

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
9691	1019	SHIGEMITSU stated in a telegram to Arita on 20 June that the time is now advantageous to use the European situation to strengthen Japan's position in East Asia. Attention must be paid to the position of French Indo-China and a statement made that Japan is gravely concerned with the stability of East Asia, including the South Seas.
6851	618-A	On 22 June Japan proposed dispatch of thirty military experts and two Foreign Office officials to Hanoi, together with interpreter, to inspect circumstances of suspension of transportation of supplies to China. Observers (as they were referred to) to be sent from either Japan or China. Desired same facilities and goodwill be extended to seven army and navy officers also to be sent from China. The list of banned materials will be decided on after inspection by this party and until then French Indo-China is requested to continue the complete blockade of frontier. France agreed to these proposals.
11703	1292	In a memorandum of 22 June, Hull requested Grew to explore the possibility of an exchange of notes between Japan and the United States regarding their common desire to maintain the status quo of possessions of belligerents in the Pacific. Hull wanted it made clear that this was not to imply any withdrawals

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11703	1292	from former positions but a preventive measure to avoid any future complications.
11706	1293	On 24 June Grew informed Hull that he had put his suggestion of the 22nd before Arita, who inquired whether Mandated Islands were included; Grew said he would inquire of Washington. The Foreign Minister informed Grew he would study the situation and reply soon, but thought the time would be more opportune after the settlement of a number of outstanding differences between the United States and Japan. The absence of a commercial treaty was quoted as one of the difficulties.
6174	523	On 24 June the German Ambassador in Tokyo cabled the German Foreign Ministry regarding Japanese efforts through MUTO and KOISO to obtain Germany's views concerning military aggression in Indo-China. Germany and Japan will support each other against America. Japanese-Russo non-aggression pact would make Japan economically free of America.
11708	1294	On 27 June KIDO stated in his diary that Arita had reported the proposals presented by Grew for a treaty between Japan and the United States regarding maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. However, in view of the fact that Japan did not want to have her activities restricted, including those in Netherlands East Indies, prompt acceptance would be limited.

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11712 1296

On 28 June Arita in an oral statement to Grew stated that in view of the present situation and the effect that the war in Europe may have on possessions of belligerent nations in the Pacific, he did not consider it opportune to conclude any agreement. Any such move might give rise to a delicate situation for Japan. He did consider, though, that it might be timely to discuss the problems of Japan and the United States only.

6233 529

On 29 June Arita delivered a speech on the air relating to "new order in East Asia," Japan's desire for world peace and the importance of the countries of Far East and South Seas being united under single sphere of their natural close relations.

6853 618-A

On 29 June the Japanese Observation Party headed by General Nishihara and consisting of forty officials arrived at Hanoi.

6233 530

On 1 July Ott cabled, remarking on Arita's speech which he said was originally coined in stronger political development terms, but due to Army influence, which holds strong military attitude towards Hong Kong and Indo-China, the original text was changed.

11710 1295

KIDO recorded in his diary of 1 July that he had spoken to Arita about his broadcast, the tense situation in Hong Kong, and

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
11710	1295	the status quo in the Pacific proposed by Grew. Arita did not consider the time opportune to settle the matter and stated that had it been limited to Japan and the United States it could have been considered.
6239	531	A telegram from Ott of 3 July related the fact that the intended speech of Arita had been disclosed by Press Chief of Foreign Ministry. It stated Japan had always been in full sympathy with Axis. Disclosure of text caused great indignation in army circles.
6240	532	An extract of KIDO's diary of 5 July disclosed arrests made of participants in attempts on cabinet members and plot thwarted Plot organized by Mada. Later on the same day HIRANUMA suggested that in view of present rumors of political rift, there would be no better appointment than Prince Kencye.
6852	618-A	As of 7 July Japan requested France to ban the importation of all materials from China for one month. France accepted the request.
6179	524	In a conversation of 8 July between Ambassador Sato and Ribbentrop, Sato by flattery and offering cooperation in economic sphere, put forward feelers for closer German-Japanese understanding. Ribbentrop advised Sato that a new foreign policy was to be adopted in view of the

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
6179	524	new order in Europe in which there were further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan. Sato stated Japan wished to end China affair and her main difficulty with United States lay in the struggle against system of 9-Power Treaty, although she was in agreement economically with principle of "open door" but wished to be host in East Asia and other nations to be guests.
6242	532	An extract from KIDO's diary of 8 July stated that the Vice War Minister Anami assented change in Cabinet is inevitable, since Yonai Cabinet is not suitable to negotiate with Germany and Kenoye would be unanimously supported as candidate by army.
9695	1020	In a telegram from Kurusu in Berlin to Arita on 10 July he gave details of an interview with Ribbentrop concerning the problems now arising in the East resulting from the European situation. Sato outlined Japan's fundamental policy of seceding from the 9-Power Treaty and outlined Japan's dissention with the United States as being mainly based on Japan's situation in China. He also stated that Japan is still economically dependent on the United States and if the supply of oil should cease, Japan would be obliged to turn her eyes towards the South Seas. Sato could get no definite German attitude regarding the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China.

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On 10 July Kurusu cabled Arita, stating that he would continue his talks with Ribbentrop. He is under the impression that an over-anxious attitude should not be shown towards Germany, although when he had questioned Ribbentrop on reports of Germany's cool attitude to Japan, Ribbentrop had denied them. Stahmer told Kurusu about Ribbentrop, considering post-war situation, thinking of cooperating with Japan and he wants it to extend over both the diplomatic and economic field.

6191	527
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On 12 July a joint conference of War (HATA) Navy and Foreign Ministries was held on strengthening of harmony between Japan, Germany and Italy, showing the existence of a strong Japanese demand for conclusion of military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy as means of realizing the Japanese Empire's plan for expansion in East Asia and the South Seas. Agreed to make agreement in form of diplomatic note to be strengthened to agreement if Germany recognized Japan's position in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Gist of agreement to be Germany keeps out of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, supports Japan in China, and favourably considers Japanese economic relations; while Japan in return supports German European policy, checks British in the Far East and supplies essential materials.

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6868	618-A	On 12 July the French-Thai non-aggression pact was concluded.
6186	525	On 13 July Arita cabled to Sato (Ambassador to Germany), in which he expressed doubts regarding German intentions to Netherlands East Indies and Indo-China and requested clarification. With regard to America Arita was anxious to find out whether Sato pointed out to Ribbentrop that war between Japan and the United States would cause Germany unfavourable reflection upon her European policy or did he give impression that war with United States would inevitably mean Japanese march on South Seas and hence difficulties in accomplishing German object. Arita also questioned whether Sato pointed out that Japanese-United States war would develop into German-United States war.
6259	534	Extract from KIDO's diary of 14 July refers to audience with the Emperor, who asked if plans for heavy artillery mobilization in Southern China campaign had been fully cleared with the Government. KIDO agreed to investigate this. Emperor stated he realized in view of the changing conditions Yonai Cabinet would have to be replaced, but stated he had faith in Yonai Cabinet and wished to have his feeling expressed to Yonai.
6189	526	On 15 July Sato replied to Arita's cable of the 13th saying that Ribbentrop gave the

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6189	526	impression that Germany attached little importance to Japan's national power at the moment, except her naval strength. Sato played on Ribbentrop's weak point that United States-Japanese war possibly mean U.S.-German war which would hamper her present operations against Britain.
9627	1005	In aide memoire of 15 July the American Embassy again called the attention of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the fact that the United States was receiving discriminatory treatment in respect of trade rights in North China. It was pointed out that Japanese controlled authorities have now established full exchange over imports as well as exports in North China, thus completing full control.
4788	394	The report of the U. S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 16 July states in Chahar and Suiyuan the production and cultivation of poppies is being strenuously encouraged.
6212	528	On 16 July a Conference of the Army (HATA), Navy and Foreign Ministries was held at which the strengthening of coalition and cooperation between Germany and Japan was discussed and the profitable guidance of Soviet friendship.
11795	1309A	On 16 July, Japan informed the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo of their intention to send an economic delegation to Batavia. On 16 July, the Yonai Cabinet fell owing to the Army withdrawing HATA from the War Ministry.

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6249	532	In his diary of 17 July, KIDO recorded that a meeting of ex-premiers (including HIRANUMA and HIROTA) was held to choose the new premier. Konoye who was favored by the Military was appointed.
6257	533	On 17 July the German Ambassador in Tokyo cabled the German General Staff concerning Japanese increasing anti-English policy and preparation for attack on Hong Kong. Japanese Army asks German Ambassador if they can count on future delivery of captured arms in settlement for Japanese delivery of raw materials.
6261	535	On 18 July, Ott informed the German Foreign Ministry that MATSUOKA had accepted the position as the new Foreign Minister.
6266	539	KIDO stated in his diary of 18 July that HATA had secretly recommended TOJO for the post of new War Minister and the Emperor did not approve of this procedure since Konoye was still in the midst of forming a cabinet. KIDO hoped for liaison with the War Minister in order that the present instance might not set a precedent.
6261	536	On 20 July Ott cabled stating that Konoye is building up his government in sections. He then quoted appointments in the new cabinet. On 22 July second Konoye Cabinet was formed; MATSUOKA became Foreign and Overseas Minister, Vice President of China Affairs

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Board; HOSHINO became Minister of State and President of the Planning Board; HATA became Military Councillor.

6262 537

On 22 July Weermann cabled the German Foreign Ministry concerning a meeting of Kenoye, MATSUOKA and TOJO and Yoshida to draw up authoritative foreign policy programme, this included rapprochement with Axis powers.

6271 541

On 26 July, the Cabinet decided on change of policy to provide a national defence structure by (1) plans for Greater East Asia, (2) increase of armaments and (3) unification of domestic policy.

8606 Liebert

By an embargo of 26 July by the President, limitations were placed on the quantity of export licenses for aviation gasoline, tetraethyl lead, lubricating oils and no. 1 steel scrap.

11793 1310

On 27 July, at a Liaison Conference decisions were made concerning policies to improve conditions at home and abroad. A swift settlement of the China Incident and the settlement of the southern problem within limits so as not to cause a war against a third power were two policies decided upon. While fostering relations with the Axis, it was decided to adjust diplomacy towards the USSR, maintain firm diplomatic front with the United States and to strengthen the diplomatic policy towards the Netherlands East Indies to obtain important raw materials.

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In a telegram from Ott to the Reich Ministry of 31 July he related the strong Japanese efforts to promote Japanese-German coalition, particularly aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations to hasten action against British possessions.

11797	1311
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The "Drafts of Alternative Demands to be made on Netherlands East Indies" of August states that whereas the Netherlands in their note of 6 June appear to accept Japan's desire for supply of essential goods, they do not appreciate the importance of freedom of entrance of Japanese into Netherlands East Indies nor the development of the country. While once using an 'open door' policy in Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch now seem to be giving preferential treatment to a few distant nations instead of opening its doors to the races of East Asia. Japan has been prevented by restrictive measures from obtaining mining rights while the United States and Britain are mining on a large scale. Japan wishes to undertake new enterprises such as mining in petroleum regions and for other minerals and demands that these requests be granted. Air routes, fishing facilities, forestry and agriculture endeavours are also needed and should be considered. Freedom to run newspapers is requested to afford rebuttals for the natives' lack of understanding of Japan and the anti-Japanese vein

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11797 1311

in Dutch newspapers. Japan's mission is the establishment of a new order in Asia and considers it unreasonable that the Netherlands East Indies so naturally rich should be excluded from Japan. In view of this Japan considers the Netherlands East Indies should sever itself from Europe and become a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

11714 1297

A Foreign Office announcement of 1 August, reiterated Japan's aim of "The World Under One Roof". Japan wishes to establish a Great Asian chain of common prosperity to pave the way for world peace, and will strive to fulfill her idea and mission.

6278 542

On 1 August, the German Embassy in Tokyo cabled the Foreign Office concerning the Japanese 4 Ministers (Army Minister (TOJO) Conference with stressed German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.

6886 620

On 1 August, a meeting was held between MATSUOKA and Henri, concerning political and economic cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China, such as passage of Japanese shipments, use of air bases in French Indo-China, and provision of all types of facilities. Henri thought such actions would constitute war against China, whereas Japan herself was not at war. MATSUOKA contradicted this and the request for such

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6886	620	measures was merely made because of Japan's obligation to do so in view of circumstances Henri agreed to transmit requests to the French Government.
6286	545	In a conversation between MATSUOKA and Ott on 1 August, MATSUOKA stated he was neither pro-German nor pro-British, but pro-Japanese. He stated that Japan intended to establish a new order in Greater East Asia with Japan, Manchukuo, China, including the South Seas. They did not wish to expel the Europeans from these regions.
6264	538	On 2 August, Ott cabled the German Foreign Ministry concerning the appointment of Ohashi as Vice Foreign Minister, which seemed to signify the strengthening of the Manchurian group in the new government, as Ohashi formerly held significant posts in the Manchurian Government.
6282	543	In a telegram from Weizacker to the German Embassy of the same day, he stated that at the 4 Minister (TOJO, War Minister) Conference, Kurusu expressed hope that Japan might belong to "New Order" after the war and Japan would not be forgotten in the "new apportionment of the world". On 3 August, ARAKI and HIROTA ceased to be Cabinet Advisers.
9712	1023	SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA on 5 August, congratulating him on his establishment of a policy for Greater East Asia, and the

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9712	1023	setting out of his ideas on foreign policy towards the United States, Great Britain and Russia. Japan's aim in East Asia will benefit more if directed at small or weak nations first (e.g. France and the Netherlands) and his advice is to dispose of enemies one by one.
6284	544	On 7 August, the German Foreign Office cabled Tokyo stating that Kurusu's main point was not Japan's relationship to Russia United States, or the United Kingdom, but the new order in East Asia. Kurusu repeated MATSUOKA's statements in greater detail, namely that Japan wants to organize the East Asia Sphere including the South Seas. Sato had been given impression of unchanged friendly German attitude, but methods of encouraging this friendship were not clear. Before MATSUOKA and Konoye could adjust their foreign policy, they would clearly have to see how Germany stood on these matters. While he did not refer to the German expression of disinterest in Overseas problems in May, it was clear what he was aiming at. On 9 August, Grew informed Welles of the anti-American attitude of Japan in China, especially in Shanghai, where Japanese controlled papers have conducted an anti-American and anti-foreign campaign.
9707	1022	

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On 9 August, a meeting was held between MATSUOKA and French Ambassador concerning Japanese demands for stopping shipment of supplies to China, bases etc. Japanese stand firm in requests and Henri points out that the utilization of air fields etc. anywhere in French Indo-China may result in Japanese landings about Cambodia, therefore, he would like clarification on actual points Japan desires to use. Japanese consider this impossible and stated they have no intention of abusing French concessions to them.

11718	1298
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KIDO stated in his diary of 10 August, that he had received a report that the Government wishes to avoid force against Netherlands East Indies and Singapore at present, and since 8 months are needed to prepare, after a decision for war is made, the later war comes the better.

6891	620
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In a conversation between the French Ambassador and the Japanese Vice Minister on 10 August, Ambassador Henri was given notice that the Japanese wished to "pass through Province of Tonkin". When he complained of the broadness of this request, Japanese stated secrecy of actual air-fields etc., to be used had to be observed and French Indo-China would play a large part in the establishment of the New Order

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6891	620	in East Asia. The Vice Minister then reiterated that Japan had no intention of transgressing on French Indo-Chinese territory and hoped the French Government would grant their request. If it is refused Japan may be forced to take military action. Henri feared that the Chinese may come down into Indo-China from the north and make the country a Sino-Japanese battlefield.
6295	547	On 15 August, Ott cabled the German Foreign Ministry and reported that MATSUOKA had advised him that the French Ambassador has changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the 3 Japanese demands regarding Indo-China, to the position that France first wanted a Japanese guarantee of renunciation of all territorial demands. They had been advised to maintain their previously announced basic agreement and the territorial guarantee would be adjusted. The Foreign Minister requested Germany to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French Government.
6914	620	On 20 August, the French Ambassador handed to MATSUOKA the French counter-proposals which Japan would consider. After investigating them Ohashi visited the Ambassador on the evening of the same day and after stating Japan's objections to

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6914	620	the counter-proposals, he stated that it was France and not Japan who was delaying the negotiations.
6919	620	On 21 August, a meeting took place between the French Ambassador and the Chief of the Western Eurasian Bureau, who stated that although it is not preferable to reveal Japanese secret military items since France was doubtful of Japan's military demands as a result of Conference with the Army to speedily dissolve French suspicion, Japan had decided unofficially to notify her the outline of her request. He asked for quick approval without alterations.
6296	548	On 23 August, Ott cabled the Reich Foreign Ministry concerning recall of various Japanese Ambassadors and Consuls in order to coordinate Japanese foreign policy, mainly, to eliminate pro Anglo-Saxon diplomats. SHIGEMITSU and TOGO survived this purge.
6921	620	On 25 August, Ambassador Henri held another conference with Ohashi on second French counter-proposal regarding French Indo-China. France will accept Japan's three military requests regarding (1) use of airfields, (2) number of troops to be stationed in Tonkin Province and

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
6921	620	(3) course of passage for these units - but for reasons of prestige cannot put this in an official letter.
8476	Liebert	On 26 August, the Korea Mining Development Company was formed for the purpose of controlling mining and sale of all minerals except magnesite, already controlled on 19 June, 1939. This company was the effective instrument by which the Government more rigidly controlled the output of mines in Korea.
11796	1309A	On 27 August, Japan informed the Netherlands Minister that Kobayashi, Minister of Commerce and Industry would head the economic mission to Batavia, to establish closer economic relations aided by 24 assistants and would leave on 31 August. On 28 August, SHIRATORI, Toshio was appointed as Diplomatic Councillor in the Foreign Office.
6936	620	On 30 August, MATSUOKA sent a letter to Henri regarding acceptance of French proposals which satisfy Japan's demands in French Indo-China.

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6923 620

In an oral statement by MATSUOKA on the same day he said Japan agreed to accept the letter as France's intention to comply with terms of their agreement. General Nishihara is to become representative of the Supreme Commander of Army and Navy to be sent.

6869 618A

On 30 August, The MATSUOKA-Henri Agreement was concluded whereby Japan's predominant interests in political and economic circles in East Asia was recognised.

7138 657

On the same day an official report was issued by the Japanese Foreign Minister concerning advance into French Indo-China and final signing of agreement concluded by Japanese persuasive efforts.

6925 620

On 31 August, Major General Nishihara called on Governor General of French Indo-China and proposed to start military negotiations. The Governor had received no instructions from France. If French failed to answer by 2 September, Nishihara had orders to evacuate Japanese nationals. MATSUOKA wired to the Japanese Ambassador in France to urge the immediate giving of instructions.

6925 620

On 2 September, Nishihara again visited the Governor, who could not give him an answer since although he had received

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instructions they were very complicated and he asked leave to give them to Nishihara on the next day. Governor declined to accept immediate negotiations. Nishihara then handed Governor notice that Japanese residents would be withdrawn and troops stationed after 5 September. After perusing instructions, Governor sent note to Nishihara stating that they differed from Japanese and advocated a revision to begin from the 3rd. Nishihara tiring of further delay informed him that his instructions for 5 September still remained.

9718 1025

On 3 September Pull cabled Grew instructing him to confer with the Foreign Minister concerning current rumors that Japan was presenting an ultimatum to French Indo-China demanding passage of troops and air bases for military operations against China.

11820 1314

11821

On 3 September, a telegram was sent by order of MATSUOKA to Saito Consul-General at Batavia instructing him in the oil negotiations with Netherlands East Indies to emphasise the acquisition of oil fields and if the Netherlands East Indies lay stress on Japan's oil purchases he was to distinguish clearly the acquisition of oil fields and the purchase of oil.

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6928 620

On 3 September, Nishihara met the Commanding General of the French Indo-China Army and the latter told him he had wired Vichy that the negotiations had ended in failure, he had no authority to negotiate, and that as a counter-proposal is being drafted, meeting with the Governor-General is desired. Counter proposal was submitted the same evening and further negotiations postponed to next day.

6307 541

At a 4-Minister Conference on 4 September and a liaison conference of 19 September discussion was held concerning the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis. TOJO attended the first meeting.

6927 620

On 4 September, the Japanese Consul General retained 2 ships to prepare for evacuation of Japanese from French Indo-China, and once more Japanese tried to make the Ambassador to France exert pressure on the French Government. to accept terms. Finally at eight o'clock on 4 September an agreement was signed between Nishihara and the French Commanding General.

6929 620

On 6 September, a unit of the Japanese Army crossed the border and on the next day the Governor proposed to drop

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6929	620	negotiations, on the grounds that this was a contravention of the Pact. Nishihara said it was a front line incident by unit which did not know of Pact, but Governor would not change his attitude. Japan then again requested the Ambassador to France to hurry French Government in instructing the Governor-General of French Indo-China to settle negotiations immediately.
6322	549	On 9 and 10 September, MATSUOKA and Stahmer held an informal conversation re importance of keeping the United States out of war, Japan to restrain and prevent United States intervention while Germany will restrain United States in the Atlantic. War materials to be supplied to Japan for arming in preparation for conflict and Germany hopes Japan will safeguard her interests in Greater East Asia. Although United States Axis conflict is to be avoided if possible, all preparation must be made to face possible strife. Axis must stand united against Anglo-Saxondom.
6971	626	Entry from KIDO's diary of 9 September, states Chief Aide-de-Camp reported the military agreement parley, which had been making smooth progress with the Governor-General of French Indo-China took a turn

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6971	626	for the worse when one battalion of Japanese troops moved into French Indo-China.
6328	550	Between 10 and 26 September, an Imperial Conference was held regarding the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact. Draft of Pact was drawn up, and discussions conducted concerning Japan and America's differences in opinion.
6930	620	On 11 September, the French Ambassador visited Ohashi and stated that he had received information that the Thailand Army was likely to invade French Indo-China along with the Japanese and he asked that Japan stop Thailand's plan.
6931	620	On 12 September, Ohashi told the French Ambassador that Japan would not intervene between French Indo-China and Thailand and French proposal was merely move to postpone negotiations.
6869	618A	Thailand demanded in note of 13 September that the Mekong river frontier be revised by ceding to Thailand the areas along the right of River Mekong across from Luang Prabang and Bakuse, which were ceded by Thailand to French Indo-China in treaty of 1904, also hoped that a guarantee would be given to return Cambodia and Laos to Thailand when France renounces sovereignty over French Indo-China. These requests were made in view

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6869	618A	of abnormal circumstances in French Indo-China.
11813	1312	On 13 September, Kobayashi cabled MATSUOKA stating that he had interviewed the Governor-General who kept to diplomatic formulas and stated that the Netherlands saw no serious situation and that in Netherlands East Indies an equal opportunity was afforded all in that country. Kobayashi stated it was useless to negotiate with such a Governor-General who evaded political problems and was not interested in sounding out Japan's intention towards Netherlands East Indies.
8606	Liebert	On 13 September, a Presidential embargo was placed on equipment for production of aviation motor fuel and tetra-ethyl lead or any plans of specifications useful in the design, construction or operation of such.
9659	1011	Grew protested to MATSUOKA on 13 September concerning the destruction on 19 August of a Methodist Episcopal Mission in Chungking by the Japanese forces. He asked for a prompt report.
6971	627	Entry from KIDO's diary of 14 September, states that MATSUOKA plans to send ultimatum to French Indo-China.
6345	551	Meeting of the Privy Council of 16 September, discussed the effect upon Japan of the proposed Tri-Partite

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6345	551	Pact, the possibility of war with the United States and the improvement of Japanese-USSR relations due to German influence.
6931	620	On 16 September, the French Ambassador accused the Japanese of delaying negotiations because they had backed Thailand. Chashi denied this and said the situation was critical and Japan might well walk in at any moment without an agreement.
6932	620	Governor-General of French Indo-China and Commanding General of the Army gave Japanese general consent to request on 17 September, but in view of uncertainty of clashes, it was decided to evacuate Japanese residents on the 20th.
6932	620	On 18 September, General Nishihara notified the French that in view of wide difference in opinions between French and Japanese on negotiation subject, all members of Japanese Observation Party would leave Hanoi on the 20th.
6940	620	18 September was the basic date for conclusion of Japanese-French military agreement. No Japanese troops may enter Hanoi; French administrative and military to retain posts; Japanese to bear all expenses of any occupation or carrying

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6940	620	of troops and reimburse for damages; Japan may select certain strategic bases and use specified railroad and highways; three airfields to be used by Japanese. Then cites threatening actions on part of Japanese.
11822	1315	On 18 September Kobayashi cabled
11823		MATSUOKA requesting that in view of Japan's urgent need for oil, and the failure of the Tokyo negotiations, Murai carry on negotiations in Batavia. If this is done, the Netherlands East Indies would aim for their success since a failure would mean that world opinion would charge the Netherlands East Indies with moral responsibility for failure. Failure to make the purchase could be utilised to browbeat the Netherlands East Indies on the enterprises problem. For these reasons he advocated that the negotiations be changed to Batavia.
9716	1024	On 18 September Grew complained to MATSUOKA concerning widespread inter- ference with U.S. trade in China in particular products, despite numerous representations to Japan by the U.S.
9721	1026	On 19 September, Grew complained to MATSUOKA concerning the use of air bases and passage of troops through French Indo-China in order to aid the Japanese war against China.

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On 19 September, France agreed to establish a committee for resolution of pending questions, but flatly refused territorial demands made by Thailand on 13 September.

7920	784
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Excerpt from Ciano's Diary of 19 September stated that Ribbentrop arrived with the Japanese military alliance which was to be signed in Berlin. Alliance will be stroke against Russia and the United States according to Ribbentrop, but Ciano is of the opinion that anti-Russian guarantees are fine but anti-American note will merely induce Washington to increase commitments to Britain.

6957	623
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Memorandum by United States Under Secretary of State Wells of 20 September concerning ultimatum of General Nishihara to the French Governor-General of French Indo-China to the effect that if it did not permit occupation by the Japanese troops, such troops would on 22 September stage an invasion of French Indo-China.

6964	624
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Memorandum of same date by Grew concerning a conversation with MATSUOKA who defends this ultimatum by stating Japanese and French Government had signed agreement permitting occupation by Japanese troops and French Indo-China was not complying therewith; such occupation was merely

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6964	624	for the purpose of striking against Chiang's army to close China conflict and upon such event troops would be withdrawn. Grew advised MATSUOKA such occupation would be considered by the United States as infringement of the "status quo" which Japan was pledged to preserve in Asia. In a telephone conversation between German and French delegates to Armistice Commission on the same day the landing of Japanese troops in French Indo-China was discussed. French wished to negotiate first, but had ordered Admiral Decoux to resist by force if necessary should large numbers of Japanese troops march in.
6969	625	
6830	621	On 22 September, after negotiations between France and Japan, France agreed to allow all military facilities required by the Japanese Navy and Army in Northern French Indo-China for execution of campaign in China.
6829	621	On 23 September, the Foreign Office issued a statement concerning conversations at Tokyo in August between MATSUOKA and the French Ambassador on basic matters regarding the question of French Indo-China. As a result of these conversations an agreement was reached between French Indo-China and Japan on 22 September.
6831	42	

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
6831	42	The announcement went on to say that despite a local skirmish in the border region, due to a misunderstanding by French Indo-China, it is expected that the agreement will be carried out.
6935	620	On 23 September, all Japanese residents and diplomats evacuated from Saigon arrived in Haikou after evacuation from French Indo-China by Japanese authorities.
6933	620	On 24 September, the final plans were made by General Nishihara with representative of French Indo-China Army re Japanese forces landing in Indo-China; evacuation of Japanese residents.
6350	552	A Conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held on 26 September - TOJO, HOSHIKAWA and MUTO were present. Members discussed the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact, the fact that in the event of War with the United States and Japan although Army was in good position, supplies of oil and petrol might prove troublesome in long war. Conclusion of Japanese-USSR pact was discussed and also watch to be made on USSR.- US relations. Pact was unanimously approved with attention to be paid not to incite the United States and Britain and improve USSR and Japanese relations.

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6379	553	On 26 September, a Privy Council Meeting attended by TOJO and HOSHINO, was held subsequent to the meeting of the Investigation Committee discussing the Tri-Partite Pact and approving draft with unanimous vote.
	1030	
6865	618-A	On 26 September, a Japanese bomber dropped 4 bombs on the City of Haipong, causing 33 killed and injured at time of entry of Japanese into French Indo-China.
7049	643	Extract from KIDO's Diary of 26 September related that a Japanese unit under orders to make a peaceful landing in French Indo-China carried out a landing, in face of enemy and bombed Haipong in spite of orders from Navy Support Command to contrary.
7928	786-A	On 26 September, Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin sent a telegram to MATSUOKA - excerpt shows that at time of signing of Tri-Partite Pact, Japan had already been informed that Germany had begun military preparations for war against USSR.
43		27 September is the official date of signing of Tri-Partite Pact and secret letters.
		On 27 September the following positions were held by the Accused:
		ARAKI, no office, DOIHARA, Lt. General in

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Command 5th Army, Supreme War Councillor
(28 September) HATA, General in command
Expeditionary Force Central China;
HIRANUMA, no office (Minister of State,
6 December, Home Minister 21 December);
HIROTA, Ex-Premier; HOSHINO, President
Planning Board; ITAGAKI, Lt. General -
no appointment; KAYA, President North
China Development Company; KIDO, Lord
Keeper of Privy Seal; KIMURA, Lt. General
in command 32nd Division; KOISO, General
on reserve list; MATSUI, General retired;
Adviser to East Asia Promotion Federation;
MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister and Over-
seas Affairs Minister; Vice President,
China Affairs Board, Supreme War
Councillor, MIYAMOTO, Governor-General of
Korea; MUTO, Chief of Military Affairs
Bureau (War Ministry); NAGANO, Special
Inspector of Navy; OKA, Rear Admiral,
Member of Naval Staff Imperial
Headquarters; OKAWA, Director General,
East Asia Research Bureau, South
Manchuria Railway; OSWALD, Ex-Ambassador
to Germany (re-appointed 20 December)
SATO, Colonel, Deputy Chief of Staff
South China Expeditionary Force;
SHIGEMITSU, Ambassador to Great Britain;
SHIMADA, Admiral in command China Fleet;
SHIMAZU, Diplomatic Councillor,

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Foreign Ministry; SUZUKI, Lt. General, Secretary of Cabinet Political Committee on China Affairs, Director, China Affairs Board; TOGO, Ambassador to USSR; TOJO, War Minister, President Manchuria Affairs Board, Vice-President China Affairs Board; UHIZU, Commander-in-Chief, Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo; Premier, Konoye.

7897 777-A

An extract from MATSUOKA's speech at the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact on 27 September was quoted to show that the Pact divided the world into two camps between which war would inevitably be waged.

8606 Liebert

As of 27 September United States exports of iron and steel scrap to Japan equals 8½ million tons for the past 6 years.

6400 555-G

Letter from Ott to MATSUOKA of 27 September promised that Germany "will do their utmost to aid Japan" - with all means in their power in the event of war between Japan and England in Greater East Asia. A letter from the German Ambassador to MATSUOKA of the same date refers to Japanese mandated territory in South Seas concerning which MATSUOKA had requested confirmation of German government's agreement that

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
6400	555-C	Germany be compensated for loss of Japanese mandated territories but Japan should retain them. Ambassador confirmed this.
6394	554	Imperial rescript issued on 27 September was addressed to the Japanese people and attempted to gain support of Tri-Partite Pact, giving the impression it was concluded for peace and security amongst nations. TOJO, and HOSHIKUNI's names appeared as principal officers of the government. On the same day the German Ambassador in Tokyo thanked MATSUOKA for favorable participation in Pact negotiations and generally extending hand of friendship. On 28 September MATSUOKA resigned as Overseas Minister but retained other posts.

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6870	618-A	On 28 September Thailand again requested revision of River Mekong boundary but dropped subject of Laos and Cambodia until the position of French Indo-China is altered.
6975	628	Statement of Japanese Foreign policy was made by Japanese Foreign Ministry on 28 September concerning establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; economic agreement with French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies; increased coalition with Thailand; plans for Japanese control of areas in southern Asia; instigate independence movement in French Indo-China so France will renounce its right therein; plans for bases in Thailand; Straits Settlements to be placed under direct control of Japan.
8817	868-A	On 1 October the Total War Research Institute was promulgated under the Prime Minister's administration to control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war; personnel requirements, etc. On 1 October HOSHIKAWA was also Director of Total War Institute.

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8560	861	A cabinet meeting of 3 October was held on "Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China." Decisions were made to accomplish this construction by perfection of reorganization of national economy organization and strengthening of sphere of self-existence, expansion and organization of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
6365	618-4	On 7 October a councillor of the French Embassy at Tokyo notified the Japanese of the 26 September bombing and they paid French 33,000 pesos compensation money.
6627	597	Memo from Wiehl of German Foreign Ministry of 8 October related to trade between Japan and Germany. It shows close economic cooperation between Japan and Germany in war material field and also that Japan contemplated at time of signing the Tri-Partite Pact that such a treaty would react unfavorably against Japan's trade.
9723	1027	On 10 October in a message from the Japanese Embassy to the United States Department of State, the former stated that it is difficult to concede that U. S. measures with regard to iron and steel scrap were modified solely in the interests of national defense - in view of the situation of iron and steel, their supply and demand, and the volume shipped to Japan.

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6870 618-A

On 11 October, France again refused Thailand's demands of 13 September; thus situation grew tense and Thailand concentrated troops on the French Indo-China border.

9768 1031

Grow informed MATSUOKA on 11 October that the setting up of a complete and discriminatory control of exchange had caused American trade in North China to come to a virtual halt. American enterprise had been driven from Manchuria, reduced to insignificant proportions in North China, and now it appears Japan intends to force the United States out of Shanghai.

On 15 October, OKA, Rear Admiral, was appointed Chief of General and Military Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry and Assistant to Navy Minister in the Imperial Headquarters; also (3 November) Secretary of the National General Mobilization Council.

11826 1307-A

The Van Mock book states that the Dutch and Japanese delegations met from 14-16 October under the chairmanship of Kobayashi and Van Mock. The Japanese delegation stated that despite the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan wanted firm friendly relations with the Netherlands East Indies and wishes for co-existence and co-prosperity. The Netherlands, stated that while the Tri-Partite Pact raised serious misgivings, they were willing to continue negotiations if it could be understood Japan had no hostile intentions nor claims leadership over Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands requested

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11826	1309-A	Japan to submit a list of points to be discussed but oil could be treated separately if desired.
8607	Liebert	On 16 October by Presidential proclamation an embargo was placed on all iron and steel scrap except to the western hemisphere and Great Britain.
11817	1313	October 18 telegram from Kobayashi to MATSUOKA regarding the urgency of placing the Netherlands East Indies within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and in order to accomplish this Japan's economic powers should be deeply implanted in the Netherlands Indies. Certain items requested in the budget of the next fiscal year should materialize.
8558	Liebert	An ordinance concerning operation of funds of banks and other financial institutions were promulgated on 19 October and provided that all financial institutions were required to adjust their investment policies in accordance with the directives of the Minister of Finance.
11829	1309-A	On 20 October, two days after accepting the Netherlands proposals regarding negotiations, Kobayashi, the Chief Japanese Delegate, left for Japan.
11829	1309-A	On 21 October a note was given by the Japanese delegation to the Netherlands, stating their appreciation for the Netherlands explanation of the petroleum situation on 7 October. It went on to state that Murai had found wide differences in the proposals of the two countries and that the proposed quantity of aviation gas and crude

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11829	1309-A	oil to Japan is almost nil. Japan would like the Netherlands to comply with her proposals. Also Japan is hindered in her exploitations of oil wells on account of the Netherlands policy of allocating spheres of interest to existing companies and is anxious to obtain rights to unexplored territories as well as government reserves. Murai is ready to enter into negotiations.
9769	1032	On 24 October Grew informed MATSUOKA that since 1 October Japanese regulations governing control of inspections and shipments of raw materials for light industries in North China are destined to result in large financial losses unless modified.
11837	1317	A Cabinet decision of 15 October stated that the Netherlands East Indies must from the economic standpoint become a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prospersity Sphere. Measures must be taken to stop Netherlands East Indies depending on the European-American economic bloc and all restrictions removed which hinder Japan's economic activities. Japan must be allowed to purchase agricultural products, obtain special cooperation from Netherlands East Indies in export of merchandise, obtain entry to unopened ports, have more freedom in fishing industry, inaugurate an air service, and although not including Netherlands East Indies in the yen bloc, must try to place exchange control under Japan's guidance and Netherlands East Indies

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1317

banks should establish credit to the Japanese and give them financial facilities. Third Powers' interest in the Netherlands East Indies must be stopped and newspaper propaganda on Anti-Japanese view controlled. Various measures such as inviting influential natives to Japan and by propaganda are to be resorted to, and the economic policy is aimed to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere and expand Japanese interests.

11834,

1316

11835

On 25 October Saito cabled MATSUOKA referring to Murai's telegram to the Chief of Fuel Affairs Bureau that from the standpoint of the industrialist it is most reasonable, but it is necessary that further consideration be given from the strategical standpoint. The application for prospecting in indicated areas may arouse Netherlands East Indies' suspicion, and those in Batavia think it necessary that Japan fortify certain areas in Dutch New Guinea etc. with planes and plain-clothes troops for a strategical base for operation against the Dutch. A large investigation is necessary and Saito advocated that prospecting rights be acquired for whole areas, taking into consideration strategical standpoint when selecting districts.

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11734	1299-4.	An article in Yomiuri newspaper of 27 October written by OSHIMA justifying the Tri-Partite Alliance as a peaceful instrument and stating that Japan must establish a new order in East Asia. A relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity must be established with French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and the South Sea Islands to be settled with the new order in Europe and consultations with Germany and Italy. The Axis must unite in their efforts since the prosecution of the war in Europe is closely bound with the new order in East Asia.
11831	1309-4	On 29 October Murai requested that certain uncommitted oil territories in Borneo, Celebes, Dutch New Guinea, Aroa Archipelago and the Schouten Archipelago be considered as Japan's Sphere of interest, Japan would like acknowledgement of these spheres of interest for her in order to explore and exploit them and requests that the necessary steps according to the mining law be taken. Japan may consider the capital participation of Netherlands East Indies in these enterprises. Japan would also like shares in the N. V. Nederlandsche Indische Handels Maatschappij and requests terms and conditions.

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5284	462	Announcement of Cabinet Information Bureau No. 5, November stated that now a new phase has been entered since the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact, Cabinet Council have decided on summary of the program for economic construction embracing Japan, Manchukuo and China.
6873	618-A	At a ministers' conference on 5 November (TOJO War Minister), it was decided to help Thailand in her boundary fight with French Indo-China and make her cooperate politically and economically in establishment of a new order in East Asia.
3004	244	The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 5 November cabled the Vice Minister of War Anami concerning change of ambassadors to Manchukuo. On 7 November KIMURA was appointed to Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee, and Land Development Committee.
3005	244	Vice War Minister telegraphed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 8 November stating change in ambassadors to Manchukuo was approved.
9771	1033	On 15 November Grew complained to MATSUOKA that merchandise owned by U. S. interests is being refused to re-export permits from Indo-China as a result of Japanese pressure, and requested steps be taken to put an end to this interference.
11844	1309-A	On 15 November the Netherlands Minister recommended to the Vice Foreign Minister in Tokyo that the negotiations be discontinued, since they were at a standstill for lack of subject matter.

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6874	618-A	On 19 November France refused Japan's request to cede territory to Thailand.
11844	1309-A	On 20 November a verbal note stated that a new special envoy had been appointed by the Japanese for the Netherlands negotiations in order to speed up the proceedings.
6270		On 21 November OKA was appointed Councillor to the Cabinet Planning Board.
6444	563	A telegram from Ott to German Foreign Ministry of 21 November was introduced to show how German aid to Japan against French Indo-China and Siam served as a springboard for attack on Singapore. Discusses Japanese and Anglo-Saxon efforts to win Thailand over to their side.
6373	618-A	The second Four-Minister (TOJO, War Minister) conference was held on 21 November where it was decided to help Thailand to gain control of Pro-bang and Pakuse as well, provided she agreed to Japanese demands.
9724	1028	On 22 November, Sir Robert Craigie in a memorandum to the Japanese Foreign Minister, gave a survey of the very large number of outstanding Anglo-Japanese cases in China, some dating back to 1938, and Japanese laxity in settling them, he enumerates many by date and location.
9773	1034	On 26 November, Grew protested to MATSUOKA on the arresting of the American Vice Consul and United Press correspondent in Hanci.
6373	618-A	On 28 November a clash occurred between French Indo-China and Thailand troops in the vicinity of Laos.

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11845	1309-4	On 23 November, Yoshizawa was appointed Japanese special envoy for the Netherlands negotiations.
6427	561	A conference between Weizsacker and Ambassador Kurusu of 23 November showed that within several months after the conclusion of the Tri-Partite alliance, collaboration between the three powers was taking the definite course of preparation for Japanese advance through the region south of China as a prerequisite for an attack on Singapore. Conclusion of Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese agreement would pave the way for these advances.
5323.	464	On 30 November a joint treaty was concluded between Japan and the new Japanese controlled government of China, and joint declaration of governments of Japan, Manchukuo and Japanese controlled China as part of plan of establishing a "New Order in East Asia."
5327	465	
	40	
4793	396	On 9 December, the U. S. consul at Tsinan made a report on the cultivation, sale and use of opium in the Tsinan Consular District.
8607	Liebert	On 10 December, the U. S. embargo on iron and steel was placed under licensing system.
6421	560	A telegram from Ott of 13 December concerned the invaluable work OSHIMA and SHIRATORI have done and can do as ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, and urged OSHIMA to once more accept post as ambassador to Germany because of his understanding of German-Japanese policy.

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6405	557	In December 1940 SHIRATORI, Toshio wrote an article entitled, "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" which was published in the publication "Contemporary Japan", regarding the treaty between Japan-Germany-Italy concluded in Berlin on 27 September.
3001	243	A telegram was sent on 16 December from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice Minister of War and Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff concerning trade pact between Japan, Manchukuo and China and Germany.
9778	1036	On 17 December Grew reiterated to MATSUOKA his complaint of 15 November concerning export permits from Indo-China for United States goods.
7930	787	A Privy Council meeting attended by TOJO was held on 18 December at which MATSUOKA stated that relations with USSR should be regulated at the moment when USSR sees no menace in Japan.
6449	567	Telegram from Ott to Reich Ministry on 19 December tells of Japanese Foreign Minister's plans to visit Rome and Berlin to coordinate Tri-Partite Pact and overcome deadlock in negotiations with China and Russia. On 20 December OSHIMA was reappointed Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany.

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6417	559	On 20 December an agreement was made providing for the establishment of a general commission and two technical commissions to be formed under the provisions of Article IV of the Tri-Partite Pact. On 21 December HIRANUMA was appointed Home Minister. SUZUKI, Lt. General, was appointed Director General of China Affairs Board and Councillor of Total War Research Bureau.
6269, 6270		On 26 December MUTO was appointed Councillor of the South Seas Bureau of the Overseas Affairs Ministry and OKA was appointed Councillor of the Bureau of Southern Colonization, the Overseas Affairs Ministry.
6451	568	Telegram from Ott to Reich Ministry of 31 December stated that the Foreign Minister was preparing to leave for Berlin.
10194	1128-A	SHIMADA stated in interrogation that Yamamoto submitted his plan for Pearl Harbor to the General Staff in January 1941.
8096	Sejima	Sejima stated in direct examination that he incinerated plans for the Japanese attack on the USSR planned to take place in 1939. From the plan, it appeared that Japan had contemplated an attack against "Far East-Russia" occupying Veroshilov, Vladivostok, etc. His position at the time was in Military Operation Section where he was in charge of the safeguarding and burning of secret papers; in this capacity he was told in the Spring of 1941 to destroy aforesaid plans, which he read before doing so.

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8097	Sejima	Sejima testified to the plan for the attack on the Maritime Provinces and against Russia prepared in 1941. Offensive to be taken in Sui Ren Ho district and extended towards Blagoveshchensk and Rubyshevska. Plan was an offensive plan, and the one for the following year was on the same lines.
1315	154	The orders of Restriction of Publication in newspapers and others, otherwise known as Imperial Ordinance Number 37 was enacted on 10 January and prohibited publication of any news which might hinder conduct of foreign affairs or national policies, or conduct of financial and economic policies and that which must be kept secret from foreign countries.
10057	1103	On 13 January a Liaison Conference was held attended by TOJO, MUTO and OKA.
6423	261	Address made by MATSUOKA on the occasion of a farewell party for OSHIMA on his departure for Germany on 15 January. MATSUOKA wished OSHIMA well and reiterated the confidence OSHIMA had gained from the German government, their pleasure at his appointment and the importance of his mission to further cement German-Japanese relations.
8451	852	Communication from Chief of Intendance Bureau, War Ministry to Ministry of Finance - Chief Finance Bureau, 16 January, requested confidential preparation of original plates of military currencies to be used in unspecified areas.

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11845	1309-4	On 16 January, the new Japanese delegation to the Netherlands East Indies headed by Yoshizawa presented a memorandum on their requests. It stated that in view of the fact that the Netherlands East Indies is thinly populated and undeveloped, Japan is of the opinion that if she participates in the exploitation and development of these islands great benefit will be reaped by both countries, therefore she makes the following proposals: That the entry of Japanese nationals into Netherlands East Indies be greatly facilitated, restrictions on medical practice be removed so Japanese medics can practice in Netherlands East Indies, Japanese be afforded favorable treatment in Japanese-Netherlands East Indies joint enterprises, mining projects be allowed, unrestricted fishing permitted, air service established by Japanese, ports opened to Japanese, submarine cables laid, establishment of Japanese businesses facilitated, import quotas arranged, and friendly customs treatment afforded Japanese imports.
11057	1103	Liaison Conferences were held on 16, 17 and 19 January, attended by HIRANUMA and TOJO.
10301	1157-B	TOJO stated in interrogation, that at the time he had agreed with MATSUOKA's speech of January when he stated the Tri-Partite Pact was the realisation of the ideal of Hakko Ichiu.

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4886	425	On 21 January the U. S. Treasury Attache in Shanghai issued a report on the opium monopoly distribution there. He attached a Chinese inclosure signed by Lee Ming.
11740	1300	In a speech to the Diet by MATSUOKA on 21 January he stated that the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China should be intimately and inseparably related with Japan. Kobayashi (Minister of Commerce and Industry) had been sent to the Netherlands East Indies to discuss negotiations for purchase of oil, but had been obliged to return when the negotiations were at a definite stage and had been replaced by Yoshizawa.
9613	1008	On 22 January, Ambassador Nomura was instructed to try to make the President and other people appreciate the fact that if, as it seems, there is no means of finding mutual understanding between Japan and the United States, then Japan has to join with countries other than the United States and Great Britain. Japan, in order to prevent war, and for her own defense, had decided to contract an alliance with the Axis. Whereas, Japan's actions in China were considered to be aggressive and unjust, her actions there were based entirely on the desire to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the principle of "The World Under One Roof" and she was not thinking of excluding foreigners from this region.

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8807	865	On 22 January, the Cabinet decided to enforce a population increase policy to insure a source of military strength as part of Japan's General Military Preparations - Goal was set as 100,000,000 domestic population by 1960.
		On 23 January, MATSUOKA, MUTO and OKA were appointed Japanese members of joint Japan-German-Italy Committee in Tokyo, and OSHIMA to similar Committee in Berlin.
6981	629	Memo of Weizsacker dated 23 January which stated the Japanese Ambassador mentioned a conversation between Ott and the Vice Foreign Minister, the British influence on Vichy must be prevented since Japan's advance in the direction of Singapore necessitates use of Malacca Peninsula and the passage through Indo-China and Siam.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 23 January attended by HIRANUMA and TOJO.
9879	1067	An extract from the Japan Times and Advertiser of 23 January stated that the fundamental principles of Japan's population policy were decided at Cabinet meeting after HOSHINO, President of the Cabinet Planning Board and the Welfare, Education and War (TOJO) Ministers gave explanations and decisions.
8451	852	Communication No. 2. Top Secret Sanctioned, 24 January bearing seals of several prominent officials referred to the subject of preparation and printing of military currency notes

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8451	852	and is acknowledgment of the communication and the matters contained therein by the several officials.
11856	1318	On 27 January 1941, Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA that since the more favorable position of the Allies through the defeat of Italy in the Mediterranean and increased United States aid, Netherlands East Indies had evidenced a strange attitude towards Japan and is even expressing her opposition on every measure. Unless Japan adopts determined measures not only the negotiations development, but also the development of relations would be difficult.
11743	1302	MATSUOKA instructed the Japanese delegate in Batavia on 28 January that Yoshizawa should absolutely refrain from using expressions that would deny Japan's hegemony within the Greater East Asia Sphere when speaking to outsiders.
11057	1103	A Liaison Conference was held on 30 January attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
6932	630	Telegram from Leahy in Paris to Secretary of State, Washington, of 28 January re German refusal to allow French troops to enter French Indo-China, as if they do not wish to have French defense strengthened there.
6429	562	Telegrams from German Ambassador in Tokyo to the Reich Foreign Minister, dated 31 January, showing that the Japanese Government and people were united behind the Tri-Partite Pact and SHIRATORI led the demand for attack on Singapore

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6429	562	and thus inspired the making of a research study of such an attack by the Military Specialists of the German Embassy in Tokyo. Confliction with United States increased.
11744	1303	KIDO stated in his diary of 1 February that Prince Fushimi, Premier Kono and General Sugiyama reported to the Emperor the policy which was decided at the Liaison Conference of 30 January regarding French Indo-China and Thailand.
	44	The use of naval and air bases was decided and the grasping of the opportunity afforded Japan by French Indo-China and Thailand having accepted arbitration would contribute to the preparation for the southward policy.
11057	1103	A Liaison Conference was held on 3 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
11852	1309-4	On 3 February the Netherlands answered the Japanese proposal of 16 January. This memorandum stated that while the Netherlands wished to afford neutrals improved economic relations, consideration must be given to the progress and emancipation of the Netherlands East Indies people and the maintenance of a strict non-discrimination affording no preponderance of foreign activity in any economic field. The Netherlands refuted the Japanese statement that the Netherlands East Indies were not developed and stated it was self-supporting. While there is naturally room for improvement, it was pointed

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11852	1309-A	out that agricultural emigrants to Java were 50,000 persons a year and still increasing and Netherlands East Indies is not in need of immigration. Japan's share in imports is larger due to the buying power by exports by Netherlands East Indies to third countries.
8607	Liebert	On 3 February copper, brass, zinc, nickel, and potash were placed on the embargo list by Presidential proclamation. On 5 February MATSUOKA was appointed Japanese mediator in dispute between France and Siam.
6446	564	Telegram from Ott to German Foreign Office, dated 6 February regarding Japan's plans to obligate England and Holland by secret agreement whereby they will make no military or political agreement with a/ Third Power.
11858	1319	Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA on 6 February reporting that MATSUOKA's speech on the Co-Prosperity Sphere had caused a great shock in the Netherlands East Indies and has been greatly publicized. He went on to complain of other irritating press releases and stated that the Dutch Minister, doubting Japan's intent, has requested recognition by Japan of the exiled government as the de jure and de facto government. Armed force seems to be the only way to make the Netherland East Indies a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and full preparations must first be made to meet this eventuality. Otherwise Japan will have to choose peaceful economic negotiations, however unsatisfactory. If the latter case is so then speeches

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11858	1319	and actions must conform to this policy to aid negotiations. The most recent developments in Tokyo do not cover this aim.
9782	1039	In a proposal from Anthony Eden to SHIGEMITSU on 7 February it is stated that although at the outset the British Ambassador had hoped the new cabinet would cooperate and settle problems peacefully, subsequent happenings reported to him did not illustrate this intention. The signing of the Tri-Partite Pact and the attitude that only Japan is entitled to mediate in affairs in the Far East cannot be overlooked. In regard to the Far Eastern situation, Britain wishes to make it clear that although she has territories in the Far East, she harbors no aggressive intent, and has no objection to Japan formulating her own policy, but hopes that it will not lead to a terrible disaster. On 7 February SHIGEMITSU replied to Eden, stating that he was not aware of such a critical situation and that England failed to understand Japan's intentions. While Britain accused Japan of cooperating with her enemies, she had consistently cooperated with Japan's enemies. Geographically, Japan should lead Asia, and this does not differ from the special interests which Britain and the United States feel to their neighbouring countries.
9739	1040	

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9648	1009	Telegram MATSUOKA to Nomura of 7 February tells him to impress upon the U. S. that Japan is not so exhausted by the China fighting as is supposed there. Japan has no intention of fighting the U. S. and they should co-operate lest the U.S.S.R. should bolshevize all China.
637	631	Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, dated 9 February regarding Japanese desire to assist Germany in getting rubber and other raw materials; telegram from Berlin approving Japanese intention in agreement with France and Thailand and these countries would make no agreements with third powers, awaiting further news on affairs in Indo-China.
6453	569	Telegram from Ott to Reich Minister dated 10 February states that MATSUOKA is to leave shortly for Berlin to discuss mainly: (1) attitude of Tri-Partite partners to America; (2) attempts to keep America out of the war. If this is unavoidable, Japan is considering a preventative attack on Singapore to eradicate the United States from the Pacific. (3) termination of China conflict.
11861	1045	On 13 February Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA, stating that the Netherlands East Indies were now much closer to the United States and Great Britain and that the South Seas problem, particularly Netherlands East Indies, is an important cause for United States expansion of naval ships. Netherlands East Indies is more inclined towards being in United States hands than Japanese, since they

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11861	1045	can expect positive aid from United States and Britain. Success of the negotiations, due to Netherlands East Indies following United States attitude, seems remote and the only means of settlement left is for Japan to exercise her real power. No success can be obtained in negotiations by Japan shouting for a co-prosperity sphere under her leadership.
4796	398	An article from the Japanese-owned newspaper "Little Critic" of 13 February gives indication that Japanese residents at Tsingtao were opposed to present Japanese narcotic policy.
9794	1041	On 13 February MATSUOKA cabled SHIGEMITSU, informing him that he intended to see Craigie in a few days and asked SHIGEMITSU to hand Eden his telegram No. 47 and explain the reason he expressed so unreserved an opinion is that he felt so close to him. He stated Craigie's report was a fantasy and groundless. SHIGEMITSU is to make verbal representation that Japan has no intention to make trouble with England.
11057	1103	A Liaison Conference was held on 13 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
9798	1043	In a memorandum of 14 February of Hull, he stated that the President had informed the new Japanese Ambassador on his visit to him that Americans were concerned about Japanese movements south to French Indo-China, etc., and her entry into the Tri-Partite Pact. In view of these situations it might be wise for the State

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9798	1043	Department officials to frankly conf r with him (the Ambassador) to see if relations could be improved.
9797	1042	Grew informed MATSUOKA on 13 February that Japanese officials in Indo-China continued their interference in granting permits to United States firms.
9804	1045	On 14 February MATSUOKA cabled Nomura in Washington and stated that he had urged at a recent Diet session reconsideration of Japan's attitude towards the United States. He set out a list of points which Nomura was to make clear to the United States Government. These points embraced the national policy of Japan and her determination to carry it out, also the fact that the China war had not exhausted Japan's supplies.
6446	565	Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, to German Foreign Ministry of 17 February concerning difficulty or arranging treaty due to Thailand's excessive demands. Hope to effect compromise and press Vichy Regime to accept.
10043	1101	MATSUOKA, in a reply to Eden of 17 February, stated that Japan is surprised at Britain's concern over the Far Eastern situation, based on reports of Ambassador Craigie. He stated that Japan was also anxious over British and United States movements in the Pacific and South Seas, and some quarters are advocating that Japan take steps to meet the worst in these regions. He again stated Japan's peaceful intentions and her

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10043	1101	motto is "no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation." Japan is ready to act as a mediator anywhere, and he hoped England would agree that there is a grave responsibility to restore peace, which can only be fulfilled by a wise and courageous statesmanship willing to be accommodating and generous.
9801	1044	MATSUOKA stated in a telegram to SHIGEMITSU on 17 February that Craigie's report seemed to be based the idea that Japan wanted military bases in French Indo-China and Thailand, and he did not know on what grounds Craigie had based this report. When the Vice-Minister stated this was based on speeches and actions of military men who controlled Japan's diplomacy, MATSUOKA stated he could find nothing to substantiate this.
9811	1046	On 18 February MATSUOKA cabled SHIGEMITSU concerning a conversation with Craigie to discuss Japanese-English relations. Japan accused England of misinterpretation of her actions and when Craigie inquired if Japanese mediation policy in the French Indo-Chinese-Siam conflict would not reap exorbitant compensation, MATSUOKA stated that Japan's real reward would be in the restoration of peace. On 19 February SHIGEMITSU was appointed Ambassador to China.
11057	1103	A Liaison Conference was held on 20 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.

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9816	1047	Craigie wrote MATSUOKA on 21 February with respect to the presence of British troops near the Malaya-Thailand border. A communique which had been issued by Thailand regarding their presence stated in effect "both countries still respect the Treaty and pact of non-aggression concluded between one another", while the Japanese press had misquoted this by stating, "Great Britain should respect the Non-Aggression Treaty which she concluded with Thailand."
6456	570	Report of conversation at Berlin between OSHIMA and Weizsacker on 22 February shows close German-Japan collaboration plans for Russian Pact, settlement of China matters, and plans for capturing Hong Kong and Singapore.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 23 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
6992	623-A	Excerpt from conference of Ribbentrop and OSHIMA of 23 February in which Ribbentrop refers to Germany's victory on continent as conclusion of Tri-Partite Pact being great advantage to Japan. Whereas in former times Japan's friendship enabled Germany to re-arm after Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany's victory has eliminated France as a power in Asia and greatly weakened English strength, allowing Japan to advance closer to Singapore.
7862	769	
9821	1049	An interchange of communications between Japan and Britain of 21 February stated that Churchill was pleased to see that MATSUOKA sees

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9821	1049	no reason to feel any untoward developments in the East. There is no question of Britain's attacking in the Far East and Britain's concern was not only based on Craigie's reports, but on events in the Far East. Britain is fighting to overthrow a system of lawlessness and violence abroad and tyranny at home and to gain no personal advantage.
9819	1048	SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA on 24 February and related a conversation with Premier Churchill in which the latter expresses regret at the present worsening of Anglo-Japanese relations. He stated that measures in Singapore were merely defensive, and Britain had never taken any offensive policy towards Japan. England would emerge victorious from the present conflict and the mediation suggested by MATSUOKA would not arise.
9826	1050	OSHIMA informed MATSUOKA in a telegram of 25 February that he had stressed various matters concerning Japanese-German relations with Ribbentrop. He told the latter that Japan is absolutely faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact and everyone is moving forward to the realization of the national policy with the pact as a keynote to foreign relations.
9828	1051	On 25 February SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA and told him that he had informed Churchill that MATSUOKA's offer was not one of mediation. SHIGEMITSU pointed out that most problems between England and Japan had arisen out of the China situation and he regretted England had

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9828	1051	been giving concrete assistance to China. The time had come for a constructive policy in the Pacific through goodwill and mutual understanding. Churchill stated Britain had kept strictly neutral in this situation and that Japan's intentions after the Tri-Partite Pact had been so vague that both Britain and the United States had become suspicious.
4797	398	Report from American Consul Tsingtao to Secretary of State on 26 February regarding New Opium Prohibition Bureau inaugurated at Tsingtao. Criticism of enforcement of opium restrictions.
9835	1053	Proposition of 27 February by SHIGEMITSU to Churchill stated that MATSUOKA wished to state that there was no hint of his readiness to act as mediator. MATSUOKA wished to reiterate what he had said before on the Tri-Partite Pact; it was a peace pact to prevent a third power from entering the European War or Sino-Japanese conflict.
9833	1052	On 27 February Grew cabled Hull and related a conversation with MATSUOKA, who had interpreted the stationing of British troops on the Malaya-Thailand border, and the reinforcement of Singapore, as offensive measures. Grew expressed amazement at this and stated that the United States should be guided by facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance and her occupation of many parts of Indo-China.

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6468	572	Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador, Tokyo, dated 27 February regarding encouraging Japan at all costs to take early possession of Singapore.
6456	571	Extract from report of conversations between OSHIMA and Ribbentrop on 28 February states that after agreement made with Russia, Germany felt herself secure on the continent; bombing of England caused serious retard in her war effort; Japan needed by Germany in order to cut off England's possessions in the Far East, advocacy of early attack on Singapore. On 1 March HATA was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Army.
7568	721-4	Excerpt from Military Topographical Data for the purpose of landing operations in the Northern Sea, Vol. 2, March - which contains military topographical data necessary for landing operations in 15 districts of the Soviet peninsula Kanchatka. Seizure planned by Japanese General Staff.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 2 March attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA & MUTO.
6469	573	Directive issued by Hitler's headquarters, 3 March, concerning collaboration between Germany and Japan, showing directives for cooperation with Japan which directly resulted from the OSHIMA-Ribbentrop conference: (1) mutual plans of action; (2) Japanese seizure of raw materials; and (3) conquest of Singapore.

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9841	1054	MATSUOKA cabled Nomura on 4 March desiring that Nomura, in answering certain types of questions act in concert with him since he had answered affirmatively when asked whether Japan would participate in the war if the United States should attack Germany.
6635	660	Letter from German Ambassador to Vice Foreign Minister of 5 March showing that Boltze replaced Ott as German Ambassador, when latter was absent in Germany.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 6-7 March attended by MUTO, HIRANUMA, TOJO.
9842	1055	A newspaper announcement with respect to the new mobilization law of 8 March stated that detailed regulation of the National Mobilization Law will be enforced on March 20.
	98	On March 8 new Peace Preservation Law was promulgated.
9843	1056	A memorandum of Hull of March 8 related to a conversation with Nomura in which Hull inquired whether he considered the United States could sit back and watch two or three large military forces being assembled. Nomura was evasive and played on the subject of U. S. embargos. Hull expressed the United States concern at Japanese aggressive policies.
6993	633	Exchange of letters of 11 March between MATSUOKA and Henri - to Henri: Japanese offer to mediate dispute between French Indo-China and Siam. To

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6993	633	MATSUOKA: French Government accepts plan of mediation by Japan and for protection of its colonies will not enter into agreement with third powers.
8550	Liebert	Promulgation of the National Savings Association Law 12 March, under provision of National General Mobilization Law, with purpose of providing for establishment of Savings Associations to encourage thrift accounts, and associations in turn bought up national bonds with their assets.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 11 March attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUFO. On 12 March MATSUOKA was appointed to visit Europe.
6447	566	Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, to German Foreign Ministry of 12 March re visit of Chashi to express thanks for German support in mediation of Thailand-French Indo-China dispute.
9847	1057	14 March memorandum of conversation between the President and Nomura, stresses American anxiety as to Japanese intentions due to MATSUOKA's loud talk, and the unexplained presence of Japanese forces near Saigon and Thailand.
8290	Liebert	The Imperial Oil Company Law of 15 March (Law No. 73) established the Imperial Petroleum Company, a national policy company, to survey and develop oil fields and to control the purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products.

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Report dated 18 March of Commander-in-Chief of German Navy to Hitler, giving suggestion that Japan should speedily attempt to eliminate Singapore. Japan is making such plans but withholding action until Germany invades England; Japan wishes to avoid war with the United States and can do so if she takes Singapore soon, says Commander-in-Chief.

MATSUOKA should be advised regarding the designs on Russia.

On 18 March SATO was appointed Chief of Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau (War Ministry), Secretary of Manchurian Affairs Board and Liaison Committee of East Asia Development Board.

4801

400

Report Treasury Attache, Shanghai, dated 19 March, giving information that two Chinese were controlling numerous heroin dens operated by Chinese in Peiping. They work in cooperation with Japanese.

11748

1304

In a memorandum of 21 March for the German Foreign Minister, it is stated that the subject of obtaining rubber and tin for Germany from Netherlands East Indies and Thailand through Japan in exchange for foreign bills of exchange will have to be discussed with MATSUOKA. Germany feels that freest possible trade should be afforded her, and as yet no aggravation has arisen to the Japanese conception that Germany deal with China, Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies through Japan alone, since Germany is dependent on Japanese imports during the war.

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12686	1289	On 24 March the U. S. Ambassador to Russia cabled the U. S. Secretary of State regarding a conversation with MATSUOKA, who stated emphatically Japan had no territorial ambitions and would on no account attack Singapore, or any United States, British or Dutch possessions. Japan would not go to war with the United States, and MATSUOKA stated that such a conflict would take place only as a result of affirmative action by the United States.
6476	575	Memorandum from Weizsacker to Reich Foreign Minister dated 24 March, regarding debate on when Japan will enter war against England. Germany will agree to forfeit the Netherlands East Indies claim and other South Seas possessions, yet Japan apparently awaits further German success against England. MATSUOKA still friendly to Russia but should be advised of change in German policy towards Russia in order to control Japanese policy through him after his European journey.
6477	576	Memorandum by Ott for German Foreign Minister of 25 March regarding situation of Japan. Japanese Army and Navy planning for attack; air force attack of Singapore aided by German dive bomber specialists advising Japanese; promote good terms with Russia to avoid fighting on that side; suggest German specialists assist Japan's war economy in conquered areas to maintain free flow of raw materials from Netherlands East Indies and Malay.
6485	577	Minutes of conference between Hitler and MATSUOKA
7943	790	of 27 March, Ott and OSHIMA present, outline of

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6485	577	points favorable to an attack; MATSUOKA's mention of circles in Japan opposing this until actually forced to do so - he believes only matter of time till Japan will attack and cannot promise anything for his Government, but will promote to the utmost the goals indicated. MATSUOKA insists 3-Power Pact was not concluded on basis of expectation Germany would win, but rather on belief in a new order. This belief was his life's labour and he devoted all his energies to it. MATSUOKA then wishes to discuss his visit to Stalin in Moscow - he impressed Stalin that Japan was opposed to Anglo-Saxon capitalism in China and also that the Anglo-Saxons were greatest menace to New Order in Asia. The Anglo-Saxons were a mutual enemy of Japan, Germany and Russia. Conference ended with MATSUOKA's praise of Hitler's leadership and the unity of German people behind him.
6498	578	Record of conversation between Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA of 27 March, in which Reich Foreign Minister gave survey of situation from Germany's point of view as follows: Germany has had high successes on land and sea and her own production is likewise high; she has practically subjugated her enemies. Smaller countries of Europe are agreeable to Tri-Partite Pact. Food in Germany will never become critical; raw materials have certain set-backs, such as rubber. Reich Minister believes Axis have practically won the war - he expects English capitulation this year.

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6498	578	England might have given up sooner except Roosevelt gave them much hope. America promises aid to England, but it will be long time till she can produce modern war materials. Tri-Partite Pact aims mainly at frightening America to keep her out of war. Hitler discusses advantage Japan's entering war, especially to strike at Singapore which would also restrain Roosevelt. Hitler believed it advantageous for Japan to enter the war. The seizure of Singapore would be a decisive factor.
7913	783	Excerpt of talk between MATSUOKA and Ribbentrop of 27 March, in which it is stated that Germany concluded pact with Russia because Japan at the time could not join in pact with Germany. In view of approaching war had to conclude pact with USSR.
4795	397	Report of 28 March from American Consulate at Tsinan regarding Japanese Army profits through sale of heroin to renegade Chinese troops.
6513	579	Notes on conversation between German Foreign Ministry and MATSUOKA on 28 March, regarding closer co-operation between Germany and Japan. Hitler pleased with MATSUOKA's activity in this matter. Great Britain must be utterly defeated, particularly Singapore must be taken to insure Japan's control of the South. Germany would help Japan in event of attack by Russia. As to the United States, it would not risk its fleet beyond Hawaii, attack on Singapore would ensure American

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neutrality. Germany was four times her strength in First World War, she and Italy would rule Europe, England might collapse sooner than expected. MATSUOKA asks Germany's attitude to America if England were beaten. Reply: If England were beaten, Germany has no interest in war with United States. If England were beaten, Germany-Italy would control Europe, Japan control Far East and United States limit herself to the American continent. MATSUOKA plans commercial treaty with Russia, but Japan is against Russia joining Tri-Partite Pact. Germany agrees to commercial treaties, but would not have Russia in 3-power pact. Japanese look with concern at war with the United States as it might last 5-10 years. If Japan conquered Singapore and took the Philippines, she would control the Far East. MATSUOKA favours German Minister's line of thought and said if Japan did not risk attack on Singapore, she would be relegated to being third-rate power, so that blow would have to be dealt one day. If she kept United States quiet for six months, all difficulties would be overcome.

11864

1320

On 28 March Konoye cabled Yoshizawa, stating that he agrees that Yoshizawa's ideas on the settlement are only reasonable ones, but states that if the negotiations fail the impression that Japan is easily dealt with will be given to the enemy, and the latter will thus intensify operation. In view of the changed situation since MATSUOKA's visit to Germany, and the proposed visit of the

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11864	1320	Foreign and Colonial Ministers, Japan's original demands for acquiring resources should be pushed. Care must be paid to the fact that the negotiations do not fall into the Dutch plan to get rid of the Japanese representatives, since their presence there is imperative.
8452	852	Top secret communication of 29 March referred to printing of "Ha" and "Ni" series currency notes, pursuant to conference of 24 January.
6522	580	Report of conversation between Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA dated 29 March, regarding pending discussion of MATSUOKA with Russians.
7939	789	Germany asks he not go too far. Germany promises aid to Japan should Russia ever strike. Germany's largest army was on the eastern front and should Russia conflict with Germany, it would be beaten in a matter of months. Japan could always attack Singapore without fear of having Russia at her back. Also regarding such an attack, Japan need have no fear of the British Fleet as it was already tied up in home waters. Japan states no fear of British or American Navy, as she could smash either, but battle with the United States Navy might drag five years. Germany insists America could do nothing if Japan attacked Singapore. If Japan took the Philippines, America, because of inadequate armament would have nothing to offset such a loss. MATSUOKA meanwhile was doing everything to assure England she had no designs on Singapore. Germany believes Japan's declaration

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6522	580	of war on England should be attack on Singapore.
7939	789	Looking to trade after the war, Germany and Japan would co-operate as between European and Far Eastern spheres; America would be self-sufficient in her own sphere. Possibility of three powers trading with South America. Japan would need German assistance in development of China potentials; Japanese business feared German competition more than American or British; German business felt exactly the same way. MATSUOKA brings up his discussion with Russia regarding Japan-Russia non-aggression pact. Also, Japan desired to purchase part of Sakhalien for oil resources which Russia took "as a joke." Germany did not care to go deeply into Japanese-Russian affairs but again pressed the point that Japan could best assist 3-powers pact by attack on Singapore. With a resultant joint victory, Japan would then have all she desired. MATSUOKA asks if Germany would assist her in attack on Singapore; Germany would have to study maps, refer it to Hitler; her aerial advices would always be available to Japan. Japan was assured she would also get control of the Netherlands East Indies upon the fall of Singapore. Germany would do as much as possible to assist Japan in the Far East, but it must be remembered that she was fighting Britain and the British fleet in the Mediterranean, whereas Japan was only fighting on the surface.

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6533	581	Discussion between Goering and MATSUOKA of 29 March - Germany will make available to Japan all her military tactics, and especially air force improvements made during the war. Germany requests promised shipment of rubber, which she says she needs to supplement her synthetic rubber. MATSUOKA said he had done as much as he could to expedite this matter and did not know the exact situation just now.
1040 1047	141	Extract from "The Way of a Subject," 31 March - denunciation of Anglo-American imperialistic union since World War I, national development and expansion of Japan gave rise to jealousy among European and American nations and they attempted economic pressure on Japan.
11751	1305	A decision by Imperial Headquarters of April states that Japan must establish close military, political and economic relations with French Indo-China and Thailand, and close economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies. Arms are only to be resorted to in the event the embargos or anti-Japanese encirclement of United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China become so tense they cannot be tolerated.
8452	852	On 1 April the Chief of Cabinet Printing Bureau ordered the manufacture of "Hi" and "Ni" series of military currency immediately in Dutch and English, to be completed in early April.

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8545	Liebert	Law concerning Extraordinary Exception from Application of Convertible Bank Note Law was passed on 1 April, which suspended the provisions which governed the monetary reserve of the Banks of Japan, Chosen and Taiwan and dissolved the distinction between specie reserve (gold and silver) and judiciary reserve (commercial paper and government bonds). These provisions and others had the effect of giving completely artificial value to yen.
8803	864	Excerpt Japan Year Book 1941-1942, giving details of further revised Military Service Law of 1 April with main points: (1) enrolment of new conscripts in overseas districts into garrisons nearest to their residences; (2) abrogation of 2nd reserve Service System; (3) prolongation of days of call for the education of supplementary reservists.
9350	864	Extract from KIDO's diary of 3 April refers to the appointment of SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board and Toyada as Minister of Commerce, with which KIDO agreed. On 4 April SUZUKI was appointed Minister of State and Chief Director Cabinet Planning Board; HOSHINO became a member of the House of Peers.
6537	582	Conversation between Hitler and MATSUOKA of 4
7945	791	April, in which MATSUOKA expresses thanks for gifts and friendliness showered on him during his stay in Berlin, and upon his return to Japan would seek to assure his people that they are treated by Germans with "honest friendliness and respect."

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6537	582	MATSUOKA requests German help in submarine warfare matters. In the event of war with England and the United States they would fight guerilla warfare in the Pacific and also request Germany's aid on this. Hitler promised this, and said Germany likewise considered war with the United States undesirable. Such war would depend on transportation, and Germany had extensive plans for U-Boat and Luftwaffe to prevent American landings in Europe. Germany would strike in the event of war between Japan and America. MATSUOKA again requests Germany's inventive aids as Japan feels Japanese Navy must prepare for immediate conflict with America. He has always believed conflict with America unavoidable, sooner or later. He personally argued Japan should strike soon and decisively and then perhaps avoid war with America for generations. She would then have firm hold in the South Seas. If she waited, she would have to fight anyway, and perhaps under less favourable conditions. MATSUOKA says America implies by notes she will not fight Japan unless Japan attempts to aid in the destruction of England. Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the United States and England would always help each other against the world. MATSUOKA requested no cables be sent regarding Singapore matter, but he would advise by courier of Japan's decision in the matter.
7945	791	

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6545	583	Conference of Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA in Berlin of 5 April, where at the Foreign Minister assured MATSUOKA Germany is full of vitality and absolutely certain of victory. MATSUOKA replies what he saw in Germany and Italy far exceeded his expectations; he was convinced Germany and Italy were united and would always remain so; remarked on high German morale. MATSUOKA questions Reich's intention towards smaller states; reply that they would be independent within the European whole, even maintain small armies and police force; England never again to meddle in the affairs of smaller nations. A basic mistake of the Versailles Treaty was increasing the number of European states; they should have been decreased. Reich Minister asked MATSUOKA to bring these points back to Japan: (1) Germany had already won the war; (2) there were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany; Germany-Italy rule Europe; Japan rule the East; (3) Germany would win the war, but Japan's entry into the war would hasten this. On 9 April, MAGANO was appointed Chief of Naval General Staff.
9852	1059	On 9 April a proposal was presented to the Department of State through the medium of private American and Japanese individuals. This plan outlined methods to reach a peaceful settlement of the present difficulties between the two countries. On 10 April KIMURA was appointed Vice War Minister.

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<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 10 April attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
9869	1062	In a letter from Churchill to MATSUOKA on 12 April, he stated he had certain questions to ask. They were: will the Germans, without command of the sea or daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Britain in the first nine months of 1941? Will the Germans try to do so, and would it not be better for Japan, until these questions are answered, to wait? Etc. He then said that the answer to these questions might enable Japan to avoid a serious catastrophe and bring about an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations.
6553	45	On 13 April the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact was signed.
6553	584	Telegram from Boltze of German Embassy in Tokyo, dated 14 April, regarding the signing of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Russia. It would facilitate Japan's expansion policy in South Asia and attack on Singapore.
9873	1064	Grew complained to Konoye on 14 April of the aerial bombardment of Kunming, China, and the resultant damage to United States property.
9861	1060	On 14 April a memorandum of Hull stated that Nomura might like to explore the question of improving United States-Japanese relations. Hull informed Nomura of the document of 9 April submitted by private individuals and suggested that it could be used as a basis for preliminary negotiations. Nomura agreed and stated his desire to do

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1061

anything within his power to preserve peace.

In a memorandum of Hull dated 16 April he again referred to the document of 9 April, being a basis for negotiations, and there were many points on which the United States agreed, and some which would require further discussion. Nomura stated he could answer the questions, or submit them to his government for answer. Both agreed that they had not reached the stage of negotiations, but were only exploring in a preliminary and unofficial way the action which might pave the way for later negotiations. The four principles as to which the questions were submitted by Hull were:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

11057

1103

Liaison Conference was held on 17 April attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA and MATSUOKA.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
9875	1065	An extract from KIDO's diary of 19 April stated that after reporting to the Throne and conversing with Konoyo concerning Nomura's instructions, they concluded that every effort must be made to keep good faith with Germany and Italy, while realizing new order in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
9872	1063	In a telegram from MATSUOKA to Churchill of 22 April, he acknowledged his note of 12 April and stated that Japan's intent was to bring about the Hakko Ichiu, and there would be no conquest, oppression or exploitation, and that Britain may rest assured concerning Japanese Foreign policy.
8452	852	Top secret communications of 23 April referring to arrangements for the manufacture of "Ha" and "Ni" series military currency notes.
6630	598	Draft of a work programme for the economic sub-commission of the Tri-Partite Pact in Berlin dated 28 April concerns cooperation by signatories of Tri-Partite Pact in economic field, war and post-war period. Exchange of economic information between governments, mutual support in procurement of raw materials, etc.
9877	1066	KIDO's diary of 28 April relates to a question by the Emperor concerning who should be consulted on diplomatic matters when the Premier, Foreign Minister and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal were ill, and asked about the progress on deliberation on Germany's policy towards the United States. KIDO expressed his opinion on these questions and had the Chief Secretary submit them to the throne. On 2 May HOSHINO became Councillor of Total War Institute.
11657	1103	Liaison Conference of 3 May attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO, and OKA.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
8607	Liebert	On 5 May the U. S. State Department revoked all licenses for shipment of scrap rubber to Japan and occupied China.
9884	1068	Ott in a cable to Ribbentrop of 6 May reported a conversation with MATSUOKA, the general outline of which was the proposal by America, which MATSUOKA thought originated through a report from the United States Ambassador to Russia, whom MATSUOKA had told that Japan would join with the Axis if the United States joined the war. Dealing with the United States proposal will lead to strained relations in economic circles and MATSUOKA wants to make the United States pledge not to participate in the European War. Regarding Russia, MATSUOKA stated the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact was an offshoot of Russian fear of Germany and in the event of German-Russo conflict, Japan would be forced to attack Russia, and no neutrality pact could change this.
9891	1069	On 6 May Grew reported to MATSUOKA that the Consulate of Kunming had been seriously damaged in a raid of 29 April.
7159	46	On 6 May treaties of residence, navigation and customs system were concluded between Japan and French Indo-China, giving Japanese equal rights with nationals of that country
7140	658	
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 8 May attended by MUTO, HIRANUMA, OKA, TOJO.
6999	47	On 9 May peace agreement between France and Thailand signed.
6999	634	Memorandum from Chief of Staff, French Indo-China Expeditionary Force to KIMURA, dated 10 May, concerned incident of assault on Japanese military employee by French Indo-Chinese soldier as one which might cause

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		severing relations of the two countries (reference to outbreak of China Incident in same way). Suggest Japan demand right to increase troops and area of its activity, freedom of housing and travel and free use of airfields.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference 12 May attended by MUTO, HIRANUMA, OKA, TOJO.
8805	864 1038	On 10 May the National Defense Security Law was enforced to safeguard the secrecy of high state secrets regarding diplomatic, financial and economic matters.
9894	1070	On 12 May Nomura submitted to Hull a draft proposal of an agreement between the two countries. This draft concerned policies to be followed; that the United States should request Chiang Kai Shek to negotiate peace with Japan along the lines of Konoye's plan, bearing in mind that Japan's expansion in the southwest Pacific is of a peaceful nature; and declare the Philippines independent with non-discriminatory treatment for Japan. These are some of the main points brought out.
11867	1308-A'	On 14 May the Japanese delegation to the Netherlands East Indies presented a new order, stating in reconsidering their Memorandum of 16 January they are presenting a new proposal by which to clarify that the Japanese viewpoint expressed in the preamble was still firmly held.
7984	807	On 15 May Ribbentrop cabled the German Ambassador to Tokyo concerning the fact that the present time was the most opportune moment to seize the Siberian Coastal Province and Vladivostock, since Russia's combined strength is strained to the utmost on the European front. Japan must be made aware of this fact without directly forcing the issue.

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9904	1071	A draft suggestion from Hull to Nomura of 16 May showed that the United States made certain amendments to the draft plan. They wished a change wherewith Japan would declare the purpose of the Axis alliance defensive, and would only adhere to the military obligations in the event one of the parties hereto were aggressively attacked by a power not involved in the European War, whereas the United States would declare its attitude based on considerations of protection, self-defense, and national security. An amendment concerning the termination of the China War was submitted and a guarantee of equal opportunity for economic activity in the southwest Pacific.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 15 May attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA MUTO, OKA.
9908	1072	Grew informed MATSUOKA on 17 May that the consulate at Kunming had again been damaged on 12 May.
9910	1073	Ott in a cable to Ribbentrop of 18 May reported on a conversation he had had with MATSUOKA. Ott told MATSUOKA that Germany wished America to give a clear assurance that she would not participate in the European conflict. MATSUOKA stated he would not jilt the Tri-Partite Pact and his motive in the negotiations is to postpone or prevent the entry of the United States into war and eliminate the increase of United States assistance to England. MATSUOKA stated he would inform Germany of the United States reply and as far as possible consult with German and Italy on further negotiations. MATSUOKA stated there were elements who are uncertain of Russia's actions, to whom he had to yield in the face of alleged United States entry into the War. HIRANUMA,

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he stated, had to resign when the German-Russian non-aggression pact was signed.

9918	1075	OSHIMA cabled MATSUOKA on 20 May stating that he was deeply troubled concerning the many rumours of negotiation between Japan and the United States and finds it his duty to inform MATSUOKA of the opinion of the German Staff and himself. He then gave a long survey of German reactions and decisions on the proposed pact between the United States and Japan and stated in conclusion that such a pact might cause bewilderment concerning Japan's true policy. If it had to be, he suggested that Japan should make clear her adherence to the principles of the Tri-artite Pact and demand the United States neutrality in the European War. In order to avoid any misconception regarding Japan's intentions, she should thoroughly convince the Axis about the meaning of the agreement.
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9933	1076	OSHIMA cabled MATSUOKA on 21 May and stated that the new agreement is thought to be an important change in Japan's policy and it is of great concern to the plans of the Japanese military and naval attaches in Germany. (Attaches received copies)
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11057	1103	Liaison Conference held 22 May attended by TOJO, MUTO and O
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11868	1321	On 23 May MATSUOKA cabled Yoshizawa, SHIGEMITSU and Nomura regarding an interview with the British Ambassador, Craigie. MATSUOKA told him that Netherlands East Indies still refused to supply the demanded tin and rubber to Japan, stating former supplies could be cut since Japan obtains some from French Indo-China. Holland claims that there is danger of Japan re-exporting these commodities to Germany; but while MATSUOKA insisted that the exports from French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies together
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are insufficient for Japan's needs, Japan considers it humiliating to give assurance to a small country like Netherlands East Indies that she will not re-export. If the negotiations fail, then the situation may incite not only anti-Dutch but anti-British and anti-United States sentiment.

6557 585

Secret instructions of 24 May from Headquarters German Army based on report by attache in Tokyo:
(1) if United States and Japan are to fight, question of how Japan should open the war;
(2) possible war between Germany and USSR caused United States to join war; (3) conclusion of China conflict before any other new tasks for Japanese army.

10752 Ballantine On 28 May Hull made it clear that the proposed formula with respect to the Axis did not adequately clarify Japan's peaceful intention towards the United States should the United States become involved in a war with Germany.

9935 1077

A memorandum dated 28 May concerning a conversation between Ambassador Nomura and Hull related that Hull had informed Nomura that MAT NOBU on his return to Japan had been declaring Japan's support of Germany in the event of war between Germany and the United States, and stated that, unless Japan clarifies

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her obligations under the Tri-Partite Pact if the United States enters the war, there is no assurance of Japan's position. Hull also asked if Japanese troops were to be retained in China and Nomura replied he thought a permanent force would be stationed there, but he did not know how strong. Hull stated this would not aid Japanese-United States friendship, since their presence might tend to produce incidents.

11057 1103

A Liaison Conference was held on 29 May attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.

11910 1326E

On 30 May, Chuan at British Penang wrote to Hayashi, President of the Japan South Seas Association, Batavia, reporting on his activities to stir up trouble by spreading rumours and committing sabotage. They have decided to corrupt soldiers and organize 5th column activities in readiness for when the fighting begins.

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9960	1030	An informal oral statement by Hull to Nomura on 31 May stated that the U. S. will at some proper time prior to any definite decision talk over in strict confidence with China the general subject matter of the discussions, especially as it relates to China.
9938	1078 1079	On 31 May another American draft of the proposal to adjust relations was handed to Ambassador Nomura, bringing out the same points mentioned in previous drafts and stating in regard to China that the U. S. will, on the basis of the Konoye principles, suggest to China she enter into negotiations with Japan. A statement was also handed to Nomura at the same time as the draft, saying that they were giving an unofficial exploratory and without commitment oral explanation to the amendments proposed.
9961	1081	Hull in a memorandum of 2 June stated that he had asked Nomura if he seriously believed Japan was seeking a peaceful settlement with the U. S. on Pacific matters, or whether the negotiations were merely a method of finding a way to get out of China. Nomura stated that Japan was honest in her intent and that an earnest and fair settlement was desired.
9963	1082	Grew complained to MATSUOKA on 4 June that on the 1st of June the Episcopal Mission at Chungking had been seriously damaged for the fifth time.

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A memorandum of Hull dated 4 June referred to a conversation between Hull, Nomura and others regarding the pact negotiations. It was stated that Japan was prepared to drop the suggestion that the U. S. state that it would not resort to any aggression aimed to assist one nation against another, if the U. S. would drop the statement in its draft requiring Japan to state that the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of defense. Amendments regarding cooperative defense of China against injurious communistic activities were suggested by the Japanese, as well as the acceptance by the U. S. of Japan's declaration as to their peaceful aims in the southwest Pacific.

9982	1085
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In an informal statement of 6 June from Hull to Nomura he stated that Japan, by her many revisions to the original text of the proposed pact, seems to have strayed from the fundamental points which the U. S. considers involved in establishing peace in the Pacific. Japan has stressed alignment with the Axis to avoid giving a clear indication of its intentions to make peace with China on a lasting basis.

10753	Ballantine
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On 6 June Hull told Nomura that he had the impression from the various revisions to the proposal and from recent manifestations that Japan was disposed to stress her alignment with the Axis.

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11871	1309-A	In a memorandum of 6 June the Netherlands answered Japan's memoranda of the 4th and 22 May. While stating that Japan had modified some of her demands she still adhered to the preamble of the 16 January memorandum, which advocated a special position for Japan in Netherlands East Indies since it was not adequately developed. The Netherlands reiterated her policy in Netherlands East Indies as stated on 3 February 1940 and stated that during war economic activities in the Netherlands East Indies would inevitably be affected since the defense of N.E.I. must be safeguarded and the Dutch war effort promoted.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference 6 June attended by HIRANUMA, TOJO, MUTO and OKA.
9979	1084	An extract from KIDO's diary of 6 June referred to OSHIMA's report from Hitler that Germany would attack Russia and Hitler had intimated a desire for Japan's participation. Konoye called a Liaison Conference that morning to consider this. KIDO reported this to the Throne. MATSUOKA told KIDO that he did not think an outbreak of war very likely in spite of OSHIMA's message, and the War Minister endorsed this.
11875	1322	On 7 June Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA stating that although the Netherlands reply of 6 June had some points in favor of Japanese demands,

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the prospects for obtaining the full demands on immigration, important commodities, etc., were not bright. In view of MATSUOKA's protests to the British and Dutch it is impossible to accept the Dutch reply but it appears that the Dutch will not accept Japanese demands since their attitude is firm. Failure of the negotiations would result in the loss of many vital supplies, such as petroleum, and only strengthen the bond with the United States and England and the situation would be grave. The probability that the Japanese delegation may be asked to leave must be considered and Yoshizawa asked for instructions immediately.

On 9 June DOIHARA, General, was appointed Chief of the Air Inspectorate General, remaining Supreme War Councillor.

6560 586

On 10 June in a telegram from Woermann to the Reich Foreign Minister, it is shown how execution of Japanese plans of aggressive action in southern areas had progressed by this date. The Japanese Army desired bases in south Indo-China for the purpose of strategic position with Singapore.

11880 1309-A

The Netherlands delegation met the Japanese delegation on 10 June at the latter's request. Technical matters were discussed and it was clear that Japan wished to wind up the business.

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9981	1086	On 11 June in a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop he stated that General UMEZU welcomed the Japan-Russo Neutrality Pact at the moment, but when German-Russo relations changed Japan's attitude must do so, too, since the Tri-Partite Pact is basis for Japan's foreign policy.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 11, 12 June attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO, OKA.
11879	1323	On 14 June MATSUOKA cabled Yoshizawa stating that Japan had decided to break off the conference and withdraw the delegation.
9988	1087	On 15 June a draft of a proposal was received from Nomura, wherein it was proposed that the United States and Japan jointly conclude a declaration for resuming traditional relations, it being the desire of both governments that the deterioration of relations between them be corrected, and that by such cooperation establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific could be realized. Both agree on isolation from European War, except where it affects their own national defense, and a resumption of trade negotiations of all commodities except those needed for their own security and defense.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 16 and 17 June attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA. Japan declared its willingness to enter into treaty with the U. S. at any time for neutralising Philippine Islands when they become independent.

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7155	660	On 16 June, a meeting of Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held concerning Treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China, and the Treaty between France and Japan concerning the Tariff System and trade and method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China, was presented for ratification. The non-official proclamation of the protocol was explained by the fact that it was to be enforced gradually and Japanese influence to be extended by degrees.
9996	1088	On the 16th of June, Grew in a telegram to Hull stated that at an appointment with MITSUOKA, he had delivered a note in regard to the recent bombing of Chungking, which had resulted in heavy damage to the U. S. Embassy and jeopardized lives of the U. S. Ambassador and others, pointing out the grave danger to U.S.-Japanese relations in consequence of such action.
11880	1309-A	On 17 June Yoshizawa visited the Governor General of Netherlands East Indies and both concurred that an agreement could not be reached. The negotiations, while not having been unproductive, would have to be discontinued. Yoshizawa presented a joint communique which was agreed upon and stated both nations' regret at the failure in the negotiations, but the discontinuation would

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not lead to a change in normal Netherlands East Indies-Japan relations.

9998 1089

On 18 June, KIDO stated in his diary that at a visit with Konoye and MATSUOKA, the latter had told him that instructions had been sent to Germany to negotiate with Vichy in connection with the French Indo-China problem.

On 19 June SUZUKI was appointed member of the Thought Control Committee.

9998 1090

On 20 June, KIDO in his diary stated that Konoye informed him in view of strained international relations and outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR, it was difficult to understand MATSUOKA's opinion. When Konoye referred to Cabinet responsibility, KIDO promised they would discuss matter with HIRANUMA, Home Minister, at earliest opportunity.

8607 Liebert

On 20 June, an executive order was issued banning all petroleum exports except to Great Britain and South America (by the US).

7910 781

On 20 June, KIDO relates a discussion between Konoye, HIRANUMA and himself in which Konoye said that if war broke out between Germany and the USSR his Cabinet would have to take the responsibility and resign, as the HIRANUMA Cabinet had done in 1939 when Germany made a pact with the USSR while the Tri-Partite Pact was under negotiation. KIDO opposed this, saying that the circumstances were different.

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7008	635	Telegram from Ambassador in Tokyo to German Foreign Minister, 21 June concerning conversation with MATSUOKA and plans for air bases in French Indo-China in preparation for attack on Netherlands East Indies.
10001	1091	On 21 June, in a statement to Nomura, Hull said although he had no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders shared Nomura's views, accumulating evidence showed some influential official Japanese leaders support Nazi Germany and its policies, envisaging Japan's fighting with Hitler in the event of U.S. becoming involved in the European War. The U.S., in view of Japan's wish to provide in its settlement with China the stationing of troops in parts of Inner Mongolia and North China to cooperate in resisting communism, while not desiring to enter into the merits, did not feel that the policies to which the U. S. is committed would permit it to associate itself with a course inconsistent with these policies and must await a clearer indication from Japan to pursue a course of peace. Nomura was then handed a revision dated 21 June to the document handed to him on 31 May.
10009	1092	On 21 June the draft proposal of a settlement between the U. S. and Japan was handed by Hull to Nomura. This draft was substantially the same as the one of 31 May with certain amendments - one being that with regard to the European war there be an exchange of letters

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in place of the annex and supplement. Also that question of economic cooperation between China and Japan could be more advantageously settled when all points in that respect had been worked out and that the entire Pacific area be substituted for the western area.

10021 1093

On 22 June, KIDO stated in his diary that he was informed of the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany and he spoke to the Emperor presenting his opinion based on talks with Konoye and HIRANUMA and there had been difference of opinion between Konoye and MATSUOKA regarding Japanese foreign policy in case of war between Germany and Russia. It was desirable that the Emperor ascertain whether MATSUOKA had consulted the Premier and try to prevail ^{upon} him to follow Konoye's opinion. KIDO again saw the Emperor after MATSUOKA had had audience when the Emperor was doubtful whether government and Supreme Command would agree that MATSUOKA's policy for Japan's advance to north and south would ever be appropriate. MATSUOKA explained to Konoye that his report to the Emperor was his prospect for the future.

6561

Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June.

7958 795

Telegram from Ott to Berlin, 22 June, it was shown that on first day of German attack on the USSR, MATSUOKA refused hostile attitude to USSR. MATSUOKA received telegram from OSHIMA stating rumours Russia had withdrawn her forces from the Far East; MATSUOKA explained he would immediately propose counter-measures.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10024	1094	On 23 June KIDO in his diary stated that at an audience with the Emperor he had expressed his opinion on the Foreign Minister's report. He also discussed with Konoye and SUZUKI of the Planning Board the changed situation caused by the German-Russo War and agreed in principle with SUZUKI's opinion on the unifying and reinforcing of the Imperial General Headquarters.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference held on 23 June attended by HIRANUMI, TOJO, MUTO and OKA.
956	793	Extract from Diary of Maetenin, USSR Ambassador to Japan on 25 June, states that MATSUOKA was asked if war occurred between Germany and Russia would Japan remain neutral and he replied Japan's foreign policy is based on the Tri-Partite Pact and supersedes the neutrality pact with Russia.
10026	1095	On 25 June KIDO stated in his diary that Konoye had discussed privately with Wang Ching Wei his opinion with regard to the question of general peace. U.S. assistance would be needed to win over certain Chinese and carry out political demarche to Chiang, but in order to meet the situation and avoid pro-American politicians again gaining influence, they would have to properly post people in the government. The adjustment of relations between Chiang and Wang would be placed in Toyama's hands. Although senior officers in

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the Japanese Army Hq in China understood Chinese policies, contacts between superiors and inferiors were bad and corrupt practices of Army were rife. KIDO saw the Emperor and Konoye and Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs reported to the Emperor on decision of Liaison Conference as to entry of Japanese troops into French Indo-China.

11753 1306

A Liaison Conference attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA on 25 June decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China, such as stationing of troops in the southern part, acquisition of air and naval bases. Diplomatic relations will be opened to accomplish this; failing that, Japan will obtain her object by arms.

11057 1103

Liaison conferences were held on 26, 27 and 28 June attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.

10029 1096

On 28 June telegram from Ribbentrop to German Embassy at Tokyo stating that Ribbentrop had agreed with OSHIMA that he should influence his government towards speedy military action against Soviet Russia, and requesting German Embassy at Tokyo to use their influence to the same end. Ribbentrop outlined arguments to be used.

10034 1097

On 28 June Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that so far no clear cut decision had been reached by the Cabinet regarding Japan's

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attitude to the German-Russo War. Preparations for an attack will take at least 6 weeks unless USSR weakens. Ott asks for instructions regarding activity in the south in view of the fact that southern expansion may be limited to FIC and thus hinder Japan's activity in the North; he also stated that OSHIMA had advised Japan to attack Russia soon.

6561 587

Ribbentrop cabled Ott on 28 June stating he agreed with OSHIMA that Japan should attack Russia soon. He should use as arguments to further this the fact that the annihilation of Russia would make Germany's victory over England possible, would solve the China problem, would protect Japan's rear in order to expand southwards, and be the best way of convincing the United States of the futility of entering the war.

10037 1098

In his diary of 28 June KIDO stated that TOJO had explained the Kwantung Army should be calm and prudent in dealing with the German-Russo War. They also discussed the China War, political moves in China and the strengthening of the I.G.H.

11057 1103

Liaison Conference held on 30 June attended by HIRANUMA, TOJO, MUTO and OKA

7962 797

On 1 July in a telegram from Mackensen, German Ambassador in Rome, sent to Berlin, he relates a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who said that Japan's intention was to advance actively against Russia but

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that such a policy would necessitate the resignation of MATSUOKA since the latter had recently concluded a pact of non-aggression with Soviet Russia. Japan's politics should aim at preventing America from entering the war.

10145 1168

On 2 July KIDO stated in his diary that that morning the national policy regarding the Russo-German War had been decided at an Imperial Conference. Konoye complained to KIDO he found it difficult to understand MATSUOKA's true intent. KIDO also had a conference with the Emperor and arranged to establish headquarters within the Imperial Court.

6566 588
 1107
 779

At the Imperial Conference of 2 July attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, KIRANUMA and OKA, relating to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the disposition of the China Incident, and dealing with the Northern problems according to the situation; Japan will remove all obstacles in attaining this policy. Japan will pursue her schemes against FIC and Thailand, continue negotiations with relevant nations in the south and take measures. While not taking up arms against the Soviet, Japan will secretly arm - and if that war progresses favorably, Japan will take arms to solve the problem. Japan must prevent U.S. intervention in the war, and if this

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fails she will follow the Tri-Partite Pact, deciding independently the time and method. Japan will continue pressure through southern regions to hasten surrender of Chiang's regime and prepare for war with Britain and the United States.

7008 636

Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo to German Foreign Minister dated 3 July concerning Japanese plans to secure "points" in French Indo-China to strengthen her pressure on Britain and America; that Japan has and will continue vigilance over the southwest Pacific against these two powers.

7009 637

Report of proceedings of Privy Council meeting of 3 July on ratification of Franco-Japanese Protocol. Outlines terms of protocol: - maintenance of friendly relations between two countries; respect each other's integrity; no regional restrictions on plans with Third Powers; maintain the peace of East Asia, etc. MITSUOKI explains Germany's treaty of non-aggression with Russia was for expediency only. MITSUOKI mentions political superiority over France, since its defeat in war in Europe and giving of 80% demands made by Japan.

7961 796

On 3 July, Ott cabled the German Foreign Minister stating that immediately upon receipt of his telegram of the 2nd, he had called on MITSUOKI personally and brought his attention to the Cabinet resolution, which will certainly not be understood by the people. MITSUOKI said

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that the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambassador was the necessity to deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being incomplete. At present Smetunin (USSR Ambassador) was not aware of speedy preparations being made against the USSR as is hinted at in the government resolution.

10154	1111
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Weizsacker in a report to Ribbentrop on 3 July stated that when he had drawn OSEIM's attention to a periodical describing Japan's attitude as iridescent; OSEIM stated that he had received reports from Tokyo indicating that Japan wanted to continue fighting the communists with Germany, strengthen her military preparation, and bring pressure to bear on British and U.S. possessions in the southwest Pacific to tie them down. Japan's foreign policy was still based on the Tri-Partite Pact.

7031	639-A
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Telegram dated 4 July from Thomas at Bangkok concerned the preparation and carrying out of certain military operations in the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China by Japanese forces. Failure of economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies would necessitate use of force to take over oil resources. Military occupation of French Indo-China envisaged in order to provide a stepping-off point for Netherlands East Indies attack. Occupation of Thailand not envisaged.

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7030 638

Telegram of 4 July from the German Ambassador in Tokyo concerned personal impression received by military attache in conversation with Japanese General Staff. Impressions are that Japanese Army is secretly and zealously preparing. The occupation of Saigon is imminent, which is preliminary condition for further southward move which is not yet discernible.

7955 792.

Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador in Tokyo of 5 July concerning his talk with MATSUOKA on 28 March on the subject of Japanese-Russo Neutrality Pact, MATSUOKA is quoted as saying in event of German-Russian war, nothing, neither Japanese ministers nor a Neutrality Pact, could keep Japan neutral.

8087 833

833 Affidavit of Matsumura states that on the return of Lt. Matsumura General Amakusu, General Okanuwa and Colonel Kaburagi from Peiping on 5 July, they called all the commanders of forces together. Amakusu had apparently received directives at the meeting concerning preparations for war against the USSR.

10156 1112

KIDO's diary of 5 July stated that the negotiations regarding entry of Japanese troops into Southern French Indo-China has been postponed for five days in view of the fact that the information had leaked out, and the British had lodged a protest with the Vice Foreign Minister, considering this a serious problem.

7965 798

Memo of Kramets, Foreign Ministry official, composed in Berlin, dated 6 July, states that Colonel Yamamoto called on German Counter-Intelligence Section, and advised Japan was ready to carry out sabotage attacks against the USSR in the Far East, especially from Mongolia and Manchukuo against area adjoining Lake Baikal.

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On 7 July ITAGAKI, General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army.

10157 1113

On 7 July Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that SHIRATORI had said that on his recovery he would advocate an active course for Japan and that he regarded Japan's entry into the war against Russia as the most important goal.

10040 1099

Grew again protested to MATSUOKA on 8 July concerning an air raid on Chungking on 29 June.

10041 1100

On 8 July Grew complained to MATSUOKA regarding the seizure of certain cargo at Hanoi and Haiphong by the Japanese, that it was impossible to check it because the owners were not permitted to inspect the warehouses. However, a substantial amount of American cargo had been taken away.

7033 639-B

A telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo on 10 July concerned the imminence of a Japanese move against French Indo-China. Utterances by MATSUOKA demonstrate that Japanese will first ask German Government to obtain Vichy consent to move. Excuse to be used will be proposition of joint defense of French Indo-China by Japanese and French. Anglo-Saxon countries are not expected to interfere and no serious French resistance is anticipated.

8476 Liebert

A law forming the Karafuto Development Company was passed on 10 July with the purpose of developing and controlling mining, forestry and agriculture of that territory.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
7901	771	Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in Tokyo dated 10 July showed how participants of pact considered that with the collapse of Russia the Tri-Partite Pact powers would be so strong that the annihilation of the British Isles would only be a matter of time, and the United States would be left to face the world alone, cut off from the rest of the world.
7966	799	On 12 July in a telegram from Ott, German Ambassador in Japan, to Berlin he enumerated the Japanese preparations for war believed to have been taken.
7037	640	Telegram to Ambassador Kato of 12 July concerned the Government's decision to occupy military bases in French Indo-China and dispatch Japanese forces to Southern French Indo-China. Kato was requested to open negotiations at once with the French on the point and request an answer of Yes or No. In the event of "Yes" a peaceful advance will be effected, and if "No" a military occupation. Keep these plans secret from the British and Americans otherwise difficulties may arise.
8813	867	On 13 July Ambassador Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that there were perceptible symptoms that Japan was taking mobilization measures. By influencing MATSUOKA and the military elements, the Military Attache is endeavoring to inveigle Japan into war with Russia. Preparations reveal Japan's participation will soon take place, the only obstacle being the disunity of the activist groups.

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7043	641	Intercepted message from Canton to Tokyo of 14 July concerned peaceful occupation of French Indo-China if possible; if resistance is offered it will be crushed by force. Navy will play main part in Singapore occupation. With air arm and submarine fleet crushing of Anglo-U.S. power will be effected. Military Headquarters for Japanese forces will be at Saigon.
7061	647	On 14 July a memo was sent by the Japanese to France demanding bases, etc., and requesting answer by 22 July 1941.
7957	794	Ott on 15 July cabled Berlin stating that the Russian Ambassador called on MATSUOKA to ask if Japanese would apply the Neutrality Pact in view of the (present) German-Russo war. Was much taken aback by MATSUOKA's refusal based on the fact that Japan had concluded this pact when German-Russo relations were essentially different.
8079	Takabo	Takabo, stated that he had heard of the existence of the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver (Kan Toku En) from Horokawa and UMEZU, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army in July. He knew that Kan Toku En was the Kwantung Army reinforcement plan and UMEZU had told him about the increase of troops of Kwantung Army and demanded food for these troops.

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10159 1114

Ott cabled Berlin on 15 July stating that the Vice Foreign Minister had asked him to send on a request to influence Vichy in the matter of French Indo-China. He stated that negotiations were going on to obtain naval bases in Southern French Indo-China and Saigon and several air bases. Japan has no territorial intentions in French Indo-China but will suffer no interference from England and the United States with regard to her desires, and if France asks German help against these requests, Japan would like Germany to influence Vichy towards a peaceful settlement.

10162 1115

In his diary of 15 July, KIDO stated that while MITSUOKI wanted to reject Hull's oral statement as disgraceful to Japan, and then send the compromise formula; he (KIDO) wanted the formula to be wired simultaneously, lest the United States take it as Japan's intention to discontinue negotiations. KIDO sent Saito to MITSUOKI to try to persuade him, and when no answer had been received by the morning of the 15th, it became clear after a visit to MITSUOKI by Terazaki, that MITSUOKI had sent instructions to Nomura by himself and not through the competent director. KIDO wanted MITSUOKI to resign, and if he refused the whole Cabinet to resign. He reported this plan to the Emperor, but

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Konoye thought that if MATSUOKA resigned he would use it to make propaganda that his resignation had been compelled by pressure of the United States on Japan.

On the 16 July the 2nd Konoye Cabinet resigned.

10165 1116

On 16 July KIDO in his diary related a telephone conversation with Matsudaira in which the latter informed him that the resignation of the Cabinet "en bloc" had been decided upon at a special Cabinet meeting. The Lord Chamberlain had been ordered to invite the President of the Privy Council and the Ex-Premier to meet and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would consult them as to a suitable person to select as Premier of the next Cabinet.

10166 1117

On 17 July, KIDO stated in his diary that a conference of ex-premiers and the President of the Privy Council (including HIROTA) was held. KIDO was advised whom to recommend to the Emperor as the new Premier. Konoye was the choice and that evening he received the Imperial Command.

On 18 July the Third Konoye Cabinet was formed; MATSUOKA was replaced by Toyoda, HIRANUMA reverted to Minister of State and the other Defendants retained their former offices.

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7053

645

Telegram from Bangkok dated 18 July dealing with a defensive front being erected aimed at suppression of De Gaulle movement through the occupation of French Indo-China.

7046

642

Telegram signed Rintelen to German Foreign Minister of 19 July concerned negotiations with French Government for naval and air bases in French Indo-China. This plan is the first move in southern push and Japanese Government believes Germany and Italy will uphold Japanese demands since in pursuing this and Japan will create diversion for Anglo-United States forces and render valuable assistance to Germany, therefore any entreaty to Germany by France for intervention would be useless. Japan wishes billeting, foreign exchange facilities, etc., to be provided for her forces.

10170

1118

In a telegram from Ott to Berlin on 20 July, it was stated that the policy of new government, as revealed by the new Foreign Minister, was to be the same as previously, based on the Tri-Partite Pact. The new Foreign Minister will continue MATSUOKA's foreign policy and strengthen the close unity with Germany and Italy.

7051

644

Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo of 20 July which deals with inquiry by Ambassador whether change in government might alter Japanese policy towards French Indo-China. Japanese denied this. Regarding Vichy answer to Japanese demands on French Indo-China, in event of refusal, Japan will resort to force.

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10064	1103	On 21 July, it was decided that the Premier and the Foreign and other Ministers should meet with the High Command occasionally and exchange views and national policies with the Navy and War Ministers and staffs of the High Command. This meant no more press announcements of Liaison or Imperial Conferences, as had previously been made.
7054	646	On 21 July a telegram was sent from Paris quoting Japanese demands on 14 July on French Indo-China and Japanese regard for French integrity. Further stated that France, although forced by violence to give in to Japan, thought England and U. S. would interpret this as hostile action and asked Japan to consent to temporary and limited occupation for duration of operations only. On 22 July SHIRATORI resigned from the Foreign Ministry owing to ill health.
7067	648	Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo on 22 July states that the Foreign Minister states that unconditional acceptance of main Japanese demands was imminent. Estimated occupation would take several weeks.
10175	1120	On 23 July Nomura cabled Toyada stating that the situation was now nearing a diplomatic break. The change in U.S. opinion is due to the southward moves by Japan, which is considered as a step towards Netherlands East Indies and Singapore. He suggested Japan dispel United States doubts by informing Grew of Japan's real intentions in occupying French Indo-China.

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10048 1102

On 24 July, the U. S. Department of State issued a press release stating that although Japan had expressed a desire that no disturbance should spread to the Pacific and the U. S. had made it clear that she concurred, Japan was establishing bases in French Indo-China and making changes there under duress. This seems to point to the fact that Japan is obtaining bases in French Indo-China for further and more obvious movements of conquest into adjacent areas.

10178 1121

Ott informed Berlin on 24 July that an agreement had been reached between Vichy and Japan regarding the occupation of bases in French Indo-China on 20 July 1941.

8071 830

Ott sent telegram to Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs concurrently to High Command, (OKW) and Army General Staff (OKH) on 25 July. This telegram concerns itself with multiple Japanese mobilization preparations, quelling number of men under arms and due for call up, drafting of Russian speaking men and technicians, limitation of use of foreign languages in communication, restrictions on travel, and transportation of troops to Ssishun, Bashin, and Shanghai. Impression from conversations is that besides Manchuria and Korea, parts of North China are to be used for action against the USSR. Goal not clear, but it does not appear it will be an attack limited to Vladivostok area, but will start simultaneously in direction of Lake Baikal. Time of start unknown, but possibly on the arrival of German troops at the Volga.

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67 Japanese assets in the U. S. were frozen on 25 July.

10763 Ballantine On 26 July Japanese assets in the British Empire were frozen.

11883 1324 On 28 July the Netherlands announced the suspension of the Japan-Netherlands Financial Agreement and the freezing of Japanese assets in the whole Netherlands East Indies.

7069 649 On 28 July, Privy Council meeting was held. Amongst those present were TOJO, MUTO, OKA, and SUZUKI. Discussion regarding protocol between France and Japan concerning military cooperation was conducted. Clarification to be made that occupation was in agreement with France and not executed by force, so as to avoid misunderstanding by foreign powers, especially U. S. A. Currency at disposal of forces as provided by French Indo-China would be adequate.

7074 650 2nd Privy Council meeting concerning exchange of official documents on military cooperation and the necessity of close Jap-France relations in military field. Agreement with France unanimously approved.

7079 651 Protocol between France and Japan of 29 July concerning joint defense of French Indo-China and two letters from Vichy. Japanese demands for air and naval bases granted, quartering of troops and freedom of movement to be arranged and recognized.

10180 1122 An official statement of the Bureau of Information on 29th July reported that Protocol between Japan and France had been ratified, the signing had been done on 29 July at Vichy--it will be effective immediately.

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7387	808
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In a telegram dated 31 July from Tokyo to Washington it was indicated that Japan was pleased with the way the Russo-German War was going, since it gave her added time for preparations.

10184	1125
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In his diary of 31 July, KIDO stated that NAGANO had concurred with former Chief of General Staff Hushimi that Japan should try to avert war as much as possible. NAGANO is opposed to the Tri-Partite Pact, since it makes the adjustment of US-Japanese relations impossible. If these relations cannot be adjusted, Japan will be cut off from her oil and would have only sufficient supplies of oil to last for 1½ years; in the event of war with the U. S., NAGANO told the Emperor a sweeping victory is doubtful. KIDO disagreed with NAGANO and stated that if the Tri-Partite Pact was annulled the United States would not have any more faith in Japan than before.

10192	1127-A
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NAGANO stated in interrogation, that the fleet had started training for Pearl Harbor in the Summer of 1941--possibly July.

8930	870-A
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The record of Table Top Maneuvers held by the Total War Research Institute in the first half of August 1941, showed that under the maneuvers the general policy of Japan concerning third power problems was that Japan did not give to the United States proposal a clear expression of her position nor exact a peaceful settlement, but would adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations, while completing her preparations for war.

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8938

871

Records of the Progress of Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War No. 1, being the results of the third period, August 1941-the ninth period October 1942, showed that during the third period (Aug 1941) Japan through the Cabinet decided to take measures to delay U. S. conciliatory proposals to Japan and to inform Soviet that as long as she observes the Neutrality Pact, Japan will not attack her. The strengthening of relations with French Indo-China and Thailand was decided as well as the acceleration of imports from U. S., Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, and preventing further deterioration regarding the latter. Censorship measures, regulations of food consumption, increased production and revised capital mobilization plan were also accounted for.

7967

800

Telegram from Ott to Berlin of 1 August, concerning remarks of Colonel Yamamoto to the effect Japan's new power in Asia worries Anglo-Saxon powers, particularly since increasing her pressure in favor of Axis powers. Japan is mobilizing for action against USSR. SEIRATORI said Japan intended to start active advance on Russia through demands such as for territory which Russia could not concede; it was all Japan could do now in face of the neutrality pact.

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KIDO stated in his diary on 2 August, that Konoye was annoyed at the tendency of the tough naval elements to become strong. There must be no mistake in Japan's diplomacy to allow Japan's oil supply to be cut off. An understanding must be reached between the War and Navy Ministers and if this could not be reached the government would have to resign and the Navy and Army assume charge of the administration of the country.

10199	1130
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In his diary of 7 August, KIDO stated he had met with Konoye and discussed the current problem. KIDO stated that oil was the most serious problem. Japan must occupy the Philippines and Singapore before a successful landing on Netherlands East Indies. Since Oil wells would be destroyed during action, it would be 1½ years before Japan could obtain oil in sufficient quantities. If Japan attacks Netherlands East Indies, then the U.S. would declare war and make the shipment of oil from these islands virtually impossible. Japan must restore friendly relations with the U. S. The ultimate aim of Japan is to advance south and to attain this, a 10-year plan has been mapped out to establish every machine tool industry Synthetic oil industry and expansion of ocean lines and shipping.

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11199 Richardson

1. map dated 10 August showed that Japan had already at this time created extensive fortifications of Wotje.

7303 667-A

Newspaper cutting from Nokumin Shinbun of 14 August contained record of General ARAKI's talk with Ishiwata, Secretary General of Imperial Rule Association, showing that ARAKI regretted that during their intervention in the east against the Soviet Union in 1922, the Japanese failed to accomplish their plans in Siberia. Also shows that ARAKI felt in 1941 that time was ripe to carry out that which failed in 1922.

8913 686-A

On 14 August, the 6th Phase of Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War was prepared which again set forth the imaginary advances of the Axis forces and recounted the declaration of war by the United States on the Axis as 1 November 1941.

7977 803

A telegram from the Japanese Government to Berlin on 15 August concerned a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in which he inquired as to Japan's attitude to the German-Russo War. In reply Japan stated she was following the Neutrality Pact; however, if (1) Russia ceded, sold or leased any property in East Asia to a third power, or (2) took any steps to extend sphere of a 3rd power into East Asia, Japan would

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consider this a threat. The Soviet Ambassador replied that Russia was strictly obeying the Neutrality Pact and gave assurance that Russia would never act in the two courses outlined above. Japan still adhered to the three-power pact as MATSUOKA had told the Soviet Government on 2 July.

7980	804
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In a telegram of 15 August from the Japanese Foreign Minister to Berlin, he said that in response to a question by Ott about the talk between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Soviet Ambassador, whether the Soviet does not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war, he had told Ott that in view of the military expansion by Japan under present conditions the present arrangement with the Soviet is the best means of taking first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, together with the German Government and that it is in harmony with the Tri-Partite Pact. He hoped that the German Government would fully understand that Japan's action is a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed.

8895	686A
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Excerpts commencing 16 August from the first table top maneuvers, a top secret symposium of the first total-war

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8895	6861	Military Games of the Total War Research Institute, imagining and forecasting the events leading up to the December attack and subsequent gains by Jap armies. Relates tactical, strategic moves, preparations and manoeuvres in visualising the attacks.
10203	1131	Nomura informed Toyoda on 16 August that relations between the United States and Japan were critical and the next move by Japan might lead to a sudden change which both Japan and America fear might happen in case Japan advances into Thailand.
8032	814	Telegram from Foreign Ministry to Japanese Ambassador in Washington of 20 August, stating that if the United States is shipping iron, planes, etc. to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this would endanger American-Japanese relations and for the Ambassador to call American attention to the fact that Japan would like such further action restrained.
10204 10205	1132	A newspaper item of 23 August, shows that at a Cabinet meeting of 22 August, the national commodity mobilisation plan for the second quarter of 1941-2 proposed by SUZUKI, president of the Planning Board was decided. The plan's key points embraced expansion of war material production.

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10766 1245B
 Ballantine

On 27 August, the Japanese Government issued a statement which was handed to the President on 28 August. Referring to the U.S.'s reply of 17 August, it stated that Japan's policy was determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements and removing obstacles against national security.

Japan is eager to exchange views on basic policies with the United States and a meeting of the two heads of the countries would aid to solve the problems. Japan stated that her actions in Indo-China were to solve the China Incident, and that as long as the USSR maintains the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, Japan will take no military actions in that direction.

8404 Liebert

Promulgation of key industries Control Ordinance on 30 August, based on provisions of Article 18 of National General Mobilisation Law was to serve as foundation for the complete control by government of all major industries, using the existing cartel structure as guiding principle.

8476 Liebert

The Imperial Petroleum Co., formed on 1 September, had purpose of surveying and developing oil fields in Japan and dominated territories and the control

REFERENCE

8476 Liebert

of purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products. This company was effective government instrument for complete control of petroleum.

7107 652

Telegram from Neumann at Bangkok of 1 September states that occupation of French Indo-China shows signs of being for a long period, contemplated that 45,000 Japanese will be there within several weeks, all strategic points, large towns, etc. are occupied. Attack on Siam is envisaged in November when additional troops have arrived and rainy season ends. Seizure of raw materials and economic measures parallel to military occupation have been effected. The Japanese are attempting to buy rubber and rice plantations, to acquire real estate, etc. in French Indo-China.

11917 1327

On 2 September Ishizawa in Batavia cabled Tokyo the increased anti-Japanese tendencies in the NEI pursuant to the occupation of French Indo-China; the strengthening of schemes with regard to the Chinese and a plan whereby influential Chinese be sent to NEI to advocate the doctrine that the Chinese and Japanese are one and influence Chinese opinion are some measures suggested. It was requested that Ambassador Honda be informed of this message.

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10773	1245C Ballantine

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On 3 September the President replied to Konoye's message of 27 August expressing his appreciation at Japan's desire to improve Japanese-U.S. relations. The U.S. recognise the swiftly moving character of world events and is proceeding as rapidly as possible towards consummating arrangements for a meeting at which Konoye and Roosevelt could exchange views and adjust relations.

7971	801A
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Telegram from Ott to Berlin of 4 September, after MATSUOKA's dismissal as Foreign Minister, states the third Konoye Cabinet still planned far-reaching mobilisation. Japanese Army was reserved on the subject of attack on Russia due to being weakened in Chinese War and not expecting to be able to make decisive victory before winter sets in. Plan to take action when numerical force of Japanese Army is increased.

10214	1134
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On 5 September, KIDO stated in his diary that Konoye advised the Emperor to summon a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff. This was done.

10215	1135
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On 6 September, KIDO, in his diary related a visit he paid to the Emperor in response to the Imperial summons. KIDO advised the Emperor that since Fara, the President of the Privy Council, would

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10215 1135

ask important questions on his Majesty's behalf, the Emperor should only issue a warning, in conclusion, to the effect that as the present situation was one which might lead to war, the Supreme War Command should make every effort to bring about a diplomatic success. KIDO visited the Emperor again later in the day and learnt that the Supreme War Command had not answered the questions put by President Hara concerning diplomatic moves but that the Navy Minister Oikawa, had made an answer to Hara. The Emperor had expressed regret that the Supreme War Command did not give a reply and emphasized the need for whole-hearted efforts in diplomatic negotiations with the United States.

8814 588
 1107

At Imperial Conference of 6 September, attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA, it was decided that Japan would execute her Southern advance policy. Japan would therefore, complete her preparations by the end of October aiming at war with the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands. In the meantime and in pace with this decision, Japan would strive to obtain fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic means. If the negotiations did not lead to success by

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1107

the beginning of October, Japan would immediately determine on war against U.S., Great Britain and the Netherlands. There would be a strong endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

10778 1245D
Ballantine

On 6 September, Nomura handed to Hull another draft proposal setting out the various concessions which Japan will agree to including not advancing in French Indo-China or resorting to military action in the southern region, and withdrawing troops from China as soon as possible. The United States reciprocal measures were set out and included suspension of any military measures in the Far East and in the South West Pacific area.

10213 1133

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of 7 September, showed that concrete plans were being drafted by the Communications and Railway Ministry, based on the traffic mobilisation plan for 1941-1942. The Railway Ministry will embark upon construction of freight cars and the Communications office will establish the shipbuilding control association to systematise the shipbuilding industry. On 5 September, the Cabinet decided a traffic mobilisation plan to place land and sea transportation on a wartime basis.

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10222 1138

On 11 September, KIDO stated in his diary that TOJO visited him after seeing the Emperor and explained the results of an investigation concerning the preparations for war with the United States.

10224 1139

In a telegram from Nomura to Toyoda on 12 September, it was stated that the main problem in the United States-Japanese negotiations was Japan's wish to keep troops stationed in China. The United States wants Japan to completely withdraw from China within two years. Since there is a possibility of the negotiations failing in the final stages of this problem, Nomura suggested that Toyoda deliberates on the proposal how to evacuate troops within 2 years after the peace.

10229 1140

On 12 September, the Cabinet adopted a plan, formulated by the Planning Board and Welfare Office, for the people's labour mobilisation.

10226 1131

Toyoda's reply to Nomura on 13 September, stated that he understood the United States wanted Japan to acknowledge the so-called 4 principles. Japan is not in a position to swallow the evacuation problem, since the world might think it was due to United States pressure. It seems that the United States have