

DECLASSIFIED

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

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CA69/A12-1
Serial 0293

U.S.S. BOSTON
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

12 November 1945

From: Commanding Officer.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: ~~(1) Commander Task Group 53.2 (CO SAINT PAUL).~~
(1) Commander Task Force 53 (ComCruDivSEVENTEEN).
(2) Commander FIFTH Fleet.
(3) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report, U.S.S. BOSTON, for period 3 September 1945 to 1 November 1945.

References: (a) Admin. Office of CTF 53 despatch 100402 of November 1945.
(b) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45.

Enclosures: ✓ (A) Copy of CO BOSTON CA69/A4-3, serial 0275, dated 16 September 1945 - Report of Demilitarization of Suicide Bases at KATSUURA and KOMINATO. *P. 6*
✓ (B) Copy of CO BOSTON CA69/A4-3, serial 0279, dated 29 September 1945 - Report of Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI areas. *P. 27*

1. As directed by reference (a), the action report of the U.S.S. BOSTON for the period 3 September 1945 to 1 November 1945, inclusive, is submitted herewith in accordance with reference (b).

PART I. BRIEF SUMMARY.

BOSTON operated as a unit of various Task Groups of the THIRD and FIFTH Fleets, taking part in operations supporting the occupation of the TOKYO BAY area of JAPAN and conducting several demilitarization tasks on the Eastern coast of HONSHU.

PART II. PRELIMINARIES.

A. On 3 September, BOSTON was operating as a unit of Task Force 35, Support Force of the THIRD Fleet, consisting at that time of the following units: COWPENS, SOUTH DAKOTA, QUINCY, BOSTON, SAINT PAUL, CHICAGO, PASADENA (F), WILKES-BARRE, SPRINGFIELD, CLARENCE K. BRONSON, COTTEN, DORTCH, GATLING, HEALY, COGSWELL, CAPERTON, INGERSOLL, KNAPP, CUSHING, COLAHAN, HALSEY POWELL, BENHAM, UHLMANN, BUCHANAN, LANSDOWNE, LARDNER, FRANK KNOX, IDAHO, MISSISSIPPI, NEW MEXICO, WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO, MOLALA, BEGOR, PATTISON, BANGUST, WATERMAN, WEAVER, KYNE, WENATCHEE, MOCTOBI, TAMALPAIS, PIEDMONT, DELTA, PROTEUS, GREENLET, SATYR, TRANQUILLITY, BENEVOLENCE, TJITJALENGA, LST 648, and ANCON. This organization was highly flexible and underwent several changes during the period covered by this report as units entered or departed the area.

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At 0000 ITEM, 20 September 1945, the Task Force designation was changed to Task Force 53, Eastern JAPAN Force, and the organization was extended to include several shore activities as well as air and service groups. While part of Task Force 35, BOSTON's immediate superior in command was ComCruDivTEN - Rear Admiral Wiltse, USS QUINCY, flagship. As a unit of Task Force 53, BOSTON's immediate superior in command was ComCruDivTEN (Admin) - Captain von Heimburg, USS SAINT PAUL, flagship.

B. No comment.

C. Operations during the period were in accordance with the following operation plans and operation orders: ComTHIRDFleet's OpPlans #10-45, #11-45, and #12-45; ComFIFTHFleet's OpPlan #9-45; ComCruDivSEVENTEEN's OpOrders #11-45 and #17-45 and OpPlans #12-45, #13-45 and #14-45; ComCruDivTEN's OpOrder #4-45; and CO BOSTON's OpOrders #1-45, #2-45 and #4-45.

While operating with Task Force 35 (Support Force) and Task Force 53 (Eastern JAPAN Force), BOSTON's tasks were to assist in supporting other THIRD and FIFTH Fleet forces as required and, in coordination with the EIGHTH Army, to inspect Japanese naval installations and take action as directed to insure effective demilitarization thereof.

D. No comment.

E. No comment.

PART III. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT.

1. The following is a brief chronological summary of operations covering the entire period from 3 September to 1 November 1945, inclusive. Special assignments in which the BOSTON participated during this time and on which reports have already been submitted are so noted and the reports included as enclosures to this report. All times used are zone minus 9 (ITEM) time. Dates are east longitude.

3 September 1945: BOSTON was anchored in SAGAMI WAN, HONSHU, JAPAN, with other units of Task Force 35. At about 0800 BOSTON got underway in company with CHICAGO, WILKES-BARRE, SPRINGFIELD, IDAHO (F), and NEW MEXICO, and proceeded to TOKYO BAY in accordance with CTG 35.5 despatch 020934 of September 1945. Entry was made without incident and at noon BOSTON anchored in berth #C-73, TOKYO BAY. At 1936 DICKENS (APA 161) came alongside to deliver provisions.

4 September 1945: Remained at anchor throughout the day without incident. Ship was placed on 4 hours notice in accordance with directive from Commander THIRD Fleet.

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- 5 September 1945: Remained at anchor throughout the day. Pursuant to ComCru DivTEN despatch 041325 of September 1945, BOSTON transferred 5 officers and 39 enlisted men to YOKOSUKA Naval Station for temporary duty with the Naval Landing Force, Training flight operations were conducted during the afternoon.
- 6 September 1945: Remained at anchor throughout the day. During the morning a Japanese pilot, Senior Lieutenant T. ITO, IJNR, and a Japanese interpreter M. SHIBATA, civilian English teacher, were brought on board for duty in connection with future operations. Training flight operations were conducted during the afternoon.
- 7 September 1945: Remained at anchor until about 1700, at which time BOSTON got underway and proceeded to berth #E-1 for provisioning from LESUTH (AK 125) returning to berth #C-73 at 2300.
- 8-11 September 1945: Remained at anchor until 1530, 8 September, at which time BOSTON got underway with Task Unit 35.7.1 (Captain M. R. Kelley, USS BOSTON) consisting of BOSTON (F), COGSWELL, CAPERTON, BEGOR, UDT 21 (embarked in BEGOR) and MOLALA, and proceeded to KATSUURA to inspect and insure demilitarization of the suicide boat bases in that area. Complete details of this operation were reported to Commander THIRD Fleet, a copy of which report is included as enclosure (A).
- 12 September 1945: BOSTON entered TOKYO BAY at 0800 and anchored about 800 yards south of berth #F-72. At 1530 BOSTON got underway to go alongside CIMARRON (AO 22) to fuel, returning to berth at 1800.
- 13 September 1945: Remained at anchor throughout the day. During the afternoon 110 men were transferred to the USS COLORADO and 49 men were received on board in exchange, pursuant to Commander THIRD Fleet's 062332 of September 1945.
- 14-24 September 1945: Remained at anchor until 1530, 14 September 1945, at which time BOSTON got underway with Task Unit 35.7.1 (Captain M. R. Kelley, USS BOSTON) consisting of BOSTON (F), CLARENCE K. BRONSON, HEALY, BEGOR, and UDT 21 (embarked in BEGOR), to proceed to the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI areas to locate, inspect, and insure demilitarization of the suicide boat and midget submarine bases in those areas. MOLALA, also assigned to Task Unit 35.7.1, was directed to get underway from YOKOSUKA KO in time to join the Task Unit in the SENDAI area by 1700, 15 September. Complete details of this operation were reported to Commander FIFTH Fleet, a copy of which report is herewith included as enclosure (B).

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1 November 1945.

25 September 1945: BOSTON entered TOKYO BAY with Task Unit 53.7.1 and anchored in berth E-17 at 0830. BOSTON got underway at 1130 and proceeded to berth #F-21 to refuel from USS GUARDOQUI (IX 218) returning to berth #E-17 at 1500. Lieutenant M. ITO and M. SHIBATA, Japanese interpreters, were delivered to Commander Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA, their duty completed.

26 September --

16 October 1945: Remained at anchor in TOKYO BAY without incident. During this period BOSTON planes made several routine training flights; and BOSTON assumed sea-plane rescue duty every fifth day, maintaining one plane on one hour's notice while assigned this duty.

17 October --

29 October 1945: Remained at anchor in TOKYO BAY without incident. Pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, under the authority of CTG 53.2 despatch 162300 October 1945, the following officers and men were detached on 17 October to report to Commander U.S. Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA, for temporary duty in connection with disposal of Japanese armament and ammunition: Lt.Cdr. W.B. Rodman, USN; Lieut. A.F. Leopold, USNR; L.M. Ormsby, GM2c; and F.L. Benedict, Slc. Under Lt.Cdr. Rodman, personnel ordered to disposal duty from ships present were organized into demolition teams to operate in the Navy Yard, Ordnance Depot, and Submarine Base areas. Ammunition disposal and demolitions reports were made to Commander Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA. Personnel returned aboard the BOSTON on 29 October. During this period BOSTON assumed sea-plane rescue duty according to schedule established by Commander FIFTH Fleet.

30 October 1945: Remained at anchor until 1000 when BOSTON got underway in accordance CTF 53 despatch 290715 of October 1945 and CO BOSTON Operation Order #4-45, as a unit of Task Unit 53.6.5 consisting of BOSTON (F) and AULT (DD-698) to proceed in company to SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN, conducting training exercises en route.

31 October 1945: En route SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN.

1 November 1945: Proceeded into SASEBO KO and moored alongside USS WICHITA (CA 45) at 1100. Reported to Commander Task Forces 51 and 55 (Vice Admiral J.B. Oldendorf) and to Commander Task Group 55.2 (Rear Admiral F.G. Fahrion) for duty as the latter's flagship.

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14 November 1945.

Subject: Action Report, U.S.S. BOSTON, for period 3 September 1945 to
1 November 1945.

PARTS IV to VIII.

No comment.

M. R. Kelley
M. R. KELLEY.

Copy to:
ComCruDivTEN
ComCruPac
CTG 53.2 (CO ST. PAUL)

Advance copy to:
CNO
CincPac
ComFIFTHFleet

CA69/14-3
Serial 0275

U.S.S. BOSTON
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

16 September 1945.

From: Commander Task Unit 35.7.1 (C.O., USS BOSTON).
To: Commander THIRD Fleet.
Via: Commander Task Force 35 (Commander Cruiser Division SEVENTEEN):

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat Bases at KITSUURA and KOHINATO, east coast of HONSHU, JAPAN 9 - 11 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

Reference: (a) CTU 35.7.1 Op-Order 1-45.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a). *(Not photostated) - p.10*
(B) List of minor caliber weapons and small arms collected at naval headquarters, KITSUURA. *- p.22*
(C) Report on radio and radar installations, KITSUURA. *- p.23*
(D) Photostat copy of Japanese outline sketch, KITSUURA area, showing caves and coastal gun positions. *- p.24*
(E) Photostat copy of Japanese outline sketch of area 3.6 miles to westward of KITSUURA W.N., showing coastal gun positions. *- p.25*
(F) Photostat copy of Japanese outline sketch of KOHINATO area, showing suicide boat caves near fore-shore. *p.26*

1. In accordance with reference (a), Task Unit 35.7.1 (Captain R. R. Kelley, U.S.S. BOSTON) consisting of BOSTON (CA69), COGSWELL (DD651), CAPERTON (DD650), BEGOR (APD127), UDT 21 (embarked in BEGOR) and HOLALA (TF106) got underway at 1530, 8 September 1945, and proceeded to KITSUURA to inspect and insure demilitarization of the suicide boat bases in that area. Representative of Commanding General EIGHTH Army (Major Edward B. Cummins) was embarked in BOSTON.

2. Assumed Condition of Readiness One, Material Condition Zebra before sunrise, on approach to target area about 0500, 9 September. At "Commence scheduled exercises" (0550), BEGOR proceeded to selected anchorage at entrance to KITSUURA W.N., followed by HOLALA and COGSWELL. BOSTON remained underway and at 0630 launched one plane for aerial reconnaissance, then maintained suitable position and heading for support and counter-battery fire. CAPERTON patrolled to seaward. H-hour was set at 0700.

3. The representatives of the Commanding General EIGHTH Army and Commander Task Unit 35.7.1 landed at the original KITSUURA naval base with the first wave at 0700. Contact was made with a representative from the naval headquarters, KITSUURA. The remainder of the day until 1600 was spent in inspection of the suicide boat bases, coastal guns, and other facilities of the naval command at KITSUURA. The following items of major importance were found to be in quantity and condition as indicated:

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Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat Bases at KATSUURA and KOJINATO, east coast of HONSHU, JAPAN 9 - 11 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

(a) Suicide Boats.

25 in caves at SAGO Base.

5 in caves at UBARA Base.

All had rudders unshipped and explosives charges, machine guns and rockets removed, but were otherwise in good condition, and could be made operable without great effort.

(b) Coastal guns.

4 12cm.

2 8cm.

Installations were not completed, but could be completed without much difficulty. Only the firing locks had been removed, as a step toward demilitarization.

(c) Minor caliber weapons and small arms.

These had been collected at the naval headquarters, KATSUURA, in numbers and types as shown in enclosure (B).

(d) Ammunition.

Approximately 30 tons of ammunition consisting of small arms, mortar, rocket, artillery, hand grenades, smoke grenades, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.

Approximately 70 tons of beach mines, a few depth charges, fuzes and primers.

All the above was stored in caves in the vicinity of the naval headquarters on the outskirts of the village of KATSUURA.

4. Recommendations were made to Commander THIRD Fleet and Commander Task Force 35 that all suicide boats and coastal guns be rendered permanently incapable of offensive action, that all minor caliber weapons and small arms be confiscated and delivered to the Naval Base, YOKOSUKA, and that all ammunition be left in its present storage under guard of Japanese naval personnel, pending disposition by Headquarters, Commanding General EIGHTH Army. All recommendations were approved.

5. The Task Unit cleared the area before dark and proceeded seaward, returning at sunrise 10 September. UDT 21, with the assistance of working parties from the ships, disposed of 77 suicide boats by sinking in deep water, or burning those found unseaworthy. A gun demolition party from BOSTON rendered all coastal guns permanently inoperative by smashing breech blocks, screw boxes, trunnions, training gears, recoil mechanisms, and burning through gun barrels. Demolition charges were not used because of the location of some of the guns. The BOSTON's Marine Detachment took in custody all the minor caliber weapons and small arms at the naval headquarters and delivered them on board the BOSTON.

16 September 1945.

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat Bases at KITSUURA and KOMINATO, east coast of HONSHU, JAPAN 9 - 11 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

All work was completed and all personnel were returned to their ships before sunset.

6. During the day, technically qualified personnel were sent ashore to inspect the radar and radio installations near the naval headquarters. Brief report is forwarded as enclosure (C). The representative of the Commanding General EIGHTH Army continued his survey of the ammunition in storage, the results of which were submitted in his report dated 12 September to the Ordnance Officer, Headquarters EIGHTH Army, A.P.O. 343.

7. For operations at KOMINATO, Task Unit 35.7.1 arrived off the harbor entrance at 0645. Enroute to this position, BOSTON at 0600 landed the gun demolition party at a point about 3.6 miles to westward of KITSUURA. WEN to locate and destroy the following coastal guns mounted in that area, employing the same methods as at KITSUURA:

2 12cm.
2 8cm.

8. There were found at KOMINATO 26 suicide boats in the same condition as those at UBARA and SAGO Bases. All were stored in caves right in the midst of the town, thus precluding any method of destruction except sinking in deep water. No working parties were employed. UDT 21 did all the work, which proceeded quite satisfactorily until mid afternoon when considerable difficulty was had in launching the last two boats. However, the task was finished by 1800, and the Task Unit got underway at 1850 to return to TOKYO BAY, arriving at 0630, 12 September 1945.

9. On the basis of the experience gained in this operation, the following comment and recommendations are submitted:

(a) Comment.

- (1) The physical characteristics of the coast line make this area an ideal hide-out and strike-launching point for suicide boats.
- (2) The storage and handling arrangements as observed would make the task of preparing a large strike an exceedingly arduous one.
- (3) The Japanese reports were found reliable as to numbers and locations but their concept of demilitarization fell considerably short of the requirements deemed essential to permit our ships to operate in safety in these areas.

(b) Recommendations (previously submitted to Commander Task Force 35 by despatch).

- (1) As long as no opposition develops, the fire support strength seems excessive, but the psychological effect on the Japanese is considered to be great, and highly beneficial.

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16 September 1945.

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat Bases at KATSUURA and KOMINATO,
east coast of HONSHU, JAPAN 9 - 11 September 1945; Report of
operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

- (2) Fire support ships provide much needed man-power for accomplishing the destruction of a large number of suicide boats expeditiously.
- (3) A shallow draft harbor tug would be of much greater utility than the ocean-going type in work of this kind.
- (4) Two tractors, with an LCM to ferry them, would greatly facilitate getting boats from the caves to the water, especially where the number of boats is large and they are widely dispersed.
- (5) Where large working parties are employed, even though in areas removed from villages or towns, a shore patrol is needed to keep the personnel within the limits of their assigned areas and enforce the regulations laid down for conduct ashore.

10. Enclosures (D), (E) and (F) are copies of outline sketches of the KATSUURA and KOMINATO areas, showing the approximate location of the numerous caves and of the coastal guns. The short black lines normal to the shore or contour lines represent the caves in which boats were stored, also ammunition and radio equipment at KATSUURA.

H. R. KELLEY.

Copies to:

ComDesDiv100	(1)
COGSWELL (DD651)	(1)
CAPERTON (DD650)	(1)
BEGOR (APD127)	(1)
UDT 21	(1)
MOLALA (ATF106)	(1)
ComGen8thArmy	(1)
ComCruPac	(1)
CTU 35.7.2(WILKES-BARRE)	(1)

CA69/A4-3
Serial 0001

TOP SECRET

Reclassified CONFIDENTIAL
12 September 1945.

United States Pacific Fleet,
THIRD FLEET,
T.U. 35.7.1, Demilitarization
Unit Able,
U.S.S. BOSTON, Flagship.

OPERATION ORDER
No. 1-45

TOKYO BAY,
8 September 1945; 1300.

TASK ORGANIZATION

35.7.1 Demilitarization Unit Able.

(a) 35.7.11 Support Unit - Captain Kelley.
BOSTON (F)
COGSWELL
CAPERTON

1 CA, 2 DD

(b) 35.7.12 Screen - Captain Dexter.
COGSWELL (F)
CAPERTON
BEGOR

2 DD, 1 APD

(c) 35.7.13 Demolition Unit - Lieutenant Commander Brooks.
BEGOR (F), with UDT 21 embarked.
MOLALA

1 APD, 1 ATF,
1 UDT

1. Information. As contained in Commander THIRD Fleet Operation Plans 10-45 and 11-45; Commander Task Force 35 Operation Plan 12-45 (as modified) and CTF 35.071416; also current dispatches applicable to THIRD Fleet units and pertinent to surrender terms imposed by Allied Powers.

Enemy Forces. Best available information indicates that there are suicide boats to the number of 105, approximately, but no midget submarines based at KATSUURA. Strength of base in personnel and emplaced guns is unknown.

2. When directed, this force will proceed KATSUURA WAN; clear the beach approaches of naval base, KATSUURA; inspect base jointly with representative of Commanding General 8th Army and report progress demilitarization by Japanese; make specific recommendation in the case of any vessel, weapon or installation that constitutes threat to U.S. Naval operations, in order to enforce earliest practicable compliance with the terms of surrender imposed by the Allied Powers.

3. (a) TU 35.7.11 Support Unit.

- (1) Seize enemy surface units encountered; destroy by gunfire if hostile actions are directed toward our units.
- (2) Provide close support and cover for TU 35.7.13.
- (3) Repel attacks by enemy aircraft.
- (4) Be prepared for counter-battery fire.
- (5) Be prepared, as directed, to land beach party, guard, and working party to police beach area; prevent interference with work of UDT and assist UDT if requested by Commanding Officer UDT 21.

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(b) TU 35.7.12 Screen.

- (1) Screen BOSTON en route target area and return.
- (2) Be prepared to operate screening vessel (one DD) to seaward of BOSTON after arrival in target area, if directed.

(c) TU 35.7.13 Demolition Unit.

- (1) On arrival in target area, BEGOR and MOLALA proceed to selected anchorage.
- (2) UDT proceed to submarine base to clear beach approaches; inspect progress of demilitarization by Japanese; make specific recommendations in the case of any vessel, weapon or beach installation that constitutes threat to U.S. naval operations.
- (3) Commanding Officer UDT report progress hourly to CTU 35.7.1, advising estimated time of completion as soon as reasonable estimate can be made.
- (4) MOLALA operate as directed by CTU 35.7.13 to assist in destruction of suicide craft and midget submarines.

(x) (1) This Operation Order effective on receipt.

- (2) All ships be prepared to tow or be towed.
- (3) If weather conditions permit, BOSTON will operate one SC-1 aircraft to perform preliminary reconnaissance of base and approaches thereto; to report any AA or coast defense batteries observed; to survey sea approaches for indications of submarine activity; and to spot for Support Unit if counter-battery fire is necessary.
- (4) Be prepared to assist in handling prisoners of war and repatriates. (References: PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 43CL-44 and Navy Department Conf. Bulletin of 30 April 1945.)
- (5) D-day is 9 September 1945. H-hour will be designated by dispatch.

4. Logistics in accordance with ComTHIRDFleet Op-Plan 10-45.

5. Communications in accordance with PAC-70B and Annex "B" hereto, which sets forth applicable details of communication plan now in effect in TF 35, in accordance with GTF 35 Op-Plan No. 12-45. Use Zone Zebra time in date group of all communications. Use Zone Item time (-9) as local time. While cruising maintain Condition of Readiness III in the AA batteries; Material Condition YOKE. Higher conditions of readiness may be prescribed by Commanding Officers at discretion, and will be prescribed by CTU 35.7.1 on approach to KATSUURA WAN. Upon completion of operation, classification of this operation order is reduced to confidential. Commander Task Unit 35.7.1 in BOSTON (CA69).

ANNEXES:

- A. Cruising and Navigation Instructions.
- B. Communication Plan.
- C. Intelligence Plan.
- D. Instructions for Personnel sent ashore.
- E. Detailed Instructions for Carrying out assigned Mission.

M. R. KELLEY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commander Task Unit 35.7.1
and Commanding Officer, USS BOSTON.

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DISTRIBUTION LIST:

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CTF 31 (1)
ComDesDiv 100 (1)
CO, WILKES-BARRE (1)
CO, COGSWELL (2)
CO, CAPERTON (2)
CO, BEGOR (2)
CO, MOLALA (2)

Authenticated:

G. S. Criswell

G. S. CRISWELL,
Lieut., (C), USNR,
Ship's Secretary.

TOP SECRET

ANNEX "A" TO CTU 35.7.1 OPERATION ORDER 1-45

CRUISING AND NAVIGATION INSTRUCTIONS

1. Cruising Disposition 3-R will normally be employed:

Stations as follows:

BOSTON (guide)	0.000	
MOLALA	1.180	
BEGOR	3.5.000	
DD	4.305	As assigned by Commander Screen.
DD	4.055	As assigned by Commander Screen.

BOSTON and MOLALA will be considered as a unit within the meaning of general signals. Thus, for a Corpen Love maneuver, the screen, consisting of the 2 DD's and the APD will reorient, while BOSTON and MOLALA will maneuver as a unit (change course by column movement).

Unless otherwise directed, ships will remain darkened between sunset and sunrise after clearing SAGAMI WAN. Dimmed navigation lights only will be employed in SAGAMI WAN.

2. Navigation Information

The coastal current from NOJIMA SAKI to IWAWADA SAKI runs with a velocity of 1 to 2 knots, but is weak inshore.

Ships are cautioned about the northeasterly set of the current across the entrance to KATSUURA BAY, which reaches a velocity of 1 1/2 knots.

The best harbor chart available is No. 2105, made from a Japanese survey in 1899.

3. Procedure in Target Area.

This Task Unit will approach KATSUURA from the south. Upon signal to "Commence Scheduled Exercises" BOSTON will proceed to a position in Lat. 35-07 N., Long. 140-18-15 E., and will anchor or lie to in that position. BEGOR proceed to selected anchorage. MOLALA clear BOSTON and follow BEGOR into harbor, selecting suitable anchorage close by but clear of BEGOR, from which ship can be maneuvered readily to support UDT with necessary towing operations or other assistance requested. As directed by Screen Commander, one DD will take station offshore from BEGOR, and second DD will take station between first DD and BOSTON, or to seaward of BOSTON as anti-submarine screen if directed by CTU 35.7.1. Vessels of Support Unit will anchor or lie to as may be most effective in maintaining position from which to cover operations most effectively with appropriate batteries, taking care to avoid blanking fire of other vessels.

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ANNEX "B" TO CTU 35.7.1 Op-Order #1-45

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION PLAN

200 GENERAL

Communications will be in accordance with CTF THIRTY-FIVE Op-Plan #11-45, Annex BAKER, as modified herein.

201 This plan is effective concurrently with CTU 35.7.1 Op-Order #1-45.

1000 FREQUENCY PLAN

Radio Frequency Plan is set forth in Appendix One to this Annex.

1110 COMBAT RADIO CALLS

Voice calls and combat CW calls, taken from PAC 71A, are set forth in Appendix Two to this annex.

2200 RADAR

The radar doctrine followed herein is in accordance with USF 10B and PAC 70B.

2230 Radar Guard assignments are as follows:

<u>Guard</u>	<u>Definition</u>	<u>Assigned to:</u>
"Able"	Long Range Air (beyond 30 miles)	BOSTON COGSWELL
"Baker"	Short Range Air (within 40 miles)	CAPEERTON BEGOR
"Charlie"	Medium Range Air (area between 30 and 70 miles)	CAPEERTON BEGOR
"Dog"	Low-Flying Aircraft	All Ships
"Fox"	Long Range Surface	BOSTON
"George"	Short Range Surface	All Ships

2600 RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

- (a) Radar Countermeasures will be in accordance with PAC 70B.
- (b) Intercept watch and jamming assigned to BOSTON.

2960 BEACH PARTY COMMUNICATIONS

- (a) Personnel - Furnished by BOSTON

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- 1 Lieutenant (jg)
- 3 Radiomen 2c
- 1 Radio Technician 2c
- 1 Chief Signaller
- 2 Signalmen 2c
- 1 Yeoman 2c

(b) Equipment - Furnished by BOSTON

- 1 TEX Complete
- 1 TBY Complete
- 1 Aldis Lamp
- 2 Sets semaphore flags
- 1 Pair binoculars
- Blanks
- Pencils

(c) Radio Channels

1. Primary

3155 kcs CW - BOSTON and BEGOR guard; ships equipped to do so, listen.

2. Secondary

65.74 mcs Voice - BOSTON guard.

3. Small Boat

37.2 mcs Voice - BEGOR guard; BOSTON listen.

Plain language radio will be used for contact and progress reports, support requests and similar communications.

APPENDICES:

- ONE - Radio Frequency Plan
- TWO - Voice and CW Calls

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX "B"

RADIO FREQUENCY PLAN

Circuit

3rd Fleet Fox	369 kc CW	All Ships Guard
TF 35 Common	483 kc CW	Ships Equipped Guard
Local Harbor Frequency	355 kc CW	BOSTON Guard
IFD and LAW	3465 kc Voice	All Ships Guard
Primary Tactical	72.1 mc Voice	All Ships Guard
TF 35 Administrative	141.12 mc Voice	All Ships Guard
Secondary IFD	2096 kc Voice	All Ships Guard
Primary Beach	3155 Voice	BOSTON, BEGOR Guard
Secondary Beach	65.74 mc Voice	BOSTON Guard
Small Boat Channel	37.2 mc Voice	BEGOR Guard
		BOSTON Listen
Fleet Fox Schedule	As assigned	All Ships Intercept
Spotting Frequency	3750 kc Voice	BOSTON Guard
Secondary Spotting Frequency	124.02 mc Voice	BOSTON Guard
Local Harbor Voice	2716 kc Voice	BOSTON listen. Use as alternate CW with Beach Party and as emergency voice circuit with MOLALA

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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX "B"

VOICE AND CW CALLS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Voice Call</u>	<u>CW Call</u>
ComTaskUnit 35.7.1 TaskUnit 35.7.1	Lockheed One Dartmouth One	5JL1 3CI1
ComDesDiv 100 DesDiv 100	Netherland Zero Netherland Zero Gang	5YGO 5YGOG
BOSTON COGSWELL CAPERTON BEGOR	Volunteer Speedball Varsity Sandlot	9OL 8HU 9LQ 7QP
ComScreen (CTU 35.7.12) Screen (TU 35.7.12)	Douglas Congress	3IB 2UY
Com UDT 21 BOSTON Beach Party	Tuffy 21 Volunteer Able	9HC21 9OLA

DECODE

<u>Voice Call</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>CW Call</u>
Congress Dartmouth One Douglas	Screen TaskUnit 35.7.1 ComScreen	2UY 3CI1 3IB
Lockheed One Netherland Zero Netherland Zero Gang	ComTaskUnit 35.7.1 ComDesDiv 100 DesDiv 100	5JL1 5YGO 5YGOG
Sandlot Speedball Tuffy 21	BEGOR COGSWELL Commander UDT 21	7QP 8HU 9HC21
Varsity Volunteer Volunteer Able	CAPERTON BOSTON BOSTON Beach Party	9LQ 9OL 9OLA

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ANNEX "C" TO CTU 35.7.1 OP-ORDER 15

INTELLIGENCE

1. KATSUURA - GENERAL INFORMATION:

References: (a) JANIS 85, Vols I & II (Central and Northern HONSHU).
(b) Japan Pilot, Vol. II, 1940.
(c) CincPac-CincPoa Bulletin No. 208-45.
(d) CincPac-CincPoa Bulletin No. 203-45.

The minor port of KATSUURA is situated on KATSUURA WAN on the Pacific side of BOSO-HANTO, or Eastern Peninsula. This artificial landing is of secondary importance only, the harbor itself being just 21 feet deep and surrounded on the inland side by steep hills. The northern shore of the harbor has a sandy, gently sloping beach. Transportation facilities to KATSUURA from other parts of JAPAN consist of the single railroad and road which wind along the narrow coastal area of the peninsula. The port was regarded as of little value as a military objective until after the surrender when it was found to be listed by the Japanese as a submarine base.

As noted above, KATSUURA WAN is an artificial harbor. Reclamation projects were in progress in October 1944. There were a drydock and 3 marine railways at that time. Two marine railways were capable of holding ships up to 250 tons each, and one was capable of holding ships up to 200 tons. There appears to be a pier and a slipway on the eastern shore of the harbor just south of the city and also south of what appears to be the naval base.

No information on the presence of fixed gun positions at the port has been received, but the existence of such installations is a possibility. More than one hundred suicide boats are believed to be located at KATSUURA, and the presence of midget submarines in the vicinity is also a possibility. It is not expected that Japanese naval units of any other type will be encountered.

References (c) and (d) contain the latest information on allied and enemy minefields in the Pacific up until the time of the surrender, and there is no indication of mined areas in the area in which this force will operate. Other navigational data of these areas are contained in ANNEX "A".

2. SUICIDE BOATS AND MIDGET SUBMARINES:

It is improbable that attacks by these types will be made by organized military units or personnel. However, "banzai" attacks by individuals may be encountered. Information on the characteristics of these types and the tactics employed in connection with them is contained in the following references:

Suicide Boats

References: (a) CincPac-CincPoa Bulletin No. 126-45.
(b) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 33.
(c) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 36.
(d) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 39.

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ANNEX "C" TO CTU 35.7.1 OF-ORDER #1-45

INTELLIGENCE

- (e) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 40.
- (f) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 45.

Midget Submarines

- References:
- (a) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 32.
 - (b) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 40.
 - (c) CincPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 49.

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ANNEX "D"

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL

1. In accordance with directives from CincPac and Commander THIRD Fleet in regard to Naval occupation the following will be strictly complied with:

- (a) Obedience to orders will be strictly enforced and a firm hand will be used in dealing with the Japanese, but there will be no needless oppression.
- (b) Property rights will be respected.
- (c) Looting and other acts contrary to standards of human decency will not be tolerated.

2. In conformity with the above all personnel landed ashore from this Task Unit will be previously instructed and governed by the following:

- (a) Souvenir hunting is absolutely forbidden and any necessary investigation of floating equipment, moorings or adjacent beach installations will be carried out only by the direction of the officer in charge of the Demolition Unit and under the supervision of his representatives. Inspection of the remaining area within the limits of the base will be conducted by the officer in charge of the Beach Party, using experienced personnel under his command.
- (b) There will be no contact between personnel of the Task Unit and Japanese personnel except that authorized by the Task Unit Commander, as may be necessary in carrying out assigned official duties.
- (c) All personnel shall conduct themselves in a severely strict military manner while ashore and under the observation and surveillance of Japanese. Officers in charge of the various units shall maintain firm control over the men they have in their charge.
- (d) Any objects or material which present the possibility of being fitted as booby traps, shall be carefully investigated by experienced personnel only. All personnel must be warned against the possibility of booby traps.
- (e) No enemy property shall be removed from the occupied area without specific authority of the Task Unit Commander or his representatives.

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ANNEX "E" TO CTU 35.7.1 OPERATION ORDER 1-45

DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS FOR CARRYING OUT ASSIGNED MISSION

1. At sunrise or shortly thereafter, Task Unit 35.7.1 arrive in target area.
2. Upon execution of "Commence Scheduled Exercises", vessels proceed independently in general conformity with paragraph 3 of Annex "A". Based upon conditions prevailing and reports from aerial reconnaissance, decision will be made as to need for seaward patrol by screening destroyer.
3. When BEGOR arrives at selected anchorage, UDT 21 will be embarked in landing craft and sent into beach, operating in accordance with current UDT doctrine to clear beach approaches and to minimize risks.
4. Representative of Commanding General 8th Army and representative of CTU 35.7.1 will be sent in with UDT to contact officer in charge of base and make inspection to determine extent of demilitarization accomplished; submit specific recommendation as to any further action required.
5. As soon as Commanding Officer UDT considers that sufficient preliminary information is available and can be relied upon as a basis for starting work, he shall return three landing craft to BOSTON for embarkation of Marines and beach party. The fourth landing craft shall be retained at the beach until the others have returned there with the second wave. Landing craft thereafter shall be operated as desired by CTU 35.7.13 and the Commanding Officer UDT 21 to facilitate the work of destroying all suicide craft, potential suicide craft, or midget submarines found.
6. Commanding Officer UDT 21 shall take steps immediately upon arrival at beach to determine by actual count the total number of craft to be destroyed, and as soon as practicable shall inform CTU 35.7.1 the estimated time of completion. He shall likewise make known as soon as possible any requirements he may have for additional personnel to assist as working parties, under the direction of competent UDT personnel.
7. Marines and beach party are to provide security for UDT while carrying out its assigned tasks, and to insure that no one, except UDT personnel or working parties under the direction of UDT personnel, enters or tampers with suicide craft, midget submarines, or mechanisms thereof.
8. Any unusual circumstances noted shall be reported at once to CTU 35.7.1, and necessary action initiated on the spot to insure safety of our personnel or equipment, reporting such action to the immediate superior in command.

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MINOR CALIBER WEAPONS AND SMALL ARMS
(Confiscated at Japanese naval headquarters, KATSUURA)


AAMG, 25mm	29
AAMG, 13mm	40
Bayonets	196
Bolts	265
Boxes, cartridge	673
Machine guns, light	2
Mortars, knee	5
Mortars, tripod	16
Pistols	32
Pistols, signal	7
Rifles, assorted	713
Rifles, automatic	11
Shotguns, assorted	47

Enclosure (B)

Report on Radar and Radio Installations, KATSUURA.


1. The radar installation, operated by the Coast Guard under the jurisdiction of the Yokosuka Naval District, was situated on the hill adjacent to the KATSUURA WAN lighthouse, and appeared to be a major naval radar station of the TOKYO area. It consisted of seven radars of familiar Japanese types, all in very good condition. The Japanese had removed the tubes and disconnected the power leads.

2. The radio installation consisted of a transmitting station and receiving station, situated in hillside tunnels about $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers apart. According to the Japanese, the stations were only about a month old, and they bore evidences of very recent installation. The transmitting station was equipped with seven transmitters, all in operable condition, three gasoline motor-generator sets capable of producing approximately 4-5KVA. The motor-generator sets were at present water-logged, and power was being supplied from outside lines. The receiving station was equipped with seven operable receivers and one transmitter which was in actual operation when the inspection party entered the tunnel. The operator immediately secured the transmitter and left his position and it was impossible to determine on what frequency the transmitter had been working. In the receiving station also, power could have been supplied by gasoline motor-generators, but these were water-logged. The receiving station, located within the village appeared to be a communication center, with complete facilities for handling traffic.




Enclosure (D)
Coastal guns indicated by

(13)



Coast Defense guns
midway between
UBARA BASE and
KOMINATO

Enclosure (E)



Kominato
26 boats

Enclosure (F)

CA69/A4-3
Serial 0279

U.S.S. BOSTON
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

29 September 1945.

From: Commander Task Unit 53.7.1 (CO, USS BOSTON).
To: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
Via: Commander Task Force FIFTY-THREE (ComCruDivSEVENTEEN).

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI Areas, East Coast of HONSHU, JAPAN 14 - 25 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times 9, east longitude date.)

Reference: (a) CTU 35.7.1 Operation Order #2-45 dated 14 September 1945.
(b) Change #1 to CTU 35.7.1 Operation Order #2-45.
(c) CTU 35.7.1 report CA69/A4-3, serial 0275 of 16 September 1945.

Enclosures: ~~(A)~~ Copy of references (a) and (b). *Not filmed - Op. 34 L*
~~(B)~~ Sketches of SENDAI Area showing locations of caves. *p. 35*
~~(C)~~ Inventory and disposition of items found in ONAHAMA Area. *-p. 44*
~~(D)~~ Sketches of ONAHAMA Area showing locations of caves. *-p. 47*
~~(E)~~ Photographs taken in ONAHAMA Area. *-p. 51*
~~(F)~~ Inventory and disposition of items found in CHOSHI Area. *-p. 55*
~~(G)~~ Sketches of CHOSHI Area showing locations of caves. *-p. 57*
~~(H)~~ Photographs taken in CHOSHI Area. *-p. 63*

1. In accordance with reference (a), Task Unit 35.7.1 (Captain M.R. Kelley in USS BOSTON), consisting of BOSTON (CA69), CLARENCE K. BRONSON (DD-668) HEALY (DD-672), BEGOR (APD-127), and UDT 21 (embarked in BEGOR) got underway at 1530, 14 September 1945, from TOKYO BAY to proceed to the SENDAI and ONAHAMA areas to locate, inspect, and insure demilitarization of the suicide boat and/or midget submarine bases in those areas, also ~~any~~ coastal defenses found. Since the first day in the target area was to be devoted to inspection only, which did not require services of a tug, the MOLALI (ATF-106), also assigned to Task Unit 35.7.1, was directed to get underway from TOKYO BAY in time to join the Task Unit on the afternoon of 15 September.

2. The initial tasks assigned TU 35.7.1 were to clear beach approach inspect, and make recommendations concerning the suicide boat and midget submarine bases, and coast defense installations in the SENDAI and ONAHAMA areas, with a view to accomplishing necessary demilitarization measures as approved by Commander Task Force 35. These tasks were subsequently extended by CTF 35 despatch 180433 to include the CHOSHI Area.

3. On approach to the first target in the SENDAI area, at 0855, 15 September, the Task Unit assumed condition of readiness I, material condition ZEBRA. At "commence scheduled exercises", the BEGOR proceeded to a selected anchorage off OHARA WAK, and the BOSTON maneuvered to seaward (westward) in a covering position, the two destroyers patrolling farther to seaward on the flanks. BOSTON launched one plane at 1025 for aerial reconnaissance. H-hour was originally set for 1100, but was later changed to 1115. One wave of two LCPR's was scheduled to land at KOAMIKURA and the other at OBUCHI.

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September 1945.

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI Areas, East Coast of HONSHU, JAPAN, 14 - 25 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

4. The landings were made on time and without incident. Empty caves were found at both KOAMIKURA and OBUCHI. The KOAMIKURA party proceeded westerly to OGINOHAMA, skirting the coast searching for caves and coastal installations, while the OBUCHI party continued to the eastward, conducting a similar inspection as far as KURO SAKI with negative results. Shortly before sunset, the OGINOHAMA party located empty caves at which a Japanese naval officer representative, sent from the main headquarters at NONOHAMA, was waiting. The officer provided sketches of all the bases in the area, including the coast from KURO SAKI to SENDAI. In the meantime, acting on information received from local fishermen, the party which had completed the search to KURO SAKI, as well as that of the off-lying islands of AJI SHIMA and TASHIRO SHIMA, was diverted to ISHINOMAKI, where contact was made with Japanese naval representatives from a nearby airfield. Arrangements were made for cars to take a party from ISHINOMAKI toward SENDAI the following day, a passing survey of the naval air station to be made en route. MOLALA joined the Task Unit off OHARA WAN at 1700.

5. The extent and results of the first day's inspection were as follows:

- (a) Coastline and villages inspected from KURO SAKI to OGINOHAMA, including the off-lying islands; contact made with Japanese naval representatives at ISHINOMAKI and at OGINOHAMA.
- (b) Twenty empty caves found at OBUCHI; twenty caves at OGINOHAMA; and twelve empty caves at KOAMIKURA. (The caves at OGINOHAMA were inspected sufficiently to insure safety of the task Unit that night, but a detailed inspection, including the immediate coastal area, was to be made the following morning.)
- (c) Aerial reconnaissance made by BOSTON planes and inspections made by the landing details did not reveal any coastal guns; this substantiated the information received from questioning local Japanese, including the naval officer at OGINOHAMA.
- (d) The Japanese officer at OGINOHAMA reported, and his charts and sketches verified, that the only other bases in the area assigned to the Task Unit were about 13 miles to the westward on the eastern coast of MIYAKO SHIMA.
- (e) The Japanese naval officer also stated that NONOHAMA was the main naval base in the area and that in addition to caves and installations nine small submarines were there. This information was transmitted to CTU 35.7.2, who had been assigned to cover that area.

In view of the foregoing, it was decided to anchor all ships off OHARA WAN for the night (15 - 16 September), maintaining an armed small boat patrol within and around the Task Unit from sunset to sunrise.

6. The schedule of operations for 16 September was follows:

- (a) BECOR to send one boat to BOSTON for the purpose of landing a party to exploit the contacts made at ISHINOMAKI.

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20 September 1945

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI Areas, East Coast of HONSHU, JAPAN, 14 - 25 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

- (b) A second BEGOR boat to land a BOSTON party to complete the inspection at OGINOHAMA and to complete the inspection of the coastline between OGINOHAMA and ISHINOMAKI, including examination of the bay at WATANOHA.
- (c) CTU 35.7.12 in BRONSON with BEGOR and MOLALA to get underway at 0630 to anchor in a suitable location off MIYAKO SHIMA. A third party (CO UDT-21) would then land and make an inspection of the coastline commencing at lat. 38-15 N. and extending to the northward to complete the inspection of MATSUSHIMA WAN.
- (d) The party mentioned in (a) above was to proceed from ISHINOMAKI, check the naval airfield just inland from NOBIRO and carry the search along the coast as far to the southwest as possible.
- (e) The party mentioned in (b) above after completing inspections of the OGINOHAMA-WATANOHA area was to proceed to MATSUSHIMA WAN where it would assist the third party in completing the inspection of MATSUSHIMA WAN.

7. The foregoing plan was carried out as scheduled, the inspections being completed about 1500, 16 September, with the following additional results:

- (a) All information which had been furnished by the Japanese was verified, that is, all the caves in the vicinity of MATSUSHIMA WAN, located on MIYAKO SHIMA, were empty, and no other naval bases existed in that area.

Sketches showing the locations of all caves in the SENDAI area, are included as enclosure (B) to this report.

8. The CLARENCE K. BRONSON, BEGOR, and MOLALA got underway from MATSUSHIMA WAN and proceeded to join the BOSTON and HEALY off OHARA WAN at 1630, 16 September. The Task Unit then got underway and proceeded to seaward for the night, preparatory to the approach to and arrival off ONAHAMA the following morning.

9. At 0530, 17 September, Task Unit 35.7.1 assumed condition of readiness I, material condition ZEBRA, and commenced the approach to ONAHAMA. At "commence scheduled exercises", the BEGOR proceeded to a selected anchorage just off the breakwater at ONAHAMA, the BOSTON remaining underway in order to facilitate launching one plane about 0610 for aerial reconnaissance, and in order to maintain a covering position to seaward; the two destroyers patrolled the flanks to seaward. H-hour was set for 0730, and at H-hour, a wave of two LCPR's from the BEGOR landed the BOSTON marines, UDT-21 personnel, and the Task Unit Commander's representative at the main dock at ONAHAMA, where contact was immediately made with the Japanese Headquarters of the 17th Storming Group. A preliminary inspection was made of ONAHAMA, and acting on information furnished by the Japanese, a second inspection party was sent to HIRAGATA, where it had been reported that empty caves existed. The results of the inspection at ONAHAMA and HIRAGATA were as follows:

- (a) Fifty-eight caves found at ONAHAMA; seven empty caves at HIRAGATA.

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Confidential

September 1945.

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI Areas, East Coast of HONSHU, JAPAN, 14 - 25 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9 east, longitude date.)

- (b) Twenty-six suicide boats and ten midget submarines were found at ONAHAMA, as well as a considerable quantity of small arms, ammunition, beach mines and depth charges. All ammunition, weapons, explosives and suicide boats were in caves; midget submarines were in caves or in the area adjacent to the marine railway employed to launch them.

A detailed inventory of the installations and weapons found at ONAHAMA is attached as enclosure (C).

10. It was recommended to CTF 35 that the suicide boats and midget submarines be destroyed by burning and sinking, and that the detonators, booster charges, and small arms ammunition be sunk in deep water; all other ammunition and explosives to be left in place awaiting disposition by the U.S. Army. These recommendations were approved.

11. The Task Unit then retired to the eastward for the night to clear the area of possible attack by midget submarines or suicide boats, and in consideration further of the heavy swells and weather reports which indicated the approach of a typhoon. Although at the time of the inspection the midget submarines and suicide boats were found to be ineffective offensively, it was considered that only a few hours work would have been required to restore one or more units to a condition that would permit launching a surprise attack. During the retirement, due to the comparatively low sustained speed of the MOLALI and in consideration of the estimated position and path of the typhoon, the destroyers and BECOR, under ComDesRon 50, were directed to leave the formation and proceed ahead at best sustained speed, the BOSTON remaining with the MOLALI. Retirement was continued to the southeast on 18 September to avoid the typhoon, during the course of which orders were received to return to TOKYO BAY, preparatory to resuming operations at ONAHAMA and completing similar tasks also in the CHOSHI area. Entry into TOKYO BAY was made at 1600, 19 September, and the Task Unit was directed to proceed independently to fuel, then anchor in assigned berths.

12. At 0000, 20 September, Task Unit 35.7.1 assumed the designation Task Unit 53.7.1 in accordance with CTF 35 dispatch 190547. The COTTEN (DD-669) replaced the CLARENCE K. BRONSON (DD-668) in the Task Unit organization.

13. Task Unit 53.7.1 got underway at 1357, 21 September, in accordance with CTF 53.7.1 Operation Order #2-45, as revised by Change #1 (see enclosure (A)), in order to complete the inspection and demilitarization of the ONAHAMA area and to execute similar tasks in the CHOSHI area.

14. At 0520, 22 September, condition of readiness I, material condition ZEBRA, were set while the Task Unit proceeded through a swept mine-field area off ONAHAMA WYN. "Commence scheduled exercises" was executed at 0614. Upon execution of this signal, the BECOR sent two boats to the BOSTON to pick up and land the representatives of CTU 53.7.1, and the BOSTON marine detachment. Following the landing of the marine detachment, which established a patrol in the working area,

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the Underwater Demolition Team was landed, and the boats returned to the BOSTON for the demilitarization working parties and gear. Later, a working party was called in from the HEALY (DD-672).

15. The work of demilitarization was completed at about 1700, 22 September, with the following accomplished:

- (a) Twenty-six suicide boats destroyed by either burning or sinking.
- (b) Six midget submarines sunk by the MOLALA and UDT-21 in positions as follows: 1 submarine in Lat. 36-49.8 N., Long. 140-56.2 E.; 1 submarine in Lat. 36-49.7 N., Long. 140-55.5 E.; 4 submarines in Lat. 36-50.0 N., Long. 140-54.9 E. A seventh submarine was towed out by a BEGOR LCPR and sunk in the same locality. Three charges were used by UDT-21 to sink each submarine.
- (c) Three submarines were destroyed in place because of inability to effect timely launching. Method used was to cut off the tail and propeller shaft just abaft the main motor and to ruin the main motor with a crowbar.
- (d) Forty-eight torpedoes, less warheads, were destroyed in caves by demolition charges.
- (e) All detonators, booster charges, exploders and small arms ammunition found were sunk in deep water.

A Complete inventory of the items destroyed or confiscated, and of those which still remain at ONAHAMA, is included as enclosure (C) to this report. Sketches of the area showing location of caves and military installations, together with representative photographs, are included in enclosures (D) and (E).

16. Leaving the ONAHAMA area, Task Unit 53.7.1 got underway at about 1800, 22 September, for INUBO SAKI to inspect the suicide boat and midget submarine bases in the CHOSHI area. Condition of readiness I and material condition ZEBRA were set at 1827 while the Task Unit passed through the gap between the reported lines of mines, as charted. Normal conditions of readiness were set at 1932.

17. At 0620, 23 September, Task Unit 53.7.1 assumed condition of readiness I, material condition ZEBRA, to proceed inshore of but well clear of the reported line of mines, as charted off INUBO SAKI, and at 0724 the order was given to "commence scheduled exercises". At 0824, two landing details were embarked in LCPR's from the BEGOR and proceeded to the beach.

18. One party landed at MOTOCHOSHI where contact was made with a Japanese naval officer representative of the Commanding Officer of the "TOYOSATO Dispatched Unit of the 12th Storming Group", a naval organization. Inspection of the MOTOCHOSHI area revealed eight caves and twenty-six suicide boats, unarmed but operable, sixteen of which were water-borne and the remaining two in caves.

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Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI Areas, East Coast of HONSHU, JAPAN, 14 - 25 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

The inspection party then proceeded to TOYOSATO where contact was made with the Japanese naval officer commanding the 12th Storming Group, which was dispersed in the following localities: MOTOCHOSHI, TOGAWA, FUNAKI, and SASAGAWA. Information was received that there were at TOYOSATA twenty-four caves containing about five tons of small arms ammunition and assorted machine guns, rifles, shotguns, etc. A Japanese army detachment had twenty-four horse-drawn field pieces collected at TOYOSATO and about 150 tons of ammunition. Japanese authorities also reported that there were twenty-five suicide boats and fourteen caves at SASAGAWA and about 2200 beach mines and depth charges at FUNAKI. This information was checked by the inspection party and found to be correct on inspection.

19. The second landing detail landed at TOGAWA. Here nine caves were found containing fifty-two suicide boats and about 1000 beach mines. No midget submarines nor coastal guns were found in the CHOSHI area.

20. On the basis of the results of these inspections, it was recommended that all suicide boats be destroyed by burning or sinking, that the small arms be rendered ineffective by a combination of confiscation and sinking, and that the field artillery weapons and ammunition, and the beach mines be left in their places pending disposition by the United States Army occupation forces. These recommendations were approved by CTF 53.

21. At about 0700, 24 September, the BOSTON marine detachment, four working parties from the BOSTON, and Underwater Demolition Team TWENTY-ONE, were landed to carry out the destruction of the suicide boats and make appropriate disposition of small arms. Trucks were provided by the Japanese, and working parties were dispatched as follows: one to SASAGAWA, a second to TOYOSATO, the third to MOTOCHOSHI, and the fourth to TOGAWA. All tasks were completed and the parties returned aboard about 1630, 24 September. A complete inventory of the items destroyed or confiscated and an estimate of those which still remain in the CHOSHI area are included as enclosure (F) to this report. Sketches of the area, together with representative photographs, are included as enclosures (G) and (H), respectively.

22. Task Unit 53.7.1 got underway at 1743, 24 September, and departed the CHOSHI area for TOKYO BAY, where entrance was made at 0800, 25 September, at which time the ships of the Task Unit were directed to proceed independently to assigned berths.

23. At 1701, 25 September, CTF 53 by his dispatch 250801, dissolved Task Unit 53.7.1.

24. The comments and recommendations made upon completion of the KATSUURA and KOMINATO operations, reference (c), remain unchanged for the operations covered by this report. They are repeated herewith, with slight

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2 September 1945

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOSHI Areas, East Coast of HONSHU, JAPAN, 14 - 25 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

Modification, and two additional comments and recommendations each submitted, as follows:

(a) Comment.

- (1) The physical characteristics of the coast line make this area an ideal hide-out and strike-launching point for suicide boats.
- (2) The storage and handling arrangements as observed would make the task of preparing a large strike an exceedingly arduous one.
- (3) The Japanese reports were found reliable as to numbers and location but their concept of demilitarization fell considerably short of the requirements deemed essential to permit our ships to operate in safety in these areas.
- (4) The LCPR's carried by the APD are considered generally unsuited to the work for which they were employed in these operations. In repeatedly running up on strange beaches, pushing aside debris in deck clearance, towing midget submarines and suicide craft out to the tug, and doing general yeoman work, they were entirely too fragile. Only two of the boats were in operation at times, but ~~found-the-clock~~ efforts restored another to operating condition near the end of the job. Replacement of all four boats is now considered necessary. It is felt that this situation would not have developed had the sturdier LCVP's with their armor side plating been used. Also, LCVP's would be needed if any vehicles are employed.
- (5) On several occasions, in the course of their investigations, small parties had to proceed inland well beyond effective cover of the fire support ships. The small hand radios carried were incapable of maintaining satisfactory communications with the units on the beach or with the ships. Transportation obtained from the Japanese was far from dependable, and it is considered that these parties would have been in a grave situation if confronted by one or two fanatics with a machine gun.

(b) Recommendations.

- (1) As long as no opposition develops, the fire support strength seems excessive, but the psychological effect on the Japanese is considered to be great, and highly beneficial.
- (2) Fire support ships provide much needed man-power for accomplishing the destruction of a large number of suicide boats and midget submarines expeditiously.
- (3) A shallow draft harbor tug would be of much greater utility than the ocean-going type in work of this kind.
- (4) Two tractors, with an LCM to ferry them, would greatly facilitate getting boats from the caves to the water, especially where the number of boats is large and they are widely dispersed.
- (5) Where large working parties are employed, even though in areas removed from villages or towns, a shore patrol is needed to keep the

29 September 1945

Subject: Demilitarization of Suicide Boat and Midget Submarine Bases in the SENDAI, ONAHAMA, and CHOCHI Areas, East Coast of HONSHU, JAPAN, 14 - 25 September 1945; Report of operations. (All times -9, east longitude date.)

Personnel within the limits of their assigned areas and enforce the regulations laid down for conduct ashore.


- (6) Substitute LCVP's for LCPR's and APD's assigned in demilitarization operations.
- (7) Include a jeep in the equipment provided for the use of shore parties. The jeep can readily be carried by the APD and loaded into an LCVP. Its speed, dependability, and ability to carry a radio capable of maintaining satisfactory communications make it invaluable for situations as outlined in (a)(5) above.

M. R. KELLEY.


Distribution:

ComDesRon 50	(1)
HEALY (DD672)	(1)
CLARENCE K. BRONSON (DD668)	(1)
COTTEN (DD664)	(1)
BEOR (APD127)	(1)
MOLALA (ATF106)	(1)
ComGen8thArmy	(2)
ComCruPac	(1)
CO WILKES-BARRE (CL103)	(1)
(ex-Com.T.U. 35.7.2 and 53.7.2)	(1)

Confidential



C768




ENCLOSURE (B) (2)

Confidential

(25)


36

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
KOBUCHI

Confidential



ENCLOSURE (B) (4)

Confidential



(28)



Confidential

Japan Sea
North Korea
North Korea

Nobiru

Nobiru Wan

Matsushima
Wan



TATAMISHIURA

MIYATO
SHIMA


(8) OSAME

(9) KOSAME

SENDAI WAN



— TATAMISHIURA —



ENCLOSURE (B) (8)

Confidential

(b)

BARRACKS

RICE
FIELD

WEAPONS CAVES
(FOR SUICIDE BOATS)

KOSAME BASE

(9)

ENCLOSURE (B) (9)

SMALL BOAT
LANDINGS

Confidential

INVENTORY AND DISPOSITION OF ITEMS FOUND AT ONAHAMA:

(Note: All items not listed as being confiscated or destroyed, remain at ONAHAMA. The Commandant at ONAHAMA was directed to maintain these items in storage under guard until the U.S. Army Occupation Forces arrived to dispose of them.)

<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
"SHINYO" (Diver-Boats)	26	Sunk or burned
"KAIRYU" (Small Submarines)	10	7 sunk, 3 wrecked on shore
8 cm trench mortar and its accessories	18	
13 mm machine-gun and its accessories (couple)	2	
13 mm machine-gun and its accessories (93-type)	14	
Light machine-gun and its accessories (91-type)	6	Confiscated
Torpedo (91-type)	48	Destroyed
Torpedo-tube	48	
Buoy for sweeping	8	
Firing apparatus	1	
Torpedo-regular rest	2	
Torpedo-pedestal	8	
Torpedo-carry car (3-type)	2	
Air-compressor (Yunker-type)	1	
Pedestal for regulation of vertical rudder	1	
Ring for pulling up torpedo	7	
Hook for explosion (Mine booster charges)	8	Sunk
Torpedo-regulators	1	
Musket and accessories (99-type)	201	Confiscated
Musket and accessories (38-type)	68	Confiscated
Cavalry gun and accessories (38-type)	27	Confiscated
Musket and accessories (i-type)	99	Confiscated
Bayonet with belt	280	Confiscated
Revolver (14-type)	5	Confiscated
Anti-gas mask (93-type No. #3)	747	
Anti-gas mask (93-type No. #4)	420	
Anti-gas mask with oxygen inhaler	1	
Gas inspector (No. 2)	6	
Gas-proof jacket (Light)	45	
Medical compound for eliminating poison gas	200	
Gas-proof cloth	55	
Medical compound for eliminating poison gas (No.5)	50	
Bullet-proof iron helmet	2	Confiscated
Portable telegraph instrument	4	
Telegraph instrument (No. 5)	1	
Special receiving instrument	7	
Charging instrument (Tanger) 15 A	1	
Charging instrument (Tanger) 2 A	2	
Storage battery (10-type)	42	
Storage battery (3-type)	17	
Vacuum tube pronouncing apparatus	1	

ENCLOSURE (C)(1)

INVENTORY AND DISPOSITION OF ITEMS FOUND AT ONAHAMA (CONT'D):

<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
Regulator of ampere	7	
Transformer	7	
Electric key	12	
Switch of charge and discharge	15	
Receiver	11	
Medium electric key	6	
<u>AMMUNITION</u>		
8 cm trench-mortar shells	916	Sunk
Bullet for 38 type musket	11520	Sunk
Shells for 12 cm rocket	104	Sunk
Bullet for 99 type light machine-guns	2800	Sunk
Bullet for 99 type musket	15140	Sunk
Bullet for 13 mm machine-guns	7200	Sunk
<u>EXPLOSIVES</u>		
Hand smoke-screen-apparatus	20	
Hand fire-shooting apparatus	100	
Smoke screen bottle	50	
Burning bottle	30	
Mine	12	
Hand grenade	1170	
Small mine	50	
Small mine (transitory name)	30	
Hand conical shell	80	
Large hand conical shell	30	
Training explosive for "Kairyu"	22	Sunk
Electric fuse for mine	22	Sunk
Training fuse for mines	25	Sunk
Percussion fuse	300	Sunk
Training explosive for mine	36	Sunk
Telescope	2	
Signal lamp (A-type)	2	
Signal lamp (direction-showing)	5	
Running signal lamp	2	
Portable signal lamp	2	Confiscated
Gauge of field of view	1	
Signal revolver	2	Confiscated
Torpedo booster charges	48	Sunk
Torpedo Fuses	48	Sunk
Depth charges	72	
Depth charge pistol and attachments	66	Sunk
Fillers for training explosive for "KAIRYU"	48	Sunk
Detonators for depth charge pistols	766	Sunk
Charges for torpedo tube (Midget Submarines)	48	
Parachutes for depth charges	66	

ENCLOSURE (C)(2)


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INVENTORY AND DISPOSITION OF ITEMS FOUND AT OLEH L. (CONT'D):

<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
Mines	3799	
Training explosives for mines	3216	
Electric fuses	3175	
Tentacles	3792	
Safety valve	3900	
Cables	3890	
Sack (bag)	5	
Portable telegraph instrument (transmitting)	1	
Regulator of electric power	1	
Portable telegraph instrument (receiving)	1	
Charging instrument	1	
Parts for portable telegraph instruments	1 set	
Electric Condenser (high)	6	
Electric Condenser (low)	2	
Vacuum tube UY 812	1	
Vacuum tube UY 814	2	
Vacuum tube HX 966	8	
Electric bulb (No. 11)	2	
Electric bulb (KX 553)	2	
Electric bulb (Tanger)	2	
Electric bulb (UZ 77)	3	
Electric bulb (UY 76)	1	
Electric bulb (UY 42)	1	

ENCLOSURE (C)(3)

Confidential




ENCLOSURE (D) (1)

(36)

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47

ONAHAMA NAVAL BASE



ENCLOSURE (D) (8)


ENCLOSURE (D-2a)

CONTENTS OF CAVES AT ONAHAMA:

<u>CAVE NO.</u>	<u>CONTENTS</u>
1 - 5	Land mines
6	Oil stores for fishing vessels (private property)
7	Barracks
8 - 10	Empty
11	Winch
12	Empty
13	16 wrecked torpedo bodies
14	4 wrecked torpedo bodies and 2 wrecked torpedo dollies
15	Air compressors
16	4 wrecked torpedo bodies
17	8 wrecked torpedo bodies
18	Empty
19	6 wrecked torpedo bodies
20	10 wrecked torpedo bodies
21 - 22	Empty
23	6 wrecked torpedo tubes
24 - 26	Empty
27	6 torpedo tubes
28	48 war heads (still intact).
29	Empty
30	Barracks
31 - 33B	Empty
34	Empty (Personnel caves)
35	Empty
36	Empty
37	16 torpedo tubes
38	20 torpedo tubes
#38A	Magazine
#38B	Magazine
#39	Armory
40	Empty
41	Winch
42 - 54	Empty
55	Maintenance cave
56 - 58	Empty


Cave Nos. 38A, 38B, and 39 (magazine and armory, respectively) contain practically all undestroyed items/which are listed in Enclosure (C).
of equipment

38
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Midget Submarine on marine railway leading from caves---ONAHAMA.



Midget Submarine in cave---ONAHAMA


ENCLOSURE (E) (1)

0768

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
Method of destruction at ONAHAMA for submarines which were not on launching dollies.



Submarine Caves—ONAHAMA

ENCLOSURE (E) (2)

Confidential



Marine Railway--Submarines in background--ONAHAMA



Launching Midget Submarine, with assistance of tow by LCPR


ENCLOSURE (E) (3)

Confidential



Suicide Boat in
cave--ONAHAMA.

Torpedo Bodies in
cave at ONAHAMA.



ENCLOSURE (E) (4)

ENCLOSURE (F)

MATERIAL DESTROYED OR CONFISCATED AT CHOSHI AREA:

<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
"SHINIYO" (Suicide boats) at TOGAWA	50#
"SHINIYO" (Suicide boats) at SASAGAWA	25
"SHINIYO" (Suicide boats) at MOTOCHOSHI	26
Pistol bullets	86
8-cm mortars	4
Shot-gun shells	2547
Light machine-gun	4
25 mm machine-gun	1
Boxes of dynamite	10
13 mm machine-guns	26
Small arms (rifles)	185
Shot guns	56
Shot gun pistols	5
Ordinary pistol	1
Signal pistol	1
Short swords (bayonets)	91
Belts	64
Cartridge belt-boxes	354

Two (2) suicide boats at TOGAWA were turned over to the 133rd Army Air Warning Squadron, Flight "A" (1st Lt. Harry Coorsh, SigC) at their request since they had need for the motors. Lt. Coorsh assumed full responsibility for the destruction of the hulls after the motors had been removed.

ESTIMATE OF MATERIAL REMAINING IN CHOSHI AREA:

(A) TOYOSATO

1. Five tons of miscellaneous explosives and equipment such as: small arms ammunition, hand grenades, smoke munitions, incendiaries, and gas masks; also, 200 50-gallon drums of methyl alcohol. These are located in the caves just to eastward of TOYOSATO, as shown on sketch marked 2 in Enclosure (G).

2. One radio transmitting and one radio receiving station, in operating condition. Facilities for about 10 transmitting and receiving positions exist. See sketch marked 2 in Enclosure (G).

(B) FUNAKI

1. About 2200 beach mines and depth charges in the caves 1/2 mile south of FUNAKI. See sketch marked 3 in Enclosure (G).

ENCLOSURE (F) (1)

(C) TOGAWA

1. About 1000 beach mines in the isolated cave. See sketch marked 5 in Enclosure (G).


(D) No equipment or munitions remaining at SASAGAWA and at MOTOCHOSHI.

ENCLOSURE (F) (2)

(45)

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
"GENERAL AREA CHART
CHOSHI AREA"

ENCLOSURE (G) (1)

(46)

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Confidential



SKETCH OF CAVES-SASAGAWA
(Not to scale)


①

Remaining (Japanese Army Equipment)


No.	Type
8	7.5 cm. guns
4	10. " "
12	47. mm. anti-tank guns
80 (about)	tons of ammunition for above guns

Remaining

About 5 tons miscellaneous explosives and equipment, such as, small arms and machine gun ammunition, hand grenades, gas masks, etc.



(Not to Scale)





③

SKETCH OF CAVES
AT FUNAXI -

Remaining
2200 beach mines
and depth charges

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(Not to Scale)

Confidential

ENCLOSURE (G) (6)

(57)

62



10 Suicide Boats at railway station, SASAGAWA, prior to wrecking.



Debris from destruction of 3 Suicide Boats by demolition--SASAGAWA.

ENCLOSURE (H) (1)



Wrecking Suicide Boats, railway station, in SASAGAWA—preliminary stage only.



SASAGAWA Suicide Boats being burned on road in front of the caves.

ENCLOSURE (H) (2)

Confidential



Caves at TOGAWA



Burning Suicide Boats—TOGAWA

ENCLOSURE (H) (3)

Confidential

(54)

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