated that there are 17,000 gallons of useable fuel oil on board, in eight tanks. All other tanks are ballasted as far as is known. It is reported that removal of ballast was accomplished by use of compressed air; the details of deballasting are not yet known. It is reported that the starboard wing tanks are leaking, but it has not yet been possible to determine the extent of damage.

8. **Communications:** The telephone systems have been in commission and have been tested from conn to steering aft, and on several circuits through the main switchboard in telephone exchange. There is a public address system which has been tested and is in working order.

9. **Steering Engines:** The steering engines are hydraulic-electric and are in excellent condition. There are two motors in each of the two steering engine rooms, and they can operate the rudder singly or in any combination. Steering has been checked from upper and lower conn and from each of the steering rooms.

10. **Anchor Windless:** The anchor windless is a reciprocating steam engine and has been operated to walk out and hoist anchor chain.

11. **Sanitary Facilities:** The heads are flushed by a gravity feed system from tanks in the superstructure, filled, by means of the fire main. One head forward on main deck is in operation. No work has been attempted on the fresh water system. The capacity of the fresh water tanks is approximately 39,000 gallons. The capacity of the reserve feed tanks, less the hot well, is approximately 49,000 gallons. The Japanese reported that the shafts have not been bent, and that the propellers are not damaged. This condition has not been checked.

**SUMMARY:** No difficulty should arise in operating the engineering plant if provisions can be made for taking fuel aboard and checking the tanks which are reported to be leaky. The machinery except for some electric motors, shows excellent care.
EX-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

DAMAGE AND C&R REPORT.

It was reported by the captain of the NAGATO that the ship sustained a near miss off the port bow during October 1944 in the vicinity of Corregidor. This has opened up a hole approximately twenty feet long at frame Ten which has been patched with fifteen pound plate twenty feet by ten feet. The work is of very poor quality and there are numerous open seams and rivet holes. The frames are weak and would not withstand a heavy sea. The bottom of the plate is three feet above the water line.

Three direct hits and sixty near misses were sustained during the July 18th raid on Yokosuka. Two hits on the Pagada structure demolished the bridge ex-05 level. However the tripods are not damaged and other levels were not damaged.

One hit just forward of turret three (ex-wardroom) detonated on the main deck blowing a hole in it and demolishing the overhead (catapult structure) and bulkheads. The main deck hole has been patched with concrete by the Japanese. Bulkheads on the main deck were blown away in the area some forty feet forward of detonation.

The sixty near misses were reported by the Japanese to have opened up all blister and some double bottom fuel tanks on the port side between turrets two and three. Two thirds of all fuel tanks are flooded carrying approximately 2000 tons of water. This had not been verified.

The ship is on an even keel.

Draft forward, feet, Aft, feet.

The fire and flushing system has ten electrical pumps five of which are operable. One pump is sufficient to maintain a pressure of ninety pounds on the system. These pumps can also be used as drain pumps.

There is one anchor aboard (starboard) and two anchor chains. The anchor windlass and winches on the forecastle are operable.

There are no satisfactory sanitary facilities aboard. There are no adequate cocking, messing or berthing facilities aboard.
U.S.S. IOWA, THIRD FLEET,
FLAGSHIP COMMANDER TASK FORCE 31,
27 August 1945.

ORDER

1. The Naval Station and Naval Air Station at Yokosuka shall be closed down as specified in the directive of Commander THIRD Fleet delivered to Japanese representatives this date. Except as noted herein, the Naval, military, and civilian population within the limits of these stations shall, by 1800, on 29 August 1945, be reduced to the following:

   (a) The Commandant First Naval District (Commandant Yokosuka Naval Air Base) and nucleus administrative staff organization (to be English-speaking, or provided with interpreters for those that are not English-speaking). This staff is to comprise administrative assistants as necessary to control under the direction of Allied occupation authorities, the various departments of the Naval establishment. A staff organization setting forth the names, rank and duties of each officer involved shall be submitted to CTF 31 for his approval prior to noon, 28 August 1945.

   (b) A Captain of the Navy and an Army officer of corresponding rank shall meet the Commanding General of the Naval Landing Force at a time and place on 30 August as specified by the Commander of the Naval Landing Force.

   (c) Necessary personnel (minimum in number) to continue operation of all essential public utilities, including power, light, water, telephone, fire department, gas (if used), hospitals, sanitation (including garbage collection) until these functions are taken over by Allied personnel. In this connection a report is to be submitted to CTF 31 by noon, 28 August, by the Commandant Yokosuka Naval District, considered by him to be the minimum required for the intended purpose.

   (d) Minimum personnel (not to exceed fifteen (15) officers and one hundred fifty (150) men). Provide shipkeepers, and technical personnel necessary to turn over to Allied control and assist in the inspection and taking over of any ships, submarines, midget submarines, boats, and auxiliary craft of all types.

   (e) Drivers for passenger cars and trucks (one for each) required to be delivered to U.S. authorities.

   (f) Essential communication key personnel to turn over in good order the station radio facilities and essential key personnel to operate the telephone system, telephone switchboards (English-speaking operators) and all airfield radio and signalling equipment for handling aircraft from the field (The Commandant of the Naval District shall prior to noon 28 August submit for approval of CTF 31 a report indicating the number of personnel considered essential to these purposes.

- 1 -

ENCLOSURE (L)
(g) Guides and interpreters to be made available on the day of occupation at time and place to be specified by Commanding General Naval Landing Force - fifteen (15) at Navy Yard and ten (10) at Naval Air Station.

2. At the time specified for the U.S. Naval occupation, the above personnel shall be wholly disarmed and shall remain at stations as designated in paragraph 3, this order, until otherwise directed by U.S. authorities, or assembled in ranks under own officers outside of their assigned barracks. Civilian personnel shall wear white cloth bands for quick identification and all personnel shall carry positive means of identification at all times. All personnel shall be quartered within the Naval establishment in accommodations as submitted by the Commandant of the First Naval District and approved by CIF 31 or his representative.

3. The disposition of above personnel at the time of occupation shall be as follows:

(a) Commandant and one (1) Staff Officer shall await the arrival of Commander Task Force 31, and the Chief of Staff Commander THIRD Fleet, at a point on the waterfront to be specified later. The remainder of the headquarters staff personnel shall remain in a body at the Naval District Headquarters.

(b) As indicated in paragraph one (1).

(c) Personnel essential to the operation of public utilities shall be at their stations, others shall be assembled at their designated barracks.

(d) Police, guards, and caretakers are to be at their stations outside of buildings, and shall remain on station until relieved by Allied Forces. (Magazines and Storage Buildings are to be locked, but access is to be available to Allied Forces by key in the possession of local guard). Further employment and disposition of this group shall be as directed by the Commanding General, Allied Landing Force.

(e) One (1) officer and two (2) shipkeepers shall be on board each naval or auxiliary vessel moored separately and the same number at each nest of small craft. Others in this group shall be assembled at a point to be designated later to report to designated officers of the Allied Landing Force for duties as they may direct.

(f) Passenger cars and trucks shall be assembled at points specified in enclosures with each driver alongside of, but outside of, his vehicle. They shall be employed as directed by U.S. authority.

(g) One watch stationed at the radio station, telephone switchboards and at airfield radio and signal stations. Others watches assembled at designated barracks until otherwise directed by Allied Authority.

ENCLOSURE (L)
(h) Fifteen (15) officer interpreters shall meet the Naval Landing Force and report to the senior Allied officer at a point on the Navy Yard waterfront to be designated later. Ten (10) officer interpreters shall perform the same functions at the south seaplane ramps at the Yokosuka Naval air Station.
4. The following action by Japanese authorities shall be completed and fully effective by 1800, 29 August 1945 or as otherwise specified herein

(a) **Navigation:**

1. Make twenty (20) pilots immediately available and ready to report on board U. S. pilot vessel at a time and place to be later designated.

2. Deliver to CTF 31, or designated agent, 10 complete sets of local charts with all data, complete and up-to-date.

3. Have all lighthouses, beacons, and other navigational aids in the Sagami Wan, and in Tokyo and its approaches in full operation on a peace time basis at once.

4. Channel and approach buoys to be placed as well as buoys indicating all obstructions.

5. Complete report of berths, anchor buoys, telephone buoys, and anchorages clear and available for use in the area of occupation and contiguous waters (to be submitted to CTF 31, prior to 1000 on 28 August 1945).

6. Clear alongside berths at piers, jetties, etc., as possible to accommodate the maximum number of allied ships within the area of occupation.

7. Submit sounding data covering the approaches to, and the water area alongside all workable piers and jetties.

(b) **Ships and Craft:**

1. Make report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 (including 10 charts) giving exact location of ships present, including all ships, submarines, boats and craft of all kinds as of 1800, 29 August 1945.

2. All ships and craft of all kinds shall be demilitarized and rendered ineffective, in accordance with previous instructions (removal of all explosives, demilitarization of all offensive armament).

3. All personnel shall be removed except as specified and approved by CTF 31.

4. All submarines shall be nested together. All midget submarines shall be placed in dry dock.

5. All small craft shall be hauled out of the water or nested afoot in not more than three groups in localities to be submitted by the Commandant of the First Naval District and approved by CTF 31. These nests shall not foul any ship berth of over fourteen (14) feet alongside.
(b) Ships and Craft: (Cont'd)

(6) Complete descriptive report shall be made to CTF 31 prior to 1000 on 28 August 1945 of all ships, boats, tugs, barges, or craft of any kind which are operational and of which may readily be made operational. This report shall include small boats adaptable for use as Admiral's barges, gigs, and ship's boats. The type of fuel used shall be specified.

(7) A special group of fifteen (15) operational picket boats, MTB's, or equivalent craft shall be assembled and made ready for immediate use by Allied Naval Forces. (Engineers shall be available among the required group of technicians for duty in the preliminary operation of these vessels).

(8) All camouflage shall be from all ships, boats, piers, or other waterfront installations.

(c) Coast Defenses:

(1) Make report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 (including 10 charts) giving exact location of all coast defense guns, AA guns, torpedo tubes, and any other defensive installations (including ammunition storages) within range of ships operating in Sagami Wan, or Tokyo Bay, or its approaches.

(2) Each of the above installations shall be clearly marked with a white flag in a manner and size so as to be clearly visible from seaward at a distance of four miles off shore.

(3) All personnel, (naval, military, or civilian) to be forbidden the area near these installations (except for guards essential to the safeguarding of magazines).

(4) All guns to be demilitarized by the removal of breech-blocks which are to be collected and locked up in storage within the area of occupation and turned over to the Allied Forces.

(5) All personnel shall be removed from Island Forts #1, #2, and #3, (except one English-speaking guide on each) and from the fortifications at Puttau Skid (except 8 English-speaking guides). The guides shall meet Allied forces about 0600 on 30 August 1945 and conduct them to defense emplacements for inspection of the condition of guns and other defense installations.

(6) Remove all nets and camouflage on all installations.

(d) Communications:

(1) Deliver radio station JME, Yokosuka Radio, ready for operation in all respects, including an adequate supply of spare parts.
(d) Communications: (Cont'd)

(2) All signal stations shall be fully ready for operation.

(3) Telephone system and telephone exchange manned and ready for operation (with English-speaking operator at the switchboard).

(4) All other communications stations and systems to be delivered, ready for operation in all respects, but with operation discontinued pending further orders from Allied authorities.

(5) Establish and maintain direct telephone communication to Atsugi Airfield (Allied Headquarters).

e) Shore Transportation:

1. Automotive transportation in first-class working order and fully ready for operation shall be made available and ready in the vicinity of the Naval Barracks, Yokosuka Navy Yard, or in the vicinity of the air field hangars at the Yokosuka air field in the number and type specified below:

(a) Yokosuka Naval Station.

- 8 high-class limousine body automobiles
- 10 sedans
- 10 passenger buses
- *20 trucks (heavy-duty)
- *30 light trucks
- 2 wrecking cars
- 4 ambulances
- 4 gasoline trucks (500 gals. or larger)
- 8 water trucks (500 gals. or larger)

*All of these may be 2 to 2½ tons capacity.

(b) Naval Air Station Yokosuka.

- 6 fully operational aircraft handling tractors
- 2 wrecking cranes - 60,000# lift
- 6 gasoline trucks - pumping capacity 1000 gals.
- 6 oil dollys - capacity 200 gals. each
- 4 passenger buses
- 1 ambulance
- 5 limousines
- 4 heavy-duty trucks
- 6 light trucks
- 4 water trucks (500 gals. or larger)

all available fire-fighting apparatus
(f) Offices, Officers Quarters, Barracks, Messing:

A. Office Space:

1. Provide and make available all existing office space in a clean and readily operable condition. Telephones to be connected, clerical supplies to be on hand, furniture to be in good repair; in general ready to be immediately used.

2. Specific facilities must exist or be provided to accommodate:

   (a) The Commander Occupation Force and his staff of 150 officers and men.

   (b) The Commander of the THIRD Fleet, U.S. Navy, and staff of 15-20 officers and 30-40 men.

   (c) The Commander Naval Shore Activities Yokosuka Naval Base and staff of 30 officers and 60 men.

B. Living Quarters:

1. Flag Officers:

   (a) All existing high ranking officers quarters shall be clean, furnished, in good repair, and ready for occupancy for ranking flag officers of the U.S. Fleet.

   (b) There must be three separate establishments to accommodate any or all of the following:

       (1) The Commander Naval Occupation Force Yokosuka.

       (2) The Commander THIRD Fleet, U.S. Navy.

       (3) The Commander Naval Shore Activities.

   (c) Each of the above shall be fully equipped for immediate occupancy.

2. Officers:

   (a) All existing officers quarters assigned to officers of the rank of commander and above shall be prepared for immediate occupancy by Allied Naval and Army Officers. They shall be scrupulously clean, fully equipped, and ready for immediate occupancy.

   (b) Suitable accommodations must be provided for 500 officers on the Yokosuka Naval Station. Accommodations are necessary for 50 officers at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.
(c) The existing officers mess shall be made ready for immediate use. It shall be clean, equipped with necessary utensils, service, china, with stowage places, and refrigerator spaces in a completely sanitary condition.

(d) The officers mess, specifically, must be ready to feed 500 officers in a wholesome, clean, and satisfactory manner.

(e) All existing officers clubs shall be made ready for immediate use by Allied officers. They will be thoroughly clean and completely sanitary, with all recreational facilities ready for use.


(a) All necessary barracks as outlined below will be immediately vacated, scrubbed, and in general made ready for U. S. Naval use.

(b) There must be quarters available for an eventual total of 13,000 men on the Yokosuka Naval Station.

(c) There must be quarters available for eventual total of 4,000 men at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.

(d) Existing recreational facilities will be made ready for immediate use.

(e) Existing messing facilities will be made ready for immediate use. All kitchens must be absolutely clean.

C. Report.

The Commandant First Naval District will submit a report to the Commander U.S. Naval Occupation Forces, Yokosuka not later than 1000 August 28th. His report shall follow this outline and summarize the existing facilities and state their location, capacity, and condition. It shall state what quarters and messing facilities are requested for Japanese officers and men. It shall explain in detail what flag officers quarters are available, what recreational facilities for officers and men are available, and what messing facilities are available.
(g) **Allied Prisoners of War:**

1. Make a complete report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945, indicating the number, location, and physical condition of all Allied Prisoners of War in Yokosuka Area and vicinity.

2. Be prepared to make immediate delivery of all Allied Prisoners to U.S. Naval Authorities as directed by CTF 31.

(h) **Medical and Sanitation:**

1. In accordance with previous instructions have all hospitals and dispensaries thoroughly cleaned and fully equipped for occupational use by U.S. Forces.

2. Submit report to CTF 31 stating general health conditions presently existing in the Yokosuka area including a statement as to whether an epidemic exist, and what diseases are most prevalent.

3. Submit to CTF 31 a complete description of the water supply system including the sources of the water supply, location and condition of all reservoirs, clarification system, and means of distribution.

(i) **Miscellaneous:**

A. Deliver at once twenty-five (25) corrected copies of layout plans of Yokosuka Naval Station and area, including waterfront, depths of water at piers, etc.

B. Man and make ready print shop with presses and supplies, fully equipped to produce work involving both the English and Japanese language.

C. Make available for immediate use one (1) storehouse (50,000 square feet) near or adjacent to large ship berth.

D. Make ready and place in full operating readiness not less than three gasoline and lubricating oil filling stations for use of automobiles in the Naval Station, Naval Air Station, and other principal localities within the area of occupation.

E. Submit to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 a complete outline of power and light system, indicating location and rate of all power plants, distribution stations, etc., and indicate the type and voltage and frequency of current supply, and availability.

O. C. BADGER,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander, Yokosuka Naval Occupation Force.

- 6 - ENCLOSEMENT (L)
COMMANDER TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE

8 September 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE (ComBatDiv 7).
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander THIRD Fleet,
      (2) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report of CTF 31, Commander Occupation Forces, YOKOSUKA; Occupation and Securing of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base and Airfield; Covering the period 19 August to 8 September 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFleet Ltr. 1CL-45 of 1 January 1945.

(B) Action Report, CTG 31.1, Flagship Group, U.S.S. IOWA.
(C) Action Report, CTG 31.2, Minesweeping Group.
   (To be forwarded separately).
(E) Action Report, CTG 31.4 - Transport Group.
(F) Action Report, CTG 31.5 - Screen.
(G) Action Report, CTG 31.6 - Yokosuka Naval Air Activities.
(H) Action Report, CTG 31.7 - Naval Shore Activities.
(I) Action Report, CTG 31.8 - SOAPA Administrator.
(K) Report of Seizure of HLMS NAGATO.
(L) Demands and Orders given to Japanese Commandant First Naval District dated 27 August 1945.

1. Pursuant to instructions in reference (a), the Action Report for Task Force THIRTY-ONE for the period 19 August to 8 September 1945, incident to the occupation of YOKOSUKA Naval Base and Airfield is forwarded herewith as enclosures.

O. C. SANGER

DISTRIBUTION
ComInCh (1 Adv. copy direct)
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Authenticated:
I. G. SEGER,
Flag Secretary.

139238
TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT
August 19 - September 8, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

A. This action report covers the period from 19 August to 8 September 1945. YOKOSUKA Occupation Force, Task Force 31 was formed at 1400 (1) August 19, 1945 in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plan 10-45; Commander Task Force 31, Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, USN. The Task Force, consisting of units assigned from THIRD Fleet including Marine and Bluejack- et landing forces, a British landing force detachment, and a Marine Combat Team consisting of 4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment, 6th Marine Division and attached units, entered TOKYO BAY Beginning 28 August. On 30 August, landings were made at the YOKOSUKA Naval Base and the surrender of the base was received by Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, from the Commandant of the FIRST Naval District, Vice Admiral Totsuko. From 30 August to 8 September, Naval activities in the YOKOSUKA area were organized and administered by Task Force 31. Fleet landing forces were relieved by the 4th Marines and reembarked from 4 to 6 September. Task Force 31 was dissolved on 8 September, its mission completed. Commander Fleet Activities YOKOSUKA and Commander Service Division 102 (SOA Adminis- trative) relieved Commander Task Force 31 and assumed respective control of all tasks assigned to Task Force 31.

PART II - PRELIMINARIES

A. Task Force THIRTY-ONE, operating as a part of the THIRD Fleet in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45, 11-45 and Com- mander Task Force 31 Operation Plan 1-45, included the following units; the composition of the force varying as units reported or were detached for special missions. The force was also supplemented as necessary by drawing on the facilities of the THIRD Fleet.

(a) T.G. 31.1 Flagship Group - Captain Wellborn.

IOWA (BB61) (FF) 1 BB
SAN DIEGO (CL153) (RFF) 1 CL(AA)

(b) T.G. 31.2 Minesweeping Group - Captain Loud.

T.U. 31.2.1 Minesweeping Unit ABLE.
ELLYSON (P)(DMS19) 7 DMS
HAMBLETON (DMS20) 2 DM
GERARDI (DMS30)
JEFFERS (DMS27)
MACOMB (DMS23)
HOPKINS (DMS13)
FITCH (DMS25)
GWYN (DM33)
T.E. FRAZIER (DM24)

ENCLOSURE (A)
TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT
August 19 - September 8, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

T.U. 31.2.2 Minersweeping Unit BAKER
   REVENGE (AM110) 6 AM
   TOKEN (AM126) 2 ACM
   TUMULT (AM127) 12 YMS
   EASTON (ACM6)
   POCHARD (AM75)
   PICKET (AC18)
   SAGE (AM11)
   REQUISITE (AM109)
   YMS 177, 268, 276, 343, 362, 461,
   371, 390, 415, 426, 441, 467.

(c) T.G. 31.3 Landing Force, Brig. General Clement (USMC)

T.U. 31.3.1 Marine Combat Team, Lt. Col. Beans
   4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment
   6th Marine Division 5400 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.2 Third Fleet Marine Landing Force,
   Lt. Col. Lantz (USMC)
   3 Battalions from TF 38 1635 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.3 Third Fleet Naval Landing Force, Comdr. Malone
   2 Battalions Bluejackets 850 Officers and Men.
   Fully equipped from TF 38.
   Nucleus Crews 330 Officers & Men.
   10 Units (33 Officers & men each).
   5 Battalions Bluejackets 2000 Officers & Men.
   Partially equipped from TF 38 in Reserve.

T.U. 31.3.4 British Landing Force, Capt. Buchanan (R.A.N.)
   1 Battalion from TF 38.5 200 Naval Personnel.
   250 Royal Marines.

(d) T.G. 31.4 Transport Group, Commodore Smoot.

T.U. 31.4.1 Fire Support Unit 10 LCI
   LCI Group 46.

T.U. 31.4.2 Transport Unit ABLE, Capt. Moen.
   GRIMES (AP 172) 5 APA
   MERRIMACK (APA203) 1 APA
   LAMIER (APA125)
   MELLETT (APA156)
   BRAXTON (APA138)
   WAUKESHA (APA84)

ENCLOSURE (A)
CONFIDENTIAL

T.U. 31.4.2, Transport Unit BAKER, Capt. F.P. Williams.
OZARK (LSSV2) THIRD Fleet Marine 2 LSV
MONITOR (LSSV5) (TU 31.3.2) and Naval 1 APA
GARRARD (APAB4) Landing Forces (TU 3 ISD
SHAWSHEEN (LSD15) 31.3.3 Battalions,
SAN MARCOS (LSD25) Beach Parties, Misc.
CATHEDRAL (LSD17) Units embarked.

T.U. 31.4.4 Transport Unit CHARLIE, Capt. Kennaday.
Sims (F) (APD50) British Landing 10 APD
PAVILIC (APD70) Force (TU 31.3.4) em-
BARR (APD39) barked.
H.A. BASS (APD124) 3 Nucleus crews, 1
Bomb Disposal Group, embarked.
GOSSELIN (APD126) Press personnel embarked.
REEVES (APD52) 2 Bomb Disposal units, commun-
WANTUCK (APD125) ication teams, 1 diver unit
and 1 Demolition unit embarked.
RUNELS (APD85) 5 Nucleus crews embarked.
W.J. PATTISON (APD104) 2 UDT teams
BEGOR (APD127) embarked.

T.U. 31.4.5 Transport Unit DOG, Lt. Comdr. W.K. Bradbury
ComLSM Group 35 12 LSM
LSM 252 (F), 208, 290, 362,
368, 371, 419, 488, 13,
284, 71.
ComLST Group 86
LST 567, 789, 1139, 1083
LST 567.
PGM 16, 26, 32.

(e) T.G. 31.5 Screen, Captain Carmichael.

DesDiv 106 6 DD
WEDDIBURNE (DD684)
TWINING (DD540)
STOCKHAM (DD683)
YARNELL (DD541)
SOUTHERLAND (DD748)
HALSY P.OWELL (DD686)

(f) T.G. 31.6 Naval Air Activities, Captain Duckworth

COMPENSATION CASU
WASP CASU
Advanced Air Base Assembly (embarked in LST 1139, 789).
CB Units (in LST's)
Navy Base Maintenance Co. #4.
(g) T.G. 31.7 Naval Shore Activities, Commodore Womble.

CB Units (in LSM)
Navy Base Maintenance Cos. # 1 and # 3.
Miscellaneous Personnel and Units assigned.

(h) T.G. 31.8 SOPA Administrative, Commodore Smoot.

2 UDT Units (in APD 104, 127).  1 AD
Nucleus Crew (when released from 1 LST
Landing Force)  1 AR
Mobile Post Office (LST 567)  1 AOW
FIELDMONT (AP17)
TAMARISK (AOW96)
DELTIA (AR9)
Personnel assigned.

(i) T.G. 31.9 Submarine Demilitarization Group, Capt. Parks.

ComSubRon 20  1 AS
PROTEUS (JS19)  1 ASR
GREENLEAF (JSR10)

Units of the THIRD Fleet were drawn upon for all personnel requirements when Task Force THIRTY-ONE was activated. Rear Admiral Badger (ComBatDiv SEVEN) upon assuming his duties as CTF 31 brought his entire staff, including Captain J.M. Sweeney as Chief of Staff into the new organization, which was further supplemented by key personnel made available by Commander THIRD Fleet. Included among the latter were Commodore John P. Womble, Jr., USN, ComTaskFlot TWO, designated as CG 31.7 (Commander Naval Shore Activities), Commodore Roland N. Smoot, USN, ComTaskFlot FOUR, designated as CG 31.4 (Transport Group) as well as CG 31.8 (SOPA Administrative) upon his arrival on shore. Commodore Joel T. Boone (MC), USN, joined the staff as Medical Officer from the staff of Com3rd Fleet, Capt. R. C. Lynch, Jr., USN joined from the staff of ComBatRon TWO as Operations Officer. Captain Duckworth, USN, of the U.S.S. COMPENS was made Commanding Officer of Naval Air Activities and Captain T.J. Dykers, USN, from the staff of CTF 36 was given the task of ordnance demilitarization. Brigadier General W. T. Clement, USMC, was designated CG 31.3 and placed in command of all landing forces. Commander Johnson, (SO) USN, Commander J.A. Coppola, USN, Commander C.W. Chisholm, USNR, all heads of departments on the IOWA were assigned corresponding positions on the staff of CG 31. Commander F. P. Gilmore (MC) USN, Senior Medical Officer on IOWA was assigned to CG 31.7 staff. Other members of the staffs of CTF 31, the task groups, and landing forces were drawn from the battleships, carriers, and cruisers of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT.

B. Task Force THIRTY-ONE was formed on 19 August 1945 from units of the THIRD Fleet and operated until 27 August in an area approximately 250 miles southeast of TOKYO. During this period the unparalleled feat of assembling and organizing an amphibious force from ships operating at sea was accomplished. The ships assigned to Task Force THIRTY-ONE were assembled and the Task Force organization completed. Landing force units which had
been organized in the ships of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT were assembled and embarked in transports and staff personnel, nucleus crews, maintenance units and other components were likewise assembled in their appropriate units. This assembly and embarkation of the landing forces in transports at sea from the various ships of the THIRD Fleet was a job of major proportions. A highlight of the operation was the transfer of Task Group 38.4 bluejacket battalion of 400 men which was assembled on the MISSOURI to the IOWA. The transfer was required by the immediate departure of the MISSOURI from the area prior to the arrival of the assigned transport. Six slings were used simultaneously and the operation was completed within an hour without interruption or incident. Three hours later the battalion was transferred again from the IOWA to the MONITOR. Once the personnel had been assembled in the transports no reloading was required and the replenishment and distribution of supplies and landing force equipment was also completed during this period.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE shifted his flag to the SAN DIEGO on August 23. From August 24 to August 27 Admiral Badger was embarked on the MISSOURI to attend the preliminary negotiations between Commander THIRD Fleet and the Japanese Naval and Military authorities. At these conferences the Japanese emissaries were advised of requirements for minesweeping, disarmament and evacuation of personnel in the occupied areas, identification of all fortifications by display of white flags and markers and other demands essential to the security and success of the operation. During the period Commodore Wambke was embarked in the SAN DIEGO and exercised Tactical command of Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

On August 27, after a delay of 24 hours due to storms in the vicinity, Task Force THIRTY-ONE arrived and anchored about 1600 (1) in the northeastern part of Sagami Wan in the shadow of Fujiyama.

The following day, 28 August, about 0900 the first United States Task Force consisting of SAN DIEGO (Flagship of CTF 31), GOSSELIN, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUISUN, screened by WEDDERBURN, STOCKHOLM, TWINING and preceded by the minesweepers BILLYSON and HAMBLETON got underway and entered TOKYO BAY, anchoring about 1300 off YOKOSUKA. Remaining units of Task Force 31 entered TOKYO BAY 30 August. During the entrance Task Force 35 and Task Force 37 made a demonstration in force in Sagami Wan and stood by to provide fire support if needed. Air support was provided by Task Force 38, and air demonstrations were conducted in such force as to discourage any treachery on the part of the enemy. This was particularly important in view of the gauntlet of heavy guns that was the vanguard of Task Force 31 had to pass in order to enter TOKYO BAY. To this end combat air patrol, direct support aircraft and patrols of outlying airfield all were directed to funnel through populated areas at low altitude in order to make their presence most evident. At daybreak 30 August 1945 the first of the transports entered with Fleet Marines and landed on FUTTESU SAKI and Island Fort No. 2 to insure the neutralization of those fortifications prior to the entry of the main landing force.
Minefields guarding the entrance to TOKYO BAY had not been cleared by the Japanese. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and the entrance was made via the west channel which was check swept by our forces prior to the entrance. Failure of the Japanese to clear the minefields was attributed to a lack of minesweepers and the crudity of their methods which required about three times as long as our methods. Information supplied by the local Japanese authorities was very accurate, and Japanese pilots were embarked on all ships during the entrance.

Negotiations with the Japanese Naval authorities at YOKOSUKA were conducted aboard the SAN DIEGO on August 28 and 29. At 0800, on August 30, nucleus crews from the SOUTH DAKOTA embarked on the H.A. BASS (APD124) under the command of Captain T. J. FLNN, U.S.N., boarded HLMS NAGATO, hauled down the Japanese colors, and hoisted the United States ensign, taking custody of this vessel in the name of the United States government.

Landing of the occupation forces began at 0930 the same day. The SAN DIEGO moved in and moored to the dock at YOKOSUKA at 1030. All landings and the occupation were executed smoothly on schedule and without opposition or incident. Surrender of the Naval Base was received at 1045 (J) on August 30 in a ceremony on the dock alongside the SAN DIEGO. Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, received the surrender from Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of the FIRST Naval District.

Task Force THIRTY-ONE headquarters were established ashore immediately; the National Ensign and Admiral Badger's personal flag were hoisted over the Naval Headquarters building. In the afternoon an inspection tour by Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey was made.

All areas were secured, patrols established, Shore Activities, and SOPA (Administrative) were activated and the organization and operation of the base was undertaken. Minesweeping operations, support of Prisoner of War evacuation and demilitarization of ships and military installations, establishment of air operations at YOKOSUKA, clearing and reconnaissance of beaches at TATEYAMA for Army landings, clearance of dock areas at YOKOHAMA for Army forces were among important operations conducted. SAN DIEGO was relieved by the PIEDMONT on 1 September; on 2 September the surrender of the Japanese Empire was witnessed aboard MISSOURI by Rear Admiral Badger. From 4 to 6 September THIRD Fleet and British Landing Force Units were reembarked for return to their ships. On 6 September Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE was relieved by Commander Naval Activities YOKOSUKA and Task Force THIRTY-ONE was dissolved.

C. The mission of Task Force THIRTY-ONE as established in Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45 and 11-45 was to occupy and secure the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, clear entrance to TOKYO BAY and anchorages, seize and operate YOKOSUKA Airfield, establish communications including press, take over and demilitarize enemy ships present, support the release of allied Prisoners of War by Task Group 30.6, demilitarize enemy defenses, establish a port director, establish headquarters and facilities at YOKOSUKA for Task Force THIRTY-ONE forces and advance representatives of the Army of Occupation, institute sanitation and health measures and medical facilities, assist Army
forces to clear and prepare dock areas in YOKOSUKA - YOKOHAMA area for disembarkation of troops, clear beaches and reconnoiter TATEYAMA area for landings by Army.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE Operation Plan 1-45 covers this operation and is based on the assumption that Japan had capitulated but the treacherous employment of any or all weapons in the TOKYO Area was a distinct possibility. Provision was therefore made to prevent and protect the occupation force from any overt or treacherous actions by organized faction or individuals. Air and gunfire support was provided by Task Forces of the THIRD Fleet, minesweeping operations by Japanese were supervised and checked by units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE. Disarmament and evacuation of Japanese military and naval personnel from the occupied and contiguous areas, was required except for personnel necessary to provide information and assistance in establishing control and operation of the base.

D. Task Force THIRTY-ONE consisting of units enumerated above were supported by Task Force THIRTY-FIVE and Task Force THIRTY-SEVEN who staged demonstrations in SAGAMI WAN while Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT furnished air support, cover, search and reconnaissance while operating in assigned areas in empire waters adjacent to the TOKYO region. All units of THIRD Fleet were also available to provide logistic support as required.

E. No enemy opposition was encountered at any time during the operation.
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PART III - CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

3 August 1945

Operating with Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, about 250 miles southwest of TOKYO, under tactical command of Vice Admiral J.S. McCain, CTF-38.


11 August

Rear Admiral Badger designated CTF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet despatch and authorized to issue warning orders to all THIRD Fleet commands. IOWA (BB61) designated flagship.

All ships in TF-38 alerted to organize bluejacket and marine landing force with arms, ammunition and rations.

Requested, through ComTHIRDFleet, that minesweeping officers and ships, UD Teams, and logistic ships be alerted by CinCPac (Advance). Initiated requests for temporary duty assignment for officers and men needed for staff. This included intelligence, interpreters, communications, clerical, CIC, ACI, operational, war correspondents, and photographic personnel. Requested necessary maps, charts, and grids from CinCPac (Advance).

Requests were initiated for supplies essential to the evacuation of prisoners-of-war. These included clothing (men, women and children), toilet articles, candy, chewing gum, small luxuries, ambulances, medical supplies including blood and water transportation.

Brigadier General William T. Clement, USMC, nominated as Commander Landing Force by Commanding General, THIRDPhiBCorps, with Regimental Combat Team from 4th and 6th Marine Divisions. All located and alerted at GUAM.

Started drafting Operation Plan.

12 August

Alerted all ships in TF-38 to organize Base maintenance companies; warning order issued to CTF-38 to form naval air activities organization to activate airfield. Requested CIF-38 to obtain vertical photos of occupation area. General Clement and Staff loaded in USS OZARK (LSV-2) at GUAM and sailed for rendezvous.

Requested APD's, APA's, AK's, and necessary amphibious craft and SeaBee maintenance unit be alerted in rear area.
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13 August

4th and 6th Division Marines loaded on 5 APA's and 1 AKA at Marianas; UD teams loaded in APD's at Guam.

Prepared demands to Japanese for cooperation, equipment and services.

Minesweepers (MinRon 20) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

14 August

First draft of Operation Plan completed, and discussed with ComTHIRDFleet on MISSOURI (BB-63). Coordination with fire and air support groups and POW rescue groups made firm.

Instructed to cease offensive operations against Japanese forces by CinCPAC.

All ships present alerted to procure, by transfer at sea, small arms and equipment needed for landing force parties from ships not furnishing landing battalions.

CinCPAC's Op-Plan 12-45 put into effect for operations. Directs THIRD Fleet to occupy and control Tokyo Bay and coastal water in conjunction with Army Forces.

15 August

TransDiv 105 (5 APA's, 1 AKA) departed Guam for rendezvous.

Requested CinCPAC to direct Japanese to initiate minesweeping in Tokyo Bay and entrances.

Received report from USCG of intense anti-invasion activity by Japanese along shores of Sagami Wan. Requested additional photographic coverage by TF-38.

Complied tentative operation plan with revisions indicated at conference on MISSOURI. Distributed to Task Group Commanders for planning purposes.

16 August

Operation Plan approved by ComTHIRDFleet at conference aboard MISSOURI. Held briefing conferences with Group Commanders.

17 August

Authorized interchange of landing force equipment between ships in order to fully equip landing battalions.
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Requested ComTHIRDFleet to fuel, replenish and ammunition all ships assigned to TF-31.

Minesweeping units (AM's and YMS's) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

Alerted all ships to organize nucleus crews to take over captured vessels.

Held conferences with Group Commanders firming up plans.

18 August

ComTHIRDFleet directed forming of TF-31 at 1400(I) 19th August as a separate tactical units to conform to movements of TF-38, remaining within TBS range of MISSOURI (Flagship, THIRD Fleet). TF-38 operating vicinity point Drink (32N - 143-30E), fueling and replenishing.

Alerted all ships to prepare to load landing battalions and other personnel in accordance with loading plan. Ordered typhus vaccine inoculations for personnel going ashore.

British landing force made available by ComTHIRDFleet.

Continued conferences re: operation plans of Group Commanders.

19 August

Commenced transferring personnel and equipment at sea, in accordance with loading plan.

Received storm warning indicating typhoon developing 300 miles to southeast.

1400(I), formed Task Force 31, in special cruising formation with transports and large amphibious ships in column, with circular screens composed of DD's, DMS's, and APD's. Following ships present: IOWA, SAN DIEGO, GRIFFES, BRAXTON, OZARK, MERRIVNDER, WAUKESHA, SHADWELL, LANIER, METLETT, GARRARD, DesDiv 106, MinRon 20, and TransDiv 105 plus WANTUCK.

Continued transferring personnel, fueling and replenishing.

20 August

REEVES, GOSSELIN joined up.

Received ComTHIRDFleet entrance plan for Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. Prepared and disseminated special entry formation.

Received despatch from ComTHIRDFleet that entry to Sagami Wan delayed until 26th August. CTF-31 alerted to board MISSOURI to meet Japanese emissaries morning of entry.
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20 August (cont’d)

In order to avoid typhoon all Task Forces directed by ComTHIRDFleet to
proceed southwest toward "Temporary point" (30-30N - 142E). SOA 10 knots.

Continued to transfer personnel, refuel and replenish.

Distributed CTF-31 Operation Plan No. 1-45.

21 August

Continued replenishing, fueling and transfer of personnel at sea, vicinity
of "Temporary point".

SOUTHERLAND assigned and joined up; assumed ACI, FDO, and CIC(air)
duties for TF-31.

Received ComTHIRDFleet Op-Plan 11-45 by despatch – added following task
to TF-31, "Assist Army forces as necessary to clear dock areas, Yokohama, in
preparation for disembarkation of troops of 3rd Phib Force on about 31 August
and 13 September". Issued necessary changes to Op-Plan to comply.

22 August

Continued replenishing and fueling in vicinity of "Temporary Point".

LOVE Day (landing day) specified as 28 August by ComTHIRDFleet. Sagami
Wan entry to be on LOVE minus Two day.

TF-31 directed to proceed and operate in area "Badger" (Lat. 32 to 33 N -
Long. 142 to 143-30 E), typhoon having passed off to eastward.

23 August

Operating in area "Badger", engaged in fueling and replenishing.

CTAURUS and LST 1083 joined up.

ComTHIRDFleet Operation Plan 10-45 made effective 1400(I). CTF-31 Op-Plan
1-45 made effective 1400(I).

Shifted Flag and Staff to SAN DIEGO.

Held conference of all Group Commanders and coordinated all operation plans.
Following additional task assigned TF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet: "Clear water and
beach approaches in TATEYAMA WAN, and mark same in preparation for amphibious
landing in that area about 2 September by THIRD Phib Force". CTF-31 Op-Plan
1-45 revised to comply.
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24 August

Continued fueling in area "Badger".

Minesweeping unit consisting of 7 AM's and 12 YM's joined up. PATISSON and BEGOR joined up.

25 August

Continued operations in area "Badger".

LSM Group 35 (12 LSM's) and PGM's 16, 26, 32 joined up.


Commodore J.F. Womble, U.S.N., OTC for TF-31 in SAN DIEGO.

Received orders from ComTHIRD Fleet delaying all operations 48 hours. New LOVE day designated as 30 August.

26 August

Operating in area "Badger" topping-off and briefing of units.

ComTHIRD Fleet ordered initial entry (Sagami Wan) executed on 27 August (Love minus three day).

Alerted minesweeping groups to commence sweeping operations as soon as conference with Japanese emissaries disclosed current mine fields and channels.

Requested station tanker and tender be assigned to provide fuel, gas, water, and provisions for landing force and small craft.

Requested AF and hospital ship be made available to landing force as early as practicable to replenish force and provide services for repatriates.

Proceeded towards entrance route to Sagami Wan in accordance with ComTHIRD Fleet directive.

27 August

Proceeding to Sagami Wan along track specified by ComTHIRD Fleet.

Japanese emissaries boarded MISSOURI and were met by Rear Admiral R.B. Carney, U.S.N., (Chief of Staff, Third Fleet) and Rear Admiral O.C. Badger, U.S.N., (CTF-31). Demands were presented to Japanese and information obtained as to mine
27 August (cont'd)

fields and channels. Japanese pilots and interpreters were loaded on a destroyer and delivered to task unit guides of TF-31. Minesweeping units were detached and proceeded on minesweeping tasks. Japanese channel into Tokyo Bay was immediately check-swept with negative results. Japs had failed to meet minesweeping demands made by SCAF, giving as their excuse the lack of minesweepers in the locality.

Plans for entry to Tokyo Bay on the 28th were solidified, with arrangements made for fire and air support, CAP, minesweeping, press coverage and berth assignments. Seaplane tenders for accommodation of flights from rear area added to ships making initial entry.

Logistic requirements for units engaged in occupation forces made firm with Service Division, by arranging for Tender to berth at naval base on Love plus one day.

Disseminated to Third Fleet co-ordinates of safe channel to Tokyo Bay as derived from Japanese charts, pilots, and own check-sweep operations.

TF-31, less minesweepers engaged in sweeping operations, anchored in Sagami Wan at 1600(I).

Rear Admiral Badger (CTF-31) returned aboard SAN DIEGO and assumed tactical command of TF-31.

28 August

Units of TF-31 anchored in Sagami Wan.

At 0900(I) the first U.S. Task Force to enter Tokyo Bay, under command of Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger (CTF-31), got underway and proceeded through swept channel. Force consisted of SAN DIEGO, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUISUN, and GOSSELIN screened by WADDLEBURN, STOCKHAM, TWINING and proceeded by minesweepers ELLYSON and HUMBLETON. Force anchored off Yokosuka Naval Base, Tokyo Bay at 1300(I).

Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, Commandant First Naval District and Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval Base, and staff reported aboard SAN DIEGO with records, charts and answers to demands made on 27 August. Japanese were interviewed by members of Staff of CTF-31. A list of further demands and instructions were read and delivered to Vice Admiral TOTSUKA. (See Enclosure 1).

Security requirements, including small boat patrols were set up.

Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages. Results negative.
Mine warning number one, Tokyo Bay, issued defining existing limits of Japanese mine fields as correlated from Jap charts and interviews.
28 August (cont'd)

All other units of TF-31 less minesweeping units remained anchored in Sagami Wan.

SOPA regulations for Tokyo Bay anchorages published.

Set up harbor entrance control ship with pilots, interpreters and charts.

29 August

Anchored as preceding day.

MISSOURI (Third Fleet Flag), IOWA, SOUTH DAKOTA, ANCON, (press ship), SAN JUAN (CTG 30.6 - Allied POW Rescue Group) BENEVOLENCE, with screening destroyers entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

CinCPacPOA broke his Flag in SOUTH DAKOTA.

Japanese staff members reported aboard SAN DIEGO and arrangements for surrender ceremonies at YOKOSUKA Naval Base and aboard MISSOURI made firm. Interviews with staff of CTF-31 continued regarding demilitarization, Naval Base facilities, location of Jap ships, dockage, dry docks, menaces to navigation etc.

Requested tugs and salvage unit be sailed from rear area to clear docks of sunken Jap ships disclosed by interviewing Japanese Naval officers.

HOW Hour (landing time) set at 1000(I), 30 August.

Minesweeping units sweeping anchorages and landing beaches; results negative.

Set up a board to survey industrial facilities of YOKOSUKA Naval Base.

Changed operation plan to provide for landings, preceded by minesweeping and UDT teams at forts commanding entrance channel at HOW Hour minus 3 hours to ensure security of channel. Added new task to have prize crew seize NAG TO, HOW Hour minus two hours to ensure security of landing beaches.

Cooperated with POW Rescue Group in initiating evacuation and processing of released Allied prisoners.

30 August

Lend Day. Proceeded with landing in accordance with Operation Plan. HOW Hour advanced to 0930(I). Harbour forts seized at 0730(I). NAG TO seized
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30 August (cont'd)

at 0830(I). Landing proceeded without incident.


1030(I): SAN DIEGO with Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, Chief of Staff, ComTHIRDFleet docked at berth in YOKOSUKA Naval Base; the first U.S. Naval ship to moor to a dock in Japanese Homeland.

1045(I): Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, guarded by Brigadier General W. T. Clement, U.S.M.C. (CTG 31.4 - Landing Force) surrendered the YOKOSUKA Naval Base to Rear Admiral Carney who accepted and receipted for same as delegate for Admiral Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet). Admiral Badger’s flag was raised over Naval Headquarters building, thereby establishing the first U.S. Headquarters on the Japanese Homeland. Headquarters and staff moved ashore and commenced operating from former Japanese Naval Headquarters.

Other units of Third Fleet entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

Released REEVES and COSSELIN to CTG 30.6 (POW Rescue Group) to assist in repatriation work.

Fleet Admiral C.W. Nimitz (CinCPOA) and Admiral W.F. Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet) came ashore and inspected Naval Base.

31 August

Operating from headquarters ashore. ComTHIRDFleet’s Operation Plan No. 11-45 put into effect 0000(2), 31 August.

Despatched UDT teams and minesweepers to clear and mark approaches at TATEYAMA WAN for 3rd Phib landing 3 September.

Continued demilitarization, surveys, research, intelligence, activating airfield and securing of occupational zone in accordance with Operation Plan.

Third Fleet units continued entering and anchoring Tokyo Bay as directed by ComTHIRDFleet.


Japanese commenced operations, in compliance with orders, to clear out anti-submarine nets and mine-fields in entrance channel to Tokyo Bay to be completed by 1600(I), 8 September.
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31 August (cont'd)

U.S. Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages in Tokyo Bay, YOKOHAMA and Tokyo Harbour. All results negative except 3 U.S. laid influence mines exploded off Tokyo entrance channel.

Re-embarked members of landing force received from ships departing area for U.S. Personnel from ships not in bay re-embarked in APA for transfer at sea.

Released APD's and amphibious units not needed to POW rescue group for re-patriation duty. Units proceeded to YOKOHAMA loaded with medical supplies, clothing and provisions.

1 September

Continuing operations from headquarters ashore in accordance with Operation Plan.

Japanese APD with Japanese troops from Marcus Island arrived Tokyo Bay. Directed to Yokohama where troops were turned over to U.S. Army. Japanese APD returned and moored with prize crew at Yokosuka Naval Base.

Completed plans for mass air display and preparations for formal surrender ceremonies on 2 September.

SAN DIEGO shifted to outside anchorage. PIEDMONT moored alongside dock and assumed service functions for forces ashore in accordance with plan.

2 September

Continuing operations from shore headquarters.

0900: Formal surrender ceremonies took place in MISSOURI (flying CinCPac-POA flag).

Released UDT teams to TF-35 for clearing of SAGAMI WAN beaches.

Completed sweeping Jap minefield by U.S.N. units. Total of 74 mines swept.

Furnished escorts, tugs and minesweeping vessel to TF-32 for landing at YOKOHAMA.

3 September - 7 September

Continued operations from headquarters ashore.
3 September - 7 September (cont'd)

Re-embarked Third Fleet Marine, Naval and British Landing Force. Loaded APA with personnel for ships not present, for transfer at sea.

Replaced shore units from ships attached to TF-31 with personnel from CruDiv 10, and permanent shore-based personnel.

Prepared KISARAZU airfield for activation by NATS.

ComTHIRDFleet shifted flag to SOUTH DAKOTA on 5 September.

Recommended that intelligence and technical experts be sent forward immediately to examine vast amounts of Japanese Naval equipment and material located in yard. Also recommended establishment of GCM at YOKOSUKA.

Continued furnishing ships, clothing and provisions to POW evacuation group.

8 September

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PART IV - Ordnance
PART V - Damage
PART VI(A) - Surface Gunnery Operations

Above parts not applicable to this report
PART VI

B. AIR OPERATIONS

1. General

With the gradual cessation of hostilities on the part of the Japanese, the primary objectives of carrier striking forces were no longer attacked. The carrier air forces thus released were made available for two primary objectives: to cover continuously every operational airfield in Japan, and, in direct support to TF 31 of cover the entrance to and occupation of the Tokyo Bay-Yokosuka area.

(a) COMBAT AIR PATROL

Combat air patrol of eight or more fighter aircraft was continuously maintained over TF 31 in Sagami Wan and in Tokyo Bay from 28 August to 5 September. No enemy airborne aircraft were encountered.

(b) DIRECT TROOP SUPPORT

Direct troop air support was furnished units landing on Puttsu Saki, at Yokosuka, Yokohama, and in the Tateyama Wan area. In addition, special air observer flights reporting directly to the Commanding General of the troops landing (CTG 31.3) were airborne continuously during landings on L and L plus 1 day.

In addition, aircraft strike groups on short notice were standing by in the carriers to furnish support as required.

(c) PRISONER-OF-WAR EVACUATION

In general support of the objective of clearing Allied Prisoners-of-war in the shortest possible time, carrier aircraft searched out and spotted POW camps and led sea-borne rescue parties.

(d) ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR FACILITIES ASHORE

In support of the general plan for air services and air evacuation, naval air facilities ashore were established at Yokosuka Naval Air Base by CTG 31.6.

2. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TF 31

18 August  CTG 31.6 reported Streamlined Air Base Assembly and Carrier Aircraft Service Unit (TG 31.6) ready for landing.

26 August (L-4) TF-31 in company with TF 38. No air activity other than routine patrols and reconnaissance flights by TF 38.

27 August (L-3 day) Routine day and night combat air patrol from TF 38 was maintained under control of TF 35 over fleet in Sagami Wan.

28 August (L-2 day) DesDiv 106 (plus SOUTHERLAND), SAN DIEGO, GARRARD, CUMBERLAND SOUND and SUISISUN entered Tokyo Harbor, Augmented combat patrol and air support groups maintained, under control of SOUTHERLAND.

30 August (Love Day) Air observer services furnished by CTG 31.3 and CTG 31.6 while forces landed and took possession of Yokosuka Area.

CTG 31.6 Airbornelanded on Yokosuka Airfield and set up Streamlined Air Base.

31 August (L-1 day) eight plane combat air patrol maintained.

Support from combat air patrol furnished to reconnaissance units at Tateyama Wan.
1 September (1st day) continued 8 plane combat air patrol. 
2 September Conducted mass demonstration flight over MISSOURI after signing of Japanese capitulation. Conducted routine combat air patrol. 
5 September KISARAZU Field ordered activated by CTG 31.6 to handle large transports which YOKOSUKA could not handle due to short runways and high terrain surrounding field. 
8 September CTG 31.6 relieved of duty by Colonel J. C. MUNN, USMC who assumed duties of Senior Naval Aviator ashore at YOKOSUKA.

3. COMMENTS.

1. Continuous air cover is a most effective deterrent to treacherous action during the occupation phase after a surrender.

2. By putting a CVL (COMPENS) out of commission as far as flight operations were concerned it was possible to draw the necessary personnel and gear to form an emergency workable Carrier Aircraft Service Unit and a Streamlined Air Base Assembly. These units proved themselves capable of conducting limited flight operations immediately, using unfamiliar facilities.

The lack of proper stowage for fuel (100 octane) was probably the biggest handicap. The runways were realized to be short prior to the taking of the field but this in addition to the high terrain surrounding the field, which was not known, proved to be a disappointment for the conducting of large transport operations. Consequently the field at Kisarazu was activated to accommodate this traffic.

C.

TG 31.3 was originally conceived as an assault group composed of Marine and Naval Units from the Third Fleet. Later orders made the 4th Marine Regiment (reinforced) available and with this unit as a foundation a landing and occupation force was activated to be commanded by Brigadier General WILLIAM T. CLEMENT, U.S.M.C. This force was composed of the 4th Marine RCT with 5400 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.1, the Third Fleet Marine Landing Force of 1635 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.2 and the Third Fleet Naval Landing Force of 863 officers and men, designated at TU 31.3.3.

The British Pacific Fleet supplied a landing force of 450 officers and men, consisting of 250 Royal Navy and 200 Royal Marine Commandos, designated as TU 31.3.4. Also organized but not embarked for landing was an additional assault Bn. of 400 men from TG 38.3 and five guard battalions of 400 men each from TF 38. These last units were activated and equipped for duty ashore and remained in a state of readiness on board their own ships.

In addition to the Assault Bns. from the Third Fleet, nucleus crews consisting of 33 men each were organized in ships of the fleet for the purpose of taking over enemy ships that remained operational. The plan for nucleus crews originally included skeleton prize crews from cruisers and destroyers with a view to taking over ships of their own type. This plan was set aside when intelligence reports indicated that there would be a greater necessity for small craft crews. These crews were fully equipped as landing force personnel and included necessary ratings for the operation of small craft.

Also included in plans for the occupation were three Base Maintenance Companies, one to be drawn from each task group of Task Force 38. These companies were alerted and equipped with the purpose in mind of landing a versatile group equipped to meet many contingencies while still employing a minimum of man power. Each company was composed of eleven groups...
designated and equipped for the following tasks: Boat Air, Ordnance and Explosive Disposal, Boat Pool, Motor Pool, Artificer Group for machine carpenter, Electric and Metal shops and outside repair for communications, Power Plant operations, Evaporator Refrigerator and Air Compressor operation, Riggers, Locomotive operation and Diving. The boat repair and boat pool were combined to form a beach party, and since there was a separately organized boat pool their services were utilized by the Captain of the Yard. A bomb disposal was also embarked with the landing forces as well as divers unit and shortly after the landing they were being employed by shore activities for material maintenance and installation. The whole effort being to economize in the number of personnel sent ashore to lessen the burden of transport, messing and berthing. This is further exemplified by the planned changeover of the transport group commander and his staff to the SOPA Administrative Ashore in the Harbor Master's Office after the landing was secure.

The Fleet Landing Forces carried with them sufficient "K" ration for 9 meals plus five units of fire and were equipped with heavy Marching order and all available landing force equipment.

(b) The Fourth Marine RTC originally designated as Task Force Able by HqThirdPhilCorps, embarked at Guam on 15 August 1945, and rendezvous with the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. The remaining units of TG 31.3 were embarked at sea from ships of the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. All troops landed on 30 August, commencing at 0558 when the Second Bn., Fourth Marines landed at Puttou Saki and continued through the day with the main landings taking place at YOKOSUKA commencing at 0929.

Shore Parties and Beachmasters were provided for from TG 38.3 but due to the small amount of cargo carried by the Fleet Landing Forces, they were not required to function as such and the Shore Party was more than adequately handled by the 4th Regiment S-4, by 1600 (1) of 2 September, all unloading for the entire task group was completed.

Fire support was planned for the entire operation utilizing the OEB's of Task Force 35 to cover the entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. In Tokyo Bay the SAN DIEGO and the destroyer screen were prepared to render counter battery fire and supporting bombardment as necessary. LCI(R) and LCS(L)(3) were requested and made available for close in fire support but were not able to arrive in time to cover the landings.

One of the two UDT's assigned to the task force cleared the beaches for the landing of 2nd Bn. Fourth Marines on Puttou Saki Island Port No. 2. The forts located there were demilitarized by the 2nd battalion. The second UDT accompanied the British Landing Force clearing the beaches at Saru Shima and Azuma Island, as required. They later did a tremendous amount of work clearing the dock areas in the Yokosuka Yard.

Due to the nature of this occupation and the excellence of the control and leadership of the engaged forces, there were no incidents of violence or casualties, although at the time of its inception it was not known that the landing would be a peaceful one and preparations were made for tending and evacuating casualties.

C.3.

In planning entry into TOKYO BAY, exact information on the location of enemy minefields was necessary as was the location of B-29-laid U.S. mines. The latter information was readily available and the location, type, and number of mines in each stick was obtained from CinCPac (Adv).
Certain areas in the approaches to TOKYO BAY had been declared restricted to shipping by the Japanese and it was reasonable to assume that mine had been laid in these areas. It was also possible that mines had been laid in other than these areas.

At the preliminary meeting with the Japanese emissaries at Manila, certain demands were made which included all information of location of enemy minefields. Also included were demands that the Japanese clear all minefields in their territorial waters. Preliminary reports received in Alpaca 150 as a result of the early meeting with the Jap emissaries in Manila gave information on the location of the fields in the entrance to TOKYO BAY but this information proved incorrect by the minecharts supplied by the Jap emissaries off Sagami Wan.

Lacking definite information, plans were made to sweep and mark an entrance channel into the bay and upon completion of this task to clear the entire area of Uraga Suido. It was realized that these plans were subject to change for later information might disclose that the planned channel could not be opened due to obstructions, anti-submarine nets, shallow-planted chain-moored mines off shore-controlled minefields.

Sweeping operations were to commence on LOVE MINUS ONE day following the meeting with the Japanese emissaries which was to be held the previous day. Eventually, the above dates were advanced one day.

At the meeting, the Japanese supplied charts showing the exact location of their swept channels and the location of all minefields. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and were across the proposed entrance channel therefore necessitating a change in the sweeping plan. The shore-controlled minefields had been blown up according to their statements and this was later proved correct. All moored minefields were still in place. The Japanese had not carried out any of the sweeping which they had been ordered to accomplish prior to our arrival.

In lieu of sweeping, the proposed channel, it was decided to use the Japanese west swept channel for entrance of the forces into TOKYO BAY and accordingly, this channel was check swept to a depth of sixty feet with negative results before declaring the channel safe for entrance.

Sweeping efforts were concentrated on clearing all anchorage areas in TOKYO BAY prior to assigning ships to these berths.

Information received from the Japanese indicated that they had swept some of the E-29-laid magnetic and acoustic mines off YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA, but they had no knowledge of mines being laid in the TOKYO area. Concentrated sweeping in the YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA had negative results but three magnetic mines were swept off the entrance to TOKYO harbor.

The Japanese were ordered to clear the anti-submarine nets and the minefields in URAGA SUIDO. Operations were started on 31 August and completed on 8 September.

Investigation as to why the Japanese had not attempted to clear the minefields prior to the arrival of our forces disclosed that very few sweepers...
were available to accomplish the task and in addition their sweeping methods are very crude. Our own sweeping forces could have accomplished the same amount of work in one-third the time.

Conclusions are that the best method of obtaining information on exact location of minefields in any particular area is to contact the local naval officials and make the necessary demands. The Japanese had destroyed, by burning, most of their official records. All information received from the local Japanese proved very accurate.

D. 2.

Task Force 31 communication channels afloat were used in the normal manner and were satisfactory. The change of flag-ships first from the U.S.S. IOWA (Captain Wellborn) to the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (Captain Mullan), and then to the U.S.S. PIEDEMONT (Captain Robbins) was accomplished by establishing an overlap of about four hours on all Fox schedules and other circuits.

All communications remained on the flagship alongside the dock for the first day except for a temporary signal station established at the weather station at the entrance to YOKOSUKA KO which was used to relay visual traffic to ships in the anchorage.

Portable voice radio equipment furnished by ships of the Fleet to landing force parties for communication between their units and commands was found to be useless due to dead batteries. The 4th Marine RCT was able to replace most of this equipment with a similar type and satisfactory communications were maintained.

U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DD-732) (Comdr. R.C. WILLIAMS) was designated as Task Force 31 CIC Ship, and performed as Task Force CIC throughout the period of occupation. In this capacity she controlled the Combat Air Patrol, Tokyo Area, directed support aircraft, air observers, transient aircraft and mass demonstration aircraft. The Naval gun fire control circuit with all support groups was set up and ready. For a protracted period she had full radar and air control responsibility for the entire Tokyo Area and for Task Force 31. Evaluated information was passed by radio voice direct to CTF 31 in the Flagship. It is considered that her mission was accomplished in an outstandingly efficient manner, and one that reflected great credit on the ship and on her CIC organization.

On Love plus one day a visual station using two 12-inch signal lights was established on a hill in back of the Task Force Commander’s Headquarters building. All ships in the anchorage were in visual range of this station. Later a Japanese 24-inch signal searchlight was moved to this signal station and put in operation. The signal station was connected by field telephone direct to the TF communication center. Portable radio equipment was set up at the communication center in the Naval Headquarters building and all voice circuits were used from there.

Coding work was done on the flagship (SAN DIEGO, later PIEDEMONT) and traffic was delivered to the TF communication center by officer messenger. A private field telephone line was established between the CWO on the flag-
ship and the CWO at the TF communication center.

The 4th Marine RCT signal section established telephone service between CTF 31 Headquarters and all units and commands ashore. The use of this telephone circuit immediately cut down the amount of voice radio traffic necessary.

Japanese radio transmitters and receivers located underground in back of the TF Headquarters were checked and set up on various naval frequencies and keying lines run to the communication center. It was decided not to use these circuits because the coding room and equipment were not moved ashore from the flagship.

Communications in all phases were satisfactory in spite of the many obstacles encountered in an amphibious operation. None of the communication personnel used in this operation except the 4th Marine RCT have had any previous experience in amphibious communications.

D. 6.

The tentative Logistic planning for the occupation of the Naval Shore Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, began on 10 August 1945. After thorough consideration of the many elements involved both ashore and afloat, it was decided to support all forces ashore from units afloat utilizing the existing organization of the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD17) (Captain F.L. ROBINS, USN). This plan proved highly successful. Warning orders were transmitted to Commander Task Group 30.3 (ComServRon 6) (Rear Admiral D.B. BEARY, USN) advising the anticipated support required and to the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD 17) in order that this ship could plan and be prepared to assume the duties of RepServPac in accordance with the Logistic Plan.

The provision for an adequate supply of water, food, and berthing facilities for the landing force, plus gasoline and lubricants for aircraft, rolling stock, and small boats, presented a major problem. In addition to these difficulties, provision had to be made to insure the delivery of all supplies in the face of enemy resistance. These items were essential for the support of the occupation, but a problem of equal or greater importance concerned the availability of an ample supply of special foods, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, medical supplies, and sundry items for all Allied Prisoners of War expected to be liberated in the Yokosuka Area.

Although the responsibility for handling these Repatriates was later assigned to Commander Task Group 30.6 (Commodore R.W. Simpson, USN), the planning and foresight in providing these supplies enabled Commander Task Force 31 to render substantial and immediate aid to the evacuation group in the form of food, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, tobacco, cigarettes, candy, and many other urgently needed items on short notice. These items were made available to 5000 persons under naval jurisdiction plus an additional 5000 Repatriates being serviced from the American Red Cross Canteens in the Yokohama area.

Upon the formation of CTF 31, all units were topped off with fuel and provisions at sea. The maximum possible levels were maintained prior to
entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay in order to avoid the necessity of fueling or replenishing at anchor during the initial stages of the occupation.

The Logistic Plan was followed in detail from the initial stages of this operation. RepServPac in the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD17) utilized the existing supply organization of the U.S.S. PIEDMONT, augmented by a Fuel Officer assigned to the U.S.S. NECHES (AO47) (Comdr. H.G. HANSEN, Jr., USNR). This organization provided adequate and prompt support to the landing forces in the form of food, water, clothing, and equipment necessary to establish messes ashore. Ten thousand POW outfits were assembled by the U.S.S. LESUTH (AK125) (Comdr. B.H. BAASET, USNR) and the U.S.S. CYBELLE (AK310) (Lt. Comdr. J.H. CHURCH, Jr. USNR), and were made available to CTG 30.6 and the American Red Cross.

During the first two days of occupation, the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (CL( AA) 53) (Capt. W.E.A. MULLAN, USN) provided all emergency issues of food, clothing, water, and particularly cleaning materials which were urgently needed in policing and rendering office and living spaces habitable. A two-inch fresh water hose was run from the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO to the dock, providing an adequate supply of fresh water for replenishment of the landing forces.

All landing forces came ashore in an amphibious landing status. In order to provide hot food, the necessary galley and mess gear was issued on the second day. Through improvisation and ingenuity, this equipment was put to good use and hot meals were served in local messes on L-PLUS THREE day. Japanese messing facilities and equipment were either non-existent or exceedingly inferior to standard U.S. Navy equipment. The Japanese equipment encountered consisted of usually a charcoal range and a few rice kettles which were left in a depleted and unsanitary condition. The galley and mess spaces were filthy and no possible use. Extensive alteration and renovation would have been required plus the installation of new stoves, ovens, mixers, sinks, etc., before they would meet the minimum sanitary standards. In view of these conditions, and the pressing need for hot food, stoves were improvised in the open near the barracks. Bread was provided by the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO, U.S.S. OAKLAND, and U.S.S. PIEDMONT. The U.S.S. PIEDMONT provided one meal per day during the initial stages of occupation for 750 men and officers attached to the naval landing force.

Water ashore was rendered potable by chlorination, and it was not necessary to utilize the 4 million gallons of fresh water in the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS (AO96) (Commander C.C. EDEN, USNR). However, the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS rendered valuable assistance to the support forces. Tokyo Bay is contaminated, thus preventing the distillation of drinking water in low pressure evaporators in ships at anchor.

Post Offices and a movie exchange were established in LST 648 (Lt. Comdr. C.L. RABELL, USNR) and LST 576 (Lt. S.W. HEARNE, USNR).

In general, it may be said that the execution of all details of this operation was facilitated by the advance planning and foresight given to the preparation. Sufficient quantities of all items were available when required and issued on schedule.
E. I.

(1) GENERAL PLAN - Conforming to the basic premise that Task Force THIRTY-ONE was to occupy the YOKOSUKA Area for a very short time, using the minimum amount of personnel and gear necessary for the purpose from the component units of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, the basic intelligence plan was to have the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE locate as much information and material as possible within the limited time of operations, leaving analysis and study for the Intelligence Organization and Technical teams of the permanent occupation forces.

(2) INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PLANNING AND ORGANIZING PERIOD.
Owing to the fact that there was no adequate photographic and map coverage of the area of occupation, it has been necessary to procure new photography and reproduce existing photographs, and to have photographic interpretation reports based on such photography. These services were in the main furnished by Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT and the carriers in an unbelievably short time and were of the greatest help. In addition, the Commander Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT offered and made available the services of one of his staff photo-interpreters who was of great assistance in processing late photographs as they were delivered. The sudden capitulation of the Japanese found us without grid maps and photo mosaics in quantity for the use of the landing forces, in going ashore, for gunfire and aerial support. The Advance Intelligence Center, Guam, particularly the 64th Engineering Topographical Battalion and InterPac TWO did a magnificent job in getting this material out in a period of 36 hours. Several conferences were held aboard ship while at sea between the Staff Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer for the landing forces. These proved to be of great value. It is regretted that a conference of all intelligence officers engaged in the operation could not have also been held, but it was prohibited by the heavy load on communications and ship to ship transportationincident to the unparalleled feat of organizing and assembling a large Amphibious Force and Naval Base from units of the Fleet while engaged in operations at sea. When Task Force THIRTY-ONE was organized, 3 intelligence officers, 1 Photo Interpretation Officer, 1 Language Officer, and 3 Yeomen were collected from 5 different ships and brought to the flagship. In addition, 20 Language Officers from the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor were distributed among the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE while at sea.

(3) INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF OCCUPATION.
As soon as the landing began, two of the Staff Intelligence Officers went ashore and made a brief inspection of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, the Battleship NAGATO and the Japanese shipping craft present in the harbor. The day after the landings the Staff Intelligence Office was moved ashore. Intelligence activities of the Landing Force, Naval Air Activities, S&A Administrative, Submarine Demilitarization Group, and Naval Shore Activities commenced immediately the huge task of locating all intelligence information and materials. Outstanding was the performance of the only Technical Intelligence Team in the area, a Technical Air Intelligence Unit, which uncovered much valuable information and equipment, especially of and concerning rocket and jet-propelled aircraft. In the same category was the work done by representatives of InterPac in securing information on Japanese mines and minesfields. Splendid performances were also turned in by G-2 Section of TG 31.3 in locating Japanese forces, guns, and defensive installations, and in Liaison activities with the Japanese, by
TG 31.8 on Japanese shipping, by TG 31.9 on Japanese submarines and by TG 31.7 on explosives and ordnance. One of the outstanding features of the operation from an intelligence standpoint was the complete absence of classified documents. The Japanese say these were destroyed prior to the occupation, but it has been noted that when pressed for information the Japanese produce it, stating they get it from the TOKYO Headquarters. It appears that most of their personnel acquainted with the facts can be produced for interrogation, which has thus far been quite productive of the desired information.

(5) **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

Owing to the necessity of getting ashore quickly it was not considered practicable to bring forward Technical Intelligence teams to go ashore with the landing forces, but it is recommended that all types of teams be sent immediately to analyze, examine, and report on the vast amount of all kinds of Naval material located by the forces under Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

E. 2.

Completed information has been submitted in a special report, "Yokosuka Naval Base Confidential Survey Report," A17/CTP 31 Serial 31 dated 3 September 1945; a brief summary follows:

Industrial facilities, Yokosuka Navy Yard. This Navy Yard is a large shipbuilding and repair yard capable of the construction and maintenance of any class of naval vessels. At its maximum capacity, about 75,000 persons were employed in the yard, although this figure had been reduced to 40,000 during the past year. This reduction was occasioned by the cessation of all ship-building except midget submarines and a lack of ships to overhaul.

As to the physical plant, the following comments are made:

(a) There are fine shipways, one of which is large enough for a BB. All are operational except #4, of which the underwater ways are collapsed. For the past several months, the ways have been used exclusively for the fabrication and assembly of midget submarines.

(b) There are six dry docks, all of which are operational except #6. The main pump motors of this dock have suffered water damage, but can be repaired. All dry docks except #6 are empty and ready for use if desired. Dry dock #6 has been used as a building dock, and contains two partially completed DD's plus a large amount of miscellaneous materials.

(c) Bomb damage to yard is slight; capacity of yard is not affected.

(d) Maintenance of shop buildings and equipment is very poor. Also the outside areas of the yard are badly cluttered up with scrap, lumber, small sheds, miscellaneous equipment from heavy ships, and piles of rubble removed in digging caves.

(e) Waterfront and dockside cranes are adequate and in good condition.

(f) About half the light shop equipment necessary for production of midget submarines has been moved into underground shops.
SHIPPING

All the time of the occupation, the following Japanese naval vessels were present:

1 - BB - NAGATO
1 - CA - FUJI
6 - DD - Second line vessels.
9 - SS -
6 - Numbered transports.
180 - SS (midget)
2 - Minelayers
1 - Collier - SOYA
Miscellaneous auxiliaries and small craft.

The NAGATO had suffered underwater and topside damage during the bombing attack of 18 July 1945, but only tentative steps had been taken for repairing her. The ship has not been docked, therefore, the extent of the underwater damage is not known. Three bomb hits topside demolished the navigating bridge and resulted in extensive damage to the superstructure and top hamper in the area of the mainmast and stack. The top of the mainmast and upper part of the stack had been removed preliminary to repairs.

The DD's and miscellaneous vessels at the base were, for the most part, operational, but appeared to have been immobilized for some time. These ships had been demilitarized prior to the occupation.

All submarines had been demilitarized prior to the occupation and were taken over by CTG 31.9 without incident. The midget submarines were now, and were evidently being readied for use against any invasion fleet.

E. 3. SPECIAL COMMENT

While the occasion, fortunately, never arose for the use of force, it is noteworthy to mention that all preliminary planning was based on the well known characteristic for treachery exhibited by the Japanese in past operations, and that strong opposition by organized military factions was likely.

Each operation was carefully covered by main battery, secondary battery and where applicable by small ship armament including rockets and automatic weapons. Air support, air reconnaissance, air photography and spotting were carefully planned for and co-ordinated. Heavy ship fire support from other Task Forces was also made available and alerted for the first sign of opposition.

Comment is also made here on the meticulous economy in the use of personnel. Forced by operating conditions to draw officers and men from ships at sea still engaged in alerted combat status, officers and men were assigned dual positions. They were initially assigned to tasks while afloat and in the approach and landing phases, and assumed other assignments as soon as the landing was established.
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PART VII - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel engaged in this operation was of highest order and in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service.

There were no casualties. No incidents of violence occurred which reflects the high standard of discipline and leadership during this occupation of enemy territory where various armed factions were present.
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PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

When it is considered that this operation was without precedent, unique in its conception; and that all planning and preliminary organization was done at sea, necessitating the transfer of personnel and material by breeches buoys and whips; the high order of the personnel performance is a credit to the ingenuity, tenacity and ability of officers and men of the U.S. Navy to overcome difficulties and handicaps imposed by the prevailing conditions.

There are no further recommendations.
CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION REPORT

FLEET LANDING FORCE (TG 31.3) AND
TASK FORCE ABLE, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

INITIAL OCCUPATION
OF
YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE AREA
JAPAN

32

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ENCLOSURE "D"
HEADQUARTERS
FLEET LANDING FORCE (TG 31.3)
YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

7 September, 1945.

From: Commanding General, Fleet Landing Force (CTG 31.3).
To: Commander YOKOSUKA Occupation Forces (CTF 31).
Subject: Special Action Report (CTG 31.3).
Reference: (a) CTF 31 Message 030000, September 1945.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following Action Report is submitted.

2. Due to the unusual conditions of the organization of this Landing Force, it has been necessary to include the history of Task Force AME, Sixth Marine Division.

Y. T. CLEMENT
ACTION REPORT

Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3)
and Task Force Able
Sixth Marine Division,
Yokosuka Naval Base,
Yokosuka, Japan
7 September, 1945
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Headquarters
Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3)
Yokosuka Naval Base
Yokosuka, Japan
7 September, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION REPORT
Initial Occupation, Yokosuka Naval Base
Yokosuka, Japan

CHAPTER I - GENERAL

1. The purpose of this Action Report is to describe
the activities and the part played in the initial occupation
of the Yokosuka Naval Base Area, Yokosuka, Japan by the THIRD
Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3) as part of Yokosuka Occupation
Forces (Task Force 31).

2. Due to the fact that this Fleet Landing Force
was formed at sea, and because the nucleus of it consists
of Task Force Able of the Sixth Marine Division, this report
covers not only the activities of the Fleet Landing Force,
from 1400, 19 August to 1200, 2 September, 1945, but the
history of Task Force Able from its inception 13 September,
1945.
CHAPTER II - TASK ORGN

a. Fourth Marines (Reinf), Sixth Marine Division (TU 31.3.1): LtCol F. D. BEANS, USMC

4th Mar Regt
1st Bn, 15th Mar
Co C, 6th Tank Bn
Tank Maint Sec, 6th Ser Bn
Co A, 6th Engr Bn
Co A, 6th Ficn Bn
Co A, 6th Med Bn
Truck Co, 6th MT Bn
1st Plt, Ord Co
Ser Plt, 6th Ser Bn
Supply Plt, 6th Ser Bn
Band Sec, 6th Mar Div Band
SP Com Team, 6th ASCO
SFC Pte, 6th ASCO
AGL Team, 6th ASCO

b. Fleet Marine Landing Force (TU 31.3.2): LtCol W. F. LANTZ, USMC

(Regt Has and 3 Prov Bns of Marines from Marine Bts of various ships of the THIRD Fleet. Total strength, Approx 1,700 officers and men.)

c. Fleet Naval Landing Force (TU 31.3.3): Comdr L. F. MALONE, USN

(Regt Has and 3 Prov Bns of Bluejackets from ships of the THIRD Fleet; 2 line Bns and the third Bn consisting of Prov nucleus crews for manning On Japanese ships. Total strength of Regt: Approx 1,000 officers and men.)

d. British Landing Force (TU 31.3.4) Capt H. J. BUCHANON, DSO, RAN

Royal Navy Bn (250 officers and men)

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Royal Marine Commando (200 officers and men)

e. Co A, Fourth Amphibious Tractor Battalion: Capt F. DAVIES USMC

f. Co D, Sixth Medical Battalion: Lt M. D. MICHAEL, (MC) USN

g. Landing Force Headquarters: LtCol L. METZGER, USMC

Hq Det
1st Plt, 6th LT Co
CHAPTER III - PRELIMINARY PLANNING

3-1

Preliminary plans for the activation of Task Force Able were drawn up by Headquarters, III Amphibious Corps on 11 August, 1945. The Task Force was to consist of a Task Force Headquarters of 19 officers and 44 enlisted men which was later augmented by 2 officers and 63 enlisted personnel, and a reinforced infantry regiment with an overall strength of 233 officers, 16 Warrant officers and 2902 enlisted for a total of 5156. Contingent units consisting of an amphibious tractor company and a medical company were added bringing the total up to 251 officers, 16 Warrant officers and 5133 enlisted or a grand total of 5400.

The regiment designated as part of the Task Force was found to be 600 enlisted men understrength. Replacements were secured from the Transient Center, Marianas Area, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific on 12 August, 1945, to bring the regiment up to strength.

Task Force Headquarters was activated on 13 August, 1945 consisting of an Executive and Special staff. The clerical staff was kept to a minimum.

3-2

The Task Force 31.3 Intelligence Section was formed from the present Sixth Marine Division Intelligence Section consisting of four officers and twelve enlisted men. Sub-sections were composed of:

- Language
- Aerial Photo Interpretation
- Counter-Intelligence
- Photographic

Necessary equipment to adequately function was immediately drawn and preparations made for embarking as Task Force Able. The 3-2 section was divided up into advance and rear party. The advance party consisted of 3-2, two language officers, two enlisted, and photographic personnel. Additional language personnel were requested from Pearl Harbor to be assigned to the Fourth Marines. Maps and aerial photos were requested from CinCPAC on possible target areas that this force would probably be assigned.

Considerable information, reports and maps were gathered prior to departure of the advance party. Distribution of Japanese Naval and Army uniform insignia identifications were made to acquaint all personnel with them.
CHAPTER III (Cont'd) Page #5

G-3

Because Task Force Able was organized with 24-hour notice before the Headquarters sailed from Guam, there was no opportunity for any preliminary planning by the Operations Section. All that was known was that the Force was directed to report to Com Third Fleet for duty in connection with the occupation of Japan. The only operations order issued was that of the Sixth Marine Division which ordered Task Group Able aboard the designated ships.

A skeleton operations section consisting of G-3, one officer assistant, two clerks and a draftsman, was assembled from the G-3 Section, Sixth Marine Division. A bare minimum of equipment and supplies were taken, assuming that the Task Force would not be expanded by additional units, as was later the case.

G-4

The Task Force G-4 Section was activated and alerted at 1030 on 11 August, 1945. The first executive staff meeting was held at this hour and warning was given that the entire organization must be ready to embark in forty-eight hours. This required the complete re-outfitting of all elements of the Fourth Regimental Combat Team (Reinforced) which were rehabilitating from the OKINAWA Campaign.

For purposes of close coordination and smooth operation G-4 acted as G-4 of the Fourth Marine Regiment during the planning phase. Complete requirements for clothing, ordnance, motor transport, signal, engineer and all other organizational equipment and supplies had to be determined and arranged for from Fifth Field Service Depot. Initially this was difficult due to the ultra secret nature of the proposed operation and to the fact that all dealing with supply service agencies and the Island Command was required to be made through G-4, Third Amphibious Corps. However, units were able to compile requisitions and have them ready for submission the moment this prohibition was lifted. Pump areas and dock spaces for ships likewise had to be arranged with Island Command without exposing the character of the operation. Planning and supplying was considerably complicated by the restriction imposed.

The veil of secrecy was lifted at 0900 on 12 August, 1945 and permission was granted to deal directly with all necessary agencies. Fifth Field Service Depot was alerted and both this and all receiving units went on a twenty-four hour basis of operation.
Fortunately, all ships were announced as due to arrive in port on 14 August, 1945, twenty-four hours later than originally planned for. The evening before the arrival of shipping all loading plans for supplies were thrown into chaos by the substitution of a smaller class ship, APA 172 (USS GRIMES) for APA 2, (USS HARPIS). This necessitated a complete reconsideration of the priorities of supplies to be loaded and the equipment to be embarked due to the drastic reduction in shipping space caused by this change. In view of this, it became evident that additional shipping space was required and an urgent request for two LSTs or an APA was submitted to Third Amphibious Corps. In response to that request an LST (No 1083) was furnished and this command was informed that no additional ships would be allocated. For the above reasons approximately 250 tons and 30,000 cubic feet of supplies and organization equipment were left behind in mounting out dumps for later transport to the Task Force.

Shipping space for this unembarked cargo was requested on departure from Guam and while still at sea this force was notified that one additional LST (No 846) had been allotted to carry a portion of the supplies that had been left behind. In a period of approximately 96 hours the Fourth Regimental Combat Team, Reinforced, had been completely re-outfitted, all equipment deficiencies corrected, all elements provided an initial allowance to bring them up to T/O and T/A levels, and a thirty day re-supply procured for shipment.

Signal Officer

Planning ashore was of necessity limited by time and security. The number and type of personnel to be taken was considered. Also, the amount and type of equipment to be used was fixed.

Personnel was chosen from the Signal Company, Sixth Marine Division. All had just returned from the OKINAWA Campaign and were familiar with field operation, SOTs and the SOF.

Type and amount of equipment to be employed was reached after an analysis of the mission to be accomplished, the number of forces involved and the time left before re-supply could be accomplished. Sufficient supplies were taken to provide for initial issue to lower units, repair of all equipment and re-plenishments for all units.
Surgeon

On receiving orders that the Fourth Marine Regiment (Reinforced) was to embark on this operation, the Regimental Surgeon was given additional duties as Landing Force Surgeon on the Commanding General Task Force Able's Staff. The usual medical set-up throughout the regiment was maintained. In addition, one medical company was among its reinforcing units. One additional medical company was assigned to the Landing Force to provide for the possible handling and evacuation of allied prisoners of war and non-combatants. A malaria and insect control squad was also attached to the Landing Force to direct an insect control program.

Medical supplies were secured of the same type and amount which were used when embarking for the OKINAWA Campaign. Care of the troops on route was accomplished in conjunction with the medical departments of the various ships.

All troops prior to embarking and while on route for the occupation of Japan received inoculations for Typhus, Cholera, and Plague. One cc of Cholera and Plague; one half cc of Typhus.
CHAPTER IV. LOADING AND DISCARATION

The Division Transport Quartermaster Section was alerted at 1400, 11 August, 1945, to load-out the Fourth Regimental Combat Team, forty-eight hours prior to the expected time of the ships' arrival.

Five APAs, one A A, and one LCS were assigned for initial embarkation of this unit: GIANTS (APA 172),亂ANNE (APA 383), EIGHTY (APA 136), "LATOS (APA 126), RALPH (APA 165), "CLANCY (APA 64), CALIFORNIA (LSD 17). These ships were allocated to units as follows:

GIANTS  HCT Hq, Fleet Landing Force Hq
BRENTON  2d Bn, 4th Mar
LATER  1st Bn, 4th Mar
ALTRINITY  3d Bn, 4th Mar
HERIT FIFTER  1st Bn, 16th Mar
ANNESHA  Co A, 6th Engr Bn and Dets
from other HCT units
CATAIJUNT  Co C, 6th Tank Bn

Unit personnel and tonnage tables were completed by the embarking units and served as a basis for the allocation of shipping. Due to the limited period during which loading was to take place and to the indefinite amount of supplies to be received on the docks from the field depot, it was necessary to stow cargo on a commercial and organizational unit loading basis to meet the embarkation requirements by the time of departure of the ships. As a result it was possible to call for only two embarkation forms: The UCT Tables and the Profile Loading Plans, the latter having to be made up while the ships were actually loading.

Logistical planning in loading-out was made difficult due to the fact that one large APA (Ham.I., APA 2) was deleted from the group of ships assigned and another APA whose capacity was one-half that of the former was substituted. This change was made only twenty-four hours before the ships arrived, at which time all cargo stowage plans had been completed on paper, necessitating that cargo scheduled for particular ships be transferred to others in order to get the high priority equipment aboard. The situation was only slightly relieved by the assignment of an LCT (Co 1063) to make up for the loss of shipping capacity and by the arrival of ships twenty-four hours later than expected. Consequently, not all the equipment scheduled for embarkation got a board, and an additional LCT (Co 346) was made available to transport a portion of that cargo left on the beach after the ships' departure, including the amphibian tractors of Co A, 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

The ships were available for loading on the afternoon of 14 August, 1945. All APAs terminated loading at 1900,
16 August, 1945, and the AM at 1600; troops went aboard between 1000 and 1200 the same day, the date of departure.

The loading got well underway during the evening of 14 August, 1945 and once started, progressed steadily without any major difficulties or delays.
CHAPTER V - IN ROUTE TO OBJECTIVE AREA (13 Aug to 18 Aug 45)

In accordance with CINCPAC order, a nucleus of the Task Force ABLE Headquarters, consisting of the Commanding General and eleven other officers and forty-two enlisted departed from the Sixth Marine Division on GUAM and embarked in the USS OZARK (LST 2) 13 August, 1945. That ship sailed that evening to join the THIRD Fleet in waters off the Japanese coast, where Brigadier General Cnatalo was ordered to report with his force for duty to Commander THIRD Fleet. Remaining elements of Task Force ABLE sailed two days later, 15 August, 1945, in ships of Transport Division Sixty.

Since no definite mission had been assigned the force, time was spent en route studying intelligence summaries of the TOKYO Area. Maps were few and inadequate. The trip was uneventful. On 15 August, 1945 a dispatch was received on board from CINCPAC to cease all offensive operations against Japanese forces.

At 0915, 16 August, 1945, the USS BONE, a DD escort ship, reported a torpedo wake across the bow of the OZARK at 1000 yards. A depth charge attack was executed with unobserved results.

Ships of the THIRD Fleet were sighted and joined 18 August, 1945.
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CHAPTER VI - PLAN FOR INVASION (19 Aug to 29 Aug 45)

In accordance with orders from Commander THIRD Fleet, the Commanding General and key staff members transferred to the USS LISSOMO (CL 63) via destroyer escort at 0800, 19 August for a conference.

At the conference it was learned that the THIRD Fleet would play an active part in the occupation of JAPAN by landing a Landing Force on the MIURA Peninsula, 30 miles SE of TOKYO. Task Force 31 was tentatively established, with Rear Admiral J. C. LARDNER, USA, in command. Task Force 31 comprised all the task groups which would participate in the occupation, one of which was THIRD Fleet Landing Force (TG 31.3), under the command of Brigade General CLEMENT. The task group included not only Task Force Able of the Sixth Marine Division (which consisted of the Fourth Marine Regiment (Reinforced), Company VC of the Sixth Medical Battalion, Company Able of the Fourth Amphibian Tractor Battalion and Task Force Headquarters) but a provisional regiment of 2,000 Bluejackets, and a provisional battalion of 450 Royal Marines and Naval ratings, all mustered from combatant ships of the THIRD Fleet.

At the time it was thought that the 11th Airborne Division would make initial Army landings by air on the YOKOSUKA Airfield, which would first have to be secured by the Fleet Landing Force. The primary mission was to occupy and secure the entire YOKOSUKA Naval Base, which included the Air Station. Other missions were: to secure the ZUSHI Area, which included HAYAMA Imperial Palace (tentative headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), and the demilitarization of the entire MIURA Peninsula.

Two tentative plans were discussed at the conference:
PLAN 1: To land on the reasonably-good beaches at ZUSHI, on the southwest coast of the Peninsula, to quickly secure the ZUSHI area; then to drive overland in two columns over the two good roads five miles across the Peninsula to the YOKOSUKA Naval Base. This plan called for the unloading of supplies and equipment at the YOKOSUKA docks and beaches, the ships to have been sent around the Peninsula as soon as the assault troops had debarked at ZUSHI.

PLAN 2: To land simultaneously on beaches at YOKOSUKA Navy Yard and Air Station and occupy and secure the entire Naval Base, then, on order, to secure the ZUSHI area, sealing off Peninsula and demilitarize it.

Plan 1 was originally the preferred plan since it did not involve the possible peril of Plan 2, that of bringing
CHAPTER VI - (Cont'd)

the shipping initially into the restricted waters south of
TOKYO BAY, keeping in mind the possibility of Japanese treach-
ery. Accordingly, a recommendation was sent from Commander
THIRD Fleet to Commanding General EIGHTH Army, who had been
assigned by SCAP as commander ashore until the arrival of
SCAP, and with whom Navy Occupation Forces were directed to
coordinate planning.

At 1400, 19 August, 1945 Task Force 31 was officially
organized and Brigadier General CLEMENT became Commander
Task Group 31.3. Consequently, Task Force ABLE, Sixth Marine
Division, was assimilated into Task Group 31.3. The Fourth
Marines (Reinforced) became Task Unit 31.3.1 and Company DOG,
Sixth Medical Battalion and Company ALLE, Fourth Amphibian
Tractor Battalion were other separate units of the Fleet
Landing Force (TG 31.3).

On 20 August, 1945 the remainder of Task Force ABLE,
Sixth Marine Division, embarked on ships of Transport Divi-
Sion Sixty, joined the THIRD Fleet. At 1400 the same day,
the Commanding General and staff transferred the headquarters
of Task Group 31.3 from the USS OLARK to the USS CRIMES (APA
172), on which the headquarters of the Fourth Marines (Re-
inforced) was already embarked. Due to lack of shipping, the
Tank Company of the Fourth Marines and the Amphibian Tractor
Company plus other materiel had been delayed in loading at
GUAM, and had not arrived.

In order for commanders of Task Units 31.3.1, 31.3.2,
and 31.3.3 to establish organization and control of their
provisional commands, it was necessary to transfer designated
marine detachments and designated groups of bluejackets from
the various ships of the THIRD Fleet to available transports.
Consequently, early on 20 August, 1945, American and British
Sailors and Marines were transferred to the following ships:

TU 31.3.2  USS GARRARD (APA 84)
           USS OZARK (LSV 2)

TU 31.3.3  USS MONITOR (LSV 5)
           USS H. A. BASS (APD 124)
           USS RUPELS (APD 85)

TU 31.3.4  USS SIMS (APD 50)
           USS PAVLIC (APD 70)
           USS LARR (APD 39)
CHAPTER VI - (Cont'd)

All transfers were accomplished while underway at sea by use of breeches buoys, a monumental and unprecedented task which was smoothly accomplished by the Navy. The largest carriers and battleships were brought alongside the various transports, and the transfers were accomplished without a mishap.

LOVE-Day, the day of the landing, was originally scheduled for 25 August. On 20 August it was changed and tentatively set for 23 August, 1945.

At 0900, 21 August, 1945, a conference was held aboard the USS CHINO at which time the Commanding General outlined to all subordinate unit commanders the provisions of Opn Plan No 1-45 (Preferred) and Opn Plan No 2-45 (Alternate). The preferred plan called for the landing on beaches at the YOKOSUKA Navy Yard and Air Station and the alternate plan provided for landing on the beach at SHURI.

Commanding General EIGHTH Army directed, by dispatch to Commander THIRD Fleet on 21 August, 1945, that the preferred plan would be executed since the SHURI area had been selected by the Supreme Commander as his headquarters area and was consequently restricted area. The message further directed that the Fleet Landing Force would secure the general area UHIDA-NAIROI-YOKOSUKA-FUTABA-SHURI, which generally outlined the force's area of responsibility, and delineated a tentative boundary. Boundaries were to be coordinated by Commanding General ELEVENTH Airborne Division, which unit was responsible for the remainder of the Peninsula. It was established at this time that the initial army airborne landings would be made at ATSHA airfield, a few miles northwest of the northern end of UHIDA Peninsula instead of YOKOSUKA Airfield, as it was originally believed they would. Consequently, HOUR-Hour of LOVE-Day was planned to mark a simultaneous Army and Navy landing on the Japanese homeland, the Army by air and the Navy by sea.

Although directives affecting the employment of the Fleet Landing Force were being received from the Commanding General EIGHTH Army, the Commanding General Fleet Landing Force had no orders placing that force under the operational control of the Army.

At 1430, 21 August, 1945 orders were received to provide for the early demilitarization of the existing forts and shore batteries on FUTUJU SHUKI, a long, narrow peninsula which jutted out from the eastern shore into UHIDA Strait at the mouth of TOYOKO BAY. The operations plan provided for elements of the British Landing Force to land on and demilitarize four small island forts in the UHIDA Strait to insure the
CHAPTER VI - (Cont'd)

the safety of American and British ships entering TOKYO BAY. That operation plan was changed to include a landing by the reserve battalion landing team of the Fourth Marines on the south shores of FUTTSU SAKI on LOVE-Day as soon after daylight as possible. On completion of that mission they were to reembark in their landing craft and proceed to the rendezvous area to rejoin the Fourth Marines and land on order as regimental reserve at the Navy Yard.

The SOUTHERLAND (DD 743) was established as the control station through which all requests for air or naval gunfire support would be filtered. Arrangements were made for two teams of two observation planes each for air observers over the objective. There were no planes assigned for direct support but, approximately 1,000 airborne planes of Task Force 52 were armed and available on call. The naval gunfire support plan called for the AA cruiser, SAP DIESO, four destroyers and 12 LCIs to furnish fire support on call.

The Underwater Demolitions Teams were assigned to the Force for the landing, one of which was assigned to the British Landing Force for their island landings, and the other to the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines for its landing on FUTTSU SAKI. A team of ten gunners' mates was also assigned to that battalion for any necessary work in connection with demilitarizing the heavy coast defense guns.

On 26 August, 1945 word was received from Commander THIRD Fleet that, due to typhoons interfering with Army air operations, LOVE-Day was postponed 48 hours and was established as August 30th.

On 28 August, 1945 the Commanding General proceeded with Rear Admiral BADGER in the USS SAN DIEGO to TOKYO BAY where a conference was held with Japanese emissaries of YOKOSUKA Naval Base, to permit certain demands relative to the landing and occupation of the area. The Japanese were directed to clear the area of personnel in excess of skeleton maintenance crews, to demilitarize and mark all coastal defense and AA installations with white flags visible four miles to seaward, to have Japanese officers and guides on the beach to meet the landing force, to provide certain motor transport, and other matters to facilitate the landing and occupation.

A final conference of subordinate unit commanders was held on 29 August, 1945. All plans had been based on NOY-Hour being at 1000, which hour had been specified throughout the planning phase. During the late afternoon of
29 August, 1945 a dispatch was received announcing the Hour for the ELEVENTH Airborne Division which would be 0600 on 30 August, 1945. This required the stepping up of the ship movement into TOKYO BAY in order to land at FUJIU SAKI at 0600 and at the YOKOSUKA Naval Base at 0930.

Appendix 1 - Intelligence Planning

The preliminary intelligence planning for the occupation of YOKOSUKA Naval Base, Air Station, ADURA Peninsula and eastern half of ADURA Peninsula was accomplished initially with a divided G-2 section. Three officers and two men formed the advance section with the remainder of the G-2 section embarking with the Fourth Marines. With the announcement of the target area, plans were made to acquire maps, latest aerial photos and mosaics, and photo interpretation reports from CINCPAC by dispatch to be forwarded immediately.

THIRD Fleet Intelligence staff was invaluable in the assistance rendered in acquiring the latest aerial photos from the carrier task force in supplementing general information on the target area, due to lack of existing maps of target area.

Cooperation from the carrier task force in furnishing needed aerial photos and charts was excellent. With the late arrival of material ordered from GUAM in maps and aerial mosaics, preliminary planning was done from a large scale inaccurate map and the assortment of aerial photographs made available.

Complete distribution of 125,000 target area maps and aerial mosaics were made to all units the day prior to the landing.

Task Force 31 assigned 13 additional language officers to augment the language section.

Appendix 2 - Supply Planning

While underway, 20 August, 1945, it was announced that a Fleet Marine Force, a Naval Landing Force, and a British Landing Force were to be attached to the Task Force for the operation and that it would be necessary to supply all of
CHAPTER VI - Appendix 2 (Cont'd)

these units initially. This required the allocation of
transportation and communication equipment from that carried
by the Fourth Marines, as well as the supply of food, water
and other supplies.

These units were all organized at sea and hence had no
Class I or III supplies. Arrangements were made to provide
these supplies until LOVE plus three at which time it was
planned that the THIRD Fleet Logistic Plan would be in opera-
tion and their supplies could be drawn from U. S. and Bri-
tish Naval facilities.

Appendix 3 - Signal Planning

Planning aboard ship was hurried, but complete. Upon
arrival of Task Force 31.3 Headquarters in the THIRD Fleet
area the communication officers of THIRD Fleet and Task
Force 31 were contacted. Thereafter, a series of conferences
were arranged, at which a complete communication plan was
evolved. During the course of the conferences liaison was
arranged between the communication officers of the air sup-
port group, naval gunfire support group and transport group.
The final plan included all radio frequencies, call signs,
codes and cyphers, radio nets and communication procedure to
be followed.

Task Force 31.3 Signal Order was delivered to lower units
aboard ship only nine days before the landing. Most of the
lower units were newly organized and were unfamiliar with land
operations. However, Task Group 31.3 Signal Plan covered
basic instructions, to include the battalion. Time for in-
doctrination of enlisted personnel was short. However, im-
mediately after the plan had been distributed all hands
were given a concentrated period of orientation. Two days
prior to landing the Force Signal Officer made spot oral
examinations of several enlisted communication personnel.
The results were gratifying and as was proven later the short
period of planning was no more of a handicap than a bit of
uneasiness in Task Group Headquarters.
LANDING PLAN
FLEET LANDING FORCE
YOKOSUKA, JAPAN
LOVE DAY, 30 AUG 45

AIRBORNE LANDING - LOVE DAY
11th AIRBORNE DIV

Main Landing H-Hr.
Yokosuka Navy Yard & Airfield
4th Marines
Fleet Naval Landing Force
Fleet Marine Landing Force

Landing Beach
Opp Plan No 2-45 (alternate)

Scale 1:250,000

0 5 10
0 10 15

CONTOUR INTERVAL 100 METERS
CHAPTER VII - OCCUPATION PHASE

EVE-Day dawned clear and warm with a calm sea, a perfect day for an amphibious landing. The transports with escorts moved from 0515 to 0615, proceeding in three groups to TOKO BAY. The first group carried the Second Battalion Fourth Marines designated to land on FUTSU and as soon as possible after daylight on EVE-Day. The second group carried the bulk of the Landing Force, consisting of the Fourth Marines minus one battalion, the Fleet Marine Landing Force, and Fleet Naval Landing Force. The third group made up of four APBs, carried the British Landing Force, designated to land on SARU SHIBA and island PANOS numbers 2 and 3 in about 0015 at Hoy minus thirty minutes.

The Second Battalion Fourth Marines landed on the south shore of FUTSU SHIBA at 0555, and the American flag was raised on the beach at 0530. Twenty-two Japanese surrendered FORT to land FUTSU SHIBA FORT which were demilitarized. Seventeen guns and mortars of various calibers were rendered inoperative in FUTSU SHIBA FORT and in FORT NO 1 four 150mm guns were demilitarized. American flags were raised over both forts. At 0615 the battalion had accomplished its mission and was reembarking in landing craft to take part in the main landing as the reserve battalion for the Fourth Marines reinforced.

The first wave of the Fourth Marines reached the Line of Departure for both RED and GREEN beaches at 0515 and proceeded to the beaches according to schedule. At 0630 the Task Group Command Post dispatched to CVP 24 from VMSB 172. At 0635 a friendly plane was reported to have landed at LANPANIA airfield without any known orders. At 0630 the Third Battalion Fourth Marines landed on beach RED, while the First Battalion Fourth Marines landed on beach RED at 0630. Ten minutes later the British Landing Force (TU 313) was proceeding toward SARU SHIBA.

The combat-trained Fourth Marines landed tactically and moved rapidly inland from the beaches at the Navy Yard and air station. There was no resistance or violence. The few remaining Japanese personnel were white armbands, as per instructions. This signified that they were essential to the maintenance and operation of public utilities and other necessary functions.

The troops moved through the Navy Yard and airfield, leaving guards on warehouses and installations, checking all arm and dual-purpose guns to see that the breech-blocks had been removed, and driving all non-essential Japanese before them.
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CHAPTER VII (Cont'd)

During the initial phases of the landing it was noted that the Japanese had complied with the order that they place white flags on all coastal batteries and AA positions, and that these flags were plainly visible from the water. This was the beginning of many incidents of complete cooperation on the part of the Japanese.

The Commanding General and his staff landed at 1000 on beach GREEN and established the Fleet Landing Force Command Post. General CLEMENT was met by a Japanese Navy Captain, an Japanese Colonel, and party of Japanese officers who formally surrendered the area and received instructions as to what was expected of the Japanese in the form of cooperation. They were informed that non-cooperation or opposition of any kind would be severely dealt with.

The Commanding General then proceeded to the old Headquarters building where the American flag was officially raised over the Naval Base at 1018 with appropriate ceremony. This flag was the one raised by the First Provisional Marine Brigade over GUAM and by the Sixth Marine Division on OKINAWA.

Instructions were then issued for Japanese Vice Admiral TOITSUKA, Commandant of the Naval Base, to be present at 1030 at Beach No 36 to formally surrender the entire Naval area to Rear Admiral BADGER (CTF 31). The Commanding General then proceeded to the dock to receive Rear Admiral BADGER from the USS SAN DIEGO. At 1045 Admiral TOITSUKA officially surrendered the area to Rear Admiral CARNEY, Chief of Staff to Commander THIRD Fleet, and to Rear Admiral BADGER (CTF 31). The surrender was made with appropriate ceremony following which the Commanding General, with Admiral BADGER, returned to Naval Base Headquarters and established headquarters for CTF 31 and Commanding General Fleet Landing Force.

At 1330 Fleet Admiral NIMITZ, Admiral HALSEY, and certain staff officers came ashore and during the afternoon made a complete inspection of Naval Headquarters and the area, accompanied by the Commanding General. Following this inspection Admiral BADGER and General CLEMENT called a conference of the Japanese Vice Admiral and his staff to perfect working arrangements between the Japanese and the American forces in taking over the naval area.

During the morning the landing of successive elements continued without any unusual incidents or violence, and it was marked by excellent cooperation on the part of the Japanese. At 1015 the British Landing Force had effected successful landings on SARU SHIMA and subsequently at the Navigation
School, in the Naval base, and was proceeding with the occupation and demilitarization of its assigned areas.

At 1037 the first wave of the Fleet Naval Landing Force (TU 31,3.3) landed on beach GREEN and orders were issued for that force to be assembled at the Sunbury School to prepare to assume responsibility for specified areas of the Navy Yard. At 1100 the Fleet Marine Landing Force (TU 31,3.2) was ordered ashore on beach RED to prepare to relieve the First Battalion Fourth Marines on the YOKOSUKA Airfield. At 1250 a patrol was sent by the Fourth Marines to the Harbor Master's Office to clear it for the arrival of SOPA Administrative (CIB 31,3). At 1100 Fleet Landing Force Command Post moved to Naval Headquarters from beach GREEN. At 1200 operational control of Fleet Landing Force passed from THIRD Fleet to EIGHTH Army.

Summarizing the operations of the Fourth Marines, the landing was carried out according to schedule with no notable incidents. The initial landing on PUTSU SAKI was rapidly accomplished; the flag was raised over FORT PUTSU SAKI and FORT No 1, weapons completely demilitarized, and the battalion reembarked immediately to take part in the main landing. The battalions landed according to schedule on beaches GREEN and RED at H-Hour and moved expeditiously forward clearing the area so that the occupying units, Fleet Marine Landing Force and Fleet Naval Landing Force, were able to land immediately. The reserve battalion and supporting units were brought ashore in the late morning and early afternoon.

Following its landing the Naval Landing Force was rapidly reorganized. In the early afternoon they relieved the Third Battalion Fourth Marines in the initial area of occupation. Guards were set up on important installations and warehouses, and walking patrols were posted where necessary. The Fleet Marine Landing Force made an uneventful landing and immediately began relieving the First Battalion Fourth Marines in the occupation of the airfield.

The British Landing Force, having made successful landings on three harbor forts, moved in to occupy their assigned area generally in the vicinity of the Navigation School. The initial landings had been made at approximately 0900 on the island forts where numerous coast defense guns were rendered inoperative. Royal Marine Commandos occupied and demilitarized AZUMA Island, which had apparently been abandoned for two or three months. All Japanese personnel
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CHAPTER VII - (Cont'd)

were evacuated from these forts and transported to the navy yard for further disposition.

The Fourth Marines, having been relieved in their initial areas of occupation, moved out the the designated Initial Occupation Line and set up a perimeter defense for the navy yard and airfield.

The first night was quiet; occupation continued, guards posted on important installations, and small patrols covered the larger areas on which guards had not been posted.

On 31 August, 1945 the Fleet Landing Force continued consolidation of the occupied Naval Base and made preparations for sending patrols down the Peninsula to demilitarize outlying installations.

At 0900 General CLIMENT left for YOKOHAMA, Headquarters of Supreme Allied Commander, to confer with Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER, Commanding General EIGHTH Army, on the policies concerning the occupation of assigned areas. During the forenoon Lieutenant General GEIGER, Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, came ashore and made an inspection of the area.

On orders from the Commanding General, EIGHTH Army, at 1030, one company from the Fourth Marines was embarked on APDs 50 and 72 to make a reconnaissance in force of the TATEYAMA Airfield and beach approaches and cover the landing of 112th Regimental Combat Team scheduled to be made on 3 September, 1945. The company was preceded by two Underwater Demolition Teams embarked on two APDs with the mission of reconnoitering and clearing approaches to the TATEYAMA beaches. At 1545, the reconnaissance company, Company LOVE, Third Battalion Fourth Marines, reported that they were on the beach, having been met by a Japanese surrender party. Complete cooperation from the Japanese Army, Navy and the Foreign Office enabled the company to expeditiously discharge their mission and set up headquarters in the Naval Air Station.

During the course of the day all units continued to occupy and secure assigned areas. No incidents of violence or non-cooperation occurred.

At 0630, 1 September, 1945 all Landing Force personnel from the USS MASSACHUSETTS, USS SAN JACINTO, USS Wasp, USS WHITE PLAINES, USS SAN DIEGO, and USS ASTORIA were dispatched from the landing force and returned to their ships.
During the morning two motorized patrols of company strength were sent from the Fourth Marines south to Uraga and Kubiri. Installations were demilitarized and formal surrenders made by several garrisons to the commanding officers of the patrols acting as representatives for the Commanding General. Three other patrols of platoon strength covered adjacent areas to the Naval Base. A guard of company strength was placed on Japanese APCs in Dry Dock No. 4 to guard Japanese prisoners from Marcus Island. One squad from the Fourth Marines was sent to Kannon Saki to act as security for the Harbor Entrance Control Post being set up by SORI Administrative.

At noon Lieutenant General Eichelberger, Commanding General, Eighth Army, visited Naval Headquarters and made an inspection of the Navy Yard and Airfield, escorted by the Commanding General.

September 2d General Clement went on board the USS Missouri to witness the signing of the Japanese surrender. Operations continued in a routine manner, patrols being sent south to remove ordnance equipment from Japanese forts and garrisons. No incidents of violence occurred.

At 1200, 2 September, 1945 the situation was as follows: Fleet Naval Landing Force (TU 31.3.3) was garrisoning and providing for internal security for the eastern half of the Navy Yard, Fleet Marine Landing Force (TU 31.3.2) had a similar mission in the entire airfield area, and the British Landing Force (TU 31.3.4) was occupying and securing important installations along the beach between the airfield and Navy Yard, as well as garrisoning Azuma Island.

The Fourth Marines were garrisoning the remainder of the Navy Yard and Naval Base perimeter to the British sector, as well as sending out daily patrols to demilitarize installations and small local garrisons in accordance with information furnished by Jap Naval Headquarters.

The Fourth Marines were alerted to take over responsibility for the entire Yokosuka Naval Base area by 6 September, 1945, the date on which Task Units 31.3.2, 31.3.3, and 31.3.4 were to be dissolved and all personnel returned to their ships.
Appendix I - Ship to Shore Movement

In this operation ship-to-shore movement was made difficult by several factors. All planning had to be made on board ship and there was no opportunity for rehearsal of any kind. The inadequacy of the beaches in the assigned area for the landing and the inexperience of many of the personnel and ships participating tended to complicate the situation even further.

With only one combat-trained assault regiment and a large area to cover, it was necessary to land the assault battalions on widely separated beaches. The distance between the two beaches necessitated two lines of departure at distances of 2200 and 2800 feet respectively. The movement to beach GREEN was further complicated by its position which required a 90 degree turn 600 yards offshore. As a result landing craft for this beach had to cross the line of departure in column and do a flanking movement at the control boat 300 yards offshore. LCPRs, although hardly suited for the purpose, were of necessity used as control boats.

The APA carrying the Second Battalion Fourth Marines arrived at a point along the route of movement from SAGAMI WAN to TOKYO BAY transport area designated as debarkation point for that force at 0510. The debarkation and landing was carried out according to schedule, the first wave hitting the beach at 0555. Considering the lack of rehearsal, the ensuing reembarkation in landing craft to join the main landing went forth expeditiously and the battalion was on hand according to schedule to assume the reserve battalion.

At 0800 the transports carrying the main body of the landing force were in the transport area. The landing craft were immediately lowered into the water and troops embarked rapidly with no marked difficulty. The first waves landed on beaches RED and GREEN at 0855 respectively. Aside from a few mistakes on the part of the control boats, the initial landings were made according to plan and schedule. In the afternoon control was a little more difficult as cargo began to come ashore. The most glaring error was the landing of the Construction Battalion unit on the wrong beach.

In summary, considering the difficulties and limitations during the planning phase, the conditions dictated by the positions of the beaches, and the inexperience of many of the personnel in amphibious landings, the operation as effected with a minimum of difficulty.
Appendix 2 - Shore Party

The Shore Party Commander, Fourth Regiment B-4, and the Transport Division Beachmaster landed at Hour-Hour on LOVE-Day on GREEN beach one. Upon making a quick reconnaissance of the beach areas it was evident that little equipment could be unloaded without the use of heavy engineer equipment. To bring this in an LSM was requested. One was detailed for this purpose but in order to pick up pioneer and engineer equipment from the various ships, it had to be unloaded first. The delayed preparations of the beach for heavy unloading but not the unloading of cargo.

Unloading points and dumps were selected, shore party platoons assembled and organized, and expeditious handling of supplies and equipment proceeded without interruption. Due to the lack of combat loading on APAs and AKs there were few trucks initially but as the unloading progressed this situation was remedied.

By 1600 of LOVE-Day six LSMs and one LST had been beached or in the immediate vicinity of GREEN beaches one and two.

Working with limited facilities and personnel the Shore Party was able to completely unload the beached LST 1023 in three and one-half hours permitting it to retract and pull out into the inner harbor to anchor for the night. This made the entire beach available for small boat unloading all that night.

Cargo unloaded from small boats was loaded directly into waiting trucks and transported to warehouses without the usual double-handling. Ammunition, which started to arrive on the morning of LOVE plus one day caused a temporary slowdown in unloading but this speeded up by rigging a 3/4 yard shovel as a substitute crane. To do this, netloads were picked up on the teeth of the bucket and swung into trucks.

By 1600 of LOVE plus three all unloading for the entire Task Force was completed.

GEAR AND EQUIPMENT UNLOADED:

From 1000 30 August, 1945 to 1700 30 August, 1945.

294 Vehicles
26 Slings, misc gear
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CHAPTER VII - (Cont'd)

From 1700 30 August, 1945 to 1600 31 August, 1945.

126 Vehicles
370 Lifts chow and misc gear
75 Lifts ammunition
700 Barrels fuel

Total gear unloaded to date

420 Vehicles
396 Lifts chow and misc gear
75 Lifts ammunition
700 Barrels fuel

From 1600 31 August, 1945 to 1600 1 September, 1945.

3 Vehicles
97 Truck loads misc gear and ammunition
687 Barrels fuel

Total gear unloaded to date

423 Vehicles
397 Lifts chow and misc gear
97 Truck loads misc gear and ammunition
75 Lifts ammunition
1387 Barrels fuel

From 1600 1 September, 1945 to 1600 2 September, 1945.

18 Vehicles
48 Truck loads misc gear
13 Truck loads P.X. supplies
445 Barrels fuel

Total gear unloaded

441 Vehicles
396 Lifts chow and misc gear
145 Truck loads misc gear and ammunition
75 Lifts ammunition
13 Truck loads P.X. supplies
1832 Barrels fuel

UNLOADING STATUS REPORTS

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Appendix 3 - Communications

At Hoyo minus five hours on LOVE-Day all radio nets were opened. Three command nets were prescribed for communication with Task Force 31 and three command nets were used to communicate with lower units. Three lower units did not have two of the necessary radio sets (SCR 300 and SCR 610). Each unit was furnished two SCR 300 sets. The SCR 610 net was only operative between RCT 4 and CTG 31.3 in addition, one liaison net was maintained with the 11th Airborne Division, U. S. Army.

Ship-to-shore communication was excellent. At Hoyo minus three hours all stations were in the prescribed nets and at no time thereafter was radio communication lost with any unit during the landing phase.
CHAPTER VII - Appendix 3 (Cont'd)

As soon as radio communication was established all sets were replaced by telephonic communication, as soon as the latter was established all sets were secured except one of medium frequency. This set was constantly maintained for reserve security and training purposes.

Radio communication within lower units was undependable due to the lack of available equipment. Total reliance, of necessity, was placed in the TBY, an obsolete undependable set. Batteries for the sets were not available and had it not been for early installation of telephones the situation might have become acute.

Two telephonic truck lines were operative between Task Force 31 and Task Group 31.3 and between Task Group 31.3 and lower units by 0430 plus one day. All wires to higher and lower units, except to OCT 4, were laid by personnel of Task Group 31.3 Headquarters. In addition, an economical distribution of switchboards made possible telephonic communication between all task unit headquarters and their lower units. All of this equipment was furnished by Task Group 31.3 Headquarters. By 0430 plus three days field telephone communication existed between all echelons of Task Group 31.3; in addition all naval headquarters and important installations occupied by the Navy were served by the field system. Only one Japanese wire was used by Task Group 31.3, that being to Army General Headquarters, VINC HAIN. Reasons for not using the existing Japanese wires were security, timeliness before proper people could be contacted and the system made operable, lack of familiarity with wires (hence difficulty to repair), and more efficient use by higher echelons better equipped to take over the system.

Shore party communication and artillery communication were electrical and due to the character of the occupation were scarcely used before they were secured.

Appendix 4 - Engineering

For the initial stage of the occupation one platoon of engineers was attached to each infantry battalion. The call for engineer personnel was so slight that these platoons reverted to company control almost immediately.

A special detail of one officer and eight men was landed on beach 31D on 0730-Day to recon after the Naval Air Station and remove any mines or obstructions on the airfield. The strips were found to be in excellent condition, and no mines were found.

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Chapter VII - Appendix 4 (Cont’d)

Company functions consisted of active reconnaissance work, and the rapid establishment of water points to relieve any water shortages that might occur. On LOV 2 plus one day, water points were in operation on the Airfield and in the Navy Yard. Later water points for the British Landing Force and the Task Force Hospital were established.

On LOV 2 plus two days, the engineers began to do general housekeeping work for the infantry battalions and the headquarters. This work consisted of carpentry, electrical work. A great need for showers and other general plumbing also developed.

Engineer requirements on this operation have been few. The roads were found to be in fair condition with the exception of a few potholes and poor drainage.

Much consideration was given to the establishment of a through water supply system that would include all the barracks area and water sources within the limits of the Navy Yard. The use of interpreters proved very valuable in locating the main pumping station. It was found that the pumping station contained a chlorine injection system, but that it had not been used for the Japanese. This chlorine system was immediately placed into operation and within one day a test of chlorine content was found in the water supply from the Navy Yard. This method of purification proved very successful and relieved any congestion that would be caused by several mobile water points throughout the area. This chlorination included the entire city of Yokosuka with a population of three hundred thousand people.

Initially all trucks and heavy dozers were used to assist the beach party in unloading of supplies for the Task Force. The men worked on a twenty-four hour basis, often without relief, to aid in the rapid flow of supplies from the beach so that unloading would not be hindered during the hours of darkness. This aided materially the unloading operations.

Appendix 5 - Medical

On disembarkation, sick bays were established in all the various units stationed at the Yokosuka Naval Base, and at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station. AHI Medical Company took over the Yokosuka Naval Hospital, and operated a 500 bed segment of the hospital for the use of all the troops ashore. AHI Medical Company established a field hospital at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station. Insect control was instituted throughout all occupied areas by spraying all buildings.
with DDT, and fumigating or draining stagnant water. Navy Shore Activities took over sanitary inspection of the area and approval of water supply after its chlorination by the Fourth Marine Regiment.

Appendix 6: Public Information

Commesurate with international interest in the initial occupation of Japan, the Public Information Section publicized the Marine Corps landings through press, radio, and photographic media. Performance of the section was, generally, two-fold: To appropriately assist the sixty civilian correspondents (attached by CINCPAC) in their coverage of Marine Corps and Navy landings and, secondly, preparation of news matter pertaining to individual personnel for dissemination in their respective communities. In the attainment of both objectives the section utilized the services of two officers and twelve men to render adequate servicing to civilians and to compile publicity material concerning more than 6000 members of the Fleet Landing Forces. The channels of publicity employed included newspapers, magazines, radio, artwork and motion pictures. Present records indicate that the volume of written and broadcast publicity accorded the Marine Corps and Navy landings was for the length of the operation, the greatest of the Pacific war.
CHAPTER VIII -- JAPANESE SITUATION IN YOKOSUKA AREA

Due to the cessation of hostilities and agreement with the Japanese high command there was no defensive organization of the Yokosuka area. Orders were issued to the Japanese prior to LOVE-Day to remove breechblocks from all weapons, disarm all ammunition, and mark all positions with a white flag. The Navy Yard was to be cleared of all but essential personnel. These orders were complied with, and only skeleton crews of the essential military, police, guides, interpreters, and civilians remained in the Naval Base area on LOVE-Day. Weapons had been properly demilitarized and small arms and ammunition were stored in warehouses or dumps and inventoried by the Japanese. Guards had been established over these military positions in readiness to be relieved by our patrols which further demobilized all positions. The Yokosuka Japanese naval Headquarters maintained a staff from LOVE-Day to the present time to assist the American forces in the occupation of the Yokosuka Area. The principals of departments and personnel familiar with the location and operation of installations remained to assist our forces in the operation of Japanese essential equipment. Skeleton crews were left at the main installations to keep them in operation, such as, telephone exchange and lines, power plant, dockyard and water plant.

Interpreters were furnished to our headquarters and forces as they became available to augment those already assigned by American authorities.

The Komei, Naval Police and Local Police assisted greatly in maintaining order and discipline among the Japanese people.

Guides were provided to our patrols to assist in locating and demilitarizing small arms and ammunition from these installations.

The Japanese have made every effort to cooperate whole heartedly amongst themselves. They have worked diligently and without question at the tasks assigned to them.

In reporting the Japanese units and the installations impounded, the objective area has for convenience been broken down into four subordinate areas, as follows:

1) YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE -- The Fleet Naval Landing Force which relieved elements of the Fourth Marine Regiment, which originally swept the area, reported a wide variety of installations. The Naval Headquarters for the First Naval

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CHAPTER VIII (Cont'd)

District, which had an area of control from northern Honshu to the Bonins was located in the Naval Base. Within its boundaries the Naval Base was composed of a large Naval hospital, engineering school, engineering laboratory, midshipman submarine assembly plant, torpedo school, gunnery school, communications school, a small arms and ammunitions factory, Naval arsenal, radio station, plus extensive Naval barracks and warehouses. Approximately 50 misfire subs were located in Naval Base area. Many of the small shops, storage centers and the radio station were underground in an elaborate tunnel system made possible by the steep hills prevalent in the objective area. The southwest coast of the peninsula on which the Naval Base is located are six drydocks, four shipbuilding ways and a major Naval repair base. This base contains facilities for repair of battleships and other major units of the former Japanese fleet.

2. YOKOSUKA NAVAL AIR STATION — The Fleet Marine Landing Force which relieved the original landing force of the Fourth Marines, verified that the Air Station was an experimental base and not an operational field. Japanese planes found at the Air Station included 32 fighters, 16 attack planes, 17 torpedo planes, and 41 others including reconnaissance-bombers and trainers. In the Air Station area were land and seaplane hangars, a meteorological observatory, an aircraft arsenal, optical experimental laboratory, navigational experimental laboratory, and all types of analysis laboratories. In the bay east of the Air Station a practice torpedo firing range was found. Many various types of aircraft both operational and experimental were found in the hangars in various stages of construction. Thirty training gliders for Naha pilots, and five Japanese copies of the German flying wing, jet or rocket fighters were found, all evidently under experimental tests. Hills in the Air Station area were honey combed with tunnels and caves which contained machine and maintenance shops, storage facilities and large caverns used as hangars.

3. AZUMA ISLAND — The responsibility of the British Landing Force, this area was found to be mainly a storage area containing supplies of fuel, ammunition, mechanical and chemical stores, radio, electric, motor and aircraft equipment. The island is a sheer hill approximately 2000 feet in height and was heavily tunnelled throughout. These tunnels were found to contain tons of paraffin, electric equipment, diving equipment, rubber boots, coils of wire and rope, hand pumps and workshops. Servicing ships from this storage
area was very likely done by small lighters to minor units of the Japanese fleet. On the northwest coast of the peninsula a midget submarine installation was found. 42 midget subs were discovered in the position, which had from all indications been expanded in about March and discontinued around June.

(4) NIIURA PENINSULA - This area includes the eastern part of the peninsula from the Naval Base to a point south of Kurushima. At Kurushima a Naval Training station, defense garrison, torpedo school, mine school and communications school were found. The torpedo school was manned by a skeleton crew of 4 officers and six men. Stored in warehouses were several disarmed land mines, one depth charge and all ordnance of defensive value. The mine school consisted of several warehouses which contained all the equipment for complete mining operations. A large number of mines both filled and empty, cables, mine sweeping gear, and electrical equipment was impounded. At Kurushima a garrison of 1400 Japanese mine sweeping personnel was engaged in clearing the minefields in Tokyo Bay. At Uraga, a coastal defense unit and various small boats including four inoperative mine sweepers and eight PT boats were located and impounded. Throughout the peninsula small defense units were waiting for units from the landing force to take over all arms and ammunition stored in the area. Patrols were sent out on a plan drawn up as a result of conference with Japanese officers who furnished the locations of all units and the orders of the operations and intelligence officers of this command. Patrols were furnished with Japanese guides and were thus able to quickly locate and demobilize all of the minor defensive units throughout the peninsula. Located at Nobo is a huge naval hospital that cares for Japanese tuberculosis patients. In all four of the above areas, the Japanese had taken excellent advantage of the rugged terrain by digging into the steep hills. Tunnels, caves and caverns of all sizes provided a secure place of storage for all types of equipment and personnel as well as a means of defense.

One very important fact was reported by all units. No records other than inventories and a few maps and charts were found in the objective area. It was later learned through interrogation that the Japanese were ordered by high authorities to burn or destroy all documents of importance. This order from all present indications was well complied with by all Japanese units. It is believed that the delay by the peace delegation in negotiations, was to afford necessary time for all Japanese forces to destroy these documents which would be of military value to the Allied Nations. Records of statistics on when, where and how their ships were sunk or disposition of garrison troops were not to be found in this naval Headquarters.
CIVIL GOVERNMENT

The mayor of YOKOSUKA, UMEZU Yoshio, has demonstrated a strong desire to show good will to the American occupational troops in order to keep discord between the Japanese civilians and the occupational troops at a minimum. His office has speedily complied with every request for maps of the city, furnishing guides to city utilities and hiring civilian labor.

The Chief of Police, OOTSU has aided in the orderly occupation of the YOKOSUKA area by maintaining normal police facilities. His office has fully cooperated with this headquarters in the joint policing of the area. The absence of civilian demonstrations is a credit to their efficiency and good faith.

JAPANESE LIAISON OFFICE

Special attention should be paid to the development of orderly liaison between the Japanese headquarters and the American occupation force.

Initially the G-2 language section of TG 31.3 carried on all liaison for Marine and Navy units ashore. As soon as Naval Shore Activities Headquarters was established ashore the G-2 language section aided them in setting up a single unified liaison office for all Naval Activities.

The G-2 language section now handles only liaison for this headquarters and attached units. Complete cooperation and smooth liaison have made possible prior planning of demilitarization patrols, with Japanese guides who possess complete information on the prescribed area. All matters which require liaison between this headquarters and the Japanese are funneled through the liaison office to avoid confusion and duplication of requests on Japanese naval authorities.

YOKOSUKA Area (before landing)

BASIC UNITS

I. NAVY - 40,000-50,000

1. YOKOSUKA Naval Base Headquarters
2. YOKOSUKA Naval District Headquarters
3. YOKOSUKA Naval Barracks
4. YOKOSUKA Naval Hospital
5. YOKOSUKA Engineering School
CHAPTER VIII (Cont'd)

6. YOKOSUKA Navigation School  
7. YOKOSUKA Gunnery School  
8. YOKOSUKA Naval Arsenal (including experimental Labs)  
9. YOKOSUKA Submarine Base  
10. YOKOSUKA Anti-submarine School  
11. YOKOSUKA Communications School  
12. YOKOSUKA Technical-Damage Control School  
13. YOKOSUKA Torpedo School  
14. YOKOSUKA Defense Unit (coastal and AA guns)  
15. YOKOSUKA Mine Unit  
16. YOKOSUKA Naval Storehouse  
17. YOKOSUKA Harbor Master's Office  
18. Headquarters, YOKOSUKA Special Landing Force  
19. 11th SLF  
20. 12th SLF  
21. 13th SLF  
22. 14th SLF  
23. 15th SLF  
24. 16th SLF  
25. Headquarters, 1st Special Attack Force Sqd (midget subs)  
26. YOKOSUKA Storming Troops (midget subs)  
27. 11th Storming Troops (midget subs)  
28. YOKOSUKA Naval Air Base  
29. TAdA Naval Air School  
30. 71st Air Flotilla (part of 3d Air Fleet) with headquarters only at YOKOSUKA  
31. Air Factory No 1  
32. Air Factory No 2

II. ARMY - 6,850

1. 114th Inf Brigade of the TOKYO BAY Army Corps - 5,000  
2. YOKOSUKA Army Fortress Bn (Bn. 2112 Bn), Coastal - 250  
3. Artillery Depot Regiments  
   (1) TOBU 189 Arty Regt - 1,000  
   (2) TOBU 191 Arty Regt

4. Army Heavy Artillery School - 500  
5. YOKOSUKA Army Hospital - 100

YOKOSUKA Area (Present time)

BASIC UNITS

I. NAVY - 3768

A. YOKOSUKA Navy Yard - 366

1. YOKOSUKA Naval Hq (CO - Vice Adm Y. TOTOMUKA) - 121

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CHAPTER VIII (Cont'd)

2. YOKOSUKA Naval Personnel Dept (Rear Adm K. ARIMATA) - 25
3. YOKOSUKA Naval Accounting & Supply Dept
   (Paymaster - Vice Adm S. MICHINO) - 50
4. YOKOSUKA Naval Munitions Dept (Paymaster Rear Adm N. I'ASAHI) - 20
5. YOKOSUKA Naval Yard (Vice adm S. HASOTANI - Head of Naval Yard) - 100
6. YOKOSUKA Harbor Master's Dept (Capt T. MATSUO) - 50

B. Occupational Zone (outside Navy Yard) - 2902

1. Naval Police (Capt K. ACASE) - 982
   2. *Skeleton crews - 1920
      a. Mine sweeping unit - 1800
      b. Other outlying establishments - 100
      c. MAGATO - 20

* Upon demand, technical working parties are made available both inside and outside the Navy Yard.

II. ARMY - 597

A. Military Police (KEIPEI) (CO, Col MATSURA) - 274

1. Stations
   a. YOKOSUKA Headquarters Station - 201
   b. KURIHAMA Station - 28
   c. N. YOKOSUKA Station - 45

B. Skeleton crews in outlying installations - 323
CHAPTER IX - CONTENTS

G-1

1. The G-1 section was unable to function smoothly due to the confusion which existed until LOVE-Day plus three, when things began to straighten out.

2. The morale of the troops was excellent in spite of the vast amount of work and poor messing facilities.

3. No casualties were suffered during the landing phase.

G-2

1. The lack of a large scale map covering the target area was a definite handicap in the initial planning phase. The absence of properly qualified intelligence teams was apparent. It is the opinion that technical teams to be used in communications, mines, ordnance, torpedoes, etc. should have followed the landing forces immediately in to examine and identify valuable material of an important intelligence value. These teams would have been of great help to patrols being sent out to patrol and demilitarize the area in filtering equipment desired for study.

2. The liaison between Task Force 31 intelligence section and this section was outstanding with every assistance possible being rendered in acquiring additional language personnel, maps, aerial photos and intelligence information covering the area.

3. The intelligence personnel assigned for this tremendous undertaking of inventorying, investigating and compiling reports for this area has been definitely inadequate.

G-3

1. Although there were no indications of violence or hostilities at any time during the operation, this command landed tactically and was fully prepared and equipped to deal with Japanese treachery.

2. The mixed and, with the exception of Task Force Able of the Sixth Marine Division, inexperienced command performed their assigned missions and duties in an admirable manner. The lack of experience was made up for by pride in accomplishment.
3. The whole-hearted cooperation of the THIRD Fleet and the initiative and effort by all hands participating were outstanding among the factors contributing to the smooth execution of this operation.

4. Japanese cooperation was excellent and apparently sincere. All dealings with them were conducted through the YOKOSUKA Imperial Naval Headquarters, which was of great help once the Fleet Landing Force was ashore.

G-4

1. a. Comment "Arrangements were made at sea to supply three additional regiments from Fourth Marines RCT (Reinf) supplies".

   b. Recommendation: "Task Forces or other units should never be constituted where facilities are not available for proper equipping and supplying. One unit cannot be stripped to sustain another."

2. a. Comment "250 tons of cargo was left on the dock when the Task Force put out to sea".

   b. Recommendation: "When circumstances require leaving some equipment and supplies behind on embarkation, provision must be made for immediate shipment. In the confusion of loading much important equipment can be overlooked thereby complicating the units' operations".

3. a. Comment: "The character of the operation necessitated dealing with supply and other agencies through Third Amphibious Corps initially".

   b. Recommendation: "All individuals or commands who are interested parties to an impending loading-out should be informed. In order to properly coordinate and/or service embarking units enough information must be disseminated to permit proper planning".

CHAP. 7.2

1. The chief difficulties encountered in planning and executing the embarkation of supplies and equipment were due to:

   (1) The late-hour substitution of an APA for one originally assigned which had twice the cargo capacity. (See Chapter IV Paragraph D above).
(2) The slow arrival of supplies from the field depot to the stockpiles on the docks.

(3) The uncertainty of actual weights and volumes of the cargo to be stowed -- due to not having such items on hand and to their direct transfer from the field depot to the docks.

2. The sources of difficulties enumerated in subparagraphs (2) and (3) above were to be expected due to the conditions which prevailed at the time. But one recommendation which a TQ frequently makes should be repeated here in regard to subparagraph (1): "Always discourage the substitution of one ship for another, particularly when the loading plans for all ships have been completed and draw to scale in final form," as was the case referred to in subparagraph (1) above, "and if such a change is absolutely necessary, demand that a ship of as nearly equal capacity as possible be substituted in order that the forms and diagrams of cargo stowage for each ship need not be altered."

General Summary

This operation is without precedent, and is unique in its conception, its organization, and its execution. Although staffed and equipped to handle only a regimental combat team, on joining the THIRD Fleet off the shores of Japan, that force was expanded to division strength by the addition of a regiment of Fleet Marines from 32 ships into 2 transports, a regiment of Bluejackets from 3 ships into 3 transports, and a British battalion of Bluejackets and Royal Marines from 5 ships into 3 transports.

To assemble and organize these regiments it was necessary to transfer, via breches buoy, while steaming at sea, some 3500 men and their equipment during daylight hours of only two days. This stupendous task was accomplished with remarkable efficiency by bringing carriers, battleships and cruisers along both sides of a transport to expedite the transfers. While companies and battalions were being organized, their commanders and key members of their staffs were assembled, by the same means, for conferences concerning the plans for the operation and methods of execution.

Field radio and other communication equipment had to be provided and distributed to the units from the Fleet, chiefly from the Fourth RCT and the little additional equipment carried by the Force Headquarters. Transportation, water tanks
and other equipment essential for field duty had to be provided promptly after landing.

By careful planning this confused situation was solved and all units landed as scheduled and functioned throughout as effective units. The successful handling of such a delicate situation which could easily have flared into a serious incident, is in itself evidence of the effective control of these hurriedly thrown-together units.

W. T. CLEMENT
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
U.S.S. WEDDERBURN (DD684)
(FLAGSHIP)
Commander, Destroyer Division 106
C/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 September 1945.

From: Commander, Task Group 31.5.
To: Commander, Task Force 31.

Subject: Action Report of Task Group 31.5 covering period
19 August 1945 to 2 September 1945.

Reference:
(a) Pacific Conf. Ltr. 101-L-45.
(b) Commander, Task Force 31 despatch 020900 of September 1945.

Enclosures:
(A) Commanding Officer, WEDDERBURN, Action Report
covering subject period, Serial 083 of 4 September 1945. - 59
(B) Commanding Officer, STOCKHAM, Action Report
covering subject period, Serial 047 of 3 September 1945. - 99
(C) Commanding Officer, TWINING, Action Report
covering subject period, Serial 0134 of 3 September 1945. - 95

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), the
Action Report for Task Group 31.5 for the period 19 August 1945
to 2 September 1945 is submitted together with enclosures (A),
(B), and (C). Action Report of U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND has not
been received and is therefore not included.

PART I

From 19 August 1945 to 2 September 1945, Destroyer Division
106, less YARNALL, plus SOUTHERLAND and such other units as were
assigned, functioned as screen for Task Force 31 during the
approach to and occupation of YOKOSUKA Naval District.

PART II

Screening units assigned included destroyers, minesweepers,
and high speed troop transports (APD's), and varied in number
available for screening between 3 and 21. Screening units were
disposed during cruising to best provide anti-submarine pro-
tection. After arrival at objective, destroyers were stationed
to render fire support as troops were landing. SOUTHERLAND
throughout the operation functioned as Force Fighter Director

ENCLOSURE "F"
U.S.S. WEDDERBURN (DD684) (FLAGSHIP)
Commander, Destroyer Division 106

CONFIDENTIAL

8 September 1945.

Subject: Action Report of Task Group 31.5 covering period 19 August 1945 to 2 September 1945 (Continued).

PART II (Cont'd.)

ship and assisted materially in handling communications.

PART III

(All dates East Longitude dates)
(All times are zone minus nine (-9))

19 August 1945

1400 Commenced forming Task Force screen.
1603 WEDDERBURN detonated mine with small arms fire.

22 - 26 August 1945

Steamed in vicinity Logistic Group while various units of force reported for duty. Screening units freely employed in transfer of mail and personnel to assist in organization of force.

27 August 1945

Entered SAGAMI WAN, HOKSHU, JAPAN and anchored.

28 August 1945

Various ships received Japanese Pilots aboard and proceeded into TOKYO BAY and anchored.

30 August 1945

Task Group 31.5 patrolled vicinity landing areas and prepared to render close fire support and counter battery fire if needed.

31 August 1945

Established anti-submarine patrol TOKYO BAY with SOUTHERLAND and WEDDERBURN, TWAINING and STOCKHAM proceeded to TATEYAMA WAN, to support units engaged in
U.S.S. WEDDERBURN (DD684) (Flagship)  
Commander, Destroyer Division 106  

8 September 1945.

Subject: Action Report of Task Group 31.5 covering period 19 August 1945 to 2 September 1945. (Continued).

PART III (Cont'd)

Beach Clearance for Subsequent Landings.

1 September 1945

At dawn STOCKHAM intercepted unescorted Japanese troop transport, boarded her without incident, and took her as a prize of war. Vessel was identified as Japanese troop transport number 16, Lieutenant Commander HARADA, Commanding, enroute MARCUS ISLANDS to Uraga K0 carrying 300 Japanese Army Troops. STOCKHAM escorted this vessel to YOKOSUKA and turned it over to Representative of Commander, Task Group 31.8. During the afternoon WEDDERBURN placed boarding party on Japanese APD 16, escorted her to YOKOHAMA.

2 September 1945

WEDDERBURN escorted Japanese APD16 from YOKOHAMA to TOKYO to unload troops after which she escorted her back to YOKOSUKA.

PART IV

(Ordnance)

No enemy opposition was encountered by units of this Task Group during operation, therefore Ordnance material and equipment were not employed.

PART V

No units of this Task Group suffered damage. No damage was inflicted on enemy.

PART VI

No comments.

PART VII

Performance of personnel was highly satisfactory.

PART VIII

No comments.

G. K. CARMICHAEL
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander, Destroyer Division 106 (CTG 31.5).
       (2) Commander Task Force 31.
       (3) Commander THIRD Fleet.
       (4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report covering period 1400 19 August 1945 to 1200 2 September 1945.

Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations 1920, Arts. 712 and 874(6).
           (b) PacFlt. Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45.
           (c) ComTHIRD Flt. Secret Despatch of 2 September 1945.
           (d) CTF 31 despatch 020900 September 1945.

PARTS I and II (Covered by Division Commanders report)
PART III (All times are Zone Minus (-) 9)

19 August
1400 ComDesDiv 106 in WEDDERBURN with STOCKHAM detached from Task Group 38.4 to form Task Force 31 with IOWA and SAN DIEGO.
1557 Sighted enemy mine, type not determined.
1603 Detonated mine with small arms fire.

20 August

Other units of Task Force 31 joined company during the day.

20 - 26 August

No remarks; no enemy contacts.

27 August
1025 Sighted the island of OSHIMA, Japan. No enemy activities in the vicinity.
1430 Made preparations for entering SAGAMI WAN, HONSHU, Japan.
1650 Anchored in SAGAMI WAN.

28 August
0849 Underway to enter TOKYO BAY.
0924 Received Japanese Navy Lieutenant aboard to assist in piloting the ship into Tokyo Bay.
Subject: Action Report covering period 1400 I 19 August 1945 to 1200 I 2 September 1945.

28 August (Cont'd.)

1146 Entered Tokyo Bay as a unit of the initial occupation force under CTF 31 in the SAN DIEGO.

29 August

No remarks.

30 August

During the morning ComDesDiv 106 in WEDDERBURN with STOCKHAM, TWINING and SOUTHERLAND patrolled the transport area ready to give close fire support and counter battery fire in the event it was needed while troops went ashore at YOKOSUKA Naval Base.

31 August

Stationed as anti-submarine vessel in entrance to Tokyo Bay, conducting sonar search across the channel.

1 September 1945

1652 Ordered by CTG 31.8 to escort Japanese APD 16 from YOKOSUKA to YOKOHAMA.

1750 Sorted with APD 16 which was manned entirely by Japanese crew. Placed WEDDERBURN boarding party on board.

1800 APD 16 berthed at YOKOHAMA.

2 September

0645 Escortd Japanese APD 16 to TOKYO to unload troops and then back to YOKOSUKA. When the APD anchored, WEDDERBURN boarding party was recalled.

1045 Formal surrender document signed by Japanese and Allied Representatives.

PART IV

No remarks.

PART V

No battle damage to this ship.
PART VI

Military measures taken during the period covered by this report were precautionary and passive in nature in the event some hostile attempt was made by the enemy. These measures included the maintaining of a Condition of Readiness ample to cope with a surprise air or surface attack. A double sentry watch was posted while in the bay area. In addition to this the surface-search radar was used on short scale at night to detect movements of any craft in the vicinity of the ship and the sonar gear was used to detect any underwater activity.

The ship's material condition was Afirm (modified) maintained as a precaution against uncontrolled flooding in event of underwater damages. Engineering department was kept on 15 minutes notice with steam to the throttle, one boiler on the line and a second boosted.

The experiences of the boarding party from this ship were most interesting.

When the WEDDERBURN party boarded the Japanese APD 16 on 1 September, they found approximately 300 troops embarked in addition to the ships company of 230. Also embarked was an APD division commander. The troops had been evacuated from Marcus Islands and their health and physical conditions were bad, many of them sick and some dying.

The boarding party consisted of two officers and seven men, all armed. They immediately took over control of the APD, the Japanese Commanding Officer taking orders from the officer in charge of the party. At all times the Japanese were cooperative and readily complied with orders given them. Both the Japanese division commander and captain could speak a small amount of English. A Japanese petty officer served as interpreter.

The boarding party found sanitary conditions and quarters aboard the APD in a deplorable state. Food and water were supplied the boarding party directly from the WEDDERBURN.

Upon docking at YOKOHAMA, it was found the U.S. Eighth Army forces had taken over the waterfront and would not allow the troops to debark there. This necessitated keeping the APD under
guard all night and escorting it the next morning to Tokyo, so
the boarding party was doubled in size. Upon arrival at TOKYO,
the officer in charge of the boarding party accompanied the
Japanese division commander and captain ashore to arrange for
landing of the troops. After debarking the troops and while
enroute back to YOKOSUKA, the Japanese officers expressed their
wishes to turn over the ship entirely to the U.S. Navy. Further
action in this matter was left to C.T.G. 31.8 at YOKOSUKA.

PART VII

Personnel aboard this ship had been instructed prior to
entering Tokyo Bay about proper conduct when dealing with
Japanese, and about the health and sanitary conditions which
would be encountered. All men who comprised the boarding party
performed their duties in an excellent manner.

PART VIII

Although food and water were supplied the boarding party
from the WEDDERBURN, and other precautions were taken, the party
did not escape without physical contamination. Two signalmen who
used Japanese telescopes while on duty aboard the AFD contracted
a minor eye infection, apparently from the telescopes. All
members of the boarding party were required to strip off their
clothing and take showers immediately upon returning to this
ship. Their clothing was treated with insecticide.

During the time the AFD was under control of this ship,
considerable difficulty was experienced in communicating with
C.T.G. 31.8 and other authorities, the messages being of an
operational priority nature. More than four hours was required
for communications to be established and an answer received
when this ship requested instructions as to the disposition of
the troops.

This is only one incident of many recently when voice
communications have been most trying if not outright impossible.
Almost without exception the causes for the difficulties have
been the cluttering up and jamming of the voice circuits with
unimportant transmissions, needless test calls, and a flagrant
lack of discipline and courtesy. The conditions in Tokyo Bay
Subject: Action Report covering period 1400 I 19 August 1945 to 1200 I 2 September 1945.

PART VIII (Cont'd.)

are the worst that have ever been experienced by this ship and positive steps to correct them must be taken by both individual ships and higher authorities before the situation will be improved.

R. W. CLARK
s.

Advance copies to:

Cominch (1)
CinCPac (3)
ComDesPac (1)
U.S.S. STOCKHAM (DD-683)
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CONFIDENTIAL

3 September 1945.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Destroyer Division 106.

Subject: Action Report, 16 August 1945 to 2 September 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45.

I. PRELIMINARY.

Report made by Commander Destroyer Division 106.

II. PRELIMINARY.

Report made by Commander Destroyer Division 106.

III. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT (All times and dates "ITEM").

On 16 August STOCKHAM was operating with TG 38.4. On 19 August STOCKHAM reported for duty with TG 31.5.

During the morning of 26 August STOCKHAM joined TG 30.1 (CTG 30.1 in U.S.S. MISSOURI) on detached duty. On 27 August this group rendezvoused with a Japanese destroyer in the approaches to TOKYO off O SHIMA. This ship received six Japanese pilots and one Japanese interpreter for delivery to TF 31. Rejoined TF 31 and took station in screen as part of TG 31.5 after delivering pilots and interpreter to designated ships. At 1900 anchored in SAGAMI WAN.

At 0115 30 August in company with U.S.S. TWINING, (DD 540), BAXTON, (APA 138), BEGOR, (APD 127), proceeded into TOKYO BAY with U.S.S. ELLYSON, (DMS 19), and U.S.S. HOPKINS, (DMS 13), sweeping for mines ahead of formation. DESDIV 106 less U.S.S. YARNALL plus U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND stood by to give necessary fire support during the capture of key fortifications in TOKYO BAY including YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE and AIR STATION. No opposition was encountered. Anchored in TOKYO BAY after completion of fire support mission.

At 1100 31 August reported for duty with CTU 31.4.4 (Captain J.M. KENNADAY, U.S. Navy, U.S.S. SIMS, Flagship), TU composed of U.S.S. SIMS, (APD 50), U.S.S. PAVLIC, (APD 70), U.S.S. TWINING, (DD 540), and U.S.S. STOCKHAM (DD 683). This ship patrolled station off entrance to TATEYAMA WAN ready to give necessary fire support for troop landings over TATEYAMA WAN beaches. No opposition was encountered.

At dawn 1 September while patrolling on station off TATEYAMA WAN U.S.S. STOCKHAM had an unidentified surface radar contact. Contact was a destroyer type vessel standing in channel heading toward TOKYO BAY at a speed of about 15 knots. After attempts to identify the contact were unsuccessful, the vessel was
ordered to stop. A boarding party from STOCKHAM (Lieut. R.E. BREGA, U.S.N., in charge) was sent aboard. Vessel was identified as Japanese Transport number 16, Lt. Comdr. Shidhiro HARADA, commanding, enroute Marcus Island to Uraga Ko carrying 300 Japanese Army troops. Capture was effected and U.S. ensign was hoisted to the mainmast. An inspection was made by the boarding party and it was determined that everything was in order and that the Commanding Officer and all personnel on board desired to cooperate to the fullest in carrying out instructions. A report to this effect was sent to Commander Task Force 31 information to Commander Task Unit 31.4.4. Orders were received from CTU 31.4.4 to "allow Jap vessel to proceed immediately". STOCKHAM boarding party was recalled and Jap vessel was directed to proceed immediately. STOCKHAM was returning to patrol station and Japanese Transport 16 was heading toward TOKYO BAY when Commander Third Fleet despatch directed STOCKHAM to "escort Jap ship to YOKOSUKA and turn him over to CTF 31". Attempt was then made while closing the Jap vessel to communicate with him by flashing light and flag hoist to direct him to follow the STOCKHAM; he did not answer our signals but proceeded into URAGA KO and anchored. The boarding party was again sent aboard and the Japanese vessel was ordered to follow the STOCKHAM into YOKOSUKA which orders were complied with. On arrival YOKOSUKA, Japanese Transport number 16 was delivered to the officer representative of Commander Task Group 31.8 who boarded the vessel. STOCKHAM boarding party was recalled, and the Japanese Transport number 16 headed toward YOKOSUKA KO with U.S.S. MOCTOBI standing by. STOCKHAM returned to patrol station off TATEMAMA WAN.

D. L. MOODY.
U.S.S. TWINING (DD540)

0/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
3 September 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From:
The Commanding Officer.
To:
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via:
(1) The Commander Destroyer Division 16.
(2) The Commander Task Force 31.
(3) The Commander THIRD Fleet.
(4) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject:

Reference:
(a) U.S. Navy Regulations 1942, Art. 712, 874 (6).
(b) Pacific Fleet Conf. Ltr. 16L-45.
(c) ComTHIRDFlt Despatch O30900 of Sept. 1945.

1. In compliance with references (a), (b) and (c), the following report is submitted:

PART III

A. 1400 I, 19 August TWINING with TF 36 engaged in transfer of personnel, CTG 31.7, Commodore J. P. WOBLE, USN, ComTaskFlt Two, embarked. 1700 I, reported for duty in TF 31. From 19 to 24 August steamed in vicinity of logistic group awaiting arrival of various units of TF 31. 0935 I, 21 August, CTG 31.7 shifted his flag to U.S.S. OZARK. 1800 I, 21 August, took departure from TF 31, carried out search for U.S.S. W.J. PATTISON and U.S.S. BBOR overdue at rendezvous. 0349 I, 25 August, rejoined TF 31, the two units having arrived. 0935 I, TF 31 formed in column commencing movement to Sagami Wan, Japan. 0227 I, 26 August, course was reversed, back-tracking to avoid an impending typhoon. 1220 I, course was again reversed the typhoon having passed clear to the North. 1605 I, 27 August, entered Sagami Wan and anchored. 0847 I, 28 August, underway in company with U.S.S. SAN DIEGO, CT 31 embarked, for Tokyo Bay. 1320 I, anchored in Tokyo Bay off Yokosuka Naval Base. 0525 I, 29 August, underway enroute Sagami Wan, anchored at 0930 I. 0112 I, 30 August underway with U.S.S. BRAXTON and accompanying units enroute Futtsu Saki. 0540 I, stood by to furnish fire support for amphibious landings. 0727 I, proceeded to vicinity Yokosuka to furnish fire support for amphibious landings. 1209 I, anchored off Naval Base. 0457 I, 31 August, underway with U.S.S. W.J. PATTISON and U.S.S. BBOR for Tateyama Wan. 0715 I, anchored in Tateyama Wan. 0823 I, 2 September, underway, relieved U.S.S. STOCKHAM on anti-submarine patrol off entrance to Tateyama Wan.
U.S.S. TWINING (DD540)

3 September 1945.


PART III (Cont'd)

B. During the period covered by this report the weather was favorable and at no time interfered with fueling, transferring passengers and provisioning underway.

PART VII

1. The personnel attached to this ship performed their duties in a highly satisfactory manner.

PART VIII

1. The period covered by this report was devoted to preparations for the occupation of the Yokosuka Naval Base and involved large scale transfer of men and equipment at sea.

2. In spite of the fact that a remarkable job was done, involving the highest standards of seamanship by all hands and improvisation to a large degree, it is recommended that future operations of this nature be organized in port.

3. No action with enemy of any kind took place during this period.

cc: COMINCH (Direct)(1);
CinCPac(Direct)(3);
ComDesPac (Direct)(1);
ComDesRon 53.
YOKOSUKA NAVAL AIR ACTIVITIES
TASK GROUP THIRTY-ONE POINT SIX

8 September 1945.

From: Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE Point SIX.
To: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE.


Reference: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE Despatch 030900.

GENERAL

1. Under directives issued by Vice Admiral McCAIN (CTF38), CTG31.6 was activated as a Streamlined Air Base Assembly and a Carrier Aircraft Service Unit from the U.S.S. COWPENS personnel. The units were organized on board and CTG31.6 reported them as ready for landing, in his despatch 182345 to CTF38, at Yokosuka Air Base. Captain DUCKWORTH reported to CTF31 at 110245 for duty.

2. Since it was considered a possibility that OTAWA Airfield would be considered a standby field in case of difficulties at Yokosuka, CTG31.6 organized, from U.S.S. COWPENS personnel, a streamlined Air Base Assembly for activating that field. All units were kept alerted on board COWPENS for immediate landing, by air, when the order was given.

3. These UNITS were fully organized and equipped, and landed to carry out the missions set forth in CTG31.6's Op-Plan 1-45, issued 23 August. Personnel and equipment as set forth in this Op-Plan were fully prepared to activate the airfields as required for temporary operation.

4. On August, 1945 Commander C. W. MITCHELL, Jr., with a Naval Air Base Unit and a CB Maintenance Unit, in LST's 1139 and 789, reported to CTG 31.6 in COWPENS, anchored in Sagami Wan, in compliance with CinCPac Adv HQ NPM CP #387. Commander MITCHELL was ordered to stand by awaiting further orders. This Naval Air Base special detachment was fully equipped and ready to establish permanent airfield operating facilities awaiting arrival of Lieutenant Col. B. J. TRUITT and MAG-31 Ground Echelons.

5. On 30 August, 1945, at 0805 the first flight of the Yokosuka SABA unit was launched from COWPENS in Sagami Wan. This first flight consisted of 9 VT and 8 VF carrying 27 SABA personnel and 17 pilots all landing at Yokosuka Airfield.
YOKOSUKA NAVAL AIR ACTIVITIES
TASK GROUP THIRTY-ONE POINT SIX

Subject: Action Report Covering period 19 August -
7 September 1945.

The first plane landing at Ø917, with Captain H. S. DUCKWORTH, USN, Commander Task Group 31.6, Lieutenant MC MASTERS, USNR, Interpreter, and MC CARTY, PFC, USMCR, as passengers, Pilot H. G. CONNORS, Lieut., USNR.

CHRONOLOGICAL

19 August - 29 August, 1945.

CTG 31.6, in COWPENS, organized, equipped and alerted SABA and CASU for activating YOKOSUKA Airfield. All UNITS organized from COWPENS personnel.

30 August -
Ø890 - First plane of 9 VT and 8 VF launched from COWPENS, underway in Sagami Wan - 27 SABA personnel as passengers.
Ø917 - First VT landed YOKOSUKA Airfield.
Ø945 - CTG 31.6 received surrender of YOKOSUKA Air Base from Captain KOBYASHI, Japanese Commanding officer.
1059 - LST 1139, followed two hours later by LST 789, docked at seaplane ramp and started unloading.
1111 - American flag raised on Administration building with appropriate ceremony. THIRD Fleet Marines provided color guard. Lieutenant Commander R. E. BROWN assumed command of Marine Air Base YOKOSUKA.
1415 - Admiral NIMITZ, Admiral HALSEY, Rear Admiral BADGER, and accompanying staff, inspected YOKOSUKA Airfield.
1500 - CTG 31.6 and Staff surveyed YOKOSUKA facilities and assigned barracks for enlisted personnel, due precautions being taken for comfort and health.
NOTE: LST 1139 invited officers and men of SABA on board for evening meal.

31 August -
Ø900 - Conference with CTG 31.6
1000 - Conference ended. Japanese given full data on their responsibility to CTG 31.6 under the surrender terms.
NOTE: Routine field operations carried out during day.

2 September -
1230 - Commander C. W. MITCHELL, Jr., USNR, assumed command of Marine Air Base, YOKOSUKA.
1337 - Vice Admiral MC GAIN departed YOKOSUKA for ATSUGI.
YOKOSUKA NAVAL AIR ACTIVITIES
TASK GROUP THIRTY-ONE POINT SIX

Subject: Action Report covering period 19 August - 7 September 1945.

CHRONOLOGICAL (Cont’d)

3 September - Routine operations. POW flight to NIIGATA with Commander STASSEN.
1057 - COWPENS POW Detachment (7VT, 8VF) set up under command of Lieutenant Commander BROWN (COWPENS).
1200 - Field Operations assumed by Marine Air Base special detachment.

4 September - Search flight to NIIGATA found COWPENS planes there. Good condition, but weathered in. Routine operations throughout day.

5 September - Routine field operations.
1312 - Temporary facilities at KISARAZU ordered activated as reported in CTG31.6’s Ø5Ø255.
1322 - Reported details of Army transport crash in CTG’s Ø5Ø355.

6 September - Routine field operations.
0900 - 1 VT and 2 VF took off for NIIGATA to evacuate injured POW.
1500 - Evacuated 18 COWPENS personnel to ship.
1745 - 1 VT and 2 VF returned with injured POW and transferred him to small boat for further transfer to hospital ship. NOTE: CB Unit commenced construction of temporary fueling facilities at KISARAZU.

7 September - Routine field operations.
1010 - Fourteen transport planes arrived from OKINAWA with advanced echelon of MAG 31.

8 September -
0930 - CTG 31.6 relieved of duty. Colonel J. C. MUNN, USMC, assumed duties of senior Naval Aviator ashore at YOKOSUKA.

See page 4 for Summary and Conclusions

H. S. DUCKWORTH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commander Task Group 31.6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Upon occupying YOKOSUKA Airfield, it was found that practically all facilities had been moved underground due to bombings. All documents had been removed, many facilities and buildings were inoperable, and equipment found in a decidedly run-down condition. It was evident the Japanese had been unable, for various reasons, to perform any maintenance work. All motor vehicles had been converted for either charcoal gas or alcohol operation and some difficulty encountered in using them.

BOQ and Barracks areas had been cleaned; bunks and beds supplied with clean blankets and sheeting; and a general attempt made to provide habitable quarters for our occupancy. The Japanese commander proved cooperative in the process of our taking over the field.

The original plan called for the use of the YOKOSUKA Airfield as a base for the evacuation of repatriates from the various POW camps. After an early survey, it became evident the field had several deficiencies which would preclude this.

One of the most serious factors in this respect was the relatively short runways as oriented for take-offs to the south. The longest runway on this field was only 3600 feet and the rising terrain to the south offered a serious obstacle for heavy transports to clear.

Another factor militating against the use of this field for the original purpose was the problem of providing stowage for gasoline. While the Japanese had approximately 110,000 gallons of underground capacity, shallow water approaches to the sea wall would make tanker supply difficult. At the time the field was occupied, this storage had about 35,000 gallons of Japanese aviation fuel (91 octane) suitable only for motor fuel. The clearing of this gasoline still remains a problem. It is now being consumed by local use in motor vehicles.

Realizing YOKOSUKA Airfield could only offer, at best, suitable facilities for small plane operation, it was decided to activate KISARAZU Naval Air-drome across TOKIO BAY for large transport service. Accordingly, temporary fueling facilities were started and are operable on the date of this report. Large transports can be handled in reasonable numbers at this time. Ferry service for personnel to KISARAZU is planned using small planes; freight service is planned using LSM’s.
COMMander Task FlOTILLA TWO
FD4-2/P16-3 c/o Fleet Post Office
Serial 027 San Francisco, California

8 September 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L:

From: Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT SEVEN,
      (Commander Task Flotilla TWO).

To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Via:
(1) Commander Task Force 31 (ComBatDiv 7).
(2) Commander THIRD Fleet.
(3) Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
    Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Action Report, Period 19 August - 8 September
         1945 - Submission of.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. LCL-45, dated 1 Jan 45.
           (b) ComTHIRDFlt OpPlan 10-45, with annexes and
               modifications thereto.
           (c) CTF 31 OpPlan 1-45 with annexes and
               modifications thereto.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Action Report.
           (B) CTG 31.7 OpPlan 1-45.

1. Action report of Commander Naval Shore
   Activities, Yokosuka Area, (CTG 31.7) for period 19 August
   to 8 September 1945 is herewith submitted as enclosure (A),
   in accordance with listed references. All dates are East
   Longitude. All times are Iem (Zone - 9 time).

   [Signature]

Distribution:
Original: CominCh
Copies: (Advance) CominCh
        CTF 31 (20 less enc)
        ComTHIRD Fleet
     (Advance) CinCPac (3)
     (Advance) ConDesPac
PART I  BRIEF SUMMARY

A. During the period of this report Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT SEVEN planned, established and maintained temporary headquarters and limited shore facilities at Yokosuka Naval Base. Accomplishment of this mission was subsequent to Japan's agreement to surrender to the Allied Powers. Prior to the signing of the official surrender, Allied forces were ordered to occupy the Yokosuka Naval Base Area, and Task Force THIRTY-ONE, formed at sea from THIRD FLEET Units, conducted the landings.

Commander Task Flotilla TWO was assigned duty as Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT SEVEN, Naval Shore Activities, Yokosuka. Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT SEVEN also assumed temporary command of Task Force THIRTY-ONE from 24 August through 27 August 1945.

There were no engagements with the enemy.

PART II  PRELIMINARIES

A. Organization of Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT SEVEN.
   Commander Task Group 31.7 - Commo. J. P. Womble, Jr., USN.
   31.7.1 Repatriation Unit -- Lt. Comdr. L. W. Harrell, USNR.
   31.7.2 Medical Unit ------- Comdr. F. P. Gilmore (MC), USN.
   31.7.3 Captain of Yard ---- Comdr. J. A. Coppola, USN.
   31.7.4 Communication Center - Lieut. F. L. Hall, USNR.
   31.7.5 Supply Unit ------- Lt. Comdr. J. W. Walsh (SC), USN.
   31.7.6 Demilitarization Unit - C.B. Demolition Officer.

B. Task Group 31.7 was formed at sea 19 August. Personnel was composed of Commander Task Flotilla TWO and his staff, and officers and men from other units of Task Force 38 ordered to report to Commander Task Group 31.7 for temporary additional duty. These numbered 26 officers and 32 men who were later augmented by an additional 77 officers and 499 men for temporary duty.

C. Own mission, doctrine and plans were the same as those stated in reference (c) and enclosure (A).

PART III  CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT


20 August: Task Force 31 engaged in transferring troops and supplies from ships of Task Force 38. 1330 CTG 31.4 (Commander Task Flotilla 4) assumed tactical command of Task Force 31, as directed by Commander Task Force 31.
21 August: 0800. CTG 31.7 and staff transferred to U.S.S. OZARK (LSV 2). Task Force 31 continued transfer of troops from Task Force 38.

22 August: Task Force 31 continued transfer of troops from Task Force 38.


25 August: 0100 U.S.S. BESOR (APD 127) and U.S.S. W. J. PATTISON (APD 104) reported for duty. 0300 Detached U.S.S. IOWA, with orders to proceed to join Task Group 30.1. 0530 Set course for Sagami Wan, Honshu in accordance with Commander Third Fleet's Operation Plan 10-45. 2100 U.S.S. YARDELL (DD696) and U.S.S. HALSEY POWELL (DD451) reported for duty.

26 August: 0300 Received orders from Commander THIRD Fleet to delay entry into Sagami Wan by 48 hours. Reversed course and proceeded to previous operating area. 1200 Received orders from Commander THIRD Fleet to proceed to Sagami Wan as previously directed. 1700 Received orders to delay original schedule in OpPlan 10-45 by 24 hours. In accordance with this directive maneuvered Task Force 31 in a 16 mile square until 2200, at which time the North Western course to Sagami Wan was resumed.


C-O-N-F-I-G-R-A-T-I-O-N

29 August: At anchor in Sagami Wan.


Period 1305 30 August to 0900 8 September.

HEADQUARTERS UNIT, CTG 31.7.

Occupied and established headquarters of U.S. Naval Shore Activities at buildings formerly occupied by HIJMN. CTG 31.7 assumed duties of Commander Naval Shore Activities, Yokosuka Area. During this period the staff established and maintained a Japanese Naval Liaison Section which, working with Japanese Naval Headquarters, Yokosuka, provided interpreters, working parties, technical specialists and Japanese Naval Officers to assist Allied forces. Arrangements were made for removal from caves and storage houses on the base, by Japanese personnel, of foodstuffs, clothing and medical supplies of no use to the Allied forces. These supplies were turned over to the Japanese civil authorities for the populace of Yokosuka and the mayor of the city expressed to U.S. Naval authorities his appreciation of their "humanity and benevolence." The staff also maintained effective contact with Allied military forces in the area in coordinating all efforts toward laying the groundwork for an effective occupation of Japan.

REPATRIATION UNIT – TU 31.7.1.

Although fully organized and equipped to handle the releasing of United Nations' repatriates, no opportunity presented itself to this unit to perform its mission. Repatriated nationals were handled entirely by CTG 30.6 and the 8th U.S. Army. Officers and enlisted personnel of TU 31.7.1 were reallocated to other units, although a skeleton organization was maintained.

MEDICAL UNIT – TU 31.7.2.

TU 31.7.2 was organized primarily to provide skilled medical care and hospital facilities for repatriates. Because no repatriates were handled, the efforts of the Medical unit were largely diverted to:

(1) The exploration of existing medical facilities in the Occupied Area.
(2) The providing of emergency medical care.
(3) The establishment of a dispensary.

(4) The coordination of procurement and distribution of medical supplies.
(5) The initiation and maintenance of adequate health and sanitary measures.

CAPTAIN OF THE YARD - TU 31.7.3.

(1) Assisted in the establishment of Naval Shore Activities and Headquarters, utilizing buildings formerly occupied by the Imperial Japanese Navy.

(2) Provided housing, messing and sanitary facilities for personnel attached to TG 31.7 Headquarters and 500 officers and men of other TG 31.7 units. The Japanese Officers Club on the base was taken over and speedily renovated to provide quarters, including suitable rooms for ComThirdFlt, and limited recreational facilities.

(3) In conjunction with the USMC and Naval Landing Force surveyed occupied area and provided internal security.

(4) Placed into commission and operated essential public utilities and services.

(5) Established motor transportation facilities to limit of capability with confiscated Japanese vehicles and equipment, augmented on 1 September by 25 vehicles provided by Service Force.

(6) Established and maintained three gas stations and an adequate supply of fresh water, procured initially from the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (CL53) and later from properly inspected and approved Japanese sources.

(7) Arranged for fire protection with improved Japanese equipment and apparatus landed from units of the Third Fleet.

(8) Arranged for the collection and disposal of trash and garbage.

(9) Supervised and assisted the Demilitarization Unit in surveying Japanese installations, and in rendering ordnance supplies and equipment inoperative. An important accomplishment was the destruction of all gun powder which had been removed from HIJMS MUGATO and stored ashore by the Japanese.

COMMUNICATION CENTER UNIT - TU 31.7.4.

(1) In coordination with TU 31.7.3 provided internal communications between activities ashore.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(2) Established Fleet Post Office, guard mail center, and officer passenger mail center utilizing U.S.S. LST 547 and U.S.S. LST 648.

136th NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION.

Increments of the 136th MCB landed at 1221 Item 30 August, and immediately commenced building an unloading beach. A detachment was sent to ATSUGI Airfield to assist the U.S. Army Airborne Engineers in keeping that field operational. A similar detachment was detailed to Kisarazu Airfield to place that field in condition for Naval Air Transport Service operation.

The balance of the 136th MCB established encampments for personnel and equipment, commenced building a Fleet Recreation Center, established a telephone cable connection with one Battleship Mooring buoy and assisted immeasurably in the establishment of utilities, facilities and services for the Naval Shore Establishment.

Without the assistance, inexhaustible energy and wholehearted cooperation of the 136th Naval Construction Battalion, under the Command of Commander L.F. Dozier (CEC) USNR, the establishment and maintenance of a temporary Naval Shore Establishment would have been virtually an impossible task.

SUPPLY UNIT - TU 31.7.5.

(1) Supervised and coordinated all Supply activities ashore, and under general direction of CTU 31.7.3 supervised all messing.

(2) Established liaison with Supply Facilities afloat for supplies, clothing, equipment and stores for units based ashore.

DEMILITARIZATION UNIT - TU 31.7.6.

Functions of this unit were incorporated in the organization of TU 31.7.3, and no organization functioned as TU 31.7.6.

PART IV

ORDNANCE

Not applicable.

PART V

DAMAGE

Not applicable.

PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND INFORMATION

None
PART VII PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

Personal performance was of a high order. All hands worked long hours, under difficult conditions, with limited equipment and facilities. Despite these handicaps assigned tasks were successfully accomplished. There were no casualties.

PART VIII LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

J. P. WOMBLE, JR.
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
COMMANDER TASK GROUP THIRTY-
ONE POINT SEVEN.

At sea,
18 August 1945.

OPERATION PLAN
CTF 31.7 No. 1-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION

Task Group 31.7 - Commo. J. P. Womble, Jr., USN.
Staff

(a) 31.7.1 Repatriation Unit - Lt.Cdr. Harrel.
Executive - 2 Officers and 24 men
from TaskFleet 2.
Medical - From 31.7.2.

(b) 31.7.2 Medical - Comdr. Gilmore (MC).
100 bed hospital from AH.
Dispensaries.
Sanitation Squad from Service Unit.

(c) 31.7.3 Captain of Yard - Comdr. Strombach.
Housing and Messing.
Shore Patrol.
Public Works.
Water Front.

(d) 31.7.4 Communication Center - Comm. Off. from Heavy.
Internal Shore Communications.
Ship-Shore Communications.
O.M. and Guard Mail Center and Temporary FPO
(from LSTs of Service Unit).

(e) 31.7.5 Supply - Lt.Cdr. Walsh (SC).
Coordinate messes, stores, equipment,
provisions, general service of supply
and general supply functions of all shore
based activities - Lieuts. Anderson and
Bacon and 3 SK from TF 38.

(f) 31.7.6 Demilitarization Unit - C.B. Unit Demolition Off.
Demolition of enemy ships and all office,
aviational, and machinery to be used by
Naval Activities - C.B. unit and demolition
units of TG 31.8.

1. General Situation.
Same as given in CTF 31 OpPlan 1-45.

2. This group will occupy and establish headquarters at
YOKOSUKA Naval Base, to carry out missions as assigned in Annex "Easy"
of CTF 31 OpPlan 1-45.
OPERATION PLAN
CTG 31.7 No. 1-45.

(a) Repatriation Unit shall arrange for proper care, billeting, outfitting, processing and in conjunction with the field hospital unit, for examination, classification and clearance of all United Nations repatriates in order to assure their orderly and expeditious evacuation. See Annex "Able" attached.

(b) Medical Unit shall provide services as indicated in Annex "How" CTF 31 OpPlan 1-45 and Annex "Baker" attached.

(c) Captain of the Yard shall establish headquarters at YOKOSUKA Naval Station, and provide essential services as indicated in Annex "Charlie" attached.

(d) Communication Center Unit shall establish adequate communication center, officer messenger and guard mail center, and temporary fleet post office. See Annex "Dog" attached.

(e) Supply Unit shall supervise and coordinate Supply activities in accordance with Logistic Plan, Annex "Fox" CTF 31 OpPlan 1-45, and be prepared to supervise messing and service of supply for shore activities as required. See Annex "Easy" attached.

(f) Disembarkation Unit shall, in conjunction with other units, survey and assure safety of office and housing spaces, automotive equipment and machinery. In conjunction with TG 31.8 examine and render safe enemy ships and small craft at docks. Neutralize and preserve all fixed defenses within area. See Annex "Fox" attached.

X.

(1) Personnel listed will be embarked in ships of DESDIV 100 and landed with Task Group Commander.

(2) Additional personnel from TF 38 and service units present will be landed as required.

(3) Annex "A" to "F" are attached hereto for guidance of unit commanders.

CTG 31.7 presently in OAKLAND will shift to TWINING (DD540) and land at first opportunity on Love Day.

J. P. Womble, Jr.,
Commander Task Group 31.7
ANNEX "A" TO CTG 31.7 OPERATING PLAN 1-45.

REPATRIATION UNIT

The primary mission of this unit is the effective, expeditious, and timely handling of released United Nations Repatriates. Efficient, untiring effort with this group is of the utmost importance.

Outstanding zeal must be displayed to accomplish the following:

1. Provide for registration, and if necessary, for housing and messing.
3. Outfit with clothing and necessary gear.
4. Provide transportation.
5. Be prepared to handle both sexes and also families.
6. Arrange expeditious evacuation by ship or planes. Repatriates physically fit should be processed with a minimum of delay.
7. Arrange for prompt clearance of all messages from repatriates to relatives.
8. Supervise receipt of necessary intelligence information from repatriates.

ANNEX ABLE. 101
ANNEX "B" TO CTG 31-7 OPERATION PLAN 1-45

MEDICAL UNIT

The functions of the Medical Unit are as follows:

(1) Supervision of all activities of the field hospital. The officer in charge of the unit shall assure himself that repatriates are being handled in the most expeditious and efficient manner possible. Supervise screening of repatriates, and advise as to time and method of evacuation, whether by sea or air.

(2) Explore existing medical facilities in the areas occupied.

(3) Provide emergency medical care.

(4) Establish dispensaries if required.

(5) Coordinate procurement and distribution of necessary medical supplies.

(6) Initiate and maintain requisite public health and sanitary measures.
ANNEX "C" TO CTG 31.7 OPERATION PLAN 1-45

CAPTAIN OF THE YARD

The missions of the Captain of the Yard are:

(1) To assist in the establishment of a Task Force Headquarters at Yokosuka Naval Station.

(2) To assist in the establishment of a temporary Naval Shore Activities Headquarters at Yokosuka Naval Station.

(3) Provide housing, messing, and sanitary facilities for attached personnel.

(4) Provide housing, messing and sanitary facilities for representatives of Occupying Forces.

(5) Provide housing, messing and sanitary facilities for the Press.

(6) Survey and be prepared to place out of bounds all unnecessary areas and places.

(7) Provide for internal security including escorts, patrols, and guards.

(8) Provide for necessary identification for authorized personnel.

(9) Operate essential public utilities and services.

(10) Establish motor transportation facilities to limit of facilities augmented by confiscated Japanese vehicles and service equipment.

(11) Establish and maintain gas and water stations.

(12) Arrange for fire protection.

(13) Arrange for collection and disposal of refuse.

(14) In conjunction with TG 31.8 supervise dock clearance, berthing local pilotage and the establishment of a boat pool.

(15) Make necessary arrangements with Demilitarization Unit for accomplishment of above missions.

(16) Establish internment camp prepared to receive 2,000 officers and 15000 enlisted men.

(17) Be prepared with plan to provide housing and necessary facilities at Hiroshima Imperial Palace without delay for high ranking visiting dignitaries if so directed.

In implementing the above utilize assigned C.B. unit. Attempt to localize and keep at a minimum Shore Based Activities.
The functions of the Communication Center Unit are:

1. To provide internal communications between activities ashore and maintain until local public utilities operating satisfactorily.

2. Provide ship to shore communications.

3. Establish Officer Messenger and Guard Mail Center.

4. If directed establish Fleet Post Office.
ANNEX "E" TO CTG 31.7 OPPLAN 1-45

SUPPLY UNIT

The basic concept of the logistic plan requires that shore based logistic functions be maintained at the barest minimum, and that only limited administrative supply activities be shore based.

The functions of the Supply Unit are:

1. Supervise and coordinate supply activities ashore.

2. Supervise messing and service of supply as required.

3. Establish liaison with Service Units present for supply of clothing, stores, equipment and provisions to shore based units.

4. Establish liaison with service units for arrangement of disbursing facilities as necessary for shore based units.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

FD4-244-3
Serial 0001
T-E-P S-E-C-R-E-T

ANNEX "F" TO CTG '31-'7 OPPLAN 1-45

DEMILITARIZATION UNIT

The Demilitarization Unit will:

(1) Assure the safety of offices, housing, automotive equipment and machinery prior to use by units of this Task Group.

(2) In conjunction with Task Group 31.6 examine and render safe all enemy ships and small craft at docks.

(3) Neutralize and preserve all fixed defenses and naval vessels within assigned area.

ANNEX FOX.
From: Commanding Officer, EX-HIJMS NAGATO.
To: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE (CombatDiv7).

Subject: Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO.

Reference: (a) CTF 31 (OBD 7) ltr., serial 2, of 29 August 1945.
(b) Memo to Comdr. T. J. Flynn, of 29 August 1945.
(c) CTF 31 despatch 030925, of September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Roster of boarding party.
(B) Roster of Japanese aboard HIJMS NAGATO.
(C) List of ship's plans and papers.
(D) Ordnance and Gunnery report.
(E) Engineering report.
(F) Damage and C&R report.

1. In accordance with orders contained in reference (a), I assumed command of the nucleus crew from the USS SOUTH DAKOTA (enclosure (A)), on 29 August 1945, for the purpose of taking possession and controlling HIJMS NAGATO moored in YOKOSUKA Inner Harbor, Japan. The crews were embarked in USS HORACE A. BASS (APD124), and were organized and briefed immediately for accomplishment of the task assigned.

2. In accordance with reference (b), the USS BASS went alongside the port side of the NAGATO at 0600, the ship being at general quarters. The ship's boats preceded the BASS for the purpose of cutting any telephone or other lines from NAGATO to shore. The boarding party boarded the NAGATO at 0805, 30 August 1945. Captain Sugino of the NAGATO, seven commissioned officers, three warrant officers, 13 enlisted men and one civilian Japanese interpreter (enclosure (B)), were formed in two ranks on the main deck of the NAGATO abreast Turret III. All were unarmed. Upon boarding, Captain Sugino stepped forward and saluted.

3. Captain Sugino was ordered to haul down the Japanese flag, and the U. S. ensign and jack were hoisted at 0810 with appropriate ceremony. The Japanese flag was delivered to Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

4. Guards were posted at various positions on the topside and inspection parties for turrets, magazines, engine spaces, lower decks, etc., proceeded with inspections immediately and were accompanied by at least one Japanese officer or man.

5. The captain was questioned as to the condition of the ship and with the help of various Japanese officers furnished the information indicated in the enclosures. Captain Sugino did not appear very familiar with the details of the ship and the other officers appeared vague. It is believed that the captain and officers listed were assigned to the ship after she was damaged with the exception of the Assistant Gunnery Officer and they may have been assigned merely for the purpose of turning over the ship. The enlisted men were familiar with the ship and furnished valuable information and aid.
5 September 1945.

Subject: Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO.

6. No opposition of any kind was encountered. At no time was any antagonism, resentment, arrogance or passive resistance encountered; both officers (including the captain) and men displaying a very meek and subservient attitude. It seemed almost incredible that these bowing, scraping, scared men were the same brutal, sadistic enemies who had tortured our prisoners, reports of whose plight were being received the same day. It is considered that the Japanese met all the terms given to them for the surrender of the NAGATO by Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE with the few exceptions noted, all of which are not considered serious. They have been very cooperative in furnishing information and assistance.

7. Ship’s plans and other documents (enclosure (C)) were turned over to me and other unidentified papers were found later and retained. A tour of the ship was made in company with Captain Sugino after which he and 4 officers, 4 enlisted men and the interpreter (enclosure (B)) were sent ashore to the Naval Base, YOKOSUKA, under guard and turned over to Marine military police. The remainder of the Japanese were kept aboard for assistance in technical matters.

8. The USS BASS remained alongside the NAGATO up to date of this report and furnished berthing and messing facilities for the nucleus crew. The officers and crew of the BASS were very cooperative in furnishing technical assistance and material for carrying out the assigned task. Technical personnel from the USS IOWA was also furnished when requested. There were no engineering or C&R artificers with the SOUTH DAKOTA crews; such men being furnished by the BASS and IOWA.

9. On 4 September 1945, the ship got underway and was towed to Buoy #3, YOKOSUKA Harbor.

10. At 0600, 5 September 1945, I was relieved by the Commanding Officer of the USS DELTA, in accordance with reference (c). Ship’s plans and other papers (enclosure (C)) were turned over to the commanding officer.

11. It is recommended that pending decision as to ultimate disposition of the NAGATO, a board be appointed to examine the ship in detail as to construction, ordnance and fire control and engineering.

/s/ T. J. FLYNN.
U.S.S. Ex-H.B. J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945

The following officers and men comprised the boarding party of the NAGATO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Rank or Rate</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.J. Flynn</td>
<td>61363</td>
<td>Captain, USN</td>
<td>USS IOWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Edwards</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gunner, USN</td>
<td>USS IOWA</td>
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<td>D.B. Hertz</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieut., USN</td>
<td>USS IOWA</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.E. Benziger</td>
<td>404402</td>
<td>Ens., USNR</td>
<td>USS SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.W. Sant</td>
<td>144156</td>
<td>Lt(jg), USNR</td>
<td>USS SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.A. Wiggienhorn</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieut., USN</td>
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<td>K.O. Dixon</td>
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<td>H.D. Williams</td>
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<td>R.E. Johnson</td>
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<td>A. Hodges</td>
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<td>Addington, V.W.</td>
<td>342 66 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barnes, W.E.</td>
<td>810 84 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benton, A.T., Jr.</td>
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<td>Buccellato, N.(n)</td>
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<td>758 17 97</td>
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<td>575 00 18</td>
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<td>619 38 62</td>
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<td>202 49 08</td>
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<td>York, G.A.</td>
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</table>
**U.S.S. Ex-Hi.J.M.S. NAGATO**

4 September 1945

Officers and men of boarding party (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Rank or Rate</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Aloisi, M.P.</td>
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<td>Gulbrandson, F.B., Jr.</td>
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<td>Crawford, G.T.</td>
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<td>King, C.S.</td>
<td>805 72 77</td>
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**U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA**
Officers and men of boarding party (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Rank or Rate</th>
<th>Ship</th>
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<tr>
<td>Klippel, W.W.</td>
<td>563 27 32</td>
<td>Cox(T), USNR</td>
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<td>Long, W.W.</td>
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<td>Montecalvo, A., (n)</td>
<td>204 89 79</td>
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<td>Phillippe, C.E.</td>
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<td>SC2c, USNR</td>
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<td>Wright, J.E.</td>
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<td>Butler, H.E.</td>
<td>888 28 65</td>
<td>Slc, USNR</td>
<td>USS SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
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</table>
Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

LIST OF JAPANESE ABOARD AT TIME OF BOARDING:

Officers:

Captain

# *Lieut. Comdr.

# *Lieut.

# *Lieut.

# *2nd Lieut.

2nd Lieut.

Ens.

# *Ens.

Warrant

Warrant

# *Warrant

S. Sugino

S. Okuda

O. Nakamura

S. Mine

M. Kuzuu

H. Kakuta

S. Nakamura

O. Sato

F. Fujino

K. Uemi

Y. Kawati

Gunnery Officer.

Engineering Officer.

Electrical Officer.

Ass't. Gunnery Officer.

Main Engine Officer.

Communication Officer.

Boiler Division Officer.

Sub Communication Officer.

Paymaster

Electrician.

Enlisted Men:

K. Suzuki

S. Nakano

## S. Yamazaki

## K. Murekaimi

## A. Ishizawa

K. Aizawa

## S. Suwabe

## K. Nakamura

## S. Okushima

## H. Endo.

## D. Arai.

## N. Misono.

## S. Tahashima

Seaman.

Seaman.

Engineer

Seaman.

Seaman.

Engineer.

Engineer.

Seaman.

Engineer.

Engineer.

Seaman.

Engineer.

Engineer.

Engineer.

Interpreter (Civilian)

Brought on board from Bass:

Shibata

Interpreter.

$Murasoe

Pilot.

* Retained on board. Others left ship under guard at 1100 on 30 August 1945.

# Left ship at 1500 4 September 1945.

$ Returned to USS Horace A. Bass.

ENCLOSURE (B) TO "K"
EX - H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

The following is a list of papers and ship's plans turned over by the Captain of the Nagato. Other miscellaneous papers found upon inspection are not listed.

12 blue prints (arrangement of each deck, outboard and inboard profiles, sectional plans, principle dimensions).

Three catalogues of armament, list of medical supplies, report of damage, present condition of ship, and tactical data.
ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY REPORT:

1. The following is a synopsis of the condition of the ordnance and gunnery material aboard the Ex-H.I.J.M.S., NAGATO as reported and as verified by preliminary inspection.

MAIN BATTERY:

1. There are 8 - 40 centimeter guns aboard in four turrets. Firing locks have been removed from the guns, 15 being stowed below. In all other respects it is believed the turrets are operable, with minor exceptions.

2. Main battery ammunition is aboard as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turret</th>
<th>Type of Ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>126 H.C. and 153 A.P. projectiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>62 H.C. and 106 A.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>80 H.C. and 138 A.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>111 H.C. and 122 A.P.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The H.C. projectiles are fitted with dummy nose plugs. The A.P. are fitted with dummy internal base fuses.

4. There is no 40 centimeter powder aboard. There are approximately 20 boxes of primers aboard.

SECONDARY AND A.A. BATTERIES:

1. There are no secondary or A.A. guns aboard, having been removed in navy yard.

2. The battery consisted of 18 single 14 centimeter guns and 12, 12-7 centimeter A.A. guns in twin mounts.

3. There is no secondary or A.A. ammunition aboard.

Machine Guns:

1. There are 36, 25 millimeter guns in operating condition unmounted and stowed in starboard gun room frame 157.

2. One twin mount damaged is mounted above navigation bridge. Two triple mounts are located on top of turret two, badly damaged and rusted.

3. There are 16,561 rounds of ammunition for these guns located in two magazines:

   07301 (frame 85) 12873 rounds. (midships)
   07515 (frame 85) 3688 rounds. (port)

Directors:

1. One main battery director is aboard located above the
U.S.S. Ex-H.I.J.M.S. Nagato

4 September 1945.

DIRECTORS (Cont.)

"Navigation Bridge amidships.

2. One main battery director removed from top level of Pagoda structure.

3. One main battery director removed from after superstructure.

4. Six secondary battery directors are aboard, two badly damaged.
   Two A.A. (12.7) directors aboard are stripped. Seven 25 millimeter directors
   installed and operable.

PLOTTING ROOM:

1. One main battery and two secondary battery plotting rooms apparently
   in operating condition.
U.S.S. Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945

ENGINEERING REPORT

The following is a synopsis of the condition of the engineering plant of the NAGATO as reported by the Japanese, and as verified by preliminary inspection:

1. The general condition of the engineering plant is good. Some electrical motors are out of commission, but all vital machinery seems usable.

2. Boilers: There are six small boilers and four large boilers arranged in four firerooms. The four large boilers are filled to steaming level and can be used. The firesides of small boilers are open. The tubes seem clean. The six small boilers are dry. Fireroom auxiliaries seem to be in good condition. Number ten boiler has been lighted off three times and has operated satisfactorily. An open type feed system is used with hot well and feed heaters. The condensate and boiler feed system has been traced and used. There are 31,735 gallons of feed water in the main feed tanks. There are 11,300 gallons of water in auxiliary feed tanks of which 7000 are considered usable. Steam has been bled to auxiliary loop to anchor engine from ten boilers. No major leaks have been discovered, but there are many minor steam leaks.

3. Electrical Power: There are four 250 kilowatt direct current turbo generators and one 200 kilowatt direct current 225 volt Diesel generator aboard. The Diesel generator has been running for light and power. Five hundred gallons of Diesel fuel have been received from the U.S.S. HORACE A. BASS, and there are now approximately 2200 gallons (of a capacity of 12,000 gallons) aboard. It is estimated that this will be sufficient for four days operation until suction is lost. The Diesel generator has never been run for more than two days continuously. Number two turbo - generator has been started and taken the whole load satisfactorily for one hour (400 amperes) and also has been paralleled with the Diesel generator. Number one generator seems in good condition. Number three generator needs some drain line repairs to the turbine. Number four generator has no ventilation due to damaged trunk. The three distribution boards seem to be in good condition, and the majority of circuits on number one board (control) have been checked out. The voltage from Diesel generator has been controlled both locally and from number one distribution board satisfactorily. No difficulty is anticipated in running the generators or the electrical system. There are some A.C. boards supplied with power from motor generators (for L.C., fire control, etc.) which have not been checked out.

4. Main Engines: There are four main engines of 20,000 H.P. each. They are cross-compound Westinghouse turbines with air pumps carrying a vacuum of about 28". Maximum speed is 24.5 knots, (cruising speed 12 knots with fuel consumption of about - estimated - of 30,000 gallons per day. All engines are in good condition and probably can be run. The shafts do not seem to be out of line.

5. Evaporators: There are two sets of high pressure evaporators, maximum capacity of about 600 gallons an hour each. Work is underway, lightening these off.
6. **Fire and Flushing System:** There are ten electric pumps aboard, of which three are out of commission and would require extensive repairs. Five pumps would require repair work. Only two pumps are in satisfactory condition; it is possible to maintain a pressure of 70 psi on the fire main with two pumps. The fire main loop has been completely checked, and pressure is being maintained on all parts of the system.

7. **Fuel Oil:** It is estimated that there are 17,000 gallons of useable fuel oil on board, in eight tanks. All other tanks are ballasted as far as is known. It is reported that removal of ballast was accomplished by use of compressed air; the details of deballasting are not yet known. It is reported that the starboard wing tanks are leaking, but it has not yet been possible to determine the extent of damage.

8. **Communications:** The telephone systems have been in commission and have been tested from conn to steering aft, and on several circuits through the main switchboard in telephone exchange. There is a public address system which has been tested and is in working order.

9. **Steering Engines:** The steering engines are hydraulic-electric and are in excellent condition. There are two motors in each of the two steering engine rooms, and they can operate the rudder singly or in any combination. Steering has been checked from upper and lower conn and from each of the steering rooms.

10. **Anchor Windlass:** The anchor windless is a reciprocating steam engine and has been operated to walk out and hoist anchor chain.

11. **Sanitary Facilities:** The heads are flushed by a gravity feed system from tanks in the superstructure, filled, by means of the fire main. One head forward on main deck is in operation. No work has been attempted on the fresh water system. The capacity of the fresh water tanks is approximately 39,000 gallons. The capacity of the reserve feed tanks, less the hot well, is approximately 49,000 gallons. The Japanese reported that the shafts have not been bent, and that the propellers are not damaged. This condition has not been checked.

**SUMMARY:** No difficulty should arise in operating the engineering plant if provisions can be made for taking fuel aboard and checking the tanks which are reported to be leaky. The machinery except for some electric motors, shows excellent care.

ENCLOSURE (E) TO "K"
EX-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

DAMAGE AND C&R REPORT.

4 September 1945.

It was reported by the captain of the NAGATO that the ship sustained a near miss off the port bow during October 1944 in the vicinity of Corregidor. This has opened up a hole approximately twenty feet long at frame Ten which has been patched with fifteen pound plate twenty feet by ten feet. The work is of very poor quality and there are numerous open seams and rivet holes. The frames are weak and would not withstand a heavy sea. The bottom of the plate is three feet above the water line.

Three direct hits and sixty near misses were sustained during the July 16th raid on Yokosuka. Two hits on the Pagado structure demolished the bridge ex-05 level. However the tripods are not damaged and other levels were not damaged.

One hit just forward of turret three (ex-wardroom) detonated on the main deck blowing a hole in it and demolishing the overhead (catapult structure) and bulkheads. The main deck hole has been patched with concrete by the Japanese. Bulkheads on the main deck were blown away in the area some forty feet forward of detonation.

The sixty near misses were reported by the Japanese to have opened up all blister and some double bottom fuel tanks on the port side between turrets two and three. Two thirds of all fuel tanks are flooded carrying approximately 2000 tons of water. This had not been verified.

The ship is on an even keel.

Draft forward, feet, Aft, feet.

The fire and flushing system has ten electrical pumps five of which are operable. One pump is sufficient to maintain a pressure of ninety pounds on the system. These pumps can also be used as drain pumps.

There is one anchor aboard (starboard) and two anchor chains. The anchor windlass and winches on the forecastle are operable.

There are no satisfactory sanitary facilities aboard. There are no adequate cooking, messing or berthing facilities aboard.
ORDER

1. The Naval Station and Naval Air Station at Yokosuka shall be closed down as specified in the directive of Commander THIRD Fleet delivered to Japanese representatives this date. Except as noted herein, the Naval, military, and civilian population within the limits of these stations shall, by 1800, on 29 August 1945, be reduced to the following:

(a) The Commandant First Naval District (Commandant Yokosuka Naval Air Base) and nucleus administrative staff organization (to be English-speaking, or provided with interpreters for those that are not English-speaking). This staff is to comprise administrative assistants as necessary to control under the direction of Allied occupation authorities, the various departments of the Naval establishment. A staff organization setting forth the names, rank and duties of each officer involved shall be submitted to CTF 31 for his approval prior to noon, 28 August 1945.

(b) A Captain of the Navy and an Army officer of corresponding rank shall meet the Commanding General of the Naval Landing Force at a time and place on 30 August as specified by the Commander of the Naval Landing Force.

(c) Necessary personnel (minimum in number) to continue operation of all essential public utilities, including power, light, water, telephone, fire department, gas (if used), hospitals, sanitation (including garbage collection) until these functions are taken over by Allied personnel. In this connection a report is to be submitted to CTF 31 by noon, 28 August, by the Commandant Yokosuka Naval District, considered by him to be the minimum required for the intended purpose.

(d) Minimum personnel (not to exceed fifteen (15) officers and one hundred fifty (150) men). Provide shipkeepers, and technical personnel necessary to turn over to Allied control and assist in the inspection and taking over of any ships, submarines, nixie submarines, boats, and auxiliary craft of all types.

(e) Drivers for passenger cars and trucks (one for each) required to be delivered to U.S. authorities.

(f) Essential communication key personnel to turn over in good order the station radio facilities and essential key personnel to operate the telephone system, telephone switchboards (English-speaking operators) and all airfield radio and signalling equipment for handling aircraft from the field (The Commandant of the Naval District shall prior to noon 28 August submit for approval of CTF 31 a report indicating the number of personnel considered essential to these purposes.

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ENCLOSURE (L)
(g) Guides and interpreters to be made available on the day of occupation at time and place to be specified by Commanding General Naval Landing Force - fifteen (15) at Navy Yard and ten (10) at Naval Air Station.

2. At the time specified for the U.S. Naval occupation, the above personnel shall be wholly disarmed and shall remain at stations as designated in paragraph 3, this order, until otherwise directed by U.S. authorities, or assembled in ranks under own officers outside of their assigned barracks. Civilian personnel shall wear white cloth bands for quick identification and all personnel shall carry positive means of identification at all times. All personnel shall be quartered within the Naval establishment in accommodations as submitted by the Commandant of the First Naval District and approved by GTP 31 or his representative.

3. The disposition of above personnel at the time of occupation shall be as follows:

(a) Commandant and one (1) Staff Officer shall await the arrival of Commander Task Force 31, and the Chief of Staff Commander THIRD Fleet, at a point on the waterfront to be specified later. The remainder of the headquarters staff personnel shall remain in a body at the Naval District Headquarters.

(b) As indicated in paragraph one (1).

(c) Personnel essential to the operation of public utilities shall be at their stations, others shall be assembled at their designated barracks.

(d) Police, guards, and caretakers are to be at their stations outside of buildings, and shall remain on station until relieved by Allied Forces. Magazines and Storage Buildings are to be locked, but access is to be available to Allied Forces by key in the possession of local guard. Further employment and disposition of this group shall be as directed by the Commanding General, Allied Landing Force.

(e) One (1) officer and two (2) shipkeepers shall be on board each naval or auxiliary vessel moored separately and the same number at each nest of small craft. Others in this group shall be assembled at a point to be designated later to report to designated officers of the Allied Landing Force for duties as they may direct.

(f) Passenger cars and trucks shall be assembled at points specified in enclosures with each driver alongside of, but outside of, his vehicle. They shall be employed as directed by U.S. Authority.

(g) One watch stationed at the radio station, telephone switchboards and at airfield radio and signal stations. Others watches assembled at designated barracks until otherwise directed by Allied Authority.
(h) Fifteen (15) officer interpreters shall meet the Naval Landing Force and report to the senior Allied officer at a point on the Navy Yard waterfront to be designated later. Ten (10) officer interpreters shall perform the same functions at the south seaplane ramps at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.
4. The following action by Japanese Authorities shall be completed and fully effective by 1800, 29 August 1945 or as otherwise specified herein

(a) **Navigation:**

1. Take twenty (20) pilots immediately available and ready to report on board U. S. pilot vessel at a time and place to be later designated.

2. Deliver to CTF 31, or designated agent, 10 complete sets of local charts with all data complete and up-to-date.

3. Have all lighthouses, beacons, and other navigational aids in the Sagami Wan, and in Tokyo and its approaches in full operation on a peace time basis at once.

4. Channel and approach buoys to be placed as well as buoys indicating all obstructions.

5. Complete report of berths, anchor buoys, telephone buoys, and anchorages clear and available for use in the area of occupation and contiguous waters (to be submitted to CTF 31, prior to 1000 on 28 August 1945).

6. Clear alongside berths at piers, jetties, etc., as possible to accommodate the maximum number of allied ships within the area of occupation.

7. Submit sounding data covering the approaches to, and the water area alongside all workable piers and jetties.

(b) **Ships and Craft:**

1. Make report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 (including 10 charts) giving exact location of ships present, including all ships, submarines, boats and craft of all kinds as of 1800, 29 August 1945.

2. All ships and craft of all kinds shall be demilitarized and rendered ineffective, in accordance with previous instructions (removal of all explosives, demilitarization of all offensive armament).

3. All personnel shall be removed except as specified and approved by CTF 31.

4. All submarines shall be nested together. All midget submarines shall be placed in dry dock.

5. All small craft shall be hauled out of the water or nested afloat in not more than three groups in localities to be submitted by the Commandant of the First Naval District and approved by CTF 31. These nests shall not foul any ship berth of over fourteen (14) feet alongside.
(b) Ships and Craft: (Cont'd)

(6) Complete descriptive report shall be made to CTF 31 prior to 1000 on 28 August 1945 of all ships, boats, tugs, barges, or craft of any kind which are operational and of which may readily be made operational. This report shall include small boats adaptable for uses as Admiral's barges, gigs, and ships' boats. The type of fuel used shall be specified.

(7) A special group of fifteen (15) operational picket boats, LTB's, or equivalent craft shall be assembled and made ready for immediate use by Allied Naval Forces. (Engineers shall be available among the required group of technicians for duty in the preliminary operation of these vessels).

(8) All camouflage shall be from all ships, boats, piers, or other waterfront installations.

(c) Coast Defenses:

(1) Make report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 (including 10 charts) giving exact location of all coast defense guns, AA guns, torpedo tubes, and any other defensive installations (including ammunition stowages) within range of ships operating in Sagami Wan, or Tokyo Bay, or its approaches.

(2) Each of the above installations shall be clearly marked with a white flag in a manner and size so as to be clearly visible from seaward at a distance of four miles off shore.

(3) All personnel, (naval, military, or civilian) to be forbidden the area near these installations (except for guards essential to the safeguarding of magazines).

(4) All guns to be demilitarized by the removal of breech-blocks which are to be collected and locked up in storage within the area of occupation and turned over to the Allied Forces.

(5) All personnel shall be removed from Island Ports #1, #2, and #3, (except one English-speaking guide on each) and from the fortifications at Futtsu Saki (except 8 English-speaking guides). The guides shall meet Allied forces about 0600 on 30 August 1945 and conduct them to defense emplacements for inspection of the condition of guns and other defense installations.

(6) Remove all nets and camouflage on all installations.

(d) Communications:

(1) Deliver radio station JME, Yokosuka Radio, ready for operation in all respects, including an adequate supply of spare parts.
(d) **Communications:** (Cont'd)

2. All signal stations shall be fully ready for operation.

3. Telephone system and telephone exchange manned and ready for operation (with English-speaking operator at the switchboard).

4. All other communications stations and systems to be delivered, ready for operation in all respects, but with operation discontinued pending further orders from Allied authorities.

5. Establish and maintain direct telephone communication to Atsugi Airfield (Allied Headquarters).

(e) **Shore Transportation:**

1. Automotive transportation in first-class working order and fully ready for operation shall be made available and ready in the vicinity of the Naval Barracks, Yokosuka Navy Yard, or in the vicinity of the air field hangars at the Yokosuka air field in the number and type specified below:

   (a) **Yokosuka Naval Station.**
   - 8 high-class limousine body automobiles
   - 10 sedans
   - 10 passenger busses
   - 20 trucks (heavy-duty)
   - 30 light trucks
   - 2 wrecking cars
   - 4 ambulances
   - 4 gasoline trucks (500 gals. or larger)
   - 8 water trucks (500 gals. or larger)
   - all available fire-fighting apparatus

   *All of these may be 2 to 2½ tons capacity.

   (b) **Naval Air Station Yokosuka.**
   - 6 fully operational aircraft handling tractors
   - 2 wrecking cranes - 60,000# lift
   - 6 gasoline trucks - pumping capacity 1000 gals.
   - 6 oil dollys - capacity 200 gals. each
   - 4 passenger busses
   - 1 ambulance
   - 5 limousines
   - 4 heavy-duty trucks
   - 6 light trucks
   - 4 water trucks (500 gals. or larger)
   - all available fire-fighting apparatus
(f) Offices, Officers Quarters, Barracks, Messing:

A. Office Space:

1. Provide and make available all existing office space in a clean and readily operable condition. Telephones to be connected, clerical supplies to be on hand, furniture to be in good repair; in general ready to be immediately used.

2. Specific facilities must exist or be provided to accommodate:

(a) The Commander Occupation Force and his staff of 150 officers and men.

(b) The Commander of the THIRD Fleet, U.S. Navy, and staff of 15-20 officers and 30-40 men.

(c) The Commander Naval Shore Activities Yokosuka Naval Base and staff of 30 officers and 60 men.

B. Living Quarters:

1. Flag Officers.

(a) All existing high ranking officers quarters shall be clean, furnished, in good repair, and ready for occupancy for ranking flag officers of the U.S. Fleet.

(b) There must be three separate establishments to accommodate any or all of the following:

(1) The Commander Naval Occupation Force Yokosuka.

(2) The Commander THIRD Fleet, U.S. Navy.

(3) The Commander Naval Shore Activities.

(c) Each of the above shall be fully equipped for immediate occupancy.

2. Officers.

(a) All existing officers quarters assigned to officers of the rank of commander and above shall be prepared for immediate occupancy by Allied Naval and Army Officers. They shall be scrupulously clean, fully equipped, and ready for immediate occupancy.

(b) Suitable accommodations must be provided for 500 officers on the Yokosuka Naval Station. Accommodations are necessary for 50 officers at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.
(c) The existing officers mess shall be made ready for immediate use. It shall be clean, equipped with necessary utensils, service, china, with stowage places, and refrigerator spaces in a completely sanitary condition.

(d) The officers mess, specifically, must be ready to feed 500 officers in a wholesome, clean, and satisfactory manner.

(e) All existing officers clubs shall be made ready for immediate use by Allied officers. They will be thoroughly clean and completely sanitary, with all recreational facilities ready for use.


(a) All necessary barracks as outlined below will be immediately vacated, scrubbed, and in general made ready for U. S. Naval use.

(b) There must be quarters available for an eventual total of 13,000 men on the Yokosuka Naval Station.

(c) There must be quarters available for eventual total of 4,000 men at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.

(d) Existing recreational facilities will be made ready for immediate use.

(e) Existing messing facilities will be made ready for immediate use. All kitchens must be absolutely clean.

C. Report.

The Commandant First Naval District will submit a report to the Commander U.S. Naval Occupation Forces, Yokosuka not later than 1000 August 28th. His report shall follow this outline and summarize the existing facilities and state their location, capacity, and condition. It shall state what quarters and messing facilities are requested for Japanese officers and men. It shall explain in detail what flag officers quarters are available, what recreational facilities for officers and men are available, and what messing facilities are available.
(g) **Allied Prisoners of War:**

1. Make a complete report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945, indicating the number, location, and physical condition of all Allied Prisoners of War in Yokosuka Area and vicinity.

2. Be prepared to make immediate delivery of all Allied Prisoners to U.S. Naval Authorities as directed by CTF 31.

(h) **Medical and Sanitation:**

1. In accordance with previous instructions have all hospitals and dispensaries thoroughly cleaned and fully equipped for occupational use by U.S. Forces.

2. Submit report to CTF 31 stating general health conditions presently existing in the Yokosuka area including a statement as to whether any epidemics exist, and what diseases are most prevalent.

3. Submit to CTF 31 a complete description of the water supply system including the sources of the water supply, location and condition of all reservoirs, clarification system, and means of distribution.

(i) **Miscellaneous:**

A. Deliver at once twenty-five (25) corrected copies of layout plans of Yokosuka Naval Station and area, including waterfront, depths of water at piers, etc.

B. Man and make ready print shop with presses and supplies, fully equipped to produce work involving both the English and Japanese language.

C. Make available for immediate use one (1) storehouse (50,000 square feet) near or adjacent to large ship berth.

D. Make ready and place in full operating readiness not less than three gasoline and lubricating oil Filling Stations for use of automobiles in the Naval Station, Naval Air Station, and other principal localities within the area of occupation.

E. Submit to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 a complete outline of power and light system, indicating location and rate of all power plants, distribution stations, etc., and indicate the type and voltage and frequency of current supply, and availability.

O. C. BADER,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander, Yokosuka Naval Occupation Force.
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET

Serial: 0536

C-G-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

1st Endorsement on
CTF 31 (CombatDiv 7)
Conf. ltr. Serial 010
dated 8 September 1945.

From: Commander THIRD Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report of CTF 31, Commander Occupation Forces,
YOKOSUKA; Occupation and Securing of the YOKOSUKA Naval
Base and Airfield; Covering the period 19 August to 8
September 1945.

1. Forwarded.

2. It is gratifying to know that communications were carried out
so well with the lack of trained shore-based communications personnel and
equipment available. Had Commander Task Force 31 been unable to place a
communications guardship alongside a seawall it is doubted if the portable
equipment furnished by the ships of the THIRD Fleet would have been adequate
to handle the radio traffic. Fortunately CTG 31.3 was able to furnish more
up-to-date equipment for the Fleet Landing Parties so that the TBV was not
used. Equipment available to the Task Force Commander, Task Group Commanders
ashore and the Fleet Landing Forces consisted of TBV, TBX and MM. The rapid
setting up of telephones ashore had the very favorable effect of making un-
necessary the use of radio to any great extent after the first day. The
planning of communications for this operation were limited due to the fact
that commanders concerned were at sea and the types of equipment available
to most of the commands were limited. Conferences were held underway and a
successful and workable plan drawn up.

3. Activation of Yokosuka airfield by the COMAFFS SABA was an
excellent performance. It is unfortunate that terrain precluded transport
operations from this field as it is much more convenient to other activities.
However, the emergency activation of Kisaramu was well handled and provided
necessary field for POW evacuation and other transport operations.

4. Individual units accomplished an outstanding feat of organi-
zizing and transferring an occupation force from combatant vessels to landing
craft type vessels at sea. The entire planning and execution was handled
efficiently and effectively in a very short time. This was an unprecedented
operation since combat vessels have not carried an organized landing force
since the beginning of hostilities.

W. F. Naley

Copy to:
CombatDiv 7

128
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

28 OCT 1945

2nd Endorsement on
CTF 31 (ComBatDiv 7)
sec. ltr., CTF31/A16-3,
serial 020, dated 8
September 1945.

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Action Report of CTF 31, Commander Occupation Forces,
YOKOSUKA; Occupation and Securing of the YOKOSUKA Naval
Base and Airfield; Covering the period 19 August to 8
September 1945.

1. Forwarded, concurring in paragraph 4 of the First
Endorsement.

2. Comment will be included in Cincpac’s Monthly Report
of Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas for the month concerned.

R. C. PARKER,
By direction