

SUPPLEMENT TO CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY - Doc. # 0001

31

SUPPLEMENT TO CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

DOCUMENT NO. 0001.

1. Attached hereto is an addendum to Prosecution Document No. 0001.
2. It covers all additional documents put in at the close of the Prosecution Case relative to individual Defendants, and any errors which have been found in the original document.
3. The additions to Appendices A and B will be drawn up from these new documents and circulated later.

373
303
403

PAGE

EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

Before entry of 6 August on Page 2 insert:-

15556

2177A
2178A
2178B
2231

Minutes of the Third Trial of OKAWA Shunsei before the Third Criminal Department of the Tokyo Court of Appeal. OKAWA was charged with violation of the Explosives Control Act and for the offences of murder and attempted murder. OKAWA in his trial testimony stated that KOISO then Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and HASHIMOTO were involved in the so-called "March Incident" (1931) to overthrow the Government. Ugaki was of the opinion that the plot should be abandoned, so it was officially given up for the time being, although OKAWA stated that he had decided to carry on by himself until Tokugawa dissuaded him from doing so. He explained in detail the objects of this and the "October" Incident and said they were closely connected with the Manchurian Incident.

15752

2202-A

Excerpt from "The Osaka Asahi", dated 1 July 1931, in which it shows that the War Ministry invited Manchurian Railway authorities to discuss Manchurian Mongolian problems. President and directors of the South Manchurian Railway, representatives of the Army, and MINAMI and KOISO attended. MINAMI made a statement in which he said the Army had long recognised the necessity of increasing their divisions in Korea, but that this question had not been decided upon at the Big Three Conference. Governor Ugaki said that this depended on the financial situation of the Army as the Government of Korea could not afford to share the expense with the Army.

Before entry for 21 September on page 5 insert:-

15735

2193

Telegram No. 623 dated 19 September 1931 from Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden to Foreign Minister Shidehara regarding an attempt to convince ITAGAKI that as Japan and China had not formally entered into a state of war, and China had declared her adherence to the non-resistance principle, an endeavour should be made to arrange the

matter through diplomatic channels. ITAGAKI, however, did not show any signs of complying with this suggestion, saying that the prestige of the State and Army were involved.

Before entry for 22 September on page 5 insert:-

15736 2194

Cable from Consul-General Hayashi to Foreign Minister Shidehara dated 21 September 1931 regarding a proclamation on the municipal administration of Mukden to be issued by the Commander of the Kwantung Army. Orishima visited the Army HQ when the proclamation was shown and ITAGAKI was present. Later Hayashi met the Commander and pointed out the error of establishing a municipal administration by the Japanese with a military man as Mayor but the Commander, although appearing to agree to this, stated that it could not be altered as the proclamation was already issued. The measure was only temporary as eventually it was intended to hand over the administration to the Chinese.

On page 9, Part 1, Exhibit 179-Q after the word "situation" and before the beginning of the next sentence insert the word "Hayashi stated that...."

Before entry for 13 November on page 11 insert:-

15738 2196

Cable No. 1258 dated 12 November, 1931, sent by Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden to Foreign Minister Shidehara about the inadvisability of Emperor Pu-Yi coming to Manchuria. The Commander of the Army said that not only had he no information about this, but had instructed Staff Officer ITAGAKI to notify the Tientsin garrison they were not to hurry this matter as the hour was not ripe for such a move. When Hayashi pointed out how impolitic it would be to reinstate the Monarchy at a time when the regimes in the various districts were unsettled and the International relations tense, the Commander of the Army agreed with this in general and promised to exert his efforts so as not to put this move in motion.

Before entry for 15 December on page 13 insert:-

15738 2195

Cablegram No. 1532 sent by Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden to Foreign Minister Inukai dated 14 December, 1931 stated that the Army Authorities were intending to summon all

Provincial Governors there with a view to saving the situation and that with a view to this, Staff Officer ITAGAKI is said to have met and negotiated with Tsang Shih on the 14th.

Before entry for 16 January on page 14 insert:-

15731 2191

In an extract from Kido's diary of 11 January 1932, he relates a conversation at the Imperial Palace between himself and ITAGAKI. The latter told him of the conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia and explained Japan's intentions regarding the establishment of a new State in Manchuria. The participation of the Japanese people in the management of this new state was also explained.

Before entry for 26 January on page 15 insert:-

15648 2185

In an article dated 17 January 1932 entitled "The Reform of Parliamentary System", published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon, HASHIMOTO condemned parliamentary government as running contrary to the Constitution. He advocated the dissolution of the political parties immediately and the prohibition of party Cabinet by enacting a political party law or a State Minister's limitation ordinance.

Before entry for 28 January on page 15 insert:-

16213 2251

On 23 January, 1932, KIDO stated in his diary that General MINAMI had that day attended a meeting before the Emperor on the Manchurian situation. His conclusions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian questions were:

- (a) Revolutionise national defence by expediting completion of Kirin-Kwanei Railway and by making the Sea of Japan into a lake to facilitate Japan's advance into North Manchuria.
- (b) Prevent economic blockade from abroad.
- (c) Establish a colonial trooping system and give emigrants same protection as in South America.

KIDO thought it advisable to unify Japanese organs in Manchuria and Mongolia under one Japanese organ under a Governor-General.

Before entry for 26 May on page 18 insert:-

16215 2252

On 17 May, 1932, KIDO recorded in his diary a meeting with Lt. Colonel SUZUKI who expressed the fear that the formation of a new cabinet under political parties might result in a second or third incident. He suggested that a cabinet of Navy, Army and political parties combined might solve the situation. SUZUKI revealed that Vice War Minister KOISO was hoping for HIRANUMA to be appointed the next premier, and he thought that the incident was stimulated this time by the declaration of the safe-guarding of political parties.

Before entry for 11 July on page 13 insert:-

15309 2210

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident, record of payment of ¥20,000 to the accused KOISO, Vice Minister of War, 5 July 1932.

Before entry for 8 August on page 19 insert:-

15310 2211

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident, record regarding payment of ¥18,500 to the accused KOISO, 2 August, 1932.

Before entry for 31 May on page 23 insert:-

16216 2253

KIDO stated in his diary that on 18 April, 1933 he met Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI and Chief of the Information Bureau, SHIRATORI. The former cited Russia as an absolute enemy and said that a non-aggression pact with that country would be nothing more than an utilitarian calculation and must be denounced by all means.

Before entry for 29 December on page 29 insert:-

15311 2213

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident. Record regarding payment of ¥1,970,000 to the accused KOISO, 27 December 1934.

Before entry for 1 July on page 30 insert:-

15733 2192

KIDO's Diary on 30 May, 1935, relates a claim reported to have been lodged by the Japanese Garrison in North China against the Chinese Government. Vice Minister SHIGEMITSU

made a general observation on this explaining that this step against China was based on the idea of ITAGAKI and others who have been intending to let the military take the lead instead of the diplomatic circles, just as in Manchuria.

Before entry for 3 February on page 34 insert:-

15977 2226A

Excerpt from the Imperial statement of Foreign Minister HIROTA on the occasion of Japan's secession from the London Naval Conference (January 16th, 1936). In this statement HIROTA affirmed that Japan participated in the Naval Conference at London as it was her policy to contribute and maintain International peace. In setting forth the reasons why Japan withdrew from the Conference, HIROTA stated that this was because the proposals of the Japanese delegates for a reduction of armaments and a common upper limit for all navies to be fixed at the lowest possible level were not accepted; nor were the proposals for abolition or limitation of certain armaments and ships; moreover Japan's proposal to conclude such agreements as might be possible at the Conference were also rejected.

After entry for 27 November on page 41 insert:-

15648 2185

On 17 December, 1936, HASHIMOTO published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon, an article entitled "A Message to Young Men". In this Article he advocated the renovation of Japan by its youth for which blood and enthusiasm were two essentials. Casting aside the old people, HASHIMOTO hoped that the ardent young people would succeed in the second creation of the world.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:-

15790 2208A

A declaration issued by the Seiyokai Party Mass Meeting (20 January 1937). Excerpt from pages 5 - 8 of "Details regarding Movements of Rightist Bodies in connection with Change of Government", published by Peace Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, April, 1937. This declaration stated

that owing to the multiplicity of the Government's diplomatic policy, it is not clear where responsibility rests. The Government persistently adhered to secret diplomacy. The purport of the Japanese-German Pact was defence against the Comintern, but the Government bungled the matter so as to cause other powers to suspect the formation of a rightist dictatorial state. Many Government plans formulated were on the assumption that a semi-wartime organisation was necessary. Measures adopted by the present Cabinet were in the interests of the Military and not of the nation.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:-

15794 2208B

Statement by the Army authorities (Night of 21 January 1937). These views expressed the Army's dissatisfaction with the present day political parties saying that any plans they had for administrative reform were of a negative nature. The existence and expansion of the Japanese people with Japan as the stabilising power of East Asia had always been the cry of their 100,000,000 compatriots and the abandonment of a positive policy would surely imply being cramped within Insular Japan. The expected collision between the advocates of the status quo and those who advocated the destruction of the status quo had come. Japan now stood at the turning point where she should realise an all-out administrative policy to overcome present difficulties and tide over the International crisis.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:-

15800 2208-E

Excerpt from Exhibit 2208 which is a notice to ex-soldiers organisations from the Vice War Minister, UMEZU on matters pertaining to the measures taken by the Army authorities in connection with the present political changes. This stated that on receipt of the report that the Imperial mandate had been given to General Ugaki on the evening of the 24th January 1937, the Army took the view that, because of Ugaki's

reputed connection with the incident which occurred while he was War Minister, and his reputed connection with the class struggle in the Army, whoever might be nominated as War Minister in the Cabinet would be unable to bear the responsibility of controlling the Army. The Three Chiefs' meeting was held to decide on a choice of candidate for succeeding War Minister, but none of them felt they could assume the position of War Minister in the present situation, and Ugaki was called on to reply accordingly to the Emperor. General Ugaki then declined the Imperial Mandate. The Army's behaviour in the present political situation was based on its hope to complete the control and maintenance of the Army.

15796 2208c

Excerpt from Exhibit 2208 which is a publication of War Minister Terauchi's talk concerning his resignation on 23 January, 1937. His reasons for this were the difference in his beliefs with the present political parties. He had ascertained that there was a fundamental difference between his views and those of the party which had some members sitting as Cabinet members for the purpose of co-operating with the execution of the policy of the present Cabinet. He felt it impossible to tide over the present situation by compromise and believed it to be impossible under the circumstances to enforce the military discipline and reform to which he had devoted his efforts.

15798 2208d

Excerpt from Exhibit 2208 giving a talk on 27 January 1937 by General UMEZU. This stated that the Army would not take any particular measures to check the formation of a Cabinet by General Ugaki. The rumours circulating about General Ugaki's efforts to form a new Cabinet even by drastic measures were intentional and made by those who did not understand the real intentions of the Army. UMEZU expressed his belief that Ugaki would not leave the Army in the lurch and to his regret

he was unable to disclose the true state of affairs and until that day had not published the reasons why the Army was opposed to General Ugaki. He could say, however, that the objection was for the sake of completion of the maintenance of discipline and the control of the cliques. The objection was against Ugaki himself and not his policy.

15648 2185

On 17 March 1937, HASHIMOTO published an article entitled "From the Point of View of National Defence, it is the Duty of the Military to Mix in Politics" in the Tokyo Dai Nippon. In this Article he criticised the recent liberalists outcry against the military mixing in politics and their quotation of the Imperial Rescript's statement "do not be misled by public opinion and do not meddle in politics". HASHIMOTO interpreted this quotation to mean 'not to be a stickler for politics' and felt that there was no reason why politics should be taboo and entrusted only to professional politicians.

Before entry for 18 June on page 47 insert:-

15980 2227

Outline sent to HIROTA, Foreign Minister, for approval of Japanese Army's Five Year Plan dated 10 June 1937 in which it shows that the plan was designed to enlarge the production of such commodities as automobiles, machinery, iron, minerals, pig-iron, steel and other materials and industries to more than ten times during the fiscal year 1941. The policies for this are outlined under the following headings: Financial Policies; Trade and Exchange Policy; Price Policy; Industrial Control Policy; Measures to be taken towards technicians and labourers; Measure for machine tool industry; Transportation Policy; National life stabilisation policy; Reform of Administrative organisation. This is similar to Exhibit 842.

Before entry for 7 July on page 47 insert:-

15648 2185

In this article entitled "Powers are desperately Building up Air Forces, Build up Invincible Air Force", appearing in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 1 July 1937, HASHIMOTO stated the

necessity of Japan building up an invincible Air force as part of the State instead of belonging to the Army.

Before entry for 16 July on page 48 insert:-

16217 2254

On 14 July 1937, KIDO recorded in his diary a visit from one Matsui who talked on discontinuing the dispatch of troops to North China and became indignant.

Before entry for 30 October on page 56 insert:-

16218 2255

KIDO stated in his diary that on 27 October 1937, he attended the extraordinary session of the Cabinet where a decision was made on the statement and answer to the invitation to the Conference in connection with the Nine-power pact.

Before entry for 5 November on page 56 insert:-

16219 2256

An entry in KIDO's diary for 3 November 1937 revealed that War Minister Sugiyama and KIDO had that day discussed saving the situation, the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters and the question of declaration of war.

Before entry for 1 December on page 56 insert:-

16220 2257

KIDO stated in his diary that in a talk with Premier Konoye on 16 November, 1937, he (KIDO) expressed concern that a commotion in interior politics now when they were on the offensive, might turn the operation into a defensive one and thus the attitude of foreign countries, which had finally turned serious, would be affected. This he thought must be avoided. KIDO told Konoye that even if he were to resign he would no doubt be ordered to form another Cabinet.

Before entry for 1 December on page 56 insert:-

16221 2258

KIDO stated in his diary on 19 November 1937, that at a Cabinet session on that day they decided the liaison between the Imperial General HQ and the Government. KIDO was of the opinion that Imperial General HQ regulations covered incidents as well as war. When he asked the War Minister if the degree and extent of an incident had been studied, the War Minister replied that he considered that Imperial General HQ would only

be established if the incident had extended to the point of a declaration of war or the Army mobilisation had been ordered.

Before entry of 23 December on page 59 insert:-

16222 2259

KIDO stated in his diary that on 21 December 1937, he attended a Cabinet Meeting where negotiations with China, draft answer to the German Ambassador, and counter measures for the China Affair were discussed. KIDO urged the necessity of creating cultural measures in North China.

Before entry for 16 January on page 61 insert:-

16223 2260

KIDO recorded in his Diary a Cabinet Meeting on 14 January 1938, where the epoch making announcement concerning the China Affair was discussed. Chiang Kai-Shek's answer was considered as lacking sincerity, and the Cabinet decided to announce a fixed policy that they would have nothing to do with the National Government, but would negotiate with the new Chinese Government and join in the promotion of a newly rising China and the peace of Asia.

Insert at bottom of page 66:-

15811 2212

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident. Record regarding payment of Y150,830 to the accused UMEZU, March, 1938.

Before entry for 26 April on page 68 insert:-

15804 2209

Transfer of secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account, 13 April, 1938. The accused UMEZU received Y77,800.

Before entry for 20 May on page 70 insert:-

16224 2261

KIDO related in his diary of 19 May 1938 a conversation with President Honjo concerning the preparations for the battle of Suchow. Honjo did not anticipate any striking changes from the Suchow battle and stated there was some peace talk at present in China. Honjo advocated an attitude of advancing to Hankow after Suchow while taking steps to settle the Incident. He also thought that if things did not turn out right it would be necessary to enter into protracted warfare.

by planning to continue for about three years. KIDO promised to do his best and agreed generally with Honjo's opinion.

Before entry for 28 June on page 72 insert:-

15741 2197

Extract from "The Japan Advertiser", Tokyo, Sunday 26 June 1938, (page 3) entitled "Long preparedness is urged by War Minister ITAGAKI", states that as it may be the intention of General Chiang Kai-Shek to "resist Japan for the rest of his life", the Army should be ready to continue fighting "perhaps for ten years". War Minister ITAGAKI expressed his confidence that with unanimity and support Japan could cope with protracted warfare over almost any length of time. There was no need to move against China at present and that no decision had been reached about the mobilisation law. General Chiang Kai-Shek's tactics in wearing down Japan's resources were reviewed. Comments were made on the Five-Minister Conference when the war situation was discussed as well as the projected establishment of a central organ for directing policy towards China. The International situation was commented upon.

Before entry for 3 July on page 73 insert:-

16255 2281

On 1 July 1938, the "Education Ministry Review" published a speech by ARAKI entitled "On the First Anniversary of the China Incident". ARAKI gave a survey of the past year's successes and strategy, pointing out that Japan would not lay down arms until anti-Japanese China had been completely crushed and Chinese territory cleared of Communistic devils. The nation must be spiritually mobilised and with deep understanding of national thought, the national constitution should be clarified as absolutely superior and the unification of the world under one roof must pervade the world.

Before entry for 10 August on page 77 insert:-

16225 2262

KIDO stated in his diary of 9 August 1938 that he attended a Cabinet Meeting where he heard about the progress of the

Changkaufeng Incident from War Minister ITAGAKI and the Foreign Minister. After, he heard of a proposal to reinforce the German-Japanese relations which had been made by Von Ribbentrop to OSHIMA. It contained a clause providing that in the case of one nation being attacked, the other would render military aid. Italy was to join and negotiations with her were under way. Ribbentrop analysed the European situation as: war with Russia would be inevitable, peace moves towards Czechs, Anglo-French relations strong, possibly backed financially but not militarily by the United States, Rumania neutral and Hungary could be made an ally.

Before entry for 31 August on page 73 insert:-

16069 2235

Outline of speeches by SATO delivered by him on the 25th and 29th August 1938. They concerned the policy for the Disposition of the China Incident etc.,

Before entry for 16 September on page 73 insert:-

16227 2263

KIDO stated in his Diary on 7 September 1938 that he had learned the state of affairs regarding the head of the new political party from Konoye. He said it might be necessary to deal with Chiang Kai-Shek in view of the changed situation brought about by the fall of Hankow. The domestic conditions were causing concern and many groups were participating in a drive for a one-party system to which Konoye had given an ambiguous answer. Konoye had come up against the China Incident and many matters had gone contrary to expectations. If the cumulation of these problems should lead to having to deal with Chiang Kai-Shek, Konoye thought he would have to resign. KIDO was against the latter action which would cause a new political situation dealt with by Ugaki's policies. KIDO thought it might be unavoidable for Konoye to accept leadership of a new party although after discussion they agreed that the selection of the Secretary General would be extremely

REFERENCE

difficult. The Rightists apparently were of the opinion that peace between Japan and China must be brought about by dealing with Chiang Kai-Shek. While the military generally agreed, ITAGAKI first opposed it but later gave way. The deadlock situation seemed to be the result of the opposite opinions of TOJO and Hasegawa.

Before entry for 3 October on page 79 insert:-

15745 2199

Extract from "The Japan Advertiser" of 2 October 1938, entitled "Konoye Cables Hitler his Congratulations of Splendid Success". War Minister ITAGAKI sent a telegram to Hitler expressing the Imperial Army's admiration and felicitations for Germany's successful conduct of the Sudeten issue and hoped that the German-Japanese armies would unite on the Anti-Comintern front. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin was instructed by Navy Minister Yonai to send similar congratulations to the Reichsfuehrer.

Before entry for 3 November on page 81 insert:-

16231 2264

On 2 November 1938, KIDO stated in his diary that he attended a Privy Council Meeting where it was decided to cease co-operating with the various bodies of the League of Nations.

Before entry for 10 November on page 82 insert:-

15347 2223-A

Gist of a broadcast by ARAKI on 7 November 1938 on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on the awakening of the Imperial Spirit. One phase of the Incident had been made by the capture of Canton and the three principal cities near Hankow. The period for actual activities in long-term construction had arrived. ARAKI interpreted the spirit of the Imperial Rescript and reminded the people of the Emperor's exhortations to bring about practical results, saying that the present time was momentous and significant. The fundamental question of the present situation did not lie in the China Incident but in the dawn of a new world peace. The occupation of some strategic points in China would not mean the settlement of the present

situation. Japan must push forward towards the construction of a new world. Japan did not stand at a deadlock and the people were urged to tide over present difficulties to exhibit the glory of Japan to the world. In excerpts from the Second Speech on Instruction at the National Conference of Principals of Agricultural Schools, ARAKI as Education Minister stated that at the present time the most important thing was to strengthen national spirit. The people must be educated to carry out the great mission of the Empire in the future. Regarding education in agricultural schools, in the present situation of Japan, she should strive for an expansion in production power. It was also very important to devise the overseas expansion of the people in order to carry out the unity policy of Japan, Manchukuo and China. The women of Japan were also urged to join in these efforts.

Before entry for 8 December on page 84 insert:-

15982 2228-A

Excerpt from pages 353-355 of book "Business Reports-1938, Volume I, Economic Relations in China", published by East Asia Ministry, 1 December, 1938. This consists of Item 2 Instruction by Minister HIROTA and concerns the German proposal for economic co-operation in China. As for the participation of Germany and Italy it will mean that special consideration is required from the political point of view. The co-operation of Germany and Italy in the economic development of North China will be accomplished chiefly by Germany's co-operative investment in important industries. The methods for this were enumerated as: Investment in the Development Company, Subscription of debentures, Supply of machinery on credit or by delivery of shares, Joint management of Japan and Germany or by Japan, Germany and China of same kind of enterprise. Germany's interests will be fully respected and given preference over any third country.

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

Before entry for 27 December on page 87 insert:-

16231 2265

KIDO recorded in his Diary that on 26 December 1938, he met HIRANUMA who was insistent that the Konoye Cabinet should not resign. His reason was that Wang Chao-ling had escaped from Chungking and that the plot was proceeding steadily.

Before entry for 30 December on page 87 insert:-

16232 2266

KIDO in his diary of 29 December, 1938 stated that Major General Teichi SUZUKI insisted that the Konoye Cabinet carry on. Later, he saw War Minister ITAGAKI at Konoye's house and he (ITAGAKI) explained the development of the scheme and the International situation.

Before entry for 7 January on page 38 insert:-

16233 2267

In his Diary for 5 January 1939, KIDO stated that on that day he saw HIRANUMA who asked him to accept the position of Home and Welfare Minister. KIDO agreed as long as he could dispose of the pending Home Ministry problems at his own discretion. HIRANUMA approved KIDO's recommendation for Vice-Minister Hirose's promotion and this was carried out.

Before entry for 8 March on page 91 insert:-

15908 2229-A

Excerpt from address of Baron HIRANUMA, Prime Minister, on 21 January, 1939, taken from the March 1939 issue of the Tokyo Gazette dealing with the feelings of HIRANUMA on the China Affair. This expressed the view that the present Cabinet was committed to the same policy as the previous one and is determined to carry it out. This was to lay the foundation of the prosperity and progress in East Asia through the co-operation of Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, cultural and economic spheres. There must be a new order to replace the old and it was hoped that the Chinese would understand this correctly, and co-operate with the Japanese. There was no alternative but to exterminate those who persisted in opposition against Japan.

Before entry for 20 March on page 92 insert:-

15746 2200

Japanese press comments published in Japan Advertiser of 17 March 1939 stated that ITAGAKI and Yonai had stated in the Diet that the policy for a new period in Asia would undoubtedly cause friction from third powers. They resented, England, U.S.S.R. and France's attitude to the China Affair and argued that unless these powers were ejected, settlement of the China Incident would be impossible. Britain's loan and fund to stabilise Chinese currency was an hostile act and is confirmed by representations made by Britain, U.S. and France protesting against exchange control in North China. These countries hamper the new order in East Asia and will probably further attempt to provide obstacles as Japan and China's community of interests increase.

Before entry for 1 April on page 93 insert:-

16234 2268

KIDO stated in his Diary on 31 March 1939 that he had conferred with Premier HIRANUMA on problems of a military alliance between Germany and Japan and the appointment of new Cabinet members.

Before entry for 1 May on page 94 insert:-

16235 2269

On 19 April 1939, KIDO stated in his Diary that he advised HIRANUMA to exert increased efforts for the Military Alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, since failure would have dangerous domestic effects and would be a decisive disadvantage to settling the China Incident.

Before entry for 4 May at top of page 95 insert:-

15648 2185

HASHIMOTO stated in an article entitled "Clear the clouds from the East Asia Sky", which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon of 1 May 1939, that England and to a lesser extent Russia must be destroyed since they are the main supporters of Chiang-Kai Shek and while they assist him a solution to the China Incident is impossible. He wanted to overthrow England first, leaving the Soviet alone. One method he cited was the

strengthening of the Tri-Partite Pact and including democracy as well as communism as the subject of attack.

16235 2270

KIDO recorded in his Diary on 2 May 1939 that he met Navy Minister Yonai and conferred on the Military Alliance. KIDO again emphasised that failure would have a bad influence on the Sino-Japanese dispute and bring about a dissatisfaction and uneasiness on the part of the people, especially if the failure were a result of a Navy-Army dispute. KIDO impressed that the public opinion must be unified even if they should fail to conclude the treaty.

Before entry for 11 May on page 95 insert:-

15815 2214

In an interview presented by Domei Radio between ITAGAKI and KOISO on 8 May 1939, War Minister ITAGAKI welcomed that Germany and Italy through their Military Alliance had bound themselves still more firmly to the maintenance of peace and the establishment of a new order in Europe and stated that it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a Military Alliance with the Axis powers. Minister of Colonies KOISO stated that apparently negotiations directed towards the conclusion of a Military Alliance among the three Axis powers were being conducted. The success of these negotiations depended upon Germany's and Italy's understanding of Japan's position and the realisation that it would be difficult for Germany and Italy to carry out their encirclement policy without the aid of Japan.

Before entry for 20 May on page 96 insert:-

15643 2185

An excerpt from an article entitled "Expel the British Influence from the Far East," written by HASHIMOTO, which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon of 15 May 1939 gives the conclusion that the balance would be on Japan's side if she used 300,000-yen planes to destroy 100,000,000-yen British battleships in the east. He cited the simplicity of beating

England if Japan threatened to occupy Hongkong and Shanghai and prevent the Fleet entering Singapore by their 'peerless aviators' and the fleet.

Before entry for 30 May on page 96 insert:-

15990 2230

Telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 23 May, 1939, requesting information regarding the new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference. In a confidential and unofficial conversation OSHIMA reported that according to a telegram he had received from Arita, the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in the event of European conflict. OSHIMA, having refused to pass on this information to the German Government he had been requested to hold the matter over pending result of discussion among the various factors. The German Ambassador was asked to make it clear that this attitude was causing distrust among the Germans and Italians.

Insert at top of page 97:-

15648 2135

On June 1st 1939 some "short cutting Remarks on the Present Situation" by HASHIMOTO were published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon. These remarks were in an anti-English vein and advocated her expulsion and definition as an enemy.

Before entry for 5 July on page 97 insert:-

15648 2135

HASHIMOTO published an article in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 20 June 1939 entitled "The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the Expulsion of England". In this article he made it clear that the only solution to the China Incident would be an attack on England - not to be stopped at Tientsin but extended to Shanghai and Hong Kong. He stated that the Premier (HIRANUMA) and the Foreign Minister were hesitant to conclude a Military Alliance with the Axis because of their fear of England, although they say it is necessary to strengthen the Axis collaboration.

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

Before entry for 10 July on page 97 insert:-

15749 2201

Extract from the 7 July 1939 issue of "The Japan Times and Mail", bears message from ITAGAKI and Yonai warning nation not to relax in determination for China Affairs goal. Unjust interference by Third Powers in the execution of Japan's mission of constructing a new order in East Asia must be stamped out. Chiang Kai-Shek's resistance was being aided by Third Powers and Japan's immediate enemy was not limited to the Chungking Government. The crushing of the anti-Japanese policy by Third Powers which aided the resistance of the Chiang regime must be carried out at all cost; but the China Affair must not be thought to be ended even if Chiang's regime collapses. The third year of the China Affair will see Japan accomplish her mission of establishing a new order in East Asia step by step and any interference by Third Powers with the execution of Japan's mission should be drastically rejected.

15648 2185

Excerpt from an article entitled "Organise a Class A war-time Cabinet that has no Fear of England and the Soviet Union" by HASHIMOTO published on 10 July 1939 in the Tokyo Dai Nippon. He stated in this article that Japan needed a wartime Cabinet with the highest authority, which would win through with a complete wartime system. Once again England and the Soviet were HASHIMOTO's idea of Japan's real opponents.

Before entry for 21 July on page 98 insert:-

15648 2185

HASHIMOTO stated in his article "Build a State Union of China and Manchukuo with Japan as its leader" published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 20 July 1939 that the Japanese public opinion had now taken an anti-British turn. He now wanted Japan to destroy the Kuo-ming-tang Government and organise China and Manchukuo with Japan as a leader, into a self-supplying defensive block banning all commercial relations with

other countries.

Before entry for 8 August on page 99 insert.

16237 2271

KIDO stated in his Diary on 4 August 1939 that he had talked to War Minister ITAGAKI on the Military Alliance with Germany and Italy and had obtained agreement. The War Minister was determined to resign if the Cabinet did not accept the Military Alliance. This would result in a Cabinet resignation en bloc. KIDO thought it best that no political change should take place until the Wang Regime had been established in China. Any failure of the establishment of the Wang Regime, as in the case when Wang escaped from Chungking bringing about the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, would result in a serious situation. KIDO wanted any attempt to form a Military administration resisted, and a solution brought about to the Army-Navy deadlock.

Before entry for 30 August on page 100 insert:-

16240 2272

KIDO recorded in his diary that on 28 August 1939 a Cabinet Meeting was held regarding the bloc resignation of the Cabinet. After HIRANUMA's explanations all agreed, and tendered their resignations but the Emperor requested that all Cabinet Ministers retain their posts until further notice. KIDO was informed that Tada might become the new War Minister and that this would only intensify friction between different army groups. Konoye told KIDO that Abe had been ordered by the Emperor to form a Cabinet, who instructed him to appoint either UMEZU or HATA as War Minister, follow a policy of co-operation with the U.S. and Britain and use discretion in choice of Home and Justice Ministers. KIDO thought the last two instructions of the Emperor could be disposed of by Abe at his discretion. Regarding the appointment of the War Minister, in order to avoid a clash with military circles, KIDO thought it best that the Emperor either summon the War Minister or convey to the Army his choice and let the three Chiefs of the Army recommend

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

the War Minister.

Insert at top of page 101:-

16003 2232

Telegram from Mackensen in Rome to the Foreign Minister in Berlin dated 2 September 1939 to say that he had received a visit from Japanese Ambassador SHIRATORI to announce that he had received his expected recall. He would welcome the opportunity to talk with the German Foreign Minister on his way home which might be via Russia. SHIRATORI thought that with a change of Cabinet in Japan there was a chance of continuing the rapprochement with the Axis. There was an opinion growing in Japan for settlement with Russia and if this came about the tendency of the U.S. to intervene in Europe would be reduced.

Insert before entry for 7 September on page 101:-

15744 2198

Cablegram sent by Ambassador Ott to the Army High Command and Air High Command on 6 September 1939 regarding five Ministers' Conference on 8 August in which Army's urgent desire was stressed for early conclusion of China conflict; alleviate present tension by conforming to wishes of masses and prevent dangerous reaction in direction of an economically tempting settlement with England. These reasons being so compelling War Minister ITAGAKI was resolved, as a last resort to risk his resignation. A decision was to be reached by 15 August and ITAGAKI requests that Berlin and Rome Governments be apprised of the situation and suggest they help by concessions. These provided that there would be no mental reservations behind the wording and that a verbal form of Japanese supplementary statement be found. The new alliance was chiefly a domestic political weapon but the Army was the Chief supporter of the Alliance. The plans of the Foreign Minister who attaches great importance to successful negotiations with England would be cancelled out if Germany shows initiative in

a spirit of concession.

Before entry for 11 November on page 104 insert:-

15242 2273

KIDO stated in his diary of 10 November 1939 that he had talked with Matsudaira on the system of appointing a new Premier. KIDO, who at that time was out of office, thought that the method at present used, i.e., the recommendation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the Emperor, was from the political viewpoint, undesirable since high officials close to the Emperor should not hold reins of political power. He wanted to restrict the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to that of adviser to the Emperor and in case of "en bloc" Cabinet resignation let the ex-Premiers and possibly ex-Ministers of State consult with the Emperor on the choice of a successor. He thought the ex-Premiers should confer, and not decide by vote but report all opinions (both dissent and assent) to the Emperor. KIDO then consulted with Konoye who assented to his opinions. Then Konoye asked KIDO if his feelings were that the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should be abolished, KIDO rejected this since he thought there would be too many important affairs of State left for him as adviser to the Emperor.

Before entry for 20 March on page 111 insert:-

15330 2215-A

Excerpt from the Minutes of Second Joint Conference of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4, of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet on 17 March 1940, with comments by KOISO. In this KOISO endorsed remarks made by Fukuda regarding the importance for Japan to advance and seize territories in the Southern Regions and put forth the same effort and financial power as required in overcoming the North China Incident, and have both North and South as Japan's objectives. The Overseas Affairs Ministry, who were to carry out the policy of having both North and

REFERENCE

South as objectives, emphasised that movement of population and economic expansion must accompany one another, but whereas on the Continent the movement of population was of primary importance, in the Southern Regions it was economic expansion which took precedence.

Before entry for 23 March on page 111 insert:-

16150 2243A

An excerpt from the "Japan Times and Mail" for March 21st 1940, entitled "MUTO Plays Bureaucrats and Parties" avers Army wants Political Organisations to Reconsider Attitudes. Stated that MUTO, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau gave the army opinion of favouring the dissolution of political parties if they seek to further their interests in the present emergency. This was in answer to interpolations put to War Minister HATA in the House of Representatives.

Before entry for 11 May on page 115 insert:-

16246 2274

In his Diary of 10 May 1940 KIDO expressed his allegiance to Konoye stating that as long as Konoye stays in the political field he would support him to the last and would like Konoye to take the leadership. KIDO expressed this opinion to Ikezaki when he called to sound KIDO's opinion on the new political party of which Konoye was to be President and KIDO Vice President.

Before entry for 1 June on page 118 insert:-

16247 2275

On 26 May 1940, KIDO stated in his diary that he had conferred with Konoye and Arima on the new political party. When the Imperial Mandate was issued the following points were to be considered. (1) Supreme National Defence Conference established between Chiefs of General Staffs (60th Army and Navy) Premier and the War and Navy Ministers; (2) consideration given to desires of Army and Navy re national defence, foreign affairs and finances; (3) Dissolution of all political parties requested by announcement of resolution for establishment of a new political party. The Cabinet composition was

PAGE EXHIBIT

REFERENCE

set out stating that all Ministers appointed prior to the establishment of a new party should be made to join it.

At bottom of page 118 insert:-

16248 2276

KIDO stated in his diary on 1 June 1940, that he had been asked to accept the appointment of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. After consultation with Konoye he decided to accept the office. Alternately Ikezaki had urged KIDO to refuse the post saying how important his position would be in connection with the new party.

Before entry for 22 July on page 132 insert:-

15644 2184

OKAWA in a letter to TOJO dated 21 July 1940, stated that all efforts should be directed to the U.S. Loan Agreement. The conclusion of this agreement would obliterate Chiang Kai Shek's only hope, bring about the end of the China Incident, and make Japan's southward advance possible.

Before entry for 22 September on page 151 insert:-

16250 2277

It is recorded in KIDO's Diary of 21 September, 1940, that a settlement with the French Indo-China authorities regarding Japanese penetration was possible. KIDO then stated he had reported to the Emperor his opinion that if a German-Italian-Japanese Military Alliance was concluded, England and America would eventually have to be opposed. In view of this, Chinese relations should be adjusted as soon as possible.

Before entry for 5 November on page 164 insert:-

16027 2234

Discussion of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis by SHIRATORI Toshio, published November, 1940. This consists of a series of Articles under the following headings:-

I. The necessity of the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance.

II. The European War and the Attitude of Japan.

- III. Soviet-German Coalition Problem and German Power.
- IV. The Trend of the Great War.
- V. The New order in Europe and Japan's Politics.
- 1) Japan's spiritual Assistance to Germany and Italy
 - 2) The New Order in Europe and the opposition of the U.S.
 - 3) The Combined Power in England, France and the U.S.
 - 4) England after her defeat and the Crises in the U.S.
 - 5) The position of the pro-British faction in Germany.
 - 6) Origin of European Civilisation.
 - 7) Japan's Lebensraum and her Bloc Theory.
 - 8) Character of German Race.
 - 9) National Organisation and Prince Konoye.
 - 10) Methods of Reform and National Structure.
 - 11) Shortcomings of the Reform Faction in our Country.
 - 12) Objectives and Reform of the New Government.
 - 13) Conversion of the Foreign Policy of our Country.
 - 14) Relations between Hakko-Ichiu and the Sphere of livelihood.
 - 15) Forecast of the World War.
- VI. Comment on Japan's Non-Interference.
- VII. Conclusion of Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance (Asahi Shimbun September 29, 1939):
- 1) Everlasting Mutual Reliances.
 - 2) Treaty of the New World Order.
 - 3) Accomplishment of the Three Countries Ideal.
 - 4) Reformation of the National Structure.
 - 5) Significance of Fank's declaration.

Before entry for 15 November on page 164 insert:

15952 2224

Article published in the newspaper "Yomiuri" on 8 November 1940, entitled "The Outline of Ten-Year Plan for Block Economy of Japan-Manchukuo-China". This was an announcement from the Cabinet Intelligence Bureau stating that by the conclusion of

the Tripartite Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, Japan fundamental policy to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia had entered on a new Stage. Japan's economic policy for the future was outlined, especially the extension of the economic reciprocal dependence to Greater East Asia and establishment of a Co-Prosperity Sphere. In ten years time the new economic order in East Asia should be established with Japan as leader. The main points of outline of this policy were set forth. The development of basic industries of Japan, Manchukuo and China and a plan for the related economy of the three countries were set forth as well as the division of Industries; Labour, Finance, Trade, Communications.

On page 166 of Part II, Exhibit 560, after the words "have done" delete the words "and can do". After the word "Rome" insert words "and which OSIMIA can still do".....

Before entry for 13 January on page 169 insert:-

15664 2186A

An excerpt from the 10 Day Report from the Home Ministry of 11 January 1941, referred to a meeting of the ultra-nationalists in the Central and Western Districts. HASHIMOTO who was President of this Society delivered lectures at both meetings in which he strongly urged the overthrow of England and America, the southward advance and the construction of East Asia under Imperial influence. HASHIMOTO, who was then on a lecture tour of Kansai, had directed that a command be relayed throughout the Country to instigate a powerful national movement and begin sweeping campaign against the U.S. and British sympathisers while inspiring an "Advance Southward" programme throughout the country.

Before entry for 31 January on page 173 insert:-

15668 2187A

Excerpts from HASHIMOTO's Book "The Second Creation" (14th Edition) of 30 January 1941 show his urgent call for the establishment of the Halko Ichiu. He proposed measures

in order to accomplish this new national structure which included; diplomatic strides and strides in military preparations. In the latter he called for absolute war preparation to be completed to enable us (Japan) to crush at any time countries which, under different ideologies, may interfere with us when we carry this national structure into operation.

Before entry for 1 July on page 213 insert:-

16173 2246

On 30 June 1941 the Army called a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council. TOJO and related official explained the fast changing International situation, after which Japan's future attitude was discussed. Defendants TOJO, DONIHARA and KIMURA were present at the meeting.

On Page 233 of Part II, Exhibit 300, after the words "action against USSR" delete remainder and read as follows:-

"The Soviet Government although reserved is increasingly anxious. SHIRATORI had pointed out these rumours to be serious. Yamamoto, on being questioned by Ott as to Japan's intentions regarding Russia, replied that Japan considered the best way to start an attack on Russia was to make demands to which she could not concede, such as demands for territory; it was all Japan could do now in face of the neutrality pact."

Before entry for 26 September on page 245 insert:-

15643 2185

HASHIMOTO stated in his article "No more Compromise" which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 25 September 1941, that the recent economic embargoes and freezing of assets by the English and Americans is a declaration of war. Japan should not follow what is expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact since both Germany and Italy have already gone into a state of war with the two countries. He objected to the solution of the China Incident by compromise with England and America, since China would still be dependent on America and England.

16253 2279

KIDO stated in his diary on 25 September 1941, SHIGEMITSU visited him regarding U.S. Japanese negotiations. The Chief

aide de Camp also visited him and told him about the report of the Chief of the Army General Staff to the Throne.

Before entry for 2 October on page 247 insert:-

16253 2280

KIDO stated in his Diary that on 1 October 1941, he talked with SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board on the National policy towards the U.S.A.

Before entry for 17 October on page 255 insert:-

16193 2250

In a fuller account written in November, 1941, KIDO revised the story contained in Exhibits 1147, 1150, 1151, 1154 and 1156, of the fall of the 3rd Konoye and formation of the TOJO Cabinets and stated that on 16 October 1941, Konoye collected the resignations of his Cabinet and presented them to the Emperor. The Information Board stated the reasons for the resignation was disagreement of opinion regarding execution of present National Policy. The actual facts, which were not really so simple, are set out in this document.

Before entry for 27 November on page 271 insert:-

16196 2249
(corrected version of 1139)

On 26 November, 1941, Kurusu and Nomura cabled Foreign Minister TOGO stating that there was no hope of the U.S. accepting Plan B in its entirety. They recommended that the President cable the Emperor of this hope for peace in the Pacific and the Emperor reply, thus clearing the air. If TOGO would sanction this action they were prepared to attempt it. Alternately if they were given more time, they felt that they might propose the establishment of neutral countries including French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Although a break in the negotiations might not mean war, there was a possibility that the U.S. would occupy the Netherlands East Indies and a conflict would inevitably start. They requested that since this telegram might well be their last that it be shown to KIDO and an answer be sent by return.

Before entry for 12 January on page 293 insert:-

15648 2135

An excerpt from the Article by HASHIMOTO entitled "The

Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence" which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon of 5 January 1942, stated that the war to end European-American culture had been started and that world culture based on domination would meet its doom. HAHIMOTO stated that it was a war for establishing a guiding principle - that of HAKKO ICHIU.

Before entry for 13 February on page 297 insert:-

16103 2236-A

Excerpts from statement made by Major General Kenryo SATO, Head of the First Section of Bureau of Military Affairs and a Government Delegate at a Budget Committee Meeting on the 79th Session of the Imperial Diet February 10th 1942. This concerned the necessity of making people understand the gist of the direction and progress of the Greater East Asia War.

16183 2248

On 10 February 1942, SHIMADA delivered a speech at the Accounts Committee Meeting of the Diet in which he stated that Japan must be the leading power in East Asia and any element not conforming to the Japanese will, must be eliminated completely. In the future, he said, concrete matters will be decided by the Government and not by the Navy alone. All economy must be directed towards winning the war and he believed that an announcement of various measures to win the war and the building of a foundation to enable future Japanese expansion would soon be made, since appropriate organs were now ready.

Before entry for 29 May on page 299 insert:-

16177 2245

On 26 May, 1942, Military Police Commander Nakamura sent to Sugiyama a report on the investigation of the eight American officers and enlisted men who took part in the raid on Japan on 13 April and were forced down in Central China. Copies of the document were sent to the Minister of War (TOJO), Chiefs of Military Affairs Bureau (SATO) and Home Defence, Vice War Minister (KIMURA) and Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau (OKA).

Before entry for 9 October on page 300 insert:-

16180 2247

On 1 October, 1942, the Defendants DOHIMARA, KIMURA and SATO

among others received German decorations from the German Ambassador Ott who acknowledged their merits in having by their joint efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the war. Sugiyama on behalf of the Generals pledged their belief in final victory of the Axis.

Before entry for 6 March on page 302 insert:-

16080 2237-A

Excerpt from statement made by Major General Kenryo SATO at a Budget Committee Meeting of the 31st Session of the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, February 19th, 1943, which stated that there was no change in the policy of dealing resolutely with those who made any statements which might hinder the war. The reports of Anglo-German peace and Soviet-German peace were enemy propaganda.

On page 213 of Appendix B under ARUKI, after Item 5 add the following:-

"6. Decorated 15 January, 1932 with the 1st Order of Merit of the Sacred Treasure.

Decorated 15 December, 1933, with the 3rd Court Rank, Senior Grade.

Decorated with the Grand Cordon of Rising Sun 29 April, 1934.

Created Baron for meritorious service 26 November, 1935.

Supplement to Document # 0001.

1. On page 6, 5th line delete "and by permission of MINAMI, Minister of War" and substitute "by Hayashi on his own initiative".
2. On page 9, 5th line from bottom of page, delete from "the ultimate -- Asia".
3. On page 20, delete lines 13, 14 and 15.
4. On page 300 and 301, delete "MINAMI" in exhibit 637.
5. On page 306, Exhibit 1278, line 13, after the word "MATA", delete the following sentence and read as follows:- "The Emperor stated that he would have the Chief of the General Staff TOJO consulted and on the strength of TOJO's objection the Emperor abandoned Terauchi as a candidate and selected KOISO".
6. On page 331 delete pages "85, 300" and "301" from paragraph 1.