

98-ASF1-0.3 (26447)

Rpt of Operations - USAFFE & USFIP in the Philippine Is.  
(Philippine Division) Annex XII Vol XI

1941-42

BOX 1158, RECORD GROUP 407, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE PARK, MD



98-USFI-0.3 (26447)

Report of Operations - USAFTE & USFTP in the Philippine Island  
(Philippine Division) Annex XII (VOL XI)

Hq, USAFTE 1941-42



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ANNEX XII  
OPERATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE DIVISION

~~ANNEX XIII~~

~~QUARTERMASTER REPORT~~

~~ANNEX XIV~~

~~MEDICAL REPORT~~

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THE PHILIPPINE DIVISION IN 1941 - 1942

1. The Philippine Division in January 1941: Previous to 1941 the Philippine Division had been organized under special tables of organization with the old square division as a basis. However the Division was not equipped as perscribed by the tables of organization of the square division and some of the units were missing in whole or in part. The division had both motor and animal drawn transportation. The machine gun companies and some artillery had pack transportation and particularly in the engineer regiment there was special and extra equipment.

The organizations of the division were:

- a. Division Headquarters - Station Ft. McKinley
- b. Headquarters Company - Station Ft. McKinley
- c. The Military Police Co. (Plus an American platoon) Ft. McKinley.
- d. The 12th Signal Co. Station Ft McKinley
- e. The 14th Engineer Regt (Actually a regiment less one Battalion) Ft. McK.
- f. The 12th Quartermaster Regt. (Actually consisted of Regt. Hqrs. & Cos. A, B, C, D, E, & F. All stationed at Ft. McKinley except Cos A & B (both Truck Cos) which were at the Port Area in Manila, and Co D (Truck) & 1 platoon of Co E (Maint) which were at Ft. Stotsenberg.
- g. The 12th Medical Regt. stationed at Ft. McKinley and consisted of the Hq & Serv Co. Co A (Coll) Co E (Amb) and Co G (Hosp) and the Veterinary Co. it totaled about 220 enl.
- h. The 57th Inf Stationed at Ft. McKinley
- i. The 45th Inf. Stationed at Ft. McKinley (except Cos A & B & most of the 1st Bn Hq. Co. & Hq 1st Bn which were stationed at Camp John Hay near Baguio and Cos C & E & the balance of the Hq Co 1st Bn which were stationed at Pettit Barracks at Zamboango P.I.
- j. The 24th F.A. stationed at Ft. Stotsenberg. It consisted of Regt. Hq. & Hq Btry & two battalions each consisting of a battalion hq btry & three gun batteries. They were equipped with British 75's truck drawn.
- k. The 23d F.A. it was stationed at Ft Stotsenberg and attached to the 24th FA. It consisted of one battery only. A pack battery (2.95 mountain gun. The strength of the artillery at Ft. Stotsenberg totled 998 enlisted.
- l. 12th Ordnance Co. Stationed at Ft. Stotsenberg.
- m. 4th Separate Chemical Co. Attached to the Div Station Ft. McKinley.



2. Recruiting campaign: In January 1941 authority was granted to the Commanding General Philippine Dept. to recruit the Philippine Scouts up to the full strength of 12000 as authorized by congress. All posts were given a quota to secure and ~~all~~ units in the Philippine Division received a considerable increase in strength. Those at Ft. McKinley received increases totaling 3803. These recruits were carefully selected in the field and over 5000 prospective recruits were sent to Ft. McKinley where they were again carefully & more thoroughly examined and the 3803 best qualified were selected. The larger organizations received increases about as follows: 12th Med R<sub>gt</sub> - 170; 12th Q.M. R<sub>gt</sub>. about 400; 14th Engrs about 500; 57th Inf about 1100; 45th Inf about 1625.

The 45th Inf received a much larger increase than the 57th inf because the five companies at Ft. John Hay and Pettit Barracks became companies of the 43d Inf and five new companies to were organized at Ft. McKinley to replace them in the 45th Inf, drawing their cadres from the 45th Inf at large. Also the 45th Inf & the 57th Inf each organized a howitzer company. The strength of these two regiments was about doubled.

The 14th Engrs added a new battalion and raised all companies to full strength. More than doubling the strength of the regiment.

The 12th Med Regt got an additional strength of 170 men (220 to 390) and was organized into a Hq & Serv Co and three clearing companies (A, B & C each with a strength of 110) Co A (Coll) & Co E (Amb) and a Veterinary Co. The Vet. Co. became the 4th Vet. Co. (Sep) and was transferred to the Phil. Dept. The reason for this change was to fit the organization better into WFO-3, each clearing company having elements of hospital, ambulance, and collecting platoons.

The 12th Q.M. Regt added a Service Co., three Bn Hqs Cos. increased the Hq Co from 11 to 69 men and brought all the units up to full authorized strength.

The Field Artillery at Ft. Stotsenberg got 1100 recruits. Key men were sent from the 23d & 24th F.A. to form new units. The 24th sent the British 75's of two batteries to the 23d F.A. and got an equal number of 2.95 mountain guns. The one battery of the 23d FA was expanded to a battalion consisting of a Hq & Hq Btry. 2 batteries of British 75's (Partee) and one battery 2.95 pack.

The 24th F.A. battalions were organized 2 batteries British 75's (Truck drawn) and 1 battery of 2.95 A. Pack. These organizations were brought to full strength. The balance of the 1100 recruits plus key men from the 23d & 24th F.A. went



to form the 88th FA consisting of two battalions. Each battalion consisted of a Bn Hq & Hq Btry and two gun batteries (75's truck drawn). Also was formed one Bn of the 86 FA consisting of a Bn Hq & Hq Btry and two gun batteries (155 GPF). Later the Hq Btry was changed to a gun battery making three gun batteries and No Hq Btry.

The recruiting campaign ended in the first week of April 1941. The required number of recruits having been obtained.

3. Training in 1941: Intensive training was started concurrently with the recruiting. The thirteen week basic training program was made the basis of training but was condensed somewhat. Excellent results were obtained as a good corps of officers & non-commissioned officers was available. More firing, especially combat firing would have been desirable, but the state of ammunition supply in the Philippines would not permit this.

After basic training was completed, training of platoons, companies, battalions and regiments was taken up in order. A couple of combat team exercises were held at Ft. McKinley & vicinity. One division CFX was held on the Ft. Stotsenberg reservation and a series of division exercises was planned for on the Fort Stotsenberg reservation. These were to be held in Oct. 1941 and were to last about two weeks. They were postponed twice due to several reasons. The final date was set for in Dec. but as the war started on Dec. 8 this final series of division exercises (one & two sided) was never held.

4. Special Security measures: As the tension between the U.S. & Japan grew, precautions for the security of Ft. McKinley and the protection of property & stores were taken. The interior guard was increased. Special guards (detached guards in some cases) were placed over aviation gas & bombs for the Air Corps. These were later replaced by guards furnished by Nichols Field. Plans to combat incendiary bombing were made and put into effect. Some special fire fighting equipment was assembled. In May a plan for defense against para-troops and the protection of critical points was drawn up. One feature called for the holding of one company reinforced with machine guns in barracks at all times with trucks in the immediate vicinity for the instant dispatch to the threatened area. Another feature called for the establishment of several detached air guard posts manned 24 hours a day and special signal communication linking them up with the telephone central at Ft. McKinley. These special guards were put on early in May 1941. The plan further called for the division of the reservation & vicinity into areas for defense to each of which was assigned one of the Major units of the Division. Several exercises were held to practice all units and to insure that all men & units were familiar with



their duties and the plan as a whole.

About this time the guard over the stores in Bataan was increased from a company to a battalion. Barracks were built at Limay for these troops where they lived when not actually on guard over the stores or at the out-guards on the west coast of Bataan. The stores at Bataan had been greatly increased and a large number of small ware houses & roads had been built by the 14th Engrs. & civilian labor in 1940 & 1941. This was a Philippine Department project.

5. Losses of Personnel: On July 28, 1941 the Headquarters of US.AFFE was organized and immediately the Division began to lose personnel to this and other headquarters that were started being called into service and large numbers of officers & men were taken from the Division to induct, administer & train these new units. Also a number of non-commissioned officers & specialists were taken for cadres to form new units. For example fifty truck drivers were taken to drive trucks for self propelled artillery battalions and a large number of specialists were taken from the Division Signal Co and the Infantry Headquarters Cos to form a communication unit for USAFFE. This loss of personnel began on July 28 and continued until was was declared. Loss of officers continued until the surrender almost. All units from Division Headquarters down were effected. It is estimated that between these dates the division lost about 1/3 of its officers & 1/3 of its higher non-commissioned officers, and a large number of specialists. As an example the Division Headquarters lost the division commander, the second in command Div. Arty Officer, G-2, G-3, Adj Gen. Div. Q.M., Surg, Sig Officer & several assistants. Fortunately replacements were available.

6. Post Service Command: Starting probably in June 1941 plans for a post service command were made. These were changes several times as the War Plans & the mission of Ft. McKinley was changed. At least three Tables of Organization were made. The top figure based on a large base hospital at Ft. McKinley & the post being used as a temporary garrison for troops passing through, called for a total of around 1000 officers & men. Some of the officers at Ft. McKinley had mobilization assignments in the Post Service Command. Some units such as the Post Hospital and Post Q.M. Detachments were exclusively the Post Service Command but due to shortages of personnel many officers who would accompany the division in the field also had peace time duties with the post. For example the Division Commander was also Post Commander. The Chief of Staff also Post Executive, Division Surgeon & Division Quartermaster were Post Surgeon & Post Quartermaster respectively etc. etc. A number of men in the Quartermaster regiment performed duties with the Post Quartermaster detachment also etc.etc.



About the early part of Sept 1941 when plans were being made to shrink the quartermaster, engineer & medical regiments down to battalions and to use the 45th Inf to bring the 57th Inf up to full war strength, it was planned to use the excess in part to fully man the Post Service Command. Plans had been completed and the men selected & tentatively assigned. Since the 45th Inf took the fields as a unit, the Post Service Command was never fully manned.

7. Projected Reorganization of Phillipine Division: It was probably in the latter part of September that Hq USAFFE decided to reorganize the Philippine Division as a New "Triangular Division at war strength. The division was to be part scout units & part American units. Part of the Div Hq & MP Co was to be filipino and part american. The same for the Artillery. The 31st Inf (American) was made part of the division and to be brought up to full war strength by replacements from the U.S. The 45th Inf was to be used largely as filler replacements to bring the 57th Inf up to full war strength. The excess scout personnel gained by shrinking the engineer, quartermaster & medical regiments to battalions used to form new units & in the Post service command. A National Guard reg. was to be brought from the US and be made the third Inf Regt in the division. It was regretted keenly by all concerned that the 45th Inf a highly efficient organization with a fine history would have to be broken up but with the limitation of 12000 scouts and the new units to be formed, or old ones brought to war strength it was felt necessary to scrap the 45th Inf. However this did not come to pass as war came before it was accomplished though all plans had been fully completed. The division with the exception of the three Infantry regiments was organized on the basis of the "Triangular Division" a few days before war was declared. The replacements for the Infantry not having arrived from the U.S. The enlisted strength present in the infantry regiments were about as follows: 31st Inf 1500; 45th & 57th Inf. each about 2000. They had no regimental medical detachment. There was no medium artillery.

On Dec. 8, 1941 when war was declared the troops and stations were as follows: At Ft. McKinley, Div Hq, Div Hq & MP Co (PS) except that the MP Platoon was American, 12th Sig Co (PS), 14th Engr Bn (PS), 12th Med Bn (PS), 12th QM Bn (PS), 45th Inf (PS) one bn (1st Bn) was at Limay, Battan, 4th Sep Cml Co (Amer) attached, 57th Inf (PS).

At Manila: 31st Inf (American) one bn was bivouaced at Ft. McKinley.

At Ft. Stotsenberg: 24th F.A. (PS), 23d FA (PS) A one bn unit consisting of two batteries 75's (Portee) & one battery 2.95 gun. 12th Ord. Co. (attached)

With the exception of the newly organized 12th Engr Bn all of the above units were at



greatly reduced strength. There were many last minute withdrawals.

8. Combat Team Organization: The units had been organized into combat teams as follows:

<u>COMBAT TEAM 31</u>	<u>COMBAT TEAM 45</u>	<u>COMBAT TEAM 57</u>
31st Inf (U.S)	45th Inf (PS)	57th Inf. (PS)
23d FA (PS)	2d Bn 24th FA (PS)	1st Bn 24th FA (PS)
Co "C" 14th Eng Bn (PS)	Co "A" 12th Med Bn (PS)	Co "A" 14th Engr Bn (Ps)
Co "B", 12th Med Bn (PS)	Co "B" 14th Engr Bn (PS)	Co "C", 12th Med Bn (PS)

Very little combat team training had been done prior to the declaration of war.

9. Equipment:

a. Arms: The status of arms & ammunition in the division or available to it left much to be desired. The division had been armed & trained with the M-1 rifle but there was a serious shortage of the modern infantry weapons, i.e. light machine guns, 60mm & 81 mm mortars, 50 cal. machine guns and the new 37mm anti-tank gun (only 3 per Inf regiment. Some of the other weapons were obsolete, for example, the old 37mm gun unmodified Browning Automatic rifle, 3 inch french mortars. The Artillery was armed as previously described. There was no medium artillery in the division.

b. Ammunition: There was enough small arms ammunition for individual requirements but there was no 60mm ammunition. Very little 81mm ammunition. The 3 inch mortar ammunition was about 50 % defective and the quantity of hand grenades was negligible. The lack of high angle fire ammunition was particularly serious due to the value of these weapons in jungle warfare. The lack of a reserve of infantry weapons for replacements was no less serious.

b. Equipment: The main shortages in equipment was in motor vehicles which was solved in part by the acquisition of commercial vehicles on the out break of the war. Enough was secured to move the division. Shortage of fire control equipment No reserve. Signal equipment was adequate except there was no motor radio equipment and little reserve. Salvage & the exploitation of civilian resources helped some.

10. War Plans: The war plans for the use of the division in case of our invasion which had obtained prior to the establishment of Hq USAFFE had been revoked. On Dec 5 the comdg Gen Philippine Division was notified verbally that in case of hostilities the division would be held in Army reserve with initial station in the vicinity of Tayug, Pangasinan Province, and that the 91st Div there in the vicinity of ~~Tayug~~ Bougabon, Nueva Ecija Province would come under his control. The area



near Tayug was reconnoitered by the staff and the Hq 91st Div contacted such general plans as were possible were made in the limited time available to the division.

11. War Declared Dec 8, 1941: On Dec 8, 1941 word was received that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor and war was declared that morning. The troops of Ft McKinley moved out of barracks and in the area as provided in the plans for the defense of Ft. McKinley. Later in the day the airfields at Iba, Clark Field & Baguio were bombed. (The 1<sup>st</sup> Bn 45th moved from Limay & took a position in beach defense at Bagac in P.M. 8 Dec.)

12. Nichols Field Bombed Dec 9 & 10: At 3:10 AM 9 Dec Nichols Field was bombed. Some of the planes flew over Ft. McKinley and were at. Some bombs dropped short of their target and struck in the area of the 14th Engrs. causing a few casualties. These were the first casualties suffered by the division. On Dec 10 Nichols Field was again bombed and Ft. McKinley, Nicholson Airport & Camblon Field were strafed but no casualties were suffered by the division. The attack took place at about 12:47 PM and some troops of the division fired at the low flying planes. Individual shelters were constructed on Dec 8, 9 & 10. (Property turned in & stored etc.)

13. Move into the Field: Shortly after the air raid on Dec 10 the Comdg General was summoned to Hq USAFFE and was informed of the reported landing of hostile paratroops in the vicinity of Arayat, Pampanga Province. Advised that the previously discarded war plans were again in effect and that he was to proceed without delay Investigated the reported landing of paratroops near Argat reduced any hostile activity in that vicinity and take up the Bamban-Arayat position, prepared to reinforce the North Luzon Force or cover its withdrawal in case such action was necessary.

The Division Commander returned to Div Hq at once and ordered the 57th Inf to proceed to the vicinity of Arayat and carry out the first part of the mission, and the other units of the division to proceed to their positions on the Bamban-Arayat line. Accordingly early the afternoon the 2d Bn, 57th Inf moved out followed by the 1st & 2d Bns all fully motorized its organization transportation augmented by civilian motor transportation. The regiment cleared the post before dark & followed the route Pasig-Marakina-Bigao-Plaridel-Calumpit-San Fernando-Mexico. The other elements of CT 57ie, Co A 14 Engrs, Co C 12 Med Bn were attached. The Artillery to join en route. The remainder of the troops of the division at Ft. McKinley followed the 57th Inf to their positions. In this order - Fwd Ech Div Hq under the Chief of Staff, Sig Co, Hq & MP Co & Med Bn - 45th Inf - 31st Inf. The elements of the combat teams accompanied the Infantry regiments, except the artillery was to join in route or at their positions. The Division commander & part of the staff remained at Ft. McKinley till all troops had cleared early in the morning of Dec 11.



The move out of the post was made without any serious difficulty but delay was caused by the late arrival of civilian transportation. Plans had been made for certain civilian companies to furnish motor transportation but enroute to Ft. McKinley a large number of drivers deserted their vehicles due to the bombing and it was necessary for the division to locate the transportation furnish drivers and service the vehicles. While the 57th Inf was enroute the division commander was informed that the reported landing of hostile para-troops in the vicinity of Arayat was false and he was directed to abandon the Arayat mission and to occupy a position from which he could cover the withdrawal of troops into the Bataan Peninsula, resist hostile landings in the vicinity of Subic Bay & prevent any advance of the enemy from the direction of Olongepa and expend the beach defenses on the west coast of Bataan from Bagacoi to Aglalong Bay. Part of the 57th Inf had already passed through San Fernando enroute to Mexico. These were turned around and the 57th Inf directed to take up the Guagua-Paroc position. Some delay & confusion was caused by this but it proved not serious. It caused the temporary assignment of the artillery of CT 45 & CT 51 to be switched. Other units were given new locations and missions.

14. Positions on Dec 11, 1941: The morning of Dec 11 found all units in or entering the areas assigned them prepared to accomplish their assigned mission. The 57th Inf was in assembly areas along the Guagua-Parac highway prepared to take up a position on the Guagua-Parac line to cover the withdrawal of friendly troops into the Bataan peninsula and to protect the west flank from any advance from that direction. The 45th Inf (less the 1st Bn) was in an assembly area on the Dinalupian-Alongopo highway near the zig & zag prepared to resist hostile landing in Subic Bay & prevent hostile advance from that direction. The 1st Bn 45th Inf Bagac defending the Bagac Bay Area. The 31st Inf (less 1st Bn) was in an assembly area on the Pillar-Bagac highway near KP 137.5 in division reserve. The 1st Bn 31st Inf was in Manila defending the Port Area & Hq USAFFE. The 23d FA was in support of the 45 Inf near Zig-Zag on the Alongapo road. The 1st Bn 24 FA was supporting the 57th Inf on the Guagua-Parac line. The 2d Bn 24th FA was in an assembly area near the 31st Inf on the Pilar-Bagac road just west of KP 137.5. The Div Hq (less rear echelon), Hq. Prov Arty Brig., Hq & MP Co & 12th Sig Co were all in Hermosa Bataan. Rear Ech Div Hq was in Limay. The 14th Engr Bn (less two Cos) & 12th Med Bn (less 3 Coll Cos) were in Orani. These Cos were with the Inf Regts to which they were normally attached for combat. The 12th QM Bn was in Samat. The 12th Ord Co was in Samat. On Dec 11 the Philippine Division changed from Army Reserve to the Bataan Force.

15. Dec. 12 to Dec 23: This period was directed mainly to the organization



strengthening of the positions that the division had taken up. Only minor changes occurred. On Dec 12 one battalion of the 57th Inf was moved from the Guagua-Porac line to Abucay & placed directly under control of the division commander. On Dec 14 the following moves were made to dispose units more favorable for their probable future employment:

- Div Hq (less Rear echelon) & Special Troops to Abucay
- 14th Engr Bn (less two Cos) to Balango
- 12th Med Bn (less Cos A, B & C) to junction of Trail 10 & East Road
- 12th QM Bn to Demalog Trail, 2 miles west of East Road
- 12th Ord Co to Pilar

Distributing points for signal, engineer, medical & quartermaster supplies accompanied their respective service agencies & opened for distribution at the new location the next day.

On Dec 17 the 1st Bn 45th Inf was attached to the 31st Div (PA) Brig Gen Clifford Bluemel, Comdg. which the day before had withdrawn from Zambaly Province into the Bataan peninsula and bivouaced in the vicinity of Bagac. He assigned to command the Bagac Bay Defence Sector & had command of all troops in that sector.

On Dec 19 due to the reported presence of hostile vessels in the vicinity of Subic Bay the battalion of the 57th Inf in division reserve at Abucay was sent to Olongapo with orders to repel any hostile attempt at landing at or near that point.

On Dec 20th the 57th Inf (less one battalion) was shifted forward to an east, west line astride highway No. 3 through Angeles with orders to cover the withdrawal of the North Luzon Forces from the north, paying particular attention to the west flank. The 2d Bn (PC) which had been inducted into the service of the US but three days previously was attached to the 57th Inf and assigned to a position on the east flank of the Angeles line.

On Dec 22 the threat of a hostile landing at Subic Bay having temporarily disappeared the battalion of the 57th Inf which had been sent to Olongapo on Dec 19 was withdrawn and returned to control of the C.O. 57th Inf. It was placed in regimental reserve behind the Angeles line.

On Dec 23d the 12th Med Bn (less 3 cos) moved to Limay and established the Div Evacuation Station at that point.

16. Change of Commanders of Bataan Force Dec 24: On Dec 24 Brig Gen Geo Parker arrived at the Div C.P. at Abucay and assumed command of the Bataan Force. This placed the control of the Philippine Division under his control but caused no immediate move of any of the units.



5 Jan ?  
17. Dec 25 to Jan 15 Division Part of Bataan Force: This period was marked

by the rapid withdrawal of the North Luzon & South Luzon Forces into Bataan. Some change of position of Philippine Division units occurred & positions strengthened.

On Dec 25th Div Hq (less rear echelon) moved from Abucay to KP 137.5 on the Pilar-Bagac road. Hq 12th QM Bn joined the remainder of its battalion on the Damalog Trail. 14 Eng Bn (less 2 Cos) moved to the Damalog Trail. The 31st Inf (less 1st Bn) moved from the Pilar-Bagac road at KP 137.5 to Abucay in reserve. On Dec 26 the 12th Med Bn moved from Limay to a point about one mile north-west of Rodriguez Park opposite KP 155.5 East Road. The 45th Inf (less 1st Bn) moved from near the Zig-Zag on the Olongapo-Dinalopi road & the vicinity of KP 155.5 on the Pilar-Bagac road. the 23d FA from vicinity of the Zig-Zag to position just south of Colss. The 2d Bn 24th FA from near KP 137.5 on the Pilar-Bagac road to a position in support of the 1st Bn 45th Inf on beach defense at Bagac. On Dec 27th the 31st Inf (less 1st Bn) moved from abucay to Calis where the 23d FA was already in position. On Dec 29th the 1st Bn 31st Inf which had been in Manila joined the rest of the regiment at Colis. On Dec 30 the 31st Inf (less 1st Bn) moved from Colis to vicinity of the Zig-Zag to cover the west flank of the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force into Bataan; the 23d FA followed the 31st Inf in support; and the 1st Bn 31 Inf moved to just south of Orion and put to work on the Second Battle Position in that sector. On Dec 31 the 57th Inf was withdrawn from the Angeles position to Abucay and took up a position on the first battle position as follows:

Outpost line of resistance - east & west line through Samal

Main Line of Resistance - east & west line through Mabatang

Hq & Regimental reserve at Abucay

The 1st Bn 24 FA accompanied the 57th Inf & took up a position in support of it at Abucay

The 41st Div (FA) which moved into Bataan on Dec 24 & 25 extended the line to the west. On Dec 31 the CG Phillipne Division placed in command of the East Sector. On Jan 5 Div Hq (less rear echelon) and Spec Troops moved to Damalog Trail about two miles west of East Road. 14th Engr Bn moved to junction of Trail 10 & east road. 31st Inf (less 1st Bn) moved from the Zig-Zag on the Olongapo Road to a position west of the highway to Colis. The 23d FA accompanied the 31st Inf & took up a position in direct support at Colis. The 12th Ord Co moved to an area just west of the East Road at junction of East Road & Damalog Trail. This unit was continuously engaged in servicing all artillery in the east sector or wherever needed. It rendered exceptional & outstanding service.



18. Jan. 6 The First Engagement. Colis. Loss of 23d FA: At 1:45 AM Jan 6 the last troops of the North Luzon Force withdrew into Bataan. At 2:00 AM the Lyac junction bridge was destroyed & the North Luzon Force was behind the covering force which was occupying a generally east & west line through Colis. The covering force was disposed in order from right to left: 71st Inf (PA, 72 Inf (PS), 31st Inf (US), and the 26th Cav. The 72 Inf was astride the East Road & the 31st Inf (US) was west of the road. One battalion of self propelled artillery was attached to the 31st Inf (US) and the 23d FA was in direct support. The enemy followed close on the rear of the retiring North Luzon Force and at about 8:30 AM was fired on by our artillery. This was the first engagement participated in by troops of the Philippine Division. The fight on this position continued through the day & was marked by severe artillery duels. The 23d FA (consisting of one battalion only) came under intense counter battery and was destroyed losing 11 of its 12 guns. The enemy had complete air superiority.

Under cover of darkness on the night of 6-7 Jan the covering force withdrew leaving the enemy in possession of the Colos Position. The 31st Inf withdrew to Damalog Trail.

On Jan 6 the I & II Corps were formed. Gen Wainwright commanded the I Corps & the West Sector & Gen Parker the II Corps and the East Sector of the Bataan Defensive system.

19. Jan. 7. In USAFFE Reserve: On Jan 7 the Philippine Division was placed in USAFFE reserve. It had attached to it for supply the 41st & 51st Divs. The Prov. Tank Brig., the Prov Air Corps Regt & the Prov S.P.M. Battalion which with the Philippine Division made over 18000 men and 1300 vehicles.

The 57th Inf with 1st Bn 24 FA in support remained in position on the First Battle Position (Abucay - Hacienda Line).

The 45th Inf (Less 1st Bn) was in bivouac near KP 155.5 on the Pilar-Bagac Road. The 1st Bn 45th Inf with the 2d Bn 24 FA in support was on beach defense at Bagac.

The 31st Inf was engaged in preparing the Second Battle Position just South of Orion.

The 23d FA had ceased to exist. Its men were transferred to other organizations.

20. Jan 8 to 14 In USAFFE Reserve: This period was largely a period of reconnaissance and development by the Japanese for an attack on the Main Battle Position. After the engagement at Colis they used patrols & reconnaissance in force. They



They made contact with the Abucay - Hacienda line on Jan 8. Contact was maintained on Jan 8, 9, 10. On the night of Jan 10-11 and on night of Jan 11-12 the 3d Bn 57th Inf on the Abucay line was attacked by the Japanese, estimated in each case by a battalion. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy loss to the Japanese. On Jan 14, the 1st Bn 45 Inf was relieved from beach defense at Bagac, moved to KP 148.5 on Pilar-Bagac road & started work on a defensive position on Trail 7. On Jan 12 the rear echelon moved to a point 1 mi west of KP 148.9 East road. On Jan 14-15 enemy pressure increased against the Abucay-Hacienda line. On the night of 14-15 Jan the 45 Inf & 2d Bn 24 FA were moved from the West to the East Sector & went into bivouac near Bani. On Jan 15 an advance CP was established. Personnel consisted of C.G. c/s, G-2 & G-3 sections & detachments from Signal & Hq & MP Co. The rest of the forward echelon of Div Hq was left on the Damalog Trail under G-4. The advance CP first went to vicinity of KP 144 Pilar Bagac Road and next day to a point on the Maldica River about 2 Km north of the Pilar-Bagac road where it remained till Jan 24. The 45th Inf moved from Bani to an assembly area on the Slisay River on night of Jan 15-16, and the 2d Bn 24 FA put into position to support the Abucay-Hacienda line, and the 31st Inf moved up to an assembly area just east of Bani. On the 16th the enemy broke through the 51st Div (PA) on the extreme left of the main battle position (Abucay-Hacienda-Mt. Natib). The 51st Div withdrew creating a serious situation on that flank.

In the after-noon the 31st Inf was moved up to a position on the Abucay-Hacienda line about three (3) mi west of Abucay and orders were issued for the 45th Inf to move at once to the left flank of the Abucay-Hacienda position and halt any attempted advance by the enemy on that flank. On the morning of the 17th the 31st Inf moved into position east of the Hacienda and attacked in a northerly direction, with the 2d Bn on the right and the 1st Bn on the left, to reestablish the mainline of resistance and to protect the exposed left flank of the 41st Div (PA). The 2d Bn advanced a short way and was stopped by heavy hostile resistance, leaving a gap between this battalion and the 41st Div on its right. The 1st Bn pushed its attack successfully to the Main Line of Resistance, thus leaving a gap between the 1st & the 2d Bn on its right.

The 3d Bn 45th attacked on the left of the 1st Bn 31st Inf and also reached the Main Line of Resistance, and in contact with the 31st Inf, but not in contact with the rest of the regiment. The country was very much broken and wooded contact was lost between the 3d Bn & the rest of the regiment and was extremely difficult to maintain between any unit as it went forward. The 3d Bn 45th was attached to the



31st Inf and was the left element on the Abucay-Hacienda line. Therefore the west flank was exposed. On the night of 17th-18th Jan. The 45th Inf (less 3d Bn) moved into the gap between the 41st Div (PA) and the 31st Inf. On 18 Jan the 31st Inf failed to make any advance. At 4:00 PM the 1st Bn 45th Inf attacked from a position on the right of the 31st Inf in a direction slightly west of north and by 6:45 PM reached its objective on the Main Line of Resistance. However when it reached it it was in contact neither with the 41st Div on its right or the 31st Inf on its left rear. There was a gap of about 1000 yds on its right and one of about 1200 or 1500 on its left. The 2d Bn 45th Inf was moved into a position in reserve behind the interval between the 31st Inf and the 1st Bn. On 19 Jan the 31st Inf continued its effort to dislodge the enemy from the Hacienda pocket. Early in the day the 1st Bn 45th Inf was withdrawn to regain contact with the 31st Inf. Later in the day the 1st Bn 45th Inf & the 2d Bn 45 Inf (2d Bn on the left) again attacked by the north and reached the Main Line of Resistance. After this successful attack there still remained a gap of about 750 yds between the 45th Inf units and the 41st Div. Contact patrols were sent out by the 1st Bn 45th Inf to cover this gap & contact was established & maintained thereafter.

On 20 Jan there was brisk action throughout the day in the Hacienda pocket but no material change was developed. The enemy succeeded in infiltrating about one company through the line and in rear of the 2d Bn 45th Inf. This hostile force was encircled by the 31st Inf, 45th Inf & some elements of the 41st Div but managed to escape on the night of the 20-21st but left behind a large number of dead. On 21 Jan the pressure against the 31st Inf was increased greatly and it was evident that the enemy was preparing to effect a movement around the left flank from the direction of Mt. Natie. The 31st Inf made strong efforts to dislodge the enemy but with no success.

About 3:00 PM the 1st Bn 45th Inf was moved to the east so as to make contact with the 41st Div and the line was refused to the south-west towards the Abucay-Hacienda Road & thus present a uniform front to the threatened attack from the direction of Mt. Natib.

The 2d Bn was ordered to conform to this movement and made contact with the 31st Inf on its left. However it did not fully complete the movement and make the contemplated change of front & contact. It stopped short of the desired position



and left a gap between its right and the 1st Bn 31st Inf.

On 22d Jan the situation on the left flank grew worse. Repeated attacks & and counter attacks took place but no material gains were made. On the contrary the 1st Bn 31st Inf was forced to withdraw from the Main Line of Resistance to a position south of the Abucay-Hacienda road & facing Mt. Natib.

The 3d Bn 31st Inf withdrew to the rear and made contact with the 2d Bn 31st Inf on its right along the Abucay-Hacienda Road. But there still was a gap on its left flank and the 1st Bn 31st Inf which was south of the road. The 3d Bn 45th Inf which was still attached to the 31st Inf and had been on the Main Line of Resistance and on the extreme left and abreast of the 1st Bn 31st Inf was withdrawn through the gap between the 3d & 1st Bns 31st Inf and placed in 31st Inf reserve. It made several counter attacks to stop the enemy who was making determined efforts to penetrate the gap. Those counter attacks were more or less successful but the threat against the left flank of the 1st Bn 45th Inf was becoming more dangerous. Late in the after-noon of the 22d word was recieved at Hq Philippine Division from Hq II Corps to have a representative of the Comdg Gen Philippine Division at the advance command-Post II Corps (Northern exit of Pilar) at 10:00 AM 23 Jan to receive orders. The Comdg Gen Philippine Division was at the Hq 41st Div where he had been since 18 Jan where he was in closer touch with the commanding officers of his three infantry regiments and where at the same time he had wire communication with his command post on the Maldica River and other headquarters.

On the 23d Jan the Chief of Staff & G-3 Philippine Division were at the advance command post II Corps, and received between the hours of 10:00 AM and 12:30 PM from G-3 II Corps an oral warning order for the withdrawal from the Main Battle Position, and the occupation of the Reserve Battle Position. This order directed (1) That on the night of 23-24 Jan the artillery begin withdrawal by echelon and that the withdrawal be completed by daylight 25 Jan. (2) That on the night 24-25 the Infantry would withdraw as follows: (a) A covering force under the command of the Comdg Gen Philippine Division and composed of one third (1/3) the strength of each of the 31st Inf & 57th Inf to begin withdrawal from the Main Battle Position at 7:00 PM 24 Jan and take up a covering position in the vicinity of Balanga to cover the withdrawal of the main elements from the Abucay-Hacienda line. (b) Main elements to begin withdrawal at 11:00 PM leaving behind a shell to screen & protect their withdrawal. (c) The shell to begin its withdrawal at 3:00 AM 25 Jan. (d) The withdrawal to be completed by daylight 25 Jan. (e) The 45th Inf upon withdrawal to proceed to an assembly area about 600 yds south west of the junction of Trails 8 & 9 in the sector



of the I Corps. (3) That the covering force begin its withdrawal from the covering position at Balanga at 11:30 PM night of 25-26 Jan and complete their withdrawal by daylight on morning 26 Jan.

The remainder of the 23d was devoted to holding the enemy and making plans (and reconnaissances) for the withdrawal.

On the 24th FO No 2 Hq II Corps dated 23 Jan was received. This order confirmed all the instructions contained in the Warning Order received on the 23d and directed that upon withdrawal from the Main Battle Position, Hq Philippine Division would assume command of Subsector D of the Reserve Battle Position which would be garrisoned in the order named from east to west by the 21st Div (PA) 41st Div (PA) and the 57th Inf (Philippine Division); that the 31st Inf (Philippine Division) upon the completion of the covering Force task, would withdraw to a bivouac area west of Limay in II Corps Reserve, that the 24 FA (less 2d Bn) would be absorbed by the Provisional Artillery Brig., and that the entire withdrawal would be completed on the night 25-26 Jan.

On the night of the 23d-24th Jan the 24th FA began withdrawal by echelon as ordered. (The 2d Bn 24 FA went to the west sector with the 45th Inf).

On the night 24-25 Jan the advance command post was moved from the Maldica River to the vicinity of KP 137 (?) on the Pilar-Bagac Road.

The Provisional Air Corps Regt was withdrawn from the Division and moved to just south of Arion on the Reserve Battle Position.

The 45th Inf moved into the West Sector and went into bivouac about 600 yds south-west of the Junction of Trails 5 & 7.

The 31st Inf took up a covering position at Balanga astride of the East Road.

The 57th Inf occupied a covering position on the left (west) of the 31st Inf and two (2) units of fire & three (3) days Class I Rations were laid down on their respective sub-sector Defense positions, for each 21st Div, 41st Div & 57th Inf this advance issue of ammunition and rations was made because the only approach to Sub-Sector D Positions was via the East Road & the Pilar-Bagac road, and the Pilar-Bagac road would be denied to our troops after the withdrawal; and because the service of supply to our troops in Sub-sector D would be extremely difficult until usable roads & trails could be opened up into the position.



On the 25th all preparations were completed so far as Hq Philippine Division was concerned for the withdrawal. The forward echelon of Div Hq (less advance CP) Div Hq & MP Co (less detachments) and a detachment of 12th Sig Co were moved from the Damalog Trail to a position about one (1) kilometer west of KP 148.9 on the East Road, under the immediate supervision of G-4. This move placed in one locality the above and the rear echelon of Div Hq and the 12th QM Battalion. The forward echelon & rear echelon remained in this position under the supervision of G-4 until April 7.

The 12th Ord Co (attached) was moved to a position on the East Road near Limay.

On the evening of the 25th at 7:25 PM an officer messenger (Capt Dunmyer) arrived at the advance command post and transmitted a change of the withdrawal order. This change directed that the 57th Infantry upon the completion of its task in the covering force would be withdrawn to a bivouac area just north of Limay in Army Reserve and the 33d Inf (PA) would occupy & defend the sector of Sub-sector D which had previously been assigned to the 57th Inf. In as much as some elements of the 57th Inf had already moved into Sub-sector D this change necessitated the crossing of units in motion and resulted in some confusion.

However during the night of the 25th-26th the withdrawal from the Main Battle Position to Sub-sector D was completed as ordered, and the morning of the 26th found all troop assigned to the subsector in or entering their assigned sector & engaged in organizing & strengthening the position. The very superior & outstanding work of the Div Chief of Staff during this critical period of withdrawal in directing and co-ordinating the planning & operations of the General & Special Staff sections of the Division Staff & supervising the movements out of the main battle position & into the Reserve Battle Position is especially worthy of mention. (Also the work of G-3 & G-4)

On the 26th the 45th Inf moved into an assembly area at Sasayan River and out-off trail 39. The 57th Inf moved into bivouac on Mariviles Cutoff, except one Bn which went into bivouac near KP 188 West Road.

On the 26th the advance CP of the Philippine Division (Hq Sub-sector D) was established near the southern end of Trail 44-a, south-east of Mt. Samat.

21. January 27 to April Subsector "D": During the period Jan 7 to Apr 1942 the history of the Philippine Division (less its Infantry regiments & the 24 FA) is largely the history of Sub sector "D" as commanded and administered by the Comdg Gen



of the Philippine Division as previously stated, the combat troops garrisoning this Sub-sector were all Philippine Army units and consisted of the 21st Div (PA), 41st Div (PA) & the 33d Inf (PA). Throughout the entire period, these units remained in Sub-sector "D" under command of Hq Philippine Division without change, excepting a brief relief of the 33d Inf (3 Mar to 3 Apr).

Under the command of the Commanding General Philippine Division, the organic units of the division performed not only their normal functions, but also carried in addition the burden of performing or supervising all the functions for all of the Philippine Army units which came under the command of the Hq Philippine Division.

The 14th Engr Bn continued to construct and improve roads & trails leading into & within the Sub-sector, to supervise the preparation & strengthening of the position for a defense & to perform all other engineering activities for the Sub-sector falling within the scope of its responsibilities.

The 12th Med. Bn established & operated advance emergency hospital within the Sub-sector (immediate evacuation for sub-sector troops being impossible due to the absence of roads or trails) and continued to evacuate all troops of the Philippine Div & all American Troops in the II Corps.

The Division Signal Co directed & supervised the construction, maintenance & operation of all signal communication within the Sub-sector and the 12th Q.M. Bn & Div Ord Sec procured, transported and delivered direct to all troops in the Sub-sector munitions and supplies of all classes. Due to the lack of roads & even usable trails leading into the sub-sector, the extremely rugged & broken terrain & the dense tropical jungle growth, the matter of supply presented a most difficult problem, the solution of which required great ingenuity & prodigious effort and involved the combined use of pack mules, carabaoes & cargadores. In brief, during this entire period, Hq Phil. Div., employing organic division troops, commanded and administered a force of over 14,000 men.

Probably due to the very heavy casualties that he had suffered in over coming the Main Battle Position, the enemy was slow to follow up the advantage through our withdrawal to the Reserve Battle Position. He advanced very cautiously and allowed contact with our Main forces to be broken off for two or three days after our withdrawal. This respite was of great value to our forces in that it permitted them to begin without hostile interference. The organization & strengthening of the defensive installations of the Reserve Battle Position.

The first contact of the enemy with our troops in Sub-sector "D" was made by small reconnaissance patrols. The strength of these patrols was soon increased



and these in turn were followed by reconnaissance in force.

Daily local combat occurred along the front of the sub-sector between hostile patrols which collided with our own patrols or OFLR troops, and frequently reconnaissance in force were made which varied in strength from a company to a battalion, but it is believed never exceeded a battalion in any one effort, in these encounters severe losses were inflicted on the enemy by our troops, and those losses would have been greatly increased had our troops been equipped with modern hand grenades, infantry mortars and adequate automatic weapons. However the supporting artillery rendered superior service and repeatedly broke up hostile concentrations, destroyed formations and frustrated attacks. The effectiveness of our artillery can hardly be over estimated. It inflicted heavy punishment on the enemy and was without doubt the defensive weapon that he feared most. Although increasing the strength of his efforts to discover weak points in our defensive organization the enemy did not change his cautious attitude. This resulted in no serious situations developing in Sub-sector "D" during the first few weeks of its occupation. Finally on Feb. 14 the enemy made a general retirement all along the front of the II Corps and thereafter, except for minor patrol actions and constant aerial reconnaissance, made no further trouble for Sub-sector "D" until the latter part of March. He will therefore be dropped from the narrative for the time being.

Meanwhile though operating under the immediate command of other headquarters during this period the movements and activities of the detached units of the Philippine Division (the Inf Regts & 24th FA) will be chronologically recorded in order to make the history of the Division more complete & keep the record up to date.

On 27 Jan the 66th Pack Troop was attached to the Philippine Division in order to make possible the supply of Sub-sector "D". The 1st Platoon of the 65th Pack Troop had previously been attached on the 19th to make possible the supply of the 51st Div on the Mt. Natib position. These two pack units were combined and attached to the 12th QM Bn and operated as an integral & absolutely necessary member of the Philippine Div transportation system for the remainder of the Bataan Campaign. It rendered invaluable service throughout the period.

Also on 27 Jan the 3d Bn 45th Inf (Maj. Strichler) were sent to Quinawan Point (I Corps Sector) to participate in an engagement against a hostile force, (Note: These troops were identified as belonging to the 20th Imperial Marine Inf Regt - Crack troops with the reputation of never having been defeated in battle.) of about two (2) companies which had landed at that point at 2:00 AM on the 23d and dug in and was being unsuccessfully attacked by certain untrained air corps & Philippine constabulary Troops which were trying to drive them out & destroy them.



On 28th Jan. a truck head for the supply of Sub-sector D was established on the San Vicente River at the end of Trail 2. which was the nearest motor approach to the sub-sector but still from 4 to 10 miles from the sub-sector troops. From this point forward supplies were necessarily transported by Pack Train, Caraboas & Car-gadores.

The 57th Inf was placed under I Corps, and by I Corps assigned to the South Sub-sector. It immediately began operations against a hostile force of about one company which had landed at Longaskawayan Point on the 23d (probably got separated from the force which landed at Quinauan Point on that date) and was being attacked at that point by an untrained force of Air Corps & Naval troops.

On the 29th Jan the 31st Inf moved into bivouac on trail 10 except the 1st Bn which took over the defense of Sub-sector "A" on the extreme right of the II Corps sector of the Reserve Battle Position and extending from Manila Bay to Orion incl.

The 1st Bn 45 Inf was moved into an assembly area 800 yds south of the junction of Trails 5 & 7 and the 57th Inf (less two battalions) moved into a bivouac area near KP 181 West Road and the other battalion remaining in action at Longaskawayan Point.

On 30 Jan the 1st Bn 45th Inf entered the attack against the enemy in the Toul Pocket - a hostile force of some 600 to 800 men which had penetrated into the I Corps sector between the 11th Division (PA) and the 1st Div (PA) and were packeted between the Cotar & Toul Rivers.

The 57th Inf (less the battalion in action at Longaskawayan Point) moved to Salaiim Point to oppose an enemy force of about a battalion which had effected a landing at that point. (Probably the reserve of the force which had landed at Auinaun & Longaskawayan Points). On the 31st Jan the 3d Bn 45th Inf entered into the attack at QUINAUN POINT in conjunction with the 57th Inf.

#### FEBRUARY

On Feb 1 the 57th Inf (less 2d Bn) with the 2d Bn 45th Inf (PS), 1st Bn 1st PC Regt & 2d Bn 2d PC Regt attached continued the attack against the enemy at Anyasan Point & Saliiam Point. It is probable that the hostile force developed at Anyasan Point was a part of the force which had landed at Saliiam Point and that in the same manner had become separated from the Saliiam Point group since these two points are quite close to each other, the action there may be considered more or less as one battle. The 2d Bn 45th Inf was put into action against the hostile force on Anyasan Point. On this date Hq 45th Inf was in bivouac about 800 yds south of the junction of Trails 5 & 7 in which position it remained till about Feb 11. During the time the battalions of



the 45th Inf were engaged in the Toul Pocket at Anyasan Point (2d Bn) and Quinauan Point (3d Bn) Hq of the regiment remained in bivouac & exercised no tactical control over actions of the battalions.

On Feb 2d the 14th Engr Bn moved up behind and into the area of Sub-sector D where it was employed on various engineering tasks but principally on trail & road construction. Bn Hq & companies were bivouaced & moved according to the location & progress of the work so no attempt will be made to trace their movements.

The 12th QM Bn (less the Truckhead detachment at Trail 2 and San Vicente River) moved up from KP 148.9 East Road to the crossing of Trail 2 & the Pandan River. Procurement, transportation and distribution of all classes of supplies for all troops within Sub-sector D had been taken over by Hq Philippine Div and this move of the bn was made in order to expedite supply and maintain closer supervision over forward auxillary installations. Only a minimum force was retained with the G-1, G-4 Rear echelon bivouac area at 148.3 East Road.

The Langoskawayan Point operations were successfully concluded & the 2d Bn 57th Inf returned from that point and went into bivouac in the Regimental bivouac area near KP 181 West Road in Army Reserve.

On the night of Feb 2-3 the enemy attempted to land a considerable force at Saliian Point estimated to be about one battalion. This force was probably intended to reinforce the hostile troops already at that point. It consisted of 12 landing boats accompanied by a tug. It was attacked by our air corps and only eight (8) boats reached the shore. The enemy suffered very severe losses and it is estimated that not more than one hundred (100) men succeeded in landing.

On Feb 5th the 1st Bn 31st Inf was relieved from Sub-sector A (II Corps sector) and went into bivouac on Trail 10.

On Feb 6th the 31st Inf (less 1st & 2d Bns & Anti Tank Co) moved into a bivouac area south of Trail 10 about KP 150 on East Road. The 1st & 2d Bns & AT Co remained in bivouac area on Trail 10. Maj Gen Albert Jones was placed in command of the I Corps replacing Lt Gen J.M. Wainwright who was placed in command of the Luzon Force established on this date *March 12*  
*(Feb 6th) 8722.*

On Feb 7th, the 3d Bn 45th Inf successfully completed operations against the enemy at Quinauan Point and returned to bivouac area on the Binuangan River at KP 204.5 West Road in Army Reserve. This released Co B 57th Inf which had been attached to the 3d Bn 45th Inf at Quinauan Point & had been badly cut up in the action there & was put in reserve on its return to the regiment.

On Feb 11th Hq 45th Inf was moved back from bivouac area 800 yds south of the



junction of Trails 5 & 7 to bivouac area with the 3d Bn on Binuangan River at KP 204.5 West Road.

On Feb 12 the 31st Inf Was moved up to a position on the San Vicente River Ridge to back up the 31st Div (PA) in Sub-sector "C", which was being threatened by an enemy attack. This hostile threat failed to develop enough force to require the use of the 31st Inf & so it was not put in action. Brig Gen Brougner took charge of the operations in the Toul Pocket where the 1st Bn 45th Inf was in action.

On Feb 13, the 57th Inf successfully completed the Anyasan & Saliian Points actions and went into bivouac on Signal Hill at KP 186.7 West Road in Army Reserve.

The action at Anyasan Point having been successfully completed the 2d Bn 45th Inf was relieved from attached to the 57th Inf and rejoined the regiment (less 1st Bn) in bivouac on the Binuangan River at KP 204.5 West Road in Army Reserve.

On Feb 14 there being no longer any need for the presence of the 31st Inf (US) in the area of Sub-sector "C" the regiment was returned to its original bivouac area on Trail 10 and East Road (KP 150) in Army Reserve.

On Feb 15 (approximate date) the motor maintenance section 12th QM Bn was loaned to the motor transportation officer of the Luzon Force to assist in motor maintenance for Army transportation. It was moved back from its position on the Pandan River to Rodriguez Park (KP 155 East Road) where it remained for the rest of the campaign. Only a few men were left in the 12th QM Bn bivouac area for the purpose of carrying on first & second echelon maintenance for Sub-sector D and in addition sub-sector C motor transportation.

On Feb 17 the Toul Pocket operations were successfully completed and the 1st Bn 45th Inf was released to the C.O. 45th Inf and went into bivouac 500 yds south of junction of Trails 5 & 7 (casualties, troops, etc see Lathrops report).

Regimental Hq & 3d Bn 31st Inf (US) moved into bivouac area just north of Lamac along the East Road and the 1st & 2d Bns moved into bivouac areas on the Artillery Loop Road along the Alangan River. The regiment remained in these positions recuperating, reorganizing & training till it was again called into action on Apr 4 to meet the final drive of the enemy. (Col Steel was made C/S II Corps on Feb 28 and Lt Col Joshua Brady took command of the 31st Inf).

On Feb 18th the 1st Bn 45 Inf rejoined the regiment in bivouac area on the Binuangan River at KP 204.5 West Road. This put the entire regiment together at this point. It remained there resting, reorganizing & recruiting (received replacements by probationary transfer from P.A. on Mar 5) and training until Mar 29 when it was again put forward to take up position for the final defense.



The 2d Bn 24th FA was kept in the Provisional Arty Brig and remained in active support of the I Corps in the West Sector for the remainder of the campaign.

The 57th Inf was in bivouac area on Signal Hill (KP 186.7 West Road) where it remained in Army Reserve until it was again put in action on Apr 4 in the II Corps Sector for the final defense. During that time it engaged in resting, reorganizing & Reconnaissance. (Lt Col Lilly was promoted to Col on Feb 23d 1942).

FEBRUARY 19TH TO MARCH 27TH INCL

This period may be characterized as a period of comparative quiet not only in Sub-sector "D" & for the detached units of the Philippine Div but also for the entire Bataan theater of war. There were no changes of locations or activities of the Inf regiments of the Division nor were there any particular activities in Sub-sector D a few items of interest are worth recording however.

Up to Feb 24 the enemy maintained contact with the defense forces of Sub-sector D and conducted feeling out operations, patrols, limited local attacks & some reconnaissance in force more or less, but these actions decreased steadily and finally were virtually abandoned on Feb 24 when the enemy made a general retirement all along the front of the II Corps. Thereafter contact was maintained mainly by patrols and the enemy did not undertake any serious activity on this front till about Mar 28 when he began reconnaissances in considerable force.

On Mar 3d the 33d Inf (PA) was relieved from assignment to Sub-sector D and placed in II Corps Reserve. It went into bivouac area along Trail 64 in the left rear of Sub-sector "C".

The 41st Inf (PA) which (less one battalion) had been up to this time attached to Sub-sector "C" was released to the command of the CG Sub-sector "D" and was assigned to a position of the left (west) flank of Sub-sector "D" replacing the 33d Inf (PA) in that sector. This exchange of troops reunited the 41st Inf & likewise the 41st Div (PA) under the command of the CG Sub-sector "D".

On Mar 3d a limited number of enlisted men were transferred on probation, from the Philippine Army to the 45th & 57th Inf regiments as replacements. About two hundred seventy-five (275) men were sent to each. These were the only replacements made for these regiments during the war. For the most part these men were acceptable to the regiments and responded well to training. The 57th Inf kept about two hundred fifty (250) and returned the others to their respective regiments. The 45th Inf kept about the same number, but there were never incorporated into the units of the regiment.

At about the same time the 31st Inf (US) received approximately three hundred seventy-five (375) men (americans) as replacements from the Chemical Warfare (175)




and american military police companies (200). The time and facilities for training these men was so limited that they could not be developed into highly efficient fighting men before the final enemy drive in early April.

On Mar 12 the 14th Engr Bn was detached from the Philippine Division and Sub sector "D" and placed under direct control of Hq Luzon Force. The battalion moved into bivouac on Signal Hill, KP 186 West Road and remained there under Luzon Force until it was released to II Corps & Hq Philippine Division on Apr 5 ( ? to Phil Div ? )

On the 25th or 26th of March the 12th Medical Bn (less Cos A, B & C collecting) was removed from control of Hq Philippine Div and Sub-sector "D" and placed under direct control of Hq Luzon Force. This did not entail any immediate move of the Bn or change of its functions. It remained at KP 155.5 East Road and continued to function under Hq Luzon Force until the end of the Bataan Force. Small detachments from the battalion remained with the advance command post of the Philippine Div and with the Div Hq units at KP 148.9 East Road.

On Mar 28 the troops of Sub-sector "D" were disposed as shown in the following diagram:



During the past several weeks of comparative quiet on the front the position had been improved and strengthened but the combat efficiency of the troops had rapidly declined due to the insufficiency of food, medicine and clothing and the resultant sickness. At least 50% of the command was sick and all were so weak from malnutrition & four months of continuous combat duty that it was foreseen with alarming certainty that they would be unable to endure the physical strain which a sustained attack by a determined enemy would impose upon them. Such was the situation on Mar 28 when the enemy resumed activity all along the front of Sub-sector "D".

During the day a hostile force of about a regiment exerted severe pressure against the 42d Inf in the center of the 41st Div sector which caused the Outpost Line of Resistance to give way in the after-noon and retire behind the main line of resistance. A counter attack by the reserve battalion was ordered to restore the line but failed to get off before dark.

On the morning of Mar 29 the counter attack was finally made but it failed to restore the OPLR and the defense had to rest on the Main Line of Resistance. This



created a serious inverted salient in the front of the 41st Div and the left (west) flank of the 43d Inf had to be refused in order to maintain the continuity of the line. The MLR of the 42d Inf was on the south bank of the Tiawor River, a very strong defensive position & considered almost impregnable. However the refused flank of the 43d Inf constituted a weak point in the line and was the cause of grave concern.

The pressure of the enemy steadily increased & it was soon apparent not only that he had come back with a serious offensive purpose but also come back with fresh shock troops. Strongly reinforced with artillery, tanks, mortars, automatic weapons and air support.

On Mar 30, 31st & Apr 1 the enemy continued his reconnaissance and brought up additional forces & developed them for an attack. Our troops resisted with all possible force but due to their weakened condition & lack of modern infantry weapons grenades & insufficient artillery ammunition the situation became more threatening.

On the morning of Apr 2d the enemy opened up with an artillery bombardment which was by far the most severe yet experienced by our troops during the entire war. The artillery fire was accompanied by mortar fire & aerial bombing of equal severity. The bulk of this fire was concentrated on the front of the 41st Div. The heavy bombardment and fire in the bamboo which was set on fire by the shelling (some reports of use of white phosphorus forced many of the defenders on the MLR to retire to the Regimental Reserve Line.

In the after-noon the enemy attacked on the front of the 42d Inf and the entire main line of resistance was over run. The regiment was forced back to the RRL & continued to resist the attack from that position.

In view of the gathering strength of the enemy it had been deemed wise to prepare to remove from the forward area of sub-sector D all supplies not immediately required for the conduct of the defense. All arrangements for this rearward displacement of supplies & supply installations were completed & checked on Apr 2d as were also all measures necessary to provide & maintain uninterrupted supply to the defending troops regardless of the developments of the situation.

Throughout the night of Apr 2-3 the enemy continued arty fire. At dawn Apr 3 heavy dive bombing attacks were made along the front of the 41st Div at the same time the hostile artillery fire was intensified. Also mortar & MG fire.

Under cover of this fire enemy tanks move up against the west flank of the 42d Inf & a heavy co-ordinated attack was launched all along the front of the 41st Div. The 42d & 43d Inf regiments gave way in complete rout. The 41st Inf also withdrew and through some confusion of orders started to retire south along Trail 29 towards Trail 8



at which point the regimental commander expected to receive further instructions.

The command post of the 41st Div withdrew from its location on the Catmon River & joined the command post of the 21st Div on the Pilar River.

Sick & wounded were assembled at the junctions of Trails 6 & 429 and every effort was made to evacuate them as rapidly & safely as possible.

The artillery regiment of the 41st Div the only artillery in direct support of Sub-sector "D" remained in position & fired most effectively against the advancing enemy repeatedly breaking up his concentrations of troops and inflicting severe losses. The courage, efficiency & devotion to duty of the artillery during this engagement was most commendable; some of the batteries remaining in position & firing till they were charged & captured by the enemy.

In an effort to restore order in the disorganized and confused units of the 41st Div, the Sub-sector commander, CG Philippine Division went forward from his advance command post to exercise personal control of the front line units.

Since the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Division had recently been ordered to Hq II Corps for temporary duty as Corps Chief of Staff & was not replaced in Hq Sub-sector "D", the departure of the CG from the advance command post left the command post in charge of ACoS G-3.

Fortunately early information of the confused orders and misdirected withdrawal of the 41st Inf was received at the advance command post. Communications were out and time was a compelling factor if the 41st Inf was to be of any further service in defense. Consequently ACoS G-3 Phil Div on his own initiative rapidly went across country to Trail 29 where he intercepted the 41st Inf & stopped its retirement & personally put it into position to close the Pantingan River corridor. The courageous & decisive action by G-3 was a powerful factor in blocking the advance of the enemy on the left (west) flank of the sub-sector.

The 41st Inf now being separated from the troops of the division was placed under command of the CG I Corps.

The 33d Inf (PA) (less one battalion) which since Mar 3d had been in II Corps Reserve was released to Hq Sub-sector "D" and was ordered into position on the Catmon River west of Mt. Samat to close the gap left by the retreating troops of the 41st Div. The 33d Inf under command of Maj Holmes, who had commanded the regiment with exceptional distinction since the "Battle of Guitol" (about Jan 20) moved into the ordered position on the after-noon and evening of Apr 3d. It is now believed it was entirely wiped out because all contact was lost with it on the 5th and so far as is now known to me no member of the command has been seen since.



The 21st Div was also heavily attacked throughout the day but managed to hold onto its position. However it refused its left flank in order to meet a thrust from the west and to make contact with any friendly troops on that flank.

The 45th Inf (PS) was released from Army Reserve and attached to the I Corps. By I Corps it was ordered from its bivouac area on the Binaungan River to an assembly area west of the junction of Trails 8 & 29.

The 12th QM Bn was moved from the crossing of Trail 2 & the Paridan River to a position on Trail 18. This move was made in order to expedite the service of supply to the defending troops & to facilitate the evacuation of unnecessary supplies & sick & wounded from the front which was being hastened under the direct supervision of G-4 Phil Div.

By the morning of the 4th the 41st Div had become completely disorganized & ceased to exist as a unit. Only the 41 Arty remained in action in Sub-sector "D" and the 41st Inf (under I Corps) was in position on the Pantingan River.

The enemy continued his attack supported by artillery & air support. By noon the 21st Div (PA) had been severely disorganized & had withdrawn from the RRL to positions on the south-east slope of Mt. Samat.

The 31st Inf (US) which had been in Army Reserve north of Lamac and on the Alangan River since Feb 17 was released to II Corps and by them to Sub-sector "D". The regiment was ordered to move up to an assembly area on the right of the Sub-sector "D" sector & prepared to attack at daylight on the 5th in the direction of the Pilar River with its left flank 500 yds west of the junction of Trails 44 & 429.

At 4:00 PM the 45th Inf (PS) (less 3d bn) was released by I Corps to II Corps & by them to Sub-sector "D". It was ordered to an assembly position at the junction of Trails 8 & 29 and prepare to attack toward the east. (The 3d Bn 45th Inf was held under control of the I Corps and sent into position behind the 1st PC Regt and the 41st Inf (PA) in the Pantingan River area).

The 14th Engr Bn in Army Reserve on Signal Hill was ordered to assemble & prepare for action.

The advance C.P. of Sub-sector "D" was moved during the day to a position about two hundred (200) yds west of the junction of Trails 6 & 8.

The 57th Inf in Army Reserve on Signal Hill was released to the II Corps & moved under cover of darkness of night 5-4 Apr to a position of readiness on Trail 10 just west of Trail 2, except 2d Bn which was held temporarily at Rodriguez Park, just west of Lamac.

On the morning of the 5th the enemy attack continued to the east accompanied by a considerable number of tanks (about 25?). The 22d & 23d Inf regiments (PA), the



center and right regiments in the 21st Div sector gave way before the attack and withdrew in fairly good order to a position about fifteen hundred (1500) yds north of Trail 429 astride trail 4. However when the enemy attacked that position the division broke in complete disorder and thereafter practically ceased to exist as a unit.

Remnants of the 41st Div (less 41st Inf PA) straggled back cross-country & along Trails 6 & 8 and an effort was made to collect them just south of Trails 8 & 46. The number so collected was very small & they were in no condition for further fighting. A part of the 41st Arty Regt (PA) had withdrawn to positions just north of the junction of Trails 6 & 8 and a small force of Infantry from the division was disposed to afford some local ground support to the artillery.

The 41st Inf (PA) remained in position in the Pantingan River valley but engaged in no serious action.

The 31st Inf (US) failed to get in position for the attack which had been ordered for daylight & was unable to make any progress in its assigned sector. The rapid advance of the enemy east of Mt. Samat caught the 31st Inf (US) off balance & unprepared for offensive action. To defend in place was the only alternative.

Contact was lost with the 33d Inf (PA) which had been sent down into the Catmon River area on the 3d and could not be re-established.

The 45th Inf (PS) (less 3d Bn) attacked on Apr 4 the 45th Inf was in Army Reserve on Saysayan Ridge & Bobo Trail about 1 Km west of the Bataan west road. And that day they received orders to assemble and rejoin the Philippine Division. The move was made by busses organic transportation & marching. The regiment was ordered to go into bivouac on Trail 29 just north of Trail 8. They were shelled enroute on Trail 7 & in the vicinity of the Corps Ordnance dump but without effect. The movement began about 4:00 PM Apr 4 and the regiment less the 1st Bn went into bivouac about 1 Km north of Trail 8 about 2:00 AM. The 1st Bn stopped where Trail 8 crosses the Pantingan River & formed a defensive line just north of Trail 8.

On 5 Apr an officer reconnaissance patrol was sent forward on Trail 29 to contact the 41st Div. The proceeded north about one mile and were stopped by an enemy antitank gun blocking the road about 2500 yds north of Trail 8.

Co I was ordered forward to keep the enemy under close observation that night and early on the morning of 6 Apr the rest of the 3d Bn moved north and extended the line to the east. The Bn attacked but were able to advance only about 150 yds. The 2d Bn then moved up, extended the line further to the east and continued the attack but failed to establish contact with the 41st Div.

About 4:00 PM orders were received from the Philippine Division to withdraw beginning at dusk south on Trail 29 thence, east on Trail 8 and break thru the enemy



line in the vicinity of the junction of Trails 6 & 8 and join the 57th Inf which was being attacked by the enemy in that vicinity. The 2d Bn lead the movement east and the 3d Bn held the R.J. Trails 8 & 29. The 2d Bn supported by tanks failed to break through and establish contact with the 57th Inf, the attack being made at daylight 7 April. The regiment was then ordered to form a defensive line along the Pantingan River astride of Trail 8. The 1st Bn which had been holding a position just north of Trail 8 with its left on the Pantingan River helped from this line. The 3d Bn which had covered the movement from the junction of Trails 8 & 29 withdrew beginning about 2:00 PM without much difficulty though subjected to some mortar and small arms fire.

The regiment held the position on the Pantingan on the 7th. On the morning of the 8th its line was extended to the south .

On the after-noon of 8 Apr it was ordered to withdraw at dusk and proceed to junction of Trails 7 & 9 where it was to entruck move to the west road thence south and receive further orders from a staff officer in the vicinity of C.P. I Corps. It received 2 days emergency rations in route. The busses were slow in arriving, not enough arrived to move the whole regiment before 1:00 AM 9 Apr. Orders were received in the vicinity of C.P. I Corps to move to the Quarantine Station in Mariveles. Col. Doyle preceded the regiment leaving junction of Trails 7 & 9 shortly after 1:00 AM. The regiment was stopped by an Ordnance Officer near KM past 190 about 6:00 AM 9 Apr, as the Corps ammunition dump was being blown up. The enemy was dive bombing west road. The regiment bivouaced under cover west of west road in vicinity of KM Post where it surrendered to the enemy about 10:00 AM 10 April.

H. C. BROWNE  
Chief of Staff, Philippine Division  
Colonel G. S. C.

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