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5 November 1945

From: Commander Third Amphibious Force (Commander Task Force THIRTY-TWO).

To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via : (1) Commander Fifth Fleet.
(2) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report on the Occupation of Northern JAPAN.

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I. PRELIMINARY

1. On 15 August 1945 the Imperial Japanese Government formally declared its acceptance of the United Nations' surrender terms as contained in the Potsdam Declaration. These terms called for the complete surrender of all Japanese military forces and equipment and for the occupation by the Allied powers of certain areas in the Japanese Empire.

2. In anticipation of a Japanese surrender, plans had been cooperatively prepared by both the Commander-in-Chief of Army Forces in the Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. In general, CinCAPPac's plan provided for the occupation of strategic and economically important points in Japan and Korea and the progressive de-militarization and demobilization of the Japanese forces. CinCPac's plan supplemented this by prescribing the activities of the fleet in conjunction with the Army for effecting the occupation and enforcing the surrender terms.

3. Immediately following the Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam terms, General of the Army Douglas MacARTHUR, Commander-in-Chief of Army Forces in the Pacific, was named Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the purpose of receiving the official Japanese surrender and for the occupation of Japan. Terms were laid down which provided for the withdrawal of Japanese forces from the initial areas of occupation and arrangements were made for the signing of the surrender documents aboard a United States warship in TOKYO Bay. This was to take place on 31 August 1945, which date was subsequently post-

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poned until 2 September due to typhoon conditions which prevented the completion of the preliminaries for a period of about two days.

4. The plans outlined a progressive occupation of certain cities and of areas adjacent thereto in three phases. Dates were set for those areas to be occupied in Phase I; these dates expressed with relation to a B-Day which was designated as August 15th. Zones of responsibility were allotted; to the Eighth Army, to the northward and eastward of a line crossing HONSHU west of YOKOHAMA and TOKYO; to the Sixth Army, the remainder of the Japanese home islands to the southward and westward of that line; and to the XXIV Corps, KOREA. The Phase I areas for the Eighth Army were (1) the TOKYO Bay area and (2) AOMORI-OMINATO area in northern HONSHU.

5. In Phases II and III further objectives were allocated to the Eighth Army, to the Sixth Army, and to the XXIV Corps, in their respective zones. No dates were set but the operations of Phases II and III were to be conducted at the discretion of the Army Commanders. In the main, troops brought in in Phase I were to be used for the succeeding phases, although plans were made for bringing in additional troops as necessary. The Phase II port for the Eighth Army was OTARU, on HAKODATE, and the Phase III ports SENDAI and NIIGATA, on the east and west coasts of HONSHU, respectively.

6. In correlation with the assignment of zones of responsibility to these military commands the Third Fleet was assigned the naval responsibility for the zone of the Eighth Army, the Fifth Fleet for that of the Sixth Army, and the Seventh Fleet for that of the XXIV Corps plus any operations which might be carried out in Chinese waters. Commander North Pacific, to be present in northern HONSHU, would be assigned local responsibility for that area and for HOKKAIDO. Similarly the three Amphibious Forces were coordinated with the respective Fleets and Armies, the Third Amphibious Force under the Commander Third Fleet for operations of the Eighth Army, the Fifth under Commander Fifth Fleet for operations of the Sixth Army, and the Seventh under the Commander Seventh Fleet for operations of the XXIV Corps and of any troops which might require transportation to CHINA.

7. At the moment when the surrender offer was made the Amphibious Forces of the Pacific Fleet were widely spread over the Pacific, from the West Coast to OKINAWA and the PHILIPPINES, engaged in troop movements and transportation of troop equipment, in overhaul, and in troop training. Plans and orders had been issued for concentration later of these forces, but these concentrations had by no means been effected at the time of the surrender, and the provision

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simultaneously at the mounting points of adequate shipping to meet the dates originally established for the occupation of all Phase I areas was impossible.

8. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific therefore, instead of ordering ships to mounting points for all Armies simultaneously, was obliged to adopt a system of priorities, based upon the relative dates of arrival prescribed in the basic plans. Accordingly shipping required for TOKYO was given the first priority, that for the Sixth Army objectives the second and third, that for KOREA the fourth, and that for AOMORI-OMINATO (Eighth Army) the fifth.

9. Further, the successive availability of shipping even in the first priority was such that a substantial delay in the first movement and consequent failure to meet the planned dates of debarkation at TOKYO would result if the entire expedition, the XI Corps, were to load and proceed to the objective as one unit. This was also true later in the case of the AOMORI-OMINATO Force which, at best, could anticipate considerable delay due to its being assigned fifth priority on shipping. The basic plans were therefore modified to provide that the sea-borne units of the TOKYO Occupation Force proceed in echelons, each echelon containing a division plus a portion of corps and headquarters troops, as soon as shipping could be assembled successively for the mounting of each division. The AOMORI-OMINATO Force likewise was to proceed in echelon of divisions. Ships carrying the first echelon of the TOKYO Force were, upon completion of debarkation at the objectives, to return to the mounting areas in order to lift succeeding echelons either to the TOKYO or AOMORI-OMINATO areas.

10. Prior to the arrival of the first echelon at TOKYO, airborne troops consisting of the 11th Airborne and 27th Infantry Divisions and the Marine Landing Force were to have secured the YOKOHAMA-YOKOSUKA areas and the area in the rear of the SAGAMI WAN beaches. Two UDTs assigned to the Third Fleet were to have reconnoitered and cleared those beaches. It was expected that Commander Third Fleet would have swept the approaches to these areas before the arrival of the first echelons. The first landings were to be made over the YOKOHAMA-YOKOSUKA docks, but if bombing damage or other reason rendered this impossible landings were to be conducted over the eastern section of the SAGAMI WAN beaches.

11. It was expected that landings would be unopposed. However, consideration was given to the possibility of opposition both to our troops and to the naval elements. Such opposition, if it occurred, was expected to be in the nature of localized resistance

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on land and of sporadic attacks on our shipping by suicide planes, boats or swimmers. Prior to the arrival of the first echelons steps were to be taken to minimize the possibility of such opposition by evacuating enemy troops from the initial landing sites, grounding planes, removing breech blocks from shore batteries, etc. Nevertheless it was considered advisable to provide for full air and gunfire support for the troops and to protect our shipping with strong air cover. The general situation indicated the advisability of adequately screening the initial convoys from submarine attack and of observing full security procedure enroute to the objective areas.

12. Due to the season of the year, weather was expected to be a more important factor than it would have been had the operation taken place in the winter or spring. Typhoons are most frequent and intense in the vicinity of JAPAN during September and October, and the definite possibility existed of their retarding the movement of the occupation forces to the objectives.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

13. The Third Amphibious Force was designated as Task Force 32. Its principal subdivisions were Task Force 33, the TOKYO Force, under Rear Admiral J. L. HALL, and Task Force 34, the Northern JAPAN Force, under Rear Admiral R. L. CONOLLY.

14. Task Force 33 was given the task of lifting those elements of the Eighth Army destined for the TOKYO area. These elements, comprising in the main the XI Corps, consisted of the First Cavalry Division, which was loaded at BATANGAS, the Americal Division loaded at CEBU, the Forty-third Infantry Division loaded at LUZON ports, and Corps and Headquarters Troops embarked at MANILA. All these units were to be landed at YOKOHAMA. The 112th RCT was loaded at BATANGAS and was to be landed over the beaches at TATEYAMA.

15. Task Force 34 was assigned to transport the IX Corps, consisting of the 81st Infantry Division loaded at LEYTE and landed at AOMORI, and the 77th Infantry Division loaded at CEBU and landed at OTARU and HAKODATE. The 158th RCT was to be loaded at LEGASPI and landed with the IX Corps in Northern JAPAN. (Later its destination was changed to YOKOHAMA, to join the XI Corps).

16. In addition to transporting the above mentioned units and their equipment; Task Forces 33 and 34 were to lift units of the Army Service Command "C" from various ports in the PHILIPPINES to ports in the Eighth Army area of occupation, as well as units of the Far Eastern Air Force which were loaded at OKINAWA and the PHILIPPINES and landed at YOKOHAMA.

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17. Commander Third Amphibious Force as Commander Task Force 32 was to accompany the initial echelon of Task Force 33 to the TOKYO Area, and therefore established a Rear Echelon at MANILA on 24 August 1945. The duties of this rear echelon included the assignment of transports, LSV, LSD and APH types to squadrons, the organization of LST and LSM flotillas, the designation of logistics points for shipping assigned to the force, and maintenance of liaison with the Eighth Army rear echelon in the loading of troops and equipment to be moved by the Third Amphibious Force.

18. Logistics support in the PHILIPPINES was provided by Commander Service Division 101 in the LEYTE-SAMAR area and by Commander Service Squadron 7 for vessels in all other anchorages. For liaison with these logistics agencies, Commander Third Amphibious Force established a representative at LEYTE whose function was to arrange for prompt unloading of any ships assigned to the Third Amphibious Force arriving at LEYTE with passengers or cargo to discharge, to arrange for logistic replenishment of such shipping so as to avoid unnecessary delay, and to screen repair requests, eliminating any not absolutely necessary.

III. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

19. In general the operation proceeded in accordance with the plans described above. Major troop units and essential initial equipment and supplies were brought up from the PHILIPPINES in transport convoys. The bulk of the vehicular and engineering equipment and of stores was carried from the PHILIPPINES and from OKINAWA in LST and LSM convoys at varying intervals after the arrival of the troop convoys. A turn-around trip was necessary only for one transport convoy but the LSTs and LSMs were all employed in one or more turn-around voyages.

20. Typhoons were prevalent throughout the period, threatening many of the convoys. Frequent diversions of course were necessary to avoid them, in some instances by the convoy commanders themselves, but in general on orders from the Force Commander, who maintained close check on the position of all units and on such weather information as could be obtained. In one instance it was necessary to turn back one TOKYO-bound convoy twice, once to avoid a newly-formed typhoon in its westward track, and again to avoid it after it had recurved and was moving along and off the coast of JAPAN.

21. A chronological narrative would, by virtue of the many units at sea at the same time, be somewhat confusing; in consequence the conduct of the operation is described below by types

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of vessels and groups.

TRANSPORT CONVOYS

Five and one-third temporary transport squadrons were assigned CTF 32 for the 8th Army and were allocated as follows:

Transrons 13, 16, 24 and TransDiv 65 plus OSAGE (LSV 3) and TRYON (APH 1) were assigned Task Force 33, and Transrons 15 and 19 were assigned Task Force 34.

Transron 16, commanded by Commodore McGOVERN, was engaged in training at LINGAYEN at the time of the surrender and was, with Transdiv 65, selected to move to the objective as the first echelon. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 112th Cavalry RCT were embarked at BATANGAS and elements of Headquarters of GHQ and of the XI Corps were embarked at MANILA. On 25 August, CTF 32 in the MOUNT OLYMPUS (AGC 8) and CTF 33 in the HANSFORD (APA 106), Transron 16 and Transdiv 65 rendezvoused outside MANILA Bay and headed for TOKYO, planning to land, as agreed with the Eighth Army, on 1 September. On receipt however of information that the initial steps of the occupation were delayed two days because of typhoon conditions, the convoy retired to SUBIC Bay until the morning of 27 August when they departed for TOKYO, to arrive on 3 September consistent with the two-day delay in the schedule. Advices from Admiral HALSEY, Commander Third Fleet, indicated however that an earlier arrival was desired and, by increasing speed and abandoning planned training exercises, the convoy arrived on 2 September, passing up the harbor during the surrender ceremony on the U.S.S. MISSOURI.

The 1st Cavalry Division was unloaded over the docks at YOKOHAMA and the 112th Cavalry RCT over the seaplane ramp at TATEYAMA, in outer TOKYO Bay. Both landings were without opposition and in fact with cooperation by the local Japanese. On completion of unloading about 4 September, Transron 16 was assigned to Fifth Amphibious Force and Transdiv 65 to the Seventh Amphibious Force, and left the area and any further operations with the Third.

The second echelon of the TOKYO Force was comprised of Transron 13, under Commodore CARLSON. This squadron commenced loading the Americal Division at CEBU and Headquarters of the XIV Corps at LEYTE about 25 August and departed for TOKYO on 1 September, arriving on 8 September. On completion of unloading about 11 September, 5 APAs and 1 APH were made available for evacuation of recovered prisoners of war, and the remaining ships of the squadron sailed for LEYTE for a lift under Task Force 34. The evacuation ships reported for loading

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after discharge at MANILA.

Transron 24 comprised the third echelon under Task Force 33. It was commanded by Commodore E. T. SHORT. Loading of the 43rd Division and elements of 8th Army Headquarters at MANILA was commenced on 1 September and the squadron sailed for TOKYO on 7 September, arriving on the 13th. Unloading was completed on the 16th, and Transron 24 was then assigned to Seventh Amphibious Force.

Transron 15, under command of Commodore POPHAM, was assigned to lift the 81st Division plus IX Corps Headquarters and Base Units. Of the squadron, three ships loaded at MANILA, the remainder at LEYTE. Transron 15 departed for AOMORI under CTF 34 (Rear Admiral CONOLLY) on 18 September, arriving on 25 September, and landing without untoward incident. Commander Third Amphibious Force had proceeded from YOKOHAMA in MOUNT OLYMPUS and was present at this landing. The 3 APAs and 3 AKAs which were loaded with IX Corps Headquarters were not unloaded at AOMORI but awaited the arrival of Transron 13 and joined those ships scheduled for OTARU. The remaining 3 AKAs departed 30 September for MANILA for a turnaround lift. Eleven of the remaining APAs were transferred to the 5th Fleet and two to the 7th Fleet.

Some of the ships of Transron 13 which returned prisoners of war to MANILA were unable to arrive at loading points in time to make the second echelon of Task Force 34, so it was necessary to substitute four ships of Transron 19, which was forming up at that time. The newly constituted Transron 13 commenced loading the 77th Division at CEBU and IX Corps elements and base command units at LEYTE, MANILA and BATANGAS on 20 September. The squadron sailed on 26 September, arriving at OTARU on 5 October. Three APAs and one AKA, loaded with the 306 RCT, were diverted into HAKODATE for unloading on 4 October. CTF 34 was present at and directed both these landings. The OTARU detachment completed unloading on 8 September, and those at HAKODATE completed unloading on 6 September. Transron 13 was then assigned to Seventh Amphibious Force, while the AKAs of Transron 15, which unloaded at OTARU, were sailed for LEYTE for another lift.

The OSAGE (LSV 3), loaded with XIV Corps elements from BATANGAS, moved north with Transron 13 as far as TOKYO, to which port she was diverted. After unloading, the OSAGE was made available to ComServPac for the return of personnel to the United States.

Transdiv 51, consisting of 2 APAs and 2 AKAs, was formed from ships of Transron 19 to lift elements of the IX Corps troops from LEYTE. They commenced loading on 26 September and sailed on 29 September, arriving OTARU on 10 October, after being diverted by typhoons. After unloading, the APAs were turned over to CinCPac for

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further assignment and the AKAs were ordered to MANILA for another lift.

The only other commitments for Transron 19 were four APAs and two AKAs to lift the 158 RCT at LEGASPI, and 3 APAs to lift XIV Corps and USASCOM C elements from BATANGAS and MANILA. These ships commenced loading on 26 September, departed on 4 October and arrived TOKYO on 13 October. On completion of unloading, all APAs except one were ordered to CinCPac for assignment. The AKAs plus one APA were returned to MANILA for another lift.

The 8th Army did not require the services of the remaining six APAs and 1 APH and these were ordered to ComServPac for return of personnel to the United States on 28 September.

LST - LSM

This Force was originally allocated 255 LSTs and 165 LSMs for the occupation of Northern JAPAN by the 8th Army. Of the total allocated, only 208 LSTs and 126 LSMs were assigned to the Third Amphibious Force because of the urgent need for landing type ships in other areas. With this total, all 8th Army shipping requirements were met at a satisfactory rate by turning around all LST and LSM echelons in a minimum of time, in the early stages within a matter of two or three days at either end of the run. The greater proportion of LSTs and LSMs made two round trips to the 8th Army area-- a few made three round trips.

About mid-October the shipping requirements were met to the extent that LSTs and LSMs could be released for employment in other areas or sent back to the rear area for their postwar assignment. On 25 October, 34 LSTs and 68 LSMs were released to AdComPhibs-Pac MARIANAS for other assignments. On 5 November, 51 LSTs and 4 LSMs were likewise released. The remainder of this type continue to be employed by PhibGroup 11 and it is estimated that all shipping requirements to be fulfilled by LST and LSM types will be completed by 1 December.

356 LST trips and 205 LSM trips had been made up to 5 November.

A few LSTs and LSMs, not able to maintain the regular schedule due to necessary repairs, were normally laid up for a considerable period of time due to either insufficient drydock facilities or to lack of adequate spare parts. Generally speaking, LSMs proved to be rather inefficient cargo carriers for so long a haul (1850 miles) in the weather normally encountered in the PHILIPPINE Sea area at

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this time of year.

ESCORTS

5 Destroyers, 10 DEs, 10 APDs, 5 PCs, 1 PCE, 1 PCS, 6 SCs were assigned to Third Amphibious Force as escorts. This number was adequate for a peaceful occupation because escorts were assigned primarily as communication ships and mine disposal ships for the convoys. Both of these functions were performed satisfactorily and the practice of escorting all convoys was continued throughout the operation. The SCs proved unsatisfactory as escorts and it is estimated that 50 per cent of them were laid up for repairs during the operation. By 5 November, all the destroyers and all but 7 DEs, 4 APDs and 5 PCs were released from Third Amphibious Force.

MISCELLANEOUS TYPES

In addition to the above, 3 APBs, 2 ARLs, 1 ATF were assigned to the Third Amphibious Force and were employed as follows:

YOLO (APB 43) arrived in TOKYO Bay in mid-September and housed the pontoon causeway platoons of TG 33.6, Port Director and transient personnel.

PRESQUE ISLE (APB 44) was routed on to OMINATO to house SeaBee and Port Director personnel; the SeaBee personnel being transferred to the APA 26 on 6 October. On 9 October, operational control passed to CTF 56.

BLACKFORD (APB 45) was diverted enroute KOMORI to TOKYO Bay, where it was routed to SASEBO and released to 5th Fleet for NavTechJap.

ROMULUS (ARL 22) arrived TOKYO Bay 1 October and anchored off YOKOSUKA and was retained to meet the urgent need of an LST repair ship in the area.

SATYR (ARL 23) arrived KOMORI 4 October with a SeaBee repair crew aboard and was passed to the operational control of CTF 56 on 9 October.

ABNAKI (ATF 96) operated in the Northern HONSHU area, accompanying LST echelons to SENAMI from her station at KOMORI. Operational control passed to CTF 56 on 9 October, and on 2 November she reverted to operational control of CTF 32 and was directed to return to YOKOSUKA and report to ComServDiv 102 for duty.

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-----PORTS

As noted the troops and supplies of the XI Corps were landed over docks in YOKOHAMA, save for the 112th Cavalry RCT landed over the seaplane ramp at TATEYAMA. In North JAPAN the AOMORI troop landing was made by boats, part over a low seawall in the city and part over beaches to the eastward. Transport stores were landed over the seawall; AKAs were taken alongside a dock and there unloaded. In HAKODATE and OTARU docks were utilized satisfactorily.

For the third phase ports, however, difficulties arose. Initially the Eighth Army stated that all troops and supplies would be moved by rail from YOKOHAMA to SENDAI and NIIGATA and no shipping would be needed. Tunnel and bridge limitations however prevented the rail movement of equipment and it was necessary to implement the XIV Corps headquarters and the 11th Airborne Division at SENDAI and the 27th Division at NIIGATA by sea.

The small port of SHIOGAMA, fifteen miles from SENDAI, was found accessible to vessels of 24 feet draft or less and a number of LSTs and LSMs were discharged there as well as several transports and AKAs by boat service from an anchorage outside.

The port of NIIGATA on the west coast of HONSHU however was blocked by mines laid by the U.S. Army Air Force. These included magnetic acoustic and pressure types with sterilization dates extending to February, 1946. Though the Japanese had reported having swept an entrance channel into the port, it was also reported that six of their ships had been sunk entering this port and it was obviously unsafe to use this channel. Accordingly, an Under Water Demolition Team embarked in the WALTER YOUNG (APD 131) with a representative of the Force Commander was despatched to reconnoiter for a suitable landing beach in the vicinity of NIIGATA. One was located at SENAMI about 20 miles northeast of that port and all cargo destined for NIIGATA was satisfactorily unloaded over this beach from LSTs and LSMs.

IV. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE - NAVAL VESSELS

22. Shipping ordered to the Third Amphibious Force was ordered to report for duty when "Ready for Sea". In general, transport types reported ready for extended operations and these ships, throughout, required little maintenance other than by ship's force. Many LSTs and LSMs had been operating for long periods with a minimum of upkeep time. In view of the probability that the landing would be unopposed and that its success would be largely dependent upon

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the speed with which it was accomplished it was decided to relax the standards of readiness normally required for an assault landing. Landing craft types were, therefore, classed as "ready" as soon as hulls were considered seaworthy and engines capable of making the round trip to JAPAN. It was recognized and accepted that this policy would create accelerated maintenance requirements later, but in the meantime the extreme urgency for shipping would have been met. Original plans contemplated that three round trips to JAPAN would be required by all ships allocated to the Third Amphibious Force.

23. The extended duration of this operation and the great amount of steaming required by all ships made it evident that provision must be made for maintenance, especially so since the occupation of JAPAN was to take place during the height of the typhoon season and all Third Amphibious Force shipping as well as all logistic and maintenance facilities would remain within the typhoon area through-

Overall plans called for the establishment by Commander Division 102 of logistic and maintenance facilities in the TOKYO area. However, adequate facilities were also available in the LEYTE-SAMAR and MANILA-SUBIC areas. To assure that the maximum services of CSD 102 would be available for emergency cases, it was decided that Third Amphibious Force shipping would normally obtain logistics and maintenance in the PHILIPPINES. LSTs operating between OKINAWA and JAPAN would obtain similar services through Commander Naval Operating Base, OKINAWA. All transport types and about half the landing craft types returning to the PHILIPPINES were to be routed via LEYTE where a minimum logistic and upkeep period would be provided. The other half of the landing craft types were to be routed via MANILA where they would receive similar services. As the character of the occupation became apparent the facilities of CSD 102 were utilized more and more until toward the close of the operation, it had become routine for CSD 102 to effect all desirable voyage repairs to LSTs, LSMs and escorts in the TOKYO Bay area.

25. Maintenance requirements were adequately met by the Service Forces. Storm damage and increased time at sea due to a higher than average number of typhoons, increased the maintenance requirements. However, this was more than balanced by the peaceful nature of the occupation, which resulted in no battle damage and also in greatly reduced shipping requirements by the Army.

V. CONCLUSION

26. The enclosures herewith illustrate some of the features of this operation. Attention is particularly invited to the aero-

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logical annex, showing the typhoons prevalent during this period and the measures adopted to avoid them. While no combat was involved and no opposition developed either en route or at the objectives, the rapid and safe delivery of large numbers of men and large amounts of stores, 180,417 men and 272,827 tons of stores, to the occupation armies of JAPAN is believed highly creditable to the vessels of this Force and to the personnel manning them.

27. Throughout the operation the Commanding General of the Eighth Army and his subordinate commanders and the officers and men of its various components evidenced a spirit of understanding and cooperation, doubtless the result of long experience in amphibious operations in this war. It has been a pleasure for the Third Amphibious Force to work with and for them.

28. This operation concludes the work of the Third Amphibious Force and with its completion the Force is dissolving. It is believed that from its inception as the Amphibious Force, South Pacific in the GUADALCANAL landing, through the long South Pacific Campaign, and in the PALAU attack and the LEYTE and LINGAYEN assaults, it has substantially contributed to the ultimate success of the war against JAPAN. Its constitution has varied as ships were assigned to it for successive operations or withdrawn for assignment to other amphibious forces, but its identity has continued for over three years. The present Force Commander, who has acted as such for nearly two and a half years, is proud of the Force and of the record he believes it has made, and values highly the opportunity of association with the hundreds of staunch vessels and the many thousands of officers and men who have from time to time comprised the Third Amphibious Force.

T. S. Wilkinson
T. S. WILKINSON.

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THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
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COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE 32

Task Force 32 - Vice Admiral WILKINSON
(Rear Admiral HALL Second in Command)

Force Flagship - MOUNT OLYMPUS - Captain DILLAVOU 1 AGC

32.1 Escort Carrier Group - Captain TAYLOR

SALAMAU 1 CVE

CortDiv 70 less GILLIGAN - Commander CULLINAN

WILLIAM SEIVERLING, ULVERT M. MOORE,
KENDALL C. CAMPBELL, GOSS, GRADY 5 DE

32.2 Third Underwater Demolition Group - Captain McCLAUGHRY

GANTNER (F)	-	UDT 24
JOSEPH M. AUMAN	-	UDT 7
W. J. PATTISON	-	UDT 18
COOK	-	UDT 20
BEGOR	-	UDT 21
WALTER X. YOUNG	-	UDT 22
KNUDSON	-	UDT 25
WALTER B. COBB	-	UDT 27

8 APD
8 UDT

32.3 Screening Group - Captain ADAMS

DesDiv 13 - Captain ADAMS (CDS 7)

BENSON (F), MAYO, MADISON,
HILARY P. JONES, CHARLES F. HUGHES 5 DD

APD Escorts - Captain GORDINIER

BURKE (F), BROCK, J. E. CALPBELL,
HOPPING, ODUM, ENRIGHT, LEE FOX,
J. Q. ROBERTS, J. C. ROBINSON 9 APD

CortDiv 35 - Captain LITCHFIELD

EARL K. OLSEN, BURROWS, GANDY,
SLATER, EBERT, CATES 6 DE

PCE 877	1 PCE
PCS 1452	1 PCS
PC 466, 549, 1177, 1180, 1230	5 PC
SC 1316, 1323, 1341, 1350, 1360	5 SC

32.10 Air Support Control Group - Commander MACCUBBIN

33 - TOKYO Force - Rear Admiral HALL

Force Flagship - HANSFORD - Commander LYNCH

1 APA

TransRon 16 (Temporary) - Commodore McGOVERN

TransDivs 46, 47, 48 (Temporary)

CECIL (SF) - ComTransDiv 46 (Commodore McGOVERN)

RUTLAND (F) - ComTransDiv 47 (Captain HUTTON)

TALLADEGA (F) - ComTransDiv 48 (Captain ANDREWS)

DEUEL, DARKE, LENAWEE, HIGHLANDS, ST. MARY'S,

BOSQUE, MISSOULA, DICKENS, DAUPHIN, SHERBURNE,

GASCONADE, BOTETOURT

15 APA

TOLLAND, YANCEY, WHITESIDE, PAMINA

MEDEA, LIBRA, SIRONA, TODD, SKAGIT

9 AKA

TransDiv 65 (Temporary) - Captain ROGERS

LAVACA (F), CLEARFIELD, SHERIDAN,

BRISCOE, CULLMAN

5 APA

TransRon 13 (Temporary) - Commodore Carlson

TransDivs 37, 51, 35, 53 (Temporary)

HARRIS (SF) - ComTransRon 13 (Commodore CARLSON)

GOODHUE (F) - ComTransDiv 51 (Captain ALLEN)

CLAY (F) - ComTransDiv 35 (Captain BARTMAN)

ROCKBRIDGE - ComTransDiv 53 (Captain THORNTON)

HEYWOOD, HYDE, NAVARRO, OCONTO, SAMUEL CHASE,

NIAGARA, BRACKEN, GOSHEN, WINDSOR, KITTSOON,

BLAND

15 APA

POLANA, UNION, WOODFORD, TOANEER,

ROLETTE

5 AKA

TRYON

1 APH

TransRon 24 (Temporary) - Commodore SHORT

TransDivs 70, 36, 71 (Temporary)

DADE (SF) - ComTransRon 24 (Commodore SHORT)

MONROVIA (F) - ComTransDiv 36 (Captain TYLER)

BROOKINGS (F) - ComTransDiv 71 (Captain DAVIS)

ORMSBY, SAN SABA, WARREN, NAPA, ST. CROIX,

ELKHART, OKALOOSA, CLARENDON, FULLER,

SITKA, CLINTON

14 APA

LEO, ALHENA, LACERT, LELLENA,

OSTARA, ATHENE, VENANGO

7 AKA

ANN ARUNDEL

1 AP

TransRon 19

BROADWATER, HARRY LEE, HEYWOOD,
LEEDSTOWN, MENDOCINO, SANDOVAL,
TAZEWELL
MULIPHEN, ALHENA

7 APA
2 AKA

YOLO (APB 43), PRESQUE ISLE (APB 44), BLACKFORD (APB 45)

3 APB

LCT Flotilla

ComLCTFlot 16 in LC(FF) 1031 - Lt Comdr. LEWIS

LCT 001, 406, 493, 521, 525, 536, 587, 605, 606, 642, 707,
1002, 1006, 1007, 1009, 1010, 1041, 1217, 1228, 1235,
1238, 1345, 1433

23 LCT

34 OMINATO Force - Rear Admiral CONOLLY

Force Flagship - APPALACHIAN - Captain RENN

1 AGC

TransRon 15 (Temporary) - Commodore POPHAM

BAYFIELD (SF), BERRIEN, KERSHAW, LOYNDES,
NEWBERRY, CATRON, FERGUS, CROCKETT,
FILLMORE, RAWLINS, ROCKWALL, EDGEcombe,
HAMPTON, ROCKINGHAM, PITT, OLMSTEAD
SOUTHAMPTON, OBERON, SHOSHONE,
WARRICK, THEENIM, CORVUS, LIBRA

16 APA

7 AKA

TransRon 13 (Temporary) - Commodore CARLSON

HARRIS (SF), SAMUEL CHASE, BRACKEN, CLAY,
BLAND, GOSHEN, WINDSOR, EASTLAND,
MOUNTRAIL, LAPORTE, ROCKBRIDGE,
NIAGARA, KITTSO, NAVARRO, OCONTO
BETELGEUSE, ROLETTE, POLANA,
SUFFOLK, WOODFORD, TO'NER
OSAGE

15 APA

6 AKA

1 LSV

TransDiv 51 (Temporary)

FAYETTE, SANBORN
CHARA, LUMEN

2 APA

2 AKA

ABNAKI (ATF 96) (Temporary duty)

1 ATF

CATAMOUNT (LSD 17) (Temporary duty)

1 LSD

LCS(L) Group

ComLCS(L)Flot 3 - Captain T. C. AYLWARD in LC(FF) 988

ComLCS(L)Group 8 - Lt. Comdr. E. C. THOMAS in LC(FF) 485

LCS(L) 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22

10 LCS(L)

ComLCS(L)Group 9 - Lt. B. A. THIAKIELD

LCS(L) 25, 38, 39, 40, 109, 110, 111, 112.

8 LCS(L)

LCT Group

ComLCTFlot 31 - Lt. Comdr. C. V. DILLEY

LCT 808, 848, 1248, 1341, 1374, 1422

6 LCT

LST Flotillas

The following LST Flotilla Commanders and the LSTs listed below were interchanged by CTF 32 among the various Task Units of CTF 33 and CTF 34.

ComLSTFlot 6 - Captain WEINTRAUB in LC(FF) 1080
ComLSTFlot 14 - Captain SEAY in LC(FF) 425
ComLSTFlot 16 - Captain SEARS in LC(FF) 783
ComLSTFlot 25 - Captain RICHTER in LC(FF) 792
ComLSTFlot 29 - Captain PETERSON in LC(FF) 998
ComLSTFlot 31 - Captain COVINGTON in LC(FF) 793
ComLSTFlot 32 - Captain CARSON in LST 902
ComLSTFlot 35 - Captain JOHNSON in LC(FF) 424
ComLSTFlot 36 - Captain SHEL in LST 284

LST Hull Numbers

16	378	582	679	760	838	900	982	1070
17	379	583	680	763	839	902	984	1071
31	395	584	682	770	842	903	988	1072
40	398	590	683	772	843	904	995	1085
47	446	591	691	775	844	908	997	1091
52	449	593	696	779	848	910	1005	1097
53	491	595	697	780	849	911	1007	1101
70	495	605	705	784	850	912	1010	1105
73	501	606	707	790	853	915	1011	1106
120	502	607	711	791	854	916	1014	1108
128	504	616	712	793	855	922	1016	1109
131	530	621	713	797	857	923	1023	1135
133	535	628	721	798	858	929(H)	1032	
176	536	631	722	799	867	931	1034	
197	540	641	725	801	875	945	1035	
205	545	642	730	802	878	936	1051	
213	547	647	731	803	881	938	1052	
230	558	651	733	805	885	940	1055	
243	560	653	736	814	886	941	1057	
283	562	659	745	816	889	947	1061	
284	570	660	740	824	893	951	1062	
286	572	666	747	825	894	960	1063	
288	573	667	751	827	895	972	1064	
309	580	670	752	831	896	973	1065	
377	581	673	757	832	898	981	1068	212 LST

LSM Flotillas

The following LSM Flotilla Commanders and the LSMs listed below were interchanged by CTF 32 among the various Task Units of CTF 33 and CTF 34:

ComLSMFlot 1 - Commander TALIAFERRO in LC(FF) 369
ComLSMFlot 3 - Commander MORRISON in LC(FF) 775 (Senior)
ComLSMFlot 6 - Commander QUINN in LC(FF) 532
ComLSMFlot 8 - Commander DOE in LC(FF) 656
ComLSMFlot 14 - Lieutenant Commander McCALEB in LSM 396
ComLSMFlot 16 - Commander S. J. McKEE in LC(FF) 783

LSM Hull Numbers

4	29	61	90	139	165	216	254	319	381
6	31	69	91	142	172	217	255	323	392
7	33	70	95	144	175	218	256	324	395
8	34	72	99	147	177	221	257	325	396
11	37	73	100	150	180	226	262	326	454
16	38	75	106	151	181	229	280	331	455
17	39	81	107	154	182	230	281	333	463
18	40	82	124	156	183	234	282	345	471
19	41	83	126	158	184	235	311	346	477
21	42	84	130	159	185	240	312	347	479
22	45	87	132	160	186	244	313	350	480
23	56	88	134	161	210	245	315	370	
24	58	89	137	163	212	247	316	379	

128 LSM

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INTELLIGENCE

1. The Intelligence requirements for the occupation of JAPAN were noticeably reduced from those of an assault operation. The main point in common with many previous operations was the short time between the receipt of the warning order and the date of initial landings, approximately three weeks elapsing between receipt of the warning order and departure of the initial convoys. As the TOKYO Bay landing was the first scheduled, time was very limited for the procurement or production of charts or photos. This necessitated obtaining charts and maps from army depots in the PHILIPPINE area or producing them aboard the Flagship. Because of the short time available and the fluidity of detailed plans only data on the TOKYO Bay area was distributed initially and Commander Amphibious Group THREE was made responsible for the distribution of all Intelligence for the AOMORI-HOKKAIDO landings.

2. Minefields - The location of enemy and allied minefields, and the status of sweeping and position of swept channels, first for TOKYO Bay area and later for the OGINATO, SENDAI and NIIGATA areas were very essential. Information provided by Cinclac-CincFOA on JAPAN was found to be substantially correct, although a few additional mine lines and further details of existing lines were later obtained from the complete report of the Japanese Headquarters. The location and status of allied minefields was much more difficult to obtain accurately as most of the mines were aerial laid and possibly as much as ten miles out of position. These were also the more difficult to sweep being acoustic, magnetic and pressure mines. NIIGATA was particularly heavily mined by USASTAF, over 800 mines being dropped within six miles of the harbor entrance. As priority of sweeping did not permit early clearance of the NIIGATA area, LST's and other craft were unloaded at SENAMI-HAKUCHI, 25 miles to the northeast and well clear of the minefields.

3. Weather - September and October are the heaviest typhoon months in the western Pacific area. Because of the many and serious problems presented this is being covered by a separate section of the report.

4. Waterfront and Dock conditions - The condition of waterfront and docks at YOKOHAMA and later at AOMORI and OTARU were uncertain because of the recent air attacks by Third Fleet Units. Aerial photos of late July, prior to the last attack, showed a few of YOKOHAMA docks with bomb damage and some additional damage to buildings and warehouses to that given in ONI report "Port of YOKOHAMA" -OF-16-FE57-45 of May 1945. A resume of this report corrected from aerial photos was distributed to the initial echelons of APA's and AKA's. The findings were checked by a reconnaissance party three days prior to the actual landings with only minor changes being reported.

5. Beach conditions in SAGAMI WAN and TATEYAMA WAN - SAGAMI WAN was an alternate landing area for YOKOHAMA and available photos and charts indicated it to be suitable for all types of landing craft without causeways West of SAGAMI GAWA and East of there with causeways for LST's. Shallow mines were reported off shore so that it would have been necessary to clear passages to the beaches. Fortunately, changed plans made this

necessary.

Landings were made at the TATEYAMA concrete seaplane ramp based on personal reconnaissance rather than on the beaches initially recommended from photographs. However, these would have been adequate if better facilities had not been readily available. UDTs were used to check dock and beach conditions as well as mark beaches in all areas.

6. Aerial and Coastal Defenses - As the area was to be lightly occupied in advance and the inactivation of major coast defenses, combatant ships and aircraft checked there was little need for elaborate Intelligence on these matters. The primary needs were bombardment and air support charts of landing areas for use in call support to neutralize any local resistance that developed.

7. Maps and Charts - AMS 1/250,000 and 1/50,000 maps of the immediate landing areas were distributed to all the major craft of the early echelons. Material was left with Flot and Group Commanders of subsequent echelons to be distributed to whatever ships were assigned to their convoys.

Many of the landing craft were not believed to hold a portfolio which contained large scale charts of the Japanese Harbors so a limited number of the necessary charts were reproduced aboard ship, including harbor charts of YOKOHAMA and YOKOSUKA with an overprint showing bomb damage and corrected shoreline based on aerial photographs.

After arrival TOKYO Bay a revised YOKOHAMA chart was produced showing berths, docks and landing point designations used by CTF 33. A similar chart of TOKYO Harbor was reproduced using a Jap Chart and an overprint of the Japanese designation for docks and other points.

Japanese charts of OMINATO, SHIOGAMA and OTARU were reproduced in sections and distributed at TOKYO Bay to units proceeding to the other objectives of this Force.

8. Aerial Photographs - Available aerial photos were used to the maximum extent but time and the almost complete breakdown in delivery procedure prevented receipt of those requested flown.

Aerial photos of late July were readily available of the YOKOHAMA Docks but did not cover the damage from the last Third Fleet strikes. ComPhibsPac had early requested coverage of the AOMORI-HAKODATE, NIIGATA and SENDAI areas at small scale but these photos were not received by this command in time to be of any value. This was partly caused by the prohibition of all aerial flights over Japanese areas for the two to three weeks preceeding the signing of surrender terms. To fill these deficiencies CTF 33 was requested to obtain photos of SHIOGAMA but these were also too late - eight days being required for the delivery from the carrier. Consequently to obtain the advance data on beaches it was found necessary to send an officer of the staff with a UDT to check each beach and landing point prior to sending craft to use it. This practice was followed for the landings at YOKOHAMA, TATEYAMA, AOMORI, SHIOGAMA and SENAMI HAKUCHI.

9. Comments - There were many gaps in the Intelligence for the occupation of JAPAN. This was particularly true in the assured distribution to small craft in later echelons, due to difficulties in establishing the composition and movements of Task Units. All delivery and communication systems appeared to be clogged slowing delivery.

However, the information on the two critical items, mine-fields and weather was generally adequately received.

COMMUNICATIONS

A. COMMUNICATION PLANNING.

1. Communication planning was affected by the following factors:
 - (a) The short time available for the planning stages of the operation.
 - (b) The distance between the two objectives assigned this command.
 - (c) The necessity for providing for alternative assault landings over beaches.
2. Commander Amphibious Forces had published the communication annex for the OLYMPIC (MAJESTIC) operation. This annex was used as the basis for a communication planning memorandum issued by Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet for the CAMPUS operation. The communication planning memorandum provided the form around which the communication plan for this force was developed.
3. In view of the wide separation between the areas assigned this command it was necessary to design the communication plan to give subordinate commanders the widest possible latitude in the conduct of communications in their areas. An overall plan was provided on which each subordinate commander could base his staging, cruising and landing plans.
4. Conferences were held during the preparation of the plans in order to permit the communication officers of subordinate commanders an opportunity to clarify all points of possible ambiguity. Subordinate commands thus received early information enabling them to prepare their own plans while the overall plan was being formulated.
5. The plan as evolved proved satisfactory except for a few minor points which were promptly corrected.

B. RADIO NETS.

1. Upon arrival in the TOKYO Bay Area it was discovered that the harbor circuits already established by Commander Third Fleet were already so loaded that the addition of amphibious communications would have seriously overloaded these circuits. It was therefore decided to retain the Task Force common (530kcs) and the Task Force VHF common (65.34mcs). The latter circuit was secured when traffic on the Fleet VHF common could accommodate amphibious traffic. The MF common circuit proved extremely valuable as a local area amphibious common and was retained as such throughout the operation.
2. The Third Amphibious Force Task Group commander's circuit (2216kcs) was designed for communications over the compar-

atively short distances involved in the OLYMPIC operation. However, in the CAMPUS operation, the distance between the TOKYO Bay Area and the TSUGURU Straits Area was too great to permit reliable 24 hour communication. It was therefore necessary to obtain a higher frequency. The only available frequency was 3570 kcs and this frequency, while it did not produce optimum results, was generally satisfactory.

C. RADIO DISCIPLINE.

1. At sea, radio silence below 60 mcs was imposed except where otherwise specified by responsible commanders. The purpose of this restriction was to provide better control of radio circuits and to prevent their unnecessary use.
2. When radio silence was lifted, radio discipline proved satisfactory.

D. TRAFFIC.

1. The CAMPUS operation was conducted during the period of greatest typhoon frequency. The necessity for diverting task units from the paths of the storms, plus the necessity for obtaining frequent weather reports from these task units, required considerable traffic of urgent and operational priority precedence which increased the communication load considerably.
2. Plans were made to handle a large volume of press traffic but only a small amount materialized and this expeditiously handled.

E. RADIO TELETYPE AND TELEPHONE.

1. CF-1-A, telephone terminal (CARRIER), equipment provided by the Army was installed in the MOUNT OLYMPUS shortly after her arrival at MANILA. In conjunction with the VHF RATT equipment used ashore, this equipment provided telephone and teletype communications to Army headquarters. These circuits expedited considerably the interchange of information between the landing force headquarters and this command. This circuit was also used in TOKYO Bay and provided excellent teletype and good telephone communication with Army headquarters ashore.
2. The HF RATT circuit to GUAM proved its value in expediting traffic either for relay on Fox circuits or for relay via point-to-point teletype circuits from GUAM to PEARL HARBOR or the PHILIPPINES. This equipment will have an increasingly important place in future communications.

F. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Provisions were made for the establishment of such joint

communications as were required to furnish the embarked Army troops with messages of interest to them. Organic ship's equipment was made available and was used until Army equipment was ashore and functioning.

G. R.D.R. COUNTERMEASURES.

1. While it was not expected that radar countermeasures would be necessary, provisions were made to intercept enemy radar transmissions and to jam if required. However, no interceptions were logged.

H. VISUAL.

1. The lifting of darken ship requirements reduced the necessity for the use of NANCY equipment. In order to continue training in this equipment it was required that NANCY be used for routine night communications and that flashing light be used only when necessary.

I. MATERIAL.

1. In general, the performance of radio, visual and radar material was excellent.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

A. TOKYO AREA

1. While it was assumed that the landings in the TOKYO Area of the troops carried by this Force would be unopposed, nonetheless it was considered desirable to be prepared for local opposition from unreconciled enemy units. Therefore, Naval Gunfire Support plans were prepared to cover landings on HIRO and UBAGA beaches in SAGAMI BAY on 2 September and on TATEYAMA beach the following day. A plan was also prepared for a landing on the less heavily defended ICHIBU beach, about 10,000 yards to the north of TATEYAMA, should conditions at the latter make a landing there inadvisable.

2. The area within a radius of 4,000 yards of the beaches was divided into sectors for which assigned ships were responsible. In delineating these sectors of responsibility, terrain features, such as rivers, highways and ridge lines, were used to the maximum extent practicable in order to facilitate orientation of ships and particularly spotting aircraft with respect to their assigned sectors.

3. Ships were to be alert to observe and report in their sectors any evidence of threatening enemy movement, to take under fire any batteries offering resistance and endangering our ships and forces, and to execute the Schedule of Fires if so ordered by CTF 32.

4. The Schedule of Fires covered a period from H-120 to H plus 240 and upon order was to be entered at the time of the order with respect to H-hour. For example, for sudden opposition at H-20, as the boat waves advanced, the scheduled fires at H-20 were to be begun and the schedule thereafter followed, unless H-hour should be delayed by signal. Provision was made for the lifting of fires as troops advanced.

5. The Fire Support Group for HIRO and UBAGA beaches was to have consisted of 4 OBB's, 2 CA's, 2 CL's and 13 DD's; and that for TATEYAMA (or ICHIBU) of 2 OBB's, 2 CA's, 2 CL's and 4 DD's.

6. These precautions proved to be unneeded as Japanese cooperation fulfilled the most optimistic expectations. HIRO and UBAGA beaches were eliminated entirely as landing points by the use of YOKOHAMA harbor and docks, and the need for support at TATEYAMA beach was illustrated in Admiral HALSEY's despatch:

"MSG VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON X WILL PROVIDE WELL ARMED
ROW BOAT FOR FIRE SUPPORT IF NEEDED X ADVISE X HALSEY"

The hint was not lost and all preparations for fire support and air support were cancelled.

B. NORTHERN AREA

7. Stand-by fire support, from cruisers and destroyers, and limited air support from two CVE's were on station for the landing of

the 81st division at AOMORI on 25 September but no firing was necessary as the landing was entirely unopposed but rather facilitated by Japanese cooperation.

8. Similarly stand-by fire support and very limited air support from cruiser planes and VPM's of a seaplane squadron based at OMINATO, were present at the landings at HAKODATE on 3 October and OTARU on 4 October, but again were not employed.

C. SUBSEQUENT LANDINGS

9. No fire or air support was contemplated for any landings subsequent to those noted above in the same localities, nor for landings at SHIOGAMA or SENAMI (near NIIGATA).

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ENCLOSURE (D)

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AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. PLANNING

(a) Planning for CAMPUS was executed aboard the U.S.S. MOUNT OLYMPUS at MANILA. Because of the very limited time permitted for planning and the lack of essential information relative to the forces involved and the employment of those forces, the Air Support Plan was based on the Joint Staff Study for CAMPUS. Assumptions based on an estimate of the situation directly concerning the Third Amphibious Force were written into the plan with provision for disseminating detailed instruction by dispatch as the situation developed.

(b) The communication plan as derived from ComPhibPac Communication Plan for OLYMPIC was adequate although designed for a large scale assault operation. Some changes in frequency assignment were necessary after arriving at the objective but this was accomplished without incident.

(c) CinCPac-CinCPOA Air Approach Charts were used for Air Support maps, distribution of which was made direct to all supporting carrier forces. These maps were supplemented by Bombardment Charts of the landing areas prepared aboard the U.S.S. MOUNT OLYMPUS and distributed with ComThirdPhibFor Operation Plan. Maps and charts available are believed to have been adequate for any emergency situation which might have occurred but not for a continued assault action.

(d) Air support was planned for initial landings at (1) YOKOHAMA (or SAGAMI Beach) (2) TATEYAMA (3) AOMORI (4) OTARU, but was not planned nor utilized at any subsequent landings at these ports or at other ports.

2. ENROUTE TOKYO BAY AREA (First Convoy)

(a) Combat Air Patrol - see paragraph (6).

(b) Air Anti-Submarine Patrol.

(1) Air Anti-Submarine Patrol was requested from FLEAF for cover of this force enroute effective 27 August and until relieved by the CVE Group (TG 32.1). No aircraft reported on station nor was any reply received to this request.

(2) The U.S.S. SALAMUA (CVE-96) provided Air Anti-Submarine Patrol commencing at 0620 on 29 September and until the evening of 1 September, prior to arrival of this force at YOKOHAMA. Requirements for both Air Anti-Submarine Patrol and Combat Air Patrol were made by dispatch. Detailed information and the Air Plan were delivered later at sea.

(3) Plan GEORGE FTP 223 A (2 sector) was flown daily through daylight hours and without incident. This patrol was controlled by CASCUS in the U.S.S. MOUNT OLYMPUS. The net control officer

was stationed in CIC and was thus aided in tracing and plotting the patrol by use of the radar facilities.

3. YOKOHAMA LANDING - 2 September.

Commander Third Fleet Operation Plan 11-45 was received enroute and set forth supporting services for this force. In view of the reduced requirements for Air Support request was made to CTF 38 to delete the offensive air support scheduled and to provide only Air Observation and Photographic missions for the landing at YOKOHAMA. The CVE Group (TG 32.1) also was requested to provide one photographic mission to cover the approach of this force to the YOKOHAMA area. Air observers from both the fast carriers (TG 38.4) and from the U.S.S. SALAMAUUA were directed to report the conditions of the dock area and the movement of ships and boats debarking troops. Photographic planes were assigned coverage of the same. These missions were executed in an excellent manner and results were very satisfactory.

4. TATEYAMA LANDING - 3 September.

(a) Air Support requirements for this landing were also reduced to Air Observation and Photographic missions and provided by fast carriers (TG 38.1) only. Employment was the same as for YOKOHAMA and again excellent coverage was provided and results very satisfactory. VHF communications were used to control these missions and were entirely satisfactory.

(b) ALPs were directed to establish communications for ship to shore liaison. Communications were satisfactory.

5. Scheduled Air Support in connection with landings by this force were secured at 1300, 3 September 1945.

6. FIGHTER DIRECTION.

(a) Fighter cover was requested from Far Eastern Air Force for Task Force 32 enroute to objective effective 27 and 28 August 1945. No aircraft reported on station nor was any reply received from the request.

(b) The U.S.S. SALAMAUUA provided Combat Air Patrol from 29 August to 2 September 1945 inclusive. The CAP consisted of four FM-2s (Wildcats) and was under the control of the Force Fighter Director in the U.S.S. MOUNT OLYMPUS. Actual control of the fighter aircraft was held by that ship's officers except during the afternoon of 31 August and early morning of 1 September when fighter direction was passed to the SALAMAUUA.

(c) There was a total of 30 bogeys encountered enroute to the objective. Of these 19 were successfully intercepted and proved to be transport planes. Ten individual bogeys were "seen" the night of 31 August and one bogey during the TATEYAMA landing when no CAP was airborne.

(d) As FORMOSA was well within range of the convoy and as there had been no formal surrender, a policy was adopted to intercept all aircraft showing IFF Code 1 that were closing the disposition. Twenty-one such interceptions were made and all aircraft were identified as transports.

(e) Total interceptions attempted enroute were 41, and 40 were successful. The one which was not successful faded from the scope when 20 miles from the CAP and was never picked up again. It consisted of several planes showing Code 1.

(f) The interceptions were well handled by all the fighter directors that controlled the CAP. The SP Radar on both the MOUNT OLYMPUS and SALAMAUA gave good altitude determination which was a leading factor in placing the CAP in a position to properly intercept all bogies and Code 1 aircraft.

(g) As Commander Task Force 31 was charged with the responsibility of the air defense of TOKYO Bay, the CAP on 2 September was returned to the SALAMAUA at 0758. At that time there was a local CAP of 12 VF controlled by the Force CIC officer in the SOUTHERLAND (DD-743). During the day the CAP was reduced to 8 and effective 5 September all CAP was cancelled.

7. SECOND CONVOY.

The SALAMAUA left the TOKYO area after the landing of the first convoy and met the second (TransRon 13) on 6 September, enroute to YOKOHAMA, furnishing anti-submarine patrol and combat air patrol as for the first, until arrival on 8 September.

8. NORTHERN JAPAN.

Air support was supplied by planes from two CVEs, the HOGGATT BAY and NATANIKAU, which were assigned by Commander Task Force 56, Rear Admiral DENEBRINK, the local representative of Commander Fifth Fleet. The CVEs, operating about 50 miles east of MUTSU WAN, launched a combat air patrol (4 VF), air observer (1 VTB), direct air group (4 VF and 4 VTB) and photo planes (4 VTB) at 0530 on the initial day of landing. Dumbo services were furnished by VPB aircraft operating from the OMINATO seadrome. The air support units were released at dark 25 September, and the CVEs released, to proceed to YOKOSUKA.

9. For the HAKODATE and OTARU landings on 4 and 5 October respectively no CVEs were available. At HAKODATE the air support consisted of one VPB from the Air Search and Reconnaissance Group (TG 53.6), Captain TRACY in CHANDELEUR, operating from OMINATO seadrome and one VOS aircraft from Task Unit 34.7.3. At OTARU, one VPB from Task Group 56.3 and one VOS aircraft from Task Group 34.7 were employed. In both operations the aircraft remained on station during the forenoon, returning to their bases by 1400.

10. In neither of these two landings was any opposition encountered, and no offensive action by the air support was necessary.

LOGISTICS

In the operation under review the Commander Third Amphibious Force was responsible for the employment and control of assigned amphibious shipping in the transportation of initial and follow-up Eighth Army forces, with accompanying equipment and supplies, from mounting areas to Japan. The Force Commander was authorized to deal directly with the Commanding General, Eighth Army with respect to all details of staging, loading and mounting troops and the preparation of plans for establishing forces ashore.

The Commander Third Amphibious Force delegated direct responsibility for embarkation, and for the proper delivery of troops and supplies to the objectives in the Tokyo Bay Area and in the Ominato-Aomori and Hokkaido area to Commander Amphibious Group Twelve (CTF 33) and Commander Amphibious Group Three (CTF 34) respectively; and directed that they coordinate with appropriate Corps Commanders in all matters as necessary to effect expeditious loading and debarkation planning.

Loading for the operation began 19 August and the first echelon, Transron 16 (Temp) with the 1st Cavalry Division embarked, departed for the target 25 August.

Commander Third Amphibious Force, and Commander Amphibious Group Twelve (CTF 33), moved to the target with the first echelon. A rear echelon of the Third Amphibious Force remained in Manila to maintain contact with the Eighth Army Liaison Group, the rear echelon of Eighth Army headquarters, in order to allocate shipping as it became available and to plan the overall employment of turnaround shipping. Commander Amphibious Group Twelve (CTF 33), left his second-in-command, Rear Admiral A. D. Struble, Commander Amphibious Group Nine (CTF 33.2), in Manila as a rear echelon that was charged with the responsibility for supervising loading and sailing of later echelons. Rear Admiral Struble was detached shortly thereafter but his Chief of Staff continued these duties. On 18 September, when Commander Amphibious Group Three (CTF 34) departed for Japan in company with the Commanding General IX Corps, Commander Amphibious Group Nine (CTF 33.2) also performed rear echelon duties for Commander Amphibious Group Three (CTF 34). The Eighth Army Liaison Group remained in Manila until 26 September before rejoining Eighth Army Headquarters, and as soon thereafter as air Transportation was available the Third Amphibious Force Rear rejoined the flagship in Tokyo Bay. Throughout the operation Commander Amphibious Group Nine (CTF 33.2) remained as a rear echelon in Manila.

The operation occasioned by the Japanese surrender entailed a rapid assembling of ships and men and tons of supplies and equipment. Figures concerning these ships, men and tons are assembled below.

1. Loading Points

A. TOKYO FORCE (TF 33) - KANTO Plain Embarkation Group.

	APA	AP	APH	AKA	LSB	LSM	LST	LSV	TOTAL
OKINAWA							112		112
LAOAG, LUZON						2	1		3
LINGAYEN, LUZON						4	12		16
SUBIC, LUZON						7	2		9
MANILA, LUZON	19			16	2	85	61		183
BATANGAS, LUZON	20			5		79	120	1	225
LEGASPI, LUZON	4			2		8	2		16
SAN JOSE, MINDORO							11		11
ILOILO, PANAY							9		9
LEYTE		1	1	2		22	34		60
CEBU CITY, CEBU	15			4		21	9		49
MINDANAO						8	3		11
BIAK							6		6
TOTAL	58	1	1	29	2	236	382	1	710

B. OMINATO Force (TF 34) - AOMORI-OMINATO Embarkation Group.

	APA	AP	APH	AKA	LSD	LSM	LST	LSV	TOTAL
LINGAYEN, LUZON						3			3
MANILA, LUZON	3			4		15	5		27
BATANGAS, LUZON	1			1			4		6
LEYTE	16			10			29		55
CEBU	13			5			16		34
TOTAL	33			20		18	54		125

2. Ships Used

A. TOKYO Force (TF 33) - KANTO Plain Embarkation Group.

	APA	AP	APH	AKA	LSD	LSM	LST	LSV	TOTAL
GHQ. AFPAC	1			2			3		6
EIGHTH ARMY		1	1	2		11	20		35
XI CORPS	52			17	1	107	126	1	304
XIV CORPS	2			2		30	53		87
FEAF						37	110		147
ASCOM "C"	3			6	1	51	70		131
TOTAL	58	1	1	29	2	236	382	1	710

B. OMINATO Force (TF 34) - AOMORI-OMINATO Embarkation Group.

	APA	AP	APH	AKA	LSD	LSM	LST	LSV	TOTAL
IX CORPS	33			20		1	54		108
FEAF						8			8
ASCOM "C"						9			9
TOTAL	33			20		18	54		125

C. Total for Third Amphibious Force.

	APA	AP	APH	AKA	LSD	LSM	LST	LSV	TOTAL
GHQ. AFPAC	1			2			2		6
EIGHTH ARMY		1	1	2		11	20		35
XI CORPS	52			17	1	107	126	1	304
XIV CORPS	2			2		30	53		87
IX CORPS	33			20		1	54		108
FEAF						45	110		155
ASCOM "C"	3			6	1	60	70		140
TOTAL	91	1	1	49	2	254	436	1	835

Note: The total number of ships given above is greater than the number actually employed, because in some instances ships made more than one run to Japan. This was most pronounced in the LST type, where 206 LST were actually engaged in the operation as contrasted with the LST shown; and in the LSM type, where 127 LSM were actually engaged in the operation as contrasted with the LSM shown.

3. Loads Embarked

A. TOKYO Force (TF 33) - KANTO Plain Embarkation Group.

	PERSONNEL	SHORT TONS
GHQ, AFPAC	1,859	2,544
EIGHTH ARMY	6,724	11,809
XI CORPS	89,067	112,239
XIV CORPS	12,615	26,426
FEAF	15,586	46,280
ASCOM "C"	8,784	14,793
TOTAL	134,635	214,091

B. OMINATO Force (TF 34) - AOMORI-OMINATO Embarkation Group.

	PERSONNEL	SHORT TONS
IX CORPS	44,549	55,281
FEAF	1,233	3,455
TOTAL	45,782	58,736

C. Total for Third Amphibious Force.

	PERSONNEL	SHORT TONS
GHQ, AFPAC	1,859	2,544
EIGHTH ARMY	6,724	11,809
XI CORPS	89,067	112,239
XIV CORPS	12,615	26,426
IX CORPS	44,549	55,281
FEAF	16,819	49,735
ASCOM "C"	8,784	14,793
TOTAL	180,417	272,827

Note: The above totals, as applied to the Eighth Army, are complete only insofar as the lift made by the Third Amphibious Force is concerned. GHQ, AFPAC allocated a few liberty and Victory ships to the Eighth Army for use in moving troops and supplies to Japan, but their number is unknown and likewise any details of their loading, all arrangements having been made and controlled independently. In addition the Fifth Air Force transported a majority of the troops of an Eighth Army Airborne Division and lightly equipped Infantry Division from Okinawa to Japan.

4. Cumulative unloading totals for Third Amphibious Force.

Date	Personnel	Vehicles	S/T Cargo (incl. veh.)
Sept. 2	11210	465	1812
3	22116	2102	16444
4	22852	2141	17054
5			
6			
7			
8	28455	2595	19155

<u>Date</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>S/T Cargo (incl. veh.)</u>
Sept. 9	37075	3748	30148
10	43251	4711	37688
11	44316	5269	40376
12	45290	5806	44606
13	50628	6849	51587
14	65945	8911	65761
15	70451	9385	69293
16	75638	11832	85383
17	77966	12539	90387
18	81588	13447	98745
19	83098	13973	104209
20			
21	83118	14153	
22			
23	84442	14791	107818
24	86478	15815	110548
25	97015	16359	112504
26	103374	17249	118380
27	104967	17677	124704
28	105984	17696	127803
29	108475	18443	134738
30	109355	18820	136216
Oct. 1	109734	18978	136862
2			
3	111815	19347	141841
4	112815	19693	144056
5			
6	123187	21183	151100
7	133753	22762	164103
8	141465	24301	182440
9			
10	141529	24355	182860
11			
12	141550		182885
13	141911	24391	182955
14	150675	26138	193778
15	151789	26188	194428
16	152414	26404	196614
17	154753	27165	202017
18	156411	27963	209585
19	156909	28024	210461
20	157264	28036	210947
21	160481	29623	223473

<u>Date</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>S/T Cargo (incl. veh.)</u>
Oct. 22	161456	29605	223770
23	162835	30213	227212
24			
25	163514	30556	229553
26	164473	31259	233954
27	165404	31629	236006
28	166487	33979	238053
29			
30	167179	34256	240458
31			
Nov. 1	173063	34612	255466
2	173116	34973	255730
3	175557	35359	262847
4	176813	35712	264712
5	179943	36080	271712
6	180417	36182	272827

5. Average loads carried:

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>DWT</u>
APA	1127	547
AKA	156	947
LST	129	323
LSM	44	133

6. Addendum.

Commander Amphibious Group Eleven arrived Tokyo Bay 2 November preparatory to effecting the relief of the Commander Third Amphibious Force in conducting the concluding phase of the operation, and the latter departed Japan 7 November. At 0001 on that date various ships accounted for in paragraphs 1 and 2 above were in the process of unloading, were enroute to Japan to unload, or were at or enroute loading points, and data concerning them not being available is not included in paragraphs 3 and 4 above. It is presumed that pertinent figures concerning these ships will be a part of a succeeding report submitted by Commander Amphibious Group Eleven. The ships in question are tabulated for reference:

	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LSD</u>	<u>LST</u>	<u>LSM</u>
Unloading	5			9
Enroute	2		37	26
Loading			44	
Enroute Loading Point	—	<u>1</u>	—	—
TOTAL	7	1	81	35

PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. Since CinCPac press activities were concentrated under Third Fleet aboard the IOWA and ANCON prior to the arrival of the THIRD Amphibious Force in Japanese waters, only two war correspondents proceeded by sea with this force from MANILA to TOKYO Bay. On the movement to OMINATO - AOMORI, six war correspondents and an Army censor were accommodated. Their stories were transmitted from the Force Flagship.

2. In the TOKYO Bay area, press material was furnished from time to time to all accredited correspondents in the area through the Navy representative at GHQ Public Relations Office.

3. Since entering Japanese waters, two Enlisted Navy Correspondents, working under the direction of the Public Information Officer, sent 800 individual stories to CinCPac or to the Fleet Home Town News Center in CHICAGO for distribution. The Enlisted Navy Correspondents covered the activities of APA's, AKA's, APD's, APB's, LST's, an LC(FF), an LCS(L), a Naval Construction Battalion, a Navy Mobile Communication Unit and an Underwater Demolition Team. In addition, individual stories concerning the officers and men of this Force and of ships involved in the movement to Japanese waters were distributed to newspapers and radio stations in the United States.

BOAT POOL

1. In considering boat pool requirements for landings in the TOKYO Area it was determined that Army boats to be provided by Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments scheduled to be lifted would be sufficient to handle lighterage and other needs after the initial landings, even assuming no dock facilities would be available. Therefore, no Navy Boat Pool was planned, and this Force was concerned only with providing lifts for Army boats.

2. The 2nd Engineer Shore Battalion was assigned to XI Corps for the TOKYO landing. The following table lists the EBSRs attached to this unit and the number of boats by type which each had to be lifted and where they were located:

<u>BOATS</u>				
<u>EBSR</u>	<u>LCM</u>	<u>LCVP</u>	<u>J-BOAT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
532	100	7	3	ILOILO
542	124	13	6	CEBU
592	115	15	5	BATANGAS
594	109	5	10	MANILA

3. Arrangements were made for Force shipping to off-load Navy boats at the boat pools at SAMAR or SUBIC in order to load Army boats. The following table lists the number of boats lifted by TransRons 13 (plus TransDiv 65), 16 and 24, and brought to TOKYO BAY.

<u>BOATS</u>				
<u>TRANS RON</u>	<u>EBSR</u>	<u>LCM</u>	<u>LCVP</u>	<u>J-BOAT</u>
13 (Plus Div 65)	542	80	13	6
16	592	84*	15	5
24	594	70	5	10

* Plus 12 Navy LCMs which were transferred to the Army at the objective.

4. This left a balance of 44, 31 and 39 LCMs of the 542nd, 592nd and 594th EBSRs respectively, plus all of the 532nd EBSR boats, still to be lifted in subsequent turn-around shipping. However, it appeared that the number of boats already lifted would be more than sufficient to meet local requirements, and on 14 September General EICHELBERGER directed that no additional 2nd ESB units be lifted to the objective. Lifts arranged for additional boats were therefore cancelled.

5. For the landings in Northern Japan the 3rd Engineer Shore Battalion was assigned to the IX Corps. It included the 543rd EBSR and the 593rd EBSR. No boats were to be lifted for the latter, while the 543rd EBSR had 126 LCMs, 18 LCVPs and 6 J-boats to be lifted to the objective by TransRons 13 and 15 from ABUYOG, LEYTE.

6. TransRon 13 lifted 55 LCMs, 8 LCVPs and 3 J-boats to HAKODATE and OTARU, boats at the latter port being used for unloading and then returned to MUTSU WAN where they were off-loaded to proceed to AOMORI under their own power. The balance of those to be lifted were carried direct to AOMORI in TransRon 15.

7. In early October, after ComServDiv 102 had become established at YOKOSUKA, a boat pool for his use was considered desirable, and as directed by Commander FIFTH Fleet, 44 LCVPs and 10 LCP(L)s were expeditiously provided from Force shipping by Commander Task Force THIRTY-THREE for this purpose. ComServDiv 102 acquired directly from sources other than Third Amphibious Force an additional 39 LCVPs, 9 LCP(L)s and 80 LCMs, so that as of 1 November 1945 this pool consisted of 80 LCMs, 83 LCVPs and 19 LCP(L)s. No personnel were provided and the boat pool was operated by personnel from other than Amphibious units.

8. By 1 November 1945, 6 LCVPs without crews had been transferred by Commander Task Force THIRTY-THREE to the Port Director YOKOHAMA at the latter's request to provide facilities necessary for the performance of his functions in the harbor.

9. It was originally intended to lift 55 LCTs aboard LSTs to be off-loaded in the TOKYO Bay Area, of which 35 were to remain in the area under operational control of Commander Task Force THIRTY-THREE and 20 were to proceed to OMINATO under their own power and report to Commander Task Force THIRTY-FOUR. However, it was determined that requirements for both areas were less than anticipated and this number was substantially reduced. Twenty-three LCTs were off-loaded at YOKOHAMA to meet the requirements of the TOKYO Bay Area and placed under the Administrative Command of ComLCTFlot 16 and under the operational control of Commander Task Force THIRTY-THREE. The operational control passed to Commander Task Force THIRTY-TWO when Commander Task Force THIRTY-THREE was dissolved on 1 November 1945, and remained in that status when Commander Amphibious Group ELEVEN relieved Commander THIRD Amphibious Force on 6 November 1945. Eight LCTs were lifted directly to OMINATO where they were off-loaded and placed under the Administrative Command of ComLCTFlot 31 and the operational control of Commander Task Force THIRTY-FOUR. Upon departure of the latter the operational control passed to Commander Task Force FIFTY-SIX.

CONFIDENTIAL


ORIGINATOR'S ROUGH DRAFT

From : CTF 32
Action To : CTU 33.9.61

Info To : CTF 33

Originator:	
Info: T SW	
Precedence	Classification
URGENT X	TOP SECRET
O. P.	SECRET
PRIORITY	CONFID
ROUTINE	RESTRICT'D
DEFERRED	PLAIN
MAILGRAM	VISUAL
AIRMOG	Send From This Copy

Date Time Group
REVERSE COURSE MAXIMUM SPEED X REPORT WEATHER EVERY THREE HOURS X



COM3RDPHIBFOR
9 OCT. 1945
0600Z

ENCLOSURE (J) 442

WEATHER

AND

THE OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN JAPAN

COMMANDER THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

WEATHER AND THE OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN JAPAN

The unconditional surrender of Japan at once simplified and complicated weather considerations in the Western Pacific. While the planning for Operation OLYMPIC had included detailed consideration of expected weather in relation to all phases of amphibious operation, the shift from an assault landing in force to an occupation in several phases introduced a new trend into weather planning. Weather related to air support, use of smoke, and surf conditions over the beaches was reduced to secondary importance. At the same time, the shift in D-Day from 1 November for Operation OLYMPIC to late August for the occupation of Northern Japan brought the realization that a large amount of slow and weather vulnerable amphibious shipping would be operating at the very height of the typhoon season, instead of at its end as was originally planned.

On the average, four typhoons occur in the Western Pacific in September, and three in October. That these typhoons would be a real hazard to the shipping, personnel, and material involved in the occupation was evident - a single typhoon could affect our staging areas in the Philippines and Okinawa, our shipping lanes to Japan, and any shipping present in Japanese ports. In short, the typhoon area coincided exactly with our operating area.

The early decision faced by this command was

whether to permit convoys at sea to exercise discretion in maneuvering to avoid typhoons, to delegate that responsibility to the task force commander to which they were assigned, or to retain direct operational control during periods of typhoon weather. After considering all of the factors involved, and particularly in view of the fact that few units of the Force shipping had aerological units embarked, it was decided to retain operational control of and assume direct responsibility for all Force shipping at sea during periods of typhoon weather.

With the minor exception that Commander Philippine Sea Frontier retained responsibility for shipping near Luzon and south of latitude 20° N, and that port directors retained their delegated authority in all ports, this policy remained essentially unchanged.

From the time that the first convoy departed Manila on 25 August until the mission assigned the Force was completed in November, various units of the Force were affected by nine typhoons. Our major loss sustained was a pontoon causeway carried away from an LST on the perimeter of the typhoon which passed Okinawa September 16.

While there were numerous delays produced by the many diversions ordered, time lost was adequately compensated by the resulting safety.


PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

TYPHOONS # 1, # 2, AND # 3

By 20 August consolidation of the Third Fleet in the vicinity of 31° N, 143° E in preparation for the occupation of northern Japan had begun. At the same time, plans for the airborne movement of the 11th Airborne Division from Luzon to Tokyo via Okinawa were completed and the Supreme Commander had announced the formal surrender date as 31 August.

By 0600Z on 22 August, the Third Fleet had maneuvered clear of one typhoon which was located northwest of Wake on the 20th and was anticipating the close approach of two additional typhoons which in the meantime had formed northeast of Luzon. Air operations between Luzon and Okinawa were curtailed.

The first echelon of the Third Amphibious Force departed Manila Bay on 25 August (Item time), and by 27 August had cleared Balintang Channel en route Tokyo. Typhoon #1 had recurved to the northeast and was no longer of interest; typhoon #2 had recurved a second time on 24 August, passing to the westward of the Third Fleet and entering Shikoku on the 25th. Typhoon #3 had also recurved a second time and entered Kyushu on the 26th. While no damage occurred to any Allied force during this entire period, the time table was upset. A delay in surrender date to 2 September was announced by the Supreme Commander.



TYPHOON # 4

28 August 2 September

First indications of the formation of typhoon #4 were present on the weather map for 1800Z, 28 August. At that time there was a weak wave development on the equatorial front in the vicinity of 15.5° N, 138.8° E, accompanied by a small closed cyclonic circulation.

Six hours later special weather plane reports from Guam disclosed the accurate location and the extent of the disturbance. Although not yet of storm proportion, it was apparent from the definitely closed cyclonic circulation and several reported winds above 30 knots that the disturbance would soon reach typhoon intensity.


Concurrently, upper winds from Iwo Jima and weather ship 114 at 22°N, 134°E were strong easterly at all levels, verifying the existence of a strong Pacific High, and foretelling the prospective westerly movement of the developing storm.

The storm continued its westerly movement, and by 1200Z on 31 August was confirmed to be of typhoon proportions, and estimated to be at 16.5°N, 129°E, moving WNW at 10 knots. From this point, the typhoon continued to increase in intensity and began recurving to the NW. Maximum winds estimated at 100 knots probably occurred just before the typhoon crossed northern Formosa at 1800Z, 2 September. From this point, the typhoon dissipated rapidly and entered the China coast above Foochow 12 hours later.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND DIVERSIONS ORDERED

During this period, Commander Third Amphibious Force was enroute Tokyo in company with major elements comprising the first echelon of the occupation forces.

Diversion of this or any other component of the Force at sea was not necessary. Several units, however, were held in ports in the Philippines; two by agencies there, and one on the basis of a dispatch from Commander Third Amphibious Force to ComTransRon 13 on 31 August.



TYPHOON # 5

5 September - 11 September

The formation of typhoon no. 5 was first detected on the 0000Z weather map of 5 September. At this time the equatorial front was very strong, and a wave formation on the front indicated at 10.5° N, 143.3° E.


From the 5th to the 9th of September the storm developed very gradually and moved slowly to the northwest. At 0000Z on the 9th it was in the vicinity of 17.5° N, 126.4° E and development into a full fledged typhoon appeared imminent.

At 0300Z 10 September, the storm definitely had reached typhoon proportions - 80 knot winds and very rough seas over a wide area north of Luzon. A short time later the typhoon crossed Formosa and entered the China coast near Foochow around 0600Z 11 September.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND DIVERSIONS ORDERED

Eight Task Groups and Task Units comprising a total of 49 APA, 23 AKA, 91 LST, 66 LSM, 3 DD, and 19 miscellaneous types of the Force were at sea on the shipping lanes between Luzon and Honshu.

At 0000Z 10 September it appeared that there was at least a 50% chance that the typhoon would recurve to the north, accelerate in that direction, and travel up a trough line which then existed in Formosa Strait. Accordingly, Task Unit 33.2.3 (59 LST, 2 APB, 1 APD, 1 SC, 1 PCS), then located near 23.5° N, 125.5° E was diverted to course 090° (T), and Task Group 34.4 (16 APA, 6 AKA, 1 APD, 1 DE) near 25° N, 128.5° E was diverted to an easterly course. Both were ordered to resume course only after it was clear that the typhoon would continue to the northwest.



TYPHOON # 6

12 September - 20 September

Between 0600Z 12 September and 1200Z 13 September typhoon #6 formed with almost explosive violence and began moving to the westward. During its entire history plane and ship reports furnished information which permitted an accurate plot of the center.

At 0600Z 15 September it was evident that the storm was recurving and that Okinawa and the shipping lanes from that point to Japan would receive the full effect of the storm.

On 16 September (Item time) the typhoon passed 50 miles to the east of Okinawa. A vivid account of this typhoon is found in a report from the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LST 896: "This ship was operating with Task Unit 32.6.2 returning from Tokyo area to Okinawa and entered Buckner Bay Saturday night, 15 September - - -."

After dragging anchor, having a narrow escape at the entrance net, and finally clearing the harbor Sunday morning, the following experiences were recorded:

"The seas had become mountainous and at about 1100 the wind had steadily increased to 35 knots with gusts estimated at 45 knots.

"At 1200 visibility had decreased to 500 to 1000 yards with constant rain and flying spray. The barometer was dropping rapidly at about .08 inch per hour.

"At 1700 the seas - - were estimated to be about 50 feet high and we were in danger - - if we could not hold our head into the sea.

"At about 1820 the ship fell off to starboard. One of these mountainous peaks estimated to be as high as the ship's con came crashing down on the main deck, bridge deck, and signal bridge, carrying off the crane, - - - spare stern anchor (third anchor lost today), 20MM gun and mount, 2 ready boxes, 50 feet of port life lines, a debarkation net, and a shaft alley vent blower. The starboard door of the wheelhouse was open and water half filled the wheelhouse - - -.

"The barometer was still dropping and read 28.72 inches at 1900; it had fallen .19 inches in one hour. The wind direction had not changed and had increased to about 60 knots. By 2100 the wind velocity had increased to 80 knots and the seas were more mountainous and confused. At 2227 the barometer needle went below the scale 27.7 inches; it fell 1.31 inches between 2200 and 2300!

"At 2305 the wind stopped abruptly; we were in the center! Changed course to 140° (T) at 1/3 S.S. The barometer was calculated by dividers to be at 26.90 inches. The worst was over; and was not too soon for anyone on board - - -."

From this point near Okinawa, the typhoon continued first NNE, and then NE, passing 150 miles NW of Tokyo at 0000Z 18 September. Continuing its NE course, it had no further effect upon units of the Force.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND DIVERSIONS ORDERED

Forces under this command at sea during this period consisted of 10 Task Groups and Task Units, comprising a total of 91 LSM, 88 LST, 13 APA, 5 AKA, and 30 miscellaneous types.

DIVERSION NO. 1

Task Unit 33.2.5 (19 LST, 1 LSM, 1 DE, 1 SC), entering Balintang Channel enroute Tokyo ordered to reverse course at 6 knots at 0520 Z 14 September.

DIVERSION NO. 2

Task Unit 32.6.3 (3 APA, 1 APH, 1 AKA, 1 DE, 1 APD) at 25°-20' N, 128°-22' E, enroute Tokyo to Okinawa ordered at 0508Z 14 September to continue on course at maximum speed.

DIVERSION NO. 3

Task Unit 32.6.1 (32 LSM, 1 APD) enroute Tokyo to Manila near 28°-22' N, 132°-10' E was ordered at 0510Z 14 September to slow to 6 knots and continue on course.

DIVERSION NO. 4

Task Unit 33.2.5, previously turned back to the westward of Luzon, was ordered at 0002Z 16 September to resume course for Tokyo. (At this time the typhoon had recurved and there was no chance that the convoy would overtake the storm.)

DIVERSION NO. 5

Task Unit 32.6.1 (32 LSM, 1 APD), previously slowed, enroute Tokyo to Manila, was ordered at 0552Z 15 September to proceed to the vicinity of 28.5° N, 128.5° E and operate within 20 miles of that point awaiting further orders.

DIVERSION NO. 6


Task Unit 32.6.4 (32 LSM, 1 APD), enroute Manila from Tokyo, was ordered at 0554Z 15 September to proceed to the vicinity of 27.5° N, 128° E, and operate within 20 miles of that point awaiting further orders.

DIVERSION NO. 7

Task Unit 32.6.1 (32 LSM, 1 APD) and Task Unit 32.6.4 (32 LSM, 1 APD) (see diversions 5 and 6 above) were ordered at 0835Z 16 September to proceed westward at maximum speed.

DIVERSION NO. 8

On September 18 and 19 all convoys were ordered to resume course to destination and sailing orders were re-issued for Task Groups and Task Units previously held up.



TYPHOON # 7

26 September - 1 October

From the time it was just apparent as a wave development on the Equatorial Front near 15.4° N 138° E at 0000Z 26 September, typhoon #7 formed very rapidly and moved to the westward.

On 28 September, the tropical disturbance reached typhoon proportions and appeared to be recurving to the north. The next day, however, recurvature had ceased, and movement to the west continued. Balintang Channel received the effect of the typhoon from 1800Z 29 September until 1200Z 30 September when it entered Formosa. Rapid dissipation took place after that time, and the storm entered the China coast between Amoy and Foochow around 2000Z 30 September.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND DIVERSIONS ORDERED

Eight Task Units comprising a total of 116 ships were at sea during this period. Major subdivisions by types included 37 LST, 31 APA, 25 LSM, and 12 AKA.

DIVERSION NO. 1

Task Unit 33.9.1 (2 APA, 2 AKA, 1 APD) at 23.5° N, 135° E, enroute Otaru, was ordered at 0942Z 27 September to change course to 120° (T). At this time recurvature of the typhoon to the NW was apparent.


DIVERSION NO. 2

Task Unit 33.9.2 (13 LST, 1 APD) enroute Tokyo to Okinawa was ordered to alter course to pass north of Amami O Shima and thence to destination at 1106Z 28 September.

DIVERSION NO. 3

Task Unit 33.9.1, previously ordered to course 120° (T) when danger of recurving existed, was ordered at 2354Z 28 September to proceed to destination.

No further diversions were necessary, and by 30 September all convoys at sea were proceeding to destination.



TYPHOON # 8

1 October - 5 October

Typhoon #8 first appeared as a tropical storm 50 miles north of Saipan on the 0600Z weather map for 1 October. By 1800Z 2 October the storm had moved WNW and NW from the vicinity of Saipan and had reached full typhoon proportions at 17.8° N, 139.5° E. From this point recurvature began, and the typhoon passed 100 miles to the SE of Tokyo Bay around 1600I on 5 October. Very soon thereafter it degenerated into a moderate extra-tropical cyclone and moved rapidly to the NE.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND DIVERSION ORDERED

One hundred seventy ships of the Force were at sea during the period 1-5 October, operating in 13 Task Groups and Task Units. The bulk of this shipping was LST, LSM, and APA types.

DIVERSION NO. 1

Task Unit 34.3.17 (4 AKA) enroute Leyte was ordered to return to Tokyo at 0118Z 2 October.

DIVERSION NO. 2

Task Unit 32.6.14 (1 AKA, 17 LSM) and Task Unit 33.9.4 (15 LST, 1 DE), both 450 miles SW of Tokyo Bay, were ordered at 1424Z 2 October to slow to 6 knots pending typhoon development.

DIVERSION NO. 3


Task Unit 32.6.14 (previously slowed to 6 knots) was ordered to take course 270° at maximum speed at 2244Z 3 October.

DIVERSION NO. 4

Task Unit 34.3.17, previously ordered to return to Tokyo Bay, was ordered to return at maximum speed at 2350Z 3 October.

DIVERSION NO. 5

At 0724Z 4 October, Task Units 33.9.4 and 32.6.14 were well in the clear to the westward of the typhoon and were ordered to resume course for destination.



TYPHOON #9

The Great Western Pacific Typhoon of 1945

4 October - 12 October

The first indication of typhoon #9 was apparent as a depression between Guam and Saipan at 1200Z 4 October. At that time typhoon #8 was at the height of its development 450 miles south of Honshu.

Shortly after 1600Z 4 October, the first hint of the extreme violence which typhoon #9 would soon assume came from CVE 98. Passing south of the storm area, CVE 98 reported winds of 50 knots with gusts to 75 knots, a pressure of 995 millibars, and 30 foot seas!

By 0000Z on the 5th, a slow movement to the NW had been noticeable, and at 0600 the center was located by aircraft at 16 N, 143.5 E, moving to the NW at 14 knots.

Continuing to the NW, the center was again located by aircraft at 0600Z 6 October at 19° N, 137° E. Winds had increased to force 14 near the center and to force 8 in a radius of 200 miles. The first of the atypical characteristics of this typhoon then appeared - by 1800Z it was clear that the track had shifted to WNW.

To further confuse the issue, an aircraft fix at 0600Z on the 7th at 20.5° N, 131.8° E indicated a continued movement to the WNW, but a deceleration to 10 knots.

The center was again located by aircraft at 1800Z on the 7th, this time at 21.2° N, 130° E - a perfect extrapolation of a 10 knot movement to the WNW. Winds in the center had increased to force 15.

At 0600Z on the 8th, the center was located at 22.5° N, 128.5° E - a sharp recurvature to the NW and a reliable indication that acceleration could be expected in a short time. Condition 1 was set on Okinawa.

Then came atypical characteristic number two. Instead of accelerating and recurving further, the typhoon actually decelerated and intensified. Sometime after 1800Z on the 8th when the center was in the vicinity of 25° N, 127.8° E, the typhoon must have come to an almost complete standstill, while the winds built up to force 16 and 17.

The center then passed directly over Okinawa around 0500Z 9 October, bringing winds in excess of 120 knots. Complete reports of the resulting damage are not yet available, but it is known that over 130 vessels were grounded, many lives lost, communications disrupted, and nearly all housing destroyed.

About this time, typhoon #9 displayed another amazing characteristic. Due to the existence of a well developed high over China (around 1030 millibars), an excessive gradient was established in the western or 'safe' semi-circle, while at the same time the eastern or 'dangerous' semi-circle experienced under-normal winds for a typhoon of this dimension - 120 knots with gusts

to 150 far out in the 'safe' semi-circle, and only 60 knots with gusts to 80 fairly close to the center in the 'dangerous' semi-circle.

Moving northward from Okinawa, the typhoon again recurved very sharply between 0600Z and 1800Z on 9 October, and continued on to the NE, entering Shikoku around 1400Z on the 9th, crossing southern Honshu, entering the Sea of Japan, and then re-entering northern Honshu at 1600Z on the 10th, where it merged with a frontal system and moved off to the NE.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND DIVERSIONS ORDERED

The most intense western Pacific typhoon in over 20 years occurred simultaneously with the peak in Third Amphibious Force ship movements. During this period, 19 Task Units of the Force with a total of 363 ships were at sea. Of these, 153 were LST's, 105 LSM's, and the remainder miscellaneous types

As might be expected, the number of diversions ordered was large, but the fact that such a large amount of shipping was controlled without loss (or even real danger) is sufficient justification of the methods used.

DIVERSION NO. 1

Task Unit 34.9.1 (2 APA, 2 AKA, 1 APD), at 26° N, 139.5° E, enroute Otaru from the Philippines, changed course to 340° (T) at 1100Z on 5 October, acting independently.

DIVERSION NO. 2

TransRon 19 (7 APA, 2 AKA, 1 APD), enroute Tokyo from Legaspi was slowed to 6 knots at 2354Z 5 October near position 19° N, 131° E.

DIVERSION NO. 3

Task Unit 34.9.1 which had previously changed course to 340° (T) was ordered to continue that course at maximum speed at 0200Z 6 October.

DIVERSION NO. 4

TransRon 19, previously slowed to 6 knots was ordered at 0432Z 6 October to reverse course at maximum speed.


DIVERSION NO. 5

Task Unit 34.9.1, which had previously changed course to 340° (T) independently and increased to maximum speed on our orders, requested permission to set northeasterly course and try to outrun typhoon. At 0648Z 6 October orders were issued to that effect.

DIVERSION NO. 6

Task Unit 33.2.9 (17 LST, 1 APD) enroute Manila to Tokyo north of Luzon, was ordered at 1108Z 6 October to change course to 150° (T).

(Continued on next page)



DIVERSION NO. 7

Task Unit 33.2.12 (29 LSM, 1 DE, 1 LCI) enroute Manila to Tokyo, was ordered at 1110Z 6 October to change course to 135° (T) upon clearing Balintang Channel.

DIVERSION NO. 8

TransRon 19, which had previously retired at maximum speed on course 340° (T), was ordered at 0750Z 7 October to alter course for destination (Tokyo), passing southward and eastward and clear of typhoon.

DIVERSION NO. 9

Task Unit 34.3.17 (4 AKA, 1 LSD), enroute Tokyo to Manila in vicinity of 31° N, 134° E, was ordered at 1132Z 7 October to slow to 6 knots.

DIVERSION NO. 10

Task Unit 34.3.17 (above) was ordered at 1122Z 8 October to come to course 180° (T) and resume normal speed.

DIVERSION NO. 11

Task Unit 32.6.15 (16 LST, 1 DD), enroute Tokyo to Manila in vicinity of 29.5° N, 132.5° E was ordered at 1128Z 8 October to change to course 180° (T).

DIVERSION NO. 12

Task Unit 32.6.16 (16 LST, 1 DE) enroute Leyte at 34.4° N, 138.7° E, was ordered to return to Tokyo Bay at 2248Z 8 October.

DIVERSION NO. 13

Task Unit 33.9.2 (11 LST, 1 DE) enroute Okinawa to Tokyo in vicinity of 31° N, 133.4° E, was ordered at 2252Z 8 October to change to course 135° (T).

DIVERSION NO. 14

Task Unit 34.3.17 (see diversions 9 and 10) was ordered at 2254Z to change to course 135° (T).

DIVERSION NO. 15

Task Unit 34.8.10 (3 AKA) enroute Ominato to Leyte was ordered to reverse course and return to Ominato at 0218Z 9 October while in the vicinity of 40.5° N, 142.7° E.

DIVERSION NO. 16

TransRon 19 (see diversion #8) was ordered to slow to 6 knots until daylight and then resume speed.

DIVERSION NO. 17

Task Unit 34.8.9 (10 APA, 5 AKA) enroute Hokkaido to Samar near 35.3° N, 141° E was ordered to proceed to Tokyo Bay.

DIVERSION NO. 18

Task Unit 33.9.2 (see diversion no. 13) was reassured at 1132Z 9 October that a southeasterly course would clear the typhoon.

DIVERSION NO. 19

Upon recommendation of CTF 34, T.U. 34.8.10 (see diversion no. 15) was ordered to proceed to destination (Leyte).

DIVERSION NO. 20

Task Unit 34.3.17 (see diversions 9, 10, and 14) was ordered at 1208Z 9 October to resume course for destination (Manila) at midnight I.

DIVERSION NO. 21

Task Unit 32.6.15 (see diversion no. 11) was ordered at 1212Z 9 October to resume course for destination (Manila).

DIVERSION NO. 22

Task Unit 34.8.10 (see diversions 15 and 19) was ordered at 2358Z 9 October to remain north of 40° N.

DIVERSION NO. 23

TransRon 19 (see diversions no. 8 and no. 16) was ordered at 0002 10 October to change to a southeasterly course at discretionary speed. (Recurvature was giving heavy weather but no real danger).

On 11 October, orders to proceed to destination were issued to all Task Units not previously so ordered.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The occupation of Northern Japan firmly demonstrates the undesirability of ever conducting an assault landing against Japan during the typhoon season. While this force suffered no serious loss, diversions and subsequent delays were frequent and necessary.
2. While it is not always desirable to do so, slow and weather vulnerable convoys can be moved through the typhoon belt, provided sufficient weather information is available. The most valuable weather information has been aircraft weather reports obtained by special weather reconnaissance planes.
3. It appears that no circumstances less than urgent military necessity is sufficient to permit the exposure of a tow convoy to the hazards of typhoon weather. During this period, three tow convoys were dispersed and partly sunk north of Luzon with considerable loss of life and material.
4. The desirability of attempting to forecast the movement of a typhoon during its early stages is open to question. Experience has indicated that proper timing of a diversion order is of great importance, and that only after several accurate plots of a typhoon center are available can a sound diversion order be formulated. In several instances, premature individual action predicated on a predicted track of a young typhoon resulted in considerable confusion.
5. The value of Okinawa as a major base or staging point in any future operation appears extremely low.