NOTE: Sections blacked out in the original are noted by X's, with number of lines where applicable.


ON _12/10/81 ??203,421

December 19, 1942

Comprehensive Report on Conditions in Relocation Centers
Administered by the War Relocation Authority as
They Effect the Security of the
Western Defense Command

a. On October 15, 1942, according to information received from the Military Police Escort Guard Company at Tule Lake, a general strike was called by the Japanese for the purpose of forcing the removal of some of the Caucasian supervisors. The strike lasted only one day, but the feeling of tension and unrest persisted. It was indicated that the project administration had not adopted a firm attitude toward the evacuees, but was seeking to placate and humor them to such an extent that the situation was getting out of hand.

b. Inasmuch as contraband articles, including axes and long knives, had entered the project prior to the present policy of parcel examination, it was recommended by this office that a thorough contraband search be made. The San Francisco Field Division, F.B.I., which has investigative jurisdiction within the project, has since advised that such search is impracticable at present, and will not be made unless specifically requested by project authorities.

c. In conversation with numerous persons at Tule Lake recently, it was stated to a reliable informant of this office that:
(1) The camp administration is "a bunch of Jap lovers"; the camp administration under Director ELMER L. SHIRREL is inexperienced and not capable of handling so extensive a project and the situation has been too much for them; that no disciplinary action is taken against the Japanese for violation of W.R.A. rules; that bodies of deceased residents have been removed to Oregon without proper authority, thus violating the law, and that the administration would give no reason for rejecting the bid of the Coroner of Modoc County, J. F. KERR, for the burial of camp residents.

(2) The Military Police Company is treated as a joke; received no cooperation from the camp administration, and has absolutely no jurisdiction within the W.R.A. housing enclosure unless called in by the camp director; that the vague definition of camp boundaries allows the Japanese to move about the area freely, and no roll calls or camp checks are made to detect absences; the administration has violated General DeWITT'S parcel inspection orders and consequently many contraband items, including knives, have entered the camp, but no contraband search has ever been made; that internal security is in charge of 140? Japanese under three Caucasians, XXXXX who are said to be too young and inexperienced for positions of such responsibility; that passes to visitors are issued by the Japanese guard and have been so issued over the objections of the Military Police; that there are not enough (100) Military Police to control the 16,000 Japanese ; that rumors have circulated to the effect that citizens of Merrill, several miles north of Newell, will revenge themselves on the Japanese at the relocation center if American aviators recently forced down in Japanese territory are executed; that Military Police Forces are inadequate to cope with such eventualities; that transfer of Japanese from one relocation center to another affords a means of secret communication among the Japanese.

(3) There have been several strikes which are treated as "conferences" by the camp administration; farm workers have violated every order regarding harvesting and packing of produce; that much dissatisfaction is caused by the actions of XXXXX, Farm Manager, who is alleged to issue orders contrary to those of XXXXX, Market Manager, to have purchased unnecessary expensive equipment, and to have purchased or ordered large numbers of hogs and chickens without proper shelter having been prepared for them; that considerable money has been wasted, and slow-ups in harvesting have resulted in the destruction of crops; that the camp administration has contracted for many articles without paying for them.

(4) Informant further advises that he has seen produce left rotting in the fields and expensive farm equipment improperly protected. Vouches for integrity of above statements. Also reports general feeling of unrest among Japanese whose chief complaints appear to be due to improper camp administration, lack of clothing allowances, improperly supervised meals, and lack of salary payments for the past two months.
d. At the JAPANESE-AMERICAN CITIZENS' LEAGUE convention held at Salt Lake City, November 17-23, 1942, WALTER TSUJIMOTO?, delegate from Tule Lake, stated that the flare-up in September over the office of War Information proposal that evacuees broadcast to Japan, as well as other strikes and disturbances, were the work of a small group of disgruntled agitators, but that conditions has improved since American citizens had taken control in the project and the Director had abandoned his earlier lenient attitude toward troublemakers. He indicated that all members of the project are aware of the identity of the agitators, but fear for themselves and their families and consequently  feel that the project administration should initiate action to get rid of the subversive element. A certain amount of unrest in the center, he said, is due to the hostile attitude of world war veterans and newspapers in the vicinity.
a. (1) A police crisis at Heart Mountain Relocation Project was precipitated October 27, 1942, by the resignation of Chief of Police ??? MATSUI at the request of the Director of Internal Security, R. C. GRIFFIN?, after MATSUI had refused to make a complete explanation of the charges of liquor-selling which he had brought against XXXXX, a member of the Police Force. Following his resignation, two dozen men of the department "walked out", and on October 23, 1942, after a meeting of the police addressed by the Director of Internal Security, during which he was jeered at and called "dictator", thirty more policemen quit. Faced with disruption in the police department and virtual cessation of police protection, Mr. RATCHFORD, Director, Mr. ROBERTSON, Assistant Director, and Mr. BARBER, Chief of Community Services, agreed over the protests of the Director of Internal Security, to put into effect a plan suggested by the Council of Block Chairman, which placed responsibility for police functions in the Council acting through the individual block chairmen.

(2) It is the opinion of the Director of Internal Security that the police situation is in part one phase of a general weakening of community morale due to several causes -- failure and delay in feeding, housing, fire protection, coal supply, the cumulative effect of continued confinement, shortage of tools and equipment and general resentment against evacuation -- but that more significantly, it is the outcome of a deliberate attempt by subversive forces to wrest control from the W.R.A., to nurture the slightest grievances, and by threats and pressures of various kinds to set up a gangster role in the heads of a small, powerful clique; that MATSUI's charges against XXXXX were without basis in fact and were made to eliminate an obstacle to his plan to develop the police department into a personal political machine; that many of the policemen who might have returned to work were prevented by threats and intimidation; that the camp administration has neither given adequate power to subordinate officers, nor supported them against the evacuees; that the administration failed to make plans to cope with emergencies such as this and have failed to take vigorous and decisive steps to combat the subversive element; that by placing responsibility for police protection in the 100 Alien Block Chairmen, the administration has played straight into the hands of the "goon squad", and that "the only power on the project is that exercised by a handful of men through the threats of violence, which power had been strengthened and given official approval by the Chief of Community Services, the Assistant Director and the Director".

b. A recent summary prepared by the District Intelligence Officer, 13th Naval District, states that the internal difficulties at Heart Mountain are largely the result of the apathetic attitude of the Project Director toward internal security.
a. Considerable unrest has been reported at Minidoka because of the attempts of pro-Japanese elements to gain control of important project positions. XXXXX, long prominent in pro-Japanese activities in Seattle and a possible espionage suspect, was elected head block manager and was influential in the appointment of ten other block managers. A reliable informant of this office advises that the pro-Axis forces exercise strong influence over the self-government program, and indicator that of the seventy block representatives elected for the purpose of selecting a seven-man constitutional committee, 44 were Issei (aliens), 17 Nisei (citizens), and the citizenship status of the remainder unknown, it being highly probable many were Issei. Of the seven comprising the constitutional committee, six were Issei (aliens).

b. An F.B.I. report, December 10, 1942, states that the Internal Security Police is inadequately staffed, has a number of alien members unable to speak English, and lacks proper authority. Quantities of liquor are being smuggled into the project and sold at high prices, but the Director of Internal Security Police has said that he could find nothing in his regulations to prevent the use of liquor on the project. Citizens of surrounding towns are bitterly critical of the presence in the towns of many evacuees who apparently come and go from the project at will. This condition is attributed to the laxity of the administration in issuing work passes to the evacuees and not keeping a time check on them, with the result that the passes are used by the Japanese long after the outside work for which they were issued has been completed. Between ?? and 18? fire hydrants over the entire project area have been temporarily out of commission. No evidence of sabotage has been uncovered and it is thought that because of the lack of protection and the flimsy construction of the hydrants, the damage could have been caused by the pressure in the mains or by any minor accident.

c. In a summary recently prepared by the District Intelligence Officer, 13th Naval District, it is reported that:
(1) Considerable unrest has developed because of the War Department order that all relocation centers be enclosed by barbed wire fences and guard towers. XXXXX Japanese propaganda agent recently convicted of curfew violation and presently awaiting action on his appeal, has written and distributed a number of subversive "poems" attacking the fence and the relocation program generally, and has remarked that he will do everything possible to secure more power for Issei in the self-government through his position as legal advisor to the Constitutional Committee.

(2) Japanese language programs allegedly originating in the Aleutian Islands are said to be regularly received by some 30 contraband short wave receiving sets owned by alien Japanese in the project. In this connection it is noted that information from the F.B.I. indicates that on a recent broadcast direct from Tokyo that spokesman was one XXXXX, apparently a prominent editor, whose remarks were in the nature of instructions to the evacuees. It is said the evacuees were advised not to take part in any program for resettlement outside, and that those who did so would be regarded as anti-Nationals by the Japanese Government. At the recent JAPANESE-AMERICAN CITIZENS' LEAGUE convention it was said that a rumor to the effect that all Japanese returning to the Fatherland will be paid 10,000 to 15,000 yen, was circulating at Minidoka, and had apparently been started by the short wave broadcasts.

(3) All applications of candidates for the Military Intelligence Service Language School at Camp Savage, Minnesota, pass through the hands XXX-1 line-XXX was formerly employed by the Seattle Japanese Consulate, and both he and his wife have applied for repatriation. Should this take place it will be possible for him to supply the Japanese military with the names and family background of the Nisei and Kibei at the Language School.

(4) The Board of Directors of the Minidoka Co-operative Society is composed mainly of Issei, and certain members, in connection with the proposed printed newspaper to take the place of the present mimeographed sheet (7 pages in English, 1 page in Japanese) had in mind a paper having 7 pages in Japanese and only 1 page in English.

(5) The Board of Censors of the Japanese Library, now engaged in securing Japanese language literature for the project, is composed of XXXXX formerly with the Japanese Methodist Church in Seattle, XXX-1 lines-XXX of the Japanese Language School in Seattle, and released from Missoula Detention Camp, has a pro-Japanese background and was considered by the D.I.O., 13th Naval District, "far too dangerous a subject to be permitted out of internment". XXXXX was connected with the ????? DAILY NEWS, a Seattle Japanese language newspaper, and operated a private Japanese language school. Many of the Japanese language schools are known to have been centers of Japanese propaganda, and to have used highly nationalistic texts supplied by the Japanese Ministry of Education.

(6) Eight classes in American history are being conducted in the Japanese language, and it is pointed out that the three instructors are aliens formerly connected with Japanese language schools.
d. Information from the F.B.I., Butte, Montana, indicate that having relinquished control of project affairs after a bitter fight, the Issei have won something of a victory by securing W.R.A. authorization for an Issei advisory board for the purpose of giving counsel to the Nisei administrators of the self-government program. A marked feeling of antagonism is said to have developed between Issei and Nisei as a result of the struggle to control the project. It is also stated that small groups of Issei are agitating for unnecessary? clothing grants as a means of contributing "in their own small way to the general cause? existing at this time in the Minidoka Center".
a. Between September 10 and November 1, 1942, seven reportedly loyal evacuees suffered beatings at the hands of pro-Axis gangs. Confidential informants of this office and of the 11th Naval District have indicated that well organized bands have been formed at the project for the purpose of injuring and possibly killing all persons known to have cooperated with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The pro-Japanese gangs are said to have been formed at the instigation of Issei released from internment camps. Through terrorism, threats and organized violence, the pro-Japanese Issei have set up the "Tano?-noshi" -- mutual contribution groups -- for the purpose of paying off hired hoodlums. It is also reported that units of HEIMUSHA KAI, a Japanese nationalistic group, are secretly operating at Poston and other centers.

b. Rioting at Poston which broke out November 15, subsided and was brought under control on November 26, 1942.
(1) On the night of November 14, 1942, XXXXX, an American-born Japanese, reported to be loyal, who had previously been attacked the night of September 12, 1942, was again beaten by unidentified Japanese. XXX-1 line-XXX investigation of the incident by F.B.I. agents resulted in the apprehension of XXXXX, both of whom were confined in the camp jail on November 1?, 1942.

(2) Shortly after the apprehension and confinement of XXXXX Japanese residents of Poston No. I (the Project is composed of three units) quit their W.R.A. jobs in protest over the arrest of the two suspects. Approximately 500 Japanese, mostly Issei and Kibei, gathered around the camp jail demanding the release of the prisoners. The Project Director, W. WADE HEAD, and his assistant were attending the JAPANESE-AMERICAN CITIZENS' LEAGUE in Salt Lake City when the strike began. A committee representing the strikers proposed that the prisoners be released for trial by a Japanese court within the project, but this proposal was rejected by the camp administration.

(3) This committee obtained a sound truck which toured the project area and from which speeches were made in the Japanese language, interspersed with the playing of "Naniwabushi" -- old Folk Songs glorifying real and legendary Japanese heroes. A definite movement was put into effect by the agitators to inflame all Japanese in the project by the Japanese speeches and martial music.

(4) Prospective applicants for the Military Intelligence Service Language School, Camp Savage, Minnesota, were threatened that if they accepted appointment to the school, reprisals against their families could be expected. Of nearly 40 selected for assignment to the school, only 8 actually left Poston for Camp Savage.

(5) Poston Units No. II and No. III were not affected by the agitation at Poston No. I, which is comprised of approximately 9,000 Japanese. As a result of the strike, work on the U.S. Army Engineer's camouflage net project at Poston was suspended for lack of labor.

(6) Upon his return to Poston, the Project Director requested the F.B.I. to make a thorough investigation, but was informed by the Phoenix Field Office, F.B.I., that no investigation would be made until the strike had terminated.

(7) Despite press reports to the contrary, the Army did not intervene, and no action was taken other than to order the Military Police Escort Guard Company stationed at the project to control movements in and out of Poston No. I, during the strike.

(8) By the morning of November 25, 1942 practically all the Japanese evacuees had returned to their W.R.A. jobs and the crowd around the jail had disbanded. It was reported that the W.R.A. administrators promptly discharged all Japanese employees and was rehiring only those who did not take active part in the strike. A list of the names of the leaders in this strike and of other disturbances at Poston is in the possession of this office.

(9) XXXXX one of the men jailed before the strike has been released for lack of evidence. The other, XXXXX, charged with having written a threatening letter to a loyal Japanese evacuee, was sought out in the camp by the U.S. Marshal of Arizona. When he arrived at the camp, Director W. WADE HEAD refused to identify XXXXX and stated that if the Chief of Internal Security identified XXXXX he was through at Poston. Later XXXXX was turned over to the U.S. Marshal at Yuma, but was subsequently released to the W.R.A. and returned to Poston. He will first be tried by a Japanese court within the project, after which he will be apprehended by the U.S. Marshal for trial on the extortion charge.

(10) During the strike, the Japanese negotiated with the project administration through two bodies: a "Committee of 72", and a "Committee of 12". The larger group is alleged by its members to have been duly elected by the people of Poston No. I on the basis of two representatives from each of the 30 blocks and as such to have been qualified to conduct official negotiations with the administration. However, the facts of the situation, according to the W.R.A. Intelligence Officer at Poston, are that the Committee was either selected by the strike leaders or elected viva voce in locked mess halls, with members of JUDO (Japanese wrestling) organizations which acted as "goon squads", looking on. The Committee included many subversive evacuees drawn from three groups: parolees from Fort Lincoln, Bismarck, North Dakota, and Santa Fe, New Mexico internment camps; Issei with strongly pro-Japanese sentiments; Kibei thoroughly imbued with the principles of "Zodo" -- the Japanese "New Order". The "Committee of 12", which acted on behalf of the larger body in negotiations, was dominated by anti-American forces, and is believed by reliable informants of this office to have been the real steering committee of the strike. Its origins are vague, and it is possible it was a purely de facto instrumentality.
c. It has been reported by an informant believed reliable that upon their arrival at Poston, many former internees secured copies of rules and regulations promulgated for the conduct of Japanese evacuees, on pretext of desiring them for study purposes. However, instead of keeping them on the project, the former internees immediately mailed them intact to the Spanish Consul in San Francisco, California, who in turn is reported to have mailed them directly to Japan, using his diplomatic immunity, to be used for propaganda and other purposes. This informant was of the opinion that the recent disturbances in the relocation centers are part of a well-organized scheme directed from Tokyo.
a. On December 8, 1942, Japanese evacuees at Central Utah War Relocation Project organized a KIBEI SHIMIN CLUB for the purpose of unifying Kibei (American-born Japanese  educated in Japan) in a manner similar to the Nisei organization, the JAPANESE-AMERICAN CITIZENS' LEAGUE. KIBEI SHIMIN CLUBS existed prior to evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast and were considered dangerous nationalistic organizations by the Department of Justice. Many of the officers of the new KIBEI SHIMIN CLUB at Central Utah have subversive records and, in the opinion of this office, the organization's activities should be viewed with suspicion.
a. Reliable information indicates that pro-Japanese agitation by Issei and Kibei has resulted in an undercurrent of tension and unrest. One of the leaders of the Issei group has been jailed for a felonious assault on another Japanese during an altercation  reportedly due to pro-Axis remarks made by the Issei leader. During the night of November 5, 1942, a Japanese flag was placed on a hill overlooking the project, and the next morning a number of evacuees were heard singing Japanese militaristic songs.
(1) On December 5, 1942, XXXXX, American-born Japanese at Manzanar, was severely beaten in his quarters by six masked male Japanese. XXXXX, a prominent member of the JAPANESE-AMERICAN CITIZENS' LEAGUE, is generally regarded by the intelligence services as loyal to the United States. XXX-2 lines-XXX.

(2) Shortly after the incident, one suspect was apprehended by the camp police and went to the County Jail at Independence. The next morning, December 6, 1942, five additional suspects were confined in the camp jail. A crowd of approximately 1,500 Japanese gathered at the jail, made threatening gestures and demanded release of the prisoners. The Military Police Escort Guard Company stationed at Manzanar was requested by W.R.A. officials to assist in dispelling the mob. When
tear gas failed to break up the crowd in front of the camp jail and the administration building, the Military Police was ordered to fire. One Japanese, JAMES ITO, was killed and nine others were injured.

(3) No investigation by agents of the Los Angeles Field Office, F.B.I., which has jurisdiction within the War Relocation Centers, was made, pending restoration of control to W.R.A. administration.
b. Prior to the incident described above, there has been a marked development of organized anti-American activity at Manzanar. Subversive forces have obstructed attempts to create a Manzanar Citizens Federation and a Camp Co-operative, and conducted a boldly anti-American Kibei meeting in August during which seditious statements were made by several speakers spurred on by an uproarious audience. Subsequently, a strike occurred on the camouflage net project and the number working on it is now approximately 100, whereas it was formerly about 700. The agitators have seized upon all manifestations of discontent, seeking to make them rallying points for their own program.

Manzanar camouflage net project 1942
Manzanar Relocation Center, Manzanar, California.
Making camouflage nets for the War Department. (1942)

c. Recently, placards have appeared in mess-halls and latrines, attacking the relocation program, the project administration, the self-government, and threatening harm to loyal evacuees and certain W.R.A. officials distasteful to the agitators. The placards have been written in the Japanese language and have been signed, "Blood Brothers Corps" (KETSU-SHI-DAN), or "Black Dragon Society" (KOKURYU KAI), names indicative of the spirit and intent of the subversive groups.

d. Reports similar to those from other projects indicate organized intimidation of applicants for the Military Intelligence Service Language School. All persons contacted by the Military Intelligence Service have received threats and it is said that as a result, the number of those ready to enlist has fallen from 30 to 16.

e. A confidential informant has advised that an efficient communications system exists between the various projects, and further states that Japanese radio programs are received by short wave sets at Manzanar.

Short wave radio at Manzanar: "They are listening to Japanese broadcast and use it as propaganda."

f. One hundred seventy six Japanese aliens, who were previously apprehended as alien enemies and later released or paroled by the Attorney General, have rejoined their families at Manzanar.

g. The result of these incidents at Manzanar, in the opinion of an F.B.I. informant believed reliable, has been to separate the project into three more or less well-defined groups: first, a small portion of the project, composed of Nisei loyal to the United States; second, the radical element, composed of Issei and Kibei favoring complete loyalty to Japan; third, a vast majority of the camp, vacillating and confused, which can be swayed either way. It is the belief of this informant that because of the incidents which have occurred, and because of the constant attempts at indoctrination made by the subversive element, the greater majority are being swayed toward the subversive position.

h. It has been reported by the F.B.I. that rumors are being circulated at Manzanar to the effect that all the pro-American Japanese and the project administration will immediately be killed when the "invincible" Japanese Army establishes a beach head on the Pacific Coast, and the occupants of the center will proceed to the vicinity of the Japanese Army and attempt to join their forces.

i. As of this date three Military Police Companies are still in control at Manzanar, having taken over internal security of the project at the request of W.R.A. administrators on December 6, 1942 when the riot described above took place.
8. Discussion of War Relocation Projects at Conference of JAPANESE-AMERICAN CITIZENS' LEAGUE held in Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-23, 1942.
a. There were reports by delegates to the conference from nearly all relocation centers of pro-Japanese agitators spreading Japanese propaganda, and seizing every opportunity to cause strikes, riots and other disturbances. These subversive elements have been aided by a sizable criminal element including many professional gamblers who operate quite openly in the project and intimidate the loyal and law-abiding evacuees.

b. In the opinion of many of the delegates, the principal cause of disorder in the projects is the failure of the W.R.A. officials to support the internal security police and loyal elements, and the refusal of officials to impose severe penalties on troublemakers. It was stated that the project administrators, though generally sincere, were lax in administering the projects and lacked experience in government and in police administration. Many of the directors, it was also said, have an inadequate understanding of the Japanese language and of Japanese problems.

c. Part of the trouble at the centers was also attributed to failure to place men with police and investigative backgrounds in charge of the internal security police. It was emphasized that the only liaison between the internal security police, and the F.B.I. and Military Police, is through the project administrative staff. Information passing through this channel has frequently leaked out, and informants of the Military Police and intelligent services have been intimidated as a result.

d. The consensus appeared to be that the plan of action of the pro-Japanese element in the projects is to create as great a disturbance as possible so that troops will be brought in to restore order. The Japanese Government can then claim that American troops are mistreating Japanese in relocation centers and broadcast such claims throughout the Far East.

e. Delegates said that a certain amount of unrest has been caused by a feeling that living conditions are poor; that proper health, educational, and recreational facilities are lacking, and that there is racial prejudice on the part of the Caucasians at the projects. The sense of confinement and the proximity of the fences enclosing the projects is said to have lowered morale in some instances.

f. The attendance of XXXXX at the conference is significant. XXXXX, a member of the PROTESTANT COMMISSION FOR WARTIME JAPANESE SERVICE and the FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, is considered sympathetic to the Japanese and has frequently attacked the evacuation policy. XXXXX of the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION in Los Angeles and whose activities have frequently followed the COMMUNIST PARTY line, has consistently opposed both mass and individual exclusion, as well as other restrictions imposed upon civilians under the provision of Public Law 503.
9. Camouflage net program.
As a result of unsatisfactory production of camouflage nets at assembly centers and relocation projects during recent months, the Chief Engineer, with the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War and the W.R.A., has determined that in the future this work will be accomplished by private contract.
10. Buddhist activities in War Relocation projects.
The Japanese Buddhist Church is reorganizing on a national scale in Salt Lake City, Utah, under the name of the AMERICAN BUDDHIST CHURCHES. While reorganization is ostensibly for the purpose of Americanizing Japanese Buddhist Churches, most Buddhist priests and officers of the church are considered dangerous by all intelligence agencies because of their close contact with the Mother Church in Japan. XXXXX, former employee of XXXXX in San Francisco, has stated that the church will do its utmost to maintain morale in relocation centers and to assist the W.R.A. expedite its resettlement program.
11. General
a. Reports from all relocation centers indicate a certain degree of unrest and tension due to physical discomforts, inadequate living conditions, and to lack of educational and recreational facilities. Some unrest is due to the inevitable psychological tensions springing from a sense of confinement and the generally abnormal situation. Friction has also developed in some cases between evacuees and project administrators, and it may be expected that a generalized resentment toward the evacuation will attach itself to any specific irritations which arise.

b. The chief development in the projects, and from which the unrest mentioned above derives its real significance, is the steady growth of open pro-Japanese activity, and the relentless and frequently successful attempts at control of project affairs which are made by subversive elements. On nearly all projects pro-Japanese forces have exercised increasing influence over project activities, have spread Japanese propaganda, and in attempts to undermine the faith of evacuees loyal to the United States, have supplemented a program of more subtle pressure with threats, intimidation, terrorism, and open brutality. The rioting at Poston and Manzanar, and the appearance of the terrorist "Blood Brothers Corps" and "Black Dragon Society" at the latter project are merely manifestations of a situation which has long been developing. Pro-Japanese evacuees have diligently seized upon the slightest pretexts for stirring up discontent, or worse, and it has been reported that their activities are part of a plan to have the projects reduced to such chaos that military control will be imperative.

c. It is significant that at both Poston and Manzanar during the recent disturbances, "committees" dominated by pro-Japanese evacuees took control and conducted negotiations with the project officials on the basis of proposals which were not only ????antly? blatantly? favorable to the evacuees as against the administration, but which served to place the "committees" in a position of leadership in the eyes of both of the project officials, and of the whole body of evacuees.

d. Issei and Kibei forces appear to have been the leaders of agitation in the projects. The majority of Issei seem to be definitely pro-Japanese, and the Kibei have taken a prominent part in the disturbances. The efforts of Nisei to Americanize Issei and Kibei of doubtful loyalty have almost been given up as futile, while dangerous inroads are said to have been made on the Americanism of many formerly loyal evacuees. It is reported that the population of the relocation projects have been split into several more or less definite segments, ranging from a rather small group actively loyal to the United States and composed mainly of Nisei, to an element composed of Issei and Kibei favoring complete loyalty to Japan, with a third group, the majority of the project, confusedly vacillating from one pole to the other.

e. The ideologically subversive groups have been strengthened by the presence in the projects of criminal and hoodlum elements which have made their own contribution to the unrest, as well as acting as the terrorist arm of the pro-Axis group through threats and attacks upon the evacuees who have expressed loyalty to this Country, and especially upon those who have cooperated with the project administrators or law-enforcement and intelligence services.

f. There are numerous indications that War Relocation Authority project officials have often laxly administered the projects, and have not taken prompt and decisive action against troublemakers and agitators. In the recent disturbances at Heart Mountain, Poston, and Manzanar, the initiative was seized by the agitators, and the proposals they advanced as basis for negotiation were so favorable to the evacuees, that the position of the project authorities may be said to have been capitulatory. It is quite possible that the portion of the evacuees which had vacillated would have taken a definite stand against the agitators, had the project officials severely penalized troublemakers, abandoned their conciliatory attitude, and presented an adamant front to all subversive demands.

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