

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

DOC.#. 0001

(2 of 2)

132

Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>
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REFERENCE

10226	1131
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conferred with Britain, Holland and China beforehand, and although Japan can not hinder the United States from negotiating with others, she will refuse to be induced into a council or an agreement among numerous countries.

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Secret communication dated 13 September contained request to make arrangements immediately for the manufacture of "Fo" series notes in denominations of pesos, and "Ni" military currency in denomination of dollars. Again requested preparation of notes in denomination of guilders. Manufacture of pesos to be completed by 20 October, dollars one half by 30 Oct. and guilders by 20 November (one half).

8080	832
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UMEZU, the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, issued a directive on 16 September, which ordered that students of foreign language schools who have been Army Russian interpreters under Kan Toku En should be given supplementary education.

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Top Secret communication of 16 September, concerned the manufacture of "Fo" and "Ni" series military currency, gives order to manufacture these notes and is technical communication regarding the printing of them.

Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10792	1245F Ballantine	On 22 September, Japan communicated to Grew a statement of the terms of peace which it is proposed to offer to China.
11207	Richardson	From 24 September onwards, Japan ordered her consuls to make reports concerning vessels along certain routes embracing Pearl Harbour.
10782	1245E Ballantine	On 25 September, Japan presented Grew a completely new draft of Japan's proposal and requested an early reply.
10230	1141	On 26 September, KIDO stated in his diary, that Konoye had told him that he had no confidence and there was no choice but for him to resign if the military insisted on starting the war on 15 October. KIDO hoped for prudence.
6412	558	Radio speech by Dr. Nobumi on 26 September, first anniversary of Tri-Partite Pact, enumerated Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia as having joined the pact, restating the peaceful intentions of the pact and the realisation of new world order as ultimate aim.
10231	1142	On 29 September, KIDO stated in his diary that the Emperor had requested an estimate of the U.S.'s rubber and tin resources and stock. KIDO contacted the President of the Planning Board. President of the Privy Council advocated

Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10231	1142	that in the event of failure of the Washington parley, the Imperial Conference should not be so formal and a full discussion should be held with the senior statesmen present. KIDO promised to look into the matter.
10189	1126	NAGANO stated in interrogation that he had heard of the plan to attack Pearl Harbour in October.
7404	684	Excerpts from report of the Committee for the Administrative Measures, October, show that limits of Japanese aggressive plans of expansion into Soviet territory depended only upon place German expansion would stop; plans to run transcontinental railway partly by Japanese and partly by Germans; complete annihilation of USSR and dividing territory between Germany and Japan.
7608	731A	The 8th all-Manchurian Congress of the Kyo Wa Kai was held in October. Amongst those present was UMEZU. This was the first congress since the beginning of the Russo-German War and Russian delegates were invited.
7157	654A	A telegram signed Henmen, a member of the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs dated 1 October, stated that the French had requested German support in order to obtain Japanese approval to deliver 5,000 tons of raw

PAGE EXHIBIT
WITNESS

REFERENCE

rubber to United States in exchange for vital goods obtain-
able only in the United States. Germany
upheld Japan's objection, pointed out
that German requests for rubber were
urgent and requested the release of
additional 5,000 tons be obtained for
Japan during October.

10795 1245G
Ballantine

On 2 October Hull gave Nomura a
memorandum of an oral statement reviewing
the developments in the conversations
and explaining the United States
attitude towards various points in the
Japanese proposal which did not appear
to the United States to be consistent
with U.S. principles.

7932 788A

Excerpt from telegram, Ott to Berlin,
of 4 October, states that from careful
sounding of the Army leaders it has been
concluded that the inherent aim of the
Tri-Partite Pact is to overpower the
British Empire, keep the United States
at bay and eliminate USSR, thus bringing
about new distribution of power in
Europe and the Far East..

10233 1143

In his diary of 7 October, KIDO stated
that there was dissention between the
Army and Navy concerning the Washington
parley which the Navy wanted to continue
and the Army to stop. The Navy wanted
Konoyo to declare his policy and a

Document No. 9001

Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

10233 1143

meeting of the Premier, War and Navy Ministers was held to settle Japan's national policy with respect to war with the United States.

10236 1144

In a telegram from Washington to Tokyo on 8 October, the United States expresses dissatisfaction at the negotiations since Japan does not appear to express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The United States adheres to the 4 principles and wishes to bring about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which the two have failed to see eye to eye, then turn to other matters.

10234 1145

On 8 October Nomura cabled Tokyo regarding the curtailing of guaranties concerning the principles in the proposal of the 6th. The Americans are still making demands on the question of stationing and evacuating troops in French Indo-China to which Japan objects in principle.

10241 1146

KIDO expressed Konoye's concern regarding the failure of the Washington talks in his diary of 9 October and KIDO stated that 6 September Imperial Conference resolution was too outright. War with the United States would have little hope for victory at the moment, and KIDO advocated completion of the China Incident followed by 10 - 15 years preparation.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>
-------------	----------------------------------

REFERENCE

9012	809	It is shown in the document "Japan's Decision to Fight" that on 10 October, Colonel Ryuto, Commander of an anchorage group, wrote a report on conditions showing that the mobilization order had been issued on 12 September. They reached Palau on 10 October and established anchorage headquarters and prepared for leading operations to accompany war.
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9013	809	It is shown that on 11 October, in a diary of Pvt. Kashino of an Infantry Regiment, his unit landed at Shanghai and prepared for the Malaya operation from 12-14, leaving for Thailand on 22 November and arriving there on 8 December.
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9014	809	In a diary of an unknown soldier of the 41st Infantry Regiment, it is revealed that his unit arrived at Shanghai on 12 October, was given jungle training and left on 2 December for Sama, and on 13 December was the first unit to enter Gubun Street.
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10246	1147	On October 12th KIDO gave details of a meeting of the War Minister TOJO, Navy Minister Oikawa, Foreign Minister Toyoda, President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI, and Premier Konoye. The War
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Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10246	1147	Minister TOJO called for a great resolution since there was no hope of an understanding with the United States while the Navy wanted to avoid war. A strong leadership by the Premier was urgent. The Foreign Minister Toyoda, stated that he was unsure of the outcome of the talks. They had agreed, on the advice of TOJO that Japan's demands for stationing of troops in China should not be altered. The successful results of the Chinese Incident should be made secure by all means; and the parley should be further based on the fact that these agreements should cease Japan's preparations for war. Konoye also wrote a full account of the meeting and other events leading up to the resignation. (Soon after it took place.) The effect is substantially the same, except that, according to him, no decision was reached on this occasion.
10251	1148	
10272	1136A	TOJO recalled in an interrogation, the fact that the War, Navy, Foreign Minister and Premier attended the meeting of 12 October. At this meeting United States negotiations were discussed and the fact that the middle 10 days of October which had been set for a time limit for a favourable diplomatic turn

Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10272	1136A	had arrived. The United States had turned down the meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt and the situation was tense. TOJO felt that there was no hope for a diplomatic success and time had come to make up Japan's mind for war.
7110	653	Telegram from Neumann at Saigon on 12 October concerning 5th columnist activities of Pan Asiatic League as a tool of Japanese expansionist policy in French Indo-China. Branch offices of league ordered to advocate agitation for Annamite independence, encourage anti-French uprisings, foster pro-Japanese sentiment through picked units of Japanese Army and to spy on French troop movements and locate raw material and foodstuff storage place. Annamites to be incorporated into Japanese occupation army; time for striking appears to be the end of the year or early spring. The leaders and a great part of the Annamite fighting units were ex-convicts. The heir to the Annamite throne fled to Japan at the beginning of this century and as early as 1935 presided over the Pan-Asiatic congress.
10274	1149	KIDO stated in his diary of 13 October that he conferred with SUZUKI on the political situation and their conclusion

Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

10274 1149

was that the Premier should make an effort to promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy Ministers.

10258- 1148
10263

Before and at a cabinet meeting on 14 October TOJO maintained the same view, and there was a deadlock. But later the Army (through MUTO) offered to give way if the Navy would come out definitely against war. OKA, for the Navy, refused to do this and left it to Konoye, which TOJO and MUTO would not accept.

10276 1150

On the 15 October, KIDO stated in his diary that SUZUKI delivered War Minister TOJO's message to him which stated that unless Konoye changed his mind the general resignation of the Cabinet would be unavoidable. The succeeding Premier should be able to unite the Army and Navy and follow the Imperial will. Prince Higashikuni's name was mentioned as a possibility. KIDO replied that this would involve a working-out of a common policy between the Army and Navy beforehand and asked whether War Minister TOJO had any accurate forecast to make on the fact that the establishment of a prudent policy would take precedence over all other questions. The Premier, Prince Konoye, visited KIDO and asked his opinion on the Higashikuni Cabinet. Prince Konoye said

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>
-------------	----------------------------

REFERENCE

10276	1150
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that the breach between himself and the War Minister TOJO was very great. Later President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI, telephoned to KIDO to say that TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and the Navy by the influence of Prince Higashikuni, and KIDO objected to the plan. Later, the Premier, Prince Konoye, said he wished to secure the informal consent of Prince Higashikuni and KIDO said he had no objection so long as Konoye acted in his capacity as Premier. Prince Higashikuni, however, wanted a few days for consideration and wished to have a meeting with War Minister TOJO and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO.

7113	654A
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Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo on 15 October, concerned Japanese occupation of French Indo-China which, according to reports was not without friction. Japanese intend to increase strength there to 40,000 and wrest concession from French colonial administration through local military authorities. He says open conflict will be avoided despite all this. The Japanese Foreign Ministry denied a Japanese-Siamese argument concerning the border zone.

8455	852
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Secret communication from Chief of Intendance Bureau, War Ministry, to Chief of Financial Bureau of 15 October, requested the forwarding of certain currencies to the

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>
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REFERENCE

8555 852

Bank of Japan, Shanghai agency, to arrive by 22 October.

10310 1159

On 16 October, Toyoda telegraphed Nomura that Japan had repeatedly affirmed the aim of the Tri-Partite Pact to the United States, which is the prevention of the European war spreading. However, should German and United States relations become aggravated, there would be a distinct danger of war. It is desired that German-United States relations stop deterioration and Japan requests the consideration of the United States.

10282 1151

On 16 October, KIDO stated in his diary that he was opposed to the Higashikuni Cabinet, such a Cabinet would show that Japan lacked suitable persons, and in the event of war a problem would arise. He told TOJO of this opposition and urged a rescission of the previous decision and a unified policy of the Army and Navy. Konoye telephoned to say he was resigning and did so at 5 o'clock. KIDO, in his talk with TOJO, urged a revision of the 6th September decisions.

10285 1152

On 16 October the Konoye Cabinet resigned and Konoye issued a statement on his resignation. This stated that Army Minister TOJO judged negotiations with the United States on friendly terms could not possibly materialise before the desired time (middle or latter part of October); that it was impossible to consent to the withdrawal of troops from China and that the time had come to open war against the United States. Prime Minister Konoye, however, thought that all negotiations with the United States were not hopeless and that the stationing of troops in China could be achieved in substance while appearing to yield to the United States.

EXHIBIT
PAGE WITNESSREFERENCE

10290 1153

TOJO stated in an interrogation that on or about 17 October he felt the time opportune for fighting was in danger of being lost, and that the Konoye Cabinet fell because TOJO favoured war with the United States while Konoye still thought a diplomatic solution possible.

10291 1154

KIDO stated in his diary of 17 October, that an ex-premiers' Conference (Procedure as on 17 July 1941) attended by Kiyoura, Wakatsuki, Okada, Hayashi, IROTA, Abe, Yonai, and Hara, it was finally decided on KIDO's suggestion that he should recommend TOJO as the new Premier with additional position of War Minister.

On 18 October the Accused held the following positions:

DOHIFARA, General, Chief of Air Inspectorate, Supreme War Councillor-; FATA, Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, Central China; HIRANUMA, Ex-Premier; IROTA, Ex-Premier; FOSHINO, Chief Secretary of Cabinet; ITAGAKI, General in command Korean Army-; KAYA, Finance Minister, Vice President China Affairs Board; KIDO, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal; KIMURA, Lt. General, Vice Minister of War; KOISO, General on reserve list; MATSUI, General, retired; MINAMI, Governor-General of Korea; MIHO, Chief, Military Affairs Board (War Ministry); TAGAMO, Chief of Naval General Staff, Supreme War Councillor; OKA, Chief Bureau of Naval and Military Affairs in Navy Ministry, Assistant to Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters, Councillor, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs, Imperial Member of German-Italian-Japanese mixed experts Committee in Tokyo; OKAWA, Director-General of East Asia Research Institute, South Manchurian Railway;

EXHIBIT
PAGE WITNESS

REFERENCE

OS IMA, Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Berlin; Imperial Member of the German-Italian-Japanese Special Council in Berlin; SATO, Major-General, Chief of Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau (War Ministry), Secretary of several Government Committees; SUGIMATSU, Attached to Foreign Ministry; SHIMADA, Navy Minister, Vice President China Affairs Board; SUZUKI, Lt. General, President of the Planning Board, Minister of State, Councillor, Total War Investigation Institute, Member Committee on Thought Control, Chief Director, China Affairs Board; TOGO, Foreign Minister, Overseas Minister, Vice President, China Affairs Board, Supreme War Councillor; TOJO, Prime Minister, War Minister, Home Minister, President China Affairs Board, Supreme War Councillor; UMEZU, General, Commander-in-Chief, Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo, ARAKI, HATSUMOTO, and SHIRATOPI held no official positions.

10283 1155 On 18 October KIDO recorded in his diary that the Emperor sanctioned the petition to allow TOJO to remain on active service and promoted him to a full general.

10285 1156 On 20 October KIDO recorded the Emperor's congratulations to him on the new Cabinet. KIDO told the Emperor that one mistake might have meant war, this was the only way to give the situation a new turn and so he had recommended it.

10312 1161 On 22 October Nomura requested that TOGO grant permission for him to return to Tokyo. He felt that to resign was the only way open for him as a man of honor.

EXHIBIT
PAGE WITNESS

REFERENCE

- 11885 1325 An official report by the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies on the organisation of the Japanese Intelligence Service in the Netherlands Indies, 27 October, stated that the Japanese Intelligence Service of the Netherlands East Indies consisted of 4 organisations, the FOO, PWO, FAO, and OCO. These organisations were under the Foreign Office, Naval Information Service Tokyo, Military director in Central Formosa and Japanese Consul General as receiving centre respectively.
- 10314 1162 On 29 October, KIDO stated in his diary that SUZUKI had reported on the progress of the Liaison Conference, the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and Manoeuvres against China.
- 8458 852 Top secret communication No. 10, dated 31 October, referred to the institution of procedures for handling military currency notes in foreign denominations for the southern regions. System of military currency will defray expenditure in event of operations in the south Seas area. Issuance of such currency decided by Premier (TOJO), Finance (KAWA), War (TOJO), and Navy (SHIMADA) Ministers.
- 7346 674A Excerpt from magazine "Kaizo" (Reconstruction) written by Tanaka (not the witness) entitled "The New Development in the Russo-German War and Japan", states world-wide struggle between Axis and anti-Axis is gradually approaching; Japan rejoices in and hopes for victory of Germany over Russia and Britain.
- 11923 1328 A list of questions was drawn up for the liaison Conference between the Government and Imperial

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

Headquarters at the end of October. These questions relate to reactions to Japan's Foreign Policy and that repercussions will result from war, particularly

11928 1329 if Japan attacks in the south, what help can be expected from the Axis etc. After consideration by the Navy, Army, Foreign, and Finance Ministries under the Accused SHIMADA, TOJO, HOGO, and KAYA, respectively, answers to these questions were decided.

10462 1197A HAGANO stated in an interrogation that he approved the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbour either at the end of October or the beginning of November.

5105 450 Tokyo Gazette extract, Vol. V, No. 5 of November, entitled "Ten Years of the New State", relates to richness of Manchukuo, its abundance of iron, coal, and non-ferrous metals and its natural resources, the success of the five-year industrial development plan and the industrial and cultural development in border districts.

8980 874A The monthly Wartime Report No. 4 of the H. A. Corps, November, gives details of the preparations for operations against Hong Kong and intensification of the blockade.

8462 853 Procedure for dealing with military currency expressed in Southern Region Foreign Currency Order from Finance Minister KAYA to Bank of Japan on 1 November. The Bank of Japan was to acknowledge receipt of notes from the Cabinet Printing Bureau and notify the Finance Ministry when they had disbursed any of these notes.

9043 809 The diary of Imoto of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army shows that his unit reached Saigon on

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
		1 November, left on 27 November en route to Hainan, leaving there on 4 December. They reached Singora (in Siam, near Malayan border) on 7 December, landing at 0600 on 8 December.
10315	809	On 1 November, the final text of Combined Fleet Secret Operational Order No. 1 had been agreed upon and was being printed: It contained schedules and plans for attacks on Pearl Harbour and various British and Dutch possessions.
10316	1163	TOGO telegraphed Nomura on 2 November stating that the Imperial Conference scheduled for 5 November expected to reach a final decision for improving relations between the United States and Japan. He would inform Nomura of the results, which would be Japan's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. When negotiations were resumed it was urgent that a decision should be reached at once. This information was strictly for Nomura's information and TOGO trusted him to exercise great prudence in handling everything before negotiations were taken up.
10317	809	On 3 November, it was decided to attack Pearl Harbour and Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO set the date.
10318	1164	TOGO cabled Nomura on 4 November, stating that Japan-United States relations were very critical. The Cabinet and Imperial Headquarters had decided on a counter proposal for resuming negotiations which was to be submitted to the conference for sanction on 5 November. The telegram then goes on to justify Japan's attitude and accuses the United States of shunning and overlooking Japan's position.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

- 10324 1165 On 4 November, TOGO cabled Nomura concerning the revised ultimatum to meet the wishes of the United States. Nomura was to make clear that Japan did not intend to expand her sphere of self-defence and desired to avoid the European War's expansion into the Pacific. Re China: Japan would withdraw her troops from North China over a period of two years except for the areas of the Mongolian border and on Hainan, where they were to remain for a suitable period (if questioned to be vaguely quoted as 25 years). He wants Nomura to give the idea that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation.
- 10329 1166 On 4 November, TOGO informed Nomura that Kurusu was being despatched to help him in the parleys. Kurusu's activities were being kept secret for the time being.
- 10330 1167 A cabinet decision of 4 November, agreed on the Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British and American Problems. This policy is to provide for the suppression of any war preparation information, etc., and to make the people hold hope for the future.
- 10335 1168 At the Imperial Conference of 5 November, attended
1107 by TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MIYOKI, and OKA, National Policy was again decided. It showed that at the Liaison Conference a decision was made to notify Germany and Italy of Japan's intention to start war against the United States and Britain when the present negotiations with the United States break down and war is inevitable (presumed to be 25 November) and as soon as preparations are ready they will open negotiations for participation by the Axis in

EXHIBIT
PAGE WITNESS

REFERENCE

the war against the United States and for a no-separate peace pact. The advance through Thailand was decided, first passage of troops to be demanded, if this is refused they will advance without it, but Japan will respect Thailand's sovereignty (in regard to decision of Liaison Conference of 1 February) and will try to turn negotiations to her advantage by suggesting the cession in the future of part of Burma or Malaya, this depending on Thailand's attitude. Plan for dealing with International settlements made, and a decision not to declare war against Chiang, but obtain same effect by a declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain.

10415 1188

On 5 November, the Ambassador at Bangkok reported to TOGO on measures to be taken in the event of Japan taking decisive action in the south. The co-operation of Thai (on which he had already undertaken work) is important and although in the event of an attack on Burma and Malaya, a temporary infringement of Thailand might happen, the independence of Thailand would be more respected after the objective had been obtained.

10347 809

1252

On 5 November, Yamamoto issued the Combined Fleet Top Secret Order No. 1, which stated that operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands will be conducted in accordance with the provisions for preparations for war, communications, supply, allocation of forces, etc.

10346 1171

TOGO wired Nomura on 5 November, informing him that arrangements for the agreement were to be completed by 25 November.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

10343 1170 On 5 November, TOGO cabled Nomura that the counter proposals wired to him on the 4th had been approved by the Imperial Conference and talks were to begin. He then advised Nomura on the policy to be adopted in submitting the proposals.

10349 809 Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order of 5 November stated that Y Day would be 23 November, and Order 3 of 10 November stated that X Day would be 8 December.

10332 1168 On 5 November KIDO stated in his diary that an Imperial Conference decided the policy towards the United States, England and the Netherlands. TOJO advised KIDO of the formation of the southern Army and the dispatch of Kurusu to the United States.

10918 1246 On 7 November Nomura stated in a memorandum to Hull that withdrawal of troops stationed in China will be completed within 2 years, to proceed gradually according to special arrangements. Japan will guarantee territory sovereignty of French Indo-China and withdraw troops as soon as China affair is settled. Japan will recognize non-discrimination of trade in China and Pacific areas provided principle will apply to rest of world.

10348 809 On 7 November Admiral Yamamoto issued an order which stated that the Task Force would gather at Hitokappu Wan and remain there under great secrecy until 22 November (a combined Fleet Order on operation was issued simultaneously).

10331 1172 German Foreign Office cabled Washington on 8 November that TOGO had stated that Kurusu had been instructed to take a firm attitude and was given a

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>
-------------	----------------------------------

REFERENCE

limit which he could not cross.

10359	809
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On 10 November Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 was issued to all ships to complete battle preparations by 20 November. Rendezvous of fleet to be at Kuriles; strict secrecy to be maintained.

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Captured copy of a pamphlet entitled, "Just read this and the war will be won," stamped 10 November (although actual date of preparation is thought to be prior to this date) gives a map of Southern China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, and a small section of the northwest Australian coast on the front. This was issued to each soldier before he left for overseas.

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Group of charts and telegrams show that quantities of munitions, ammunition, machinery, fuel, oil, grease for motor cars and parts for repairing munitions were to be delivered to various seaports in Japan and distributed on 10, 12, 13 and 15 November to the 55th, 56th and 16th Divisions, and that in October notification was dispatched to various governmental agencies to keep secret the general plan for operation which was to be put into effect in French Indo-China.

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At a Liaison Conference of 11 November the principal reasons alleged for the commencement of hostilities against the United States and Great Britain stated that it is Japan's mission to establish a new order in Greater East Asia. Although for eight months Japan and the United States have negotiated for a peaceful settlement, they can not concur, and Japan can not

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

realize her policy and bring about stability if she accedes to the United States. Greater East Asia is at a crisis and Japan's future is in jeopardy and she is compelled to take up arms to smash all obstacles.

10356 1174 A telegram from TOGO to Nomura on 11 November related a conversation between Craigie and TOGO on the matter of United States negotiations. Craigie was of the opinion that they were still at the preliminary stages while TOGO pointed out they had reached the realm of actual negotiations. The Ambassador is to make the United States realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

10352 1173 On 12 November Tokyo Nichi Nichi printed Churchill's declaration that England was ready in the Pacific and will fight if America does.

8985 876A Report of Military Administrative Measures to be taken in event of Japan's entering the war, dated 12 November gives: plans for military operations in (a) Sino-Japanese War, (b) Russo-Japanese War, and (c) First World War, (d) Siberian Expedition, to be taken into consideration as a guide.

10376 1176 The general outline for hastening the conclusion of war against the United States, Britain, Netherlands and Chungking, dated 12 November, provides in essence the plan to be adopted towards foreign powers of 5 November.

8993 878 On 13 November a Liaison Conference considered the measures to be taken towards foreign countries decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor on 5 November.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>
-------------	----------------------------------

REFERENCE

10377	1177	Nomura cabled TOGO on 14 November, stating that he would fight to the end and believed he would win out in the negotiations. American policy was based on stopping Japanese expansion in the Pacific and if Japan moves to the South, she will have to fight England and the United States, and possibly Russia.
8977	873	Secret telegram dated 14 November, from Nanking (Chief of Third Air Group) to Vice Ministers of War and General Staff regarding plans for aerial group to leave Nanking on 15 November, to establish command post at Saigon in South Indo-China on or after 16 November.
11207	1256	In a telegram from TOGO in Tokyo to Riyoji at Honolulu, dated 15 November, it is stated that in view of the critical situation between the United States and Japan, report on ships in harbour should be sent twice a week, observing secrecy.
9025	809	On 15 November a pamphlet entitled "Message to Warriors in the South Seas" was issued by General Horii, Commander of the South Seas detachment detailed to attack Guam.
10331	1178	TOGO cabled Nomura on 16 November requesting Nomura fight harder than ever before. In Nomura's opinion Japan ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. TOGO was sorry but he had set the deadline for solving the negotiations as 25 November.
1117	655	On 17 November Erdmannsdorff, former member of German Legation at Bangkok, cabled Foreign Minister of Reich

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

concerning conversation with OSHIMA on possibility of Japanese action in northern and southern direction. After initial expression of ignorance, OSHIMA said there was a possibility of invasion of Thailand in order to secure a springboard for attack on Singapore, but increase of Japanese troops in French Indo-China would have to be effected first.

11210 1257 On 18 November Kita in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reporting ship movement in the harbour.

10383 1179 On 18 November Kurusu cabled TOGO expressing faith in Roosevelt's desire to continue negotiations, and stated that Japan might give the United States sufficient security so that they could concentrate more deeply in the Atlantic, enabling Japan to occupy a more favourable position in the post-war international situation.

9032 809 The diary of a member of the South Seas Detachment shows that on 18 November group war exercises were held under General Horii, the unit arrived at Hahajima on 28 November, landing there on 3 December. On 4 December there was an announcement of a Japanese-American war.

10387 1180 TOGO telegraphed Nomura on 19 November, giving more amendments to the pact proposal, one of which was that Japan could not agree to non-discrimination in trade being applied only to China, and also that Japan wished to decide independently whether there had been an attack and was not bound by the interpretation of other parties to the Tri-Partite Pact, in the event the United States should enter the European War.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

10389 1181

In his diary of 19 November KIDO stated he pointed out to the Emperor various conditions which might arise if the Emperor resolved on war by the end of November. For war to come just because November had expired might be very difficult with public opinion, and KIDO suggested that when the Premier makes his final decision he order a congress of senior statesmen to convene before the Emperor.

8988 877

In a Liaison Conference of 20 November a decision regarding "Details of the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories" was made. It relates to the setting up of a military administration in occupied areas using existing organs as much as possible and ordering co-operation of United States and Dutch nationals with Japan's military. Final disposition of territories is to be decided later. The occupation forces will control all facilities and communications. All important matters on local administration are to be decided at Liaison Conferences. In French Indo-China and Thailand a military administration is not to be set up, but measures are to be taken later.

10811 1245-H

On 20 November Nomura handed Hull another draft Ballantine proposal incorporating the various points of the previous proposals.

11243 1331

On 20 November it was decided at a Cabinet Conference to establish a new Committee within the Cabinet - the Sixth Committee under Chairmanship of the President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI. This committee was to draft plans for the economic exploitation of the southern areas. The establishment of the committee and its dealings were secret. The regulations

PAGE 211
WITNESSREFERENCE

for the establishment of this committee were approved by the Premier on 2 December.

9027 809

From the diary of Superior Private Yamashita of the 41st Infantry Regiment it is shown that his unit anchored in sight of Takao on 21 November.

10332 1182

On 21 November an Investigation Committee meeting of the Privy Council attended by TOGO and TOJO was held on Prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was decided unanimously to approve the pact and to request the government to make every effort to make it effective.

6637 601

Telegram from Ribbentrop 21 November, showing that on 18 November Japan sought advice from Germany as to whether Germany would agree not to conclude a separate peace with the United States in event of the United States-Japanese War, and that Germany would not conclude a separate peace regardless of reason for war and in the event Japan commenced it.

8934 875

In a cable from Tsukada, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, to KIMURA, Vice Minister of War 22 November, it is stated that the Southern Army will leave Tokyo on 25 November, landing at Keelung on 29 November and the establishment of the headquarters at Taihoku on 30 December.

10400 1183

TOGO in a cable to Nomura on 22 November explained the difficulty of altering the deadline date of the

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
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agreement, but stated that if the signing could be completed by the 29th, and an understanding with Britain and the Netherlands be reached by an exchange of notes by that date, Japan would make arrangements to wait. After that things will automatically happen.

6640	602	Telegram from German Ambassador at Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister of 23 November states Japanese War Minister's gratitude for the fact that Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch in case of United States conflict, and also inquired if Japan-United States war would mean German-United States war. Operation intentions of Japanese in the event of war gave the impression that Thailand, North and East Borneo would be occupied, but Philippine decision has not been reached.
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10402	1184	On 23 November Nomura cabled TOGO that he had met with Hull and Ballantine concerning the negotiations. Britain, Australia and the Netherlands representatives had been conferred with on the 22nd and their opinions on Japan's proposals obtained. He gave a general survey of the conversations, ending by informing TOGO that the United States will submit a counter proposal on Monday.
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<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10408	1185	TOGO cabled Nomura on 24 November, telling him of a conference with Grew concerning the movement of troops in French Indo-China. Japan objected to intervention with Japan's efforts for peace when Roosevelt acts as mediator in connection with the Chinese problem and has Chiang Kai Shek propose peace with Japan. Clarification must be obtained on this point before negotiations between United States and Japan can be settled.
10411	1187	On 25 November the Japanese Ambassador at Hanoi stated that he had been advised that the United States was to reply by the 25th; failing this, he presumed war will result. However, if they fail, Japan's forces are ready to move. He queried whether status quo of TIC would be maintained in war.
8407	Liebert	The law entitled, "Law Concerning Industrial Equipment Corporation" was passed on 25 November, by virtue of which the Government created a special equipment corporation, having as its object in times of war to have war and essential industries equipped with necessary plants for increased production on definite lines of the government program.
6046	495	On 25 November the Anti-Comintern Pact was renewed
6048	496	with the provision for admission of new participants -
	48	Japanese - controlled China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and Denmark.
10418	1189	Nomura and Kurusu cabled TOGO on 26 November, stating that there was hardly any hope of the United States accepting the "B" proposal in toto.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
-------------	----------------------------	------------------

Situation was tense and all they could suggest to save it was that Roosevelt cable Japan stating that he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate in maintaining peace and Japan replies with a cordial message. If Japan approved, they would begin negotiations on receipt of the wire. It seems to them that the rupture, although possibly not causing war, would result in the occupation of Netherlands East Indies, wherewith Japan would be forced to attack. They asked TOGO to consult KIDO (at least) on this point.

10815	1245I Ballantine	
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Hull replied to the Japanese on 26 November outlining a tentative form of the proposed basis for agreement.

10429	1190	
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In his diary for 26 November KIDO stated that he conferred with the President of the Privy Council about a senior statesmen's conference. The Emperor feared the worst and said that final decision for war should be carried out after another senior statesmen's conference with a broader discussion of the matter.

10461	1197A	
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MAGANO stated in interrogation that the Fleets started for Pearl Harbour either on 26 or 27 November.

10432	1191	
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Record of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto of the Foreign Office on 27 November reveals that the negotiations do not seem to be getting along any better. Yamamoto told Kurusu not to break them off and that he would carefully read the President's message. Kurusu said they wanted to keep on negotiating but the Army is champing at the bit and there is a crisis.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10437	1192	On 28 November the Cabinet approved a plan for establishing a new system in press circles. An Imperial Ordinance creating a new system will be issued under the National Mobilization Law. It is aimed at placing the newspapers on a wartime basis.
10442	1193	TOGO informed Nomura on 28 November that in view of the latest United States proposal, there is practically nothing left but to break off the negotiations. However, Nomura and Kurusu are not to convey the impression that the negotiations are broken off and to say that they are awaiting instructions from home, and while not clarifying the Government's intent, they are to give personal opinion that Japan's claims have been just and the United States has not co-operated. The measures suggested in their telegram are considered improper, although they had been referred to the parties mentioned.
6644	603A	Intercepted message from Berlin to Tokyo of 23 November stated that if Japan should fight the United States, Germany would join war immediately, also no possibility of Germany entering into separate peace with the United States.
6652	604	Excerpt from interrogation of OSHIMA in which he stated that around 29 or 30 November he received word that Hull's reply of 26 November with regard to Japanese-United States negotiations had been extremely severe in tone.
10444	1194	TOGO cabled Nomura on 29 November, instructing the Ambassadors to make one more verbal attempt by

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESSREFERENCE

stating traditional United States fairness, and Japan can not understand why United States rejects her new proposals. They were to ask careful reflection on what has become of the basic objectives that the United States has made the basis for negotiations for 7 months (with this change of front on the China problem) and to exercise care that this does not lead to breaking off relations.

11938 1330

On 29 November the Japanese Consul General in Batavia instructed all Japanese consuls in Netherlands East Indies to report the arrival, departure, nationality, port, etc. of all foreign merchant men or warships operating in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and South China Sea zones.

10452 1196

On 29 November KIDO in his diary described a meeting of Senior Statesmen (ex-premiers etc., including HIRANUMA and HIROTA) to give the Emperor their individual views on the question of peace or war. The Government explained that in their view war was inevitable. According to TOJO the members of the Government present besides himself were SHIMADA, TOGO and SUZUKI at the first part of the conference when the explanations were given; himself only in the later stages when the Senior Statesmen spoke. KIDO summarizes the views of the Senior Statesmen; none dissented from the Government view.

10468 1198

KIDO stated in his diary of 30 November that in view of Prince Takamatsu's statement that the Navy wished to wage war, he advised the Emperor to ask opinions of the Navy Minister (SHIMADA),

PAGEEXHIBIT
WITNESSREFERENCE

Chief of Naval General Staff (NAGANO), and the Premier. Later, the Emperor told KIDO that in view of the fact that the Navy Minister and Chief of Navy General Staff had given affirmative answers as to the success of war, he had told the Premier to act accordingly.

7974 802

Telegram from Tokyo to Berlin of 30 November showed that the Japanese were ready to turn on Soviet Russia should it join with England and America.

10449 1195

On 30 Nov. 1940 cabled Nomura setting out the lines along which Nomura is to make one more attempt with the negotiations. The Imperial Government cannot understand the proposal of the 26th and holds a doubtful attitude towards the fundamental plans of the United States government in the negotiations.

10469 1199

1940 cabled OSHIMA on 30 November and informed him that the Tri-Partite Pact had throughout formed the corner stone of Japanese Foreign Policy. Regarding the negotiations, the question of evacuation of troops on which the negotiations rested had been violently opposed, and it has become clear that Japan could no longer continue negotiations. The American proposal of 26 November which aimed at attempting to trick Japan into agreeing that if United States enters the European war Japan cannot assist Germany and Italy has made their attitude clearer than ever. The United States is now in collusion with Australia, England, Holland and China and has decided to regard Japan as well as Italy and Germany as an enemy.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>
-------------	----------------------------

REFERENCE

10475	1200	Record of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto on 30 November showed that Kurusu stated that a reported speech by TOJO had caused much publicity and comment in the United States and the President was returning, possibly on account of it. Yamamoto told Kurusu to continue negotiations and Kurusu said to stretch them out they would need help from home. Kurusu said that more discretion should be exercised in speeches by the Premier and Foreign Minister and that he would see Hull the next day.
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10506 to 10513	1206A 1207A	TOGO in his interrogation stated that the contents of the final note from Japan to the United States were decided at a series of Liaison Conferences on or before 30 November and confirmed by the Cabinet shortly afterwards, and that the instructions as to the time of its delivery were known to all the members of the Liaison Conferences. These included in both cases the accused TOJO, SHIMADA, NAGANO, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO, and OKA. The accused members of the Cabinet were TOJO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI and HOSHINO. He claims that all the above mentioned were responsible in both respects. TOGO admitted and excused the non-delivery of any warning whatever to Great Britain until after 0700 hours on 8 December when he handed a copy of the note to Ambassador Craigie, by saying that he thought Washington would pass it on to London.
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10483	1202	According to TOGO it was decided at one of these Liaison Conferences to leave it to TOGO, NAGANO and Sugiyama to decide the time of delivery of the note.
	1201A	In accordance with the repeatedly expressed wishes of the Emperor it was to be before the attack. He agrees

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
	1201A	that the gist of the contents of the note was approved both by the Liaison Conference and the Cabinet; he denies that the time of delivery was reported to the Liaison Conference, but says that SUZUKI also knew it.
10498	1204A	Ideas as to the length of the interval between the delivery of the note and the attack varied from half an hour to one and a half hours, but it was not to be such as to interfere with the success of the "surprise attack".
10493	1204A	TOJO admitted that the note was not a declaration of war, but he says he thought it was a breaking off of diplomatic relations. He and the Cabinet studied the relevant treaties and he says they thought they were justified, in spite of the Hague Convention and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, because Japan had been challenged militarily and economically by the other countries and was acting in self-defense. He and TOGO expressed the same opinions to the Liaison Conference and they all agreed.
10488	1203A	TOJO agreed that owing to the shortness of time allowed there was danger of a hitch, but trusted the Foreign Ministry to see that it did not occur.
10484	1202A	The War (TOJO), Navy (SHIMADA), Planning Board (SUZUKI), Foreign (TOGO), and Finance (KAYA) Ministers were among the members of the Cabinet who were always present at Liaison Conferences.
10173	1119A	The decisions of the Imperial conferences as a rule merely confirmed decisions previously taken at Liaison Conferences, according to TOJO.
10491	1203A	TOJO said that the Pearl Harbour plan was kept secret in the Navy Ministry until it was disclosed at the Liaison Conference of 30 November.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
11969	1354	The Fundamental Principles of Remedial Measures in Southern Regions to be occupied through Great East Asia War, dated December, states that when all American, British and Dutch southern regions are occupied, Japan will alone decide their sovereign, political, cultural and economic futures. Remedial measures should accord with statement in Imperial Rescript declaring war. Independence is to be afforded various countries, but even so their defense and foreign relations will be indirectly controlled by Japan.
10516	1208	On 1 December TOGO cabled Nomura, stating that the deadline date had come and gone and the situation was increasingly difficult. To prevent United States suspicion they had advised the press that though there were wide differences between the United States and Japan, negotiations were continuing. The note would be withheld from the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo and representations made in Washington only. They were asked to make investigations concerning the President's return.
10519	588	On 1 December an Imperial Conference was held at
	1107	which it was decided that since the negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of national policy decided on 5 November have failed, Japan will open hostilities against Britain, the United States and the Netherlands. According to TOJO (and as shown in Exhibit 1107) there were present on this occasion himself, all or nearly all the Cabinet members (who included SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA, and SUZUKI) NAGANO, HOSHINO, MUTO, AND OKA.
10523	1210	KIDO's diary of 1 December stated that the Council, in the presence of the Emperor, was held that day and decided on war between Japan and the United States; the

PAGE	EXHIBIT WITNESS	REFERENCE
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Premier consulted KIDO about the declaration of war.

10523	1211	On 2 December TOGO instructed Nomura and consuls in the United States territory by cable to burn all codes, secret documents, etc., without raising suspicion from outside.
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11214	Richardson	Bernard Huehn admitted that on 2 December he gave Kita, Consul General Honolulu, documents concerning full details of United States shipping information in Pearl Harbour.
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11193	1252	On 2 December Combined Fleet Top Secret Order No. 7 was issued.
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11211	1258	On 2 December TOGO cabled Honolulu stating that in view of the present situation, he would like a day by day report on whether balloons have been installed above Pearl Harbour and if warships are provided with anti-mine nets.
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6654	605	In a telegram sent on 2 December from OSHIMA to TOGO he stated he had been unable to get Hitler's opinion on the subject of German participation in American War with Japan, but would do so as soon as possible. OSHIMA had assured Gaus that the agreement would be mutual. OSHIMA suggested that a German-Italian-Japanese declaration of joint non-conclusion of separate peace would be best.
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On 2 December TOGO ceased to be Overseas Minister, but retained other offices.

6657	606	Intercepted message from Rome to TOGO of 3 December concerned the fact that United States-Japanese negotiations are not working out and Mussolini backs up
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PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

Japan in the Far East, would declare war himself if Japan were involved, and give Japan all assistance possible by holding England in the Mediterranean.

6630 607 Extract from Ciano's diary 3 December related to a meeting between the Japanese Ambassador and the Duce, in which the former asserted that United States-Japanese negotiations were at a deadlock. He asked Italy to declare war immediately after Japan did so, and Mussolini said he would, reserving right to confer with Berlin first.

11316 1231 On 3 December Kita in Honolulu cabled Tokyo, reporting a change in his method of communicating by signals.

10526 1213 TOGO cabled Nomura on 3 December and instructed him concerning the rumour of strengthening of troops in French Indo-China to state that it was caused by exaggerated reports of strengthening troops there against Chinese troops which have been carrying on activities in French Indo-China and China border districts.

10528 1213 On 3 December Nomura acknowledged TOGO's cable and stated that he assumed it was a result of consultations and considerations. He stated that the United States considered it important and that this reply will be the key to peace or war. He could not anticipate the United States reply. Nomura asked for a clearer expression of Japan's intent, and intimated that the suggested explanation was unsatisfactory.

10530 1214 In a cable from TOGO to Hsinking on 4 December steps to be taken by Manchukuo in case the situation becomes critical are stated, reversing previous instructions. When Japan commences war, Manchukuo will not participate

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
		for the moment. Since she is closely bound with Japan, and England, United States and Holland have not recognized her, she will consider them as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly.
10569	Shirao	On 4 December witness Shirao stated that on orders from the War Ministry he issued written instructions to all branch offices in Tokyo and to other sections of his censorship staff concerning 5-hour delay for cables to and from abroad.
6661	607	Extract from Ciano's diary of 4 December states that Berlin does not like the idea of United States intervention in war, while Mussolini appears pleased about it.
6662	608	Telegram from German Ambassador Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister of 5 December, concerning impending break-off in United States-Japanese negotiations. Deliberations in Foreign Ministry on how Japan will open conflict, whether by declaration of war simultaneously with, or after the beginning of hostilities.
10532	1215	On 5 December Nomura handed a statement to Hull, giving the explanations regarding troop movements in French Indo-China as instructed by TOGO in his cable of 3 December.
11219	1262	A message from Honolulu to TOGO dated 5 December gave specific mention of the movements of ships in and out of the Harbour.
6662	607	Extract from Ciano's diary of 5 December related that Ribbentrop, after two days' delay, sent a message and submitted a plan for triple action on Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace.
7981	805	Telegram from Tokyo to Berlin of 6 December states that

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

Japan hesitates to bring about a clash with Soviet until circumstances are right and wants this explained to German Government so it will not insist on exchange of notes on this matter at the present time.

10534 1216

TOGO cabled Nomura on 6 December and stated that the Government had deliberated on the United States proposal of 26 November and had decided on a memorandum. This memorandum may be delayed until the next day and the exact time for handling it will be telegraphed later.

10536 1217

On 6 December TOGO informed Nomura again of the strict secrecy of the memorandum.

11224 1264

A message was sent from Honolulu to TOGO on 6 December, giving the location of ships in the Harbour and that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm.

10825 1245-5

Ballantine

1221

On 6 December the President of the United States telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor that the tragic possibilities in the situation be avoided. By the President's instructions the telegram was in gray code, easy to decipher. The alerting message was dispatched at 2000 hours on 6 December and the message at 2100 hours on the same day, all Washington time.

11222 1263

A message of 6 December from Honolulu to TOGO gave direct information for the surprise attack and dealt with important subjects of barrage balloons and torpedo nets.

10569 Shirao

On 6 December Shirao, Chief of Censorship Department, Communications Ministry, stated his orders to

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

delay telegrams were changed from 5 hours' delay to 5 and 10 hours on alternate days: 7 December became a "ten-hour" day.

10537 1218 On 7 December (6 December in Washington) Nomura cabled TOGO that the reply was to be given to the United States at 1:00 PM on 7 December, Washington time.

10538 1219 A telegram from TOGO of 7 December stated measures to be taken in the event of a national crisis, in regard to China. British concessions to be occupied, Shanghai International Settlement, Peking Legation compounds to be taken over. On declaration of war the Nanking Government is to be directed (contrary to previous instructions) not to participate, but to maintain close relations with Japan.

10542 1220 KIDO stated in his diary on 7 December that HOSHINO visited him to consult about the war with the United States and England.

10533 Ballantine At 7:40 PM on 6 December the White House informed the Press that a note was being dispatched to the Emperor.

10544 1222 Synchronized Time Chart for 6, 7, 8 December showed that events occurred in the following order, according to Tokyo time:

December 7 0940 American Press told telegram on way to Emperor

1000 Hull cabled Grew the cable was on way

1100 Hull sent President's message to Emperor to Grew, cable marked "Triple Priority" and message sent in easily decipherable code

Document No. 0001

Year: 1941
Cabinet: TOJO

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

1200 President's message received in Tokyo

1500 U. S. radio announces message on way

1800 by this time at latest the contents of the

President's message were known in Japanese

Government offices.

2230 Grew received the message

December 8 0015 Grew sees TOGO, reads message to him, and asks

for appointment to deliver it to the Emperor personally

0045 The Shanghai Bund occupied

0140 Kota Bahru shelled

0200 Nomura asks to see Hull

0205 Japanese land at Kota Bahru

0300 Nomura asks for postponement of meeting with Hull

0305 Japanese land at Singora and Patani (Siam)

0320-25 attack on Pearl Harbour

0405 Nomura arrives at Hull's office

0420 Nomura hands Hull the document terminating
negotiations

0520 H.M.S. Peterel sunk

0530 Japanese troops invade Siam from French Indo-
China

0610 air raid on Singapore

0700 Tokyo radio gives first notice that hostilities
have begun

0730 Grew calls on TOGO, who hands him copy of
document handed by Nomura to Hull, stating it
was Emperor's answer to President's message

0800 Craigie sees TOGO at his request and is handed
a copy of the last-mentioned document

0805 Tuan attacked

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

0900 Hong Kong attacked

between 1140 and 1200 Imperial Rescript issued.

10552 1224

Affidavit of Joseph Clark Grew stated that about 1500

1247

on 7 December it was announced by radio in the United

States that the President had sent a message to the

Emperor, but no information was given as to its substance

or the channel of transmission. At 2100 he received a

telegram marked "Triple Priority" from Hull, sent at

2000 6 December, Washington time (1100 7 December Tokyo

time), stating that a telegram was then being encoded

containing a message from the President, which Grew was

to communicate to the Emperor at the earliest possible

moment. About 2230 the actual message was delivered at

the Embassy. It was stamped as having been received in

Japan at 1200 and was marked "Triple Priority" sent

6 December, 2100 Washington time (1100 7 December, Tokyo

time). Grew immediately telephoned to TOGO asking for

an urgent appointment at midnight. TOGO attempted to put

it off until the next day, but made the appointment.

As soon as the telegram was decoded and typed, Grew

took it to TOGO's residence and saw him on 8 December

at 0015. He requested an audience with the Emperor to

present the message, which he read aloud, and of which

he gave a copy to TOGO. TOGO said at first he would

study the document, but when Grew asked if this meant

some doubt as to whether he would ask for the audience,

he replied he would present the matter to the Throne.

TOGO made some further remarks about the Washington

conversations, but when Grew said he had not received

a report of the 5 December talk and it would complicate

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>
-------------	----------------------------------

REFERENCE

matters as he tried to repeat talks in his comments to the Department, TOGO said it was not necessary. Grew left at 0600. At about 0700 Grew received a telephone call requesting him to come and see the Minister at once. The person speaking said he had tried to get Grew since 0500. Grew arrived at the Minister's residence at about 0730. TOGO said he had seen the Emperor and handed Grew a copy of the memorandum entitled, "Memorandum handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 PM on December 7, 1941." TOGO said he had seen the Emperor at about 0300, and this memorandum is the Emperor's reply. Grew reminded TOGO that he had asked for an audience and still wished to present the President's message personally. TOGO said he had no desire to stand between the Throne and Grew. He then thanked Grew for cooperation during the conversations and saw him off. TOGO said nothing to Grew about war having broken out anywhere, or about Pearl Harbour. Shortly after returning to the Embassy Grew learned through a newspaper bulletin that Japan was at war with the United States and Great Britain. Later that morning an official of the Foreign Office called at the Embassy and read the official announcement that war had broken.

10570 Shirao Shirao stated that on 7 December before 6:00 PM, possibly between 4 and 6 - he knew of the contents of Roosevelt's message to the Emperor from the War Ministry.

10631 1245-K Text of the memorandum handed on 7 December at 2:20 PM, Ballantine Washington time, by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary of State Hull, breaking off negotiations with the United States.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10629	1232	At 1:20 PM, 7 December, Washington time, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour.
10627	1232	Nomura and Kurusu arrived to see Hull at 2:05 PM on 7 December (Washington time) and were received by him at 2:20 PM. They presented the memorandum breaking off negotiations and apologized, saying it should have been delivered at 1:00 PM, but decoding had delayed its delivery.
10571	Shirao	Shirao stated that at 0430 on 8 December he was told by the Chief of the Foreign Telegram Section to stop all communications with foreign countries.
10680	1238	At 0645 on 8 December, General Maltby was informed that war existed between Japan and Britain and at 0800 Japanese aircraft bombed Hong Kong airfield.
10637	Tateno	Witness Tateno, radio announcer, stated that at 0700 on 8 December he broadcast the first publication of Japan's attacks. It was not true as stated in the broadcast that there had been a previous announcement at 600.
10673	1236	At 0800 on 8 December (Tokyo time) TOGO handed the same reply to Craigie at which time Craigie stated he had received no information of any state of war or attack on Britain or the United States, and was relieved to find the document did not suggest it.
10676	1236	At 1130 on 8 December an official of the Japanese Foreign Office informed Craigie that war existed between Great Britain and Japan.
10572	Shirao	At 12 o'clock midday on 8 December the Imperial
	1240	Rescript was read according to testimony of Shirao.
10683	1239	On 8 December KIDO in his diary stated that at 12:40 AM Foreign Minister TOGO reported that Ambassador Grew had brought a personal telegram from President to the Emperor.

EXHIBIT
PAGE . WITNESS

REFERENCE

KIDO advised TOGO to deliberate carefully with Premier TOJO as regards its diplomatic effect. The Emperor would grant an audience even at midnight. KIDO went to the palace at 2:40 AM and talked with TOGO, back home at 3:30 AM. As he was returning to his office, which he reached at 7:15 AM, he saw a fine sun rise and reflected that this was the day on which Japan was to enter the war against the United States and Britain, and that at day-break a mass air attack had been carried out at Hawaii. Knowing this, and being anxious about the result, he prayed. At 7:30 AM on arrival at the office, he heard of the grand success of the surprise attack from TOJO, NAGANO and Sugiyama. From 11:40 to 12:00 midday, KIDO was received in audience. The Imperial Proclamation of War was issued.

10642	1235-A	8 December 1140 Japan announced her attack on Hong Kong
		1150 " " " " on Malaya
		1300 " " " air raid on Hawaii
		and others
		1700 " " air raid on the Philippines
		2100 " " air raid on airdromes in
		the Philippines and advance into
		Thailand.

10690	1241	At an Inquiry Committee Meeting of the Privy Council at 7:30 AM on 8 December, attended by TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA, SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA, while SHIMADA was reporting on the starting of war against the United States and England, the Emperor's reference bill for their deliberation on the subject arrived. In answer to a question as to the time of declaration of war, TOJO replied it shall be done as soon as the Imperial Sanction
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PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

is obtained. He also said since 1 December the negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy, and that Japan would not declare war against Holland in view of future strategic convenience. KAYA said there would be a Special Emergency War Expense Account. TOGO spoke of the form in which the announcement would be made to enemy countries. The Secretaries reported that at 8:00 PM on 7 December they were informed at Premier's residence that the action would begin in the early morning next day, and that during the day the declaration of war against America and England would be presented for Imperial Sanction.

10700 1242

On 8 December Berlin cabled Tokyo reporting that OSHIMA had stated to Ribbentrop Japan's wish for a formal declaration of war by Italy and Germany. Ribbentrop agreed to transmit TOGO's wish to Hitler.

7122 656

Local Military Treaty between French authorities and the Japanese Army was enacted on 9 December concerning the joint defense of French Indo-China. By this agreement Japanese troops are granted all facilities of movement, etc. France and Japan agree to collaborate for defense of French Indo-China with all their resources and various measures concerning air defense, ship movements, plane movements, transport communications and counter-espionage adopted, all of which benefit Japanese and give them virtual control.

11304 1266

On 10 December the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council met to discuss the matter of no-separate peace. TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, MUTO and OKA were present when it was queried whether the treaty should not be deferred until Germany and Italy had actually entered

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

the war; TOGO and TOJO answered that it had been arranged with Hitler to announce German participation as soon as he signed the agreement and they could trust the Germans.

11305 1267 On 10 December a Privy Council Meeting was held attended by TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA and SUZUKI on the matter for the conclusion of the agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy regarding the waging of a common war against the United States of America and the United Kingdom, non-separate peace and collaboration for the establishment of the new order.

6668 51 On 11 December the Board of Information announced the conclusion of an agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy with respect to their joint prosecution of war against the United States and British Empire, abstention from concluding peace and cooperation for the establishment of a new order.

8060 826-A Excerpt from newspaper "Asahi" of 12 December giving text of statement of TOJO on occasion of declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the United States and of the conclusion by Japan of the military agreement with Germany and Italy. TOJO states the world is divided into two groups, one fighting to maintain the status quo and the other for a new order; he believes victory will come to the latter. Offers hearty congratulations on the alliance of the three countries.

11948 1332 On 12 December the first report of the Sixth Committee (SUZUKI, Chairman), "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Areas," was made. Principal policy stated to be meeting demand for important national resources so as to help war, to establish self-sufficient system for co-

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

prosperity sphere, and to strengthen Japan's economy.

Two areas are named for this purpose: one to include Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Borneo, Philippines, and the other French Indo-China and Thailand.

11961 1333-A On 14 December a summarized plan for the management of the southern area was made. Purpose to guarantee Japan's security and establish necessary organization for Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan as leader. Basic policies are acquisition and utilization of military bases, acquisition of resources for national defense, tightening economic cooperation, severing European and American political shackles and respecting local desire for emancipation and independence. The plans for the independence or occupation of the southern areas are then set forth, taking into consideration the cooperation afforded to Japan.

6671 609 At a meeting between OSHIMA and Hitler on 14 December, at which Hitler decorated OSHIMA with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold, Hitler expressed his delight at the method Japan used to declare war. Hitler stated that if the other party only puts one off when negotiating, then one should strike and not waste time declaring war. The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany; it facilitated her submarine warfare now that the United States position was clear. Hitler excused the set-back in Russia as due to weather and gave information on contemplated Mediterranean attack with U-boats. OSHIMA gave the Fuehrer a survey on the Pacific war situation, stating that after the fall of Singapore, Japan will turn on India; he also revealed

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

that Japan had been carrying out landing exercises on Hainan Island for some time.

9073	879-A	On 16 December TOJO made a ministerial address to the Diet, stating that Japan owes the Army and Navy debts of gratitude and unbounded admiration for the demonstration of their great prowess. For years they had been silently preparing for this great day.
11308	1268	On 16 December KIDO stated in his diary that Prince Konoye visited him and expressed his feelings about political responsibility. KIDO asked him to be prudent.
11309	1269	On 18 December KIDO stated in his diary that the Chief of the Naval General Staff (NAGANO) reported to the palace the results at Hawaii.
11315	1270-A	Soon after 8 December, a collection of Essays on Problems of International Law related to the Greater East Asia War was prepared by a committee of well known Japanese international lawyers in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry. Amongst these was "A Report of Study concerning Hostilities on the Outbreak of War." It was delivered on 26 December.
12184	DeWeerd	In 1942 the Japanese initiated the AAA Movement, the theme of which was Asia for the Asiatic.
12043	1339	In January Major G. L. Reinderhoff was taken prisoner by the Japanese in Tarakan. He states in his affidavit that he and two other Dutch officers were sent by the Japanese Commanding General to the Dutch Commander of Balikpapan. He was informed that if the oil works in Balikpapan were destroyed or a Japanese landing resisted, all soldiers and all Europeans of both sexes in Balikpapan would be killed.
8141		Matsumura stated in affidavit existence of plan of operation for 1942 against USSR which contained:

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
		(1) general tasks of Kwantung Army; (2) distribution of military strength; (3) tasks of different fronts and armies. Plan was signed by UMEZU, Commander Kwantung Army, and others and witness stated it was not clear to him whether war against USSR would actually be carried on.
7352	677-A	In the book "Thailand", of January, a map is shown encircling territory which Japan expects to encompass under her control of the new East Asia, including Maritime Province, Aleutians, Hawaiian Islands, Australia and New Zealand.
7532	706	According to Red Army reports, the strength of the Kwantung Army on 1 January was established as 1,100,000 men strong, 22 times the strength in 1932 and 4 times the strength in 1937; 1000 tanks, 500 pieces of ordinance; 7 divisions; and 1500 planes.
7348	675-A	Excerpt from newspaper "Tokyo Dai Nippon" of 5 January states that Greater East Asia Sphere includes these countries: Japan, Manchukuo, China, Soviet Far East, French Indo-China, Burma, Malay, Dutch East Indies, India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines and islands of Pacific and Indian Oceans; they may not be included at once, but for purposes of defense Japan includes them in its sphere of influence. This article, which is entitled "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence" by HASHIMOTO goes on to state that careful consideration should be given to the divisions and administration of the countries in the Sphere. The principles to be followed were independence to be given to each race in its proper place and incorporation into Japan for those areas where the inhabitants have no
12021	675-A	

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

capacity for independence or where the areas were of strategic importance. There should also be a supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Japan's leadership to be set up in Tokyo. The article advocated the launching of anti-American and British movements and the development of superior races in preparation for the great future fight between white and colored races.

12024 1337

On 12 January there was a declaration by the Board of Information concerning the opening of hostilities against Netherlands forces. This stated that, in spite of the previous declaration of war on the United States and Great Britain, Japan had wished to avoid war against the Netherlands East Indies, but Holland had notified Japan that, in view of Japan's war against the United States and Great Britain, a state of war did exist between Japan and the Netherlands. In view of the need for protecting Japanese interests, therefore, Japan opened hostilities against the Netherlands forces on 11 January.

6681 49

On 18 January a military agreement was signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in which the Axis, acting in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, divided the world into zones of military operation.

6424 688-A

Excerpt from secret publication of the Institute of Total War of 27 January entitled, "Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," defines extent of co-prosperity sphere as within limits of Pacific Ocean, Central Asia and Indian Ocean; plans for development of Manchukuo and fortifying it for military operations against USSR; plans for annexation of Soviet Maritime Provinces; provisions for Mongolian defense wall against USSR.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
12047	1340	On 20 January the Dutch Commander of the town of Balikpapan received from Captain Reinderhoff the Japanese ultimatum. He replied that he had received the necessary order and that the oil installation would be destroyed.
12050	1341	On 24 January the Japanese occupied Balikpapan as is stated in the affidavit of J. T. Anstel. On 20 February it was rumoured that all Europeans would be murdered by the Japanese on 24 February and this was duly carried out, the number of Europeans killed being from 80 to 100. The native population was compelled to attend.
12028	1338-A	On 22 January Foreign Minister TOGO made a speech in the Diet. In this speech, TOGO stated that Japan's task was the emancipation and prosperity of East Asia and the setting up of a new world order. The Axis connection had become increasingly tight and there was close economic, military and diplomatic cooperation. The Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union remained unchanged. Japan wished to keep on good terms with neutral states but Japan was watching the situation in South America. Japan had begun fighting against the Netherlands East Indies because Britain, Holland and Chungking had made the Netherlands East Indies their strategic base. TOGO then outlined the aim of the war, which was to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere and decide the destiny of all East Asia. It was, therefore, natural that areas necessary for defending East Asia should be grasped by Japan.
12035	1338-B	On 22 January TOJO made a speech in the Diet. TOJO stated that the cardinal principle for directing the war was to secure strategic points in Greater East Asia and

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESSREFERENCE

gain control of areas containing important resources, to fight out the war until the United States and Britain were defeated. Japan would carry out aggressive operations closely with Germany and Italy. While Japan was pushing her military operations, she was engaged in establishing the East Asia Sphere. Japan would establish eternal peace in East Asia and construct a new world order absolutely indispensable for the defense of Greater East Asia. TOJO then enumerated the territories captured and outlined Japan's intentions towards them.

12009 1336

On 27 January the Total War Research Institute drafted the basic plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It stated that the States, Citizens and Resources belonging to the Pacific, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean, were to be established as an autonomous zone on behalf of the peoples of East Asia. The area was to include Japan, Manchuria, North China, lower Yangtze River and the Russian Maritime Province. It was Japan's duty to be leader of this Union. There would be the Inner Sphere, vital for Japan. The Smaller Co-prosperity Sphere would be the smaller self-supplying Sphere of East Asia, and the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere would be the larger self-supplying sphere and would include the smaller one plus Australia, India and the Islands in the Pacific. The points which should be made the primary starting points for political construction were explained.

11339 1271

(7383) (306)

On 29 January Ott reported to Berlin the various speeches made by TOJO, TOGO and SUZUKI at the Diet and Budget Commission recently which brought forth many interesting and important declarations concerning Japanese

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

aims and the execution of the war. Future moves towards the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and the Soviet are mentioned. The military occupation of the conquered countries is to be a benevolent one (Greater East Asia under Japanese management) and the main object to be the acquisition of sources of raw materials. The countries conquered, or to be conquered, were divided into groups: some (Hong Kong and Malaya) to remain in the possession of Japan, and others (Philippines and Burma) to be granted independence on the model of Manchukuo if they cooperate with Japan; Netherlands East Indies, Australia and Chungking, China, to be conquered if they persist in resisting. TOJO stated relations towards Russia to be unchanged, but very confidential information showed military preparations against USSR to be already underway in Manchuria. Japan must turn against Russia, seize Vladivostok, the coastal provinces and North Sakhalin in order to feel secure in the north.

7349 676-A Article by Tanaka, Makiki in paper "Osaka Ji Ji," dated 31 January, stated the purpose of Great Union of Asia is first to unite morally Japan, China, and Manchuria under Japanese leadership; second, then include Thailand, Annam, Philippines and Burma; and third, to effect emancipation of Australia, India and Siberia.

7991 810 Excerpt from symposium of Institute of Total War entitled, "The Program of Total War in the First Period," The Construction of East Asia" of February 1942. If prospect of peace between Germany and USSR would cause Soviet alienation from England and America and thus reduce threat to Japan, Japan would attempt to mediate, or she

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

might threaten to attack Russia if Russia refused to suspend hostilities. If war situation is unfavorable to Germany, no efforts will be made to bring about peace.

7610 731-A All Manchurian Extraordinary Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai (General UMEZU was present) was held on 8 February. UMEZU's speech relates to Japan's aim to liberate East Asia from baneful influence of England and the United States and delegates must contribute to cause of national defense so Nippon might be sure as far as rear is concerned. On 17 February TOJO resigned from Home Ministry, remaining Premier and War Minister.

7410 682 An extract from the plan concerning scope and structure of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of 18 February plans for German-Japanese occupation of Russia and Japanese counter plans to keep Slavs from German occupied territory out of Japanese section of the USSR.

7430 689 A top secret publication of the Total War Research Institute dated 18 February entitled, "Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia", introduced to show Japanese plans for war against USSR and capture of Soviet territory east of Lake Baikal.

8410 849 In March SATO in his speech made clear that prior to 1941 Japan had expanded her production far in excess of need for China War, and had carefully gathered all controls in hands of government, effectively chaining all industry to the national policy of industrial preparation for a far greater conflict.

12150 de Weerd 7 March Japanese military paper currency was introduced and the guilder reduced to the value of the yen.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
12053 to 12064	1342	The discussion and agreement of the surrender of troops in Netherlands East Indies to Japan was conducted on 8 March.
12183	deWeerd	On 20 March the Japanese prohibited discussion or activities in the organization and structure of government and certain Indonesian leaders were arrested. In December 1942 to January 1943 there was a large scale round-up of Indonesians and those who were not executed or who did not die in prison remained in captivity until September 1945.
12140	de Weerd	In April a ban on listening to the radio from outside Netherlands East Indies was enforced, and in July some persons who had listened to broadcasts and spread news were sentenced to death by court martial.
12145	de Weerd	In April all existing law courts were abolished and Ordinance Nos. 2 and 3 of March 1942, all meetings and associations were forbidden in the Netherlands East Indies. On 20 April SATO became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, MUTO being appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards Division in Tokyo.
12145	de Weerd	On 29 April the first daily newspaper in the Malay language appeared and all forms of propaganda came under Japanese control.
7984	807	Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador in Tokyo of 15 May stated that if Japan feels unable to capture Vladivostok and penetrate into Siberia successfully, without weakening her position against England and America (as in Burma), then she should maintain friendly attitude to Russia. By maintaining neutrality the risk of long-drawn out war and attack on Japanese home islands may be avoided. In short, a sudden and successful attack against Soviet Russia would be great boon for

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

further conduct of war, but should only be undertaken if success can be assured.

11352 1272 On 17 May Ott cabled Ribbentrop suggesting that SUZUKI, SHIRATORI, Sugiyama, KIMURA, MUTO, SATO, Kasahara, and DOHIHARA be recommended for decorations by Germany, in view of the important contributions they had made towards German-Japanese cooperation, details being given in each case. On 29 May MINAMI was appointed a Privy Councillor.

12154 de Weerd On 1 June so-called private estates in the Netherlands East Indies were appropriated without payment and public utilities seized.

7900 778 In a talk between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA on 24 June Ribbentrop stated that the strength of the Tri-Partite powers had been in their offensive war. OSHIMA agreed and stated that neither he nor his government believed in defensive war, but that victory was based on further attacks.

5023 430 In Imperial Order 613 of 14 July it is shown that the Government had power to issue orders for supervision of enterprises of South Manchurian Railway; the Kwantung Army may direct military affairs concerning business affairs of company, - in wartime, may issue orders involving business affairs of company.

12161 de Weerd On 5 August an entirely new system of local administration was set up. The composition of the Administration Corps was later modified according to TOJO's promise but leading positions remained with the Japanese and they did not hand over authority until August 1945. Witness de Weerd then explained the reorganization of the Judicial System.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESSREFERENCE

11359 1273 KIDO related in his diary on 1 September that friction had arisen between TOJO and TOGO, who objected in principle to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry. TOGO had been asked to resign, and after intervention by SHIMADA had agreed to do so, thus averting a resignation of the Cabinet en bloc.

On 1 September TOGO resigned; TOJO temporarily was also appointed Foreign Minister.

On 1 October UHEZU, General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army (previously Commander).

12070 687 On 9 October there was a meeting of the Privy Council on the Greater East Asia Ministry at which MINAMI, TOJO, HOSHINO and SUZUKI were present. TOJO made a report and explanation of the draft bill and made a statement to the effect that victory was an absolute necessity for Japan and that in order to achieve this the combined fighting power of East Asia must be strengthened. It was, therefore, desired to establish a Ministry which should be known as the "Greater East Asia Ministry". TOJO then gave his opinion as to the effect of this on foreign countries which was that their misunderstanding would be solved since the draft aimed for the benefit for all, but that close attention should be paid to the alienation of the relative countries. At the fourth meeting of the Privy Council on 14 October, there were present MINAMI and SUZUKI, the question of naming the new Ministry, Greater East Asia Ministry was discussed and SUZUKI approved of this name. The extranormal diplomacy with countries within the Sphere was discussed as well as the intimate relationship between foreign policy and

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

extranormal diplomacy in the areas and it was decided that the new Minister should take charge. At the fifth meeting on 14 October, which MINAMI attended, the relations of Japan with countries in the Sphere and the diplomacy to be used was discussed. The overseas affairs would come under the superintendence of the Foreign Minister. At the meeting on 20 October, MINAMI, SHIMADA, and OKA were present and at the 8th meeting on 21 October MINAMI, TOJO and OKA were present. Record of second conference of Privy Council attended by HOSHINO, MINAMI, SUZUKI and TOJO on 12 October concerning Greater East Asia Ministry - excerpt on Japan's plans for economic advancement by diplomatic means, last resort would be armed warfare, Greater East Asia Sphere defined as including Kwantung, South Sea Islands, Manchuria, China, Siam, French Indo-China and any new occupation zones resulting from Greater East Asia War.

5186 90

Imperial Ordinance No. 704 of 1 November concerning establishment and organization of the Greater East Asia Ministry. Greater East Asia Ministry established to execute various political affairs concerning Greater East Asia protect commercial interests, affairs concerning Japanese subjects resident there.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

5191 456-A

Extract from "Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations, - 1942", concerning East Asiatic Affairs refers to statement by Aoki, Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs on 1 November, concerning the establishment of Greater East Asia as a new order based on morality and righteousness, on basis of "Hakko Ichiu" (World Under One Roof). Necessary to win war and urgently required that nation's power be replenished and strengthened to do this by cooperating with high command. Hoped for cooperation from French Indo-China, China and Thailand. On 1 November Greater East Asia Ministry was created; took over all duties of Overseas Ministry and Manchurian and China Affairs Boards and some of Foreign Ministry (reason for TOJO's resignation).

On 25 November TOJO was also again appointed temporarily Home Minister.

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On 21 January 1943 the Board of Information announced the conclusion of economic agreements between Germany, Italy and Japan; also they are considering an extension of the Tri-Partite Pact to enable three countries to prosecute war against their common enemy and promote permanent economic cooperation after the war.

7993 812-A

Excerpt from record of Ribbentrop's talk with OSHIMA of 6 March in which the latter reported to the German Foreign Minister that the Japanese Government did not feel strong enough to open up hostilities against Russia at that time as such action might endanger operations on other fronts. Germany points out that all forces under the Tri-Partite Pact should join forces against Russia as well as England and America; Japan should make full use of her strength now as Germany is already strained to the limit. If Germany became weak, Japan alone would face a world

EXHIBIT
PAGE WITNESS

REFERENCE

coalition of not only England, America and Russia, but all bolshevized Europe. OSHIMA replied Japan did not have sufficient army and material to successfully engage Russia and also did not wish to split her Army. Japan would prejudice the southern front if she fought Russia.

12186 DeWeerd On 9 March the "Putera" Movement was begun whose aim was to arouse the strength of the people for victory, to establish a new Java, and eliminate occidental influences.

On 11 March KIMURA was appointed a Supreme War Councillor on resignation as Vice War Minister.

7434 690-A Summarized Research Papers for Year 1942, published by the Research Institute of Total War on 30 March 1943, introduced to show Japanese made plans for possible occupation of Siberia.

8174 839-A Talk between Reich Minister and Ambassador OSHIMA of 18 April shows that Germany considers this the best time for Japan's assault on Russia, who was now weakened by assault from west. Germany estimates Russian force in Siberia as considerably less than Japan's estimate. OSHIMA did not know his Government's views on the subject and for the past 20 years Japan had been preparing to attack USSR.

On 20 April SHIGEMITSU became Foreign Minister.

On 1 May DOHIHARA was appointed Commander of the Eastern District Army (in Japan) and a Supreme War Councillor.

11363 1274 On 13 May KIDO recorded that SHIGEMITSU visited the palace and spoke of the critical situation in Germany. The overwhelming of the Nazi Party by the Army may cause a similar situation to that which arose at the end of the last war, and SHIGEMITSU suggested that a powerful person be sent from Japan to establish liaison between the two countries.

EXHIBIT
PAGE WITNESSREFERENCE

12096 1345

On 16 June TOJO made a speech at the 82nd Session of the Diet and stated that Japan was making arrangements to launch decisive operations. TOJO then outlines Japan's intentions towards the populations of Malay, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes and other places.

7663 737

Conference of Kwantung Army Information Department at Harbin conducted on 16 June by Major General Doi, Chief of Information Department, showing that the war of sabotage against the USSR was continued by Japan even in 1943 when Japan was bound by the Neutrality Pact.

On 21 June NAGANO became Supreme War Councillor and Admiral of Fleet.

11364 1275

On 18 August a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held to discuss the treaty between Japan and Thailand. MINAMI, TOJO, SHIGEMITSU, SATO and OKA were present. This provided that Thailand should annex the Shan States from Burma and that although this was contrary to International Law, Japan would overcome the difficulty by releasing her military occupation and allowing Thailand to annex them. TOJO said Japan would recognize International Law as long as the enemy did so but would interpret it from the viewpoint of the war according to her own opinions.

12192 DeWeerd

On 5 September by Ordinance No. 37 the Adviser System was set up which was established to advise the Resident on local government in the Netherlands East Indies.

8061 773-A

Radio address by SHIGEMITSU on 27 September, the occasion of the second anniversary of the Tri-Partite Pact, which states that the Axis Alliance remains unshaken, despite British and American maneuvers to induce the Badoglio regime to fresh acts of betrayal, and the Pact of Alliance shines forth illuminating the road to victory.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

- 12195 DeWeerd In October an army of volunteers for the defence of the homeland was set up to persuade the Indonesians to defend Java as part of the joint defence of Greater East Asia.
- On 8 October TOJO became temporarily also Commerce and Industry Minister.
- 5010 466 On 30 October a Pact of Alliance between so-called Republic of China and Japanese was concluded. This effected non-validity of former treaty of 30 November 1940.
- 12103 1347-A On 5 November TOJO gave an address at the Assembly of the
12104 Greater East Asiatic Nations in which he stated that a successful conclusion of the war meant the completion of the construction of the new order. TOJO then gave his views on the conditions necessary for world peace and the ties which bound the nations of Greater East Asia together. While the nations of the Sphere mutually recognise their autonomy and independence there must be mutual trust and cooperation.
- 12106 1344 On 5 November, at the time of the decision of the Assembly
12107 of the Greater East Asiatic Nations, TOJO was in favor of in-
12332 dependence and was supported by the Foreign Minister. The Supreme Command and others, however, were against it and it was finally decided that the territories should be incorporated. The Japanese Army on the spot was dissatisfied with the decision but made no representations of their position. Soon after,
- 12282 DeWeerd Sukarno who visited Japan after the Conference, requested TOJO to grant East Indies their independence. The meeting got no definite reply. Later, SHIGEMITSU supported a request for the independence of the East Indies. At the first War Supervision Conference it was decided to make a statement of independence. The Navy still maintained such strong opposition that the promotion of independence was deferred entirely so far as areas under the Navy's Administration were concerned.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
	1	The Cairo Conference was held on 1 December.
12178	Deweerd	In December an organization for the training of the youth of Java was established.
7876	773	On 11 December SHIGEMITSU made a radio speech in which he accused England and the United States of being "forces of aggression" and having been driven out of East Asia during the past two years by the "irresistible might of the Japanese army and navy."
12138	Deweerd	By the end of 1943 it was stated by witness that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands East Indies had been interned except people of 65 and over. All Occidental military personnel, some 45,000 men, were also interned.
12283	Deweerd	In 1944, although witness did not see the atrocities to 1,200 Indonesians, he had learned of them from hundreds of reports and seen confessions by the Japanese chiefly responsible for them.
12213	Deweerd	During 1944, Japanese propaganda was increased and all sections of the community were worked upon, using the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" and an increase of the campaign of hate against the west.
11367	1276	On 6 January KIDO discussed with his Chief Secretary measures Japan must take in the event the situation in Germany grows worse. The TOJO Cabinet, in their opinion, would not be able to cope with the situation. A plan was envisaged for the settlement of the Pacific war by coming to an understanding with the Allies which would not be too drastic for Japan. In February TOJO became Chief of Army General Staff. On 19 February KAYA resigned and became Adviser to Finance Ministry. On 21 February SHIMADA became Chief of Naval General Staff and Supreme War Councillor.

EXHIBIT
PAGE WITNESS

REFERENCE

12208 DeWeerd On 9 March the "Putera" was officially dissolved and the corporation for communal services in Java, comprising all Asiatics, was installed. The organization was to enlist everyone in support of the military. The new organization abolished all others and anyone who attracted suspicion was tortured.

On 22 March DOHIMARA became Commander-in-Chief of 7th Area Army in Malaya.

8062 827 On 15 April Prime Minister TOJO made a speech at a meeting of mixed specialists' commission, convened in accordance with the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact, in which he stated that although the Allies were hammering the Axis powers in East and Western Europe, firm conviction of victory still remains. Japan's solid camp has not even shown the slightest stir. Despite separation of western and far eastern battlefields, close concert must be maintained between Axis powers and Japan must smash all plots to segregate Japan from other Axis nations.

On 2 June HATA became Field Marshal.

4848 350 Witness Wang Shi Ziang stated in his affidavit that on 4 July Japanese Kojo troops arrived in the village of Hiang Doong of the Shan District and subsequently indulged in arson, robbery, slaughter and other atrocities.

11372 1277 On 17 July an unofficial Senior Statesmen's Council was
1278 held at HIRANUMA's house to discuss the reorganization of the Cabinet. HIROTA and Yonai declined to join the TOJO Cabinet (Yonai had been asked by OKA and SATO) and Wakatsuki stated that the present Cabinet had lost the sympathy of the public and the situation was serious. Decision: "to build a powerful national cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly."

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

11377 1278

On 18 July KIDO reported the meeting of the 17th to the Emperor. TOJO informed KIDO that he had decided on a resignation of the Cabinet en bloc.

On 18 July UMEZU became Army Chief of Staff; OKA became Vice Navy Minister.

At an official meeting of the Senior Statesmen convened by KIDO, a long discussion centered round the reconciliation of differences between the Army and Navy. HIROTA proposed the Imperial Prince, HIRANUMA objected and insisted on a military man, so did KIDO. Wakatsuki several times suggested Ugaki but got no support, except from Konoye. HIROTA said the prosecution of the war was first and foremost and no one dissented. They recommended Terauchi, KOISO or HATA. On TOJO's advice the Emperor selected KOISO.

11381 1279

On 19 July Konoye suggested to KIDO the new Cabinet should be a coalition between KOISO and Yonai; KIDO agreed to this proposal.

11383 1280

On 20 July the Senior Statesmen met and KIDO explained the development regarding the coalition. KOISO and Yonai were ordered by the Emperor to form a Cabinet.

On 22 July KOISO became Prime Minister; SHIGEMITSU remained Foreign Minister and became Great East Asia Minister; TOJO,

SUZUKI and HOSHINO lost Cabinet office.

On 2 August SHIMADA ceased to be Chief of Naval General Staff and became Supreme War Councillor.

On 30 August KIMURA became Commander-in-Chief, Burma Army.

12216 DeWeerd

1352

In September an order from the Chief of Staff of the 16th Army stated that based on KOISO's proclamation on granting independence of the East Indies the Army would meet the situation with certain stipulations. The interpretation of

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
		independence and the time that it would come into operation were set forth.
12109 1348		On 2 September the Minister concerned proposed that the
12110		policy in regard to the independence of the East Indies was to announce that the East Indies would be made independent in the future. The Navy's approval was reserved. The form and time of independence would be determined separately. The measures to be taken in Java were then set forth.
3703 277		On 5 September KOISO made a speech before the 85th Diet
12215 DeWeerd		Session, on the occasion of his appointment as Premier.
12226 DeWeerd		On 7 September KOISO's promise that the East Indies would have independence, although it was not made clear what region, was announced in Java. In this he said that the matter would be a link in the Co-Prosperity Sphere and contribute to the development of Greater East Asia under Japan's leadership. At the same time the 16th Army was instructed to advise the War Ministry as to the areas to be declared independent and the time when it would be put into operation.
12221 DeWeerd		On 7 September an order from the Military Administration
1353		stated that the policy was to promote racial consciousness and incite feeling against the United States and Great Britain. Measures for independence would be left to the Army.
		On 5 October MUTO became Chief of Staff to Yamashita, 14th Area Army (Philippines).
2143 Tanaka		Discussion took place between MINAMI and Tanaka on 19 November, regarding the dissatisfaction in Mongolia - Tanaka asked MINAMI to become President of a Mongolian Society. MINAMI refused on grounds of his being a Privy Councillor.
		On 22 November HATA became Director-General of Military Education.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
8065	828-A	A telegram was sent by SHIGEMITSU to Ribbentrop on 11 December (contained in copy of Nippon Times of 12 December). This telegram stated the determination of Axis to fight for common idea of establishing new order. Japan has faith in Europe's salvation by Germany and Italy and is confident of victory of Japan in Far East, and as long as the Axis is united there is no doubt of successful outcome of the war. In December, SATO became Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Force.
5026	439	At Shareholders Extraordinary General Meeting of Southern Manchurian Railway on 20 January, it was decided to allot the Manchukuo Government 175,000,000 yen (in addition to 50,000,000 yen of 2 January 1930) and issue 3,500,000 shares for them.
8067	829-A	SHIGEMITSU made a speech at the 86th Diet Session on 21 January, saying that the combination between Japan and her Allies was becoming firmer and firmer, and that it is their sacred mission to continue fighting to make clear and accomplish common war aim of international justice in war of self-existence and self-defense. (This shows the tenacity in the realization of the aims of the conspiracy and the unity in aggressive war, despite fact that it was only three months prior to Germany's unconditional surrender.)
7166	661	On 1 February "Measures towards French Indo-China to meet the sudden change in the situation" were decided at the Supreme War Leadership Council.
7165	662	Telegram from Saigon, Ambassador Matsunoto to SHIGEMITSU dated 3 March, referred to the ultimatum to be handed to the Governor-General of Indo-China, with a view to placing the whole of French Indo-China under the Japanese Army Control. On 5 March KIMURA became General.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
7177	663	Ambassador Matsumoto visited Governor-General of French Indo-China on 9 March, and requested strengthening of common defense of French Indo-China by France and Japan, in view of possibility of American landings. France rejected the proposal, and so the Japanese therefore set about disarming French troops and using force.
7183	664	Proclamations were issued by the Japanese on 10 March, relating to measures Japanese took to obtain control of military and administration of French Indo-China. Orders were issued to civilians regarding behaviour, and the fact was impressed upon them that this "coup" was merely directed against the anti-Japanese Government and not the people as a whole.
11385	1281	On 4 April KIDO reported in his diary that KOISO stated his intention to resign. KIDO suggested he postpone it until next day in order to give the Emperor time to consider and he agreed.
	54	USSR denounced the Neutrality Pact on 5 April.
11390	1282	KIDO stated in his diary of 5 April that KOISO tendered his resignation because Cabinet must be strengthened in view of war situation and it was to be announced that night. KIDO first interviewed (among others) UMEZU, who stressed need of fighting it out to the bitter end, and need of a special cabinet for that purpose. He then called a Senior Statesmen's Conference. TOJO said there was now a section of opinion in favour of accepting unconditional surrender and demanded a decision on that. HIRANUMA said several times that Japan must fight to the bitter end, HIROTA agreed and was hopeful of victory. No one expressed dissent openly. HIRANUMA wanted to recommend cabinet members as well as the Premier. He

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>
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REFERENCE

finally suggested Admiral Suzuki, Kantaro, President of the Privy Council, who spoke of being prepared to die fighting for the Emperor and country. KIDO supported and he was recommended. TOJO suggested that if the Army was not satisfied it might "stand aloof" -- to the general indignation.

On 7 April Suzuki became Prime Minister; TOGO again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor; SATO, Lt. General in command of the 37th Division in Indo-China and (later) Siam; DOHIMARA became Chief Inspector of Military Training and again Supreme War Councillor; ITAGAKI, General, Commander-in-Chief 7th Army (Malaya); HATA, Commander-in-Chief 2nd Army.

On 9 April HIRANUMA again became President of the Privy Council.

7193 665

On 11 April the Provisional Government of French Republic issued a warning to the Japanese Government concerning the treatment of French and Allied nationals in French Indo-China, any people who permit or perform injuries to nationals will be considered as war criminals.

5179 663

On 15 May the Japanese troops in French Indo-China finished the "mopping up" and armed operations against French troops in French Indo-China, although in view of activities of Viet Nam Party, Japanese were forced to employ considerable strength in cleaning this up until the surrender.

12234 DeWeerd

On 15 May Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters requested views on independence and on May 25 a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. Recognizing that the war was going against Japan, it was decided to allow Java to study preparations for independence, but the territory was narrowed down to Java as the naval territories were not represented at the Conference.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
12121	1350	On 17 July there was a Decision of the Supreme War Plans Council No. 27 regarding the measures for the East Indies independence stating that preparations for independence should be hastened. The area to be independent was the Netherlands East Indies and the independence as a new nation would be proclaimed as soon as preparations were completed. In areas where preparations were not complete, steps would be taken to transfer them by degrees to the jurisdiction of the new nation.
12115	1349	On 17 July, in the Data for Foreign Minister's explanation on measures for Netherlands East Indies independence, movements which had existed in the East Indies since the Dutch occupation had cooperated wholeheartedly with the Japanese in the expectation of realizing that independence. The Greater East Asia Joint Declaration was issued in November 1943 and this clarified Japan's position with regard to the independence of each country in Greater East Asia, and Japan considered it proper to carry out the spirit of this declaration.
12236	DeWeerd	On 17 July the Supreme War Direction Council decided to grant independence to the East Indies as soon as possible to comprise all Netherlands East Indies.
2		The Potsdam Declaration was signed on 26 July.
12237	DeWeerd	On 7 August, on orders from Tokyo, Terauchi set up a preparatory committee for independence.
64		USSR declared war on Japan on 8 August.
12241	DeWeerd	On 9 August Terauchi received three leading nationalists and transmitted to them the contents of the Imperial Decree. The decree stated that Japan was setting up a committee to prepare for the independence of the Netherlands East Indies.

PAGE EXHIBIT
 WITNESS

REFERENCE

The day of independence was to be decided by Japan and the Government would be installed first in the place where preparations were complete and other areas would follow when they were ready.

11323 1283

On 9 August KIDO recorded in his diary that Premier Suzuki informed him that the Supreme War Guidance Council had decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration with four reservations: (1) preservation of the Imperial Dynasty; (2) Independent evacuation of troops; (3) handling in our own country of persons responsible for the war; and (4) no guarantee occupation.

3

The Japanese qualified acceptance of 10 August contained only the reservation with regard to the Emperor.

4

The Allies replied on 11 August.

5

Final Japanese acceptance was 14 August.

12242 DeWeerd

On 14 August a Committee was formed with representatives from the various areas and the first meeting was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August they were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation. Japan's defeat was kept secret until 21 August.

On 17 August Prince Higashikuni became Prime Minister; SHIGEMITSU again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor.

On 25 August DOHIMURA became Commander-in-Chief 12th Area Army, and again of Eastern District Army (Japan), and Supreme War Councillor.

6

The Instrument of Surrender was signed 2 September

On 9 October Shidehara became Prime Minister.

7

The Moscow Conference Agreement was signed 26 December.

APPENDIX A.

The following phases of the Prosecution Case are not fully dealt with in the Summary, owing to their general character. Oral testimony relating to these and other phases is only covered so far as it records a dated event. The following Exhibits are not referred to for the above reason. There are also a number of Exhibits mentioned in the Summary which bear upon phases in addition to those in which they were introduced.

- I. 1. Treaties: Exhibits 12 - 35.
2. Japanese Constitution: Record pp. 517 - 685. Exhibits 68-99.
3. Preparing Japanese opinion for war: Record pp. 307 - 1678. Exhibits 130-163 (of which only 135-8, 141, 148, 151, 155, 163 are mentioned in the Summary), 182, 267.
4. Narcotics: Record pp. 4407-4422, 4429-4634, 4663-4993. Exhibits: 17, 345, 372-435, all of which are mentioned in the Summary except 17, 389, 401-4, 416, 423(2), 429, 430-2, 434-5.
5. Economic Aggression in China (including Manchuria): Record pp. 4999-5350. Exhibits 436-471, 474, of which the following are omitted from the Summary, 441, 447-8, 454A, 467 - 472, 474.
6. Preparations for War: Record pp. 8182 - 9263. Exhibits 840-919, of which the following are omitted from the Summary, 843-8, 854-5, 858-60, 866, 869, 880-908, 913-13.
7. Class B and C Offences: (a) in China: Record pp. 2527-2703, 3353-3424, 4455-4734: Exhibits 204-10, 213, 249 - 54, 306-347.
- (b) Elsewhere: Record pp. 5351-5847: Exhibits 472, 473, 475-6 (Col. Wild) Record pp. 11403-11528 (Lt. Col. Coates), 11529-11631 (Brig. Blackburn).
- (c) All evidence given after December 10th, 1946.

- II. In addition the following Exhibits, dealing generally with other phases, have been omitted or only incidentally mentioned: 174-6, 199-201, 220, 221, 245, 247, 267, 275, 377, 389, 666, 668-70, 678-81, 683, 685, 691-700, 707-18, 722-30, 732-3, 735, 738-43, 750, 755, 763-5, 811, 813, 815-24, 891, 895-8, 1029, 1104-6, 1249, 1253-5, 1265, 1342, 1351

- III. The following is a list of extracts (in order of date) from

176
"Foreign Relations Series, United States and Japan" (Exhibit 58), which relate to the negotiations in 1941, the break-down of which led to the Pacific War: Exhibits 1059, 1060, 1061, 1070, 1071, 1074, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1083, 1085, 1087, 1091, 1092, 1245A (comparison of 1070 and 1092), 1102, 1245B-I inclusive, 1215, 1245J, 1221, 1245K, 1232, (1246, 1247, put in by Defence from Pearl Harbour Report Exhibit 174). Affidavits and statements Exhibits: Hull 1106, Ballantine 1245, Grow 1105 and 1224, Craigie 1236, Byrnes 1233, Sargent 1231.

APPENDIX B

The following pages contain under the name of each accused, where applicable:

1. All the pages of the Summary on which he is named.
2. A list of some of the offices, etc., held by him, with the dates, and the pages of the Summary recording the events of that period. (The degree of his responsibility for all or some of those events will of course vary greatly with the circumstances, both of the office and of the events.)
3. The exhibit numbers of extracts from his interrogation.
4. Speeches and writings (other than correspondence) by him.
5. Decorations which he is recorded to have received in respect of specific matters dealt with in the Summary.

ARAKI

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

3, 13, 17, 18, 23, 24, 26, 45, 55, 56, 71, 73, 74, 80,
83, 84, 88, 92, 106, 136, 153, 235, 256.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 103.)

<u>Offices, etc.</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
War Minister	13 Dec 1931-23 Jan 1934	13-24
Cabinet Councillor	15 Oct 1937-26 May 1938	55-71
Education Minister	26 May 1938-30 Aug 1939	71-100
(Also Pres. General Nat- ional Mobilization Committee)	(28 Mar-30 Aug 1939)	(92-100)
Cabinet Councillor	1 Dec 1939-3 Aug 1940	106-136

3. Extracts from his interrogation are Exhibits:

187A-W, 188A-E, 229.

4. Speeches and writings by him are Exhibits 148A, 760.

5. Created baron 26 Nov 1936.

DOHIHARA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
3, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 24, 35, 43, 45, 72, 103, 114,
153, 210, 255, 299, 303, 307, 312, 314.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 104.)

<u>Offices, etc.</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Colonel employed by Chinese Government	17 Mar 1928-15 Mar 1929	1
Attached Army General Staff	22 Dec 1930-1 Aug 1931	2
Attached H. Q. Kwantung Army	1 Aug 1931-11 Apr 1932	2-17
Major General attached H.Q. Kwantung Army	16 Oct 1933-7 Mar 1936	24-35
Lt. General i/c 14th Division	1 Mar 1937-18 Jun 1938	43-72
Attached General Staff	18 Jun 1938-19 May 1939	72-96
Commander 5th Army	19 May 1939-9 Jun 1941	96-210
Supreme War Councillor	28 Sep 1940	153
Chief of Air Inspectorate General	9 Jun 1941-1 May 1943	210-303
Commander Eastern District Army in Japan	1 May 1943-22 Mar 1944	303-307
Commander 7th Area Army in Malaya	22 Mar 1944-7 Apr 1945	307-312
Chief, Inspectorate General of Military Training	7 Apr 25 Aug 1945	312-314
Commander 12th Area Army	25 Aug-14 Sep 1945	314

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "incident";
also 29 April 1940 for services in the China "incident".
Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit
1272).

HASHIMOTO

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
1, 2, 3, 5, 9, , 45, 58, 91, 114, 256, 292.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibit 105).

<u>Offices, etc.</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Major, Military Attache, Embassy in Turkey	28 Sep 1927-30 Jun 1930	1
Lt. Colonel, Member Army General Staff	3 Jul 1930-12 Dec 1931	2-13
Colonel, Commander 2nd Heavy Field Artillery	1 Aug 1934-1 Aug 1936	26-39
Commander 13th Heavy Field Artillery in China	before December 1937- 9 Mar 1939	57-91

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 258.
4. Extracts from his writings and speeches are Exhibits:
177A, 264, 675-A, 866, 1290.
5. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4
"disturbances" and 29 April 1942 for services in the
China "disturbances".

HATA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
3, 39, 45, 52, 65, 67, 96, 100, 114, 129, 131, 132,
133, 154, 184, 255, 307, 309, 312.
2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 106).

<u>Offices, etc.</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Lt. General, Inspector of Artillery	1 Aug 1931-1 Aug 1933	2-23
Commander 14th Division	1 Aug 1933-2 Dec 1935	23-33
Chief, Army Air Force Headquarters	2 Dec 1935-1 Aug 1936	33-39
Commander, Formosan Army	1 Aug 1936-2 Aug 1937	39-50
Inspector General of Military Education and Military Councillor	26 Aug 1937-14 Feb 1938	52-65
(also Cabinet Councillor)	(13 Dec 1937-14 Feb 1938)	(58-65)
Commander in Chief Expeditionary Force to China	14 Feb 1938-15 Mar 1938	65-67
Military Councillor	15 Mar 1938-25 May 1939	67-96
Chief A.D.C. to the Emperor	25 May-30 Aug 1939	96-100
War Minister	30 Aug 1939-22 Jul 1940	100-132
Military Councillor	22 Jul 1940-1 Mar 1941	132-184
C-in-C Expeditionary Force to China	1 Mar 1941-22 Nov. 1944	184-309
Field Marshal	2 Jun 1944	
Inspector General of Military Education	22 Nov 1944-7 Apr 1945	309-312

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 256.
4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident" and 29 April 1941 for services in the China "affair".

HIRANUMA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

2, 3, 19, 30, 32, 35, 40, 42, 45, 56, 80, 83, 88, 91,
95, 100, 127, 132, 154, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 178,
180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203,
206, 209, 211, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 227, 255,
273, 307, 308, 311, 312.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 107.)

<u>Office, etc.</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Vice President, Privy Council	12 Apr 1926-13 Mar 1936	1-35
President, Privy Council (also Cabinet Councillor)	13 Mar 1936-5 Jan 1939 (6 Apr 1936-5 Jan 1939)	35-88 (36-88)
Premier	5 Jan-30 Aug 1939	88-100
Minister of State	6-21 Dec 1940	166-168
Home Minister	21 Dec 1940-17 Jul 1941	168-227
Minister of State	18 Jul-17 Oct 1941	227-255
President, Privy Council	9 Apr-15 Dec 1945	312-314

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 768.

4. Granted set of gold cups 29 Apr 1934.

HIROTA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

3, 14, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 45,
51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71,
80, 111, 132, 136, 154, 227, 255, 273, 307, 308, 311.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 108.)

<u>Office</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Ambassador to USSR	15 Oct 1930-19 Nov 1932	2-20
Foreign Minister	14 Sep 1933-2 Apr 1936	24-36
Premier	9 Mar 1936-2 Feb 1937	36-42
Foreign Minister	4 Jun 1937-29 May 1938	45-71
Cabinet Councillor	13 Mar-3 Aug 1940	111-136

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 972-C.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the "Showa 6-7 Incident," and 2 Nov 1938 for services re the Anti-Comintern Pact.

HOSHINO

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

3, 18, 20, 37, 45, 114, 133, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 172, 195, 200, 255, 260, 275, 277, 282, 300, 301.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 109.)

<u>Office</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Chief of General Affairs Manchukuo	17 Jul 1932-16 Dec 1936	19-41
Chief of General Affairs Manchukuo	16 Dec 1936-21 Jul 1940	41-132
President, Planning Board and Minister of State	22 Jul 1940-4 Apr 1941	132-195
(also Acting Director of the Total War Strength Experimental Station)	(16 Oct 1940-11 Jan 1941)	(160-169)
Councillor of the Total War Strength Experimental Station	2 May 1941-22 Jul 1944	200-308
(Member National Mobilization Investigation Committee)	(12 Jul-5 Nov 1941)	(224-260)
Chief Secretary of Cabinet and Minister of State	18 Oct 1941-22 Jul 1944	255-308

3. Extracts from his interrogation are Exhibits:

453A, 454A.

4. Decorated 23 Feb 1937 for services in 1931-4 "affair",

and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair".

ITAGAKI

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

3, 5, 12, 17, 28, 35, 43, 45, 72, 80, 83, 84, 85, 88, 91, 95, 154, 223, 255, 312.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 110).

<u>Offices, etc.</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Various posts on Staff of Kwantung Army (Colonel rising to Lt. General), (rising to Chief of Staff)	14 May 1929-1 Mar 1937 (23 Mar 1936-1 Mar 1937)	1-43 (35-43)
Attached Army General Staff	25 May 1937-3 Jun 1938	45-72
War Minister and President Manchurian Affairs Board	3 Jun 1938-30 Aug 1939	72-100
General, Commander Korean Army	7 July 1941-7 Apr 1945	223-312
Commander 7th Army (Malaya)	7 Apr 1945-2 Sep 1945	312-314

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 761.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "war", 7 Jul 1937 higher decoration for same service, and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "war".

KAYA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

3, 42, 43, 45, 56, 71, 73, 99, 154, 255, 257, 258, 260,
275, 276, 277, 287, 288, 289, 306.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 111.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Secretary and other posts in Finance Ministry	10 Mar 1930-2 Feb 1937	1-42
Vice Minister of Finance and Member of many official committees including Opium	2 Feb 1937-4 Jun 1937	42-45
Finance Minister	4 Jun 1937-26 May 1938	45-71
Adviser to Finance Ministry	1 Jul 1938-14 Aug 1939	73-99
President, North China Development Company	14 Aug 1939-18 Oct 1941	99-254
Finance Minister	18 Oct 1941-19 Feb 1944	254-306
Adviser to Finance Ministry	4 Mar 1944-29 Sep 1945	307-314

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4
"incidents".

KIDO

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 46, 55, 60, 71, 80, 99, 118, 121, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 138, 145, 147, 153, 154, 174, 195, 200, 209, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 226, 227, 232, 234, 240, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 262, 267, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 282, 286, 287, 291, 300, 303, 306, 308, 311, 312, 314.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 112).

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper of Privy Seal	28 Oct 1930-22 Oct 1937	2-55
Education Minister	22 Oct 1937-26 May 1938	55-71
Welfare Minister (concurrent until 26 May 1938)	11 Jan 1938-5 Jan 1939	60-88
Home Minister	5 Jan 1939-30 Aug 1939	88-100
Lord Keeper of Privy Seal	1 Jun 1940-10 Oct 1945	118-314

3. Extracts from his diary (Exhibit 178) are Exhibits (in order of date):

179A, B, F, G, C, E, D, H, R, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, 775, 619, 1294, 532, 534, 539, 1298, 626, 627, 643, 1303, 1058, 1065, 1066, 1084, 1089, 1090, 781, 1093, 1094, 1095, 1098, 1108, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1125, 1129, 1130, 1134, 1135, 1138, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1147, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1162, 1168, 1181, 1190, 1196, 1198, 1210, 1220, 1239, 1268, 1269, 1273, 1274, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1295.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "affair".

KIMURA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
3, 39, 46, 114, 154, 164, 197, 201, 255, 268, 299, 303,
308, 310.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 113).

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Colonel, Commander 22nd Field Artillery	1 Aug 1931-8 Aug 1932	2-19
Major-General, Director of Ordinance	1 Aug 1936-9 Mar 1939	39-91
Lt. General, Commander 32nd Division	9 Mar 1939-7 Nov 1940	91-164
Member of Japanese-Manchurian Committees	7 Nov 1940-10 Apr 1941	164-197
Vice War Minister Councillor, Planning Board, Total War Strength Institute, etc.	10 Apr 1941-11 Mar 1943	197-303
C-in-C Burma Area Army	30 Aug 1944-2 Sep 1945	308-314

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4
"incident", and 29 April 1942 for services in the
China "incident". Recommended 17 May 1942 for German
decoration (Exhibit 1272).

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
3, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 33, 46, 94, 107, 125, 154, 255,
308, 309, 311.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 114.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Major General, Director, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, and Chief Secretary, Supreme War Council	21 Aug 1930-29 Feb 1932	1-16
Lt. General, Vice War Minister	29 Feb - 8 Aug 1932	16-19
Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army	8 Aug 1932-5 Mar 1934	19-25
Commander, 5th Division	5 Mar 1934-2 Dec 1935	25-33
Commander, Korean Army	2 Dec 1935-15 Jul 1938	33-74
General, Overseas Minister	7 Apr-30 Aug 1939	94-100
General, Overseas Minister	16 Jan-22 Jul 1940	107-132
Governor-General of Korea	29 May 1942-22 Jul 1944	298-308
Premier	22 Jul 1944-7 Apr 1945	308-312

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 277.
4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "affair".

MATSI I

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
3, 12, 13, 22, 23, 46, 52, 56, 58, 67, 74, 97, 114,
154, 255.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 115).

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Lt. General, Commander, 11th Division	1 Aug 1929-1 Oct 1931	1-8
Plenipotentiary to the Geneva Conference	9 Dec 1931-4 Feb 1933	12-21
(concurrently Army General Staff)	(1 Oct 1931-18 Mar 1933)	(8-22)
Supreme War Councillor	18 Mar 1933-15 Aug 1937	22-52
General, Commander Shanghai Expeditionary Force-	15 Aug-30 Oct 1937	52-56
Commander China Expeditionary Force	30 Oct 1937-5 Mar 1938	56-67
Cabinet Councillor	20 Jul 1938-23 Jan 1940	74-107

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 257.
4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "war"
and 29 April 1940 (with 1st class Order of Golden Kite)
for services in China "incident".

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

2, 4, 6, 13, 16, 21, 28, 35, 39, 46, 85, 154, 255, 299,
300, 301, 304, 309.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 117.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
General, War Minister	14 Apr-13 Dec 1931	2-13
Supreme War Councillor	13 Dec 1931-10 Dec 1934	13-28
(also Cabinet Councillor)	(9 Feb 1933-10 Dec 1934)	21-28
Commander, Kwantung Army, and Ambassador to Manchukuo	10 Dec 1934-6 Mar 1936	28-35
Governor-General of Chosen	5 Aug 1936-1 Apr 1939	39-93
Privy Councillor	29 May 1942-29 Mar 1945	299-311

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 185 (see also 184).

4. Decorated 29 April 1940 for services in China "affairs".

MUTO

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 31, 43, 46, 103, 114, 125, 152, 154, 168, 169, 172, 173, 174, 176, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 216, 217, 218, 231, 240, 252, 255, 260, 287, 288, 298, 299, 309.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 118.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Major, Member Army General Staff	27 Nov 1930-5 Mar 1934	2-25
Colonel, Staff Officer Kwantung Army	29 Jun 1936-1 Mar 1937	38-43
Section Chief, Military Affairs Bureau	1 Mar 1934-date unknown	43-?
(also Member Naval General Staff)	(1 Apr-30 Oct 1937)	(44-56)
Vice-Chief of Staff, North China Army	date unknown-30 Sep 1939 ?	- 103
Director, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, and Chief Secretary, Supreme War Council	30 Sep 1939-20 Apr 1942	103-298
(Many concurrent posts in other ministries, including Japanese member of the Italo-German Japanese Mixed Commission)		
Commander, Imperial Guard Division	20 Apr 1942-5 Oct 1944	298-309
Chief of Staff, 14th Area Army (Philippines)	5 Oct 1944-2 Sep 1945	309-314

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 255.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "war", and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair". Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).

OKA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 46, 114, 154, 159, 165, 169, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 181, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 216, 217, 218, 219, 231, 240, 252, 255, 260, 287, 288, 301, 304, 307.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 120.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Commander, Member of Naval General Staff	10 Oct 1931-25 Oct 1932	9-20
Captain, Member of Naval General Staff	15 Nov 1933-1 Dec 1936	24-41
Chief of No. 1 Section, Bureau of Naval Affairs	15 Jan 1938-15 Oct 1940	61-153
(also Secretary, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs, etc.)	(25 Jan 1938-21 Oct 1939)	(62-103)
Chief of Bureau of Naval Affairs, attached to Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters	15 Oct 1940-2 Sep 1945	153-314
(also Secretary, National General Mobilization Council and numerous other posts)	(8 Nov 1940-18 Jan 1941)	164-170

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "incidents", and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "incident".

OWA SA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
2, 4, 5, 9, 26, 46, 154, 255.
2. Throughout the period he was Director-General, East Asia Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway.

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 25, 46, 79, 80, 89, 92, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, 114, 121, 154,
163, 166, 167, 169, 181, 182, 184, 188, 204, 209, 215, 217, 218, 221,
256, 266, 272, 274, 278, 288, 290, 299, 302, 303

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 121.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Section Chief Army General Staff, and Member Navy General Staff	1 Aug. 1931-5 Mar. 1934	2-25
Military Attache, Berlin	5 Mar. 1934-8 Oct. 1938	25-79
Ambassador to Germany	8 Oct. 1938-29 Dec. 1939	79-107
Ambassador to Germany	20 Dec. 1940-19 Feb. 1945	167-310

3. Extracts from his interrogation are Exhibits:

477, 478, 487, 488, 490, 497, 604, 776.

4. Writing by him is Exhibit 1299.

5. Decorated 25 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident",
2 November 1938 for services in the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern
Pact, and 29 April 1940.

S.M.O.

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 19, 46, 53, 74, 78, 96, 114, 154, 187, 256, 297, 298, 299, 304, 307, 310, 312

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 122.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Major, Commander 8th Medium Artillery Battalion	8 Aug. 1932-1 Aug. 1933	19-23
Lt. Colonel, Member Military Affairs Bureau	1 Aug. 1936-May 1939	39-95
(Secretary, Planning Board)	(26 Nov. 1937-29 July 1938)	(56-76)
(Colonel, Army Spokesman, Cabinet Information Board)	(15 July-12 Dec. 1938)	(74-86)
Deputy Chief of Staff, South China Expeditionary Force	May 1939-March 1941	95-176
Chief of 1st Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry	Mar. 1941-20 Apr. 1942	176-298
Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry	20 Apr. 1942-Dec. 1944	298-310
Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Force	Dec. 1944-7 Apr. 1945	310-312
Commander 37th Division in Indo-China and Siam	7 Apr.-2 Sept. 1945	312-314

3. Speeches by him are Exhibits 270, 349.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services 1931-4, and 29 April 1934 for services in the China "affair". Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).

SHIGEMITSU

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 17, 29, 40, 46, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 109, 112, 114, 115, 118, 124,
136, 140, 154, 176, 178, 180, 182, 183, 204, 256, 303, 304, 305, 306,
308, 310, 314

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 123.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Councillor of Embassy and Consul-General, China	21 Jan. 1930-10 July 1934	1-26
Councillor, Board of Manchurian Affairs, etc.	18 Jan. 1935-10 Apr. 1936	29-36
Ambassador to U.S.S.R.	27 Aug. 1936-22 Sept. 1938	40-79
Ambassador to Great Britain	22 Sept. 1938-19 Feb. 1941	79-180
Ambassador to China	19 Feb. 1941-20 Apr. 1943	180-303
Foreign Minister	20 Apr. 1943-7 Apr. 1945	303-312
(also Greater East Asia Minister)	(20 July 1944-7 Apr. 1945)	(308-312)
Foreign Minister and Greater East Asia Minister	17 Aug.-17 Sept. 1945	314

3. Speeches by him are Exhibits 773A, 829A.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1941-4 "affairs", and 29 April
1940 for services in China "affair".

SHIMADA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 15, 18, 33, 46, 56, 80, 114, 154, 168, 256, 257, 258, 260, 273, 275,
276, 277, 287, 288, 289, 300, 301, 306, 308

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 124.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Chief of Staff of 1st and Combined Fleets	1 Dec. 1930-2 Feb. 1932	2-15
Chief of Staff, 3rd Fleet	2 Feb.-28 July 1932	15-19
Naval General Staff (rising to Vice-Chief)	28 July 1932-1 Dec. 1937	19-56
Commander 2nd Fleet	1 Dec. 1937-15 Nov. 1938	56-82
Commander China Fleet	1 May 1940-1 Sept. 1941	114-237
Navy Minister	18 Oct. 1941-19 Feb. 1944	255-306
Chief of Naval General Staff	19 Feb.-17 July 1944	306-307

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 1128.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934, and 29 April 1940 for services in the China
"incident".

SHIRATORI

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 8, 9, 23, 32, 44, 46, 79, 88, 101, 111, 114, 121, 141, 154, 166, 167,
173, 223, 229, 233, 256, 299

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibit 125.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Chief, Information Dept., Foreign Ministry	31 Oct. 1930-2 June 1933	2-33
In Foreign Ministry	28 Apr.-22 Sept. 1938	69-79
Ambassador to Italy	22 Sept. 1938-9 Mar. 1940	79-111
Councillor in Foreign Ministry	28 Aug. 1940-22 July 1941	141-229

3. Writing by him is Exhibit 557.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the "Manchurian affair", and
29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair". Recommended 17 May
1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).

SUZUKI

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 8, 39, 46, 85, 96, 114, 155, 168, 195, 213, 216, 219, 231, 237, 240, 251, 252, 253, 256, 260, 267, 273, 275, 276, 277, 287, 289, 295, 299, 300, 301, 308

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 126.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Lt. Col., Member of Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry, etc.	1 Aug. 1931-1 Aug. 1936	2-39
Colonel, Commander 14th Infantry	1 Aug. 1936-1 Nov. 1937	39-56
Major-General, 16th Division Headquarters	1 Nov. 1937-10 Nov. 1938	56-82
Section Chief in China Affairs Bureau rising to Commissioner General	16 Dec. 1938-4 April 1941	86-185
(Member of Opium Committee)	(21 June 1939)	
Minister of State and President, Planning Board	4 Apr. 1941-8 Oct. 1943	185-305
(also Councillor of the Total War Investigation Laboratory)	(21 Dec. 1940-8 Oct. 1943)	168-305
(Member Thought Control Committee)	(19 June 1941)	
Cabinet Councillor	17 Nov. 1943-28 Oct. 1944	305-309

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident".

Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).

TOGO

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 12, 21, 40, 46, 56, 59, 60, 73, 74, 80, 114, 120, 140, 155, 256,
258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273,
274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287,
288, 289, 294, 295, 296, 300, 312

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 127.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Member of delegation to League of Nations and Disarmament Conference	30 July 1930-1 Feb. 1933	1-21
Chief of European-American Bureau, Foreign Ministry	1 Feb. 1933-1 June 1934	21-26
Chief of European-Asiatic Bureau	1 June 1934-27 Oct. 1937	26-55
Ambassador to Germany	27 Oct. 1937-15 Oct. 1938	55-80
Ambassador to U.S.S.R.	15 Oct. 1938-18 Oct. 1941	80-255
Foreign and Overseas Minister	18 Oct. 1941-1 Sept. 1942	255-300
Foreign Minister and Greater East Asia Minister	7 Apr.-17 Aug. 1945	312-314

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 1207.

4. Speech by him is Exhibit 1338A.

5. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services during 1931-4, and 29 April 1940.

TOJO

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 31, 43, 46, 60, 61, 64, 71, 72, 85, 114, 132, 133, 135, 136, 144,
152, 153, 155, 156, 164, 165, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 181,
184, 185, 186, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 216,
217, 218, 219, 231, 240, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258,
262, 268, 273, 275, 276, 277, 287, 288, 289, 291, 294, 295, 299, 300,
301, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 311, 312

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 128.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Colonel, Section Chief, Army General Staff	1 Aug. 1931-5 Mar. 1934	2-25
Major-General, Commander 24th Infantry Brigade	1 Aug. 1934-1 Aug. 1935	26-31
Commander, Kwantung Military Police	21 Sept. 1935-1 Mar. 1937	31-43
Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Japanese Member Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee	1 Mar. 1937-30 May 1938	43-71
Vice War Minister (and numerous posts connected with other Departments)	30 May-10 Dec. 1938	71-85
Inspector-General, Army Air Force	10 Dec. 1938-22 July 1940	85-132
War Minister	22 July 1940-18 Oct. 1941	132-255
Premier and War Minister (also at various dates Home, Foreign, Education, Commerce and Munitions Minister)	18 Oct. 1941-22 July 1944	255-308

3. Extracts from his interrogation are Exhibits:

1110A, 1119, 1123-4, 1136-7, 1153, 1157-8, 1201-6, 1209, 1243-4

4. Speeches by him are Exhibits:

826, 827, 879, 1338B, 1345, 1347.

5. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in "Manchurian incident, 1931-4,"
and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair".

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

4, 25, 30, 31, 35, 42, 46, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71, 80, 101, 114, 155, 210, 225, 244, 246, 256, 292, 297, 300, 308, 311

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 129.)

<u>Offices</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Major General, Chief, General Affairs Dept., Army General Staff	1 Aug. 1931-5 Mar. 1934	2-25
Commander of the Army in China	5 Mar. 1934-1 Aug. 1935	25-31
Lt. General, Vice War Minister (and on numerous committees of other Departments)	23 Mar. 1936-30 May 1938	35-71
Commander, 18th Army	30 May 1938-7 Sept. 1939	71-101
Commander, Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo	7 Sept. 1939-18 July 1944	101-308
General	1 Aug. 1940	
Chief of Army General Staff	18 July 1944-2 Sept. 1945	308-314

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident", 2 November 1938 for services in the Anti-Comintern Pact, and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair".

SUPPLEMENT TO CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

DOCUMENT NO. 0001.

1. Attached hereto is an addendum to Prosecution Document No. 0001.
2. It covers all additional documents put in at the close of the Prosecution Case relative to individual Defendants, and any errors which have been found in the original document.
3. The additions to Appendices A and B will be drawn up from these new documents and circulated later.

Before entry of 6 August on Page 2 insert:-

15556

2177A
2178A
2178B
2291

Minutes of the Third Trial of OKAWA Shumei before the Third Criminal Department of the Tokyo Court of Appeal. OKAWA was charged with violation of the Explosives Control Act and for the offences of murder and attempted murder. OKAWA in his trial testimony stated that KOISO then Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and HASHIMOTO were involved in the so-called "March Incident" (1931) to overthrow the Government. Ugaki was of the opinion that the plot should be abandoned, so it was officially given up for the time being, although OKAWA stated that he had decided to carry on by himself until Tokugawa dissuaded him from doing so. He explained in detail the objects of this and the "October" Incident and said they were closely connected with the Manchurian Incident.

15752 2202-A

Excerpt from "The Osaka Asahi", dated 1 July 1931, in which it shows that the War Ministry invited Manchurian Railway authorities to discuss Manchurian Mongolian problems. President and directors of the South Manchurian railway, representatives of the Army, and MINAMI and KOISO attended. MINAMI made a statement in which he said the Army had long recognised the necessity of increasing their divisions in Korea, but that this question had not been decided upon at the Big Three Conference. Governor Ugaki said that this depended on the financial situation of the Army as the Government of Korea could not afford to share the expense with the Army.

Before entry for 21 September on page 5 insert:-

15735 2193

Telegram No. 623 dated 19 September 1931 from Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden to Foreign Minister Shidehara regarding an attempt to convince ITAGAKI that as Japan and China had not formally entered into a state of war, and China had declared her adherence to the non-resistance principle, an endeavour should be made to arrange the

matter through diplomatic channels. ITAGAKI, however, did not show any signs of complying with this suggestion, saying that the prestige of the State and Army were involved.

Before entry for 22 September on page 5 insert:-

15736 2194

Cable from Consul-General Hayashi to Foreign Minister Shidehara dated 21 September 1931 regarding a proclamation on the municipal administration of Mukden to be issued by the Commander of the Kwantung Army. Orishima visited the Army HQ when the proclamation was shown and ITAGAKI was present. Later Hayashi met the Commander and pointed out the error of establishing a municipal administration by the Japanese with a military man as Mayor but the Commander, although appearing to agree to this, stated that it could not be altered as the proclamation was already issued. The measure was only temporary as eventually it was intended to hand over the administration to the Chinese.

On page 9, Part 1, Exhibit 179-2 after the word "situation" and before the beginning of the next sentence insert the words "Hayashi stated that...."

Before entry for 13 November on page 11 insert:-

15738 2196

Cable No. 1256 dated 12 November, 1931, sent by Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden to Foreign Minister Shidehara about the inadvisability of Emperor Pu-Yi coming to Manchuria. The Commander of the Army said that not only had he no information about this, but had instructed Staff Officer ITAGAKI to notify the Tientsin garrison they were not to hurry this matter as the hour was not ripe for such a move. When Hayashi pointed out how impolitic it would be to reinstate the Monarchy at a time when the regimes in the various districts were unsettled and the International relations tense, the Commander of the Army agreed with this in general and promised to exert his efforts so as not to put this move in motion.

Before entry for 15 December on page 13 insert:-

15738 2195

Cablegram No. 1532 sent by Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden to Foreign Minister Inukai dated 14 December, 1931 stated that the Army Authorities were intending to summon all

Provincial Governors there with a view to saving the situation and that with a view to this, Staff Officer ITAGAKI is said to have met and negotiated with Tsang Shih on the 14th.

Before entry for 16 January on page 14 insert:-

15731 2191

In an extract from Kido's diary of 11 January 1932, he relates a conversation at the Imperial Palace between himself and ITAGAKI. The latter told him of the conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia and explained Japan's intentions regarding the establishment of a new State in Manchuria. The participation of the Japanese people in the management of this new state was also explained.

Before entry for 26 January on page 15 insert:-

15648 2185

In an article dated 17 January 1932 entitled "The Reform of Parliamentary System", published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon, HASHIMOTO condemned parliamentary government as running contrary to the Constitution. He advocated the dissolution of the political parties immediately and the prohibition of party Cabinet by enacting a political party law or a state Minister's limitation ordinance.

Before entry for 28 January on page 15 insert:-

16213 2251

On 28 January, 1932, KIDO stated in his diary that General MINAMI had that day attended a meeting before the Emperor on the Manchurian situation. His conclusions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian questions were:

- (a) Revolutionise national defence by expediting completion of Kirin-Kwanei Railway and by making the Sea of Japan into a lake to facilitate Japan's advance into North Manchuria.
- (b) Prevent economic blockade from abroad.
- (c) Establish a colonial trooping system and give emigrants same protection as in South America.

KIDO thought it advisable to unify Japanese organs in Manchuria and Mongolia under one Japanese organ under a Governor-General.

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

Before entry for 26 May on page 18 insert:-

16215 2252

On 17 May, 1932, KIDO recorded in his diary a meeting with Lt. Colonel SUZUKI who expressed the fear that the formation of a new cabinet under political parties might result in a second or third incident. He suggested that a cabinet of Navy, Army and political parties combined might solve the situation. SUZUKI revealed that Vice War Minister KOISO was hoping for HIRANO to be appointed the next premier, and he thought that the incident was stimulated this time by the declaration of the safe-guarding of political parties.

Before entry for 11 July on page 18 insert:-

15809 2210

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident, record of payment of ¥20,000 to the accused KOISO, Vice Minister of War, 5 July 1932.

Before entry for 8 August on page 19 insert:-

15810 2211

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident, record regarding payment of ¥18,500 to the accused KOISO, 2 August, 1932.

Before entry for 31 May on page 23 insert:-

16216 2253

KIDO stated in his diary that on 18 April, 1933 he met Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI and Chief of the Information Bureau, SHIRATORI. The former cited Russia as an absolute enemy and said that a non-aggression pact with that country would be nothing more than an utilitarian calculation and must be denounced by all means.

Before entry for 29 December on page 29 insert:-

15811 2213

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident. Record regarding payment of ¥1,970,000 to the accused KOISO, 27 December 1934.

Before entry for 1 July on page 30 insert:-

15733 2192

KIDO's Diary on 30 May, 1935, relates a claim reported to have been lodged by the Japanese Garrison in North China against the Chinese Government. Vice Minister SHIGEMITSU

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

made a general observation on this explaining that this step against China was based on the idea of ITAGAKI and others who have been intending to let the military take the lead instead of the diplomatic circles, just as in Manchuria.

Before entry for 3 February on page 34 insert:-

15977 2226A

Excerpt from the Imperial statement of Foreign Minister HIROTA on the occasion of Japan's Secession from the London Naval Conference (January 16th, 1936). In this statement HIROTA affirmed that Japan participated in the Naval Conference at London as it was her policy to contribute and maintain International peace. In setting forth the reasons why Japan withdrew from the Conference, HIROTA stated that this was because the proposals of the Japanese delegates for a reduction of armaments and a common upper limit for all navies to be fixed at the lowest possible level were not accepted; nor were the proposals for abolition or limitation of certain armaments and ships; moreover Japan's proposal to conclude such agreements as might be possible at the Conference were also rejected.

After entry for 27 November on page 41 insert:-

15648 2185

On 17 December, 1936, HASHIMOTO published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon, an article entitled "A Message to Young Men". In this Article he advocated the renovation of Japan by its youth for which blood and enthusiasm were two essentials. Casting aside the old people, HASHIMOTO hoped that the ardent young people would succeed in the second creation of the world.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:-

15790 2208A

A declaration issued by the Seiyokai Party Mass Meeting (20 January 1937). Excerpt from pages 5 - 8 of "Details regarding Movements of Rightist Bodies in connection with Change of Government", published by Peace Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, April, 1937. This declaration stated

that owing to the multiplicity of the Government's diplomatic policy, it is not clear where responsibility rests. The Government persistently adhered to secret diplomacy. The purport of the Japanese-German Pact was defence against the Comintern, but the Government bungled the matter so as to cause other powers to suspect the formation of a rightist dictatorial state. Many Government plans formulated were on the assumption that a semi-wartime organisation was necessary. Measures adopted by the present Cabinet were in the interests of the Military and not of the nation.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:-

15794 2208B

Statement by the Army authorities (Night of 21 January 1937). These views expressed the Army's dissatisfaction with the present day political parties saying that any plans they had for administrative reform were of a negative nature. The existence and expansion of the Japanese people with Japan as the stabilising power of East Asia had always been the cry of their 100,000,000 compatriots and the abandonment of a positive policy would surely imply being cramped within Insular Japan. The expected collision between the advocates of the status quo and those who advocated the destruction of the status quo had come. Japan now stood at the turning point where she should realise an all-out administrative policy to overcome present difficulties and tide over the International crisis.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:-

15800 2208-E

Excerpt from Exhibit 2208 which is a notice to ex-soldiers organisations from the Vice War Minister, UMEZU on matters pertaining to the measures taken by the Army authorities in connection with the present political changes. This stated that on receipt of the report that the Imperial mandate had been given to General Ugaki on the evening of the 24th January 1937, the Army took the view that, because of Ugaki's

reputed connection with the incident which occurred while he was War Minister, and his reputed connection with the class struggle in the Army, whoever might be nominated as War Minister in the Cabinet would be unable to bear the responsibility of controlling the Army. The Three Chiefs' meeting was held to decide on a choice of candidate for succeeding War Minister, but none of them felt they could assume the position of War Minister in the present situation, and Ugaki was called on to reply accordingly to the Emperor. General Ugaki then declined the Imperial Mandate. The Army's behaviour in the present political situation was based on its hope to complete the control and maintenance of the Army.

15796 2208c

Excerpt from Exhibit 2208 which is a publication of War Minister Terauchi's talk concerning his resignation on 23 January, 1937. His reasons for this were the difference in his beliefs with the present political parties. He had ascertained that there was a fundamental difference between his views and those of the party which had some members sitting as Cabinet members for the purpose of co-operating with the execution of the policy of the present cabinet. He felt it impossible to tide over the present situation by compromise and believed it to be impossible under the circumstances to enforce the military discipline and reform to which he had devoted his efforts.

15798 2208d

Excerpt from Exhibit 2208 giving a talk on 27 January 1937 by General UMEZU. This stated that the Army would not take any particular measures to check the formation of a cabinet by General Ugaki. The rumours circulating about General Ugaki's efforts to form a new cabinet even by drastic measures were intentional and made by those who did not understand the real intentions of the Army. UMEZU expressed his belief that Ugaki would not leave the Army in the lurch and to his regret

he was unable to disclose the true state of affairs and until that day had not published the reasons why the Army was opposed to General Ugaki. He could say, however, that the objection was for the sake of completion of the maintenance of discipline and the control of the cliques. The objection was against Ugaki himself and not his policy.

15648 2185

On 17 March 1937, HASHIMOTO published an article entitled "From the Point of View of National Defence, it is the Duty of the Military to Mix in Politics" in the Tokyo Dai Nippon. In this Article he criticised the recent liberalists outcry against the Military mixing in politics and their quotation of the Imperial Rescript's statement "do not be misled by public opinion and do not meddle in politics". HASHIMOTO interpreted this quotation to mean 'not to be a stickler for politics' and felt that there was no reason why politics should be taboo and entrusted only to professional politicians.

Before entry for 18 June on page 47 insert:-

15980 2227

Outline sent to HIROTA, Foreign Minister, for approval of Japanese Army's Five Year Plan dated 10 June 1937 in which it shows that the plan was designed to enlarge the production of such commodities as automobiles, machinery, iron, minerals, pig-iron, steel and other materials and industries to more than ten times during the fiscal year 1941. The policies for this are outlined under the following headings: Financial Policies; Trade and Exchange Policy; Price Policy; Industrial Control Policy; Measures to be taken towards technicians and labourers; Measure for machine tool industry; Transportation Policy; National life stabilisation policy; Reform of Administrative organisation. This is similar to Exhibit 842.

Before entry for 7 July on page 47 insert:-

15648 2185

In this article entitled "Powers are desperately Building up Air Forces, Build up Invincible Air Force", appearing in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 1 July 1937, HASHIMOTO stated the

necessity of Japan building up an invincible Air force as part of the State instead of belonging to the Army.

Before entry for 16 July on page 48 insert:-

16217 2254

On 14 July 1937, KIDO recorded in his diary a visit from one Matsui who talked on discontinuing the dispatch of troops to North China and became indignant.

Before entry for 30 October on page 56 insert:-

16213 2255

KIDO stated in his diary that on 27 October 1937, he attended the extraordinary session of the Cabinet where a decision was made on the statement and answer to the invitation to the Conference in connection with the Nine-Power Pact.

Before entry for 5 November on page 56 insert:-

16219 2256

An entry in KIDO's diary for 3 November 1937 revealed that War Minister Sugiyama and KIDO had that day discussed saving the situation, the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters and the question of declaration of war.

Before entry for 1 December on page 56 insert:-

16220 2257

KIDO stated in his diary that in a talk with Premier Konoye on 16 November, 1937, he (KIDO) expressed concern that a commotion in interior politics now when they were on the offensive, might turn the operation into a defensive one and thus the attitude of foreign countries, which had finally turned serious, would be affected. This he thought must be avoided. KIDO told Konoye that even if he were to resign he would no doubt be ordered to form another cabinet.

Before entry for 1 December on page 56 insert:-

16221 2258

KIDO stated in his diary on 19 November 1937, that at a Cabinet session on that day they decided the liaison between the Imperial General HQ and the Government. KIDO was of the opinion that Imperial General HQ regulations covered incident as well as war. When he asked the War Minister if the degree and extent of an incident had been studied, the War Minister replied that he considered that Imperial General HQ would only

be established if the incident had extended to the point of a declaration of war or the Army mobilisation had been ordered.

Before entry of 23 December on page 59 insert:-

16222 2259

KIDO stated in his diary that on 21 December 1937, he attended a Cabinet Meeting where negotiations with China, draft answer to the German Ambassador, and counter measures for the China Affair were discussed. KIDO urged the necessity of creating cultural measures in North China.

Before entry for 16 January on page 61 insert:-

16223 2260

KIDO recorded in his Diary a Cabinet Meeting on 14 January 1938, where the epoch making announcement concerning the China Affair was discussed. Chiang Kai-shek's answer was considered as lacking sincerity, and the Cabinet decided to announce a fixed policy that they would have nothing to do with the National Government, but would negotiate with the new Chinese Government and join in the promotion of a newly rising China and the peace of Asia.

Insert at bottom of page 66:-

15011 2212

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident. Record regarding payment of Y150,800 to the accused UMEZU, March, 1938.

Before entry for 26 April on page 68 insert:-

15804 2209

Transfer of secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account, 19 April, 1938. The accused UMEZU received Y77,800.

Before entry for 20 May on page 70 insert:-

16224 2261

KIDO related in his Diary of 19 May 1938 a conversation with President Honjo concerning the preparations for the battle of Suchow. Honjo did not anticipate any striking changes from the Suchow battle and stated there was some peace talk at present in China. Honjo advocated an attitude of advancing to Hankow after Suchow while taking steps to settle the Incident. He also thought that if things did not turn out right it would be necessary to enter into protracted warfare.

PAGE

EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

by planning to continue for about three years. KIDO promised to do his best and agreed generally with Honjo's opinion.

Before entry for 28 June on page 72 insert:-

15741 2197

Extract from "The Japan Advertiser", Tokyo, Sunday 26 June 1938, (page 3) entitled "Long preparedness is urged by War Minister ITAGAKI", states that as it may be the intention of General Chiang Kai-Shek to "resist Japan for the rest of his life", the Army should be ready to continue fighting "perhaps for ten years". War Minister ITAGAKI expressed his confidence that with unanimity and support Japan could cope with protracted warfare over almost any length of time. There was no need to move against China at present and that no decision had been reached about the mobilisation law. General Chiang Kai-Shek's tactics in wearing down Japan's resources were reviewed. Comments were made on the Five-Minister Conference when the war situation was discussed as well as the projected establishment of a central organ for directing policy towards China. The International situation was commented upon.

Before entry for 3 July on page 73 insert:-

16255 2281

On 1 July 1938, the "Education Ministry Review" published a speech by ARAKI entitled "On the First Anniversary of the China Incident". ARAKI gave a survey of the past year's successes and strategy, pointing out that Japan would not lay down arms until anti-Japanese China had been completely crushed and Chinese territory cleared of Communistic devils. The nation must be spiritually mobilised and with deep understanding of national thought, the national constitution should be clarified as absolutely superior and the unification of the world under one roof must pervade the world.

Before entry for 10 August on page 77 insert:-

16225 2262

KIDO stated in his diary of 9 August 1938 that he attended a Cabinet Meeting where he heard about the progress of the

Changkaifeng Incident from War Minister ITAGAKI and the Foreign Minister. After, he heard of a proposal to reinforce the German-Japanese relations which had been made by Von Ribbentrop to OSHIMA. It contained a clause providing that in the case of one nation being attacked, the other would render military aid. Italy was to join and negotiations with her were under way. Ribbentrop analysed the European situation as: war with Russia would be inevitable, peace moves towards Czechs, Anglo-French relations strong, possibly backed financially but not militarily by the United States, Rumania neutral and Hungary could be made an ally.

Before entry for 31 August on page 78 insert:-

16069 2235

Outline of speeches by SATO delivered by him on the 25th and 29th August 1938. They concerned the Policy for the Disposition of the China Incident etc.,

Before entry for 16 September on page 78 insert:-

16227 2263

KIDO stated in his Diary on 7 September 1938 that he had learned the state of affairs regarding the head of the new political party from Konoye. He said it might be necessary to deal with Chiang Kai-Shek in view of the changed situation brought about by the fall of Hankow. The domestic conditions were causing concern and many groups were participating in a drive for a one-party system to which Konoye had given an ambiguous answer. Konoye had come up against the China Incident and many matters had gone contrary to expectations. If the cumulation of these problems should lead to having to deal with Chiang Kai-Shek, Konoye thought he would have to resign. KIDO was against the latter action which would cause a new political situation dealt with by Ugaki's policies. KIDO thought it might be unavoidable for Konoye to accept leadership of a new party although after discussion they agreed that the selection of the Secretary General would be extremely

difficult. The Rightists apparently were of the opinion that peace between Japan and China must be brought about by dealing with Chiang Kai-shek. While the military generally agreed, ITAGAKI first opposed it but later gave way. The deadlock situation seemed to be the result of the opposite opinions of TOJO and Hasegawa.

Before entry for 3 October on page 79 insert:-

15745 2199

Extract from "The Japan Advertiser" of 2 October 1938, entitled "Konoye Cables Hitler his Congratulations of Splendid Success". War Minister ITAGAKI sent a telegram to Hitler expressing the Imperial Army's admiration and felicitations for Germany's successful conduct of the Sudeten issue and hoped that the German-Japanese Armies would unite on the Anti-Comintern front. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin was instructed by Navy Minister Yonai to send similar congratulations to the Reichsfuehrer.

Before entry for 3 November on page 81 insert:-

16231 2264

On 2 November 1938, KIDO stated in his Diary that he attended a Privy Council Meeting where it was decided to cease co-operating with the various bodies of the League of Nations.

Before entry for 10 November on page 82 insert:-

15347 2223-A

Gist of a broadcast by ARAKI on 7 November 1938 on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on the awakening of the Imperial Spirit. One phase of the Incident had been made by the capture of Canton and the three principal cities near Hankow. The period for actual activities in long-term construction had arrived. ARAKI interpreted the spirit of the Imperial Rescript and reminded the people of the Emperor's exhortations to bring about practical results, saying that the present time was momentous and significant. The fundamental question of the present situation did not lie in the China Incident but in the dawn of a new world peace. The occupation of some strategic points in China would not mean the settlement of the present

situation. Japan must push forward towards the construction of a new world. Japan did not stand at a deadlock and the people were urged to tide over present difficulties to exhibit the glory of Japan to the world. In excerpts from the Second Speech on Instruction at the National Conference of Principals of Agricultural Schools, ARAKI as Education Minister stated that at the present time the most important thing was to strengthen national spirit. The people must be educated to carry out the great mission of the Empire in the future. Regarding education in agricultural schools, in the present situation of Japan, she should strive for an expansion in production power. It was also very important to devise the overseas expansion of the people in order to carry out the unity policy of Japan, Manchukuo and China. The women of Japan were also urged to join in these efforts.

Before entry for 3 December on page 84 insert:-

15982 2228-A

Excerpt from pages 353-355 of book "Business Reports-1938, Volume I, Economic Relations in China", published by East Asia Ministry, 1 December, 1938. This consists of Item 2 Instruction by Minister HIROTA and concerns the German proposal for economic co-operation in China. As for the participation of Germany and Italy it will mean that special consideration is required from the political point of view. The co-operation of Germany and Italy in the economic development of North China will be accomplished chiefly by Germany's co-operative investment in important industries. The methods for this were enumerated as: Investment in the Development Company, Subscription of debentures, Supply of Machinery on credit or by delivery of shares, Joint management of Japan and Germany or by Japan Germany and China of same kind of enterprise. Germany's interests will be fully respected and given preference over any third country.

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

Before entry for 27 December on page 87 insert:-

16231 2265

KIDO recorded in his Diary that on 26 December 1938, he met HIRANUMA who was insistent that the Konoye Cabinet should not resign. His reason was that Wang Chao-ling had escaped from Chungking and that the plot was proceeding steadily.

Before entry for 30 December on page 87 insert:-

16232 2266

KIDO in his diary of 29 December, 1938 stated that Major General Teichi SUZUKI insisted that the Konoye Cabinet carry on. Later, he saw War Minister ITAGAKI at Konoye's house and he (ITAGAKI) explained the development of the scheme and the International situation.

Before entry for 7 January on page 38 insert:-

16233 2267

In his Diary for 5 January 1939, KIDO stated that on that day he saw HIRANUMA who asked him to accept the position of Home and Welfare Minister. KIDO agreed as long as he could dispose of the pending Home Ministry problems at his own discretion. HIRANUMA approved KIDO's recommendation for Vice-Minister Hirose's promotion and this was carried out.

Before entry for 8 March on page 91 insert:-

15988 2229-A

Excerpt from address of Baron HIRANUMA, Prime Minister, on 21 January, 1939, taken from the March 1939 issue of the Tokyo Gazette dealing with the feelings of HIRANUMA on the China Affair. This expressed the view that the present Cabinet was committed to the same policy as the previous one and is determined to carry it out. This was to lay the foundation of the prosperity and progress in East Asia through the co-operation of Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, cultural and economic spheres. There must be a new order to replace the old and it was hoped that the Chinese would understand this correctly, and co-operate with the Japanese. There was no alternative but to exterminate those who persisted in opposition against Japan.

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

Before entry for 20 March on page 92 insert:-

15746 2200

Japanese press comments published in Japan Advertiser of 17 March 1939 stated that ITAGAKI and Yonai had stated in the Diet that the policy for a new period in Asia would undoubtedly cause friction from third powers. They resented, England, U.S.S.R. and France's attitude to the China Affair and argued that unless these powers were ejected, settlement of the China Incident would be impossible. Britain's loan and fund to stabilise Chinese currency was an hostile act and is confirmed by representations made by Britain, U.S. and France protesting against exchange control in North China. These countries hamper the new order in East Asia and will probably further attempt to provide obstacles as Japan and China's community of interests increase.

Before entry for 1 April on page 93 insert:-

16234 2268

KIDO stated in his Diary on 31 March 1939 that he had conferred with Premier HIRANUMA on problems of a military alliance between Germany and Japan and the appointment of new Cabinet members.

Before entry for 1 May on page 94 insert:-

16235 2269

On 19 April 1939, KIDO stated in his Diary that he advised HIRANUMA to exert increased efforts for the Military Alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, since failure would have dangerous domestic effects and would be a decisive disadvantage to settling the China Incident.

Before entry for 4 May at top of page 95 insert:-

15648 2185

HASHIMOTO stated in an article entitled "Clear the clouds from the East Asia Sky", which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon of 1 May 1939, that England and to a lesser extent Russia must be destroyed since they are the main supporters of Chiang-Kai Shek and while they assist him a solution to the China Incident is impossible. He wanted to overthrow England first, leaving the Soviet alone. One method he cited was the

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

strengthening of the Tri-Tartite Pact and including, in addition, as well as communism as the subject of attack.

16235 2270

KIDO recorded in his Diary on 2 May 1939 that he met Navy Minister Yonai and conferred on the Military Alliance. KIDO again emphasised that failure would have a bad influence on the Sino-Japanese dispute and bring about a dissatisfaction and uneasiness on the part of the people, especially if the failure were a result of a Navy-Army dispute. KIDO impressed that the public opinion must be unified even if they should fail to conclude the treaty.

Before entry for 11 May on page 95 insert:-

15315 2214

In an interview presented by Domei Radio between ITAGAKI and KOISO on 8 May 1939, War Minister ITAGAKI welcomed that Germany and Italy through their Military Alliance had bound themselves still more firmly to the maintenance of peace and the establishment of a new order in Europe and stated that it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a Military Alliance with the Axis powers. Minister of Colonies KOISO stated that apparently negotiations directed towards the conclusion of a Military Alliance among the three Axis powers were being conducted. The success of these negotiations depended upon Germany's and Italy's understanding of Japan's position and the realisation that it would be difficult for Germany and Italy to carry out their encirclement policy without the aid of Japan.

Before entry for 20 May on page 96 insert:-

15643 2185

An excerpt from an article entitled "Expel the British Influence from the Far East," written by HASHIMOTO, which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon of 15 May 1939 gives the conclusion that the balance would be on Japan's side if she used 300,000-yen planes to destroy 100,000,000-yen British battleships in the east. He cited the simplicity of beating

England if Japan threatened to occupy Hongkong and Shanghai and prevent the Fleet entering Singapore by their 'peerless aviators' and the fleet.

Before entry for 30 May on page 96 insert:-

15990 2230

Telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 23 May, 1939, requesting information regarding the new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference. In a confidential and unofficial conversation OSHIMA reported that according to a telegram he had received from Arita, the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in the event of European conflict.

OSHIMA, having refused to pass on this information to the German Government he had been requested to hold the matter over pending result of discussion among the various factors. The German Ambassador was asked to make it clear that this attitude was causing distrust among the Germans and Italians.

Insert at top of page 97:-

15648 2135

On June 1st 1939 some "Short cutting Remarks on the Present Situation" by HASHIMOTO were published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon. These remarks were in an anti-English vein and advocated her expulsion and definition as an enemy.

Before entry for 5 July on page 97 insert:-

15648 2135

HASHIMOTO published an article in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 20 June 1939 entitled "The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the Expulsion of England". In this article he made it clear that the only solution to the China Incident would be an attack on England - not to be stopped at Tientsin but extended to Shanghai and Hong Kong. He stated that the Premier (HIRANUMA) and the Foreign Minister were hesitant to conclude a Military Alliance with the Axis because of their fear of England, although they say it is necessary to strengthen the Axis collaboration.

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

Before entry for 10 July on page 97 insert:-

15749 2201

Extract from the 7 July 1939 issue of "The Japan Times and Mail", bears message from ITAGAKI and Yonai warning nation not to relax in determination for China Affairs goal. Unjust interference by Third Powers in the execution of Japan's mission of constructing a new order in East Asia must be stamped out. Chiang Kai-Shek's resistance was being aided by Third Powers and Japan's immediate enemy was not limited to the Chungking Government. The crushing of the anti-Japanese policy by Third Powers which aided the resistance of the Chiang regime must be carried out at all cost; but the China Affair must not be thought to be ended even if Chiang's regime collapses. The third year of the China Affair will see Japan accomplish her mission of establishing a new order in East Asia step by step and any interference by Third Powers with the execution of Japan's mission should be drastically rejected.

15648 2185

Excerpt from an article entitled "Organise a Class A war-time Cabinet that has no Fear of England and the Soviet Union" by HASHIMOTO published on 10 July 1939 in the Tokyo Dai Nippon. He stated in this article that Japan needed a wartime Cabinet with the highest authority, which would win through with a complete wartime system. Once again England and the Soviet were HASHIMOTO's idea of Japan's real opponents.

Before entry for 21 July on page 98 insert:-

15648 2185

HASHIMOTO stated in his article "Build a State Union of China and Manchukuo with Japan as its leader" published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 20 July 1939 that the Japanese public opinion had now taken an anti-British turn. He now wanted Japan to destroy the Kuo-ming-tang Government and organise China and Manchukuo with Japan as a leader, into a self-supplying defensive block banning all commercial relations with

other countries.

Before entry for 8 August on page 99 insert.

16237 2271

KIDO stated in his diary on 4 August 1939 that he had talked to War Minister ITAGAKI on the Military Alliance with Germany and Italy and had obtained agreement. The War Minister was determined to resign if the Cabinet did not accept the Military Alliance. This would result in a Cabinet resignation en bloc. KIDO thought it best that no political change should take place until the Wang Regime had been established in China. Any failure of the establishment of the Wang Regime, as in the case when Wang escaped from Chungking bringing about the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, would result in a serious situation. KIDO wanted any attempt to form a Military administration resisted, and a solution brought about to the Army-Navy deadlock.

Before entry for 30 August on page 100 insert:-

16240 2272

KIDO recorded in his diary that on 28 August 1939 a Cabinet Meeting was held regarding the bloc resignation of the Cabinet. After HIRANUMA's explanations all agreed, and tendered their resignations but the Emperor requested that all Cabinet Ministers retain their posts until further notice. KIDO was informed that Tada might become the new War Minister and that this would only intensify friction between different army groups. Konoye told KIDO that Abe had been ordered by the Emperor to form a Cabinet, who instructed him to appoint either UMEZU or HATA as War Minister, follow a policy of co-operation with the U.S. and Britain and use discretion in choice of Home and Justice Ministers. KIDO thought the last two instructions of the Emperor could be disposed of by Abe at his discretion. Regarding the appointment of the War Minister, in order to avoid a clash with military circles, KIDO thought it best that the Emperor either summon the War Minister or convey to the Army his choice and let the three Chiefs of the Army recommend

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

the War Minister.

Insert at top of page 101.--

16003 2232

Telegram from Mackensen in Rome to the Foreign Minister in Berlin dated 2 September 1939 to say that he had received a visit from Japanese Ambassador SHIRATORI to announce that he had received his expected recall. He would welcome the opportunity to talk with the German Foreign Minister on his way home which might be via Russia. SHIRATORI thought that with a change of Cabinet in Japan there was a chance of continuing the rapprochement with the Axis. There was an opinion growing in Japan for settlement with Russia and if this came about the tendency of the U.S. to intervene in Europe would be reduced.

Insert before entry for 7 September on page 101.--

15744 2198

Cablegram sent by Ambassador Ott to the Army High Command and Air High Command on 6 September 1939 regarding five Ministers' Conference on 8 August in which Army's urgent desire was stressed for early conclusion of China conflict; alleviate present tension by conforming to wishes of masses and prevent dangerous reaction in direction of an economically tempting settlement with England. These reasons being so compelling War Minister ITAGAKI was resolved, as a last resort to risk his resignation. A decision was to be reached by 15 August and ITAGAKI requests that Berlin and Rome Governments be apprised of the situation and suggest they help by concessions. These provided that there would be no mental reservations behind the wording and that a verbal form of Japanese supplementary statement be found. The new alliance was chiefly a domestic political weapon but the Army was the Chief supporter of the Alliance. The plans of the Foreign Minister who attaches great importance to successful negotiations with England would be cancelled out if Germany shows initiative in

a spirit of concession.

Before entry for 11 November on page 104 insert:-

15242 2273

KIDO stated in his diary of 10 November 1939 that he had talked with Matsudaira on the system of appointing a new Premier. KIDO, who at that time was out of office, thought that the method at present used, i.e., the recommendation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the Emperor, was from the political viewpoint, undesirable since high officials close to the Emperor should not hold reins of political power. He wanted to restrict the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to that of adviser to the Emperor and in case of "en bloc" Cabinet resignation let the ex-Premiers and possibly ex-Ministers of State consult with the Emperor on the choice of a successor. He thought the ex-Premiers should confer, and not decide by vote but report all opinions (both dissent and assent) to the Emperor. KIDO then consulted with Konoye who assented to his opinions. When Konoye asked KIDO if his feelings were that the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should be abolished, KIDO rejected this since he thought there would be too many important affairs of State left for him as adviser to the Emperor.

Before entry for 20 March on page 111 insert:-

15330 2215-A

Excerpt from the Minutes of Second Joint Conference of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4, of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet on 17 March 1940, with comments by KOISO. In this KOISO endorsed remarks made by Fukuda regarding the importance for Japan to advance and seize territories in the Southern Regions and put forth the same effort and financial power as required in overcoming the North China Incident, and have both North and South as Japan's objectives. The Overseas Affairs Ministry, who were to carry out the policy of having both North and

South as objectives, emphasised that movement of population and economic expansion must accompany one another, but whereas on the Continent the movement of population was of primary importance, in the Southern Regions it was economic expansion which took precedence.

Before entry for 23 March on page 111 insert:-

16150 2243A

An excerpt from the "Japan Times and Mail" for March 21st 1940, entitled "MUTO Plays Bureaucrats and Parties" avers Army wants Political Organisations to Reconsider Attitudes. Stated that MUTO, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau gave the army opinion of favouring the dissolution of political parties if they seek to further their interests in the present emergency. This was in answer to interpolations put to War Minister HATA in the House of Representatives.

Before entry for 11 May on page 115 insert:-

16246 2274

In his Diary of 10 May 1940 KIDO expressed his allegiance to Konoye stating that as long as Konoye stays in the political field he would support him to the last and would like Konoye to take the leadership. KIDO expressed this opinion to Ikezaki when he called to sound KIDO's opinion on the new political party of which Konoye was to be President and KIDO Vice President.

Before entry for 1 June on page 118 insert:-

16247 2275

On 26 May 1940, KIDO stated in his diary that he had conferred with Konoye and Arima on the new political party. When the Imperial Mandate was issued the following points were to be considered. (1) Supreme National Defence Conference established between Chiefs of General Staffs (60th Army and Navy) Premier and the War and Navy Ministers; (2) consideration given to desires of Army and Navy re national defence, foreign affairs and finances; (3) Dissolution of all political parties requested by announcement of resolution for establishment of a new political party. The Cabinet composition was

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

set out stating that all Ministers appointed prior to the establishment of a new party should be made to join it.

At bottom of page 118 insert:-

16248 2276

KIDO stated in his diary on 1 June 1940, that he had been asked to accept the appointment of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. After consultation with Konoye he decided to accept the office. Alternately Ikezaki had urged KIDO to refuse the post saying how important his position would be in connection with the new party.

Before entry for 22 July on page 132 insert:-

15644 2184

OKAWA in a letter to TOJO dated 21 July 1940, stated that all efforts should be directed to the U.S. Loan Agreement. The conclusion of this agreement would obliterate Chiang Kai Shek's only hope, bring about the end of the China Incident, and make Japan's southward advance possible.

Before entry for 22 September on page 151 insert:-

16250 2277

It is recorded in KIDO's Diary of 21 September, 1940, that a settlement with the French Indo-China authorities regarding Japanese penetration was possible. KIDO then stated he had reported to the Emperor his opinion that if a German-Italian-Japanese Military Alliance was concluded, England and America would eventually have to be opposed. In view of this, Chinese relations should be adjusted as soon as possible.

Before entry for 5 November on page 164 insert:-

16027 2234

Discussion of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis by SHIRATORI Toshio, published November, 1940. This consists of a series of Articles under the following headings:-

- I. The necessity of the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance.
- II. The European War and the Attitude of Japan.

- III. Soviet-German Coalition Problem and German Power.
- IV. The Trend of the Great War.
- V. The New order in Europe and Japan's Politics.
 - 1) Japan's spiritual Assistance to Germany and Italy
 - 2) The New Order in Europe and the opposition of the U.S.
 - 3) The Combined Power in England, France and the U.S.
 - 4) England after her defeat and the Crises in the U.S.
 - 5) The position of the pro-British faction in Germany.
 - 6) Origin of European Civilisation.
 - 7) Japan's Lebensraum and her Bloc Theory.
 - 8) Character of German Race.
 - 9) National Organisation and Prince Konoye.
 - 10) Methods of Reform and National Structure.
 - 11) Shortcomings of the Reform Faction in our Country.
 - 12) Objectives and Reform of the New Government.
 - 13) Conversion of the Foreign Policy of our Country.
 - 14) Relations between Hakko-Ichiu and the Sphere of livelihood.
 - 15) Forecast of the World War.

VI. Comment on Japan's Non-Interference.

VII. Conclusion of Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance (Asahi Shimbun September 29, 1939):

- 1) Everlasting Mutual Reliances.
- 2) Treaty of the New World Order.
- 3) Accomplishment of the Three Countries Ideal.
- 4) Reformation of the National Structure.
- 5) Significance of Funk's declaration.

Before entry for 15 November on page 164 insert:

Article published in the newspaper "Yomiuri" on 8 November 1940, entitled "The Outline of Ten-Year Plan for Block Economy of Japan-Manchukuo-China". This was an announcement from the Cabinet Intelligence Bureau stating that by the conclusion of

15952 2224

the Tripartite Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, Japan's fundamental policy to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia had entered on a new Stage. Japan's economic policy for the future was outlined, especially the extension of the economic reciprocal dependence to Greater East Asia and establishment of a Co-Prosperity Sphere. In ten years time the new economic order in East Asia should be established with Japan as leader. The main points of outline of this policy were set forth. The development of basic industries of Japan, Manchukuo and China and a plan for the related economy of the three countries were set forth as well as the division of Industries; Labour, Finance, Trade, Communications.

On page 166 of Part II, Exhibit 560, after the words "have done" delete the words "and can do". After the word "Rome" insert words "and which OSMIA can still do".....

Before entry for 13 January on page 169 insert:-

15664 2136A

An excerpt from the 10 Day Report from the Home Ministry of 11 January 1941, referred to a meeting of the ultra-nationalists in the Central and Western Districts. HASHIMOTO who was President of this Society delivered lectures at both meetings in which he strongly urged the overthrow of England and America, the southward advance and the construction of East Asia under Imperial influence. HASHIMOTO, who was then on a lecture tour of Kansai, had directed that a command be relayed throughout the Country to instigate a powerful national movement and begin sweeping campaign against the U.S. and British sympathisers while inspiring an "Advance Southward" programme throughout the country.

Before entry for 31 January on page 173 insert:-

15668 2137A

Excerpts from HASHIMOTO's Book "The Second Creation" (14th Edition) of 30 January 1941 show his urgent call for the establishment of the Hakkō Ichiu. He proposed measures

in order to accomplish this new national structure which included: diplomatic strides and strides in military preparations. In the latter he called for absolute war preparation to be completed to enable us (Japan) to crush at any time countries which, under different ideologies, may interfere with us when we carry this national structure into operation.

Before entry for 1 July on page 218 insert:-

16178 2246

On 30 June 1941 the Army called a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council. TOJO and related official explained the fast changing International situation, after which Japan's future attitude was discussed. Defendants TOJO, DONIHARA and KIMURA were present at the meeting.

On Page 239 of Part II, Exhibit 800, after the words "action against USSR" delete remainder and read as follows:-

"The Soviet Government although reserved is increasingly anxious. SHIRATORI had pointed out these rumours to be serious. Yamamoto, on being questioned by Ott as to Japan's intentions regarding Russia, replied that Japan considered the best way to start an attack on Russia was to make demands to which she could not concede, such as demands for territory; it was all Japan could do now in face of the neutrality pact."

Before entry for 26 September on page 245 insert:-

15648 2185

HASHIMOTO stated in his article "No more Compromise" which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 25 September 1941, that the recent economic embargoes and freezing of assets by the English and Americans is a declaration of war. Japan should now follow what is expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact since both Germany and Italy have already gone into a state of war with the two countries. He objected to the solution of the China Incident by compromise with England and America, since China would still be dependent on America and England.

16253 2279

KIDO stated in his diary on 25 September 1941, SHIGEMITSU visited him regarding U.S. Japanese negotiations. The Chief

aide de Camp also visited him and told him about the report of the Chief of the Army General Staff to the Throne.

Before entry for 2 October on page 247 insert:-

16253 2280

KIDO stated in his Diary that on 1 October 1941, he talked with SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board on the National policy towards the U.S.A.

Before entry for 17 October on page 255 insert:-

16193 2250

In a fuller account written in November, 1941, KIDO revised the story contained in Exhibits 1147, 1150, 1151, 1154 and 1156, of the fall of the 3rd Konoye and formation of the TOJO Cabinets and stated that on 16 October 1941, Konoye collected the resignations of his Cabinet and presented them to the Emperor. The information Board stated the reasons for the resignation was disagreement of opinion regarding execution of present National Policy. The actual facts, which were not really so simple, are set out in this document.

Before entry for 27 November on page 271 insert:-

16196 2249
(corrected version of 1109)

On 26 November, 1941, Kurusu and Nomura cabled Foreign Minister TOGO stating that there was no hope of the U.S. accepting Plan B in its entirety. They recommended that the President cable the Emperor of this hope for peace in the Pacific and the Emperor reply, thus clearing the air. If TOGO would sanction this action they were prepared to attempt it. Alternately if they were given more time, they felt that they might propose the establishment of neutral countries including French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Although a break in the negotiations might not mean war, there was a possibility that the U.S. would occupy the Netherlands East Indies and a conflict would inevitably start. They requested that since this telegram might well be their last that it be shown to KIDO and an answer be sent by return.

Before entry for 12 January on page 293 insert:-

15648 2185

An excerpt from the Article by HASHIMOTO entitled "The

Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence" which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon of 5 January 1942, stated that the war to end European-American culture had been started and that world culture based on domination would meet its doom. HATHEOTO stated that it was a war for establishing a guiding principle - that of HAKKO ICHIU.

Before entry for 18 February on page 297 insert:-

16103 2236-A

Excerpts from statement made by Major General Kenryo SATO, Head of the First Section of Bureau of Military Affairs and a Government Delegate at a Budget Committee Meeting on the 79th Session of the Imperial Diet February 10th 1942. This concerned the necessity of making people understand the gist of the direction and progress of the Greater East Asia War.

16183 2243

On 10 February 1942, SHIMADA delivered a speech at the Accounts Committee Meeting of the Diet in which he stated that Japan must be the leading power in East Asia and any element not conforming to the Japanese will, must be eliminated completely. In the future, he said, concrete matters will be decided by the Government and not by the Navy alone. All economy must be directed towards winning the war and he believed that an announcement of various measures to win the war and the building of a foundation to enable future Japanese expansion would soon be made, since appropriate organs were now ready.

Before entry for 29 May on page 299 insert:-

16177 2245

On 26 May, 1942, Military Police Commander Nakamura sent to Sugiyama a report on the investigation of the eight American officers and enlisted men who took part in the raid on Japan on 18 April and were forced down in Central China. Copies of the document were sent to the Minister of War (TOJO), Chiefs of Military Affairs Bureau (SATO) and Home Defence, Vice War Minister (KIMURA) and Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau (OKA).

Before entry for 9 October on page 300 insert:-

16130 2247

On 1 October, 1942, the Defendants DONIHARA, KIMURA and SATO

among others received German decorations from the German Ambassador Ott who acknowledged their merits in having by their joint efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the war. Sugiyama on behalf of the Generals pledged their belief in final victory of the Axis.

Before entry for 6 March on page 302 insert:-

16080 2237-A

Excerpt from statement made by Major General Kenryo SATO at a Budget Committee Meeting of the 31st Session of the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, February 19th, 1943, which stated that there was no change in the policy of dealing resolutely with those who made any statements which might hinder the war. The reports of Anglo-German peace and Soviet-German peace were enemy propaganda.

On page 318 of Appendix B under ARUKI, after Item 5 add the following:-

"6. Decorated 15 January, 1932 with the 1st Order of Merit of the Sacred Treasure.

Decorated 15 December, 1933, with the 3rd Court Rank, Senior Grade.

Decorated with the Grand Cordon of Rising Sun 29 April, 1934.

Created Baron for meritorious service 26 November, 1935.

Supplement to Document # 0001.

1. On page 6, 5th line delete "and by permission of MINAMI, Minister of War" and substitute "by Hayashi on his own initiative".
2. On page 9, 5th line from bottom of page, delete from "the ultimate -- Asia".
3. On page 20, delete lines 13, 14 and 15.
4. On page 300 and 301, delete "MINAMI" in Exhibit 637.
5. On page 308, Exhibit 1278, line 13, after the word "HATA", delete the following sentence and read as follows:- "The Emperor stated that he would have the Chief of the General Staff TOJO consulted and on the strength of TOJO's objection the Emperor abandoned Terauchi as a candidate and selected KOISO".
6. On page 331 delete pages "85, 300" and "301" from paragraph 1.