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COMMANDER TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE

CTF31/A16-3
Serial 010

8 September 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE (ComBatDiv 7).
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander THIRD Fleet.
(2) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report of CTF 31, Commander Occupation Forces, YOKOSUKA; Occupation and Securing of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base and Airfield; Covering the period 19 August to 8 September 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFleet Ltr. 1CL-45 of 1 January 1945,

Enclosure: (A) Action Report, Commander Task Force 31. *P.R.*
(B) Action Report, CTG 31.1, Flagship Group, U.S.S. IOWA.
(C) Action Report, CTG 31.2, Minesweeping Group.
(To be forwarded separately).
(D) Action Report, CTG 31.3, Fleet Landing Force and Task Force Able, Sixth Marine Division.
(E) Action Report, CTG 31.4 - Transport Group.
(F) Action Report, CTG 31.5 - Screen.
(G) Action Report, CTG 31.6 - Yokosuka Naval Air Activities.
(H) Action Report, CTG 31.7 - Naval Shore Activities.
(I) Action Report, CTG 31.8 - SOPA Administrator.
(J) Action Report, CTG 31.9 - Submarine Demilitarization Group. *-Mser. 138106*
(K) Report of Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO. *P. 32*
(L) Demands and Orders given to Japanese Commandant First Naval District dated 27 August 1945. *P. 44*

1. Pursuant to instructions in reference (a), the Action Report for Task Force THIRTY-ONE for the period 19 August to 8 September 1945, incident to the occupation of YOKOSUKA Naval Base and Airfield is forwarded herewith as enclosures.

O. C. BADGER.

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Authenticated:

I. G. Seeger
I. G. SEEGER,
Flag Secretary.

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PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

A. This action report covers the period from 19 August to 8 September 1945. YOKOSUKA Occupation Force, Task Force 31 was formed at 1400 (I) August 19, 1945 in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plan 10-45; Commander Task Force 31, Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, USN. The Task Force, consisting of units assigned from THIRD Fleet including Marine and Bluejacket landing forces, a British landing force detachment, and a Marine Combat Team consisting of 4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment, 6th Marine Division and attached units, entered TOKYO BAY beginning 28 August. On 30 August, landings were made at the YOKOSUKA Naval Base and the surrender of the base was received by Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, from the Commandant of the FIRST Naval District, Vice Admiral Totsuko. From 30 August to 8 September, Naval activities in the YOKOSUKA area were organized and administered by Task Force 31. Fleet Landing forces were relieved by the 4th Marines and reembarked from 4 to 6 September. Task Force 31 was dissolved on 8 September, its mission completed. Commander Fleet Activities YOKOSUKA and Commander Service Division 102 (SOPA Administrative) relieved Commander Task Force 31 and assumed respective control of all tasks assigned to Task Force 31.

PART II - PRELIMINARIES.

A. Task Force THIRTY-ONE, operating as a part of the THIRD Fleet in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45, 11-45 and Commander Task Force 31 Operation Plan 1-45, included the following units; the composition of the force varying as units reported or were detached for special missions. The force was also supplemented as necessary by drawing on the facilities of the THIRD Fleet.

(a) T.G. 31.1 Flagship Group - Captain Wellborn.

IOWA (BB61) (FF)	1 BB
SAN DIEGO (CL53) (RFF)	1 CL(AA)

(b) T.G. 31.2 Minesweeping Group - Captain Loud.

T.U. 31.2.1 Minesweeping Unit ABLE.

ELLYSON (F)(DMS19)	7 DMS
HAMBLETON (DMS20)	2 DM
GHERARDI (DMS30)	
JEFFERS (DMS27)	
MACOMB (DMS23)	
HOPKINS (DMS13)	
FITCH (DMS25)	
GWIN (DM33)	
T.E. FRAZER (DM24)	

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T.U. 31.2.2 Minesweeping Unit BAKER

REVENGE, (AM110)	6 AM
TOKEN (AM126)	2 ACM
TUMULT (AM127)	12 YMS
BASTON (ACM6)	
POCHARD (AM375)	
PICKET (ACM8)	
SAGE (AM11)	
REQUISITE (AM109)	
YMS 177, 268, 276, 343, 362, 461, 371, 390, 415, 426, 441, 467.	

(c) T.G. 31.3 Landing Force, Brig. General Clement (USMC)

T.U. 31.3.1 Marine Combat Team, Lt. Col. Beans
4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment
6th Marine Division 5400 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.2 Third Fleet Marine Landing Force,
Lt. Col. Lantz(USMC)
3 Battalions from TF 38 1635 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.3 Third Fleet Naval Landing Force, Comdr. Malone
2 Battalions Bluejackets 850 Officers and Men.
Fully equipped from TF 38.
Nucleus Crews 330 Officers & Men.
10 Units (33 Officers & men each).
5 Battalions Bluejackets 2000 Officers & Men.
Partially equipped from TF 38 in Reserve.

T.U. 31.3.4. British Landing Force, Capt. Buchanan(RAN).
1 Battalion from TF 38.5 200 Naval Personnel.
250 Royal Marines.

(d) T.G. 31.4 Transport Group, Commodore Smoot.

T.U. 31.4.1 Fire Support Unit 10 LCI
LCI Group 46.

T.U. 31.4.2. Transport Unit ABLE, Capt. Moen.
GRIMES (F) (APA172) 5 APA
MERRIWEATHER (APA203) 1 AKA
LANIER (APA125) (Marine RCT T.U. 31.3.1
embarked).
MELLETTE (APA156)
BRAXTON (APA138)
WAUKESHA (AKA84)

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T.U. 31.4.2. Transport Unit BAKER, Capt. F.P. Williams.
 OZARK (LSV2))THIRD Fleet Marine 2 LSV
 MONITOR (LSV5))(TU 31.3.2) and Naval 1 APA
 GARRARD (APA84))Landing Forces (TU 3 LSD
 SHADWELL (LSD15))31.3.3 Battalions,
 SAN MARCOS (LSD25) Beach Parties, Misc.
 CATAMOUNT (LSD17) Units) embarked.

T.U. 31.4.4 Transport Unit CHARLIE, Capt. Kennaday.
 SIMS (F) (APD50))British Landing 10 APD
 PAVLIC (APD70))Force (TU 31.3.4)em-
 BARR (APD39))barked.
 H.A. BASS (APD124) 3 Nucleus crews, 1
 Bomb Disposal Group,
 embarked.
 GOSSELIN (APD126) Press personnel embarked.
 REEVES (APD52)
 WANTUCK (APD125))2 Bomb Disposal units, comm-
)unication teams, 1 diver unit
)and 1 Demolition unit embarked.
 RUNELS (APD85) 5 Nucleus crews embarked.
 W.J. PATTISON (APD104)) 2 UDT teams
 BEGOR (APD127)) embarked.

T.U. 31.4.5 Transport Unit DOG, Lt. Comdr. W.K. Bradbury
 ComLSM Group 35 12 LSM CB units in 12
 LSM 252 (F), 208, 290, 362, LSM, airfield
 368, 371, 419, 488, 13, detachment in
 284, 71. IST 789, 1139,
 ComLST Group 86 Post Office in
 LST 567, 789, 1139, 1083 4 LST IST 567.
 PGM 16, 26, 32. 3 PGM

(e) T.G. 31.5 Screen, Captain Carmichael.

DesDiv 106 6 DD
 WEDDERBURN (DD684)
 TWINING (DD540)
 STOCKHAM (DD683)
 YARNELL (DD541)
 SOUTHERLAND (DD743)
 HALSEY POWELL (DD686)

(f) T.G. 31.6 Naval Air Activities, Captain Duckworth

COWPENS CASU
 WASP CASU
 Advanced Air Base Assembly (embarked in IST 1139, 789).
 CB Units (in LSM's)
 Navy Base Maintenance Co. #4.

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CONFIDENTIAL(g) T.G. 31.7 Naval Shore Activities, Commodore Womble.

CB Units (in LSM)

Navy Base Maintenance Cos. # 1 and # 3.

Miscellaneous Personnel and Units assigned.

(h) T.G. 31.8 SOPA Administrative, Commodore Smoot.

2 UDT Units (in APD 104, 127). 1 AD

Nucleus Crew (when released from 1 LST

Landing Force) 1 AR

Mobile Post Office (IST 567) 1 AOW

PIEDMONT (AD17)

TAMALPAIS (AOW96)

DELTA (AR9)

Personnel Assigned.

(i) T.G. 31.9 Submarine Demilitarization Group, Capt. Parks.

ComSubRon 20 1 AS

PROTEUS (AS19) 1 ASR

GREENLET (ASR10)

Units of the THIRD Fleet were drawn upon for all personnel requirements when Task Force THIRTY-ONE was activated. Rear Admiral Badger (ComBatDiv SEVEN) upon assuming his duties as CTF 31 brought his entire staff, including Captain J.M. Sweeney as Chief of Staff into the new organization, which was further supplemented by key personnel made available by Commander THIRD Fleet. Included among the latter were Commodore John P. Womble, Jr., USN, ComTaskFlot TWO, designated as CTG 31.7 (Commander Naval Shore Activities), Commodore Roland N. Smoot, USN, ComTaskFlot FOUR, designated as CTG 31.4 (Transport Group) as well as CTG 31.8 (SOPA Administrative) upon his arrival on shore. Commodore Joel T. Boone (MC), USN, joined the staff as Medical Officer from the staff of Com3rd Fleet, Capt. R. C. Lynch, Jr., USN joined from the staff of ComBatRon TWO as Operations Officer. Captain Duckworth, USN, of the U.S.S. COWPENS was made Commanding Officer of Naval Air Activities and Captain T.M. Dykers, USN, from the staff of CTF 38 was given the task of ordnance demilitarization. Brigadier General W. T. Clement, USMC, was designated CTG 31.3 and placed in command of all landing forces. Commander Johnson, (SC) USN, Commander J.A. Coppola, USN, Commander C.W. Chisholm, USNR, all heads of departments on the IOWA were assigned corresponding positions on the staff of CTF 31. Commander F. P. Gilmore (MC) USN, Senior Medical Officer on IOWA was assigned to CTG 31.7 staff. Other members of the staffs of CTF 31, the task groups, and landing forces were drawn from the battleships, carriers, and cruisers of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT.

B. Task Force THIRTY-ONE was formed on 19 August 1945 from units of the THIRD Fleet and operated until 27 August in an area approximately 250 miles southeast of TOKYO. During this period the unparalleled feat of assembling and organizing an amphibious force from ships operating at sea was accomplished. The ships assigned to Task Force THIRTY-ONE were assembled and the Task Force organization completed. Landing force units which had

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been organized in the ships of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT were assembled and embarked in transports and staff personnel, nucleus crews, maintenance units and other components were likewise assembled in their appropriate units. This assembly and embarkation of the landing forces in transports at sea from the various ships of the THIRD Fleet was a job of major proportions. A highlight of the operation was the transfer of Task Group 38.4 bluejacket battalion of 400 men which was assembled on the MISSOURI to the IOWA. The transfer was required by the immediate departure of the MISSOURI from the area prior to the arrival of the assigned transport. Six slings were used simultaneously and the operation was completed within an hour without interruption or incident. Three hours later the battalion was transferred again from the IOWA to the MONITOR. Once the personnel had been assembled in the transports no reloading was required and the replenishment and distribution of supplies and landing force equipment was also completed during this period.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE shifted his flag to the SAN DIEGO on August 23. From August 24 to August 27 Admiral Badger was embarked on the MISSOURI to attend the preliminary negotiations between Commander THIRD Fleet and the Japanese Naval and Military authorities. At these conferences the Japanese emissaries were advised of requirements re minesweeping, disarmament and evacuation of personnel in the occupied areas, identification of all fortifications by display of white flags and markers and other demands essential to the security and success of the operation. During the period Commodore Womble was embarked in the SAN DIEGO and exercised Tactical command of Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

On August 27, after a delay of 24 hours due to storms in the vicinity, Task Force THIRTY-ONE arrived and anchored about 1600 (I) in the northeastern part of SAGAMI WAN in the shadow of Fujiyama.

The following day, 28 August, about 0900 the first United States Task Force consisting of SAN DIEGO (Flagship of CTF 31), GOSSELIN, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUISUN, screened by WEDDERBURN, STOCKHAM, TWINING and preceded by the minesweepers ELLYSON and HAMBLETON got underway and entered TOKYO BAY, anchoring about 1300 off YOKOSUKA. Remaining units of Task Force 31 entered TOKYO BAY 30 August. During the entrance Task Force 35 and Task Force 37 made a demonstration in force in SAGAMI WAN and stood by to provide fire support if needed. Air support was provided by Task Force 38, and air demonstrations were conducted in such force as to discourage any treachery on the part of the enemy. This was particularly important in view of the gauntlet of heavy guns that was the vanguard of Task Force 31 had to pass in order to enter TOKYO BAY. To this end combat air patrol, direct support aircraft and patrols of outlying airfield all were directed to funnel through populated areas at low altitude in order to make their presence most evident. At daybreak 30 August 1945 the first of the transports entered with Fleet Marines and landed on FUTTSU SAKI and Island Fort No. 2 to insure the neutralization of those fortifications prior to the entry of the main landing force.

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Minefields guarding the entrance to TOKYO BAY had not been cleared by the Japanese. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and the entrance was made via the west channel which was check swept by our forces prior to the entrance. Failure of the Japanese to clear the minefields was attributed to a lack of minesweepers and the crudity of their methods which required about three times as long as our methods. Information supplied by the local Japanese authorities was very accurate, and Japanese pilots were embarked on all ships during the entrance.

Negotiations with the Japanese Naval authorities at YOKOSUKA were conducted aboard the SAN DIEGO on August 28 and 29. At 0800, on August 30, nucleus crews from the SOUTH DAKOTA embarked on the H.A. BASS (APD124) under the command of Captain T. J. FLYNN, U.S.N., boarded HIJMS NAGATO, hauled down the Japanese colors, and hoisted the United States ensign, taking custody of this vessel in the name of the United States government.

Landing of the occupation forces began at 0930 the same day. The SAN DIEGO moved in and moored to the dock at YOKOSUKA at 1030. All landings and the occupation were executed smoothly on schedule and without opposition or incident. Surrender of the Naval Base was received at 1045 (I), 30 August in a ceremony on the dock alongside the SAN DIEGO. Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, received the surrender from Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of the FIRST Naval District.

Task Force THIRTY-ONE headquarters were established ashore immediately; the National Ensign and Admiral Badger's personal flag were hoisted over the Naval Headquarters building. In the afternoon an inspection tour by Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey was made.

All areas were secured, patrols established, Shore Activities, and SOPA (Administrative) were activated and the organization and operation of the base was undertaken. Minesweeping operations, support of Prisoner of War evacuation and demilitarization of ships and military installations, establishment of air operations at YOKOSUKA, clearing and reconnaissance of beaches at TATEYAMA for Army landings, clearance of dock areas at YOKOHAMA for Army forces were among important operations conducted. SAN DIEGO was relieved by the PIEDMONT on 1 September; on 2 September the surrender of the Japanese Empire was witnessed aboard MISSOURI by Rear Admiral Badger. From 4 to 6 September THIRD Fleet and British Landing Force Units were reembarked for return to their ships. On 8 September Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE was relieved by Commander Naval Activities YOKOSUKA and Task Force THIRTY-ONE was dissolved.

C. The mission of Task Force THIRTY-ONE as established in Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45 and 11-45 was to occupy and secure the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, clear entrance to TOKYO BAY and anchorages, seize and operate YOKOSUKA Airfield, establish communications including press, take over and demilitarize enemy ships present, support the release of allied Prisoners of War by Task Group 30.6, demilitarize enemy defenses, establish a port director, establish headquarters and facilities at YOKOSUKA for Task Force THIRTY-ONE forces and advance representatives of the Army of Occupation, institute sanitation and health measures and medical facilities, assist Army

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forces to clear and prepare dock areas in YOKOSUKA - YOKOHAMA area for disembarkation of troops, clear beaches and reconnoiter TATEYAMA Area for landings by Army.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE Operation Plan 1-45 covers this operation and is based on the assumption that Japan had capitulated but the treacherous employment of any or all weapons in the TOKYO Area was a distinct possibility. Provision was therefore made to prevent and protect the occupation force from any overt or treacherous actions by organized faction or individuals. Air and gunfire support was provided by Task Forces of the THIRD Fleet, minesweeping operations by Japanese were supervised and checked by units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE. Disarmament and evacuation of Japanese military and naval personnel from the occupied and contiguous areas, was required except for personnel necessary to provide information and assistance in establishing control and operation of the base.

D. Task Force THIRTY-ONE consisting of units enumerated above were supported by Task Force THIRTY-FIVE and Task Force THIRTY-SEVEN who staged demonstrations in SAGAMI WAN while Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT furnished air support, cover, search and reconnaissance while operating in assigned areas in Empire waters adjacent to the TOKYO region. All units of THIRD Fleet were also available to provide logistic support as required.

E. No enemy opposition was encountered at any time during the operation.

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PART III - CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

8 August 1945

Operating with Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, about 250 miles southwest of TOKYO, under tactical command of Vice Admiral J.S. McCain, CTF-38.

Advance copy of ComTHIRDFleet (Admiral W.F. Halsey, U.S. Navy) Operation Plan No. 10-45 received, setting up Task Force THIRTY-ONE, YOKOSUKA Occupation Force, under command of Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, U.S. Navy, Commander Battleship Division SEVEN. Began intensive study of Joint Staff's Preliminary study for "Campus Operation" and initiated Task Force planning. Started Estimate of Situation.

11 August

Rear Admiral Badger designated CTF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet despatch and authorized to issue warning orders to all THIRD Fleet commands. IOWA (BB61) designated flagship.

All ships in TF-38 alerted to organize bluejacket and marine landing force with arms, ammunition and rations.

Requested, through ComTHIRDFleet, that minesweeping officers and ships, UD Teams, and logistic ships be alerted by CinCPac (Advance). Initiated requests for temporary duty assignment for officers and men needed for staff. This included intelligence, interpreters, communications, clerical, CIC, ACI, operational, war correspondents, and photographic personnel. Requested necessary maps, charts, and grids from CinCPac (Advance).

Requests were initiated for supplies essential to the evacuation of prisoners-of-war. These included clothing (men, women and children), toilet articles, candy, chewing gum, small luxuries, ambulances, medical supplies including blood and water transportation.

Brigadier General William T. Clement, USMC, nominated as Commander Landing Force by Commanding General, THIRDPhibCorps, with Regimental Combat Team from 4th and 6th Marine Divisions. All located and alerted at GUAM.

Started drafting Operation Plan.

12 August

Alerted all ships in TF-38 to organize Base maintenance companies; warning order issued to CTF-38 to form naval air activities organization to activate air field. Requested CTF-38 to obtain vertical photos of occupation area. General Clement and Staff loaded in USS OZARK (LSV-2) at GUAM and sailed for rendezvous.

Requested APD's, APA's, AKA's, and necessary amphibious craft and SeaBee maintenance unit be alerted in rear area.

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13 August

4th and 6th Division Marines loaded on 5 APA's and 1 AKA at Marianas; UD teams loaded in APD's at GUAM.

Prepared demands to Japanese for cooperation, equipment and services.

Minesweepers (MinRon 20) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

14 August

First draft of Operation Plan completed, and discussed with ComTHIRDFleet on MISSOURI (BB-63). Coordination with fire and air support groups and POW rescue groups made firm.

Instructed to cease offensive operations against Japanese forces by CinCPOA.

All ships present alerted to procure, by transfer at sea, small arms and equipment needed for landing force parties from ships not furnishing landing battalions.

CinCPac's Op-Plan 12-45 put into effect for operations. Directs THIRD Fleet to occupy and control Tokyo Bay and coastal water in conjunction with Army Forces.

15 August

TransDiv 105 (5 APA's, 1 AKA) departed Guam for rendezvous.

Requested CinCAFPac to direct Japanese to initiate minesweeping in Tokyo Bay and entrances.

Received report from Soviet of intense anti-invasion activity by Japanese along shores of SAGAMI WAN. Requested additional photographic coverage by TF-38.

Completed tentative operation plan with revisions indicated at conference on MISSOURI. Distributed to Task Group Commanders for planning purposes.

16 August

Operation Plan approved by ComTHIRDFleet at conference aboard MISSOURI. Held briefing conferences with Group Commanders.

17 August

Authorized interchange of landing force equipment between ships in order to fully equip landing battalions.

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Requested ComTHIRDFleet to fuel, replenish and ammunition all ships assigned to TF-31.

Minesweeping units (AM's and YMS's) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

Alerted all ships to organize nucleus crews to take over captured vessels.

Held conferences with Group Commanders firming up plans.

18 August

ComTHIRDFleet directed forming of TF-31 at 1400(I) 19th August as a separate tactical units to conform to movements of TF-38, remaining within TBS range of MISSOURI (Flagship, THIRD Fleet). TF-38 operating vicinity point Drink (32N - 143-30E), fueling and replenishing.

Alerted all ships to prepare to load landing battalions and other personnel in accordance with loading plan. Ordered typhus vaccine inoculations for personnel going ashore.

British landing force made available by ComTHIRDFleet.

Continued conferences re: operation plans of Group Commanders.

19 August

Commenced transferring personnel and equipment at sea, in accordance with loading plan.

Received storm warning indicating typhoon developing 300 miles to southeast.

1400(I), formed Task Force 31, in special cruising formation with transports and large amphibious ships in column, with circular screens composed of DD's, DMS's, and APD's. Following ships present: IOWA, SAN DIEGO, GRIMES, BRAXTON, OZARK, MERRIWEATHER, WAUKESHA, SHADWELL, LANIER, MELLETTE, GARRARD, DesDiv 106, MinRon 20, and TransDiv 105 plus WANTUCK.

Continued transferring personnel, fueling and replenishing.

20 August

REEVES, GOSSELIN joined up.

Received ComTHIRDFleet entrance plan for Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. Prepared and disseminated special entry formation.

Received despatch from ComTHIRDFleet that entry to Sagami Wan delayed until 26th August. CTF-31 alerted to board MISSOURI to meet Japanese emissaries morning of entry.

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20 August (cont'd)

In order to avoid typhoon all Task Forces directed by ComTHIRDFleet to proceed southwest toward "Temporary point" (30-30N - 142E). SOA 10 knots.

Continued to transfer personnel, refuel and replenish.

Distributed CTF-31 Operation Plan No. 1-45.

21 August

Continued replenishing, fueling and transfer of personnel at sea, vicinity of "Temporary point".

SOUTHERLAND assigned and joined up; assumed ACI, FDO, and CIC(air) duties for TF-31.

Received ComTHIRDFleet Op-Plan 11-45 by despatch - added following task to TF-31, "Assist Army forces as necessary to clear dock areas, Yokohama, in preparation for disembarkation of troops of 3rd Phib Force on about 31 August and 13 September". Issued necessary changes to Op-Plan to comply.

22 August

Continued replenishing and fueling in vicinity of "Temporary Point".

LOVE Day (landing day) specified as 28 August by ComTHIRDFleet. Sagami Wan entry to be on LOVE minus Two day.

TF-31 directed to proceed and operate in area "Badger" (Lat. 32 to 33 N - Long. 142 to 143-30 E), typhoon having passed off to eastward.

23 August

Operating in area "Badger", engaged in fueling and replenishing.

CATAMOUNT and LST 1083 joined up.

ComTHIRDFleet Operation Plan 10-45 made effective 1400(I). CTF-31 Op-Plan 1-45 made effective 1400(I).

Shifted Flag and Staff to SAN DIEGO.

Held conference of all Group Commanders and coordinated all operation plans. Following additional task assigned TF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet: "Clear water and beach approaches in TATEYAMA WAN, and mark same in preparation for amphibious landing in that area about 2 September by THIRD Phib Force". CTF-31 Op-Plan 1-45 revised to comply.

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24 August

Continued fueling in area "Badger".

Minesweeping unit consisting of 7 AM's and 12 YMS's joined up. PATTISON and BEGOR joined up.

25 August

Continued operations in area "Badger".

LSM Group 35 (12 LSM's) and PGM's 16, 26, 32 joined up.

IOWA and GOSSELIN detached to join TG 30.1 (THIRDFleet flagship group). CTF-31 (R. Adm. Badger) joined ComTHIRDFleet on MISSOURI for conference with Japanese emissaries.

Commodore J.P. Womble, U.S.N., OTC for TF-31 in SAN DIEGO.

Received orders from ComTHIRDFleet delaying all operations 48 hours. New LOVE day designated as 30 August.

26 August

Operating in area "Badger" topping-off and briefing of units.

ComTHIRDFleet ordered initial entry (Sagami Wan) executed on 27 August (Love minus three day).

Alerted minesweeping groups to commence sweeping operations as soon as conference with Japanese emissaries disclosed current mine fields and channels.

Requested station tanker and tender be assigned to provide fuel, gas, water, and provisions for landing force and small craft.

Requested AF and hospital ship be made available to landing force as early as practicable to replenish force and provide services for repatriates.

Proceeded towards entrance route to Sagami Wan in accordance with ComTHIRD Fleet directive.

27 August

Proceeding to Sagami Wan along track specified by ComTHIRDFleet.

Japanese emissaries boarded MISSOURI and were met by Rear Admiral R.B. Carney, U.S.N., (Chief of Staff, Third Fleet) and Rear Admiral O.C. Badger, U.S.N., (CTF-31). Demands were presented to Japanese and information obtained as to mine

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27 August (cont'd)

fields and channels. Japanese pilots and interpreters were loaded on a destroyer and delivered to task unit guides of TF-31. Minesweeping units were detached and proceeded on minesweeping tasks. Japanese channel into Tokyo Bay was immediately check-swept with negative results. Japs had failed to meet minesweeping demands made by SCAF, giving as their excuse the lack of minesweepers in the locality.

Plans for entry to Tokyo Bay on the 28th were solidified, with arrangements made for fire and air support, CAP, minesweeping, press coverage and berth assignments. Seaplane tenders for accommodation of flights from rear area added to ships making initial entry.

Logistic requirements for units engaged in occupation forces made firm with Service Division, by arranging for Tender to berth at naval base on Love plus one day.

Disseminated to Third Fleet co-ordinates of safe channel to Tokyo Bay as derived from Japanese charts, pilots, and own check-sweep operations.

TF-31, less minesweepers engaged in sweeping operations, anchored in Sagami Wan at 1600(I).

Rear Admiral Badger (CTF-31) returned aboard SAN DIEGO and assumed tactical command of TF-31.

28 August

Units of TF-31 anchored in Sagami Wan.

At 0900(I) the first U.S. Task Force to enter Tokyo Bay, under command of Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger (CTF-31), got underway and proceeded through swept channel. Force consisted of SAN DIEGO, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUISUN, and GOSSELIN screened by WEDDERBURN, STOCKHAM, TWINING and proceeded by minesweepers ELLYSON and HAMBLETON. Force anchored off Yokosuka Naval Base, Tokyo Bay at 1300(I).

Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, Commandant First Naval District and Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval Base, and staff reported aboard SAN DIEGO with records, charts and answers to demands made on 27 August. Japanese were interviewed by members of Staff of CTF-31. A list of further demands and instructions were read and delivered to Vice Admiral TOTSUKA. (See Enclosure L).

Security requirements, including small boat patrols were set up.

Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages. Results negative. Mine warning number one, Tokyo Bay, issued defining existing limits of Japanese mine fields as correlated from Jap charts and interviews.

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28 August (cont'd)

All other units of TF-31 less minesweeping units remained anchored in Sagami Wan.

SOPA regulations for Tokyo Bay anchorages published.

Set up harbor entrance control ship with pilots, interpreters and charts.

29 August

Anchored as preceeding day.

MISSOURI (Third Fleet Flag), IOWA, SOUTH DAKOTA, ANCON, (press ship), SAN JUAN (CTG 30.6 - Allied POW Rescue Group) BENEVOLENCE, with screening destroyers entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

CinCPacPOA broke his Flag in SOUTH DAKOTA.

Japanese staff members reported aboard SAN DIEGO and arrangements for surrender ceremonies at YOKOSUKA Naval Base and aboard MISSOURI made firm. Interviews with staff of CTF-31 continued regarding demilitarization, Naval Base facilities, location of Jap ships, dockage, dry docks, menaces to navigation etc.

Requested tugs and salvage unit be sailed from rear area to clear docks of sunken Jap ships disclosed by interviewing Japanese Naval officers.

HOW Hour (landing time) set at 1000(I), 30 August.

Minesweeping units sweeping anchorages and landing beaches; results negative.

Set up a board to survey industrial facilities of YOKOSUKA Naval Base.

Changed operation plan to provide for landings, preceded by minesweeping and UDT teams at forts commanding entrance channel at HOW Hour minus 3 hours to ensure security of channel. Added new task to have prize crew seize NAGATO, HOW Hour minus two hours to ensure security of landing beaches.

Cooperated with POW Rescue Group in initiating evacuation and processing of released Allied prisoners.

30 August

Love Day. Proceeded with landing in accordance with Operation Plan. How Hour advanced to 0930(I). Harbour forts seized at 0730(I). NAGATO seized

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30 August (cont'd)

at 0830(I). Landing proceeded without incident.

Broadcasting and press aboard SAN DIEGO gave a play-by-play description over world-wide hookup. Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, U.S.N. (CTF-31) broadcast short concept of operation.

1030(I); SAN DIEGO with Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, Chief of Staff, ComTHIRDFleet docked at berth in YOKOSUKA Naval Base; the first U.S. Naval ship to moor to a dock in Japanese Homeland.

1045(I): Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, guarded by Brigadier General W. T. Clement, U.S.M.C. (CTG 31.4 - Landing Force) surrendered the YOKOSUKA Naval Base to Rear Admiral Carney who accepted and receipted for same as delegate for Admiral Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet). Admiral Badger's flag was raised over Naval Headquarters building, thereby establishing the first U.S. Headquarters on the Japanese Homeland. Headquarters and staff moved ashore and commenced operating from former Japanese Naval Headquarters.

Other units of Third Fleet entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

Released REEVES and GOSSELIN to CTG 30.6 (POW Rescue Group) to assist in repatriation work.

Fleet Admiral C.W. Nimitz (CinCPOA) and Admiral W.F. Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet) came ashore and inspected Naval Base.

31 August

Operating from headquarters ashore. ComTHIRDFleet's Operation Plan No. 11-45 put into effect 0000(Z), 31 August.

Despatched UDT teams and minesweepers to clear and mark approaches at TATEYAMA WAN for 3rd Phib landing 3 September.

Continued demilitarization, surveys, research, intelligence, activating airfield and securing of occupational zone in accordance with Operation Plan.

Third Fleet units continued entering and anchoring Tokyo Bay as directed by ComTHIRDFleet.

Lt.Gen. Eichelberger, U.S.A. (ComGen8thArmy) inspected Naval Base and firmed up plans for cooperation for future landings.

Japanese commenced operations, in compliance with orders, to clear out anti-submarine nets and mine-fields in entrance channel to Tokyo Bay to be completed by 1600(I), 8 September.

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31 August (cont'd)

U.S. Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages in Tokyo Bay, YOKOHAMA and Tokyo Harbour. All results negative except 3 U.S. laid influence mines exploded off Tokyo entrance channel.

Re-embarked members of landing force received from ships departing area for U.S. Personnel from ships not in bay re-embarked in APA for transfer at sea.

Released APD's and amphibious units not needed to POW rescue group for repatriation duty. Units proceeded to YOKOHAMA loaded with medical supplies, clothing and provisions.

1 September

Continuing operations from headquarters ashore in accordance with Operation Plan.

Japanese APD with Japanese troops from Marcus Island arrived Tokyo Bay. Directed to Yokohama where troops were turned over to U.S. Army. Japanese APD returned and moored with prize crew at Yokosuka Naval Base.

Completed plans for mass air display and preparations for formal surrender ceremonies on 2 September.

SAN DIEGO shifted to outside anchorage. PIEDMONT moored alongside dock and assumed service functions for forces ashore in accordance with plan.

2 September

Continuing operations from shore headquarters.

0900: Formal surrender ceremonies took place in MISSOURI (flying CinCPac-POA flag).

Released UDT teams to TF-35 for clearing of SAGAMI WAN beaches.

Completed sweeping Jap mine field by U.S.N. units. Total of 74 mines swept.

Furnished escorts, tugs and minesweeping vessel to TF-32 for landing at YOKOHAMA.

3 September - 7 September

Continued operations from headquarters ashore.

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3 September - 7 September (cont'd)

Re-embarked Third Fleet Marine, Naval and British Landing Force. Loaded APA with personnel for ships not present, for transfer at sea.

Replaced shore units from ships attached to TF-31 with personnel from CruDiv 10, and permanent shore-based personnel.

Prepared KISARAZU Airfield for activation by NATS.

ComTHIRDFleet shifted flag to SOUTH DAKOTA on 5 September.

Recommended that intelligence and technical experts be sent forward immediately to examine vast amounts of Japanese Naval equipment and material located in yard. Also recommended establishment of GCM at YOKOSUKA.

Continued furnishing ships, clothing and provisions to POW evacuation group.

8 September

0900(I) Task Force 31 dissolved. Relieved by Commander Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA (Commodore O.O. Kessing, U.S.N.) and ComSerDiv 102 (Commodore J.T. Acuff, U.S.N.) as SOPA Administrative.

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PART IV - Ordnance
PART V - Damage
PART VI(A) - Surface Gunnery Operations

Above parts not applicable to this report

ENCLOSURE (A)

PART VI

B. AIR OPERATIONS

1. General

With the gradual cessation of hostilities on the part of the Japanese, the primary objectives of carrier striking forces were no longer attacked. The carrier air forces thus released were made available for two primary objectives: to cover continuously every operational airfield in Japan, and, in direct support to TF 31 of cover the entrance to and occupation of the Tokyo Bay-Yokosuka area.

(a) COMBAT AIR PATROL

Combat air patrol of eight or more fighter aircraft was continuously maintained over TF 31 in Sagami Wan and in Tokyo Bay from 28 August to 5 September. No enemy airborne aircraft were encountered.

(b) DIRECT TROOP SUPPORT

Direct troop air support was furnished units landing on Futtsu Saki, at Yokosuka, Yokohama, and in the Tateyama Wan area. In addition, special air observer flights reporting directly to the Commanding General of the troops landing (CTG 31.3) were airborne continuously during landings on L and L plus 1 day.

In addition, aircraft strike groups on short notice were standing by in the carriers to furnish support as required.

(c) PRISONER-OF-WAR EVACUATION

In general support of the objective of clearing Allied Prisoners-of-war in the shortest possible time, carrier aircraft searched out and spotted POW camps and led sea-borne rescue parties.

(d) ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR FACILITIES ASHORE

In support of the general plan for air services and air evacuation, naval air facilities ashore were established at Yokosuka Naval Air Base by CTG 31.6.

2. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TF 31

18 August CTG 31.6 reported Streamlined Air Base Assembly and Carrier Aircraft Service Unit (TG 31.6) ready for landing.

26 August (L-4) TF-31 in company with TF 38. No air activity other than routine patrols and reconnaissance flights by TF 38.

27 August (L-3 day) Routine day and night combat air patrol from TF 38 was maintained under control of TF 35 over fleet in Sagami Wan.

28 August (L-2 day) DesDiv 106 (plus SOUTHERLAND), SAN DIEGO, GARRARD, CUMBERLAND SOUND and SUISUN entered Tokyo Harbor. Augmented combat patrol and air support groups maintained, under control of SOUTHERLAND.

30 August (Love Day) Air observer services furnished by CTG 31.3 and CTG 31.6 while forces landed and took possession of Yokosuka Area. CTG 31.6 Airborne landed on Yokosuka Airfield and set up Streamlined Air Base.

31 August (L / 1 day) eight plane combat air patrol maintained. Support from combat air patrol furnished to reconnaissance units at Tateyama Wan.

1 September (L / 2 day) continued 8 plan combat air patrol.
2 September Conducted mass demonstration flight over MISSOURI after signing of Japanese capitulation. Conducted routine combat air patrol.
5 September KISARAZU Field ordered activated by CTG 31.6 to handle large transports which YOKOSUKA could not handle due to short runways and high terrain surrounding field.
8 September CTG 31.6 relieved of duty by Colonel J. C. MUNN, USMC who assumed duties of Senior Naval Aviator ashore at YOKOSUKA.

3. COMMENTS.

1. Continuous air cover is a most effective deterrent to treacherous action during the occupation phase after a surrender.

2. By putting a CVL (COWPENS) out of commission as far as flight operations were concerned it was possible to draw the necessary personnel and gear to form an emergency workable Carrier Aircraft Service Unit and a Streamlined Air Base Assembly. These units proved themselves capable of conducting limited flight operations immediately, using unfamiliar facilities.

The lack of proper stowage for fuel (100 octane) was probably the biggest handicap. The runways were realized to be short prior to the taking of the field but this in addition to the high terrain surrounding the field, which was not known, proved to be a disappointment for the conducting of large transport operations. Consequently the field at Kisarazu was activated to accommodate this traffic.

C.

T.G. 31.3 was originally conceived as an assault group composed of Marine and Naval Units from the Third Fleet. Later orders made the 4th Marine Regiment (reinforced) available and with this unit as a foundation a landing and occupation force was activated to be commanded by Brigadier General William T. CLEMENT, U.S.M.C. This force was composed of the 4th Marine RCT with 5400 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.1, the Third Fleet Marine Landing Force of 1635 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.2 and the Third Fleet Naval Landing Force of 863 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.3. The British Pacific Fleet supplied a landing force of 450 officers and men, consisting of 250 Royal Navy and 200 Royal Marine Commandos, designated as TU 31.3.4. Also organized but not embarked for landing was an additional assault Bn. of 400 men from TG 38.3 and five guard battalions of 400 men each from TF 38. These last units were activated and equipped for duty ashore and remained in a state of readiness on board their own ships.

In addition to the Assault Bns. from the Third Fleet, nucleus crews consisting of 33 men each were organized in ships of the fleet for the purpose of taking over enemy ships that remained operational. The plan for nucleus crews originally included skeleton prize crews from cruisers and destroyers with a view to taking over ships of their own type. This plan was set aside when intelligence reports indicated that there would be a greater necessity for small craft crews. These crews were fully equipped as landing force personnel and included necessary ratings for the operation of small craft.

Also included in plans for the occupation were three Base Maintenance Companies, one to be drawn from each task group of Task Force 38. These companies were alerted and equipped with the purpose in mind of landing a versatile group equipped to meet many contingencies while still employing a minimum of man power. Each company was composed of eleven groups.

designated and equipped for the following tasks: Boat repair, Ordnance and Explosive Disposal, Boat Pool, Motor Pool, Artificer Group for machine carpenter, Electric and Metal shops and outside repair for communications, Power Plant operations, Evaporator Refrigerator and Air Compressor operation, Riggers, Locomotive operation and Diving. The boat repair and boat pool were combined to form a beach party, and since there was a separately organized boat pool their services were utilized by the Captain of the Yard. A bomb disposal was also embarked with the landing forces as well as divers unit and shortly after the landing they were being employed by shore activities for material maintenance and installation. The whole effort being to economize in the number of personnel sent ashore to lessen the burden of transport, messing and berthing. This is further exemplified by the planned changeover of the transport group commander and his staff to the SOPA Administrative Ashore in the Harbor Master's Office after the landing was secure.

The Fleet Landing Forces carried with them sufficient "K" ration for 9 meals plus five units of fire and were equipped with heavy marching order and all available landing force equipment.

(b) The Fourth Marine RCT originally designated as Task Force Able by Hq Third Phib Corps, embarked at Guam on 15 August 1945, and rendezvoused with the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. The remaining units of TG 31.3 were embarked at sea from ships of the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. All troops landed on 30 August, commencing at 0558 when the Second Bn., Fourth Marines landed at Futtsu Saki and continued through the day with the main landings taking place at YOKOSUKA commencing at 0929.

Shore Parties and Beachmasters were provided for from TG 38.3 but due to the small amount of cargo carried by the Fleet Landing Forces, they were not required to function as such and the Shore Party was more than adequately handled by the 4th Regiment S-4. By 1600 (I) of 2 September, all unloading for the entire task group was completed.

Fire support was planned for the entire operation utilizing the OBB's of Task Force 35 to cover the entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. In Tokyo Bay the SAN DIEGO and the destroyer screen were prepared to render counter battery fire and supporting bombardment as necessary. LCI(R) and LCS(L)(3) were requested and made available for close in fire support but were not able to arrive in time to cover the landings.

One of the two UDT's assigned to the task force cleared the beaches for the landing of 2nd Bn. Fourth Marines on Futtsu Saki Island Fort No. 2. The forts located there were demilitarized by the 2nd battalion. The second UDT accompanied the British Landing Force clearing the beaches at Saru Shima and Azuma Island, as required. They later did a tremendous amount of work clearing the dock areas in the Yokosuka Yard.

Due to the nature of this occupation and the excellence of the control and leadership of the engaged forces, there were no incidents of violence or casualties, although at the time of its inception it was not known that the landing would be a peaceful one and preparations were made for tending and evacuating casualties.

C.3.

In planning entry into TOKYO BAY, exact information on the location of enemy minefields was necessary as was the location of B-29-laid U.S. mines. The latter information was readily available and the location, type, and number of mines in each stick was obtained from CinCPac (Adv).

Certain areas in the approaches to TOKYO BAY had been declared restricted to shipping by the Japanese and it was reasonable to assume that mine had been laid in these areas. It was also possible that mines had been laid in other than these areas.

At the preliminary meeting with the Japanese emissaries at Manila, certain demands were made which included all information of location of enemy minefields. Also included were demands that the Japanese clear all minefields in their territorial waters. Preliminary reports received in Alpac 150 as a result of the early meeting with the Jap emissaries in Manila gave information on the location of the fields in the entrance to TOKYO BAY but this information proved incorrect by the minecharts supplied by the Jap emissaries off Sagami Wan.

Lacking definite information, plans were made to sweep and mark an entrance channel into the bay and upon completion of this task to clear the entire area of Uraga Suido. It was realized that these plans were subject to change for later information might disclose that the planned channel could not be opened due to obstructions, anti-submarine nets, shallow-planted chain-moored mines off shore-controlled minefields.

Sweeping operations were to commence on LOVE MINUS ONE day following the meeting with the Japanese emissaries which was to be held the previous day. Eventually, the above dates were advanced one day.

At the meeting, the Japanese supplied charts showing the exact location of their swept channels and the location of all minefields. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and were across the proposed entrance channel therefore necessitating a change in the sweeping plan. The shore-controlled minefields had been blown up according to their statements and this was later proved correct. All moored minefields were still in place. The Japanese had not carried out any of the sweeping which they had been ordered to accomplish prior to our arrival.

In lieu of sweeping, the proposed channel, it was decided to use the Japanese west swept channel for entrance of the forces into TOKYO BAY and accordingly, this channel was check swept to a depth of sixty feet with negative results before declaring the channel safe for entrance.

Sweeping efforts were concentrated on clearing all anchorage areas in TOKYO BAY prior to assigning ships to these berths.

Information received from the Japanese indicated that they had swept some of the B-29-laid magnetic and acoustic mines off YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA, but they had no knowledge of mines being laid in the TOKYO area. Concentrated sweeping in the YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA had negative results but three magnetic mines were swept off the entrance to TOKYO harbor.

The Japanese were ordered to clear the anti-submarine nets and the minefields in URAGA SUIDO. Operations were started on 31 August and completed on 8 September.

Investigation as to why the Japanese had not attempted to clear the minefields prior to the arrival of our forces disclosed that very few sweeper

were available to accomplish the task and in addition their sweeping methods are very crude. Our own sweeping forces could have accomplished the same amount of work in one-third the time.

Conclusions are that the best method of obtaining information on exact location of minefields in any particular area is to contact the local naval officials and make the necessary demands. The Japanese had destroyed, by burning, most of their official records. All information received from the local Japanese proved very accurate.

D. 2.

Task Force 31 communication channels afloat were used in the normal manner and were satisfactory. The change of flag-ships first from the U.S.S. IOWA (Captain Wellborn) to the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (Captain Mullan), and then to the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (Captain Robbins) was accomplished by establishing an overlap of about four hours on all Fox schedules and other circuits.

All communications remained on the flagship alongside the dock for the first day except for a temporary signal station established at the weather station at the entrance to YOKOSUKA KO which was used to relay visual traffic to ships in the anchorage.

Portable voice radio equipment furnished by ships of the Fleet to landing force parties for communication between their units and commands was found to be useless due to dead batteries. The 4th Marine RCT was able to replace most of this equipment with a similar type and satisfactory communications were maintained.

U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DD-732) (Comdr. R.C. WILLIAMS) was designated as Task Force 31 CIC Ship, and performed as Task Force CIC throughout the period of occupation. In this capacity she controlled the Combat Air Patrol, Tokyo Area, directed support aircraft, air observers, transient aircraft and mass demonstration aircraft. The Naval gun fire control circuit with all support groups was set up and ready. For a protracted period she had full radar and air control responsibility for the entire Tokyo Area and for Task Force 31. Evaluated information was passed by radio voice direct to CTF 31 in the Flagship. It is considered that her mission was accomplished in an outstandingly efficient manner, and one that reflected great credit on the ship and on her CIC organization.

On Love plus one day a visual station using two 12-inch signal lights was established on a hill in back of the Task Force Commander's Headquarters building. All ships in the anchorage were in visual range of this station. Later a Japanese 24-inch signal searchlight was moved to this signal station and put in operation. The signal station was connected by field telephone direct to the TF communication center. Portable radio equipment was set up at the communication center in the Naval Headquarters building and all voice circuits were used from there.

Coding work was done on the flagship (SAN DIEGO, later PIEDMONT) and traffic was delivered to the TF communication center by officer messenger. A private field telephone line was established between the CWO on the flag-

ship and the CWO at the TF communication center.

The 4th Marine RCT signal section established telephone service between CTF 31 Headquarters and all units and commands ashore. The use of this telephone circuit immediately cut down the amount of voice radio traffic necessary.

Japanese radio transmitters and receivers located underground in back of the TF Headquarters were checked and set up on various naval frequencies and keying lines run to the communication center. It was decided not to use these circuits because the coding room and equipment were not moved ashore from the flagship.

Communications in all phases were satisfactory in spite of the many obstacles encountered in an amphibious operation. None of the communication personnel used in this operation except the 4th Marine RCT have had any previous experience in amphibious communications.

D. 6.

The tentative Logistic planning for the occupation of the Naval Shore Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, began on 10 August 1945. After thorough consideration of the many elements involved both ashore and afloat, it was decided to support all forces ashore from units afloat utilizing the existing organization of the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD17) (Captain F.L. ROBBINS, USN). This plan proved highly successful. Warning orders were transmitted to Commander Task Group 30.8 (ComServRon 6) (Rear Admiral D.B. BEARY, USN) advising the anticipated support required and to the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD 17) in order that this ship could plan and be prepared to assume the duties of RepServPac in accordance with the Logistic Plan.

The provision for an adequate supply of water, food, and berthing facilities for the landing force, plus gasoline and lubricants for aircraft, rolling stock, and small boats, presented a major problem. In addition to these difficulties, provision had to be made to insure the delivery of all supplies in the face of enemy resistance. These items were essential for the support of the occupation, but a problem of equal or greater importance concerned the availability of an ample supply of special foods, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, medical supplies, and sundry items for all Allied Prisoners-of-War expected to be liberated in the Yokosuka Area.

Although the responsibility for handling these Repatriates was later assigned to Commander Task Group 30.6 (Commodore R.W. Simpson, USN), the planning and foresight in providing these supplies enabled Commander Task Force 31 to render substantial and immediate aid to the evacuation group in the form of food, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, tobacco, cigarettes, candy, and many other urgently needed items on short notice. These items were made available to 5000 persons under naval jurisdiction plus an additional 5000 Repatriates being serviced from the American Red Cross Canteens in the Yokohama area.

Upon the formation of CTF 31, all units were topped off with fuel and provisions at sea. The maximum possible levels were maintained prior to

entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay in order to avoid the necessity of fueling or replenishing at anchor during the initial stages of the occupation.

The Logistic Plan was followed in detail from the initial stages of this operation. RepServPac in the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD17) utilized the existing supply organization of the U.S.S. PIEDMONT, augmented by a Fuel Officer assigned to the U.S.S. NECHES (AO47) (Comdr. H.G. HANSEN, Jr., USNR). This organization provided adequate and prompt support to the landing force in the form of food, water, clothing, and equipment necessary to establish messes ashore. Ten thousand POW outfits were assembled by the U.S.S. LESUTH (AK125) (Comdr. B.H. BASSET, USNR) and the U.S.S. CYBELLE (AKS10) (Lt. Comdr. J.H. CHURCH, Jr. USNR), and were made available to CTG 30.6 and the American Red Cross.

During the first two days of occupation, the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (CL(AA) 53) (Capt. W.E.A. MULLAN, USN) provided all emergency issues of food, clothing, water, and particularly cleaning materials which were urgently needed in policing and rendering office and living spaces habitable. A two-inch fresh water hose was run from the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO to the dock, providing an adequate supply of fresh water for replenishment of the landing forces.

All landing forces came ashore in an amphibious landing status. In order to provide hot food, the necessary galley and mess gear was issued on the second day. Through improvisation and ingenuity, this equipment was put to good use and hot meals were served in local messes on L-PLUS THREE day. Japanese messing facilities and equipment were either non-existent or exceedingly inferior to standard U.S. Navy equipment. The Japanese equipment encountered consisted of usually a charcoal range and a few rice kettles which were left in a depleted and unsanitary condition. The galley and mess spaces were filthy and no possible use. Extensive alteration and renovation would have been required plus the installation of new stoves, ovens, mixers, sinks, etc., before they would meet the minimum sanitary standards. In view of these conditions, and the pressing need for hot food, stoves were improvised in the open near the barracks. Bread was provided by the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO, U.S.S. OAKLAND, and U.S.S. PIEDMONT. The U.S.S. PIEDMONT provided one meal per day during the initial stages of occupation for 750 men and officers attached to the naval landing force.

Water ashore was rendered potable by chlorinization, and it was not necessary to utilize the 4 million gallons of fresh water in the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS (AOW96) (Commander C.C. EDEN, USNR). However, the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS rendered valuable assistance to the support forces. Tokyo Bay is contaminated, thus preventing the distillation of drinking water in low pressure evaporators in ships at anchor.

Post Offices and a movie exchange were established in LST 648 (Lt. Comdr. C.L. RABELL, USNR) and LST 576 (Lt. S.W. HEARNE, USNR).

In general, it may be said that the execution of all details of this operation was facilitated by the advance planning and foresight given to the preparation. Sufficient quantities of all items were available when required and issued on schedule.

E. 1.

(1) GENERAL PLAN - Conforming to the basic premise that Task Force THIRTY-ONE was to occupy the YOKOSUKA Area for a very short time, using the minimum amount of personnel and gear necessary for the purpose from the component units of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, the basic intelligence plan was to have the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE locate as much information and material as possible within the limited time of operations, leaving analysis and study for the Intelligence Organization and Technical teams of the permanent occupation forces.

(2) INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PLANNING AND ORGANIZING PERIOD.

Owing to the fact that there was no adequate photographic and map coverage of the area of occupation, it has been necessary to procure new photography and reproduce existing photographs, and to have photographic interpretation reports based on such photography. These services were in the main furnished by Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT and the carriers in an unbelievably short time and were of the greatest help. In addition, the Commander Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT offered and made available the services of one of his staff photo interpreters who was of great assistance in processing late photographs as they were delivered. The sudden capitulation of the Japanese found us without grid maps and photo mosaics in quantity for the use of the landing forces, in going ashore for gunfire and aerial support. The Advance Intelligence Center, Guam, particularly the 64th Engineering Topographical Battalion and InterPon TWO did a magnificent job in getting this material out in a period of 36 hours. Several conferences were held aboard ship while at sea between the Staff Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer for the landing forces. These proved to be of great value. It is regretted that a conference of all intelligence officers engaged in the operation could not have also been held, but it was prohibited by the heavy load on communications and ship to ship transportation incident to the unparalleled feat of organizing and assembling a large Amphibious Force and Naval Base from units of the Fleet while engaged in operations at sea. When Task Force THIRTY-ONE was organized, 3 intelligence officers, 1 Photo Interpretation Officer, 1 Language Officer, and 3 Yeomen were collected from 5 different ships and brought to the Flagship. In addition, 20 Language Officers from the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor were distributed among the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE while at sea.

(3) INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF OCCUPATION

As soon as the landing began, two of the Staff Intelligence Officers went ashore and made a brief inspection of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, the Battleship NAGATO and the Japanese shipping craft present in the harbor. The day after the landings the Staff Intelligence Office was moved ashore. Intelligence activities of the Landing Force, Naval Air Activities, SOPA Administrative, Submarine Demilitarization Group, and Naval Shore Activities commenced immediately the huge task of locating all intelligence information and materials. Outstanding was the performance of the only Technical Intelligence Team in the area, a Technical Air Intelligence Unit, which uncovered much valuable information and equipment, especially of and concerning rocket and jet-propelled aircraft. In the same category was the work done by representatives of ComMinPac in securing information on Japanese mines and minefields. Splendid performances were also turned in by G-2 Section of TG 31.3 in locating Japanese forces, guns, and defensive installations, and in Liaison activities with the Japanese, by

TG 31.8 on Japanese shipping, by TG 31.9 on Japanese submarines and by TG 31.7 on explosives and ordnance. One of the outstanding features of the operation from an intelligence standpoint was the complete absence of classified documents. The Japanese say these were destroyed prior to the occupation, but it has been noted that when pressed for information the Japanese produce it, stating they get it from the TOKYO Headquarters. It appears that most of their personnel acquainted with the facts can be produced for interrogation, which has thus far been quite productive of the desired information.

(5) RECOMMENDATIONS.

Owing to the necessity of getting ashore quickly it was not considered practicable to bring forward Technical Intelligence teams to go ashore with the landing forces, but it is recommended that all types of teams be sent immediately to analyze, examine, and report on the vast amount of all kinds of Naval material located by the forces under Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

E. 2.

Completed information has been submitted in a special report, "Yokosuka Naval Base Confidential Survey Report," A17/CTF 31 Serial 01 dated 3 September 1945; a brief summary follows:

Industrial facilities, Yokosuka Navy Yard. This Navy Yard is a large shipbuilding and repair yard capable of the construction and maintenance of any class of naval vessel. At its maximum capacity, about 75,000 persons were employed in the yard, although this figure had been reduced to 40,000 during the past year. This reduction was occasioned by the cessation of all ship-building except midget submarines and a lack of ships to overhaul.

As to the physical plant, the following comments are made:

- (a) There are fine shipways, one of which is large enough for a BB. All are operational except #4, of which the underwater ways are collapsed. For the past several months, the ways have been used exclusively for the fabrication and assembly of midget submarines.
- (b) There are six dry docks, all of which are operational except #6. The main pump motors of this dock have suffered water damage, but can be repaired. All dry docks except #6 are empty and ready for use if desired. Dry dock #6 has been used as a building dock, and contains two partially completed DD's plus a large amount of miscellaneous materials.
- (c) Bomb damage to yard is slight; capacity of yard is not affected.
- (d) Maintenance of shop buildings and equipment is very poor. Also the outside areas of the yard are badly cluttered up with scrap, lumber, small sheds, miscellaneous equipment from heavy ships, and piles of rubble removed in digging caves.
- (e) Waterfront and dockside cranes are adequate and in good condition.
- (f) About half the light shop equipment necessary for production of midget submarines has been moved into underground shops.

SHIPPING

All the time of the occupation, the following Japanese naval vessels were present:

- 1 - BB - NAGATO
- 1 - CA - FUJI
- 6 - DD - Second line vessels.
- 9 - SS -
- 6 - Numbered transports.
- 180 - SS (midget)
- 2 - Minelayers
- 1 - Collier - SOYA
- Miscellaneous auxiliaries and small craft.

The NAGATO had suffered underwater and topside damage during the bombing attack of 18 July 1945, but only tentative steps had been taken for repairing her. The ship has not been docked, therefore, the extent of the underwater damage is not known. Three bomb hits topside demolished the navigating bridge and resulted in extensive damage to the superstructure and top hamper in the area of the mainmast and stack. The top of the mainmast and upper part of the stack had been removed preliminary to repairs.

The DD's and miscellaneous vessels at the base were, for the most part, operational, but appeared to have been immobilized for some time. These ships had been demilitarized prior to the occupation.

All submarines had been demilitarized prior to the occupation and were taken over by CTG 31.9 without incident. The midget submarines were new, and were evidently being readied for use against any invasion fleet.

E. 3. SPECIAL COMMENT

While the occasion, fortunately, never arose for the use of force, it is noteworthy to mention that all preliminary planning was based on the well known characteristic for treachery exhibited by the Japanese in past operations, and that strong opposition by organized military factions was likely.

Each operation was carefully covered by main battery, secondary battery and where applicable by small ship armament including rockets and automatic weapons. Air support, air reconnaissance, air photography and spotting were carefully planned for and co-ordinated. Heavy ship fire support from other Task Forces was also made available and alerted for the first sign of opposition.

Comment is also made here on the meticulous economy in the use of personnel. Forced by operating conditions to draw officers and men from ships at sea still engaged in alerted combat status, officers and men were assigned dual positions. They were initially assigned to tasks while afloat and in the approach and landing phases, and assumed other assignments as soon as the landing was established.

TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT
August 19, - September 8, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

PART VII - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel engaged in this operation was of highest order and in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service.

There were no casualties. No incidents of violence occurred which reflects the high standard of discipline and leadership during this occupation of enemy territory where various armed factions were present.

TAS FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT
August 19, - September 8, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

When it is considered that this operation was without precedent, unique in its conception; and that all planning and preliminary organization was done at sea, necessitating the transfer of personnel and material by breeches buoys and whips; the high order of the personnel performance is a credit to the ingenuity, tenacity and ability of officers and men of the U.S. Navy to overcome difficulties and handicaps imposed by the prevailing conditions.

There are no further recommendations.

Ex-HIJMS NAGATO

5 September 1945.

From: Commanding Officer, Ex-HIJMS NAGATO.
To: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE (ComBatDiv7).

Subject: Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO.

Reference: (a) CTF 31 (CBD 7) ltr., serial 2, of 29 August 1945.
(b) Memo to Comdr. T. J. Flynn, of 29 August 1945.
(c) CTF 31 despatch 030925, of September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Roster of boarding party. *P. 34*
(B) Roster of Japanese aboard HIJMS NAGATO. *P. 37*
(C) List of ship's plans and papers. *P. 38*
(D) Ordnance and Gunnery report. *P. 39*
(E) Engineering report. *P. 41*
(F) Damage and C&R report. *P. 43*

1. In accordance with orders contained in reference (a), I assumed command of the nucleus crews from the USS SOUTH DAKOTA (enclosure (A)), on 29 August 1945, for the purpose of taking possession and controlling HIJMS NAGATO moored in YOKOSUKA Inner Harbor, Japan. The crews were embarked in USS HORACE A. BASS (APDL24), and were organized and briefed immediately for accomplishment of the task assigned.

2. In accordance with reference (b), the USS BASS went alongside the port side of the NAGATO at 0800, the ship being at general quarters. The ship's boats preceded the BASS for the purpose of cutting any telephone or other lines from NAGATO to shore. The boarding party boarded the NAGATO at 0805, 30 August 1945. Captain Sugino of the NAGATO, seven commissioned officers, three warrant officers, 13 enlisted men and one civilian Japanese interpreter (enclosure (B)), were formed in two ranks on the main deck of the NAGATO abreast Turret III. All were unarmed. Upon boarding, Captain Sugino stepped forward and saluted.

3. Captain Sugino was ordered to haul down the Japanese flag, and the U. S. ensign and jack were hoisted at 0810 with appropriate ceremony. The Japanese flag was delivered to Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

4. Guards were posted at various positions on the topside and inspection parties for turrets, magazines, engine spaces, lower decks, etc., proceeded with inspections immediately and were accompanied by at least one Japanese officer or man.

5. The captain was questioned as to the condition of the ship and with the help of various Japanese officers furnished the information indicated in the enclosures. Captain Sugino did not appear very familiar with the details of the ship and the other officers appeared vague. It is believed that the captain and officers listed were assigned to the ship after she was damaged with the exception of the Assistant Gunnery Officer and they may have been assigned merely for the purpose of turning over the ship. The enlisted men were familiar with the ship and furnished valuable information and aid.

ENCLOSURE (K)

5 September 1945.

Subject: Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO.

6. No opposition of any kind was encountered. At no time was any antagonism, resentment, arrogance or passive resistance encountered; both officers (including the captain) and men displaying a very meek and subservient attitude. It seemed almost incredible that these bowing, scraping, scared men were the same brutal, sadistic enemies who had tortured our prisoners, reports of whose plight were being received the same day. It is considered that the Japanese met all the terms given to them for the surrender of the NAGATO by Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE with the few exceptions noted, all of which are not considered serious. They have been very cooperative in furnishing information and assistance.

7. Ship's plans and other documents (enclosure (C)) were turned over to me and other unidentified papers were found later and retained. A tour of the ship was made in company with Captain Sugino after which he and 4 officers, 4 enlisted men and the interpreter (enclosure (B)) were sent ashore to the Naval Base, YOKOSUKA, under guard and turned over to Marine military police. The remainder of the Japanese were kept aboard for assistance in technical matters.

8. The USS BASS remained alongside the NAGATO up to date of this report and furnished berthing and messing facilities for the nucleus crew. The officers and crew of the BASS were very cooperative in furnishing technical assistance and material for carrying out the assigned task. Technical personnel from the USS IOWA was also furnished when requested. There were no engineering or C&R artificers with the SOUTH DAKOTA crews; such men being furnished by the BASS and IOWA.

9. On 4 September 1945, the ship got underway and was towed to Buoy #8, YOKOSUKA Harbor.

10. At 0800, 5 September 1945, I was relieved by the Commanding Officer of the USS DELTA, in accordance with reference (c). Ship's plans and other papers (enclosure (C)) were turned over to the commanding officer.

11. It is recommended that pending decision as to ultimate disposition of the NAGATO, a board be appointed to examine the ship in detail as to construction, ordnance and fire control and engineering.

/s/ T. J. FLYNN.

ENCLOSURE (K)

U.S.S. Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945

1. The following officers and men comprised the boarding party of the NAGATO:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Rank or Rate</u>	<u>Ship</u>
T.J. Flynn	61363	Captain, USN	USS IOWA
B. Edwards		Gunner, USN	USS IOWA
D.B. Hertz		Lieut., USN	USS IOWA
T.M. Benziger	404402	Ens., USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
J.W. Sant	144156	Lt(jg)., USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
E.A. Wiggenghorn		Lieut., USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
T.E. Rippey		Ens., USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
K.O. Dixon		Ens., USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
H.D. Williams		Lt(jg)., USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
R.E. Johnson		Ens., USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
A. Hodges		Ens., USNR	USS HORACE A. BASS
Addington, V.N.	342 66 21	GM3c, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Barnes, W.E.	810 84 18	StMlc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Bennett, M.W.	956 00 34	Flc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Benton, A.T., Jr.	625 62 69	GMLc(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Boyd, F.L.	262 55 87	BMlc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Buccellato, N.(n)	377 72 26	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Clark, J.W.	283 86 22	PhM2c(T), USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Foster, E.F.	655 26 96	Cox(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Gonzalez, M.S.	625 42 74	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Jackson, B.W.	965 76 25	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Johnson, F.W.	654 93 19	RM2c(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Jorgensen, J.M.	277 99 85	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Kennedy, W.W.	721 67 25	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Kundus, R.S.	949 69 33	Flc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Larson, R.J.	758 17 97	Flc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Lewis, J. Jr.	575 00 18	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Lunday, A.F.	351 07 53	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Menzed, H.W.	313 07 53	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Moser, J.W.	845 97 17	Slc(GM), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Mosher, E.G. Jr.	608 57 24	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Naill, R.E.	301 17 46	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Pippin, H.W.	885 21 17	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Robey, K.C.	602 87 61	SC2c(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Sebeni, W.(n)	822 23 13	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Shea, T.G.	204 51 77	QM3c, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Spratt, A.C.	566 03 56	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Swank, L.R.	342 92 88	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
West, M.S.	619 38 62	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Yanchun, S.(n)	202 49 08	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
York, G.A.	338 70 60	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA

U.S.S. Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945

Officers and men of boarding party (cont'd)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Rank or Rate</u>	<u>Ship</u>
Aloisio, M.P.	652 80 04	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Bray, J.E.	831 37 25	PhM3c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Brown, D.P.	840 62 46	St3c(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Budd, W.G.	202 52 13	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Ejma, F.C.	852 40 27	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Crosby, N.W.	606 31 11	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Flack, G.W.	554 05 33	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Floyd, S.(n)	721 87 55	QM3c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Gray, M.E.	387 06 17	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Grislona, G.(n)	668 29 68	QM3c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Grovum, C.G.	758 14 64	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Gulbrandson, F.B., Jr.	961 96 65	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Heringer, P.M.	554 54 94	SM3c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Hobson, C.W.	285 59 88	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Homer, G.B.	251 18 49	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Hughes, C.E.	311 54 87	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Lapsley, J.H.	973 06 56	F1c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Larlee, P.S.	899 22 23	F1c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Liro, J.R.	651 36 28	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Midler, W.A.	869 10 05	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Mordarski, E.(n)	862 12 43	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Pratt, M.F.	300 24 07	BM1c, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Rivers, H.L.	317 32 89	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Rogers, R.W. Jr.	677 28 97	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Stewart, H.L.	274 80 25	RM3c, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Umstead, M.J.	322 17 36	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Warncke, E.J.	577 21 14	Slc(GM), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Woodsworth, R.S.	378 74 47	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Allen, J.	944 89 69	StM1c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Amsih, F.(n)	225 14 18	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Bell, A.L.	347 10 86	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Bennetts, W.S.	952 54 62	F1c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Boylston, J.C.	829 18 00	PhM2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Crawford, G.T.	575 11 42	RM3c(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Davis, W.R.	272 80 96	BM1c(T), USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Gaulden, J.B.	552 41 98	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
George, P.M.	623 30 42	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Gould, J.E.	202 25 74	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Grace, T.W.	266 32 67	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Ingram, E.L.	301 01 49	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Kennedy, H.A.	377 96 79	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Jones, N.S.	377 66 70	GM2c(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
King, C.R.	805 72 77	Y3c(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA

U.S.S. Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945

Officers and men of boarding party (cont'd)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Rank or Rate</u>	<u>Ship</u>
Klippel, W.W.	563 27 32	Cox(T), USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Kuhimann, J.H. Jr.	223 25 95	Flc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Long, W.W.	264 40 25	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Montecalvo, A. (n)	204 89 79	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Phillippe, G.E.	872 98 38	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Reisinger, F.J.	245 74 97	Slc, USN	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Schultz, N.J. Jr.	860 59 95	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Skelly, C.J.	800 47 97	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Smith, W.W. Jr.	338 72 12	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Street, L.B. Jr.	876 33 15	S2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Therialualt, J.C.	312 43 53	QM3c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Wersky, A.W.	564 85 90	SC2c, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Wright, J.E.	655 95 23	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA
Butler, H.E.	888 28 65	Slc, USNR	USS SOUTH DAKOTA

Ex-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

LIST OF JAPANESE ABOARD AT TIME OF BOARDING:

Officers:

Captain	S. Sugino	
# *Lieut. Comdr.	S. Okuda	Gunnery Officer.
# *Lieut.	O. Nakamura	Engineering Officer.
# *Lieut.	S. Mine	Electrical Officer.
# *2nd Lieut.	M. Kuzuu	Ass't. Gunnery Officer.
2nd Lieut.	H. Kakuta	Main Engine Officer.
Ens.	S. Nakamura	Communication Officer.
# *Ens.	O. Sato	Boiler Division Officer.
Warrant	F. Fujino	Sub Communication Officer.
Warrant	K. Uswi	Paymaster
# *Warrant	Y. Kawati	Electrician.

Enlisted Men:

K. Suzuki	Seaman.
S. Nakano	Seaman.
#*S. Yamazaki	Engineer
#*K. Murakaimi	Seaman.
#*A. Ishizawa	Seaman.
K. Aizawa	Engineer.
*S. Suwabe	Engineer
*K. Nakamura	Seaman.
#*S. Okushima	Seaman
*H. Endo.	Engineer
#*D. Arai.	Engineer
#*N. Misono.	Engineer.
#*S. Tahashima	Engineer.

H. Hiyimur Interpreter (Civilian)

Brought on board from Bass:

Shibata	Interpreter.
\$Murase	Pilot.

* Retained on board. Others left ship under guard at 1100 on 30 August 1945.

Left ship at 1500 4 September 1945.

\$ Returned to USS Horace A. Bass.

ENCLOSURE (B)

EX - H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

The following is a list of papers and ship's plans turned over by the Captain of the Nagato. Other miscellaneous papers found upon inspection are not listed.

12 blue prints (arrangement of each deck, outboard and inboard profiles, sectional plans, principle **dimensions**).

Three catalogues of armament, list of medical supplies, report of damage, present condition of ship, and tactical data.

4 September 1945.

ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY REPORT:

1. The following is a synopsis of the condition of the ordnance and gunnery material aboard the Ex-H.I.J.M.S., NAGATO as reported and as verified by preliminary inspection.

MAIN BATTERY:

1. There are 8 - 40 centimeter guns aboard in four turrets. Firing locks have been removed from the guns, 15 being stowed below. In all other respects it is believed the turrets are operable, with minor exceptions.

2. Main battery ammunition is aboard as follows:

Turret I	124 H.C. and 153 A.P. projectiles.
Turret II	62 H.C. and 106 A.P. "
Turret III	80 H.C. and 138 A.P. "
Turret IV	111 H.C. and 122 A.P. "

3. The H.C. projectiles are fitted with dummy nose plugs. The A.P. are fitted with dummy internal base fuzes.

4. There is no 40 centimeter powder aboard. There are approximately 20 boxes of primers aboard.

SECONDARY AND A.A. BATTERIES:

1. There are no secondary or A.A. guns aboard, having been removed in navy yard.

2. The battery consisted of 18 single 14 centimeter guns and 12, 12-7 centimeter A.A. guns in twin mounts.

3. There is no secondary or A.A. ammunition aboard.

Machine Guns:

1. There are 36, 25 millimeter guns in operating condition unmounted and stowed in starboard gun room frame 157.

2. One twin mount damaged is mounted above navigation bridge. Two triple mounts are located on top of turret two, badly damaged and rusted.

3. There are 16,561 rounds of ammunition for these guns located in two magazines:

07301 (frame 85) 12873 rounds. (midships)
07515 (frame 85) 3688 rounds. (port)

Directors:

1. One main battery director is aboard located above the

4 September 1945.

DIRECTORS (Cont.)

Navigation Bridge amidships.

2. One main battery director removed from top level of Pagoda structure.
3. One main battery director removed from after superstructure.
4. Six secondary battery directors are aboard, two badly damaged. Two A.A. (12.7) directors aboard are stripped. Seven 25 millimeter directors installed and operable.

PLOTTING ROOM:

1. One main battery and two secondary battery plotting rooms apparently in operating condition.

4 September 1945

ENGINEERING REPORT

The following is a synopsis of the condition of the engineering plant of the NAGATO as reported by the Japanese, and as verified by preliminary inspection:

1. The general condition of the engineering plant is good. Some electrical motors are out of commission, but all vital machinery seems usable.
2. Boilers: There are six small boilers and four large boilers arranged in four firerooms. The four large boilers are filled to steaming level and can be used. The firesides of small boilers are open. The tubes seem clean. The six small boilers are dry. Fireroom auxiliaries seem to be in good condition. Number ten boiler has been lighted off three times and has operated satisfactorily. An open type feed system is used with hot well and feed heaters. The condensate and boiler feed system has been traced and used. There are $31\frac{1}{8}$ gallons of feed water in the main feed tanks. There are 11,300 gallons of water in auxiliary feed tanks of which 7000 are considered usable. Steam has been led to auxiliary loop to anchor engine from ten boilers. No major leaks have been discovered, but there are many minor steam leaks.
3. Electrical Power: There are four 250 kilowatt direct current turbo generators and one 200 kilowatt direct current 225 volt Diesel generator aboard. The Diesel generator has been running for light and power. Five hundred gallons of Diesel fuel have been received from the U.S.S. HORACE A. BASS, and there are now approximately 2200 gallons (of a capacity of 12,000 gallons) aboard. It is estimated that this will be sufficient for four days operation until suation is lost. The Diesel generator has never been run for more than two days continuously. Number two turbo - generator has been started and taken the whole load satisfactorily for one hour (400 amps.) and also has been paralleled with the Diesel generator. Number one generator seems in good condition. Number three generator needs some drain line repairs to the turbine. Number four generator has no ventilation due to damaged trunk. The three distribution boards seem to be in good condition, and the majority of circuits on number one board (control) have been checked out. The voltage from Diesel generator has been controlled both locally and from number one distribution board satisfactorily. No difficulty is anticipated in running the generators or the electrical system. There are some A.C. boards supplied with power from motor generators (for I.C., fire control, etc.) which have not been checked out.
4. Main Engines: There are four main engines of 20,000 H.P. each. They are cross-compound Westinghouse turbines with air pumps carrying a vacuum of about 28". Maximum speed is 24.5 knots, (cruising speed 12 knots with fuel consumption of about - estimated - of 30,000 gallons per day. All engines are in good condition and probably can be run. The shafts do not seem to be out of line.
5. Evaporators: There are two sets of high pressure evaporators, maximum capacity of about 600 gallons an hour each. Work is underway, lighting these off.

U.S.S. EX - H.I.J.M.S.
NAGATO

4 September 1945

ENGINEERING REPORT - CONTINUED.

6. Fire and Flushing System: There are ten electric pumps aboard, of which three are out of commission and would require extensive repairs. Five pumps would require repair work. Only two pumps are in satisfactory condition; it is possible to maintain a pressure of 70 psi on the fire main with two pumps. The fire main loop has been completely checked, and pressure is being maintained on all parts of the system.

7. Fuel Oil: It is estimated that there are 17000 gallons of useable fuel oil on board, in eight tanks. All other tanks are ballasted as far as is known. It is reported that removal of ballast was accomplished by use of compressed air; the details of deballasting are not yet known. It is reported that the starboard wing tanks are leaking, but it has not yet been possible to determine the extent of damage.

8. Communications: The telephone systems have been in commission and have been tested from conn to steering aft, and on several circuits through the main switchboard in telephone exchange. There is a public address system which has been tested and is in working order.

9. Steering Engines: The steering engines are hydraulic-electric and are in excellent condition. There are two motors in each of the two steering engine rooms, and they can operate the rudder singly or in any combination. Steering has been checked from upper and lower conn and from each of the steering rooms.

10. Anchor Windless: The anchor windless is a reciprocating steam engine and has been operated to walk out and hoist anchor chain.

11. Sanitary Facilities: The heads are flushed by a gravity feed system from tanks in the superstructure, filled, by means of the fire main. One head forward on main deck is in operation. No work has been attempted on the fresh water system. The capacity of the fresh water tanks is approximately 39000 gallons. The capacity of the reserve feed tanks, less the hot well, is approximately 49000 gallons. The Japanese reported that the shafts have not been bent, and that the propellers are not damaged. This condition has not been checked.

SUMMARY: No difficulty should arise in operating the engineering plant if provisions can be made for taking fuel aboard and checking the tanks which are reported to be leaky. The machinery except for some electric motors. Shows excellent care.

ENCLOSURE (E)

EX-H.I.J.M.S. NAGATO

4 September 1945.

DAMAGE AND C&R REPORT.

It was reported by the captain of the NAGATO that the ship sustained a near miss off the port bow during October 1944 in the vicinity of Corregidor. This has opened up a hole approximately twenty feet long at frame Ten which has been patched with fifteen pound plate twenty feet by ten feet. The work is of very poor quality and there are numerous open seams and rivet holes. The frames are weak and would not withstand a heavy sea. The bottom of the plate is three feet above the water line.

Three direct hits and sixty near misses were sustained during the July 18th raid on Yokosuka. Two hits on the Pagado structure demolished the bridge ex-05 level. However the tripods are not damaged and other levels were not damaged.

One hit just forward of turret three (ex-wardroom) detonated on the main deck blowing a hole in it and demolishing the overhead (catapult structure) and bulkheads. The main deck hole has been patched with concrete by the Japanese. Bulkheads on the main deck were blown away in the area some forty feet forward of detonation.

The sixty near misses were reported by the Japanese to have opened up all blister and some double bottom fuel tanks on the port side between turrets two and three. Two thirds of all fuel tanks are flooded carrying approximately 2000 tons of water. This had not been verified.

The ship is on an even keel.

Draft forward, feet, Aft, feet.

The fire and flushing system has ten electrical pumps five of which are operable. One pump is sufficient to maintain a pressure of ninety pounds on the system. These pumps can also be used as drain pumps.

There is one anchor aboard (starboard) and two anchor chains. The anchor windlass and winches on the forecastle are operable.

There are no satisfactory sanitary facilities aboard. There are no adequate cooking, messing or berthing facilities aboard.

U.S.S. IOWA, THIRD FLEET,
FLAGSHIP COMMANDER TASK FORCE 31,
27 August 1945.

O R D E R

1. The Naval Station and Naval Air Station at Yokosuka shall be closed down as specified in the directive of Commander THIRD Fleet delivered to Japanese representatives this date. Except as noted herein, the Naval, military, and civilian population within the limits of these stations shall, by 1800, on 29 August 1945, be reduced to the following:

- (a) The Commandant First Naval District (Commandant Yokosuka Naval Air Base) and nucleus administrative staff organization (to be English-speaking, or provided with interpreters for those that are not English-speaking). This staff is to comprise administrative assistants as necessary to control under the direction of Allied occupation authorities, the various departments of the Naval establishment. A staff organization setting forth the names, rank and duties of each officer involved shall be submitted to CTF 31 for his approval prior to noon, 28 August 1945.
- (b) A Captain of the Navy and an Army officer of corresponding rank shall meet the Commanding General of the Naval Landing Force at a time and place on 30 August as specified by the Commander of the Naval Landing Force.
- (c) Necessary personnel (minimum in number) to continue operation of all essential public utilities, including power, light, water, telephone, fire department, gas (if used), hospitals, sanitation (including garbage collection) until these functions are taken over by Allied personnel. In this connection a report is to be submitted to CTF 31 by noon, 28 August, by the Commandant Yokosuka Naval District, considered by him to be the minimum required for the intended purpose.
- (d) Minimum personnel (not to exceed fifteen (15) officers and one hundred fifty (150) men). Provide shipkeepers, and technical personnel necessary to turn over to Allied control and assist in the inspection and taking over of any ships, submarines, midget submarines, boats, and auxiliary craft of all types.
- (e) Drivers for passenger cars and trucks (one for each) required to be delivered to U.S. authorities.
- (f) Essential communication key personnel to turn over in good order the station radio facilities and essential key personnel to operate the telephone system, telephone switchboards (English-speaking operators) and all airfield radio and signalling equipment for handling aircraft from the field (The Commandant of the Naval District shall prior to noon 28 August submit for approval of CTF 31 a report indicating the number of personnel considered essential to these purposes.

- (g) Guides and interpreters to be made available on the day of occupation at time and place to be specified by Commanding General Naval Landing Force - fifteen (15) at Navy Yard and ten (10) at Naval Air Station.

2. At the time specified for the U.S. Naval occupation, the above personnel shall be wholly disarmed and shall remain at stations as designated in paragraph 3, this order, until otherwise directed by U.S. Authorities, or assembled in ranks under own officers outside of their assigned barracks. Civilian personnel shall wear white cloth bands for quick identification and all personnel shall carry positive means of identification at all times. All personnel shall be quartered within the Naval establishment in accommodations as submitted by the Commandant of the First Naval District and approved by CTF 31 or his representative.

3. The disposition of above personnel at the time of occupation shall be as follows:

- (a) Commandant and one (1) Staff Officer shall await the arrival of Commander Task Force 31, and the Chief of Staff Commander THIRD Fleet, at a point on the waterfront to be specified later. The remainder of the headquarters staff personnel shall remain in a body at the Naval District Headquarters.
- (b) As indicated in paragraph one (1).
- (c) Personnel essential to the operation of public utilities shall be at their stations, others shall be assembled at their designated barracks.
- (d) Police, guards, and caretakers are to be at their stations outside of buildings, and shall remain on station until relieved by Allied Forces. (Magazines and Storage Buildings are to be locked, but access is to be available to Allied Forces by key in the possession of local guard). Further employment and disposition of this group shall be as directed by the Commanding General, Allied Landing Force.
- (e) One (1) officer and two (2) shipkeepers shall be on board each naval or auxiliary vessel moored separately and the same number at each nest of small craft. Others in this group shall be assembled at a point to be designated later to report to designated officers of the Allied Landing Force for duties as they may direct.
- (f) Passenger cars and trucks shall be assembled at points specified in enclosures with each driver alongside of, but outside of, his vehicle. They shall be employed as directed by U.S. Authority.
- (g) One watch stationed at the radio station, telephone switchboards and at airfield radio and signal stations. Others watches assembled at designated barracks until otherwise directed by Allied Authority.

- (h) Fifteen (15) officer interpreters shall meet the Naval Landing Force and report to the senior Allied officer at a point on the Navy Yard waterfront to be designated later. Ten (10) officer interpreters shall perform the same functions at the south sea-plane ramps at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.

4. The following action by Japanese Authorities shall be completed and fully effective by 1800, 29 August 1945 or as otherwise specified herein

(a) Navigation:

- (1) Make twenty (20) pilots immediately available and ready to report on board U. S. pilot vessel at a time and place to be later designated.
- (2) Deliver to CTF 31, or designated agent, 10 complete sets of local charts with all data complete and up-to-date.
- (3) Have all lighthouses, beacons, and other navigational aids in the Sagami Wan, and in Tokyo and its approaches in full operation on a peace time basis at once.
- (4) Channel and approach buoys to be placed as well as buoys indicating all obstructions.
- (5) Complete report of berths, anchor buoys, telephone buoys, and anchorages clear and available for use in the area of occupation and contiguous waters (to be submitted to CTF 31, prior to 1000 on 28 August 1945).
- (6) Clear alongside borths at piers, jetties, etc., as possible to accommodate the maximum number of allied ships within the area of occupation.
- (7) Submit sounding data covering the approaches to, and the water area alongside all workable piers and jetties.

(b) Ships and Craft:

- (1) Make report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 (including 10 charts) giving exact location of ships present, including all ships, submarines, boats and craft of all kinds as of 1800, 29 August 1945.
- (2) All ships and craft of all kinds shall be demilitarized and rendered ineffective, in accordance with previous instructions (removal of all explosives, demilitarization of all offensive armament).
- (3) All personnel shall be removed except as specified and approved by CTF 31.
- (4) All submarines shall be nested together. All midget submarines shall be placed in dry dock.
- (5) All small craft shall be hauled out of the water or nested afloat in not more than three groups in localities to be submitted by the Commandant of the First Naval District and approved by CTF 31. These nests shall not foul any ship berth of over fourteen (14) feet alongside.

(b) Ships and Craft: (Cont'd)

- (6) Complete descriptive report shall be made to CTF 31 prior to 1000 on 28 August 1945 of all ships, boats, tugs, barges, or craft of any kind which are operational and of which may readily be made operational. This report shall include small boats adaptable for uses as Admiral's barges, gigs, and ship's boats. The type of fuel used shall be specified.
- (7) A special group of fifteen (15) operational picket boats, MTB's, or equivalent craft shall be assembled and made ready for immediate use by Allied Naval Forces. (Engineers shall be available among the required group of technicians for duty in the preliminary operation of these vessels).
- (8) All camouflage shall be from all ships, boats, piers, or other waterfront installations.

(c) Coast Defenses:

- (1) Make report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 (including 10 charts) giving exact location of all coast defense guns, AA guns, torpedo tubes, and any other defensive installations (including ammunition stowages) within range of ships operating in Sagami Wan, or Tokyo Bay, or its approaches.
- (2) Each of the above installations shall be clearly marked with a white flag in a manner and size so as to be clearly visible from seaward at a distance of four miles off shore.
- (3) All personnel, (naval, military, or civilian) to be forbidden the area near these installations (except for guards essential to the safeguarding of magazines).
- (4) All guns to be demilitarized by the removal of breech-blocks which are to be collected and locked up in storage within the area of occupation and turned over to the Allied Forces.
- (5) All personnel shall be removed from Island Forts #1, #2, and #3, (except one English-speaking guide on each) and from the fortifications at Futtsu Saki (except 8 English-speaking guides). The guides shall meet Allied forces about 0600 on 30 August 1945 and conduct them to defense emplacements for inspection of the condition of guns and other defense installations.
- (6) Remove all nets and camouflage on all installations.

(d) Communications:

- (1) Deliver radio station JME, Yokosuka Radio, ready for operation in all respects, including an adequate supply of spare parts.

(d) Communications: (Cont'd)

- (2) All signal stations shall be fully ready for operation.
- (3) Telephone system and telephone exchange manned and ready for operation (with English-speaking operator at the switchboard).
- (4) All other communications stations and systems to be delivered, ready for operation in all respects, but with operation discontinued pending further orders from Allied authorities.
- (5) Establish and maintain direct telephone communication to Atsugi Airfield (Allied Headquarters).

(e) Shore Transportation:

1. Automotive transportation in first-class working order and fully ready for operation shall be made available and ready in the vicinity of the Naval Barracks, Yokosuka Navy Yard, or in the vicinity of the air field hangars at the Yokosuka air field in the number and type specified below:

(a) Yokosuka Naval Station.

- 8 high-class limousine body automobiles
- 10 sedans
- 10 passenger busses
- *20 trucks (heavy-duty)
- *30 light trucks
- 2 wrecking cars
- 4 ambulances
- 4 gasoline trucks (500 gals. or larger)
- 8 water trucks (500 gals. or larger)
- all available fire-fighting apparatus

*All of these may be 2 to 2½ tons capacity.

(b) Naval Air Station Yokosuka.

- 6 fully operational aircraft handling tractors
- 2 wrecking cranes - 60,000# lift
- 6 gasoline trucks - pumping capacity 1000 gals.
- 6 oil dollies - capacity 200 gals. each
- 4 passenger busses
- 1 ambulance
- 5 limousines
- 4 heavy-duty trucks
- 6 light trucks
- 4 water trucks (500 gals. or larger)
- all available fire-fighting apparatus

(f) Offices, Officers Quarters, Barracks, Messing:

A. Office Space:

1. Provide and make available all existing office space in a clean and readily operable condition. Telephones to be connected, clerical supplies to be on hand, furniture to be in good repair; in general ready to be immediately used.
2. Specific facilities must exist or be provided to accommodate:
 - (a) The Commander Occupation Force and his staff of 150 officers and men.
 - (b) The Commander of the THIRD Fleet, U.S. Navy, and staff of 15-20 officers and 30-40 men.
 - (c) The Commander Naval Shore Activities Yokosuka Naval Base and staff of 30 officers and 60 men.

B. Living Quarters:

1. Flag Officers.

- (a) All existing high ranking officers quarters shall be clean, furnished, in good repair, and ready for occupancy for ranking flag officers of the U.S. Fleet.
- (b) There must be three separate establishments to accommodate any or all of the following:
 - (1) The Commander Naval Occupation Force Yokosuka.
 - (2) The Commander THIRD Fleet, U.S. Navy.
 - (3) The Commander Naval Shore Activities.
- (c) Each of the above shall be fully equipped for immediate occupancy.

2. Officers.

- (a) All existing officers quarters assigned to officers of the rank of commander and above shall be prepared for immediate occupancy by Allied Naval and Army Officers. They shall be scrupulously clean, fully equipped, and ready for immediate occupancy.
- (b) Suitable accommodations must be provided for 500 officers on the Yokosuka Naval Station. Accommodations are necessary for 50 officers at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.

- (c) The existing officers mess shall be made ready for immediate use. It shall be clean, equipped with necessary utensils, service, china, with stowage places, and refrigerator spaces in a completely sanitary condition.
- (d) The officers mess, specifically, must be ready to feed 500 officers in a wholesome, clean, and satisfactory manner.
- (e) All existing officers clubs shall be made ready for immediate use by Allied officers. They will be thoroughly clean and completely sanitary, with all recreational facilities ready for use.

3. Berthing and Messing.

- (a) All necessary barracks as outlined below will be immediately vacated, scrubbed, and in general made ready for U. S. Naval use.
- (b) There must be quarters available for an eventual total of 13,000 men on the Yokosuka Naval Station.
- (c) There must be quarters available for eventual total of 4,000 men at the Yokosuka Naval Air Station.
- (d) Existing recreational facilities will be made ready for immediate use.
- (e) Existing messing facilities will be made ready for immediate use. All kitchens must be absolutely clean.

C. Report.

The Commandant First Naval District will submit a report to the Commander U.S. Naval Occupation Forces, Yokosuka not later than 1000 August 28th. His report shall follow this outline and summarize the existing facilities and state their location, capacity, and condition. It shall state what quarters and messing facilities are requested for Japanese officers and men. It shall explain in detail what flag officers quarters are available, what recreational facilities for officers and men are available, and what messing facilities are available.

(g) Allied Prisoners of War:

1. Make a complete report to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945, indicating the number, location, and physical condition of all Allied Prisoners of War in Yokosuka Area and vicinity.
2. Be prepared to make immediate delivery of all Allied Prisoners to U.S. Naval Authorities as directed by CTF 31.

(h) Medical and Sanitation:

1. In accordance with previous instructions have all hospitals and dispensaries thoroughly cleaned and fully equipped for occupational use by U.S. Forces.
2. Submit report to CTF 31 stating general health conditions presently existing in the Yokosuka area including a statement as to whether an epidemic exists, and what diseases are most prevalent.
3. Submit to CTF 31 a complete description of the water supply system including the sources of the water supply, location and condition of all reservoirs, clarification system, and means of distribution.

(i) Miscellaneous:

- A. Deliver at once twenty-five (25) corrected copies of layout plans of Yokosuka Naval Station and area, including waterfront, depths of water at piers, etc.
- B. Man and make ready print shop with presses and supplies, fully equipped to produce work involving both the English and Japanese language.
- C. Make available for immediate use one (1) storehouse (50,000 square feet) near or adjacent to large ship berth.
- D. Make ready and place in full operating readiness not less than three gasoline and lubricating oil Filling Stations for use of automobiles in the Naval Station, Naval Air Station, and other principal localities within the area of occupation.
- E. Submit to CTF 31 prior to 1000, 28 August 1945 a complete outline of power and light system, indicating location and rate of all power plants, distribution stations, etc., and indicate the type and voltage and frequency of current supply, and availability.

O. C. BADGER,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander, Yokosuka Naval Occupation Force.

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COMMANDER TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE

CTF31/A16-3
Serial 010

8 September 1945.


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From: Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE (ComBatDiv 7).
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander THIRD Fleet.
(2) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Action Report of CTF 31, Commander Occupation Forces, YOKOSUKA; Occupation and Securing of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base and Airfield; Covering the period 19 August to 8 September 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFleet Ltr. 1CL-45 of 1 January 1945,

Enclosure: (A) Action Report, Commander Task Force 31. - p.2
no (B) Action Report, CTG 31.1, Flagship Group, U.S.S. IOWA. - M-ser. 140646
(C) Action Report, CTG 31.2, Minesweeping Group.
(To be forwarded separately). - Missing
no (D) Action Report, CTG 31.3, Fleet Landing Force and Task Force Able, Sixth Marine Division. - p.32
no (E) Action Report, CTG 31.4 - Transport Group. - M-ser. 140642
no (F) Action Report, CTG 31.5 - Screen. - p.75
no (G) Action Report, CTG 31.6 - Yokosuka Naval Air Activities. - p.87
no (H) Action Report, CTG 31.7 - Naval Shore Activities. - p.91
no (I) Action Report, CTG 31.8 - SOPA Administrator. - M-ser. 140641
Pres. Photo. (J) Action Report, CTG 31.9 - Submarine Demilitarization Group. - M-ser. 138106
" " (K) Report of Seizure of HIJMS NAGATO. - p.107
" " (L) Demands and Orders given to Japanese Commandant First Naval District dated 27 August 1945. - p.119


1. Pursuant to instructions in reference (a), the Action Report for Task Force THIRTY-ONE for the period 19 August to 8 September 1945, incident to the occupation of YOKOSUKA Naval Base and Airfield is forwarded herewith as enclosures.


O. C. BADGER.

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Authenticated:


I. G. SEEGER,
Flag Secretary.

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TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT

August 19 - September 8, 1945

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PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

A. This action report covers the period from 19 August to 8 September 1945. YOKOSUKA Occupation Force, Task Force 31 was formed at 1400 (I) August 19, 1945 in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plan 10-45; Commander Task Force 31, Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, USN. The Task Force, consisting of units assigned from THIRD Fleet including Marine and Bluejacket landing forces, a British landing force detachment, and a Marine Combat Team consisting of 4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment, 6th Marine Division and attached units, entered TOKYO BAY beginning 28 August. On 30 August, landings were made at the YOKOSUKA Naval Base and the surrender of the base was received by Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, from the Commandant of the FIRST Naval District, Vice Admiral Totsuko. From 30 August to 8 September, Naval activities in the YOKOSUKA area were organized and administered by Task Force 31. Fleet Landing forces were relieved by the 4th Marines and reembarked from 4 to 6 September. Task Force 31 was dissolved on 8 September, its mission completed. Commander Fleet Activities YOKOSUKA and Commander Service Division 102 (SOPA Administrative) relieved Commander Task Force 31 and assumed respective control of all tasks assigned to Task Force 31.

PART II - PRELIMINARIES.

A. Task Force THIRTY-ONE, operating as a part of the THIRD Fleet in accordance with Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45, 11-45 and Commander Task Force 31 Operation Plan 1-45, included the following units; the composition of the force varying as units reported or were detached for special missions. The force was also supplemented as necessary by drawing on the facilities of the THIRD Fleet.

(a) T.G. 31.1 Flagship Group - Captain Wellborn.

IOWA (BB61) (FF)	1 BB
SAN DIEGO (CL53) (RFF)	1 CL(AA)

(b) T.G. 31.2 Minesweeping Group - Captain Loud.

T.U. 31.2.1 Minesweeping Unit ABLE.

ELLYSON (F)(DMS19)	7 DMS
HAMBLETON (DMS20)	2 DM
GHERARDI (DMS30)	
JEFFERS (DMS27)	
MACOMB (DMS23)	
HOPKINS (DMS13)	
FITCH (DMS25)	
GWIN (DM33)	
T.E. FRAZER (DM24)	

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T.U. 31.2.2 Minesweeping Unit BAKER

REVENGE, (AM110) 6 AM
TOKEN (AM126) 2 ACM
TUMULT (AM127) 12 YMS
BASTON (ACM6)
POCHARD (AM375)
PICKET (ACM8)
SAGE (AM11)
REQUISITE (AM109)
YMS 177, 268, 276, 343, 362, 461,
371, 390, 415, 426, 441, 467.

(c) T.G. 31.3 Landing Force, Brig. General Clement (USMC)

T.U. 31.3.1 Marine Combat Team, Lt. Col. Beans
4th Marine (Reinforced) Regiment
6th Marine Division 5400 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.2 Third Fleet Marine Landing Force,
Lt. Col. Lantz(USMC)
3 Battalions from TF 38 1635 Officers & Men.

T.U. 31.3.3 Third Fleet Naval Landing Force, Comdr. Malone
2 Battalions Bluejackets 850 Officers and Men.
Fully equipped from TF 38.
Nucleus Crews 330 Officers & Men.
10 Units (33 Officers & men each).
5 Battalions Bluejackets 2000 Officers & Men.
Partially equipped from TF 38 in Reserve.

T.U. 31.3.4. British Landing Force, Capt. Buchanan(RAN).
1 Battalion from TF 38.5 200 Naval Personnel.
250 Royal Marines.

(d) T.G. 31.4 Transport Group, Commodore Smoot.

T.U. 31.4.1 Fire Support Unit 10 LCI
LCI Group 46.

T.U. 31.4.2. Transport Unit ABLE, Capt. Moen.
GRIMES (F) (APA172) 5 APA
MERRIWEATHER (APA203) 1 AKA
LANIER (APA125) (Marine RCT T.U. 31.3.1
embarked).
MELLETTE (APA156)
BRAXTON (APA138)
WAUKESHA (AKA84)

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T.U. 31.4.2. Transport Unit BAKER, Capt. F.P. Williams.
 OZARK (LSV2)) THIRD Fleet Marine 2 ISV
 MONITOR (LSV5)) (TU 31.3.2) and Naval 1 APA
 GARRARD (APA84)) Landing Forces (TU 3 ISD
 SHADWELL (LSD15)) 31.3.3 Battalions,
 SAN MARCOS (LSD25) Beach Parties, Misc.
 CATAMOUNT (LSD17) Units) embarked.

T.U. 31.4.4 Transport Unit CHARLIE, Capt. Kennaday.
 SIMS (F) (APD50)) British Landing 10 APD
 PAVLIC (APD70)) Force (TU 31.3.4) em-
 BARR (APD39)) barked.
 H.A. BASS (APD124) 3 Nucleus crews, 1
 Bomb Disposal Group,
 embarked.
 GOSSELIN (APD126) Press personnel embarked.
 REEVES (APD52)
 WANTUCK (APD125)) 2 Bomb Disposal units, comm-
) unication teams, 1 diver unit
) and 1 Demolition unit embarked.
 RUNELS (APD85) 5 Nucleus crews embarked.
 W.J. PATTISON (APD104)) 2 UDT teams
 BEGOR (APD127)) embarked.

T.U. 31.4.5 Transport Unit DOG, Lt. Comdr. W.K. Bradbury
 ComLSM Group 35 12 LSM CB units in 12
 LSM 252 (F), 208, 290, 362, LSM, airfield
 368, 371, 419, 488, 13, detachment in
 284, 71. IST 789, 1139,
 ComLST Group 86 Post Office in
 LST 567, 789, 1139, 1083 4 LST IST 567.
 PGM 16, 26, 32. 3 PGM

(e) T.G. 31.5 Screen, Captain Carmichael.

DesDiv 106 6 DD
 WEDDERBURN (DD684)
 TWINING (DD540)
 STOCKHAM (DD683)
 YARNELL (DD541)
 SOUTHERLAND (DD743)
 HALSEY POWELL (DD686)

(f) T.G. 31.6 Naval Air Activities, Captain Duckworth

COWPENS CASU
 WASP CASU
 Advanced Air Base Assembly (embarked in IST 1139, 789).
 CB Units (in LSM's)
 Navy Base Maintenance Co. #4.

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CB Units (in LSM)

Navy Base Maintenance Cos. # 1 and # 3.

Miscellaneous Personnel and Units assigned.

(h) T.G. 31.8 SOPA Administrative, Commodore Smoot.

2 UDT Units (in APD 104, 127). 1 AD

Nucleus Crew (when released from 1 LST

Landing Force) 1 AR

Mobile Post Office (IST 567) 1 AOW

PIEDMONT (AD17)

TAMALPAIS (AOW96)

DELTA (AR9)

Personnel Assigned.

(i) T.G. 31.9 Submarine Demilitarization Group, Capt. Parks.

ComSubRon 20 1 AS

PROTEUS (AS19) 1 ASR

GREENLET (ASR10)

Units of the THIRD Fleet were drawn upon for all personnel requirements when Task Force THIRTY-ONE was activated. Rear Admiral Badger (ComBatDiv SEVEN) upon assuming his duties as CTF 31 brought his entire staff, including Captain J.M. Sweeney as Chief of Staff into the new organization, which was further supplemented by key personnel made available by Commander THIRD Fleet. Included among the latter were Commodore John P. Womble, Jr., USN, ComTaskFlot TWO, designated as CTG 31.7 (Commander Naval Shore Activities), Commodore Roland N. Smoot, USN, ComTaskFlot FOUR, designated as CTG 31.4 (Transport Group) as well as CTG 31.8 (SOPA Administrative) upon his arrival on shore. Commodore Joel T. Boone (MC), USN, joined the staff as Medical Officer from the staff of Com3rd Fleet, Capt. R. C. Lynch, Jr., USN joined from the staff of ComBatRon TWO as Operations Officer. Captain Duckworth, USN, of the U.S.S. COWPENS was made Commanding Officer of Naval Air Activities and Captain T.M. Dykers, USN, from the staff of CTF 38 was given the task of ordnance demilitarization. Brigadier General W. T. Clement, USMC, was designated CTG 31.3 and placed in command of all landing forces. Commander Johnson, (SC) USN, Commander J.A. Coppola, USN, Commander C.W. Chisholm, USNR, all heads of departments on the IOWA were assigned corresponding positions on the staff of CTF 31. Commander F. P. Gilmore (MC) USN, Senior Medical Officer on IOWA was assigned to CTG 31.7 staff. Other members of the staffs of CTF 31, the task groups, and landing forces were drawn from the battleships, carriers, and cruisers of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT.

B. Task Force THIRTY-ONE was formed on 19 August 1945 from units of the THIRD Fleet and operated until 27 August in an area approximately 250 miles southeast of TOKYO. During this period the unparalleled feat of assembling and organizing an amphibious force from ships operating at sea was accomplished. The ships assigned to Task Force THIRTY-ONE were assembled and the Task Force organization completed. Landing force units which had

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been organized in the ships of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT were assembled and embarked in transports and staff personnel, nucleus crews, maintenance units and other components were likewise assembled in their appropriate units. This assembly and embarkation of the landing forces in transports at sea from the various ships of the THIRD Fleet was a job of major proportions. A highlight of the operation was the transfer of Task Group 38.4 bluejacket battalion of 400 men which was assembled on the MISSOURI to the IOWA. The transfer was required by the immediate departure of the MISSOURI from the area prior to the arrival of the assigned transport. Six slings were used simultaneously and the operation was completed within an hour without interruption or incident. Three hours later the battalion was transferred again from the IOWA to the MONITOR. Once the personnel had been assembled in the transports no reloading was required and the replenishment and distribution of supplies and landing force equipment was also completed during this period.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE shifted his flag to the SAN DIEGO on August 23. From August 24 to August 27 Admiral Badger was embarked on the MISSOURI to attend the preliminary negotiations between Commander THIRD Fleet and the Japanese Naval and Military authorities. At these conferences the Japanese emissaries were advised of requirements re minesweeping, disarmament and evacuation of personnel in the occupied areas, identification of all fortifications by display of white flags and markers and other demands essential to the security and success of the operation. During the period Commodore Womble was embarked in the SAN DIEGO and exercised Tactical command of Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

On August 27, after a delay of 24 hours due to storms in the vicinity, Task Force THIRTY-ONE arrived and anchored about 1600 (I) in the northeastern part of SAGAMI WAN in the shadow of Fujiyama.

The following day, 28 August, about 0900 the first United States Task Force consisting of SAN DIEGO (Flagship of CTF 31), GOSSELIN, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUISUN, screened by WEDDERBURN, STOCKHAM, TWINING and preceded by the minesweepers ELLYSON and HAMBLETON got underway and entered TOKYO BAY, anchoring about 1300 off YOKOSUKA. Remaining units of Task Force 31 entered TOKYO BAY 30 August. During the entrance Task Force 35 and Task Force 37 made a demonstration in force in SAGAMI WAN and stood by to provide fire support if needed. Air support was provided by Task Force 38, and air demonstrations were conducted in such force as to discourage any treachery on the part of the enemy. This was particularly important in view of the gauntlet of heavy guns that was the vanguard of Task Force 31 had to pass in order to enter TOKYO BAY. To this end combat air patrol, direct support aircraft and patrols of outlying airfield all were directed to funnel through populated areas at low altitude in order to make their presence most evident. At daybreak 30 August 1945 the first of the transports entered with Fleet Marines and landed on FUTTSU SAKI and Island Fort No. 2 to insure the neutralization of those fortifications prior to the entry of the main landing force.

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Minefields guarding the entrance to TOKYO BAY had not been cleared by the Japanese. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and the entrance was made via the west channel which was check swept by our forces prior to the entrance. Failure of the Japanese to clear the minefields was attributed to a lack of minesweepers and the crudity of their methods which required about three times as long as our methods. Information supplied by the local Japanese authorities was very accurate, and Japanese pilots were embarked on all ships during the entrance.

Negotiations with the Japanese Naval authorities at YOKOSUKA were conducted aboard the SAN DIEGO on August 28 and 29. At 0800, on August 30, nucleus crews from the SOUTH DAKOTA embarked on the H.A. BASS (APD124) under the command of Captain T. J. FLYNN, U.S.N., boarded HIJMS NAGATO, hauled down the Japanese colors, and hoisted the United States ensign, taking custody of this vessel in the name of the United States government.

Landing of the occupation forces began at 0930 the same day. The SAN DIEGO moved in and moored to the dock at YOKOSUKA at 1030. All landings and the occupation were executed smoothly on schedule and without opposition or incident. Surrender of the Naval Base was received at 1045 (I), 30 August in a ceremony on the dock alongside the SAN DIEGO. Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, representing Commander THIRD Fleet, received the surrender from Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of the FIRST Naval District.

Task Force THIRTY-ONE headquarters were established ashore immediately; the National Ensign and Admiral Badger's personal flag were hoisted over the Naval Headquarters building. In the afternoon an inspection tour by Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey was made.

All areas were secured, patrols established, Shore Activities, and SOPA (Administrative) were activated and the organization and operation of the base was undertaken. Minesweeping operations, support of Prisoner of War evacuation and demilitarization of ships and military installations, establishment of air operations at YOKOSUKA, clearing and reconnaissance of beaches at TATEYAMA for Army landings, clearance of dock areas at YOKOHAMA for Army forces were among important operations conducted. SAN DIEGO was relieved by the PIEDMONT on 1 September; on 2 September the surrender of the Japanese Empire was witnessed aboard MISSOURI by Rear Admiral Badger. From 4 to 6 September THIRD Fleet and British Landing Force Units were reembarked for return to their ships. On 8 September Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE was relieved by Commander Naval Activities YOKOSUKA and Task Force THIRTY-ONE was dissolved.

C. The mission of Task Force THIRTY-ONE as established in Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45 and 11-45 was to occupy and secure the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, clear entrance to TOKYO BAY and anchorages, seize and operate YOKOSUKA Airfield, establish communications including press, take over and demilitarize enemy ships present, support the release of allied Prisoners of War by Task Group 30.6, demilitarize enemy defenses, establish a port director, establish headquarters and facilities at YOKOSUKA for Task Force THIRTY-ONE forces and advance representatives of the Army of Occupation, institute sanitation and health measures and medical facilities, assist Army

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forces to clear and prepare dock areas in YOKOSUKA - YOKOHAMA area for disembarkation of troops, clear beaches and reconnoiter TATEYAMA Area for landings by Army.

Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE Operation Plan 1-45 covers this operation and is based on the assumption that Japan had capitulated but the treacherous employment of any or all weapons in the TOKYO Area was a distinct possibility. Provision was therefore made to prevent and protect the occupation force from any overt or treacherous actions by organized faction or individuals. Air and gunfire support was provided by Task Forces of the THIRD Fleet, minesweeping operations by Japanese were supervised and checked by units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE. Disarmament and evacuation of Japanese military and naval personnel from the occupied and contiguous areas, was required except for personnel necessary to provide information and assistance in establishing control and operation of the base.

D. Task Force THIRTY-ONE consisting of units enumerated above were supported by Task Force THIRTY-FIVE and Task Force THIRTY-SEVEN who staged demonstrations in SAGAMI WAN while Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT furnished air support, cover, search and reconnaissance while operating in assigned areas in Empire waters adjacent to the TOKYO region. All units of THIRD Fleet were also available to provide logistic support as required.

E. No enemy opposition was encountered at any time during the operation.

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PART III - CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

8 August 1945

Operating with Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, about 250 miles southwest of TOKYO, under tactical command of Vice Admiral J.S. McCain, CTF-38.

Advance copy of ComTHIRDFleet (Admiral W.F. Halsey, U.S. Navy) Operation Plan No. 10-45 received, setting up Task Force THIRTY-ONE, YOKOSUKA Occupation Force, under command of Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, U.S. Navy, Commander Battleship Division SEVEN. Began intensive study of Joint Staff's Preliminary study for "Campus Operation" and initiated Task Force planning. Started Estimate of Situation.

11 August

Rear Admiral Badger designated CTF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet despatch and authorized to issue warning orders to all THIRD Fleet commands. IOWA (BB61) designated flagship.

All ships in TF-38 alerted to organize bluejacket and marine landing force with arms, ammunition and rations.

Requested, through ComTHIRDFleet, that minesweeping officers and ships, UD Teams, and logistic ships be alerted by CinCPac (Advance). Initiated requests for temporary duty assignment for officers and men needed for staff. This included intelligence, interpreters, communications, clerical, CIC, ACI, operational, war correspondents, and photographic personnel. Requested necessary maps, charts, and grids from CinCPac (Advance).

Requests were initiated for supplies essential to the evacuation of prisoners-of-war. These included clothing (men, women and children), toilet articles, candy, chewing gum, small luxuries, ambulances, medical supplies including blood and water transportation.

Brigadier General William T. Clement, USMC, nominated as Commander Landing Force by Commanding General, THIRDPhibCorps, with Regimental Combat Team from 4th and 6th Marine Divisions. All located and alerted at GUAM.

Started drafting Operation Plan.

12 August

Alerted all ships in TF-38 to organize Base maintenance companies; warning order issued to CTF-38 to form naval air activities organization to activate air field. Requested CTF-38 to obtain vertical photos of occupation area. General Clement and Staff loaded in USS OZARK (LSV-2) at GUAM and sailed for rendezvous.

Requested APD's, APA's, AKA's, and necessary amphibious craft and SeaBee maintenance unit be alerted in rear area.

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13 August

4th and 6th Division Marines loaded on 5 APA's and 1 AKA at Marianas; UD teams loaded in APD's at GUAM.

Prepared demands to Japanese for cooperation, equipment and services.

Minesweepers (MinRon 20) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

14 August

First draft of Operation Plan completed, and discussed with ComTHIRDFleet on MISSOURI (BB-63). Coordination with fire and air support groups and POW rescue groups made firm.

Instructed to cease offensive operations against Japanese forces by CinCPOA.

All ships present alerted to procure, by transfer at sea, small arms and equipment needed for landing force parties from ships not furnishing landing battalions.

CinCPac's Op-Plan 12-45 put into effect for operations. Directs THIRD Fleet to occupy and control Tokyo Bay and coastal water in conjunction with Army Forces.

15 August

TransDiv 105 (5 APA's, 1 AKA) departed Guam for rendezvous.

Requested CinCAFPac to direct Japanese to initiate minesweeping in Tokyo Bay and entrances.

Received report from Soviet of intense anti-invasion activity by Japanese along shores of SAGAMI WAN. Requested additional photographic coverage by TF-38.

Completed tentative operation plan with revisions indicated at conference on MISSOURI. Distributed to Task Group Commanders for planning purposes.

16 August

Operation Plan approved by ComTHIRDFleet at conference aboard MISSOURI. Held briefing conferences with Group Commanders.

17 August

Authorized interchange of landing force equipment between ships in order to fully equip landing battalions.

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Requested ComTHIRDFleet to fuel, replenish and ammunition all ships assigned to TF-31.

Minesweeping units (AM's and YMS's) departed Okinawa for rendezvous.

Alerted all ships to organize nucleus crews to take over captured vessels.

Held conferences with Group Commanders firming up plans.

18 August

ComTHIRDFleet directed forming of TF-31 at 1400(I) 19th August as a separate tactical units to conform to movements of TF-38, remaining within TBS range of MISSOURI (Flagship, THIRD Fleet). TF-38 operating vicinity point Drink (32N - 143-30E), fueling and replenishing.

Alerted all ships to prepare to load landing battalions and other personnel in accordance with loading plan. Ordered typhus vaccine inoculations for personnel going ashore.

British landing force made available by ComTHIRDFleet.

Continued conferences re: operation plans of Group Commanders.

19 August

Commenced transferring personnel and equipment at sea, in accordance with loading plan.

Received storm warning indicating typhoon developing 300 miles to southeast.

1400(I), formed Task Force 31, in special cruising formation with transports and large amphibious ships in column, with circular screens composed of DD's, DMS's, and APD's. Following ships present: IOWA, SAN DIEGO, GRIMES, BRAXTON, OZARK, MERRIWEATHER, WAUKESHA, SHADWELL, LANIER, MELLETTE, GARRARD, DesDiv 106, MinRon 20, and TransDiv 105 plus WANTUCK.

Continued transferring personnel, fueling and replenishing.

20 August

REEVES, GOSSELIN joined up.

Received ComTHIRDFleet entrance plan for Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. Prepared and disseminated special entry formation.

Received despatch from ComTHIRDFleet that entry to Sagami Wan delayed until 26th August. CTF-31 alerted to board MISSOURI to meet Japanese emissaries morning of entry.

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20 August (cont'd)

In order to avoid typhoon all Task Forces directed by ComTHIRDFleet to proceed southwest toward "Temporary point" (30-30N - 142E). SOA 10 knots.

Continued to transfer personnel, refuel and replenish.

Distributed CTF-31 Operation Plan No. 1-45.

21 August

Continued replenishing, fueling and transfer of personnel at sea, vicinity of "Temporary point".

SOUTHERLAND assigned and joined up; assumed ACI, FDO, and CIC(air) duties for TF-31.

Received ComTHIRDFleet Op-Plan 11-45 by despatch - added following task to TF-31, "Assist Army forces as necessary to clear dock areas, Yokohama, in preparation for disembarkation of troops of 3rd Phib Force on about 31 August and 13 September". Issued necessary changes to Op-Plan to comply.

22 August

Continued replenishing and fueling in vicinity of "Temporary Point".

LOVE Day (landing day) specified as 28 August by ComTHIRDFleet. Sagami Wan entry to be on LOVE minus Two day.

TF-31 directed to proceed and operate in area "Badger" (Lat. 32 to 33 N - Long. 142 to 143-30 E), typhoon having passed off to eastward.

23 August

Operating in area "Badger", engaged in fueling and replenishing.

CATAMOUNT and LST 1083 joined up.

ComTHIRDFleet Operation Plan 10-45 made effective 1400(I). CTF-31 Op-Plan 1-45 made effective 1400(I).

Shifted Flag and Staff to SAN DIEGO.

Held conference of all Group Commanders and coordinated all operation plans. Following additional task assigned TF-31 by ComTHIRDFleet: "Clear water and beach approaches in TATEYAMA WAN, and mark same in preparation for amphibious landing in that area about 2 September by THIRD Phib Force". CTF-31 Op-Plan 1-45 revised to comply.

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24 August

Continued fueling in area "Badger".

Minesweeping unit consisting of 7 AM's and 12 YMS's joined up. PATTISON and BEGOR joined up.

25 August

Continued operations in area "Badger".

LSM Group 35 (12 LSM's) and PGM's 16, 26, 32 joined up.

IOWA and GOSSELIN detached to join TG 30.1 (THIRDFleet flagship group). CTF-31 (R. Adm. Badger) joined ComTHIRDFleet on MISSOURI for conference with Japanese emissaries.

Commodore J.P. Womble, U.S.N., OTC for TF-31 in SAN DIEGO.

Received orders from ComTHIRDFleet delaying all operations 48 hours. New LOVE day designated as 30 August.

26 August

Operating in area "Badger" topping-off and briefing of units.

ComTHIRDFleet ordered initial entry (Sagami Wan) executed on 27 August (Love minus three day).

Alerted minesweeping groups to commence sweeping operations as soon as conference with Japanese emissaries disclosed current mine fields and channels.

Requested station tanker and tender be assigned to provide fuel, gas, water, and provisions for landing force and small craft.

Requested AF and hospital ship be made available to landing force as early as practicable to replenish force and provide services for repatriates.

Proceeded towards entrance route to Sagami Wan in accordance with ComTHIRD Fleet directive.

27 August

Proceeding to Sagami Wan along track specified by ComTHIRDFleet.

Japanese emissaries boarded MISSOURI and were met by Rear Admiral R.B. Carney, U.S.N., (Chief of Staff, Third Fleet) and Rear Admiral O.C. Badger, U.S.N., (CTF-31). Demands were presented to Japanese and information obtained as to mine

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27 August (cont'd)

fields and channels. Japanese pilots and interpreters were loaded on a destroyer and delivered to task unit guides of TF-31. Minesweeping units were detached and proceeded on minesweeping tasks. Japanese channel into Tokyo Bay was immediately check-swept with negative results. Japs had failed to meet minesweeping demands made by SCAF, giving as their excuse the lack of minesweepers in the locality.

Plans for entry to Tokyo Bay on the 28th were solidified, with arrangements made for fire and air support, CAP, minesweeping, press coverage and berth assignments. Seaplane tenders for accommodation of flights from rear area added to ships making initial entry.

Logistic requirements for units engaged in occupation forces made firm with Service Division, by arranging for Tender to berth at naval base on Love plus one day.

Disseminated to Third Fleet co-ordinates of safe channel to Tokyo Bay as derived from Japanese charts, pilots, and own check-sweep operations.

TF-31, less minesweepers engaged in sweeping operations, anchored in Sagami Wan at 1600(I).

Rear Admiral Badger (CTF-31) returned aboard SAN DIEGO and assumed tactical command of TF-31.

28 August

Units of TF-31 anchored in Sagami Wan.

At 0900(I) the first U.S. Task Force to enter Tokyo Bay, under command of Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger (CTF-31), got underway and proceeded through swept channel. Force consisted of SAN DIEGO, CUMBERLAND SOUND, SUISUN, and GOSSELIN screened by WEDDERBURN, STOCKHAM, TWINING and preceded by minesweepers ELLYSON and HAMBLETON. Force anchored off Yokosuka Naval Base, Tokyo Bay at 1300(I).

Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, Commandant First Naval District and Commandant YOKOSUKA Naval Base, and staff reported aboard SAN DIEGO with records, charts and answers to demands made on 27 August. Japanese were interviewed by members of Staff of CTF-31. A list of further demands and instructions were read and delivered to Vice Admiral TOTSUKA. (See Enclosure L).

Security requirements, including small boat patrols were set up.

Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages. Results negative. Mine warning number one, Tokyo Bay, issued defining existing limits of Japanese mine fields as correlated from Jap charts and interviews.

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28 August (cont'd)

All other units of TF-31 less minesweeping units remained anchored in Sagami Wan.

SOPA regulations for Tokyo Bay anchorages published.

Set up harbor entrance control ship with pilots, interpreters and charts.

29 August

Anchored as preceeding day.

MISSOURI (Third Fleet Flag), IOWA, SOUTH DAKOTA, ANCON, (press ship), SAN JUAN (CTG 30.6 - Allied POW Rescue Group) BENEVOLENCE, with screening destroyers entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

CinCPacPOA broke his Flag in SOUTH DAKOTA.

Japanese staff members reported aboard SAN DIEGO and arrangements for surrender ceremonies at YOKOSUKA Naval Base and aboard MISSOURI made firm. Interviews with staff of CTF-31 continued regarding demilitarization, Naval Base facilities, location of Jap ships, dockage, dry docks, menaces to navigation etc.

Requested tugs and salvage unit be sailed from rear area to clear docks of sunken Jap ships disclosed by interviewing Japanese Naval officers.

HOW Hour (landing time) set at 1000(I), 30 August.

Minesweeping units sweeping anchorages and landing beaches; results negative.

Set up a board to survey industrial facilities of YOKOSUKA Naval Base.

Changed operation plan to provide for landings, preceded by minesweeping and UDT teams at forts commanding entrance channel at HOW Hour minus 3 hours to ensure security of channel. Added new task to have prize crew seize NAGATO, HOW Hour minus two hours to ensure security of landing beaches.

Cooperated with POW Rescue Group in initiating evacuation and processing of released Allied prisoners.

30 August

Love Day. Proceeded with landing in accordance with Operation Plan. How Hour advanced to 0930(I). Harbour forts seized at 0730(I). NAGATO seized

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30 August (cont'd)

at 0830(I). Landing proceeded without incident.

Broadcasting and press aboard SAN DIEGO gave a play-by-play description over world-wide hookup. Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger, U.S.N. (CTF-31) broadcast short concept of operation.

1030(I); SAN DIEGO with Rear Admiral Badger and Rear Admiral Carney, Chief of Staff, ComTHIRDFleet docked at berth in YOKOSUKA Naval Base; the first U.S. Naval ship to moor to a dock in Japanese Homeland.

1045(I): Japanese Vice Admiral TOTSUKA, guarded by Brigadier General W. T. Clement, U.S.M.C. (CTG 31.4 - Landing Force) surrendered the YOKOSUKA Naval Base to Rear Admiral Carney who accepted and receipted for same as delegate for Admiral Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet). Admiral Badger's flag was raised over Naval Headquarters building, thereby establishing the first U.S. Headquarters on the Japanese Homeland. Headquarters and staff moved ashore and commenced operating from former Japanese Naval Headquarters.

Other units of Third Fleet entered Tokyo Bay and anchored.

Released REEVES and GOSSELIN to CTG 30.6 (POW Rescue Group) to assist in repatriation work.

Fleet Admiral C.W. Nimitz (CinCPOA) and Admiral W.F. Halsey (ComTHIRDFleet) came ashore and inspected Naval Base.

31 August

Operating from headquarters ashore. ComTHIRDFleet's Operation Plan No. 11-45 put into effect 0000(Z), 31 August.

Despatched UDT teams and minesweepers to clear and mark approaches at TATEYAMA WAN for 3rd Phib landing 3 September.

Continued demilitarization, surveys, research, intelligence, activating airfield and securing of occupational zone in accordance with Operation Plan.

Third Fleet units continued entering and anchoring Tokyo Bay as directed by ComTHIRDFleet.

Lt.Gen. Eichelberger, U.S.A. (ComGen8thArmy) inspected Naval Base and firmed up plans for cooperation for future landings.

Japanese commenced operations, in compliance with orders, to clear out anti-submarine nets and mine-fields in entrance channel to Tokyo Bay to be completed by 1600(I), 8 September.

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31 August (cont'd)

U.S. Minesweeping units continued clearing anchorages in Tokyo Bay, YOKOHAMA and Tokyo Harbour. All results negative except 3 U.S. laid influence mines exploded off Tokyo entrance channel.

Re-embarked members of landing force received from ships departing area for U.S. Personnel from ships not in bay re-embarked in APA for transfer at sea.

Released APD's and amphibious units not needed to POW rescue group for repatriation duty. Units proceeded to YOKOHAMA loaded with medical supplies, clothing and provisions.

1 September

Continuing operations from headquarters ashore in accordance with Operation Plan.

Japanese APD with Japanese troops from Marcus Island arrived Tokyo Bay. Directed to Yokohama where troops were turned over to U.S. Army. Japanese APD returned and moored with prize crew at Yokosuka Naval Base.

Completed plans for mass air display and preparations for formal surrender ceremonies on 2 September.

SAN DIEGO shifted to outside anchorage. PIEDMONT moored alongside dock and assumed service functions for forces ashore in accordance with plan.

2 September

Continuing operations from shore headquarters.

0900: Formal surrender ceremonies took place in MISSOURI (flying CinCPac-POA flag).

Released UDT teams to TF-35 for clearing of SAGAMI WAN beaches.

Completed sweeping Jap mine field by U.S.N. units. Total of 74 mines swept.

Furnished escorts, tugs and minesweeping vessel to TF-32 for landing at YOKOHAMA.

3 September - 7 September

Continued operations from headquarters ashore.

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3 September - 7 September (cont'd)

Re-embarked Third Fleet Marine, Naval and British Landing Force. Loaded APA with personnel for ships not present, for transfer at sea.

Replaced shore units from ships attached to TF-31 with personnel from CruDiv 10, and permanent shore-based personnel.

Prepared KISARAZU Airfield for activation by NATS.

ComTHIRDFleet shifted flag to SOUTH DAKOTA on 5 September.

Recommended that intelligence and technical experts be sent forward immediately to examine vast amounts of Japanese Naval equipment and material located in yard. Also recommended establishment of GCM at YOKOSUKA.

Continued furnishing ships, clothing and provisions to POW evacuation group.

8 September

0900(I) Task Force 31 dissolved. Relieved by Commander Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA (Commodore O.O. Kessing, U.S.N.) and ComSerDiv 102 (Commodore J.T. Acuff, U.S.N.) as SOPA Administrative.

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PART IV - Ordnance

PART V - Damage

PART VI(A) - Surface Gunnery Operations

Above parts not applicable to this report

ENCLOSURE (A)

PART VI

B. AIR OPERATIONS

1. General

With the gradual cessation of hostilities on the part of the Japanese, the primary objectives of carrier striking forces were no longer attacked. The carrier air forces thus released were made available for two primary objectives: to cover continuously every operational airfield in Japan, and, in direct support to TF 31 of cover the entrance to and occupation of the Tokyo Bay-Yokosuka area.

(a) COMBAT AIR PATROL

Combat air patrol of eight or more fighter aircraft was continuously maintained over TF 31 in Sagami Wan and in Tokyo Bay from 28 August to 5 September. No enemy airborne aircraft were encountered.

(b) DIRECT TROOP SUPPORT

Direct troop air support was furnished units landing on Futtsu Saki, at Yokosuka, Yokohama, and in the Tateyama Wan area. In addition, special air observer flights reporting directly to the Commanding General of the troops landing (CTG 31.3) were airborne continuously during landings on L and L plus 1 day.

In addition, aircraft strike groups on short notice were standing by in the carriers to furnish support as required.

(c) PRISONER-OF-WAR EVACUATION

In general support of the objective of clearing Allied Prisoners-of-war in the shortest possible time, carrier aircraft searched out and spotted POW camps and led sea-borne rescue parties.

(d) ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL AIR FACILITIES ASHORE

In support of the general plan for air services and air evacuation, naval air facilities ashore were established at Yokosuka Naval Air Base by CTG 31.6.

2. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TF 31

18 August CTG 31.6 reported Streamlined Air Base Assembly and Carrier Aircraft Service Unit (TG 31.6) ready for landing.

26 August (L-4) TF-31 in company with TF 38. No air activity other than routine patrols and reconnaissance flights by TF 38.

27 August (L-3 day) Routine day and night combat air patrol from TF 38 was maintained under control of TF 35 over fleet in Sagami Wan.

28 August (L-2 day) DesDiv 106 (plus SOUTHERLAND), SAN DIEGO, GARRARD, CUMBERLAND SOUND and SUISUN entered Tokyo Harbor. Augmented combat patrol and air support groups maintained, under control of SOUTHERLAND.

30 August (Love Day) Air observer services furnished by CTG 31.3 and CTG 31.6 while forces landed and took possession of Yokosuka Area. CTG 31.6 Airborne landed on Yokosuka Airfield and set up Streamlined Air Base.

31 August (L / 1 day) eight plane combat air patrol maintained. Support from combat air patrol furnished to reconnaissance units at Tateyama Wan.

1 September (L / 2 day) continued 8 plane combat air patrol.
2 September Conducted mass demonstration flight over MISSOURI after signing of Japanese capitulation. Conducted routine combat air patrol.
5 September KISARAZU Field ordered activated by CTG 31.6 to handle large transports which YOKOSUKA could not handle due to short runways and high terrain surrounding field.
8 September CTG 31.6 relieved of duty by Colonel J. C. MUNN, USMC who assumed duties of Senior Naval Aviator ashore at YOKOSUKA.

3. COMMENTS.

1. Continuous air cover is a most effective deterrent to treacherous action during the occupation phase after a surrender.

2. By putting a CVL (COWPENS) out of commission as far as flight operations were concerned it was possible to draw the necessary personnel and gear to form an emergency workable Carrier Aircraft Service Unit and a Streamlined Air Base Assembly. These units proved themselves capable of conducting limited flight operations immediately, using unfamiliar facilities.

The lack of proper stowage for fuel (100 octane) was probably the biggest handicap. The runways were realized to be short prior to the taking of the field but this in addition to the high terrain surrounding the field, which was not known, proved to be a disappointment for the conducting of large transport operations. Consequently the field at Kisarazu was activated to accommodate this traffic.

C.

T.G. 31.3 was originally conceived as an assault group composed of Marine and Naval Units from the Third Fleet. Later orders made the 4th Marine Regiment (reinforced) available and with this unit as a foundation a landing and occupation force was activated to be commanded by Brigadier General William T. CLEMENT, U.S.M.C. This force was composed of the 4th Marine RCT with 5400 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.1, the Third Fleet Marine Landing Force of 1635 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.2 and the Third Fleet Naval Landing Force of 863 officers and men, designated as TU 31.3.3. The British Pacific Fleet supplied a landing force of 450 officers and men, consisting of 250 Royal Navy and 200 Royal Marine Commandos, designated as TU 31.3.4. Also organized but not embarked for landing was an additional assault Bn. of 400 men from TG 38.3 and five guard battalions of 400 men each from TF 38. These last units were activated and equipped for duty ashore and remained in a state of readiness on board their own ships.

In addition to the Assault Bns. from the Third Fleet, nucleus crews consisting of 33 men each were organized in ships of the fleet for the purpose of taking over enemy ships that remained operational. The plan for nucleus crews originally included skeleton prize crews from cruisers and destroyers with a view to taking over ships of their own type. This plan was set aside when intelligence reports indicated that there would be a greater necessity for small craft crews. These crews were fully equipped as landing force personnel and included necessary ratings for the operation of small craft.

Also included in plans for the occupation were three Base Maintenance Companies, one to be drawn from each task group of Task Force 38. These companies were alerted and equipped with the purpose in mind of landing a versatile group equipped to meet many contingencies while still employing a minimum of man power. Each company was composed of eleven groups.

designated and equipped for the following tasks: Boat repair, Ordnance and Explosive Disposal, Boat Pool, Motor Pool, Artificer Group for machine carpenter, Electric and Metal shops and outside repair for communications, Power Plant operations, Evaporator Refrigerator and Air Compressor operation, Riggers, Locomotive operation and Diving. The boat repair and boat pool were combined to form a beach party, and since there was a separately organized boat pool their services were utilized by the Captain of the Yard. A bomb disposal was also embarked with the landing forces as well as divers unit and shortly after the landing they were being employed by shore activities for material maintenance and installation. The whole effort being to economize in the number of personnel sent ashore to lessen the burden of transport, messing and berthing. This is further exemplified by the planned changeover of the transport group commander and his staff to the SOPA Administrative Ashore in the Harbor Master's Office after the landing was secure.

The Fleet Landing Forces carried with them sufficient "K" ration for 9 meals plus five units of fire and were equipped with heavy marching order and all available landing force equipment.

(b) The Fourth Marine RCT originally designated as Task Force Able by Hq Third Fleet, embarked at Guam on 15 August 1945, and rendezvoused with the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. The remaining units of TG 31.3 were embarked at sea from ships of the THIRD Fleet on 20 August 1945. All troops landed on 30 August, commencing at 0558 when the Second Bn., Fourth Marines landed at Futtsu Saki and continued through the day with the main landings taking place at YOKOSUKA commencing at 0929.

Shore Parties and Beachmasters were provided for from TG 38.3 but due to the small amount of cargo carried by the Fleet Landing Forces, they were not required to function as such and the Shore Party was more than adequately handled by the 4th Regiment S-4. By 1600 (I) of 2 September, all unloading for the entire task group was completed.

Fire support was planned for the entire operation utilizing the OBB's of Task Force 35 to cover the entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay. In Tokyo Bay the SAN DIEGO and the destroyer screen were prepared to render counter battery fire and supporting bombardment as necessary. LCI(R) and LCS(L)(3) were requested and made available for close in fire support but were not able to arrive in time to cover the landings.

One of the two UDT's assigned to the task force cleared the beaches for the landing of 2nd Bn. Fourth Marines on Futtsu Saki Island Fort No. 2. The forts located there were demilitarized by the 2nd battalion. The second UDT accompanied the British Landing Force clearing the beaches at Saru Shima and Azuma Island, as required. They later did a tremendous amount of work clearing the dock areas in the Yokosuka Yard.

Due to the nature of this occupation and the excellence of the control and leadership of the engaged forces, there were no incidents of violence or casualties, although at the time of its inception it was not known that the landing would be a peaceful one and preparations were made for tending and evacuating casualties.

C.3.

In planning entry into TOKYO BAY, exact information on the location of enemy minefields was necessary as was the location of B-29-laid U.S. mines. The latter information was readily available and the location, type, and number of mines in each stick was obtained from CinCPac (Adv).

Certain areas in the approaches to TOKYO BAY had been declared restricted to shipping by the Japanese and it was reasonable to assume that mine had been laid in these areas. It was also possible that mines had been laid in other than these areas.

At the preliminary meeting with the Japanese emissaries at Manila, certain demands were made which included all information of location of enemy minefields. Also included were demands that the Japanese clear all minefields in their territorial waters. Preliminary reports received in Alpac 150 as a result of the early meeting with the Jap emissaries in Manila gave information on the location of the fields in the entrance to TOKYO BAY but this information proved incorrect by the minecharts supplied by the Jap emissaries off Sagami Wan.

Lacking definite information, plans were made to sweep and mark an entrance channel into the bay and upon completion of this task to clear the entire area of Uraga Suido. It was realized that these plans were subject to change for later information might disclose that the planned channel could not be opened due to obstructions, anti-submarine nets, shallow-planted chain-moored mines off shore-controlled minefields.

Sweeping operations were to commence on LOVE MINUS ONE day following the meeting with the Japanese emissaries which was to be held the previous day. Eventually, the above dates were advanced one day.

At the meeting, the Japanese supplied charts showing the exact location of their swept channels and the location of all minefields. Anti-submarine nets were still in place and were across the proposed entrance channel therefore necessitating a change in the sweeping plan. The shore-controlled minefields had been blown up according to their statements and this was later proved correct. All moored minefields were still in place. The Japanese had not carried out any of the sweeping which they had been ordered to accomplish prior to our arrival.

In lieu of sweeping, the proposed channel, it was decided to use the Japanese west swept channel for entrance of the forces into TOKYO BAY and accordingly, this channel was check swept to a depth of sixty feet with negative results before declaring the channel safe for entrance.

Sweeping efforts were concentrated on clearing all anchorage areas in TOKYO BAY prior to assigning ships to these berths.

Information received from the Japanese indicated that they had swept some of the B-29-laid magnetic and acoustic mines off YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA, but they had no knowledge of mines being laid in the TOKYO area. Concentrated sweeping in the YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA had negative results but three magnetic mines were swept off the entrance to TOKYO harbor.

The Japanese were ordered to clear the anti-submarine nets and the minefields in URAGA SUIDO. Operations were started on 31 August and completed on 8 September.

Investigation as to why the Japanese had not attempted to clear the minefields prior to the arrival of our forces disclosed that very few sweeper

were available to accomplish the task and in addition their sweeping methods are very crude. Our own sweeping forces could have accomplished the same amount of work in one-third the time.

Conclusions are that the best method of obtaining information on exact location of minefields in any particular area is to contact the local naval officials and make the necessary demands. The Japanese had destroyed, by burning, most of their official records. All information received from the local Japanese proved very accurate.

D. 2.

Task Force 31 communication channels afloat were used in the normal manner and were satisfactory. The change of flag-ships first from the U.S.S. IOWA (Captain Wellborn) to the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (Captain Mullan), and then to the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (Captain Robbins) was accomplished by establishing an overlap of about four hours on all Fox schedules and other circuits.

All communications remained on the flagship alongside the dock for the first day except for a temporary signal station established at the weather station at the entrance to YOKOSUKA KO which was used to relay visual traffic to ships in the anchorage.

Portable voice radio equipment furnished by ships of the Fleet to landing force parties for communication between their units and commands was found to be useless due to dead batteries. The 4th Marine RCT was able to replace most of this equipment with a similar type and satisfactory communications were maintained.

U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DD-732) (Comdr. R.C. WILLIAMS) was designated as Task Force 31 CIC Ship, and performed as Task Force CIC throughout the period of occupation. In this capacity she controlled the Combat Air Patrol, Tokyo Area, directed support aircraft, air observers, transient aircraft and mass demonstration aircraft. The Naval gun fire control circuit with all support groups was set up and ready. For a protracted period she had full radar and air control responsibility for the entire Tokyo Area and for Task Force 31. Evaluated information was passed by radio voice direct to CTF 31 in the Flagship. It is considered that her mission was accomplished in an outstandingly efficient manner, and one that reflected great credit on the ship and on her CIC organization.

On Love plus one day a visual station using two 12-inch signal lights was established on a hill in back of the Task Force Commander's Headquarters building. All ships in the anchorage were in visual range of this station. Later a Japanese 24-inch signal searchlight was moved to this signal station and put in operation. The signal station was connected by field telephone direct to the TF communication center. Portable radio equipment was set up at the communication center in the Naval Headquarters building and all voice circuits were used from there.

Coding work was done on the flagship (SAN DIEGO, later PIEDMONT) and traffic was delivered to the TF communication center by officer messenger. A private field telephone line was established between the CWO on the flag-

ship and the CWO at the TF communication center.

The 4th Marine RCT signal section established telephone service between CTF 31 Headquarters and all units and commands ashore. The use of this telephone circuit immediately cut down the amount of voice radio traffic necessary.

Japanese radio transmitters and receivers located underground in back of the TF Headquarters were checked and set up on various naval frequencies and keying lines run to the communication center. It was decided not to use these circuits because the coding room and equipment were not moved ashore from the flagship.

Communications in all phases were satisfactory in spite of the many obstacles encountered in an amphibious operation. None of the communication personnel used in this operation except the 4th Marine RCT have had any previous experience in amphibious communications.

D. 6.

The tentative Logistic planning for the occupation of the Naval Shore Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, began on 10 August 1945. After thorough consideration of the many elements involved both ashore and afloat, it was decided to support all forces ashore from units afloat utilizing the existing organization of the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD17) (Captain F.L. ROBBINS, USN). This plan proved highly successful. Warning orders were transmitted to Commander Task Group 30.8 (ComServRon 6) (Rear Admiral D.B. BEARY, USN) advising the anticipated support required and to the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD 17) in order that this ship could plan and be prepared to assume the duties of RepServPac in accordance with the Logistic Plan.

The provision for an adequate supply of water, food, and berthing facilities for the landing force, plus gasoline and lubricants for aircraft, rolling stock, and small boats, presented a major problem. In addition to these difficulties, provision had to be made to insure the delivery of all supplies in the face of enemy resistance. These items were essential for the support of the occupation, but a problem of equal or greater importance concerned the availability of an ample supply of special foods, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, medical supplies, and sundry items for all Allied Prisoners-of-War expected to be liberated in the Yokosuka Area.

Although the responsibility for handling these Repatriates was later assigned to Commander Task Group 30.6 (Commodore R.W. Simpson, USN), the planning and foresight in providing these supplies enabled Commander Task Force 31 to render substantial and immediate aid to the evacuation group in the form of food, clothing for men, women, and children, toilet articles, tobacco, cigarettes, candy, and many other urgently needed items on short notice. These items were made available to 5000 persons under naval jurisdiction plus an additional 5000 Repatriates being serviced from the American Red Cross Canteens in the Yokohama area.

Upon the formation of CTF 31, all units were topped off with fuel and provisions at sea. The maximum possible levels were maintained prior to

entry into Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay in order to avoid the necessity of fueling or replenishing at anchor during the initial stages of the occupation.

The Logistic Plan was followed in detail from the initial stages of this operation. RepServPac in the U.S.S. PIEDMONT (AD17) utilized the existing supply organization of the U.S.S. PIEDMONT, augmented by a Fuel Officer assigned to the U.S.S. NECHES (AO47) (Comdr. H.G. HANSEN, Jr., USNR). This organization provided adequate and prompt support to the landing force in the form of food, water, clothing, and equipment necessary to establish messes ashore. Ten thousand POW outfits were assembled by the U.S.S. LESUTH (AK125) (Comdr. B.H. BASSET, USNR) and the U.S.S. CYBELLE (AKS10) (Lt. Comdr. J.H. CHURCH, Jr. USNR), and were made available to CTG 30.6 and the American Red Cross.

During the first two days of occupation, the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO (CL(AA) 53) (Capt. W.E.A. MULLAN, USN) provided all emergency issues of food, clothing, water, and particularly cleaning materials which were urgently needed in policing and rendering office and living spaces habitable. A two-inch fresh water hose was run from the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO to the dock, providing an adequate supply of fresh water for replenishment of the landing forces.

All landing forces came ashore in an amphibious landing status. In order to provide hot food, the necessary galley and mess gear was issued on the second day. Through improvisation and ingenuity, this equipment was put to good use and hot meals were served in local messes on L-PLUS THREE day. Japanese messing facilities and equipment were either non-existent or exceedingly inferior to standard U.S. Navy equipment. The Japanese equipment encountered consisted of usually a charcoal range and a few rice kettles which were left in a depleted and unsanitary condition. The galley and mess spaces were filthy and no possible use. Extensive alteration and renovation would have been required plus the installation of new stoves, ovens, mixers, sinks, etc., before they would meet the minimum sanitary standards. In view of these conditions, and the pressing need for hot food, stoves were improvised in the open near the barracks. Bread was provided by the U.S.S. SAN DIEGO, U.S.S. OAKLAND, and U.S.S. PIEDMONT. The U.S.S. PIEDMONT provided one meal per day during the initial stages of occupation for 750 men and officers attached to the naval landing force.

Water ashore was rendered potable by chlorinization, and it was not necessary to utilize the 4 million gallons of fresh water in the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS (AOW96) (Commander C.C. EDEN, USNR). However, the U.S.S. TAMALPAIS rendered valuable assistance to the support forces. Tokyo Bay is contaminated, thus preventing the distillation of drinking water in low pressure evaporators in ships at anchor.

Post Offices and a movie exchange were established in LST 648 (Lt. Comdr. C.L. RABELL, USNR) and LST 576 (Lt. S.W. HEARNE, USNR).

In general, it may be said that the execution of all details of this operation was facilitated by the advance planning and foresight given to the preparation. Sufficient quantities of all items were available when required and issued on schedule.

E. 1.

(1) GENERAL PLAN - Conforming to the basic premise that Task Force THIRTY-ONE was to occupy the YOKOSUKA Area for a very short time, using the minimum amount of personnel and gear necessary for the purpose from the component units of Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT, the basic intelligence plan was to have the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE locate as much information and material as possible within the limited time of operations, leaving analysis and study for the Intelligence Organization and Technical teams of the permanent occupation forces.

(2) INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PLANNING AND ORGANIZING PERIOD.

Owing to the fact that there was no adequate photographic and map coverage of the area of occupation, it has been necessary to procure new photography and reproduce existing photographs, and to have photographic interpretation reports based on such photography. These services were in the main furnished by Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT and the carriers in an unbelievably short time and were of the greatest help. In addition, the Commander Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT offered and made available the services of one of his staff photo interpreters who was of great assistance in processing late photographs as they were delivered. The sudden capitulation of the Japanese found us without grid maps and photo mosaics in quantity for the use of the landing forces, in going ashore for gunfire and aerial support. The Advance Intelligence Center, Guam, particularly the 64th Engineering Topographical Battalion and InterpRon TWO did a magnificent job in getting this material out in a period of 36 hours. Several conferences were held aboard ship while at sea between the Staff Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer for the landing forces. These proved to be of great value. It is regretted that a conference of all intelligence officers engaged in the operation could not have also been held, but it was prohibited by the heavy load on communications and ship to ship transportation incident to the unparalleled feat of organizing and assembling a large Amphibious Force and Naval Base from units of the Fleet while engaged in operations at sea. When Task Force THIRTY-ONE was organized, 3 intelligence officers, 1 Photo Interpretation Officer, 1 Language Officer, and 3 Yeomen were collected from 5 different ships and brought to the Flagship. In addition, 20 Language Officers from the Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor were distributed among the component units of Task Force THIRTY-ONE while at sea.

(3) INTELLIGENCE DURING THE PERIOD OF OCCUPATION

As soon as the landing began, two of the Staff Intelligence Officers went ashore and made a brief inspection of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, the Battleship NAGATO and the Japanese shipping craft present in the harbor. The day after the landings the Staff Intelligence Office was moved ashore. Intelligence activities of the Landing Force, Naval Air Activities, SOPA Administrative, Submarine Demilitarization Group, and Naval Shore Activities commenced immediately the huge task of locating all intelligence information and materials. Outstanding was the performance of the only Technical Intelligence Team in the area, a Technical Air Intelligence Unit, which uncovered much valuable information and equipment, especially of and concerning rocket and jet-propelled aircraft. In the same category was the work done by representatives of ComMinPac in securing information on Japanese mines and minefields. Splendid performances were also turned in by G-2 Section of TG 31.3 in locating Japanese forces, guns, and defensive installations, and in Liaison activities with the Japanese, by

TG 31.8 on Japanese shipping, by TG 31.9 on Japanese submarines and by TG 31.7 on explosives and ordnance. One of the outstanding features of the operation from an intelligence standpoint was the complete absence of classified documents. The Japanese say these were destroyed prior to the occupation, but it has been noted that when pressed for information the Japanese produce it, stating they get it from the TOKYO Headquarters. It appears that most of their personnel acquainted with the facts can be produced for interrogation, which has thus far been quite productive of the desired information.

(5) RECOMMENDATIONS.

Owing to the necessity of getting ashore quickly it was not considered practicable to bring forward Technical Intelligence teams to go ashore with the landing forces, but it is recommended that all types of teams be sent immediately to analyze, examine, and report on the vast amount of all kinds of Naval material located by the forces under Task Force THIRTY-ONE.

E. 2.

Completed information has been submitted in a special report, "Yokosuka Naval Base Confidential Survey Report," AL7/CTF 31 Serial 01 dated 3 September 1945; a brief summary follows:

Industrial facilities, Yokosuka Navy Yard. This Navy Yard is a large shipbuilding and repair yard capable of the construction and maintenance of any class of naval vessel. At its maximum capacity, about 75,000 persons were employed in the yard, although this figure had been reduced to 40,000 during the past year. This reduction was occasioned by the cessation of all ship-building except midget submarines and a lack of ships to overhaul.

As to the physical plant, the following comments are made:

- (a) There are fine shipways, one of which is large enough for a BB. All are operational except #4, of which the underwater ways are collapsed. For the past several months, the ways have been used exclusively for the fabrication and assembly of midget submarines.
- (b) There are six dry docks, all of which are operational except #6. The main pump motors of this dock have suffered water damage, but can be repaired. All dry docks except #6 are empty and ready for use if desired. Dry dock #6 has been used as a building dock, and contains two partially completed DD's plus a large amount of miscellaneous materials.
- (c) Bomb damage to yard is slight; capacity of yard is not affected.
- (d) Maintenance of shop buildings and equipment is very poor. Also the outside areas of the yard are badly cluttered up with scrap, lumber, small sheds, miscellaneous equipment from heavy ships, and piles of rubble removed in digging caves.
- (e) Waterfront and dockside cranes are adequate and in good condition.
- (f) About half the light shop equipment necessary for production of midget submarines has been moved into underground shops.

SHIPPING

All the time of the occupation, the following Japanese naval vessels were present:

- 1 - BB - NAGATO
- 1 - CA - FUJI
- 6 - DD - Second line vessels.
- 9 - SS -
- 6 - Numbered transports.
- 180 - SS (midget)
- 2 - Minelayers
- 1 - Collier - SOYA
- Miscellaneous auxiliaries and small craft.

The NAGATO had suffered underwater and topside damage during the bombing attack of 18 July 1945, but only tentative steps had been taken for repairing her. The ship has not been docked, therefore, the extent of the underwater damage is not known. Three bomb hits topside demolished the navigating bridge and resulted in extensive damage to the superstructure and top hamper in the area of the mainmast and stack. The top of the mainmast and upper part of the stack had been removed preliminary to repairs.

The DD's and miscellaneous vessels at the base were, for the most part, operational, but appeared to have been immobilized for some time. These ships had been demilitarized prior to the occupation.

All submarines had been demilitarized prior to the occupation and were taken over by CTG 31.9 without incident. The midget submarines were new, and were evidently being readied for use against any invasion fleet.

E. 3. SPECIAL COMMENT.

While the occasion, fortunately, never arose for the use of force, it is noteworthy to mention that all preliminary planning was based on the well known characteristic for treachery exhibited by the Japanese in past operations, and that strong opposition by organized military factions was likely.

Each operation was carefully covered by main battery, secondary battery and where applicable by small ship armament including rockets and automatic weapons. Air support, air reconnaissance, air photography and spotting were carefully planned for and co-ordinated. Heavy ship fire support from other Task Forces was also made available and alerted for the first sign of opposition.

Comment is also made here on the meticulous economy in the use of personnel. Forced by operating conditions to draw officers and men from ships at sea still engaged in alerted combat status, officers and men were assigned dual positions. They were initially assigned to tasks while afloat and in the approach and landing phases, and assumed other assignments as soon as the landing was established.

TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT
August 19, - September 8, 1945

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PART VII - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel engaged in this operation was of highest order and in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service.

There were no casualties. No incidents of violence occurred which reflects the high standard of discipline and leadership during this occupation of enemy territory where various armed factions were present.

TASK FORCE THIRTY-ONE ACTION REPORT
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PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

When it is considered that this operation was without precedent, unique in its conception; and that all planning and preliminary organization was done at sea, necessitating the transfer of personnel and material by breeches buoys and whips; the high order of the personnel performance is a credit to the ingenuity, tenacity and ability of officers and men of the U.S. Navy to overcome difficulties and handicaps imposed by the prevailing conditions.

There are no further recommendations.