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CHIM, Shinsun; Merchant Seaman, Apprentice Engineer; BATAVIA MARU.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

CINCPAC-CINCPOA PRELIMINARY POW INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 68

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>
CHIN, Shinsun 陳振春	Merchant Seaman Apprentice Engineer	None

  

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DUTY PERFORMED</u>	<u>DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE</u>
BATAVIA MARU	Electrical Engineering	19 June 1944 200 miles N of SAIPAN

1. PREAMBLE

POW is twenty-one, unmarried and a native of TAIWAN. His family there is apparently one of some prominence - an uncle studied in PARIS and his father, a veterinary surgeon, is head of a large live-stock firm. After attending school for ten years, he was conscripted for the Japanese Merchant Marine. Home address is #28 MIZUHO MACHI, HEITO SHI, TAKAO SHU, FORMOSA.

POW combines native intelligence with a relatively keen sense of observation. As a Formosan who desires the liberation of his country from the Japanese, he is naturally cooperative and eager to be of service in any possible way. With the exception of certain inaccuracies in shipping information which may be ascribed to unfamiliarity with the maritime profession, his reliability seems unquestioned.

2. CHRONOLOGY

1942:

16 Jan.	Conscripted at TAKAO. Boarded the ARGUN MARU.
19 Jan.	Left TAKAO and went to LINGAYEN, P.I., carrying soldiers and ammunition.
End Feb.	Went to HONGKONG.
Beginning of March	Arrived at PALEMBANG, SUMATRA.
Middle of March	Left PALEMBANG for SINGAPORE.
End March	Arrived at BATAVIA. Attempted to go on to SINGAPORE, but ship was driven back to BATAVIA on account of the threat of SS attacks.
Beginning of May	Arrived at SINGAPORE.
Middle of May	Proceeded to MANILA.

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## 2. CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

### 1942: (Cont'd)

Beginning of June Set out for K<sup>o</sup>BE, stopping at DAIREN on the way to pick up cargo of iron.

Middle of June Arrived at K<sup>o</sup>BE.

End June Arrived at KIIRUN.

Beginning of July Proceeded to HONGKONG.

Middle of July Reached SINGAPORE.

20 July Arrived at MELANG.

End July Returned to SINGAPORE.

13 Aug. Arrived at TAKAO. Remained there for two weeks on leave.

End of Aug. 1942 to Sept. 1943 Sailed on regular K<sup>o</sup>BE - TAKAO - SAIGON run on same vessel.

### 1943:

21 Sept. ARGUN MARU torpedoed and sunk by American SS, while sailing in convoy with five other ships NE of KIIRUN. Special Duty Ship (TOKUMUKAN) SHIRIYA and three unidentified vessels also sunk; one escaped. Survivors picked up by Japanese DD and taken to KIIRUN.

Beginning of Oct. Arrived at K<sup>o</sup>BE.

12 Dec. Boarded BATAVIA MARU at K<sup>o</sup>BE. Proceeded to BANGKOK.

### 1944:

End Jan. Arrived at BANGKOK.

End Feb. Returned to TAKAO on way to K<sup>o</sup>BE.

March Proceeded from K<sup>o</sup>BE to YOKOSUKA and YOKOHAMA.

15 April Left YOKOHAMA for GUAM.

2 June Left GUAM on way to SAIPAN.

3 June Arrived at SAIPAN.

11 June Left SAIPAN, en route to JAPAN.

12 June BATAVIA MARU sunk by American air action.

19 June POW captured by US DD.

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### 3. DETAILS OF CAPTURE

The BATAVIA MARU was first attacked by American aircraft on the afternoon of 12 June, although no hits were made on the vessel. About 1630 a second and more successful attack was made, resulting in hits on the No. 5 and No. 6 hatches. Fire immediately broke out, but it was speedily brought under control and extinguished. The damage caused by the bombs was too great to be even temporarily repaired, however, and the ship sank about 1900. POW stated that there were no boats in usable condition at that time and the few survivors were compelled to swim or cling to pieces of debris in the neighborhood of the sinking. After having been in the water for a week, he was picked up by an American DD on 19 June in a half-dead condition, at a point which he estimated as being about 200 miles North of SAIPAN.

### 4. ORGANIZATION

The BATAVIA MARU was commanded by a Merchant Marine captain who held the rank of Lieutenant-Commander in the Japanese Naval Reserve. POW said that the officers of the Engineering Department were all similarly naval reservists, although he was uncertain of the status of the other officers aboard. The crew were mostly personnel who had previously been conscripted for the maritime service.

POW himself was in the Engineering Department and was an assistant to the Engineering officers, although not strictly speaking one of the ship's officers himself.

In addition to the regular ship's company, there was a Navy gun crew of 12 men, commanded by a petty officer first class.

### 5. IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER UNITS

#### CVE KAIYO

POW saw this vessel in early April, 1944, while it was being repaired at YOKOSUKA after having been damaged by a torpedo.

#### AIKOKU MARU HOKOKU MARU GOKOKU MARU

POW talked with sailors from these three vessels at the offices of the OSAKA SHOSEN KAISHA in KOBE at the end of October, 1943. They told him that they had all been taken off their ships, which were to be converted to XCVs.

#### CVL ZUTHO

POW asserted that he saw this unit in company with an unidentified BB, four CA or CL and a number of DDs off the PESCADORES ISLANDS in February, 1944.

#### CVL ASAHI

He claimed to have seen this as yet unidentified CVL or possibly CV at the same time as the above. He said he had heard that it was of recent construction.

#### ARABIA MARU

This ship - used as an AH - was seen in a floating dry-dock in KOBE in October, 1943.

#### DD ASAGAO

Picked up survivors of ARGUN MARU on 21 September 1943, NE of KIIRUN.

#### Eighth Air Regiment

Stationed at HEITO Airfield at beginning of this year.



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#### 5. IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER UNITS (cont'd)

ORYOKU MARU POW's ship was in convoy with this vessel (now used as an AP) North of KIIRUN in October/November, 1943.

See other ships, listed as sunk in Section 15.

#### 6. IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONALITIES

POW could contribute but little regarding the names of Formosan officials, and he declared that few people on the island knew very much about this matter, as the annual list of officials was no longer published. He added that since the war numerous changes were made every year among the occupants of official positions in FORMOSA. The following identifications were established:

pers / Vice-Admiral HASEKAWA - Governor-General of FORMOSA.  
/ KINOSHITA - Mayor of HEITŌ.  
/ RIN (Jap. name - HAYASHI) - Assistant Mayor of HEITŌ.  
/ KATŌ - Chief of Police of HEITŌ.  
/ 2nd Lieutenant NATSUSEI - Asst. Officer in Charge of Military Police, TAKAO.

#### 7. PARTICULARS OF POW's SHIP

The BATAVIA MARU was a 4,300 ton steamship owned by the OSAKA SHŌSEN KAISHA. An old vessel that was built in 1919, its maximum speed was slightly over ten knots, and its fuel capacity about 1,200 tons. It carried a crew of 87, and, used as an AP, could provide space for over 300 passengers.

When POW first boarded this ship, it was still a commercial vessel engaged in carrying freight and passengers between KOBE and BANGKOK. However, it was taken over by the government at the end of March 1944, in order to transport Army men and supplies to the MARIANAS.

According to POW, it carried a defensive armament of one eight-inch gun (this figure is doubtless inaccurate) and two AA machine guns.

#### 9. ENEMY METHODS AND TRAINING

POW gave the following outline of the draft system used by the Japanese in FORMOSA:

The supreme agency with overall charge of all conscription is the Conscription Headquarters (CHOYO SHIREIBU) at TAIHOKU. Under it are three subsidiary agencies: the Military Bureau (GUMBU), the Civilian Occupation Office (SHOKYGYO KYOKU), and the Maritime Office (KAIJI KYOKU). Each of these three offices regularly prepares lists of the number of men it needs for various activities and forwards them to the central office at TAIHOKU. On receipt of these estimates the Conscription Headquarters makes levies on available manpower throughout the Island, through a number of branch offices (SHIYAKUSHŌ), and directs all men summoned to report to one of the three subsidiaries.

The KAIJI KYOKU, a subsidiary of the Japanese Ministry of Communications (TEISHINSHO), has charge of the recruiting of men for the merchant marine. It was to this agency that POW reported when he received notice of conscription shortly after he had graduated from Elementary Engineering School.

## 9. ENEMY METHODS AND TRAINING (cont'd)

Immediately after reporting, conscriptees received physical examinations and were classified according to aptitude and previous training. They were then assigned to various ships as crew replacements. The GUMBU has under its jurisdiction men called up for duty with military labor units (SETSUEITAI), certain technicians, and students and others who are equipped to serve as Translators and Interpreters with Army units (mainly in Chinese). The SHOKUGYO KYOKU assigns skilled and unskilled workers to various factories in FORMOSA on the basis of personnel requests sent in by the industrial firms. POW stated that conscriptees processed through the KAIJI KYOKU and the GUMBU are regarded as Militarized Civilians (GUNZOKU), while those from the SHOKUGYO KYOKU are generally not considered so.

The stringency of the draft laws leaves little room for evasion on the part of the Formosans. POW declared that for the past few years the penalty for attempted evasion of conscription has been imprisonment for the duration of the war.

POW believed that a limited sort of conscription is in force among the aborigines, although he was not cognizant of any details. When called up, the tribesmen were almost invariably used as porters and laborers and frequently as scouts in jungle warfare. POW knew of several units of this sort which had been serving with the Japanese in the NEW GUINEA area.

The Japanese Army in FORMOSA, according to POW, was continually undergoing the most rigorous type of training. Large-scale maneuvers were held twice every year, at which times most of the troops on the island would go out of the barracks for extensive field practice, long marches, and training in jungle and mountain warfare. POW knew of units which had crossed the island several times by going straight through the wild mountainous area in the interior, deliberately shunning whatever roads might have been at hand. Although the soldiers suffered great hardships on such expeditions, it was obvious that they were, as a result, not only well acquainted with the nature of the land, but experienced in maneuvering under virtually all possible conditions.

## 13. MORALE AND PROPAGANDA

POW regards Americans as friends rather than adversaries and, indeed, expressed the hope that he might be allowed to land in FORMOSA with any American Expeditionary Force which might attack the island. He is vehemently opposed to Japanese rule in FORMOSA and wished for the complete independence of the Formosan nation after the war, feeling that nothing short of free nationhood could ever be a guarantor of peace and material well-being for the people of FORMOSA.

He declares that almost all Formosans share his feeling, having not merely a national, but in most cases a personal enmity towards the Japanese, mainly because of their coercive measures and the stranglehold that they have held over the island's material goods. Relations between Japanese and Formosans are never good, POW stated, and even on the ships on which he sailed, quarrels were always breaking out between the two. POW doubts, however, whether his countrymen would attack the Japanese in a mass rising at the moment of a possible American landing operation, for repressive measures practiced by the Japanese against the island's inhabitants have been so severe that active resistance has been largely discouraged.

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### 13. MORALE AND PROPAGANDA

However, he feels certain that if effective propaganda mediums, mainly in the form of airplane leaflets, were to reach the people of FORMOSA from American sources, the way would be very well paved for the passive support of all Formosans and the active support of an extremely large number should an American landing be attempted. POW attaches great importance to the effect of propaganda leaflets used in this manner and he believes that a simple statement of the imminence of American attack and instructions to the civil population as to what they should do when it came, would be of great value. A grave error, however, would be made if any of these leaflets were to be printed in Japanese instead of Chinese, as the psychological result would be quite bad because of the resentment of Formosans at the forced intrusion of the Japanese tongue in the island as the prevailing medium of speech.

POW asserted that discrimination against Formosans in all fields was still the general rule. It was only with the greatest difficulty that Formosan students could gain even a high-school education, and one was almost forced to go abroad in order to attend college. Even in cases where higher or secondary education was open to the native population, Japanese students almost invariably received scholastic preferment whether or not their ability warranted it.

The Japanese language is generally used throughout the island, and POW stated that in any locality, no matter how remote, Japanese-speaking people can be found. As it is taught in the schools and its use made mandatory for commercial and official transactions, this fact can be readily understood. POW added, however, that great numbers of people in the country districts speak only Formosan and, in general, Japanese was used only when it was impossible or forbidden to converse in the native tongue.

When asked about the possible available leadership in the event of a Formosan rising against the Japanese, POW declared that there were, in his opinion, a great many people capable of directing resistance. Foremost among them, he felt, would be the younger people who had received education either in JAPAN or elsewhere abroad. These students, whose families were generally among the most influential in FORMOSA, particularly resented the relatively servile status of their fellow-nationals, after having compared the generous treatment which they received abroad, even in JAPAN, to that given them in their native country by the Japanese. Although most of them have either been conscripted like POW or else forced to join various Japanese controlled youth service organizations, POW would regard them as the spearhead of any anti-Japanese resistance movement.

The Japanese police exercise a most stringent control over the life of the entire island and the most minor offenses, particularly those against public order, are punished with severe penalties. The rigid family system in FORMOSA has lent itself to more easily controlling the populace in the country districts; the Japanese give orders to an elected chief in charge of a varying number of subdivided household groups, who is then held responsible for passing the word down until it reaches each individual under his jurisdiction. This method obviously eases greatly the duties of police officials. As city and town populations are more accessible, this system need not be practiced in thickly-settled areas. In any case, the efficiency of Japanese coercive measures has been such that POW could not recall any outbreak against Imperial authority in recent years.



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### 13. MORALE AND PROPAGANDA (cont'd)

pers (sign) Virtually all of the young men in FORMOSA are included in two Japanese-sponsored youth organizations - the Home Defense League (BOEIDAN) and the Union of Able-bodied Men (SOTEIDAN). The function of both is roughly the same, i.e. to assist the police in maintaining public order and to act as something of an auxiliary police force in time of emergency. The Home Defense League, according to POW, is an offshoot of a similar organization called the KEIBODAN, which has branches throughout the Japanese Empire. Its membership embraces all the youth of the island who have graduated from Japanese primary school, and its main strength is found in the cities. Recently, its name was changed from Young Men's Association (SEINENDAN) to the present form and the membership has received special training in air raid protection. POW believes that the head of this unit is a Japanese official of Imperial Appointment (CHOKUNIN) rank.

The Union of Able-bodied men is a considerably smaller group, numbering perhaps one third the membership of the other. Its greatest strength is drawn from the country districts and graduation from school is not a prerequisite of membership. The chief of the Japanese police system in Formosa is in overall charge.

POW held that membership in these two groups is compulsory, thus making it impossible for any Formosan boy or young man to avoid participation in them. In time of war, they are under the command of the Japanese military commander on the island and can be called up at any time for whatever service is demanded of them. However, POW stated that their loyalty to the Japanese is of the most questionable sort; he had little doubt that, in the event of an American invasion of FORMOSA, they would be of little service to the Japanese, and he felt, furthermore, that they might well be a good asset to the American forces.

### 15. WASTAGE AND CASUALTIES

Special Duty Ship  
(TOKUMUKAN) SHIRIYA  
ARGUN MARU, and 3 u/i  
AP or AK

On 21 September 1943, these five ships, together with a sixth unidentified vessel were traveling in convoy about 100 miles NE of KIIRUN, when they were attacked by several American SS. As the prearranged escorting vessels had not been supplied, due to some error in planning, the attack was not opposed and only one ship escaped sinking.

TAKAO MARU

POW saw this ship sunk in LINGAYAN GULF in February 1942.

HORAI MARU

This ship was sunk in LINGAYAN GULF about the same time as the above. It was subsequently raised and recommissioned, only to be sunk again this year, according to a report heard by POW.

TAINAN MARU  
KAGI MARU  
TAICHU MARU  
HOZAN MARU

Although exact circumstances of these sinkings are unknown, POW saw sailors from all four at various times in the OSAKA SHOSEN KAISHA's KOBE offices. They told him that their ships had been torpedoed and and sunk.

YAMATO MARU

This ship (an NYK vessel) was torpedoed and sunk by an American SS in October or November 1943, N of KIIRUN. A friend was aboard at the time and told POW of the sinking.

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15. WASTAGE AND CASUALTIES (cont'd)

FUJI MARU  
KAMO MARU

POW heard from survivors that these ships, part of a convoy escorted by Japanese DD, were sunk N of KIIRUN about the same time as those mentioned above. A third, the ORYOKO MARU was also hit by a torpedo which proved to be a dud.

NEKKA MARU  
TAKACHIHO MARU

POW heard she was sunk in Nov. '43, N. of KIIRUN. Sunk in March 1943, N. of KIIRUN; POW talked with survivors.

SHOKA MARU

POW heard from a survivor that this ship was sunk in the middle of 1942 somewhere in the SOUTH PACIFIC area, en route from RABAU to JAPAN.

ASAMA MARU  
MIKE MARU

According to stories POW had heard, both these vessels were sunk in the vicinity of PALAU several months before his capture.

17. MILITARY AND NAVAL BASES

FORMOSA

Transportation Systems: POW declared that, in general, both road and railroad systems have been improved extensively by the Japanese since the outbreak of war. Most railroad lines have been double-tracked, among others the TAKAO-TAICHU SHINCHIKU line, the TAIHOKU-KIIRUN line and the stretches between SHOKA and TAINAN and TOEN and HEICHIN. He asserted that the double-track system was so arranged that one track was used exclusively by military, the other by civilian traffic. The rolling stock used was in good condition and there seemed to be no deficiency in any respect. POW knew of large repair shops at TAIHOKU, TAINAN and KAGI and it was his opinion that some cars were manufactured at these or similar places. According to POW, all Formosan railroads are Japanese standard gauge.

POW said that serviceable roads now connected almost all important points in the island, many having been constructed quite recently for military purposes. The following roads were mentioned specifically in the course of the interrogation:

TAITO-TAINAN A close friend of POW's had traveled across the island over this road in 1942, just after it had been completed. It apparently runs through KISAN and S. to RIKO, at which point it turns E. From a place presumably near EMPO it follows the path of an old trail through the HUAN-TE aborigine country until it joins the regular network of roads about ten miles W. of TAITO, possibly near the village of LIKE. As POW had not travelled this route himself, he was not overly sure about its exact location. He had been told that the surface of the road was of crushed stone. Its width through the aborigine country was about three meters.

CHUREKI-KARENKO In September 1943, POW heard of a newly-constructed road that crossed the northern part of the island from CHUREKI to KARENKO. He knew nothing of the route taken nor any other particulars about the matter and the reliability of this information is open to question.

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17. MILITARY AND NAVAL BASES(cont'd)

TAITO-KARENKO POW stated that a road of fairly recent construction ran southward from KARENKO along the east coast and connected with the highway going N from TAITO at a point near TSURUNO MISAKI, about five miles N of the KARENKO CHO-TAITO CHO border. It is constructed of crushed stone and is suitable for two-way military traffic.

TAINAN-KISAN A new road connects these points. It is made of crushed stone and is about six meters wide.

HOSAN-HEITO A highway about ten meters wide runs between these cities. The concrete bridge over the SHIMOTAMSUI River, according to POW, is the only one in the area capable of resisting the heaviest possible flood waters.

HOSAN-RIKO A road directly connecting these two places was recently built. It apparently runs directly NW from HOSAN and bridges the SHIMOTAMSUI near the village of KAUTE, after which it joins the HEITO-RIKO road.

HEITO-NAIHO A wide road built expressly for military use connects these places.

HATTO Tunnel There is a small tunnel at HATTO, on the KIIRUN-TAIHOKU road. It is constructed of concrete, is about 25 feet in height, and has two narrow lanes for vehicles.

POW declared that all roads in FORMOSA except for those in and near cities are built of crushed stone. City streets and most roads in urban areas are generally asphalt. He regards the surface transportation system of FORMOSA as good and feels that it can satisfy almost any military need. Although the Japanese have thus been quite successful in their aim of building a network of strategic roads throughout the island, a weak point of the system is possibly an insufficient number of bridges capable of withstanding heavy floods, notably in the SHIMOTAMSUI River area.

KIIRUN Although POW had often visited the city, he possessed little information of value concerning it. The harbor entrances are thoroughly mined and the harbor itself has been deepened considerably; at present three or four vessels of 20,000 tons can moor in the outer harbor. Docking facilities have been improved and the drydock is apparently capable of accommodating 10,000 ton ships. Naval Headquarters is located near the docks just N of KIIRUN Station. Other than this POW knew of no specific locations of military buildings or fortifications.

When questioned about the area on the south shore of SHARYO ISLAND and that about BASSHIKO WAN across the small channel which had been tentatively noted as a possible submarine base, POW said that on several occasions he had seen SS and other small warcraft moored in the area.

POW stated that there were usually three or four CAs or CLs and numerous DDs in KIIRUN harbor.

TAKAO POW's information about this city was mainly confirmatory. He knew of two unidentified AA artillery regiments stationed in the city and he had heard that they were completely equipped with radar direction-finding apparatus. POW declared that the harbor had been deepened to the extent that ships of 20,000 tons could now go slightly past the railroad station and freight yards area. However, he characterized warship repair facilities as poor. There were large mine fields outside the harbor entrance.

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17. MILITARY AND NAVAL BASES (cont'd)

ROKURYO POW declared that there is an Army airfield at this place, a town SSE of KAGI. The mayor of the village had told POW's family in 1940 that all the inhabitants were to be evacuated that year by government order, so that the area could be converted into a military airfield. In the latter part of 1941, POW spent some time in this vicinity at AMOPI, site of the FORMOSA Government Livestock Laboratory (which is slightly over two miles SSE of KAGI) and observed that the people of ROKURYO had already been evacuated and their town made a restricted area. On making inquiries he was told that an airfield had been built there and was at that time the operating base of the 12th Air Regiment. Due mainly to lack of adequate maps on the region, it has been impossible to determine exactly the location of this alleged field. As POW described it as being in a valley or plateau with the aircraft housed in hangars built into a mountainside, it is possible that the field lies in one of several small valleys cutting the foothills just N of the UNSUI riverbed. It is reached by a good road about six meters in width which runs E from KAGI past a Middle School on the city's outskirts, and then continues in a general easterly and southeasterly direction past AMOPI to ROKURYO.

TOSHIE As this new port is a completely military establishment, POW has never entered it, nor was it considered prudent for Formosans to discuss the place. However, he stated that the large-scale construction which had been going on there for some years has now been completed and the harbor's importance as a naval base has increased to the extent that it is now considered in a class with MAKO. A road roughly eight meters in width has been built between TOSHIE and TAKAO and there is a good deal of military traffic between the two points.

There is also an airfield two or three miles inland from the port, according to rumor heard by POW. The talk was that it is primarily a navy field, although its facilities are used by army aircraft, also. (This information, based on hearsay, does not agree with the photographic coverage of the region).

JITSUGETSUTAN Area POW had not visited this section in recent years and knows little about it. He said that there had been some new road construction there since the beginning of the war and that there was an airfield and AA artillery defenses comprising several AA Regiments in the immediate region.

MAKO POW had visited this harbor on several occasions, but had had scarcely any opportunity to go ashore. Many warships of all types were usually seen there, and the surrounding waters were mined on all sides. There was one large airfield near MAKO and two others located elsewhere, which were all the fields he knew of in the PESCADORES.

KOBE POW was familiar with a good deal of the harbor area, having gone ashore there many times. He stated that when he last left KOBE in March of this year, most work on the various new harbor developments, notably that near the ONOHAMA Station, had been completed. However, work on the dock area just E. of the KOBE Iron Works was still about one-fourth unfinished.

Both the KAWASAKI and MITSUBISHI dockyards were in full production, with some night work done in addition to the regular shifts. The KAWASAKI Yard built only naval vessels. POW noticed one large CV under construction there near the end of last year. The MITSUBISHI Yard built both merchant ships and warships, in particular SS (although POW had noticed that CAs also were constructed there).



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#### 17. MILITARY AND NAVAL BASES (cont'd)

AA defenses were very numerous throughout the dock area. POW had noticed both HMG and AA artillery positions located on the docks and on the roofs of buildings. There were soldiers everywhere and most of the warehouses and factories were under strict military guard.

SAIGON POW was fairly familiar with this city, as he had stopped there frequently while aboard the ARGUN MARU, last having left the port in September 1943. There were seldom over 20 ships in the harbor and these were usually small Japanese merchantmen. Japanese warships of various types were often present in the harbor; also, the number of escort vessels was fairly large. POW noticed only one French vessel there, which he guilelessly classed as a BB (probably the CL LAMOTTE-PICQUET).

Although he had not seen any airfields, POW had always noticed a good deal of Japanese fighter activity over the town. He observed numerous AA positions, though possessing little specific information as to their location and type.

Japanese soldiers were observed guarding warehouses in the harbor area, as well as various important points in the city.

BANGKOK POW was last in BANGKOK at the end of January 1944. There were about ten ships, all small merchantmen, in the harbor which he said was about the usual number to be found there. A good deal of military activity was noticed in the city, and aircraft, both fighters and bombers, from a field N of the city, were frequently seen overhead.

#### 20. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

POW saw a number of Allied POWs working in the KAWASAKI and MITSUBISHI shipyards in KÖBE, employed at riveting and similar duties. They were housed in barracks in the harbor district and seemed well treated. The number of soldiers guarding them was very small.

Economic Conditions (FORMOSA) POW declared that all planting is now under strict government control. Sugar-growing has greatly declined, notably in the area around TAKAO, and rice has been planted in its stead.

--- The information herein has been obtained from Prisoner of War sources and must be judged accordingly ---