1. Early in August estimates of the situation indicated that the collapse of Japanese resistance might occur within a matter of days. The THIRD Fleet had been scheduled to return to Eniwetok and Leyte for replenishment prior to resumption of offensive operations in September but the trend of events necessitated the remaining in the Empire area in order to capitalize on any weakness of great magnitude which might develop. Orders were issued by Commander THIRD Fleet to keep the logistic pipe-line full in case it became necessary to indefinitely prolong operations in Empire waters; no single decision contributed more to the later success of the THIRD Fleet in reorganizing for occupation.

2. By 10 August planning was well in hand to meet by emergency measures the contingency of surrender; radical improvisations were conceived and laid out, and extensive lists of ships, equipment, facilities and personnel were prepared for dispatch submission to CincPac. Commander THIRD Fleet’s Operation Plan 10-45, in the rough, was discussed with all interested commanders and although it was not promulgated in its entirety until 19 August, most of its provisions were separately covered by dispatch or verbal warning orders prior to 15 August. The forces afloat were called upon to organize marine and blue jacket landing force components and to assemble groups of specialists and artificers to permit the establishment of temporary emergency shore facilities and to operate seized Japanese facilities and equipment.
SECRET

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THIRD FLEET

Subject: Report on Operations of the THIRD Fleet 16 August 1945 to 19 September 1945.

3. One essential was a Fleet Landing Force to assist in the occupation of selected areas in the Tokyo Bay region. All available Marines on ships present were organized into a provisional Marine regiment, strength approximately 2000. Three naval battalions, organized and equipped from the three Task Groups of Task Force 38 and a British naval battalion from Task Force 37, each battalion of an approximate strength of 400, completed initial force from the Fleet available for landings. A reserve force of 5 battalions, with personnel drawn from ships present, was available but poorly equipped and remained boated. It was impossible to equip the Fleet Landing Force with combat supplies and equipment from Fleet sources, adequate for meeting organized resistance ashore; fortunately no such resistance developed.

4. Following the pattern employed by this command in the South Pacific, an expeditionary force command, Task Force 31, was set up with Rear Admiral O.C. Badger, U.S. Navy, as Commander Task Force 31; in collaboration with Commander THIRD Fleet, Commander Task Force 31 prepared his operation plan and set up his task organization with commanders and personnel detailed from the forces afloat for this temporary additional duty. Centralized unified command was the essence of the Task Force 31 organization.

5. Plans and organization included provision for the occupation and development of the Yokosuka Naval Base and air station, the manning of many enemy vessels with nucleus crews, the demilitarization of enemy installations, the rescue of our prisoners of war in Japanese hands, supply drops to prisoners of war camps, in fact, a multitude of tasks normally not required of a combatant striking force at sea. All hands responded to the unusual demands enthusiastically and well.

6. The assistance requested from CinCPac was provided most expeditiously, and by 20 August the Fleet Landing Force components were being transferred to APAs, ADEs, LSDs, and LSVs afloat, as these ships became available. The arrival from Guam of the 4th Marine ADT added much needed strength and permitted the organization of an effective force spearheaded by seasoned combat troops and followed in by the lightly-armed and quickly-formed THIRD Fleet Landing Force components.

7. Assembly areas were delineated southeast of Tokyo just outside of any effective enemy air threat. An enormous heterogeneous fleet gradually assembled so that at one time some 250 ships of all classes were in the assembly area.

8. In the meantime, (circa 12-13 August) diplomatic negotiations seemed to be progressing slowly, so offensive air operations were intensified; the Commander THIRD Fleet saw no reason why the enemy should be spared if he was behaving in a dilatory manner but still in a belligerent status.
9. The "cease firing" order came on 15 August even as the first wave of a carrier-plane attack arrived over the Tokyo area.

10. The initial landing of Army, Navy and Marine components was originally scheduled on 28 August but foul weather to the west interfered with Army airborne movements and the Supreme Commander, General of the Army MacArthur set 30 August as the simultaneous date for the forces of all services. The THIRD Fleet occupation force and covering forces were busy dodging typhoons and due to the fact that the landing force and components were already embarked and in congested situation, Commander THIRD Fleet recommended the entry be made into Sagami Wan on the 27th.

11. On the morning of the 27th Japanese emissary Captain I. Otani from the Japanese Navy Department, Captain Y. Takasaki from the Yokosuka Naval District Command, and various Japanese pilots, embarked in the Japanese destroyer Hatusakura, effected rendezvous with the MISSOURI and were transferred to the MISSOURI to receive instructions from Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to Commander THIRD Fleet, and to give information concerning hydrographic and minefield matters. After receiving general instructions concerning the occupation of Tokyo Bay waters and the Naval Control Zone around Yokosuka, the Japanese emissaries were further instructed in detail by Rear Admiral Badger in matters concerning the occupation of the Naval Control Zone by landing forces.

12. Satisfied with the minefield information, the advance units of the THIRD Fleet led by the U.S.S. MISSOURI and including the H.M.S. DUKE OF YORK, Flagship of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, CinCFFE, approached selected anchorage in Sagami Wan, while advance contingents of minesweepers commenced minesweeping at the mouth of Uraga Suido Channel. At sunset from the U.S.S. MISSOURI's anchorage the sun appeared to descend into the crater of Fujiyama; the symbolism was obvious. (See photo attached).

13. The other elements of the THIRD Fleet followed into Sagami Wan while the carriers remained in covering position and kept the eastern part of Honshu under tight aerial surveillance.

14. On 28 August the minesweepers, and a few light units entered Tokyo Bay; by 29 August at 1400 Itum, upon arrival in Tokyo Bay of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, 3 BBs, including U.S.S. MISSOURI, THIRD Fleet Flagship and U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA, CinPac's Flagship, 2 CLs, and many DDs were anchored off Yokosuka. The OEBs remained in Sagami Wan, prepared to furnish fire support for the landings of the 11th Airborne Division 30 August.
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15. The landings 30 August were made as planned, without untoward incident. Landings to insure neutralization of Japanese forts bearing on the entrances to Tokyo Bay were made initially at 0600 followed at Hour 1000 Item - by the main landings at the Yokosuka Naval Base and Yokosuka Airfield. There were no requests for fire support at Yokosuka or Atsugi; the Japanese were docile and eager to avoid friction. Vice Admiral Totsuka of the Japanese Navy transferred custody and control of the Yokosuka Naval Base and Airfield to Rear Admiral Carney, acting as representative of Commander THIRD Fleet and CinCPac. The surrender took place on the waterfront of the Yokosuka Naval Base.

16. Task Group 30.6, organized early to deal with an anticipated necessity to provide adequate and quick rescue of our prisoners of war under Japanese control, proved effective and invaluable. Starting 29 August, ships were sent to waterfront camps on Tokyo Bay, and the prisoners of war found therein rescued from intolerable conditions. Operations were gradually widened, and fullest use was made of this Task Group. After evacuation from the Tokyo area, rescue missions covered the Nagoya and Sendai areas; by 15 September 7591 former prisoners of war had been rescued, processed, clothed, hospitalized where necessary, and evacuation to rear areas started by ship and plane. This Task Group is preparing a special report on its operations; it executed in brilliant speedy fashion an unusual, difficult mission.

17. On 2 September, aboard the U.S.S. MISSOURI, the formal surrender of the Japanese was received by General of the Army MacArthur (Supreme Commander) and by representatives of the Allied Powers. An impressive and forceful note was added by the debarking at the Yokohama docks of the 1st Cavalry Division, brought from Luzon by Commander Task Force 32, Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The period of preparation was finished; the occupation of Japan had begun.

18. Utilizing the amphibious facilities under Vice Admiral Wilkinson, troops of the Eighth Army continued to pour into the Tokyo Area. The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team was put ashore at Tatenaya the 3rd, relieving an advance detachment of marines; debarkation of the 1st Cavalry Division at Yokohama was completed 4 September; the Americal Division came in 8 September, the 43rd Division, 13 September. On 15 September, elements of the 11th Airborne Division were transported by surface and landed at Sendai, after necessary preliminary minesweeping.

19. Task Force 35, the fire support force, while not called upon to perform its intended task, nevertheless found unusual and profitable employment. Known Japanese suicide boat and torpedo nests and coastal batteries in the Tokyo area were first demilitarized and the midget subs, kaiten and boats destroyed or sunk; then a carefully-planned, methodical search was made of the Japanese coastline in the THIRD Fleet zone of responsibility, utilizing all possible sources of intelligence, resulting in elimination of numerous potential
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threats to surface operations afforded by the cave-concealed Japanese midgets, boats, and torpedoes.

20. Yokosuka Airfield was found not suitable for heavy landplanes due to shortness of runway and nearby hill masses; Kisarazu Airfield was obtained for limited development for use by heavy planes. Marine Air Group 31 was established at Yokosuka Airfield to make maximum use of Japanese air facilities already established there; NATS facilities were set up at Kisarazu by 6 September, and were of material assistance in evacuation to rear areas of the rescued prisoners of war.

21. A semi-permanent organization was devised to take over from Commander Task Force 31 at such time as the situation had sufficiently stabilized. Commodore O.O. Kessing had been brought in and served with CTF 31 during the occupation. The fleet components of the landing force were returned to their ships as the situation became progressively secure and by the 8th of September it was considered that the semi-permanent organization would be established. Task Force 31 was dissolved on that date and its functions were apportioned between CTF 39, (Commodore Kessing, Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka) and CTF 30.9, (Commodore Jasper Acuff) who was assigned the duties of SOFA Admin. The sea-going tasks in the coastal area were being performed by CTF 35, Rear Admiral J.C. Jones, and by CTF 30.6, Commodore Roger Simpson engaged in POW rescue operations.

22. CTF 39 was given command of the Yokosuka Naval Station, Yokosuka Air Station, Kisarazu Air Field, Landing Force 4th Marine RT and special elements attached to the Naval Base, instructions were given to him to continue work on industrial surveys, inventories of Japanese equipment and material, and similar tasks in connection with stabilization of the Naval Control Zone in accordance with the terms of the surrender. The semi-permanent organization decentralized to Task Force Commanders virtually all of Commander THIRD Fleet's tasks other than those of planning and supervision -- a concept considered necessary in view of the prospective relieving of Commander THIRD Fleet by the Commander FIFTH Fleet who would come into the area unfamiliar with the details of the situation.

23. The airborne movement of the 11th Airborne Division and the 27th Infantry Division into the Tokyo area, commenced 30 August, was initially given fighter cover by Task Force 38. It soon became apparent that no necessity existed for air cover; surface units were maintained along the line of flight of the transport planes until 14 September, for possible rescue employment.

24. Elements of the Fast Carrier Task Force continued to maintain surveillance over the allocated THIRD Fleet portion of Honshu until their duty was taken over by MAG 31 based at Yokosuka at which time the function of the
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Carrier force became one of strategic support.

25. 19 September saw the completion of THIRD Fleet tasks in the
Tokyo area; those units which were to remain in Japanese waters were placed
under Commander FIFTH Fleet; the remainder prepared for early departure to
West Coast ports.

26. The period reported on herein was characterized by rapidity
of planning and execution by THIRD Fleet forces of many varied and novel tasks.
Personnel met the demands with enthusiasm, intelligence and initiative, pro-
viding a fitting finale to their long, epic fight to crush Japan.

W.F. HALSEY

W.F. HALSEY.
OPERATION PLAN
NO. 10-45

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET
TOKYO BAY OCCUPATION FORCE
U.S.S. MISSOURI, FLAGSHIP
AT SEA
19 August 1945.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Task Group 30.1, Fleet Flagship Group, Captain Murray.
(b) Task Group 30.2, British Flagship Group, Captain A. D. Micholl.
(c) Task Group 30.3, Air Search and Reconnaissance Group, Captain Grant.
(d) Task Group 30.4, Allied POW Rescue Group, Commodore Simpson.
(f) Task Group 30.6, Eniwetok Service Group, Commodore Acuff.
(g) Task Force 31, Yokosuka Occupation Force, R.Adm. Badger.
(h) Task Force 35, Support Force, R.Adm. Jones
(i) Task Force 37, British Support Force, V.Adm. Rawlings, R.N.

Units assigned to all groups and forces indicated above are shown in Annex A.

1. Japan has capitulated. Further information of the Tokyo Bay Area will be obtained by Commander THIRD Fleet from Japanese officials who tender local surrenders. This Operation Plan stems from CinCPac and CinCPA Operation Plan 12-45. It covers the initial entrance into the Tokyo Bay Area and the seizure of Yokosuka naval zone only, which operations coincide with the execution of CinCPac BRANCH SEAT operation. Commander THIRD Fleet will issue other Operation Plans to cover the later phases of operations required by CinCPac and CinCPA Operation Plan 12-45.

Enemy Forces

General - will be instructed to conduct themselves in accordance with directives received from Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet or, if superior instructions have not been received, as Commander THIRD Fleet may direct.

Enemy Forces, will, as appropriate;

(a) Retire beyond prescribed boundary of occupied zone.
(b) Assemble, disarmed, in prescribed areas.
19 August 1945

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EXECUTIVE PLAN

(c) Exercise control over their own assigned forces or functions under U.S. direction.

OWN FORCES: THIRD Fleet forces will be deployed as described herein or as later directed. Simultaneously with the execution of this plan airborne troops under the command of Commanding General 8th Army will land in the KANTO PLAIN area and seize airfields and other objectives in the general area of Tokyo.

3. (a)(b) Task Groups 30.1 and 30.2, operate as directed by Commander THIRD Fleet.

(c) Task Group 30.5, conduct air search and reconnaissance and provide limited air transportation as directed by Commander THIRD Fleet. (See Annex D).

(d) Task Group 30.6, operate as directed by Commander THIRD Fleet to receive, care for and evacuate Allied Prisoners of War.

(e) Task Group 30.8, while operating as specified in Movement Schedule, Annex C, provide logistic support for THIRD Fleet forces at sea and for Task Forces 31, 35 and Task Group 30.1 in Tokyo Bay Area in accordance with Logistics Plan, Annex E.

(f) Task Group 30.9, provide maximum logistic and repair services to all fleet units at Eniwetok and in the Tokyo Bay Area as later directed.

(g) Task Force 31, when and as directed by Commander THIRD Fleet establish headquarters in the Yokosuka Area and execute the tasks outlined in Letter of Instructions, Annex B.

(h) Task Force 35, make demonstration in force in Sagami Wan when directed.

Reinforce, support and cover Task Groups 30.1, 30.2 and Task Force 31 when directed.
(i) Task Force 37, make demonstration in force in Sagami Wan when directed. Reinforce, support and cover Task Groups 30.1, 30.2, Task Forces 31 and 35 when directed. CTF 37 arrange for own logistics. In Tokyo Bay area keeping Commander THIRD Fleet and CTF 35 advised of required movements.

(j) Task Force 38, while operating in areas in accordance with Movement Schedule, Annex C, support Task Force 31 by conducting air search of the sea approaches to Tokyo Bay and air patrol of all airfields in Honshu as specified in air Plan, Annex D. Maintain day and night CAP over T.G. 30.1, T.G. 30.2, T.F. 31, T.F. 35 and 37 in Sagami Wan and Yokosuka as directed. Be prepared to strike airborne or grounded enemy aircraft, ground air installations, and enemy troop formations if specifically directed by Commander THIRD Fleet. Provide air Commander and staff, maintenance, communication and control personnel for emergency operation of one airfield in Tokyo Bay area as specified by Commander Task Force 31. Be prepared to reinforce and/or cover forces in Tokyo Bay area.

(x)(1) Tokyo Bay is conquered territory and all Japanese are the enemies of the United States and Allied Nations.

(2) All CV, CVL, BB, CL, and CL assigned to Task Forces 31, 35 and 38 organize marine and bluejacket landing force units to report to Commander Task Force 31 when directed in accordance with instructions prepared by Commander Task Force 31 and approved by Commander THIRD Fleet.

(3) Be prepared to receive surrender of enemy submarines at sea and escort them into specified ports.

(4) Operation Plans 11-45 and 12-45 to be issued will cover later phases of these operations.

4. Logistics in accordance with Logistics Plan, Annex E.

A16-5/(11)
Serial 00276

19 August 1945

Operations Plan
TC-12-45

Public Relations as per Annex G.
This Operation Plan will be placed in effect by dispatch.

[Signature]
N. F. Halsey
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander THIRD Fleet.

Annexes:
A. Assignment of Forces.
B. Letter of Instructions to Commander Task Force 31.
C. Movement Schedule.
D. Air Plan.
E. Logistics Plan.
F. Command Relations.
G. Public Information.
H. Communications.
I. Typhoon Plan.
J. Minesweeping Plan.
K. Initial Terms of Surrender.

Distribution:
(See Distribution List attached).

[Signature]
H. E. Stassen
Flag Secretary.
ANNEX "A" TO COMMANDER THIRD FLEET OPERATION PLAN NO. 10-45.

ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES

(1) Task Group 30.1

MISSOURI (BB 63)
TAYLOR (DD 468)
NICHOLAS (DD 449)
O'BANNON (DD 450)

(1) Formed when directed.

Task Group 30.2

DUKE OF YORK
WHelp
WAGER

Task Group 30.5

CUMBERLAND SOUND (AV 17)
HAMLIN (AV 15)
GARDINERS BAY (AVP 39)
SUJIN (AVP 53)
MACKINAC (AVP 13)
VPB 26
VPB 208

Task Group 30.6

SAN JUAN (CL 54) (ComTaskFlot 6)(F)
Forces and facilities as assigned.

Task Group 30.8

DETROIT (CL 8)(GF)

AO

TALUGA (AO 62)
ASHATABULA (AO 51)
CACAPON (AO 52)
NANTAHALA (AO 60)
CHIPOLA (AO 63)
SABINE (AO 25)
PATUXENT (AO 44)
CALIFANTE (AO 52)
HOUSATONIC (AO 35)
KENNERBAG (AO 81)
CACHE (AO 67)
COSSATOT (AO 77)

KASKASKIA (AO 27)
TAPPAHANNOCK (AO 43)
AUCILLA (AO 56)
ESCALANTE (AO 70)
MESHANIC (AO 71)
CAHABA (AO 82)
NEOSHO (AO 48)
KANKAKEE (AO 39)
MARIAS (AO 57)
PLATTE (AO 24)
NECHES (AO 47)
CIMARRON (AO 22)

SCHUYLKILL (AO 76)
TOMAHAWK (AO 88)
KERRIMACK (AO 37)
MASCOTA (AO 83)
LACKAWANNA (AO 40)
ESCAMBIA (AO 90)
CHICOPPE (AO 34)
MANATEE (AO 58)
CANEY (AO 95)
ATASCOSA (AO 66)
SEBEC (AO 87)
PAMANSET (AO 85)
CHICKASKIA (AO 54)
**ANEX "A" TO COMMANDER THIRD FLEET OPERATION PLAN NO. 10-45**

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<td>MUNDA (CVE 104)</td>
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<td>HOLLANDIA (CVE 97)</td>
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**ESCORTS**

| STEWENSON (DD 645)(GDS 19) | CROWLEY (DE 303) |
| GILLESPIE (DD 609)(CDD 28) | DIONNE (DE 261) |
| KALK (DD 611)              | CANFIELD (DE 262) |
| STOCKTON (DD 646)          | ELDEN (DE 264) |
| THORN (DD 647)             | DEEDE (DE 263) |
| NICHOLSON (DD 443)         | LE RAY WILSON (DE 414) |
| WILKES (DD 441)(CDD 14)    | WILLMARTH (DE 638) |
| WOODWORTH (DD 460)         | CARLSON (DE 9) |
| TERRY (DD 513)             | W. C. MILLER (DE 259)(CED 16) |
| BRISTOL (DD 857)           | GRISWOLD (DE 7)(CED 8) |
| HOFENWELL (DD 681)         | LAKE (DE 301) |
| ROSS (DD 563)              | CARANA (DE 260) |
| JOS. E. CONNOLLY (DE 450)  | DONALDSON (DE 44) |
| MITCHELL (DE 43)           | LYMAN (DE 302) |
| REYNOLDS (DE 42)(CED 49)   | HILBERT (DE 742) |
| LAMONS (DE 743)            | McCLELLAND (DE 750) |

**Task Group 30.2**

- Units currently assigned.
ANNEX "A" TO COMMANDER THIRD FLEET OPERATION PLAN NO. 10-45

Task Force 31

IOWA (BB 61)

(1) SAN DIEGO (CL 53)(FF)

DesDiv 106

MinDiv 20

HOPKINS (DG 13)
ELLYSON (DG 19)(CN 20)
HAMPTON (DG 20)
GERARDI (DG 30)
JEFFERS (DG 27)
MACOMB (DG 32)
FITCH (DG 25)
CWIN (DM 33)
FRAZER (DM 24)

MinDiv 13

REVENGE (AM 110)
TOKEN (AM 126)
TUNULT (AM 127)

MinDiv 24

POCHARD (AM 375)

MinRon 104

PICKET (ACM 8)
REQUISITE (AM 109)
SAGE (AM 111)

YMS 177, 268, 276, 243, 362, 461, 371, 390, 415, 426, 441, 467

10 APD's

BARR (APD 39)
SIMS (APD 60)
REEVES (APD 52)
PAVLIC (APD 70)
RUNELS (APD 85)
H. A. BASS (APD 124)
WANTUCK (APD 125)
COSSELIN (AD 126)

Wm. J. PATTERSON (APD 104)

BECK (APD 127)

CZANK (LV 2)
MONITOR (LKA 5)
SHAPWELL (LSD 15)(With Landing Craft)
SAN ANGELO (LSD 25)
BERNSTEIN (APA 203)
LANZER (APA 125)
MELANIE (APA 126)
BROXTON (APA 138)
GRIMES (APA 172)
WANESHA (AKA 84)
ANNEX "A" TO COMMANDER THIRD FLEET OPERATION PLAN NO. 10-45

Task Force 31 (cont'd)

LSM 252, 208, 290, 362, 368, 371, 419, 488, 13, 71, 101, 284, 15
(Com LSM Group 35 in LSM 252)

LST 567, 643, 1139, 1083

1/2 CB Battalion (Regular)

20 Interpreters and Translators

1 Advanced Air Base Assembly

10 LCI(10M)R

40 LCS(L)(3)

1 RCT (4th Reg't, 6th MarDiv)

Notes:

(1) Commander Task Flotilla FOUR shift to destroyer of DesDiv 106.

(1) Task Force 35

PASADENA (CL 65)(FF)

SPRINGFIELD (CL 66)

WILKES-BARRE (CL 103)

ASTORIA (CL 90)

QUINCY (CA 71)(ComCruDiv 10)

BOSTON (CA 69)

CHICAGO (CA 186)

ST. PAUL (CA 73)

(2) SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57)

CONTENTS (CVL 25)

DesRon 50

DesDiv 105

(9 DD)

(5 DD)

(3) BUCHANAN (DD 484)

(3) LANSDOWNE (DD 436)

(2) LARDNER (DD 487)

BANDED (DE 729)(CEC 32)

WATERMAN (DE 740)

WEAVER (DE 741)

KYNE (DE 744)

WENATCHEE (ATF 118)

MOCICSI (ATF 105)

TAMALPAIS (AO 96)

FLETCHER (AD 17)

DELA (AR 9)

PROTEUS (AS 19)

GREENLEAF (ASR 10)

SATRY (ARL 23)

TRAPSEY (AH 14)

REYNOLDS (AH 13)

TJITPALENGA (H3 3)

RESCE (AH 18)

LST 656

Reinforcements from Task Force 38 as directed by Commander THIRD Fleet.
SECRET

ANNEX "A" TO COMMANDER THIRD FLEET OPERATION PLAN NO. 10-45

Notes:
(1) Units this force report to CTF 31 for duty when requested by him or when directed by Commander THIRD Fleet.
(2) Flagship for CinCPac when present.
(3) Available as escorts for SOUTH DAKOTA if required.

Task Group 35.90

(Under direct control of Commander THIRD Fleet until otherwise directed).

IDAHO (BB 42)(F)
MISSISSIPPI (BB 41)
NEW MEXICO (BB 40)
WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48)(CRD 4)
COLORADO (BB 45)
Escorts as may be assigned.

Task Force 37

KING GEORGE V (BB)
NEWFOUNDLAND (CL)
GAHLIA (CL)
NAPIER (DD)
NIZAM (DD)

SECOND Carrier Task Force (Task Force 38)

Task Group 38.1

BENNINGTON
LEXINGTON
HANCOCK
SAM JACINTO
BELLEAU WOOD
ALABAMA
INDIANA
AMSTERDAM
OKLAHOMA CITY
TUCSON

DE HAVEN (CDS 61)
MANSFIELD
LYMAN K. SWENSON
COLLETT
MADDOX
SANGUINIV. MOORE
BRUSH
BLUE
TAUSSIG
JOHN RODGERS (CDS 25)
HARRISON
MC KEE
MURRAY
RINGGOLD
SCHROEDER
DASHIELL
HIGBEE
### Task Group 38.3

| RANDOLPH | ERSBEN (CDS 48) | TEAZER (Plot 24) |
| ESSEX | WALKER | TENACIOUS |
| TICONDEROGA | HALE | TERMAGENT |
| INDESTRUCTIBLE | STEMBEL | TERRORSCHORE |
| MONTEREY | BLACK | TROUBLEDGE |
| DAVAAN | CHAUNCEY | WRANGLER (Plot 27) |
| NORTH CAROLINA | BARTON (CDS 50) | WAKEFUL |
| MASSACHUSETTS | WALKE | BARTLE |
| TOPEKA | HEIDMANN | BARFLEUR (Plot 19)(F) |
| DULUTH | SOUTHERLAND | |
| OAKLAND | BENNER | |

### Task Group 38.4

| YORKTOWN | WATTS (CDS 57) | ENGLISH (CDS 62) |
| SHAFTO LA | WREN | CHAS. S. SPERRY |
| WASP | SMLLEY | HANK |
| DON HOMER RICHARD | STODDARD | AULT |
| INDEPENDENCE | ROWE | WALDRON |
| WISCONSIN | CHEVALIER (CDS 10) | JOHN W. WEEKS |
| ATLANTA | FRANK KNOX | WALLACE L. LIND |
| DAYTON | NORMAN SCOTT | |
| FLINT | WADSWORTH | |
| | BULLARD | |
1st Endorsement on
ComjndFlt, sec. ltr.,
serial 88007, dated
6 October 1945.

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Report on Operations of the THIRD Fleet 16
August 1945 to 19 September 1945.

1. Forwarded.

2. If comment is considered appropriate, it will be
included in Cincpac's Monthly Report of Operations in the Pacific
Ocean Areas for the month concerned.

R. C. PARKER,
By direction
SECRET

1st Endorsement on
Com3rdFlt, Sec. ltr.,
Serial RE007, dated
6 October 1945.

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Commander THIRD Fleet report on operations 16 August -
19 September 1945.

1. Forwarded.

2. The operations of the Third Fleet during the period
16 August - 19 September 1945 conformed to basic plans and strategic
directives issued by CinCPac after consultation with the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers.

3. These final operations of the Third Fleet in the war
against Japan were conducted with the same bold leadership and
vigorous initiative which characterized the operations of the Third
Fleet throughout the war.

4. Attention is particularly invited to the fact that on
the day of the Japanese surrender, 2 September 1945, bad weather
had prevented the arrival of any appreciable Army combat strength
and the Third Fleet and its landing forces were the principal elements
of strength at the disposal of the Supreme Commander.

5. CinCPac desires particularly to commend the manner in
which ComTHIRDFlt initiated measures for the early recovery and
for adequate care of the officers and men who were in enemy prisons
in the Tokyo area. The humanitarian tasks involved were accomplished
in such a manner as to bring great credit on the Navy.

CHESTER W. NIMITZ.

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