SPY MANUAL FOR JAPANESE-AMERICAN QUISLINGS

"Once hostilities begin, our first move will be an attack upon the Panama Canal... We have submarines capable of traveling 10,000 miles without refueling. The Midway Islands can be taken within one day; then we must attack Hawaii...." These statements and many others of the same tenor appear in a book published in Tokyo last October, entitled "The Triple Alliance and the Japanese-American War" (illustration on this page) by Kinoaki Matsuo.

Last December, a retired Japanese naval captain, Otojiro Endo, and a retired Japanese army major, Masichi Sugihara, visited Pacific Coast states in America and held secret meetings with leaders of Japanese-American citizens. Purpose of the tour was to inspire courage among sabotage and espionage agents, and to recruit new men for the Japanese-American Trojan Horse Brigade. In their discussions, frequent use was made of the book, "The Triple Alliance and the Japanese-American War". A few copies of this volume were given out, only to the most trusted leaders. NRS succeeded in obtaining one of these; a translation was made, and even the most casual perusal suggests immediately that this is a well-camouflaged textbook for Japanese espionage.

The table of contents in itself is most revealing. Following are the translated chapter headings and sub-headings, as they appear in the table of contents:

I. Crucial Moment for Japan and America.
   (1) The China Incident and the United States.
   (2) The Second World War and the United States.
   (3) The United States and the United States.
   (4) The United States and Canada.

II. Expansion of the American Fleet.
    (1) Illusions in Construction.

III. History of the Japanese-American Struggle.
     (1) The First Anti-Japanese Question.
     (2) U.S., Japanese, and Manchurian Conflict.
     (3) Imperialistic Foreign Diplomacy of U.S.
     (4) Long-delayed Destruction of London Conference.

IV. United States-Japan War Inevitable.
    (1) United States-Japan Friendship a Delusion.
    (2) Pacifists and the Fear of the American Question.
    (3) United States-Japan War Costs.

V. United States Naval Strength.
    (1) U.S. Capital Ships.
    (2) U.S. Cruisers.
    (3) U.S. Destroyers.
    (4) U.S. Aircraft Carriers.
    (5) U.S. Submarines.
    (6) U.S. Naval Bases.
    (7) U.S. Present Military Strength.
    (8) U.S. Naval Developments.

VI. New U.S. Weapons and Mechanized Units.
    (1) New U.S. Weapons.
    (2) Fear of Chemical Warfare.

VII. The Great Air Force of the United States.
     (1) Brief Sketch of U.S. Air Force.
     (2) Present U.S. Air Force.

VIII. War Plans of the United States.
      (1) U.S. Plans for Attack.
      (2) U.S. Plans Attack on Western Pacific.

IX. Immediate War vs. Prolonged War.
    (1) Immediate American War Decision.
    (2) Immediate Japanese War Decision.

X. Time of Conflict.
    (1) Lightning Military Movements.

XI. Japan's Attack on the Philippine Islands.
    (1) The Philippine and Asiatic Fleet.
    (2) Occupation of Guam by Japanese Fleet.

XII. The Fall of Manila.
     (1) Japan's Flag Hoisted in the Philippine Islands.

XIII. Fear of Destruction of Foreign Trade.
      (1) Japan Plans Foreign Trade Destruction.
XIV. Singapore and Hongkong.
(1) Problem of Singapore Army Base.
(2) What Becomes of Hongkong?

XV. The United States Fleet in Hawaii.
(1) Pacific Battle Force and Military Strength.
(2) Entire Fleet Concentrates at Pearl Harbor.

XVI. Japan's Surprise Fleet.
(1) United States Plans for Crossing the Ocean.
(2) Activities of the Surprise Fleet.

XVII. American Naval Expedition to Japan.
(1) Japanese Expedition.
(2) Destruction of U. S. Fleet.
(3) Movement of Japan's Fleet.

XVIII. United States Air Force Attacks Japan.
(1) U. S. Bombing of Japanese Cities.
(2) Defense Against Air Attack.

(1) Attacks of U. S. Capital Ships.
(2) Withdrawal of U. S. Fleet.

XX. Occupation of Hawaii and Closing of Panama Canal.
(1) Japanese Occupation of Hawaii.
(2) Japanese Closing of Panama Canal.

XXI. Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance and the United States.
(1) Establishment of the Triple Alliance.
(2) The Meaning of the Alliance.

"The Japanese Surprise Fleet"

Under that subtitle, the author of the book reveals Japan's plans to employ long range submarines on the American side of the Pacific, and to take and use the Midway Islands as a submarine base:

Chapter 17
In the future, our submarines must be able to operate alone in the West Pacific; their ability to attack, and to make long journeys, is vitally important. Submarines which can travel 10,000 miles could easily cross the Pacific. There are very small type subs which could accomplish a lot on the American side of the Pacific.

Our navy will quickly occupy the Midway Islands, and a submarine base will be established at once. It is only 1160 miles to Hawaii, a very convenient distance for our surprise fleet. To this surprise fleet belong...mine layers of type...model 21. This type is capable of carrying a heavy load of mines for distribution in American sea routes of merchantmen and battleships. We can then strike the enemy fleet at a most opportune time, and cut off communication lines as well as merchantmen. (Ed. Note: The number and type of mine layers are not given in the original text.)

In discussing "Japanese Occupation of Hawaii", the book optimistically foresees that a Japanese naval victory would be sufficient incentive for the Japanese in Hawaii to immediately organize a volunteer army:

Chapter 21
In the Japanese occupation of Hawaii, cooperation between army and navy is most important. The Midway Islands must be taken before we attack Hawaii, for they would give us a good foothold. It will be very easy to take Midway Islands, which are practically defenseless; in fact, it would require only about one day's bombardment to take them.

In Hawaii, there are about 150,000 Japanese, one-half of whom are "Nisei" (Japanese descendants of foreign citizenship). Once the news of Japanese naval victories reaches Hawaii, the Japanese there will quickly organize a volunteer army. There is no doubt but that Hawaii will come into our hands.

Of course, the Japanese strategists have devoted much thought to the Panama Canal. Under the sub-title, "Closing the Panama Canal", one reads:

Chapter 21
The remaining question is: What will become of the Panama Canal? Panama is a little over 4600 knots from Hawaii and about 8,000 knots from Japan, so an attack is not an easy matter, and will require a considerable navy force. If, at the outbreak of war, we proceed immediately to attack and close the Canal, we could cut off the Atlantic from the Pacific. It would prove an invaluable asset to our war strategy.
If the Panama Canal falls into Japanese possession and there is another Japan-America war, the United States will certainly strike at Panama; however, while Japan controls this area, the American fleet will be divided -- one part in the Pacific, the other in the Atlantic -- and the two fleets cannot combine. American imperialism depends upon the strength of her navy, for without it her imperialistic ambitions cannot be realized. Once we control the Canal, we can enforce peace. Besides this, it will bring to an end American threats against Mexico and all other small nations in Central and South America.

Japanese possession of the Panama Canal has a direct bearing upon future peace; therefore, by all means, Japan must take the Canal and keep it even after the war. However, inasmuch as Panama is fortified, it will not be easy to take.

The "Meaning of Triple Alliance" carries a subtle threat as to what America may expect as the result of a united attack from Japan, Germany and Italy:

Chapter 22

The purpose of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo alliance is to secure the best possible cooperation in dealing with all kinds of military, political, and economic problems, and to assist one another in the strongest sense of the word. Should America become involved in the war, she would be subjected to a gigantic united attack by Japan, Germany and Italy.

Only the flag of the sun, which symbolizes our nation, would fly over the Pacific. On the Atlantic, the swastika, which also symbolizes the sun and life, will be active with might. In addition, the meaningful flag of Italy would flash. In the face of all this, if America comes against Japan and tries to block her, it would be no more than a pin prick.

The Voice of Rafu Shimpo

Rafu Shimpo, the bi-lingual "Los Angeles Japanese Daily News", carries many articles in the Japanese language, designed specifically to encourage Japanese faith in the might of the Mikado's Empire. Said Rafu Shimpo recently, under the caption: "Two-Ocean Navy and Pacific":

Battleships of more than 35,000 tons cannot pass through the Panama Canal. Only ships whose width is 106 feet or less can pass through it. Four ships of Iowa class, built in 1940, were of 45,000 tons each. Ten battleships now under construction are too large... Therefore, the two-ocean navy really is a one-ocean navy.

President Roosevelt is very much concerned as to how America can match German armaments which have been prepared for seven years. America might launch a battle against us, with 15 capital ships, 6 aircraft carriers, 16 heavy cruisers, 17 light cruisers, 80 destroyers, 45 submarines, comprising a first line navy. But it would be very dangerous to attack Japan several thousand miles away...for it would be fatal for the American navy to fight so far from its base.

If capital ships constitute power, look at what Germany does before our very eyes! It is so clear that there is no need for further explanation. Japan will not sit idle while America prepares.

While the Japanese government exploits the racial ties to foster loyalty to the home-country among Japanese-Americans, gullibles in the United States...
are worked upon with propaganda brochures prepared in scholarly style. The latest such literature, received gratis from Tokyo, is a volume entitled "Introductory Studies on the Sino-Japanese Conflict" (illustration on this page), by Kiyoshi Miki and Karoku Hosokawa, published by the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This Institute has achieved a position of great prestige in American and British diplomatic, academic and industrial circles.

The well-indexed book, over 100 pages long, presents the Japanese version of imperialist expansion in China on the part of the European powers and the United States. Throughout the book, the reader is led to believe that the authors were prompted only by a feeling of compassion for "poor, abused China". In the first pages, the authors tread lightly, but in conclusion, they assert, under the sub-title "The 'Open Door' vs. Japan's Continental Policy":

The clash between the ambitions of Western powers and Japanese continental policy, both of which are seeking to advance in China, would seem to be inevitable unless one is forced to submit to the superior power of the other, as long as the semi-colonial China continues to exist as in the past, or as long as the present world order prevails.

Note the clever strategy of the authors in placing alleged "ambitions of Western powers" in juxtaposition with the "Japanese continental policy", as if it were the Western powers and not Japan whose ambition is responsible for the Chinese-Japanese war. The authors continue:

The present Sino-Japanese Incident, with utmost insistence, demands a solution to the question of creating a new and true world order, and of making a clean sweep of the semi-colonial condition of China.

To reach her goal, as detailed in last week's NRS release, Japan relies not only on her military arms and her Axis allies, but also upon Japanese-American Quislings who will gladly volunteer.

Thus, Japan falls into line with the Axis cry for a new order; thus, Japan prepares for the day when -- so bluntly stated in "The Triple Alliance and the Japanese-American War" -- only the Flag of the Rising Sun will wave over the Pacific; and the swastika, which also symbolizes the sun, will rule the Atlantic.

INTRODUCTORY STUDIES ON THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

By KIYOSHI MIKI and KAROKU HOSOKAWA

"FAR EASTERN CONFLICT" SERIES

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At Left: Front cover of Japanese propaganda brochure, mailed gratis to thousands of Americans.

At Right: Reproduction of envelope in which brochure was mailed from Tokyo by the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.