June 27, 1984 - J-AAWR Hearings, Testimony of David Lowman

JAPANESE-AMERICAN AND ALEUTIAN WARTIME RELOCATION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON

H.R. 3387, H.R. 4110, and H.R. 4322

JAPANESE-AMERICAN AND ALEUTIAN WARTIME RELOCATION

JUNE 20, 21, 27, AND SEPTEMBER 12, 1984

Serial No. 90

Printed for the use of the Committee on Judiciary

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1985

40-176 O

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

64-273 O-86--1

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

PETER W. RODINO, JR., New Jersey, Chairman
JACK BROOKS, Texas		HAMILTON FISH, JR., Missouri
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin		CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, Florida
DON EDWARDS, California		HENRY J. HYDE, Georgia
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan		THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, Ohio		HAROLD S. SAWYER, Tennessee
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky		DAN LUNGREN, Michigan
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey		F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., New Mexico
SAM B. HALL, Texas		BILL McCOLLUM, Arkansas
MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma		E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado		GEORGE W. GEKAS,
DAN GLICKMAN, Kansas		MICHAEL DeWINE, Ohio
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
BRUCE A. MORRISON, Connecticut
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
FREDERICK C. BOUCHER, Virginia
M. ELAINE MIELKE, General Counsel
GARNER J. CLINE, Staff Director
ALAN F. COFFEY, JR., Associate Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
SAM B. HALL, JR., Texas, Chairman
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky		THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts		BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California		E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida
FREDERICK C. BOUCHER, Virginia
WILLIAM P. SHATTUCK, Counsel
JANE S. POTTS, Assistant Counsel
STEVEN N. DOUGLAS, Assistant Counsel
DAVID L. KARMOL, Associate Counsel

NOTE: [Bracketed] text in original. This excerpt starts from page 430 of the record.

Mr. HALL. Our next witness this morning is Mr. David Lowman, a former official, National Security Agency, now retired.

Mr. Lowman, if you will come forward, please, and proceed with your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID LOWMAN,
FORMER OFFICIAL (RETIRED), NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY JEFFREY LOWMAN

Mr. LOWMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.

The gentleman on my left is my son, Jeffrey Lowman, who has kindly consented to carry about and help with my reference books.

I would also like to say that all of the materials that I am going to refer to today are in the public domain and are available to anybody.

Additionally, I have received no special research support from any element of the Government.

At the outset, I would like to make it perfectly clear that I, too, feel that a grave injustice was done to many resident Japanese nationals and to many Japanese Americans who lived on the West Coast in 1942, who were evacuated and interned solely on the basis of their ancestry.

My quarrel is with the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians which, appointed to look into this tragedy, failed to disclose one of the major reasons why the U.S. Government felt that the implementation of Executive Order 9066 was necessary.

The Commission, in its report "Personal Justice Denied," has misrepresented the prevailing intelligence opinion at that time, and was unaware of the most significant intelligence available to the United States on the subject which the Commission was charged to investigate.

For these reasons, the Commission's report contains a number of demonstratively wrong statements and erroneous impressions and conclusions.

Unknown to the Commission, Roosevelt had before him when he made his decision to evacuate ethnic Japanese from the West Coast the most important and authoritative intelligence available to the U.S. Government at that time on this issue, data from broken Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers, cover named MAGIC.

The fact that MAGIC was available at this crucial time was due to one of the most remarkable achievements of the war. U.S. cryptoanalysts had succeeded by late 1940 in breaking all of the Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers. Japanese messages sent in these systems were intercepted by U.S. Army and Navy radio-intelligence units on a continuing basis. Included among the diplomatic communications were hundreds of reports dealing with espionage matters in the United States and its possessions.

The most comprehensive study ever made of events leading up to Pearl Harbor -- hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 volumes of hearings, published in 1946 -- examined every aspect of MAGIC in excruciating detail. It is the single most investigated subject in the study. The Joint Committee's conclusion: "MAGIC * * * contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, saved many thousands of American lives," and it was "some of the finest intelligence in our history."

The information contained in these messages was so significant, and the fact that we had broken the code so sensitive, that distribution was limited. MAGIC intelligence was restricted to the Secretary of War, the Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Army War Plans, Director of Military Intelligence, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval War Plans Division, Director of Naval Intelligence, the Secretary of State, and the President of the United States.

However, limited distribution of MAGIC itself did not mean that the intelligence never left the tight circle of readers in Washington, DC. The Army and Navy recipients in the Nation's Capital looked out for their field commanders. Normally the data was passed on in a sanitized version -- that is, the information was given out in a way which did not disclose its source.

At this juncture, I would like to point out to the committee some of the more important Japanese Government messages -- at least for our purposes here -- which are contained in the Department of Defense study published in 1977 entitled "The MAGIC Background of Pearl Harbor," eight volumes.

I wish to stress, however, that these volumes contained only a fraction of the Japanese Government's communications concerning its espionage activities on the West Coast and its involvement with resident Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans. Unless the information had to be expedited for some reason, the Japanese officials would normally send it by diplomatic pouch or courier mail, because there was no danger then of the United States obtaining a copy of the enciphered message. If they sent it by cable, it was subject to being intercepted, something the Japanese attempted to avoid for particularly sensitive matters, as a routine precaution.

In fact, a June message from the Japanese Foreign Minister stated, and I quote: "Needless to say, courier mail is a more secure method of transmitting information than reliance upon codes, so when there is some secret matter which might arouse a given nation, please send the message by courier mail." If there was anything designed to arouse the United States, it was certainly the specter of massive espionage nets being established on the Pacific coast utilizing U.S. residents of Japanese ancestry. Frankly, I am surprised that we have the number of messages we do which were not time urgent and which could just as well have gone by pouch.

Everyone on MAGIC distribution during 1941 realized that what was being seen was only a portion of the actual flow. We had a small window on a very large scene. Nonetheless, what was available was sufficient to form a reasonably accurate picture of the scope, nature, and success of the Japanese Government's espionage activities on the West Coast, as well as its involvement with Japanese-Americans and resident Japanese nationals.

Now on to the MAGIC messages which we actually intercepted and read and were available to the select group of recipients which I outlined previously.

In January 1941, the Japanese Embassy and its consulate officials in the United States and its consulate officials in the United States were instructed to start emphasizing intelligence acquisition rather than propaganda in order to be prepared for the worst.

Following this, Tokyo issued detailed instructions to spy on U.S. aircraft plants and their output, movement of military supplies to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, shipping activity, arms production, and any naval or Army data of interest. Support was to be given to any group or organization which could be used to foment discord in the United States. Specifically mentioned, among others, were the negro movement, labor unions, the Communist Party, and anti-Semitic organizations. Alterations to airports were to be reported. Any strengthening of the defenses on the Pacific coast or in Hawaii was to be noted. Information was desired on merchant vessels, such as any deviations from regular schedules, any remodeling of the ships, or any special requisitions by the U.S. Government. Movement of troops to the South Pacific, information on drafting people into the Army and Navy, and the number of people graduating from aviation schools was wanted.

From time to time, these basic requirements would be supplemented by special requests for information. For example, a dispatch from Tokyo on October 16, 1941, to its Seattle consulate instructed, "Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once."

To assist in this massive information-gathering project, agents were to be recruited. The agents were to include both resident-Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese ancestry, as well as other ethnic groups. In recruiting Japanese second generation and resident nationals, Tokyo warned to use the utmost caution, lest "our people in the United States" be subject to persecution.

In May 1941, Ambassador Nomura was instructed to appoint Secretary Terazaki to be in charge of coordinating Japanese intelligence in both North and South America. Every facility was to be granted for the efficient completion of his work.

In April, Tokyo instructed all the consulates to wire home lists of first- and second-generation Japanese according to specified categories. These data were to be compiled from the October 1940 census; but the Chicago consulate in its reply stated that its figures were based on the "Annual Japanese Occupational Report," and the "Record of Movement of Japanese Nationals." Obviously, the consulates were maintaining comprehensive files and records on all ethnic Japanese in their area.

By May 1941, the Japanese Embassy discovered that espionage was an expensive proposition and asked Tokyo for substantial increase in funds "for the purpose of employing nationals and foreigners."

A paternalistic attitude by the Japanese Government toward people of Japanese ancestry living in the United States is evident in many messages. They are referred to as "our second generation," "our resident nationals," and "our people." There are discussions about propaganda broadcasts and Japanese language newspapers -- which, incidentally, were subsidized by Japan and depended on the Japanese news service, Domei, for their information. There were discussions about maintaining close relations with various organizations and societies all designed to keep the ethnic Japanese in the United States informed of the Tokyo point of view, and for the purpose of collecting intelligence from them.

In July 1941, there was a particularly alarming message from Mexico City to Tokyo. This message stated that a meeting had been held for the purpose of giving guidance to Japanese nationals residing in Mexico. At the meeting were the most influential Japanese from Mexico City and representatives from various other areas in Mexico. "All those present assured me that our nationals -- would do everything in their power to adhere to our decisions." Mexico was divided into nine districts with a liaison officer for each one who would relay in the most effective manner instructions issued by this office -- this office being the Japanese Embassy -- to the Japanese population in the area.

What this message said is that representative of Japanese nationals living in Mexico agreed to abide by the decisions and follow the orders of the Japanese Embassy, and that command channels had been established within Mexico for the purpose of passing on Embassy orders to the Japanese population throughout all of Mexico. In 1941, the implications involved in this message must have been very disturbing. The possibility that a similar arrangement might exist in the United States to some extent could not be ruled out.

This kind of close-knit family relationship evident in Japanese messages, which seemed to assume on the part of the Japanese Government that most Japanese, regardless of their status, would remain loyal to the homeland and the Emperor, had to be viewed with great apprehension by the recipients of MAGIC.

In May 1941, Japanese consulates on the West Coast reported to Tokyo that first- and second-generation Japanese had been successfully recruited and were now spying on shipments of airplanes and war material in the San Diego and San Pedro areas. They were reporting on activities within aircraft plants in Seattle and Los Angeles. Local Japanese were watching movements across the Mexican border. They were reporting on shipping activities at the Bremerton Naval Yard and were supplying inside information about labor unions. The Los Angeles consulate reported "We shall maintain connections with our second generation who are at present in the Army to keep us informed of various developments in the Army." Seattle followed with a similar dispatch.

Earlier in 1941, Tokyo had decided that Mexico would be the fallback position to control the espionage nets established in the United States. In case of war, a June 1941 message stated that Mexico City, along with Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago, were considered the most important bases for gathering intelligence about the United States.

In June and July, plans were initiated concerning communications between agents in the United States and control in Mexico City in the event of war. Land routes for couriers to cross the border were discussed . It was decided that Laredo, Juarez, and Mexicali were the best suited. Officials in the United States and Mexico -- Japanese officials -- were to get together and work out details of their intelligence nets, including contacts and exchanges on the border.

All these arrangements presupposed that there would no longer be any overt Japanese officials left in the United States after the war started. Who then would comprise the underground intelligence nets in the United States which were to be controlled from Mexico? A message from Tokyo to Mexico City answered at least part of that question. The message said, "In case the U.S. joins the war, we will endeavor to use our nationals there to our best possible advantage."

During the latter half of 1941, there was a steady stream of espionage messages with the requested information going back to Tokyo.

In Panama, the Japanese came up with secret charts of the fortifications of the Canal Zone. Other reports to Tokyo from Panama contained detailed information concerning the location of airfields, air strength, ammunition, location, and camouflage of petroleum supply tanks, location and strength of our artillery patrols, radar detectors and the range, map procurement and other matters, which the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor observed would be of interest only if an attack on Panama were contemplated because it was in such detail. There is evidence in MAGIC which suggests that much of this information came from local Japanese recruited in Panama for espionage purposes.

In the United States, an espionage nugget was forwarded to Tokyo in September from the Los Angeles consulate. This was a detailed message concerning airplane production. Not only were each of the airplane plants in the Los Angeles area named specifically, but also listed was the size of the orders filled by each plant, the exact numbers of employees, and the total expenditures for salaries. In addition, the kinds of production at each plant by type aircraft -- that is P38's, B-39's, DC-3's, and so on -- were given and whether these aircraft were designated for Great Britain or the United States. It was estimated by the Japanese that this data comprised 40 percent of the total aircraft production in the Los Angeles area and 10 percent in the San Diego area. The message is particularly interesting because the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles had previously reported that it had "connections with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes."

The Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack assessed the value of the espionage messages as follows: "Washington authorities learned that Japanese spies and agents, directed by the Japanese Government, were collecting and transmitting to Tokyo an immense amount of exact and detailed information respecting the military and naval installations and the state of preparedness in the Hawaiian Islands as well as elsewhere."

When all this communications intelligence, this MAGIC, was coupled with other intelligence estimates of large numbers of potentially disloyal Japanese on the West Coast, Roosevelt and his top aides had to be alarmed at the emerging picture, especially if the possibilities of sabotage were also contemplated. It is impossible to believe that all this intelligence did not play a major role in the thinking of President Roosevelt and his key advisers. The forward of the Department of Defense study, The "MAGIC" Background of Pearl Harbor, concludes prophetically with the sentence, "Scholars no doubt will find new challenges in this voluminous intelligence information as they examine not only the decisions made by the United States, but also the intelligence which influenced and occasionally prompted those decisions."

The well-known historian John Costello in his excellent book, "The Pacific War," has no doubts of the role of MAGIC in Roosevelt's decision. He states unequivocally, "the rising current of fear on the West Coast, and the evidence from the MAGIC intercepts the previous year of espionage organizations had been important factors in the President's decision to sign Executive Order 9066."

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Commission has misstated the functions, responsibilities and professional opinions of the U.S. intelligence community as it existed in late 1941 and early 1942. In its report, Personal Justice Denied, there is a section entitled "Intelligence." No mention is made of MAGIC because the Commission was unaware of it. The section purports to present the intelligence data, its evaluation, and the recommendations of the intelligence community which were available to Roosevelt when he made his evacuation decision in February 1942. In this section, as in other areas of the report, the Commission repeats its theme that the people who had the intelligence responsibility were ignored when they opposed evacuation.

Who were these people, and what was the intelligence they possessed which the Commission says was reliable and should have been followed, but which Roosevelt chose to ignore and, instead, went the route of lack of political leadership, racism, and war hysteria?

The first source cited of the three given was a journalist named John Franklin Carter who sent reports directly to the President. His specialty was to "obtain information and estimates by exploiting sources outside the Government." Most of Carter's information came from someone named Curtis B. Munson, who is extensively quoted in the Commission's report. Munson was "a well-to-do Chicago businessman who had gathered intelligence for Carter under the guise of being a government official" -- whatever that means. It is difficult to take seriously the report's statement that this pair of amateurs and their methods was one of the best sources of intelligence available to the U.S. Government. After discussing the situation in some detail, Carter and Munson concluded that evacuation was unnecessary.

The second source cited by the report, Personal Justice Denied, was a Lt. Com. K. R. Ringle of the Office of Naval Intelligence, who was assigned to the 11th Naval District located in southern California. Ringle was a professional intelligence officer. The Commission relies heavily on him because he is the only military intelligence officer of any standing at all that the Commission was able to find who thought mass evacuation was not necessary.

But Ringle, surprisingly, also believed that staggering numbers of Japanese were potentially disloyal. In one estimate he felt that about 3 percent of the West Coast Japanese might act as saboteurs or espionage agents -- about 3,500 by his reckoning. In another estimate, Ringle thought that only 75 percent of the American-born Japanese could be considered completely loyal. Presumably, this figure would be much lower for the first generation Japanese, but even using the 75-percent figure across the board meant that there were almost 30,000 potentially disloyal Japanese according to Ringle. Nonetheless, Ringle thought the potentially dangerous Japanese could be identified through hearings and, therefore, mass evacuation was unnecessary. Ringle was at the time a minor official and did not speak for the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The third source listed by the Commission as supporting its position is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. J. Edgar Hoover, then the FBI Director, felt that the situation could be handled without mass evacuation. However, uncharacteristically, Hoover thought his opinion should be balanced by his West Coast field offices' views on evacuation. Los Angeles was noncommittal, San Francisco was dismissive, San Diego and Seattle were "vehemently favorable" to evacuation.

Thus, the Commission bases its conclusions regarding prevailing intelligence attitudes on the private opinions of three individuals -- Munson, Carter, and Ringle -- and a badly divided FBI assessment -- two civilians posing as Federal agents, a lieutenant commander who thought thousands of Japanese were potentially disloyal, and an FBI report with Hoover riding the fence. This is what Roosevelt is accused of ignoring in making his evacuation decision.

On the other hand, supporting evacuation -- or at least not opposing it -- were the Secretary of War, the Army Chief of Staff, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Chiefs of Army and Navy Plans -- probably the most elite group in the American power structure of the day. These were the people the nation called upon to defend their country and to prosecute the war. It was from this group that Roosevelt received his advice on national defense. Again, all of the people just named, along with the President, regularly received MAGIC intelligence.

Ringle, Munson and Carter were totally unawares of MAGIC. Even J. Edgar Hoover was not on distribution.

In assessing the U.S. intelligence posture in 1941 and early 1942, the Commission was totally unaware of the role of the Office of Naval Communications and the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, the organizations responsible for producing the most important intelligence the United States possessed -- MAGIC.

The Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack described the Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Communications, the organizations responsible for intercepting Japanese communications, breaking the codes and disseminating the information. The Joint Congressional Committee said as follows:

With extraordinary skill, zeal and watchfulness, the intelligence services of the Army Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Communications broke Japanese codes and intercepted messages between the Japanese Government and its spies and agents and ambassadors in all parts of the world and supplied the high authorities in Washington with reliable secret information respecting Japanese designs, decisions, and operations at home, in the United States, and in other countries.

Also ignored in the Commission's report are the military intelligence officials responsible for handling and evaluating intelligence on the threat posed by ethnic Japanese on the West Coast. Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, is mentioned once in the report as one of several people attending a meeting. Admiral Turner, responsible for U.S. Navy intelligence assessments, including Japanese espionage on the West Coast, is not mentioned at all; nor is General Miles, Director of Military Intelligence for the Army.

Incredibly, also apparently overlooked by the Commission are both Army and Navy intelligence bulletins which were given extensive distribution warning of Japanese espionage activities on the West Coast. Three days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Office of Naval Intelligence published a 26-page report detailing Japanese intelligence and propaganda activities during 1941, which the Office of Naval Intelligence said had culminated in "an intelligence machine geared for war," in operation, and utilizing resident West Coast Japanese.

On January 21, 1942, more than 6 weeks after Pearl Harbor, Army Intelligence, with ONI input, issued a bulletin on the existence of operational Japanese espionage networks on the West Coast. This report stated flat out that the Japanese Government's espionage net containing Japanese aliens, first and second generation Japanese and other nationals is now thoroughly organized and working underground.

I would like to make both of those reports, if I may, a matter of record.

On February 12, 1 week before President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, Gen. Mark Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army, forwarded this last report, the Army report, to John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, with the note: "Some of the information contained herein may be of assistance to you in settling this question." That is, Japanese espionage on the West Coast.

Presumably oblivious to all the foregoing, the Commission ends its section on intelligence as follows: "Stronger political forces outside of the intelligence services wanted evacuation. Intelligence opinions were disregarded or drowned out." The intelligence opinions they are talking about were Carter, Munson, Ringle and a divided FBI report. It was the Commission that ignored the actual views of the intelligence community and the intelligence which shaped its opinions.

This kind of misrepresentation of the intelligence community is embedded throughout the Commission's report, and it is wrong.

Numerous books and studies have been released on MAGIC. It is the single most discussed topic in the Pearl Harbor inquiry. Practically every history book concerning the Pacific war published in the last four decades has at least one chapter on MAGIC. But somehow, even after devoting almost 3 years of research and spending $1.5 million in the process, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians managed to overlook it. Stung by my charge in the New York Times in May 1983 pointing out this omission, the Commission issued an addendum to its basic report in June 1983. Filled with inaccuracies and wrong assumptions, the addendum offers proof only that MAGIC analysts -- that is to say communications analysts -- are not created in 1 month.

Basically, the Commission's addendum makes two points -- both wrong: One, that MAGIC confirms the views expressed in its report, Personal Justice Denied; and two, that MAGIC intelligence data was not very secret, nor important, nor very reliable.

The first point is overwhelmingly contradicted by the MAGIC messages themselves. For example, MAGIC totally refutes the Commission's views on page 60 of its report that "there was no knowledge or evidence of organized or individual Nisei spying." And on page 50 of its report, I quote, "the government has conceded at every point that there was no evidence of actual sabotage, espionage or fifth column activity among the people of Japanese descent on the West Coast in February 1942." The Office of Naval Intelligence, the G-2 of the Army, the Secretary of State, the President and others would have been surprised to have learned that the Government had conceded that there was no such evidence. These statements by the Commission are simply not true.

The fact is that the cumulative effect of MAGIC and other intelligence by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor presented to the U.S. Government the frightening specter of massive espionage nets, utilizing large numbers of ethnic Japanese living on the West Coast of the United States, established and controlled by the Government of Japan.

On the second point, the value of MAGIC, the findings of the Joint Congressional Inquiry bear repeating. MAGIC * * * "was some of the finest intelligence in our history," and the U.S. code breakers "supplied the high authorities in Washington with reliable secret information respecting Japanese * * * operations in the United States" from "intercepted messages between the Japanese Government and its spies and agents."

The addendum makes an issue out of one of the cables directing recruiting of agents, pointing out that groups other than Japanese were to be recruited, and that these groups are listed first in the cable. This hardly nullifies the instructions to recruit first and second generation Japanese.

A point is made in the addendum that Roosevelt did not see MAGIC cables from May until November. This is grasping at a technical distribution-and-form decision. The implication is that Roosevelt was unaware of MAGIC during this period. The facts are that in every one of these months, the President either saw the cables, was briefed on them, or was given gists of the messages or received some combination of the above.

The Commission makes the statement on page 4 of the addendum that "of course, information could be transmitted by methods other than MAGIC codes, but there is no considerable room to doubt that any program of this sort was fulfilled." Absolutely wrong. I have already explained that the normal practice was to send information of this type by diplomatic pouch rather than in coded radio traffic. In fact, the Japanese consuls were under specific direction from the Foreign Minister not to send this kind of information by cable if it could be avoided. The MAGIC cables in our possession were only the tip of the iceberg. Roosevelt and his advisers were well aware of that fact.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the key civilian and military leaders of a nation at war personally were aware of MAGIC intelligence, including its source, nature, content, and scope. MAGIC messages discussed here today, read in the context of 1941 and 1942, clearly portrayed a potentially dangerous and perhaps unmanageable situation on the West Coast. There was genuine and legitimate cause for concern about the loyalty and actions of large numbers of resident Japanese aliens and Japanese-Americans.

Given the awesome responsibility President Roosevelt had, the military situation at that time, and the Japanese Government's apparent success in establishing vast espionage nets along the West Coast designed to function in a wartime environment utilizing local Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans, Roosevelt made an understandable decision.

Hindsight information about an event that happened 40 years ago is not the issue here. The question is, did the leaders of the U.S. Government have before them at that time intelligence which would explain their decision in terms other than political opportunism, racial hatred and war hysteria? The answer clearly is yes, they did, and its name was MAGIC.

Mr. Chairman, my purpose here today has been to provide you with fully documented intelligence which was available and known to President Roosevelt when he made his decision to implement Executive Order 9066, information which was not provided in the Commission's report. If the documentation which I have presented to you is accepted, the Commission's report, Personal Justice Denied, and its addendum, insofar as its handling of the entire subject of intelligence is concerned, must be substantially revised. As it presently stands, it is incomplete, inaccurate and misleading.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. Thank you for your attention.

[The statement of Mr. Lowman follows:]

MAGIC AND THE JAPANESE
RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT

by

David D. Lowman

1221 Victoria Street
Apartment 1905
Honolulu, Hawaii 96814
(808) 537-2328

{Typed in lowercase for ease of readability}

When President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, the cumulative effect of "MAGIC" intelligence from broken Japanese codes presented the frightening specter of massive espionage nets on the West Coast of the United States, established and controlled by the Japanese Government, and utilizing large numbers of resident Japanese. The situation appeared dangerous and perhaps unmanageable. Given the awesome responsibility of the President and the military outlook at the time, you could hardly have expected the President to have acted otherwise. To conclude, as has the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment, that President Roosevelt was motivated solely by political and racial considerations, is absurd.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David D. Lowman holds a B.A. degree from Stanford and a J.D. degree from George Washington. He was a career intelligence Officer with the National Security Agency where he received numerous commendations and honors, including the Agency's highest award, the Exceptional Civilian Service Medal. He retired in 1976 as a Special Assistant to the Director. Later he served as a consultant on the release of World War II intelligence. Mr. Lowman is the author of a number of historical articles based on declassified intelligence from World War II.

MAGIC

AND THE

JAPANESE EVACUATION AND INTERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II

-- LOWMAN STATEMENT --

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

At the outset I would like to make it perfectly clear that I too feel that a grave injustice was done to many resident Japanese nationals and to many Americans of Japanese descent living on the West Coast who were evacuated and interned in 1942 solely on the basis of their ancestry.

My quarrel is with the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians which, appointed to look into this tragedy, failed to disclose one of the major reasons why the U.S. Government felt that implementation of Executive Order 9066 was necessary. This failure to present the full picture in the Commission's report Personal Justice Denied and its addendum, stems from a lack of understanding of U.S. intelligence operations and responsibilities in 1941 and early 1942. Consequently, the Commission has misrepresented the prevailing intelligence opinion at that time, and was unaware of the most significant intelligence available to the U.S. on the subject which the Commission was charged to investigate.

For these reasons, the Commission's report contains a number of demonstratively wrong statements and erroneous impressions and conclusions. Also, for these same reasons, the Commission has concluded incorrectly that President Roosevelt, in implementing E. O. 9066, acted in opposition to responsible intelligence advice and contrary to the intelligence available to him.

The Commission has then used these erroneous conclusions to support its contention that the President of the United States was motivated solely by racial and political considerations and war hysteria since there was no military necessity or valid intelligence to support his actions.

I will provide to the committee documentation which will clearly show that President Roosevelt did have legitimate cause for concern about the loyalty of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast in February 1942, and that his decision to implement E. O. 9066 was understandable at the time it was made.

MAGIC INTELLIGENCE

Unknown to the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Roosevelt had before him when he made his decision to evacuate ethnic Japanese from the West Coast the most important and authoritative intelligence available to the U.S. at that time on this issue -- data from broken Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers -- cover named Magic.¹

The fact that the U.S. had Magic at this crucial time was due to one of the most remarkable achievements of the war. U.S. cryptanalysts had succeeded by late 1940 in breaking all of the Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers. Japanese messages sent in these systems were intercepted by U.S. Army and navy radio intelligence units on a continuing basis. Included among the diplomatic communications were hundreds of reports dealing with espionage matters in the U.S. and its possessions.

The U.S. Chief of Army Intelligence called Magic the most reliable and authentic information the War Department had on Japanese intentions and activities.² General George Marshall called it a "priceless asset."³ Secretary of State Cordell Hull looked upon Magic as a witness giving evidence against himself.⁴ It was by far the most important source of intelligence regarding Japan within the Office of Naval Intelligence.⁵ Every scholar involved with the era of World War II has praised it as a magnificent intelligence achievement. The most comprehensive study ever made of events leading up to Pearl Harbor, Hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 volumes, published in 1946, examined every aspect of Magic in excruciating detail. It is the single most investigated subject in the study. Their conclusion: "Magic... contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and saved many thousands of lives."⁶ And it was "some of the finest intelligence in our history."⁷

The information contained in these messages was so significant and the fact that we had broken the codes so sensitive that distribution was severely limited.

MAGIC intelligence was restricted to the Secretary of War, the Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Army War Plans, Director of Military Intelligence, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Navy's War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Secretary of State, and the President of the United States.⁸

Special pouches were used to carry the information to recipients who then unlocked the pouch with a special key, read the Magic material, put it back in the pouch, and locked it.⁹ Magic was never mentioned over the phone.⁹ Special care was taken to see that no memos or notes were ever left around where someone not on the select list might see them.⁹ The folder made up for regular distribution included the most important diplomatic and espionage messages.¹⁰ Message volume ran anywhere from 50 to 75 messages a day but got as high as 130.¹¹ Of these, an average of about 25 messages would be selected for distribution.¹²

The President received his Magic information in a variety of ways during 1941.¹³ At first, selected messages were put in the folder. Then as volume grew, gists were made, then wrap-ups. And he was briefed on Magic by his key advisers who incorporated the information into their subject-matter presentations. When things got tight in November 1941, the President asked to see the actual messages again because he was afraid that the gists might miss something important.¹³

The high officials not only read Magic avidly and discussed it at their conferences, they acted upon it.¹⁴

Limited distribution of Magic did not mean that the intelligence never left the tight circle of readers in Washington, D.C. The Army and navy recipients in the nation's capitol were supposed to look out for their field commanders. Normally, the data was passed on in a sanitized version.^15,75 That is, the information was given out in a way which did not disclose its source.

General DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and one of the prime movers behind evacuation, received Magic intelligence -- at the very least in a sanitized form -- from the Director of Military Intelligence (Army), Sherman Miles. These West Coast espionage messages obviously were directly related to his responsibilities, and the information in them was passed on to the intelligence people (G-2) in DeWitt's Western Defense Command.^16,75 Moreover, it is difficult to believe that General DeWitt's recommendation for evacuation which went through Secretary Stimson and then to the President was all done without a thorough airing of Magic. Some of the statements attributed to DeWitt, which distressed the Commission so much because there seemed to be no supporting evidence, were based on intelligence of which the Commission was unaware.

At this juncture, I would like to point out to the Committee some of the more important Japanese Government messages, at least for our purposes here, which are contained in the Department of Defense study published in 1977 entitled The "Magic" Background to Pearl Harbor, in eight volumes.

I wish to stress, however, that these volumes contain only a fraction of the Japanese Government's communications concerning its espionage activities on the West Coast and its involvement with resident Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans. Unless their information had to be expedited for some reason, the Japanese officials would normally send it by diplomatic pouch because this was both safer and cheaper. It was safer because there was no danger of the U.S. obtaining a copy of the enciphered message, something which the Japanese attempted to avoid for particularly sensitive subject matter as a routine precaution. In fact, a June message from the Japanese Foreign Minister stated: "Needless to say, courier mail is a more secure method of transmitting information than reliance upon codes, so when there is some secret matter which might arouse a given nation, please send the message by courier mail."¹⁸ If there was anything designed to arouse the United States, it was certainly the specter of massive espionage nets being established on the Pacific coast utilizing U.S. residents of Japanese ancestry.

Thus, everyone on Magic distribution during 1941 realized that what was being seen was only a portion of the actual data flow. We had a small window on a very large scene. Nonetheless, what was available was sufficient to form a reasonably accurate picture of the scope, nature, and success of the Japanese Government's espionage activities on the West Coast, as well as its involvement with Japanese Americans and resident Japanese nationals.

One last note of caution before we finally get into the Magic messages. Since they are somewhat peripheral to our purposes here, I do not intend to discuss the scores of espionage messages involving the Philippine Islands. Nor am I going to include any detail so-called legal spying dispatches, that is, reports by Japanese governmental officials, particularly military attaches. I won't be talking about the Japanese naval spy in Honolulu, for example, reporting on the U.S. Fleet nor the several known cases of Japanese Naval Attaches spying on the U.S. mainland. Instead, I'll confine my discussion to instances which directly involve, or might involve, resident Japanese nationals and Americans of Japanese ancestry. I include in this category messages which give the scope of Japanese espionage activities on the West Coast and messages which reflect the frame of mind and attitudes of the Japanese Government toward all ethnic Japanese living in the United States.

Now, the Magic messages.

In January 1941, the Japanese Embassy and its consulate officials in the United States were instructed to start emphasizing intelligence acquisition rather than propaganda in order to be "prepared for the worst."¹⁹

In this same time frame there was a flurry of messages with instructions to organize Japanese business men, bank officials, the Japanese Institute, the Tourist Bureau, and Japanese newspaper men for the purpose of gathering intelligence.²⁰ The Japanese Embassy reported in February 1941 that this program was moving ahead and that the information gathered by these groups would be transmitted through diplomatic channels in order to maintain secrecy.²¹

Following this, Tokyo issued detailed instructions to spy on U.S. aircraft plants and their output, movement of military supplies to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, shipping activity, arms production, and any naval or Army data of interest.²² Support was to be given to any group or organization which could be used to foment discord in the United States. Specifically mentioned, among others, were the negro movement, labor unions, the Communist Party, and anti-Semitic organizations.²³ Alterations to airports were to be reported.²⁴ Any strengthening of the defenses on the Pacific coast or in Hawaii was to be noted.²⁴ Information was desired on merchant vessels, such as any deviations from regular schedules, any remodeling of the ships, or any special requisitions by the U.S. Government.²⁴ Movement of troops to the South Pacific, information on drafting people into the Army and navy, and the number of people graduating from aviation schools was wanted.²⁴

From time to time, these basic requirements would be supplemented by special requests for information. For example, a dispatch from Tokyo on October 16, 1941, to its Seattle consulate instructed, "Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once."²⁵ Also, the consulate was instructed to report on the movement and basing of warships at least once every ten days "as long as there is no change."²⁵ But a report was to be submitted immediately "should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time.²⁵

To assist in this massive information-gathering project, agents were to be recruited. The agents were to include both resident Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese ancestry as well as other ethnic groups. In recruiting Japanese second generation and resident nationals, Tokyo warned to use the utmost caution lest "our people in the U.S." be subjected to persecution.²⁶

In May 1941, Ambassador Nomura was instructed to appoint Secretary Terazaki to be in charge of coordinating Japanese intelligence in both North and South America. Every facility was to be granted for the efficient completion of his work.²⁷

In April, Tokyo instructed all the consulates to wire home lists of first and second generation Japanese according to specified categories.²⁸ These data were to be compiled from the October 1940 census; but Chicago, in its reply, stated that its figures were based on the Annual Japanese Occupational Report, the 1936 Japanese Census, the Yearly Status Report, and the Record of Movement of Japanese Nationals.²⁹ Obviously, the consulates were maintaining comprehensive files and records on all ethnic Japanese in their area.

By May 1941, the Japanese Embassy discovered that espionage was an expensive proposition and asked Tokyo for substantial increase in funds "for the purpose of employing nationals and foreigners."³⁰

A paternalistic attitude by the Japanese Government toward people of Japanese ancestry living in the United States is evident in many messages. They are referred to as "our second generation," "our resident nationals," and "our people."³¹ Tokyo was genuinely concerned about their problems and well-being.³² There was distress over the lack of ships to evacuate those who wished to return to the Japanese homeland.³³ There are discussions about propaganda broadcasts and Japanese language newspapers (which relied on the Japanese news service Domei for their news)³⁴ and about maintaining close relations with various organizations and societies all designed to keep the ethnic Japanese in the U.S. informed of the Tokyo point-of-view, and for the purpose of collecting intelligence from them.³⁵

When relations between Japan and the U.S. became increasingly strained, one of the consulates noted that many Japanese were becoming more and more concerned. It was proposed that measures be taken through local societies and organizations to put the minds of second generation Japanese and their native parents at ease.³⁶

In July 1941, there was a particularly alarming message from Mexico City to Tokyo.³⁷ This message stated that a meeting had been held for the purpose of giving guidance to Japanese nationals residing in Mexico. At the meeting were the most influential Japanese from Mexico City and representatives from various other areas in Mexico. "All those present assured me that our nationals... would do everything in their power to adhere to our decisions." Mexico was divided into nine districts with a liaison officer for each one who would "relay in the most effective manner instructions issued by this office to the Japanese population in his area."

What this message is saying is that representatives of Japanese nationals living in Mexico agreed to abide by the decisions and follow the orders of the Japanese Embassy, and that command channels had been established within Mexico for the purpose of passing on Embassy orders to the Japanese population throughout all of Mexico. In 1941, the implications involved here must have been very disturbing. The possibility that a similar arrangement for the United States might exist could not be ruled out.

This kind of close-knit family relationship evident in Japanese messages, which seemed to assume on the part of the Japanese Government that most Japanese, regardless of their status, would remain loyal to the Homeland and the Emperor, had to be viewed with great apprehension by the recipients of Magic.

In May 1941, Japanese consulates on the West Coast reported to Tokyo that first and second generation Japanese had been successfully recruited and were now spying on shipments of airplanes and war material in the San Diego and San Pedro areas.³⁸ They were reporting on activities within aircraft plants in Seattle and Los Angeles. Local Japanese were watching movements across the Mexican border.³⁸ They were reporting on shipping activities at the Bremerton Naval Yard and were supplying inside information about labor unions.³⁹ Los Angeles reported: "We shall maintain connections with our second generation who are at present in the Army to keep us informed of various developments in the Army."³⁸ Seattle followed with a similar dispatch.³⁹

The Los Angeles and Seattle consulate messages reporting ethnic Japanese spying on naval activities within their jurisdiction form an interesting backdrop to the Commission's statement in its report Personal Justice Denied: "Whatever its intelligence officers thought, the Navy was intent on moving ethnic Japanese away from its installations at Terminal Island near Los Angeles and Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound.⁴⁰ The Commission didn't know it, but these are the areas pinpointed by the Japanese messages, and are the intelligence data behind why these areas were the first chosen to be evacuated by the U.S. Military.

Earlier in 1941, Tokyo had decided that Mexico would be the fallback position to control the espionage nets established in the U.S.⁴¹ In case of war, a June 1941 message stated that Mexico City along with Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago were considered the most important bases for gathering intelligence about the U.S.⁴²

In June and July, plans were initiated concerning communications between agents in the United States and control in Mexico City in the event of war.⁴³ Land routes for couriers to cross the border were discussed . It was decided that Laredo, Juarez, and Mexicali were the best suited.⁴⁴ Officials in the U.S. and Mexico were to get together and work out details of their intelligence nets including contacts and exchanges on the border.⁴⁵

All these arrangements presupposed that there were no longer any overt Japanese officials left in the U.S. after the war started. Who then would comprise the underground intelligence nets in the U.S. which were to be controlled from Mexico? A message from Tokyo to Mexico City answered at least part of the question. "In case the U.S. joins the war, we will endeavor to use our nationals there to our best possible advantage."⁴²

During the latter half of 1941, there was a steady stream of espionage messages with the requested information going back to Tokyo. In a few cases the messages state that the information is from someone in the consulate; in other instances it is stated that it's from a spy. But most give no attribution for the information, standard practice for espionage messages: never give out an agent's name if it can be avoided.

In Panama, the Japanese came up with secret charts of the fortifications of the canal zone.⁴⁶ Also regarding Panama, the Joint Congressional Committee made an interesting observation in its Pearl Harbor report: "While no instructions from Tokyo to Panama are available subsequent to August 2, 1941, the reports to Tokyo contain detailed information concerning the location of airfields, air strength, ammunition, location and camouflage of petroleum supply tanks, location and strength of artillery patrols, radar detectors and their range, map procurement and other matters which obviously would be of interest only if an attack on the Panama Canal were contemplated."⁴⁷ There is evidence in Magic which suggests that much of this information came from local Japanese recruited in Panama for espionage.⁴⁸

In the United States, an espionage nugget was forwarded to Tokyo in September from the Los Angeles consulate.⁴⁹ This was a detailed message concerning airplane production. Not only were each of the airplane plants in the Los Angeles area named specifically, but also listed was the size of the orders filled by each plant, the exact numbers of employees, and the total expenditures for salaries. In addition, the kinds of production at each plant by type aircraft (i.e., P-38, B-39, DC-3, etc.) were given and whether these aircraft were destined for Great Britain or the United States. It was estimated by the Japanese that this data comprised forty percent of the total aircraft production in the Los Angeles area and 10% from the San Diego area. The message is particularly interesting because the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles had previously reported that it had "connections with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes."⁵⁰

The Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack assessed the value of the espionage messages as follows: "Washington authorities learned that Japanese spies and agents, directed by the Japanese Government, were collecting and transmitting to Tokyo an immense amount of exact and detailed information respecting the military and naval installations and the state of preparedness in the Hawaiian Islands as well as elsewhere."⁵¹

When all this communications intelligence, this Magic, was coupled with other intelligence estimates of large numbers of potentially disloyal Japanese on the West Coast, Roosevelt and his top aides had to be alarmed at the emerging picture, especially if the possibilities of sabotage were also contemplated. It is impossible to believe that all this intelligence did not play a major role in the thinking of President Roosevelt and his key advisers. The forward of the DOD study, The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, concludes prophetically with the sentence: "Scholars no doubt will find new challenges in this voluminous intelligence information as they examine not only the decisions made by the U.S., but also the intelligence which influenced and occasionally prompted those decisions."

The well-known historian John Costello, in his excellent book, The Pacific War, has no doubts of the role of Magic in Roosevelt's decision. He states unequivocally, "The rising current of fear on the West Coast, and the evidence from the Magic intercepts the previous year of espionage organizations had been important factors in the President's decision to sign Executive Order 9066."⁵²

MAGIC AND LATIN AMERICA

I would like now to discuss a related topic where the Commission has again gone astray because it was unaware of Magic. In its appendix, the report has a section entitled Latin Americans.⁵³ This section describes in some detail how about 1500 Japanese, mostly diplomatic and consular officials, were deported from Latin America to the U.S. for internment. The report correctly states that the United States encouraged this movement because it did not feel confident that the countries in Latin America could control subversive activity within their borders. Having said that, the Commission once again leaves its readers with the impression that the U.S. acted against Japanese people without reason or cause by concluding that section of its report as follows: "Although the need for this extensive, disruptive program has not been definitely reviewed by the Commission, John Emmerson, a well-informed American diplomat in Peru during the program, wrote more than thirty years later: 'During my period of service in the embassy, we found no reliable evidence of planned or contemplated acts of sabotage, subversion, or espionage.'"⁵⁴

That is the "view" which the Commission wants to leave with the reader. In truth, the whole South American continent was riddled with both Nazi and Japanese agents, and this was well known to United States security authorities.⁵⁵

There was a good deal of Magic intelligence available concerning Japanese espionage in Latin America directed at the U.S. I've already covered some of the messages dealing with Mexico and Panama. Other messages from Tokyo levied requirements on its diplomatic facilities in Central and South America to gather intelligence on the U.S. and to keep abreast of U.S. activities in Latin America so that actions could be taken to counter U.S. aims and desires in these countries.⁵⁶ Again, the diplomatic posts were instructed to recruit Japanese residents to assist in the intelligence effort.⁵⁷ In the messages intercepted are discussions of how communications would be handled in the event of war,⁵⁸ and there was the usual array of intelligence reports. Although there are military dispatches,59 the intelligence from Latin America, understandably, tended to be more diplomatic and economic.

One of the more dramatic messages was a proposal to incite and finance a revolution in Guatemala.⁶⁰ The Japanese message pointed out that:

"Such a plot might not necessarily be a success in every respect; however, even if it fails, if it's carried out to a certain extent, it would have to be quieted by the United States using its armed forces. In such a case, it would cast a shadow on the so-called 'Good Neighbor Policy' of the United States and cause a cleavage among the countries on the American continent. It would also endanger considerably the fundamental policy on which the United States attaches the greatest importance, a policy which envisages placing within her influence the regions extending to Panama. If it succeeds to an extent, it would at least upset at once the political balance among the countries as far as Panama. It would seem to me that there is considerable likelihood of its turning that region into an arena of political confusion... It seems to me that we should provide funds sufficient to commence preparations for the rebellion..."

With messages like this being intercepted along with previously mentioned reports that the Japanese had obtained details of the Panama Canal Zone fortifications, is it any wonder that the U.S. preferred not to leave stranded Japanese officials running loose in Latin America?

Just a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Terazaki, Second Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. and Chief of Intelligence in the Western Hemisphere, received a message from Tokyo ordering him to leave immediately. The Japanese ambassador protested and asked as a personal favor that Terazaki be allowed to remain until December 19. But the Japanese Government was adamant.⁶¹ Their chief spymaster had to be safely out of the U.S. before the Pearl Harbor attack in order to manage the espionage nets which had been so carefully constructed for just this eventuality. Commander Kramer, who selected out the most important Magic for the President and others, penciled on this message: "Terazaki -- is head of Japanese espionage in the Western hemisphere. He and his assistants are being sent to South America."⁶² Ominous words indeed.

MAGIC AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Commission has misstated the functions, responsibilities, and professional opinions of the U.S. intelligence community as it existed in late 1941 and early 1942. In its report, Personal Justice Denied, there is a section titled Intelligence. No mention is made of Magic because the Commission was unaware of it. The section purports to present the intelligence data, its evaluation, and the recommendations of the intelligence community which were available to Roosevelt when he implemented Executive Order 9066 in February 1942. In this section, as in other areas of its report, the Commission repeats its theme that the people who had the intelligence responsibility were ignored when they opposed evacuation.

Who were these people, and what was the intelligence they possessed, which the Commission says was reliable and should have been followed, but which Roosevelt chose to ignore? Three sources are cited in the report.

The first was a journalist named John Franklin Carter who sent reports directly to the President. His specialty was to "obtain information and estimates by exploiting sources outside the government."⁶³ Most of Carter's information came from someone named Curtis B. Munson who is extensively quoted in the Commission's report. Munson was "a well-to-do Chicago businessman who had gathered intelligence for Carter under the guise of being a government official"⁶⁴ It is difficult to take seriously the report's statement that this pair of amateurs and their methods was one of the best sources of intelligence available to the U.S. After discussing the situation in some detail, including how the Japanese Government did not trust the Nisei and was in fact afraid of them, Carter and Munson concluded that evacuation was unnecessary.

The second source cited by the report Personal Justice Denied was a Lt. Cmdr. K. R. Ringle of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Ringle was a professional. The Commission relies heavily on him because he is the only Naval intelligence officer of any standing at all that the Commission was able to find who thought mass evacuation was not necessary; but Ringle believed that staggering numbers of Japanese were potentially disloyal. In one estimate he felt that about 3% of the West Coast Japanese might act as saboteurs or espionage agents -- about 3,500 by his reckoning.⁶⁵ In another estimate Ringle thought that only 75% of the American-born Japanese could be considered completely loyal.⁶⁶ Presumably, this figure would be much lower for the first generation Japanese, but even using the 75% figure across the board meant that there were almost 30,000 potentially disloyal Japanese on the West Coast. Nonetheless, he thought the potentially dangerous Japanese could be identified through hearings, and therefore mass evacuation was unnecessary. Ringle was at the time a minor official and did not speak for the ONI.

Although, as the Commission states, there is no single statement of ONI's position, there are a number of heavy inferences in the Commission's report that ONI was opposed to evacuation. In point of fact, the Office of Naval Intelligence wasn't allowed to have an official position on evacuation. Samuel Eliot Morison, the Navy's official historian, states that in late 1941 ONI "did a thorough job of gathering intelligence about the enemy; but it was not allowed to evaluate, much less to disseminate, the information so gathered. Evaluating the material, which included the decrypted dispatches between the Japanese Government and its agents abroad, predicting future movements of the Japanese Navy, and deciding who should be let in on this information was the responsibility of the War Plans Officer, Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, on Admiral Stark's staff."⁶⁷

Admiral Turner, insofar as I have been able to determine, shared the anxiety of other naval authorities about the security of West Coast bases and was in favor of evacuation.⁶⁸ This concern was considerably reinforced in his case by the receipt of Magic which Turner felt influenced Naval War Plans by about 15% even though it was largely diplomatic at the time.⁶⁹

Given a vote, ONI would undoubtedly have opted for evacuation because, like the Army, it too considered Magic as its principal source of intelligence.⁷⁰ It was, in fact, one of the chiefs of ONI, Admiral Anderson, who came up with the name, Magic. He thought it was the most miraculous source of intelligence that he had ever encountered, and deserved to be known as "Magic."⁷¹

The third source listed by the Commission as supporting its position is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). J. Edgar Hoover, then the FBI Director, felt that the situation could be handled without mass evacuation. However, uncharacteristically, Hoover thought his opinion should be balanced by his West Coast field offices' views on evacuation: Los Angeles was noncommittal; San Francisco was dismissive; San Diego and Seattle were "vehemently favorable" to evacuation.⁷²

Thus, the Commission bases its conclusions regarding prevailing intelligence attitudes on the private opinions of three individuals -- Munson, Carter, and Ringle -- and a badly divided FBI assessment. No hard intelligence is offered, only opinions. This is what Roosevelt is accused of ignoring in making his evacuation decision.

On the other hand, supporting evacuation, or at least not opposing it, were the Secretary of War, the Army Chief of Staff,⁷³ the Director of Military Intelligence, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Chiefs of Army and Navy Plans -- probably the most elite group in the American power structure of the day. These were the people the nation called upon to defend the country and to prosecute the war. It was from this group that Roosevelt received his advice on national defense. All of them, along with the President, regularly received MAGIC intelligence.

Ringle, Munson and Carter were totally unaware of MAGIC. Even J. Edgar Hoover was not on distribution.

In assessing the U.S. intelligence posture in 1941 and early 1942, the Commission was totally unaware of the role of the Office of Naval Communications and the Army's Signal Intelligence Service -- the organizations responsible for producing the most important intelligence the United States possessed -- Magic.

The Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack described them as follows:

With extraordinary skill, zeal and watchfulness, the intelligence services of the Army Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Communications broke Japanese codes and intercepted messages between the Japanese Government and its spies and agents and ambassadors in all parts of the world and supplied the high authorities in Washington with reliable secret information respecting Japanese designs, decisions, and operations at home, in the United States, and in other countries.⁷⁴

"The fact that the two Niihau Japanese who had previously shown no anti-American tendencies went to the aid of the pilot when Japanese domination of the island seemed possible, indicates likelihood that Japanese residents previously believed loyal to the United States, may aid Japan if further Japanese attacks appear successful."

One can well imagine the impact of this intelligence report on the key decision makers in Washington, D.C. who were struggling with the evacuation question and already had in their possession the Magic cables and Army and navy intelligence reports, all of which were giving alarming signals of large scale Japanese disloyalty.

In addition to all the foregoing, the Commission's report contains major errors of fact about the intelligence community.

The Commission is confused on the difference between counterintelligence and radio intelligence. Consequently, on pages 63 and 65 of its report, it has labeled radio intelligence units -- the very organizations which were responsible for the greatest intelligence feat in U.S. history (breaking the Japanese codes and intercepting and reading their communications throughout the entire war) -- as "incompetent" and "woefully deficient," conducting a "ramshackle operation" and "knowing nothing of the technical subjects essential to radio intelligence."

On page 11 of its report the Commission makes the point that the Army had no responsibility for counterespionage on the West Coast during the period preceding the signing of E.O 9066. Not true. On 26 June 1939 a presidential order specifically charged the FBI and the Army and navy intelligence divisions with this task. Indeed, General Miles, Director of Military Intelligence for the Army, testified before the Joint Congressional Committee in Vol. 27, page 62, that he considered counterespionage to be one of his most important responsibilities. It was only later in the war that some rearrangements of counterespionage tasks were made among the Army, Navy and the FBI.

The Commission has included in its report a statement on page 256 that General Willoughby, MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, credited Nisei intelligence troops with shortening the Pacific War by two years. I have been unable to document this statement. If, however, Willoughby said it, he was undoubtedly referring to Magic and related code and cipher operations, and was merely echoing similar statements by the Joint Congressional Committee and General Marshall. MacArthur relied heavily on radio intelligence, and as General Marshall stated, "all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes." Although by the time the war ended there were nearly 20,000 people in radio intelligence units, none of them were Nisei. From beginning to end these operations were carried on without utilizing any people of Japanese ancestry because of security considerations.

{On} page 8 of its report the Commission states that the people in ONI who had the relevant intelligence responsibility were ignored when they opposed evacuation. Presumably, the Commission thinks that Lt. Cmdr. Ringle in the 11th Naval District held this unique position in the U.S. Navy. The people in the Navy who actually had the intelligence responsibility on this issue were Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Turner, charged with intelligence evaluation, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of ONI, and the Chief of the Counter Subversion Section of ONI, Cmdr. Davis, all of whom would have been astounded to learn that they had gone on record as opposing evacuation. In fact, none of them had done so.

The Commission's entire treatment of the intelligence picture prior to the evacuation decision is so mistaken and so confused that it renders this portion of its report, Personal Justice Denied, virtually worthless as a reference and as a historical document.

THE MAGIC ADDENDUM

Numerous books and studies have been released on Magic. It is the single most discussed topic in the Pearl Harbor Inquiry. Practically every history book concerning the Pacific War published in the last four decades has at least one chapter on Magic. But somehow, even after devoting almost 3 years of research to the project, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians managed to overlook it. Stung by several newspaper articles in May 1983 pointing out this omission, the Commission issued an addendum to its basic report in June 1983. Filled with inaccuracies and wrong assumptions, the addendum offers proof only that Magic analysts are not created in a month.

Basically, the Commission's addendum makes two points -- both wrong: (1) That Magic confirms the views expressed in its report, Personal Justice Denied, and (2) That Magic intelligence data was not very secret, nor important, nor very reliable.

The first point is overwhelmingly contradicted by the Magic messages themselves. For example, Magic totally refutes the Commission's views on page 60 of its report that "there was no knowledge or evidence of organized or individual Nisei spying," and on page 50, "the government has conceded at every point that there was no evidence of actual sabotage, espionage or fifth column activity among the people of Japanese descent on the West Coast in February 1942." These statements are simply not true.

The fact is that the cumulative effect of MAGIC and other intelligence by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor presented to the U.S. Government the frightening specter of massive espionage nets, utilizing large numbers of ethnic Japanese living on the West Coast of the United States, established and controlled by the Japanese Government.

On the second point, the value of Magic, the findings of the Joint Congressional Inquiry bear repeating. Magic... "was some of the finest intelligence in our history,"⁷ and the U.S. code breakers "supplied the high authorities in Washington with reliable secret information respecting Japanese... operations in the United States" from "intercepted messages between the Japanese Government and its spies and agents."⁷⁴

The addendum makes an issue out of one of the cables directing recruiting of agents, pointing out that groups other than Japanese were to be recruited, and that these groups are listed first in the cable. This hardly nullifies the instructions to recruit first and second generation Japanese. If, however, the order is important, what does the Commission make of the Japanese Embassy message of 19 May 1941 requesting a half million dollars from Tokyo to employ "nationals and foreigners," in that order, for espionage?³⁰

A point is made in the addendum that Roosevelt did not see Magic cables from May until November. This is grasping at a technical distribution-and-form decision. The implication is that Roosevelt was unaware of Magic during this period. The facts are that in every one of these months the President either saw the cables, was briefed on them, or was given gists of the messages or received some combination of the above.¹³

The Commission makes the statement on page 4 of the addendum that "of course, information could be transmitted by methods other than MAGIC codes, but there is no considerable room to doubt that any program of this sort was fulfilled." Absolutely wrong. I have already explained that the normal practice was to send information of this type by diplomatic pouch rather than in encoded radio traffic. In fact, the Japanese consuls were under specific direction from the Foreign Minister not to send this kind of information by cable if it could be avoided.¹⁸ The Magic cables in our possession were only the tip of the iceberg. Roosevelt and his advisers were well aware of that fact.

Not understanding the complexities of utilizing communications intelligence, the Commission assumes that General DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, was unaware of the information in the Magic messages concerning espionage on the West Coast because he was not on direct distribution. Not so. His Command received Magic data but in a sanitized form which concealed the source of the information -- standard practice for distributing Magic data in those days,16,75

Lastly, the addendum footnote 2 should be changed. The Magic Background of Pearl Harbor does not contain only Japanese cables sent in the highest grade systems. It also includes messages sent in medium grade systems and low grade systems.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

The key civilian and military leaders of a nation at war personally were aware of Magic intelligence including its source, nature, content, and scope. Magic messages discussed here today, read in the context of 1941 and 1942, clearly portrayed a potentially dangerous and perhaps unmanageable situation on the West Coast. There was genuine and legitimate cause for concern about the loyalty and actions of large numbers of resident Japanese aliens and Japanese Americans.

Given the awesome responsibility President Roosevelt had, the military situation at that time, and the Japanese Government's apparent success in establishing vast espionage nets along the West Coast designed to function in a wartime environment utilizing local Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans, Roosevelt made an understandable decision.

Hindsight information about an event that happened forty years ago is not the issue here. The question is did the leaders of the U.S. Government have before them at that time intelligence which would explain their decision in terms other than political opportunism, racial hatred and war hysteria? The answer is, yes, they did, and it was called Magic.

Gentlemen, my purpose here today has been to provide you with fully documented intelligence which was available and known to President Roosevelt when he made his decision to implement E. O. 9066, information which was not provided in the Commission's report. If the documentation which I have presented to you is accepted, the Commission's report, Personal Justice Denied, and its addendum, insofar as its handling of the entire subject of intelligence is concerned, must be substantially revised; as it presently stands, it is incomplete, inaccurate and misleading.

This completes my statement. Thank you for your attention.

NOTES

1 Wohlstetter, p. 169.

2 Kahn, p. 31; Wohlstetter, p. 285.

3 Kahn, p. 31.

4 Kahn, p. 31.

5 Wohlstetter, p. 316; Dorwart, p. 177.

6 Report JC, p. 232.

7 Report JC, p. 253.

8 Prange p. 86; Kahn, p. 24.

9 Kahn, p. 28.

10 Wohlstetter, p. 211.

11 Kahn, p. 29.

12 Kahn, p. 30; Hearings JC, Vol. XXXIII, p. 196.

13 Kahn, p. 30; Prange p. 86; Hearings JC, Vol. XI, pp. 5475-5476; Kramer Memo of 7 Nov. 1941 on delivery of Magic to President Roosevelt:

From Jan. 1941 through June 1941 -- regular delivery to the President of either messages or memos (gists). Services alternating every other month.
July -- no delivery by Army, but President discussed some materials with his Naval Aide.
Aug. -- Navy month. Navy delivered memos.
Sept. -- Army made no deliveries, but Navy provided materials near end of month.
Oct. -- Navy delivered memos.
Nov. 12 -- Regular delivery of Magic messages resumed. President said he had been seeing or was told about material through Secretary Hull, but from now on he wanted Magic messages on a regular basis and did not want gists because something important might be missed.

14 Lewin, p. 57; Kahn, p. 31.

15 Kahn, p. 24; Report JC, p. 181.

16 GHQ G2 Info. Bull. No. 6 of 21 Jan. 1942. A 12 Feb. 1942 letter from General Mark Clark to J. J. McCloy encloses Info. Bull. No. 6 and states that G2 of WDC has a copy.

17 Pers. Jus., pp. 6-7; and No. 16 above.

18 Magic, Append. 2, No. 373.

19 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 118.

20 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 112, 113, 114.

21 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 114.

22 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 119, 131.

23 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 119, 162.

24 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 131.

25 Magic, Append. 3, No. 313.

26 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 119.

27 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 143.

28 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 167.

29 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 171.

30 Magic, Append. 2, No. 219.

31 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 119.

32 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 196; Magic, Append. 4, No. 414.

33 Magic, Append. 3, No. 448; No. 460.

34 Magic, Append. 4, No. 418.

35 Magic, Vol. 1, Nos. 174, 192.

36 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 192.

37 Magic, Append. 2, No. 422.

38 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 174.

39 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 175. The Lt. Cmdr. Okada mentioned in the message was in charge of espionage in San Francisco, Seattle, and Dutch Harbor. Cmdr. Tachibana was in the Los Angeles area. See Farago, p. 140.

40 Pers. Jus., p. 60.

41 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 119.

42 Magic, Append. 2, No. 384.

43 Magic, Append. 2, No. 400.

44 Magic, Append. 3, No. 410A; Append. 2, No. 411.

45 Magic, Append. 2, No. 411.

46 Magic, Append. 2, Nos. 227, 228.

47 Report JC, p. 186.

48 Magic, Append. 3, No. 499.

49 Magic, Append. 3, No. 428, 429.

50 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 174.

51 Report JC, p. 525.

52 Costello, p. 211.

53 Pers. Jus., p. 305.

54 Pers. Jus., p. 314.

55 Lewin, p. 125.

56 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 129, 130; Append. 3, No. 643.

57 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 117, 129; Append. 3, No. 652.

58 Magic, Vol. 1, Nos. 125, 126, 127, 128.

59 Magic, Vol. 1, No. 123; Append. 2, No. 243; Append. 4, No. 248.

60 Magic, Append. 2, No. 414.

61 Magic, Append. 4, Nos. 442, 457, 460.

62 Prange, p. 456.

63 Pers. Jus., p. 51.

64 Pers. Jus., p. 52.

65 Pers. Jus., p. 54.

66 Bosworth, p. 140.

67 Morison, p. 134; Wohlstetter, pp. 162, 322.

68 Dorwart. In correspondence on the subject with me, Prof. Dorwart agreed that Turner, along with Admiral Stark who was CNO and Admiral Wilkinson, Chief ONI, all probably supported the official position which was evacuation although as yet this cannot be documented.

69 Kahn, p. 31.

70 Wohlstetter, p. 316; Dorwart, p. 177.

71 Wohlstetter, p. 75.

72 Pers. Jus., p. 52

73 Pogue, pp. 140, 144. Although General Marshall does not appear to have been involved personally in the Japanese evacuation issue, he did agree to use Army troops to carry it out. Moreover, he was an old and close friend of DeWitt, and had relied upon him in the past.

74 Report JC, p. 514.

75 Office of Naval Intelligence, Wash., D.C., 4 December 1941, Japanese Intelligence and Propaganda in the United States during 1941.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bosworth, Allan R. America's Concentration Camps, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1967.

Costello, John. The Pacific War, New York: Rawson, Wade, 1981.

Dorwart, Jeffrey M. The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983.

Farago, Ladislas. The Broken Seal: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster. New York: Random House, 1967.

Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. 79th Congress. 39 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946.

Kahn, David. The Codebreakers. New York: Macmillan Co., 1967.

Lewin, Ronald. The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1982.

The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor. Department of Defense. 5 vol. and 3 appendices. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942. Vol. III of History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975.

Personal Justice Denied. Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. Washington: Government Printing Office, December 1982.

Pogue, Forest C. George C. Marshall, Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945. New York: Viking Press, 1973.

Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. In collaboration with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, and the Additional Views of Mr. Keef Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946.

APPENDIX

1. A selection of Japanese espionage messages taken from The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor.

2. Memo from General Mark W. Clark to John J. McCloy dated 12 February 1942 enclosing Army Information Bulletin No. 6, 21 Jan. 1942.

3. Page 3 of Army Information Bulletin No. 6, 21 Jan. 1942.

4. First two pages of a 26-page ONI intelligence report dated 4 Dec. 1941.

No. 118
January 30, 1941
#043.

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)

Foreign Office secret.

Heretofore, we have placed emphasis on publicity and propaganda work in the United States. In view of the critical situation in the recent relations between the two countries, and for the purpose of being prepared for the worst, we have decided to alter this policy. Taking into consideration the small amount of funds we have at our disposal, we have decided to de-emphasize propaganda for the time being, and instead, to strengthen our intelligence work.

Though we must give the matter of intelligence work our further study -- in this connection we are at present conferring with the intelligence bureau -- we have mapped out a fundamental program, the outline of which is contained in my supplementary cable No. 44.

Please, therefore, reorganize your intelligence set-up and put this new program into effect as soon as possible.

Cable copies of this message, as "Minister's orders" to Canada, Mexico, (a copy to be relayed from Mexico to Mexicali), San Francisco, (copies from San Francisco to Honolulu, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver), New York, New Orleans, and Chicago.

Trans. 2-7-41

No. 119
January 30, 1941
#44.

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)

(In two parts -- complete).

(Foreign Office secret).

(1) Establish an intelligence organ in the Embassy which will maintain liaison with private and semi-official intelligence organs (see my message to Washington #591 and #732 from New York to Tokyo, both of last year's series).

With regard to this, we are holding discussions with the various circles involved at the present time.

(2) The focal point of our investigations shall be the determination of the total strength of the U.S. Our investigations shall be divided into three general classifications: political, economic, and military, and definite course of action shall be mapped out.

(3) Make a survey of all persons or organizations which either openly or secretly oppose participation in the war.

(4) Make investigations of all anti-Semitism, communism, movements of Negroes, and labor movements.

(5) Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations described in the preceding paragraph would undoubtedly bear the best results.

These men, moreover, should have access to governmental establishments, (laboratories?), governmental organizations of various characters, factories, and transportation facilities.

(6) Utilization of our "Second Generations" and our resident nationals. (In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and the utmost caution must be exercised).

(7) In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our intelligence set-up will be moved to Mexico, making that country the nerve center of our intelligence net. Therefore, will you bear this in mind and in anticipation of such an eventuality, set up facilities for a U.S.-Mexico international intelligence route. This net which will cover Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru will also be centered in Mexico.

(8) We shall cooperate with the German and Italian intelligence organs in the U.S. This phase has been discussed with the Germans and Italians in Tokyo, and it has been approved.

Please get the details from Secretary Terasaki upon his assuming his duties there.

Please send copies to those offices which were on the distribution list of No. 43.

Trans. 2-7-41

No. 120
February 26, 1941
#60

FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo

The situation is very strained and we have to review our Embassy's intelligence and propaganda work. On this subject last year I sent you my #762^a. You in return sent #43^b and #44^c in the form of instructions to Washington. I am endeavoring to strengthen and further revise my work here in New York and in order to achieve liaison and cooperation. I consider it necessary to have Consul FUKUSHIMA, who has been doing this kind of work all along and who knows his business, make a trip to New York before going back to Japan. Therefore, I want you to be sure to approve of this.

Relayed to Los Angeles.

^a New York discusses plan to strengthen the Japanese political propaganda methods in the United States for 1941.
^b Tokyo directs Washington to reorganize their intelligence set-up and put into effect the new program which will de-emphasize propaganda and strengthen intelligence work.
^c Outline of major points in connection with setting up of intelligence organizations in the United States.

Trans. 3-6-41

No. 121
February 14, 1941
#16

FROM: Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

(Abstract)

Some recent messages have been badly garbled. I suspect that American companies may be purposely garbling the texts.

Trans. 2-18-41

No. 131
February 15, 1941
#073

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)

(2 parts -- complete)

Re my #43^a.

The information we particularly desire with regard to intelligence involving U.S. and Canada, are the following:

1. Strengthening or supplementing of military preparations on the Pacific Coast and the Hawaii area; amount and type of stores and supplies; alterations to air ports (also carefully note the clipper traffic).

2. Ship and plane movements (particularly of the large bombers and sea planes).

3. Whether or not merchant vessels are being requisitioned by the government (also note any deviations from regular schedules), and whether any remodeling is being done to them.

4. Calling up of army and navy personnel, their training, (outlook and maneuvers) and movements.

5. Words and acts of minor army and navy personnel.

6. Outlook of drafting men from the viewpoint of race. Particularly, whether Negroes are being drafted, and if so, under what conditions.

7. Personnel being graduated and enrolled in the army and navy and aviation service schools.

8. Whether or not any troops are being dispatched to the South Pacific by transports; if there are such instances, give description.

9. Outlook of the developments in the expansion of arms and the production set-up; the capacity of airplane production; increase in the ranks of labor.

10. General outlooks on Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, with particular stress on items involving plane movements and shipment of military supplies to those localities.

11. Outlook on U.S. defense set-ups.

12. Contacts (including plane connections) with Central and South America and the South Pacific area. Also outlook on shipment of military supplies to those areas.

Please forward copies of this message as a "Minister's Instruction" to New York. San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland, (Chicago or New Orleans?), Vancouver, Ottawa, and Honolulu. Also to Mexico City and Panama as reference material.

^a "We have decided to de-emphasize our propaganda work and strengthen our intelligence work in the U.S."

Trans. 2-20-41

No. 174
May 9, 1941
#067.

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

(In 2 parts -- complete).

Strictly Secret.

Re your message #180 to Washington.

We are doing everything in our power to establish outside contacts in connection with our efforts to gather intelligence material. In this regard, we have decided to make use of white persons and Negroes, through Japanese persons whom we can't trust completely. (It not only would be very difficult to hire U.S. (military?) experts for this work at the present time, but the expenses would be exceedingly high.) We shall, furthermore, maintain close connections with the Japanese Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the newspapers.

With regard to airplane manufacturing plants and other military establishments in other parts, we plan to establish very close relations with various organizations and in strict secrecy have them keep these military establishments under close surveillance. Through such means, we hope to be able to obtain accurate and detailed intelligence reports. We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego area, who will keep a close watch on all shipments of airplanes and other war materials, and report the amounts and destinations of such shipments. The same steps have been taken with regard to traffic across the U.S.-Mexico border.

We shall maintain connection with our second generations [Nisei] who are at present in the (U.S.) Army, to keep us informed of various developments in the Army. We also have connections with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes.

With regard to the Navy, we are cooperating with our Naval Attache's office, and are submitting reports as accurately and as speedily as possible.

We are having Nakazawa investigate and summarize information gathered through first hand and newspaper reports, with regard to military movements, labor disputes, communistic activities and other similar matters. With regard to anti- Jewish movements, we are having investigations made by both prominent Americans and Japanese who are connected with the movie industry which is centered in this area. We have already established connections with very influential Negroes to keep us informed with regard to the Negro movement.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 175
May 11, 1941
#45.

FROM: Seattle (Sato)
TO: Tokyo

(3 parts -- complete).

Re your # 180 to Washington.

1. Political Contacts.

We are collecting intelligences revolving around political questions, and also the question of American participation in the war which has to do with the whole country and this local area.

2. Economic Contacts.

We are using foreign company employees, as well as employees in our own companies here, for the collection of intelligences having to do with economics along the lines of the construction of ships, the number of airplanes produced and their various types, the production of copper, zinc and aluminum, the yield of tin for cans, and lumber. We are now exerting our best efforts toward the acquisition of such intelligences through competent Americans. From an American, whom we contacted recently, we have received a private report on machinists of German origin who are Communists and members of the labor organizations in the Bremerton Naval Yard and Boeing airplane factory. Second generation Japanese ----- ----- -----.

3. Military Contacts.

We are securing intelligences concerning the concentration of warships within the Bremerton Naval Yard, information with regard to mercantile shipping and airplane manufacturer, movements of military forces, as well as that which concerns troop maneuvers.

With this as a basis, men are sent out into the field who will contact Lt. Comdr. OKADA, and such intelligences will be wired to you in accordance with past practice. KANEKO is in charge of this. Recently we have on two occasions made investigations on the spot of various military establishments and concentration points in various areas. For the future we have made arrangements to collect intelligences from second generation Japanese draftees on matters dealing with the troops, as well as troop speech and behavior. ----- ----- -----.

4. Contacts With Labor Unions.

The local labor unions A.F. of L. and C.I.O. have considerable influence. The (Socialist?) Party maintains an office here (its political sphere of influence extends over twelve zones.) The C.I.O., especially, has been very active here. We have had a first generation Japanese, who is a member of the labor movement and a committee chairman, contact the organizer, and we have received a report, though it is but a resume, on the use of American members of the (Socialist?) Party. ----- OKAMARU is in charge of this.

5. In order to contact Americans of foreign extraction and foreigners, in addition to third parties, for the collection of intelligences with regard to anti-participation organizations and the anti-Jewish movement, we are making use of a second generation Japanese lawyer.

This intelligence ----- ----- -----.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 298
September 4, 1941
#105

FROM: Seattle (Sato)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 2)

3. The 39th Bombardment Group (44 planes), the 89th Observation Squadron (15 planes), and the 310th Signal Company, all of Spokane, left August 23 (?) to take part in the September maneuvers in Louisiana.

4. The planes (number unknown) which the 54th Bombardment Group at (?) near Everett are to get are Republics(?) or twin-motored Lockheeds(?).

5. The Naval Air Base at Dutch Harbor was opened on the 2nd. W. N. Updegraff has been named Commandant as has been previously reported (?). The Naval supply base at Port Andrews(?) was opened on the 4th, according to reports.

6. The steering apparatus (?) (diameter 8 inches, double cylinders (?), gear ration 410 to 1 (?) for the 312 10,000 ton freighters to be leased to England are to be manufactured in two factories, one in Everett and one in New York (?).

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 299
September 4, 1941
#38 (Circular).

FROM: Seattle (Sato)
TO: Washington

Message to Tokyo #104.

Re my #10.

Two Soviet planes arrived at the Navy air field, Sand Point, at 5 P.M. on the 4th. The party is putting up at a hotel in the city. It is reported that their mission is to confer with the American authorities concerning the degree of aid the Soviet may be able to obtain from the United States.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 300
September 6, 1941
#170.

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi)
TO: Tokyo

The Russian Air Mission inspected the B-19 heavy bomber at March Field on the 2nd, and on the 3rd came to Los Angeles where they are inspecting various airplane factories.

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco and Seattle.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 308
September 18, 1941
#218.

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)
TO: Tokyo

According to a spy report, the English warship Warspite arrived here from Bremerton on the ----- and is at present moored near the (naval arsenal at Mare Island?). It has been determined that it requires two more months for repairs at Liverpool (my message #187).

Relayed to -----, Los Angeles and Seattle.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 309
September 20, 1941
#123.

FROM: Seattle (Sato)
TO: Tokyo

1. The following warships are now at Bremerton:

The Warspite (repair work continuing. The upper part of the bridge and the port side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint).

Maryland class -- one ship (the bridge, turrets and other main armaments have been painted red. Also, they seem to be constructing mountings on the forward main deck for ten anti-aircraft guns).

Saratoga class aircraft carrier, 1 ship (tied up alongside the pier).

One ship which appears to be a cruiser (it has two smoke stacks but we were unable to distinguish anything else).

One other ship just arrived for repair.

2. The New Mexico class ship mentioned in message #101 has departed.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 310
October 2, 1941
#222.

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)
TO: Washington

Message to Tokyo as #230.

1. One Oklahoma class battleship has arrived in port and is moored in front of the Bethlehem ship-building yard. No reconstruction work is going on on the outside but a great deal of repair work appears to be in progress within the ship.

No. 428
September 16, 1941
#184.

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)
TO: Tokyo

Strictly Secret.

(Part 1 of 2.)

An outline of airplane production in the various factories of Southern California (up to date):

a. Orders placed with each company (40% of total orders in the Los Angeles area and 10% centers around San Diego).

Company	Amt. of Orders	Employees	Monthly Salaries
Lockheed	$371,000,000	32,791	$5,287,000
Vega	120,000,000	7,364	1,201,000
Douglas	491,000,000	31,818	4,749,000

(for subsequent data on orders placed in the various factories of Santa Monica, El Segundo and Long Beach, see my #147)

Company	Amt. of Orders	Employees	Monthly Salaries
North American	$385,000,000	11,443	$1,976,000
Vulte	86,000,000	9,720	1,579,000
Northrop	49,000,000	2,549	461,000
Consolidated	540,000	2,000	----------

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 429
September 16, 1941
No number.

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 2.)

b. Types of craft on order in the various companies:

Company	For Britain	For American Army
Lockheed	Hudson Bombers	P-38 Interceptor pursuit planes
Vega	Vega "Ventura" bombers	B-39-E heavy bombers
Douglas	Bombers	DC-3 transport planes, B-39-E and B ----- heavy bombers A-20 bombers
North American	B-medium bombers Mustang pursuit planes	(Same as for Britain)
Vulte		"Valiant" primary pursuit planes "Vengeance" high-speed bombers
Consolidated	B-type heavy bombers(?)	B-type heavy bombers(?)

Relayed to Washington.