

F.I - O.3 (26447) Rpt of Operations - USAFFE & USFIP in Philippine Island (Luzon Force) - Annex VI (Vol V) Hq. USAFFE

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REPORT OF OPERATIONS

OF

U S A F F E

AND

U S F I P

IN THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

1941-1942

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Report of Operations - USAFFE & USFIP in Philippine Island (Luzon
Force) Annex VI (VOL V)

Hq, USAFFE

12 Mar-9 Apr 1942

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

22 November 1946

AKAAG-BD

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Records

TO : The Adjutant General
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Attached hereto two (2) copies of Report of USAFFE and USFIP Operations in the Philippines 1941 - 1942 with Annexes I to XVIII inclusive, with the exception of Annex XI.

2. Annex XI, Operations of Visayan - Mindanao Force, is not attached because distribution of this Annex has been made previously. The distribution shown for Annex XI is one (1) copy to The Adjutant General, U.S. Army and one (1) copy to the Historical Division, W.D.S.S.

FOR GENERAL WAINWRIGHT:

John W. Bundy
JOHN W. BUNDY
1st Lt., Cml Corps
Actg Asst Adj Gen

2 Incls:
As stated above

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction.
- II. Pre-war Preparation.
 - A. Command and Staff USAFFE
 - B. Command and Staff Hq HPD
 - C. Schools
 - D. Cadre Training
 - E. Unit Training
- III. Organization of the Philippine Islands for Defense
 - A. Initial Mission
 - B. The Defense Areas
 - C. Organization and Commanders of the Defense Areas
 - D. Coordination with the Navy
- IV. Mobilization Status on December 8, 1941.
 - A. Personnel
 - B. Training
 - C. Supply
- V. Conduct of the Campaign.
 - A. Preliminary steps immediately preceding war
 - B. Beach Defense
 - C. Withdrawal into Bataan
 - D. Bataan Defense
 - E. Corregidor Defense
 - F. Visayan-Mindanao Force
- VI. Conclusions

ANNEXES

Vol II { Annex I
Annex II
Annex III

USAFPE Staff

Data Sheet: Showing Plan of mobilization of Philippine Army units and units expected to arrive from the states.

HPD Staff

Vol III Annex IV

North Luzon Force
I Philippine Corps

Vol IV Annex V

South Luzon Force
Bataan Defense Force
II Philippine Corps

Vol V Annex VI

Luzon Force

Vol VI Annex VII

USFIP Staff

Vol VII Annex VIII

Harbor Defense Manila and Subic Bay

Vol VIII Annex IX

Operations of 200th CAC (AA)

Vol IX Annex X

Operations of Armored Group

Vol X Annex XI
Parts 1-3

Operations of Visayan-Mindanao Force

Vol XI Annex XII

Operations of the Philippine Division (PS)

Vol XII Annex XIII

Quartermaster Report

Vol XIII Annex XIV

Medical Report

Vol XIV { Annex XV
Annex XVI

Finance Report

Data showing Units of U.S. Forces stationed in the Philippines on 7 December 1941

Vol XV Annex XVII

Signal Report

Vol XVI Annex XVIII

Citations

I. INTRODUCTION.

The data for the compilation of this report has been gathered from the following sources: Reports rendered by the separate force commanders after the war; official notes and extracts taken from the G-3 journals which were forwarded from the Philippines while the campaign was still in progress; notes made by officers while prisoners of war and events still fresh in their minds, and conferences of officers assembled at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, by War Department Orders to draw up the historical report of the Philippine Campaign.

This report is historically accurate. The main battle lines are shown, engagements and main phases of the Philippine Campaign recorded, i.e., the Beach Defense; the Withdrawal to Bataan; the Bataan Defense; the Defense of the Fortified Islands and the Defense of the Southern Islands by the Visayan-Mindanao Force.

The mission assigned to American Forces on Luzon, as laid down by the War Department for the Defense of the Philippine Islands, was to hold Manila, thus denying to the enemy the use of Manila Bay.

The immediate Pre-War preparation for the defense of the Philippines is included because of the fact that the efforts made to improve existing conditions during the months immediately preceeding the inception of hostilities had an important bearing on the conduct of the actual battle campaign.

The following table lists units and the annex which covers in detail the operation of a particular unit.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ANNEX NUMBER</u>	<u>REPORT OF OPERATION</u>	<u>DATE OF OPERATIONS</u>
11th Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 24, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Jan 24, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
21st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
31st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 14, 1941
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Jan 16, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 24, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 16, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
41st Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 22, 1941
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 23, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
51st Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	North Luzon Force	Jan 30, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
61st Division (PA)	XI	Visayan Mindanao Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
71st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 19, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Jan 6, 1942 to Jan 7, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
81st Division (PA)	XI	Visayan Mindanao Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
91st Division (PA)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 23, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942

101st Division (PA)	XI	Visayan-Mindanao Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
1st Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 22, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense	Dec 27, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
2d Division (PA)	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 26, 1941 to Jan 1, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 26, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
Philippine Div (PS)	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 24, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	XII	Philippine Division	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
Armored Group	X	Armored Group	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade 200th CA (AA) & 515th CA (AA)	IX	Operation 200th CA	Dec 8, 1941 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
26th Cavalry (PS)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Jan 6, 1942 to Jan 9, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 9, 1942 to Apr 6, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Apr 6, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	V	II Corps	Apr 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
86th Field Artillery (PS)	IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 23, 1941
	V	South Luzon Force	Dec 8, 1941 to Dec 23, 1941
	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 26, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	IV	I Corps	Jan 27, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
301st Field Artillery (PA)	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 26, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
Provisional Air Corps Regiment (Infantry)	V	Bataan Defense Force	Dec 24, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
	V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
	VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942, to Apr 9, 1942

Provisional Battalion
(SPM) 75mm

IV	North Luzon Force	Dec 13, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
V	South Luzon Force	Dec 22, 1941 to Jan 6, 1942
V	Bataan Defense Force	Jan 6, 1942
IV	I Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
V	II Corps	Jan 7, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
VI	Luzon Force	Mar 12, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942

Philippine Coast
Artillery Command &
Harbor Defense of
Manila and Subic
Bays

VIII	PCAC & Harbor Defense of Manila & Subic Bays	Dec 8, 1941 to May 6, 1942
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4th U.S. Marine

VIII	PCAC	Dec 24, 1941 to May 6, 1942
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Philippine Army
Air Corps

VIII	PCAC	Dec 30, 1941 to May 6, 1942
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IV	North Luzon Force	Jan 26, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
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3d, 17th, 34th Pur.
Sq., 5th Int Command
(Infantry Troops)

IV	I Corps	Jan 26, 1942 to Apr 9, 1942
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II. PRE-WAR PREPARATION.

A. COMMAND STAFF USAFFE

On July 26, 1941, General Douglas MacArthur, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, retired, and on duty in the Philippine Islands as Military Advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, was appointed by the President of the United States as Commanding General of all United States Army Forces in the Far East, and authorized to mobilize the Philippine Army.

General MacArthur began at once the task of forming a staff. Under his command were several officers of the United States Army who had been detailed on special duty, as assistants to aid in the training of the Philippine Army. These officers were used to form the nucleus of the USAFFE Staff. Additional officers, who were on duty with Philippine Scout units and familiar with conditions in the Philippines and with Filipino personnel, were selected and asked for by name early in August to complete a small but highly efficient staff.

The Headquarters staff, Philippine Department, was left intact.

A tremendous task confronted General MacArthur and his newly formed staff. Available housing facilities would not house more than one-third of the strength of the reserve Philippine Army divisions. Suitable cantonment areas had to be selected and housing facilities constructed for each of the ten reserve divisions before mobilization could be completed. War plans and training schedules had to be completed. Supply requirements studied and plans completed for securing and storing supplies. The small staff worked practically day and night.

For the USAFFE STAFF (See Annex 1)

B. COMMAND AND STAFF HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT

The Headquarters Philippine Department continued its normal function, and in addition was given the mission of drawing up the training schedule for the Philippine Army, to conduct the training of the Philippine Army and to establish supply depots in areas closer to each mobilization district than Manila. The Quartermaster, Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Officers worked in a dual capacity, as special staff officers USAFFE Headquarters and special staff officers Headquarters Philippine Department. Upon the movement to Bataan the Headquarters Philippine Department staff became the Service Command Staff and, initially, in addition to its normal duties of service command functions, was given the responsibility of the beach defense of the southern portion of Bataan. For list of Headquarters Philippine Department (See Annex III).

C. SCHOOLS

Upon the beginning of Mobilization of the Philippine Army, schools were established in order to give concentrated training to selected key enlisted personnel and to officers of all units of the Philippine Army. The mission of the schools was to train the Philippine Army officers in the functions of command and in the training of their units, and the key enlisted personnel in the functions of supply, mess, administration and combat training of units. This would materially aid in the training of the Philippine Army units when mobilization was completed. The schools were conducted by American officers detailed for this specific duty. The following schools were established:

1. The Command and Staff School, Baguio, Luzon. The students at this school were a few American Colonels, who had been selected to

take command of Philippine Army Divisions; Division Commanders of the Philippine Army, and selected key staff officers of the Philippine Army Divisions. The purpose of the school was to train officers in command and staff procedure of higher units. The school was under the supervision of USAFFE Headquarters.

2. Schools for training infantry cadres were established in each division mobilization district. American officers were detailed as instructors with specially selected enlisted personnel from American and Philippine Scout units detailed as assistant instructors. The students at these schools were officers of the Philippine Army and key enlisted personnel of the companies of an infantry division. This cadre included regimental staffs, battalion staffs, company commanders and platoon lieutenants. The enlisted cadre consisted of first sergeants, mess sergeants, supply sergeants, platoon sergeants, cooks, runners, and company clerks. All were required to take basic infantry training in addition to their specialities. The officers and platoon sergeants were given training in combat principles. Along with their basic infantry training, each student was specialized in the particular function according to his assignment in the Philippine Army.

3. Two engineer schools were established to train the engineer officers and selected enlisted personnel of the engineer battalions of the Philippine Army Divisions, similar to the cadres shown in paragraph 2 above. These schools were conducted similar to the infantry school, except in addition to combat infantry training the cadres were also trained in all engineer functions pertaining to combat engineers. Engineer officers and selected enlisted personnel were detailed as instructors from the engineer regiment (PS) of the Philippine Division. (14th Engineer Battalion, PS).

4. A signal school and a medical school were established at

Fort William McKinley, under the supervision of the commanding general, Fort William McKinley.

a. All officers and key enlisted men assigned to the signal companies and to the signal section of all units of the Philippine Army Divisions, with the exception of the communications details of the Field Artillery and Coast Artillery Units, who were to train at the artillery schools, were selected to attend the signal school. Officers and enlisted personnel, selected from signal units or communication sections of American and Philippine Scout units were detailed as instructors.

b. Officers and key enlisted personnel of the medical battalions and medical detachments of the infantry regiments of the Philippine Army Divisions were ordered to the Medical school. Instructors were detailed from the American and Philippine Scout medical units.

5. Another medical school was established at Camp Murphy with Major Jack W. Schwartz, MC, USA, as commandant. Selected American Medical officers were detailed in addition to their regular duties to give specific lectures on various phases of medical field training. Specially qualified medical enlisted personnel were detailed to assist the commandant of the school. The purposes of this school was to train officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army, who were not assigned to divisional units, in the establishment of field hospitals, medical supply functions and medical administrative matters in performance of duty under field conditions in war time.

6. A Quartermaster Motor Transport School was established in the Port Area under the supervision of Brigadier General George Parker,

USA, with Major Michael A. Quinn, QMC, as senior instructor. The cadres selected to attend the school were officers and key enlisted personnel assigned to the Quartermaster Transportation Units of the Philippine Army. The purpose of the school was to train officers and enlisted men in convoy duty, passenger car and truck driving, and the responsibilities of first, second, third and fourth echelon maintenance functions. In addition, the cadres were given the basic training of a soldier.

7. Coast Artillery Schools were established at Fort Mills and Fort Wint. Available space and housing necessitated the establishment of two schools. The student body consisted of officers and key enlisted personnel of the Coast Artillery, Philippine Army. Four hundred twenty-eight students attended the school at Fort Mills and three hundred and sixty-five attended the school at Fort Wint. At Fort Mills, the cadres were divided between the 91st and 92d Coast Artillery Regiments for supervision and training. The training at Fort Wint was under Colonel Napoleon Boudreau, CAC, and his American staff. The training consisted of all phases of the school of the soldier and of seacoast defense artillery.

8. The Philippine Army had established a field artillery training center at Camp Dau, Pampanga, near Fort Stotsenburg where all trainees assigned to the field artillery were sent for five and one-half months training. Headquarters USAFFE after considering and checking available quarters and training facilities decided to continue the use of Camp Dau as an exclusive training center for field artillery. One of the deciding factors in this decision was the availability of the Fort Stotsenburg field artillery ranges and the personnel and materiel of the Philippine Scout Field Artillery units.

The following field artillery personnel of the ten Philippine Army Reserve Divisions were ordered mobilized 1 September 1941, inducted into United States service and moved to Camp Dau for field artillery instruction:

All officers

All non-commissioned officers

All clerks

All cooks

Complete signal communication units of all the field artillery units.

The training was under the supervision of the Commanding General, Fort Stotsenburg. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Hirsch, FA, who had formerly been on duty at the Philippine Army Training Center at Camp Dau, was designated commandant and senior instructor. American Field Artillery officers, Philippine Scout non-commissioned officers and key Philippine Scout enlisted men at Fort Stotsenburg were made available for full or part time duty as instructors. Units of the Philippine Scout Artillery, complete with personnel, material and equipment, were made available for tactical training and practice range firing.

D. CADRE TRAINING

The cadres as outlined in paragraph C, (schools) above began reporting to mobilization induction areas September 1, 1941. After induction they were immediately dispatched to the specific school according to the school schedules. The cadres were being trained as fast as could possibly be done under the tremendous difficulties imposed by the following factors; language difficulties (in one division eleven different dialects were spoken); far too few instructors; lack of proper housing conditions and cantonment areas, necessitating the shifting of troops; lack of equipment to train personnel; difficulties of travel for cadres to reach mobilization and induction areas which meant a great deal at this time, as each day lost was a large handicap at the schools. On the outbreak of the war December 8, 1941, the cadre schools were closed and steps were taken to have all cadres rejoin their organizations. This was accomplished with few exceptions.

The artillery cadres of the artillery units assigned to the Visayan-Mindanao

Force could not be sent back to their units.

C. UNIT TRAINING

1. Coast Artillery Units, Philippine Army, had received no unit training and were organized into regiments after the outbreak of war. (See Annex X, Report of Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays)

2. The Field Artillery Units, Philippine Army, had not been mobilized at the outbreak of war and school cadres from each unit were still undergoing instruction at Camp Dau. Personnel belonging to reserve field artillery units had been ordered after the outbreak of hostilities, 8 December, to report immediately to their mobilization districts for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States. The 301st Field Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army, was formed after the outbreak of war from two groups of volunteer Filipinos, five hundred in the first group and two hundred in the second, and equipped with sixteen 155mm World War I, wooden wheel, slow speed guns and two 155mm howitzers, same type. (The only howitzers in the Philippines)

3. School cadres from each of the Infantry Regiments, Philippine Army, had not completed the cadre school course of instruction. One regiment per reserve division inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States 1 September had completed basic training of the soldier and had started combat training of smaller units, when war began. The second infantry regiments inducted on or about 15 November had not completed basic training and had not started any combat training for even smaller units. Personnel belonging to the third regiments had been ordered after the outbreak of war to report to mobilization districts for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States.

4. School cadres from the Divisional service units and communication companies of infantry regiments had not completed cadre schools, and had received no organizational training.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FOR DEFENSE.

A. INITIAL MISSION

The initial mission assigned to all force commanders, harbor defense commander and to USAFFE reserve units was to repel any enemy landing attempt, but if the landing was successful then to defeat the enemy at the beach by attacking and destroying the landing force.

B. THE DEFENSE AREAS

The following forces were organized:

The North Luzon Force, organized November 5, 1941

The South Luzon Force, organized November 5, 1941

The Visayan-Mindanao Force, organized November 5, 1941

The Philippine Coast Artillery Command, organized in August 1941

The USAFFE Reserve

1. Sector assigned to the Commanding General, North Luzon Force: the area north of the general line - Bataan Peninsula (inclusive) Lubao (inclusive) - San Fernando (inclusive) - Plaridel (inclusive) - Montal Ban (exclusive) - Infanta (exclusive). (See map)

2. Sector assigned to the Commanding General, South Luzon Force: the area bounded on the north by the general line - Paranaque - Pasig - Montalban - Infanta, (all inclusive) and bounded on the south by the general line - Igonoc - Mindoro - Santa Rosa, Mindoro - Pinagaabangan, Mindoro (all inclusive) - Bungao, Mindoro (inclusive) - Marinduque Island (inclusive) - Burias Island (inclusive) - Ticao Island (exclusive) - Samar Island (exclusive). (See map)

3. Sector assigned to the Commanding General, Visayan-Mindanao Force: the area of Philippine Islands south of the general line - Igonoc, Mindoro - Santa Rosa, Mindoro - Pinagsabangan, Mindoro (all exclusive) Bungao, Mindoro (exclusive) - Marinduque Island (exclusive) - Burias Island (exclusive) - Ticao Island (inclusive) - Samar Island (inclusive). (See map)

4. The Philippine Coast Artillery Command, with Headquarters in

Manila was assigned the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays. The PCAC was given the mission of protecting the Philippine Inland Seas. Its main mission was to protect the entrance of Manila Bay and to deny the use of Manila and Subic Bays to the enemy.

5.. The area assigned for use of the USAFFE Reserve was the Pampanga Valley south of San Fernando to include the city of Manila and Fort William McKinley.

C. ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDERS OF THE DEFENSE AREA

1. The following organizations were assigned to the Northern Luzon Force under the command of Major General J. M. Wainwright, AUS:

11th Division, PA - Brigadier General W. E. Brougher, AUS, Commanding.

21st Division, PA - Brigadier General Mateo Capinpin, PA, Commanding.

31st Division, PA - Brigadier General Clifford Bluemel, AUS, Commanding.

26th Cavalry, PS, Colonel Clinton A. Pierce, AUS, Commanding.

23d Field Artillery (PS), Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Lindsay, Commanding.

66th Pack Troop, Quartermaster Corps (PS), Captain V. F. Sayre, Commanding.

3d Battalion, 45th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Lathrop, USA, Commanding.

2. The following organizations were assigned to the Southern Luzon Force under the command of Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr., AUS:

41st Division, PA, Brigadier General Vincente Lim, PA, Commanding.

51st Division, PA, Brigadier General A. M. Jones, AUS, Commanding.

3. The following organizations were an integral part of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays under the Command of Brigadier General George F. Moore, AUS, and were assigned to the Philippine Coast Artillery Command:

59th Coast Artillery (US) Colonel Paul D. Bunker, Commanding.

60th Coast Artillery (AA)(US) Colonel Theodore M. Chase, Commanding.

91st Coast Artillery (PS) Colonel Joseph P. Kohn, Commanding.

92d Coast Artillery (PS) Colonel Napoleon Boudreau, Commanding.

1st and 2d Regiments Coast Artillery, Philippine Army (organized at outbreak of war).

Harbor Defense Headquarters.

Military Police, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Chemical Warfare, and Engineer Detachments, and Army Mine Planter Service.

200th Coast Artillery, Army of the United States, Colonel Gurdon Sage, Commanding, with headquarters at Fort Stotsenburg. Not an integral part of Harbor Defense but assigned to PCAC.

4. The organizations held directly under control of USAFFE :

were :

Philippine Division (less 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry) Brigadier General Maxon S. Lough, Commanding, located in vicinity of Fort William McKinley and Manila.

71st Division, PA, Brigadier General Clyde A. Sellick, AUS, Commanding, located in vicinity of Urdaneta.

91st Division, PA, Brigadier General Luther R. Stevens, AUS, Commanding, located in vicinity of Cabanatuan.

USAFFE Air Force, Major General Louis H. Brereton, AUS, Commanding with Headquarters at Nielson Field, Manila, Philippine Islands.

Headquarters Philippine Department, Brigadier General Allan C.

McBride, U. S. Army, Commanding, located in Fort Santiago, Philippine Islands.

86th Field Artillery in direct support of North Luzon Force and South Luzon Force.

Headquarters Philippine Army, located in Manila.

5. The following organizations were assigned to the Visayan-Mindanao Force under the command of Brigadier General William F. Sharp, AUS:

61st Division, Philippine Army, Brigadier General Bradford A.

Chynoweth, AUS, Commanding.

81st Division, PA, Brigadier General Guy O. Fort, Philippine Army, Commanding.

101st Division, PA, Brigadier General Joseph F. Vachon, AUS, Commanding.

D. COORDINATION WITH NAVY

Closest cooperation and coordination was maintained with the 16th Naval District and the Asiatic Fleet. The 16th Naval District planned and completed a number of operations: (1) Drydock Dewey moved from Olongapo to Mariveles, and an anti-submarine net installed across entrance to Mariveles Harbor (2) Contact mine fields laid in accordance with plans approved by Navy and War Department, so as to tie in with the Harbor Defense controlled mines. This completely closed the entrance to Manila Bay. (3) Radio intercept tunnel completed and equipped on Corregidor. (4) Naval Headquarters installations prepared on Corregidor (5) Torpedo Replenishment Depot established on Corregidor.

Plans were drawn up, Army and Navy cooperating for defense of the Philippine Islands. Close coordination was maintained between inshore patrol (Army) and offshore patrol (Navy).

Naval Liason Signal Detail ~~was~~ placed on duty with Headquarters Philippine Department, to maintain close contact with the Air Warning Service set up by Headquarters Philippine Department.

Frequent visits were made by both Army and Navy Staff Officers to each Headquarters to iron out difficulties in order to insure very close cooperation in the formation of a smooth functioning joint plan that would immediately go into effect upon any emergency.

The Navy Radio intercept Station was functioning at Corregidor and was keeping in close touch with the Harbor Defense Commander and his staff at Corregidor. In fact this station intercepted a radio message at 3:40 AM 8 December 1941 stating that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and immediately notified Brigadier General George F. Moore, Commanding General of the PCAC and Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays.

IV. MOBILIZATION STATUS ON 8 DECEMBER 1941.

A. PERSONNEL

Congress, the latter part of January, 1941, authorized an increase of six thousand enlisted men for the Philippine Scouts. This increase doubled the strength of the Scouts, but by 8 December approximately two thousand three hundred of the older and well trained scouts, mostly non-commissioned officer, had been attached to the various units of the Philippine Army as instructors, and remained with those units throughout the entire campaign.

The Philippine Army Air Corps and only one infantry regiment and school cadres from the other regiments and divisional units of the ten Philippine Army reserve divisions had been inducted into the service of the United States on 1 September 1941. The mobilization of the second infantry regiment of each of the divisions and the induction of these units into the Armed Forces of the United States had been initiated on 1 November.

The mobilization of the division headquarters and service elements of the Philippine Army divisions and the induction of these units into the Armed Forces of the United States had been completed by about 20 November.

The mobilization of the third infantry regiment, and the artillery regiments of each division and the induction of these units into the Armed Forces of the United States was completed after the outbreak of hostilities.

Because of the difficulties of travel and communications, it generally took a period of from several days to two weeks for the personnel to arrive at the mobilization centers.

The Philippine Army division as planned would have consisted of the following:

Three (3) Infantry regiments (approximately 1400 each)	4200
One (1) Artillery regiment	1000
One (1) Anti-tank battalion	600
One (1) Engineer battalion	600
One (1) Medical battalion	500
One (1) Quartermaster battalion	500
Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Signal Company, Ordnance Company (L.M.), Motor Transportation Company	<u>800</u>
Total	8200

However, because of the sudden outbreak of war, there was not a single division that had all of its units. The anti-tank battalion was never organized because no equipment was available. The 61st, 81st and 101st Divisions because of lack of equipment organized the artillery units as infantry battalions. The 31st Division for the same reason organized one of its artillery battalions as infantry. The 21st Division, 71st Division and the 91st Division had only two battalions of artillery. The 11th Division and 41st Division had three (3) battalions of artillery assigned.

B. TRAINING

At the outbreak of war there was not a single division of the Philippine Army complete with its personnel and equipment.

The American officers who were detailed on duty with the Philippine Army were as a group assigned as advisors and instructors. Only in a few exceptions were American officers actually assigned as commanders of Philippine Army units.

1. The Coast Artillery trainees, undergoing instruction at Fort Mills, had been organized at the outbreak of war into the First Coast Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army. Headquarters Battery and Batteries A, B, C and D constituted, with Headquarters Battery assigned twenty-eight men and the lettered gun batteries one hundred men each. The trainees at Fort Wint had been organized into an identical regiment, designated as the Second Coast Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army, with twenty-five men in Headquarters Battery and eighty-five men each in Batteries A, B, C and D. Both these units were commanded by native Filipino officers.

By 8 December, instruction at the cadre schools, unit training of the smaller organizations of the mobilized infantry regiments and the training of service elements had been progressing satisfactorily. However, not even the mobilized infantry regiments had received any regimental training. Not one of the ten reserve divisions had been completely mobilized, therefore had not received any training in divisional maneuvers. Personnel belonging to units not yet mobilized continued to report to their mobilization centers for about two weeks after the conflict started. Some of the personnel reporting to mobilization areas in the Cagayan Valley, North Luzon, had been cut off and unable to join their units. The 71st and 91st divisions never received their third infantry regiments. These two infantry regiments, because of the shortage of water transportation had to be left in the southern islands, and were assigned to the commander of the Visayan-Mindanao Force. The entire artillery units of the 61st and 81st divisions had to be converted to infantry for the same reason. The 11th Division Artillery did not join the division until after the division had occupied a position on Guagua-Porac line.

The Philippine Army Air Corps, completely mobilized, had been satisfactorily training under USAFFE supervision, even though training had been conducted with an obsolete low speed(maximum 150 miles per hour),

biplane type fighter plane, which in combat was no match for the new high speed fighter plane in use at that time in all modern armies.

The divisions at the outbreak of war had been in the process of mobilization and only the smaller units had started organizational training. Force commanders had started the movement, in accordance with approved plans, of mobilized units to their respective defensive sectors. Details of this phase covered by the reports of Force Commanders attached hereto as annexes.

2. The preceding paragraphs on the pre-war training and mobilization status on 8 December has covered the training and induction of the Philippine Army. To complete the picture it is necessary to include the training of the regular American and Philippine Scout organizations. The training of these units had continued at a stepped up pace. The strength of the Philippine Scouts had been doubled by Act of Congress the latter part of January, 1941. This necessitated an intensive recruiting campaign, as only the best of the Filipino applicants had been selected for enlistment. The Scout organizations had a high morale and were proud of their record and up to this time had maintained their strength of six thousand by a priority list, it had been considered and deemed a very high honor to any Filipino to be selected for enlistment in any of the scout organizations.

It had been necessary with the increased strength to reorganize all scout units. Tables of organization had been drawn up similar to the new T/O's under which the United States Troops in the states were being organized, but due to the strength of scout units, organizations could be formed at only two-thirds T/O strength. A request had been forwarded to the War Department for approval of special T/O's for all scout organizations.

The 26th Cavalry (PS) with its proportionate strength increase consisted of eight hundred and eighty-nine men, however with the furnishing of cadre instructors to the Philippine Army, it had an actual combat strength

of six hundred and eighty-two men as compared to a modern cavalry regiment of twelve hundred fifty-one men.

The Philippine Scout infantry regiments had a strength of two thousand two hundred men, however after furnishing cadre instructors to the Philippine Army, actual combat strength dropped to between seventeen hundred and eighteen hundred men.

The Philippine Scout Engineer regiment in process of reorganization when the war broke had been reduced to an engineer battalion. The surplus personnel had furnished most of the cadre for the medical detachments of the infantry scout regiments.

The increase allotted to the field artillery enabled a reorganization into a provisional field artillery brigade as follows:

23d Field Artillery, PS, from one pack battery into a three battery battalion with a small headquarters detachment. Approximate strength: 300.

24th Field Artillery, PS, remained a regiment of two three battery battalions, but Headquarters Battery had been transferred complete as Provisional Brigade Headquarters Battery. Approximate strength: 700.

88th Field Artillery, PS, activated as a light regiment of two three battery battalions without a regimental headquarters battery. Approximate strength: 550.

86th Field Artillery, PS, activated as a separate 155mm gun battalion, two batteries and a battalion headquarters battery. Approximate strength: 300.

Provisional Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Approximate strength: 150.

The trained and experienced men of the 23d and 24th Field Artillery regiments had been allotted proportionately to all the brigade units, and likewise the new recruits had been allotted to each unit. Thus, each unit

of the brigade had a framework of well trained men for key positions and experienced non-commissioned officers.

The Coast Artillery regiments had received their proportional share of the increase. For details see Annex VIII attached hereto.

The service elements also received their proportional increase.

The training of the Philippine Scout Organizations had been intensified in order to bring the state of training of the newly enlisted recruits up to standard. A large number of reserve officers, mostly in junior grades, reported from the United States and were assigned to scout units. Most of these young officers commanded scout units throughout the campaign as a majority of the older officers were assigned as instructors for the Philippine Army, to the staffs of larger units, to Force Commands and to USAFFE Headquarters.

The 31st (US) Infantry (American) had been authorized an increase in strength and just prior to the war had received about three hundred recruits, bringing its strength to approximately eighteen hundred men. After furnishing instructing cadres for the Philippine Army, its actual strength present with the organization at the outbreak of war was approximately fourteen hundred.

The Air Corps was undergoing rapid expansion. Training had been intensified and new fields were being prepared. However, funds for the construction of new fields had not been appropriated until September 1941, therefore new fields in process of construction were unservicable when war started. The Air Corps was at a distinct disadvantage by having only three fields, Clark, Nichols and DelMonte, available for use of bombardment squadrons, which meant no dispersion for the bombardment units. The pursuit squadrons on Luzon could use Nichols, Clark, and Iba. The Philippine Army Air Corps could use numerous small fields because of their low speed planes.

For details on the Armored Group as to its strength and state of training, see Annex X attached to this report.

For details on the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) as to its strength and state of training see Annex IX attached to this report.

The American and Philippine Scout organizations were fit, and trained in combat principles and ready to take the field in any emergency.

C. SUPPLY

The G-4 section, USAFFE Headquarters, had been initially set up with two officers and a small clerical force, an entirely inadequate staff to conduct the business of a newly organized Army Headquarters. But even the formation of this staff nucleus, as well as that of the several other sections of headquarters, had placed a tremendous strain on the units from which such personnel had necessarily been drawn.

Fortunately, this small staff was highly trained, regular army personnel, of considerable experience in Philippine Island operations and with reasonable knowledge of the methods of procedure of the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff. Much of the lost motion and uncertainty that otherwise might have been expected had been accordingly eliminated. Close and constant contact with the civil government, the Philippine Army, civilian agencies and combat troops and services had been rapidly established, and business therewith amicably and promptly dispatched.

Speed in planning and operations had been most essential in order to keep ahead of mobilization. There were two main requirements: current operations and long-range planning to utilize all available resources in the Philippine Islands, as well as those that could be made available by the home nation, which had a multitude of other problems to be reconciled with local needs. A strain had been placed upon the small section by the initial and justifiable centralization of policies, pending the working out and delegation of responsibilities to the staff sections.

Another officer had been added to the G-4 section in early November, which materially lightened the load being carried by the section. Still later, with the incoming of additional personnel on the last transports from the states, the staff had been further augmented by officer and enlisted personnel.

The apparent overlap of functions between the newly established USAFFE and the Philippine Department Headquarters had been coordinated by placing policy making in the hands of the former and operation, with certain restrictions, in the hands of the latter.

8 December 1941 witnessed a sudden transition in method of procedure. Laborious peace-time perfection and recording had been discarded; shortcircuiting speedily adopted; property accountability abandoned and freedom of expenditure authorized.

Drastic shortages of needed supplies with which to conduct a campaign in isolation existed. The scores of transports and freighters scheduled to arrive in the next month had to be diverted elsewhere. Only stocks actually on hand, military and commercial, were available from this date forward.

All conceivable items of a commercial nature had been quickly purchased or legally confiscated, certain exceptions being granted for the preservation of life and conduct of highly essential business among the civilian population.

The decision to move to Bataan speeded up the accumulation of supplies and their dispatch by vessel, barge, rail and truck to that peninsula; the destruction of all non-transportable supplies that would be of value to the enemy; the utilization to the fullest of the meagre available transportation in shuttle operations to transfer troops and supplies and the final destruction of communication avenues in the face of the enemy advance.

Upon the transfer of USAFFE Headquarters to Corregidor, an advance echelon remained in Manila and later assumed a similar function on Bataan.

As supplies rapidly diminished, greater ingenuity had to be exercised to pursue every possible source of replacement. Some insignificant quantities of food had been obtained from adjacent islands before the tight embargo placed by enemy land, naval, and air operations had completely dried up even those meagre sources.

Constant touch by radio had been maintained with Australia, China, Hawaii and the War Department in order to exploit every possible source, but distance and enemy embargo nullified all such effort.

V. CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Only the orders issued by the Headquarters of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and United States Forces in the Philippines that vitally effected the campaign are included herein. All details of the campaign are covered in full by the reports of force commanders and corps commanders and are attached hereto as annexes.

Details covered by annexes:

The beach defense period, 8 December to 23 December 1941 annex IV, operations of the North Luzon Force; Annex V, operations of the South Luzon Force and Annex X, operations of the Armored Force.

The period 24 December 1941 to 6 January 1942, the withdrawal to Bataan, annexes IV, V, IX, X and XII. These are the operations reports of the North Luzon Force, the South Luzon Force, the 200th Coast Artillery (AA), the Armored Force and the Philippine Division respectively.

The Bataan Defense, 6 January to 9 April 1942, annex IV, the operation of the I Philippine Corps which defended the western half of the Bataan Peninsula; annex V, the operation of the II Philippine Corps, which defended the eastern half of the Bataan Peninsula, and annex VI, operations of the Luzon Force, which was the higher headquarters charged with the defense of Bataan Peninsula from 11 March 1941.

Annex XII, the operation report of the Philippine Division, 8 December 1941 to 9 April 1942 includes the complete operation of the division in all phases of the Philippine campaign.

The Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, Annex VIII, 8 December 1941 to 7 May 1942, includes the operation of the forces on Corregidor and the other Fortified Islands.

Reports of the Signal, Quartermaster, Medical and Finance activities as submitted by special staff officers of the United States Forces in the Far East and United States Forces in the Philippines are also attached hereto as annexes.

The Philippine campaign has been divided into the following sub-heads:

- A. Preliminary steps immediately preceding war
- B. Beach Defense
- C. Withdrawal into Bataan
- D. Bataan Defense
- E. Corregidor Defense
- F. Visayan-Mindanao Force

In order to maintain chronological sequence these sub-heads appear in the above order.

A. PRELIMINARY STEPS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING WAR

The first tactical command established by USAFFE Headquarters was the Philippine Coast Artillery Command (PCAC). USAFFE received authorization from the War Department to establish this command in August 1941, and immediately issued orders setting up the command with Headquarters in Manila under the command of Brigadier General George F. Moore, AUS.

The command was assigned the mission of the defense of Manila and Subic Bay Harbors. 26 September 1941, the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) New Mexico National Guard assigned to the PCAC.

Major General George Grunert, U.S.A. relieved from command of the Philippine Department 30 October 1941 and departed from the Philippine Islands for the United States.

On 1 November 1941 General MacArthur assumed command of the Headquarters Philippine Department and appointed Colonel Allan C. McBride as Chief of Staff.

On 5 November 1941 USAFFE Headquarters organized the following tactical commands:

1. The North Luzon Force
2. The South Luzon Force
3. The Visayan-Mindanao Force

Officers appointed to command these tactical units:

North Luzon Force: Major General Edwin P. King, Jr., U.S.A., who conducted the training and command functions from Fort Stotsenburg.

Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, AUS, assumed command on 28 November 1941.

South Luzon Force: Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr., AUS.

Visayan-Mindanao Force: Colonel William F. Sharp, U.S.A.

The units, mission and areas of defense assigned to each force stated in general in paragraph III Organization of the Philippine Islands for Defense, and in detail in Annexes IV, V, and XI.

26 November 1941 the Commanding General North Luzon Force, Commanding General South Luzon Force, the Commanding General Philippine Coast Artillery Command, the Commanding Officer of the Visayan-Mindanao Force and commanders of units directly under USAFFE control were notified that diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating rapidly and that troops would be alerted and prepared to meet any surprise attack. General MacArthur talked to General Wainwright, who was commanding the Philippine Division with headquarters at Fort William McKinley, by telephone and instructed him to turn over the command of the Philippine Division as rapidly as possible to Brigadier General Maxon S. Lough, and to assume command of the North Luzon Force at once.

A copy of this warning message was transmitted to the Navy Headquarters.

Again late in the evening of 28 November 1941 USAFFE notified all force commanders and commanders of units directly under USAFFE control that negotiations with Japan were breaking down and that such measures as they saw fit to insure the readiness of their respective commands to meet any eventuality would be taken immediately.

All unit commanders responded at once to this alert order.

See reports of the various force commanders attached hereto as annexes.

From 29 November to 8 December 1941, all Forces and units were engaged in intensive training and preparations for any eventuality, or emergency, and were as ready for war as was possible with the means available.

The first information USAFFE had that hostilities had commenced was about 3:00 AM, 8 December 1941, when an associated press newsman telephoned Major LeGrande Diller, Aide to General MacArthur, reporting to him that he had picked up an AP news flash which stated that Pearl Harbor had been bombed and that hostilities had commenced between the United States and Japan. Major Diller immediately called Brigadier General Sutherland, Chief of Staff, USAFFE, informing him of the message.

General Sutherland instructed Major Diller and Major James V. Collier, Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, USAFFE, to call all members of the General Staff Sections and to direct them to report to headquarters immediately to be prepared to notify all force commanders as soon as USAFFE could get verification from the War Department of this associated press report.

Verification that a state of hostilities existed came in by an official message from the War Department at 3:30 AM.

Immediately upon receipt of this message from the War Department, force commanders, all units directly under USAFFE, and the Navy were sent the following notification: "Hostilities has commenced by an air attack on Pearl Harbor and a state of war exists between the United States of America and the Japanese Empire."

B. BEACH DEFENSE

Beach defense plans had been prepared by Force Commanders and approved by USAFFE prior to the commencement of hostilities. Force Commanders had assigned sectors of defense to subordinates and available troops had occupied defensive positions since 29 November 1941.

8 December 1941.

Headquarters Far East Air Force ordered a heavy bombardment attack on air fields and air installations on Taiwan. The attack formation, scheduled to take off at 2:00 PM, was prevented from carrying out the mission by a heavy Japanese bombing and strafing attack on Clark Field.

Bagio bombed about 8:00 AM, the damage was slight.

Iba and Clark Fields bombed from high altitude at about 12:35 PM, immediately followed by a strafing attack by fighter formations, which destroyed many planes on the ground. The damage to planes and installations was heavy.

These early bombing attacks on our airfields dealt a disastrous blow to our air force and seriously crippled our defensive strength in the Philippine Islands. Enemy bombers came over at a high altitude, 23,000 to 25,000 feet. The time powder-train fuze with which the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) was supplied could not reach the planes. Shells exploded 2,000 to 4,000 feet below the attacking formations. Enemy fighters, following close behind the heavy bombers, came in low dropping light bombs and strafing the fields. The strafing attack inflicted the most serious damage to the B-17's, which were in splinter proof bays that did not provide protection against incendiaries and strafing. Thirteen B-17's were destroyed and severe damage inflicted on the fighter squadrons at Clark and Iba Fields.

Ninety-six trucks and one hundred ninety-six enlisted men (truck drivers) detached from the 200th Coast Artillery

(AA), and used to help form the Provisional Battalions, Self propelled mounts (FA) (SPM).

200th Coast Artillery (AA) organized into two regiments. The second regiment temporarily designated: Provisional 200th Coast Artillery (AA) of Manila, was later officially designated as the 515th Coast Artillery (AA).

Headquarters Philippine Department enemy alien plan immediately put into effect. Japanese civilians living in the Japanese section of Manila ordered to remain in their homes. Military police took over the guard of this section.

9 December 1941.

Nichols Field bombed at 3:00 AM.

Enemy activity, 9 to 12 December, confined mainly to air attacks. After 12 December 1941 our ground forces were practically without air support.

10 December 1941.

Troop "F", 26th Cavalry, released from USAFFE control and rejoined 26th Cavalry.

The Philippine Division ordered to proceed to the vicinity of Arrayat to investigate a reported enemy paratroop landing and to reduce any hostile activity in that area; to take up a position on the Bamban-Arrayat defensive line prepared to reinforce the North Luzon Force.

Investigation by the Commanding General, North Luzon Force, failed to verify the reported enemy paratroop landing at Arrayat. Orders sending the Philippine Division to Arrayat rescinded, and the Division ordered to occupy at once a position in the general vicinity of Layac Junction from which it could cover the withdrawal of troops to Bataan; resist hostile landings in the vicinity of Subic Bay and prevent any advance of the enemy from that direction, or extend beach defenses from