

NO-13353 UNCLASSIFIED

A16-3/FF12

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial: 0395

11 February 1946

02383

[REDACTED]

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Surrender and Occupation of Japan.

Reference: (a) Cincpac confidential ltr. A6-5, serial 0396, dated 11 February 1946.

Enclosures: (See Table of Contents following.)

1. The subject report is forwarded herewith.
2. Reference (a) contains most of the source materials on which this report is based.
3. The operations described herein include brief mention of the activities of Army forces under CinCAPPac, inasmuch as all forces involved were closely integrated under a common plan. It is not intended, however, that this report should cover in much detail the operations of Occupation Forces, especially after completion of the landing phases.
4. This report is CONFIDENTIAL, and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of Article 76, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.

J. H. Towers
J. H. TOWERS.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

RECEIVED S-C FILES

Room 2055

26 APR 1946

ROUTE TO:

File No. 63

A16-3(12) EF37
198971

Doc. No.

Copy No.

Req. No.

UNCLASSIFIED

7R
15 MAY 1946

PO Log # 3238022

Another view was that the cooperative civilian attitude in southern Japan was conditioned initially by the great relief felt at the orderly behavior of the American troops. Many Japanese stated that the conduct of the occupation forces had dealt a blow to the prestige of their military class by disproving propaganda claims about American cruelties. The dispelling of the fear that Chinese or Russian troops might be used for occupation duty also served to contribute to the friendly reception given American forces.

A sustaining factor in the friendly relations prevailing between U.S. troops and civilians was the wide-spread expectation on the part of the latter that the occupation forces would devote their efforts to alleviation of Japanese food, fuel, and other welfare problems. Among the Japanese, however, there was a definite popular disapproval of open fraternization, and the subject of greatest interest to all civilians was how soon the occupation forces would depart.

Captain F. D. McCorkle, during his inspections of Japanese combatant ships at Sasebo, had an excellent opportunity to study their naval officers, and makes the following enlightening observations:

"From conversation with a young ensign who was born and lived 17 years in Pasadena before his return to Japan in 1936, it is obvious that the true plight of Japan was concealed from such officers as he and, of course, all those below him. Consequently, it may be assumed only a very minor percentage of the Japanese were acquainted with the true state of Japan or the outside world on 10 August 1945. All had learned what bombings and fires meant; so, regardless of what they really knew about what was going on, not one (civil or military) ever failed to signify that 'he was glad the war was over.

"Commander Destroyer Squadron Five is of the further opinion that much misunderstanding can occur with the Japanese because of their language. Apparently it in no way approaches English in its capacity to communicate thoughts and ideas precisely and accurately. For example, in a transaction with Japanese, it is much better to write out a statement than to speak it. Short sentences spoken two or three times often cannot be understood, yet when written down are grasped instantly due to the Japanese practiced capability of determining the meaning of a group of characters assembled together, rather than one for a word signifying one meaning and one meaning alone.

"This was confirmed by Captain Tobita (the Japanese liaison officer for inspections) who further stated that control of a naval ship and its weapons (where language must be precise) was a burdensome matter to the Japanese. He appeared amazed, and so stated repeatedly, at seeing a yeoman take down five minutes of dictation and then find in a few minutes more a full plan of inspecting a dozen or so ships for the following day, including all plans for transportation, boats, and or vehicles, times, names, etc.

"For the Japanese to bring a small boat alongside requires no end of talk. Whether the evolution is smart depends on conditions. It is always careful and slow; also, the coxswain can always know each man of the crew will perform accurately, exactly what he has been told to do. The crew do what they are told very precisely, but if something upsets the plan, then the talk is bedlam, and they must often start all over again."