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SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

July 1 to December 31

1943

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT
July 1 - December 31, 1943

GENERAL SUMMARY

For the War Relocation Authority, the latter half of 1943 was dominated by the segregation program and the many problems implicit in its execution. In this period, the Tule Lake Relocation Center at Newell, California, was converted to use as a segregation center. The planning and execution of the major policy of segregation, which involved the mass movement of thousands of segregants from the 9 relocation centers to Tule Lake and thousands of non-segregants from Tule Lake to the other centers, absorbed the time and attention of the majority of the staff members at all 10 centers and affected in greater or lesser degree the activities of practically every division within the Authority. No sooner had the first, great mass movement been accomplished than an uprising of one faction among the segregants occurred at the Tule Lake Center and resulted in the occupation of the center by the Army. Between the sensational publicity accorded this incident and the numerous official and unofficial investigations resulting from it, the segregation issue remained the focal point of attention throughout the entire six-months period and tended to overshadow the more routine and less spectacular developments of the WRA program.

Without the competition of the long awaited and widely publicized segregation movement and its somewhat sensational by-products, the progress of the relocation program would unquestionably have dominated any report on WRA for the latter half of the year. Relocation of the evacuated people to normal life and employment, always the primary objective of the Authority, had been given impetus by the speeding up of leave clearance machinery and the re-evaluation of WRA's relocation objectives in the first six months of 1943. In the second period, relocation continued to gain momentum and was further stimulated by the creation within the Authority of a special Relocation Division which could devote its entire attention to this increasingly vital function of WRA. Despite the distraction provided by the execution of the segregation program, 8,434 evacuees relocated during the July 1 to December 31 period, increasing the total number of relocated persons by 100 per cent.

SEGREGATION

Unquestionably the execution of the segregation program in the latter half of 1943 represented a milestone in WRA history. The only major policy of comparable significance in the existence of the agency was the mass registration program of the previous spring, which had accented the need of separating the pro-Japanese minority from the pro-American majority of the evacuees. The registration program had also furnished the information essential to any equitable selection of

segregants, and had provided WRA with a backlog of experience invaluable to the planning and conducting of subsequent major programs. The importance of having such a backlog was demonstrated by the impressive smoothness with which the segregation operations were carried out. Not one of the administrative difficulties encountered during the mass registration arose during the execution of the segregation program.

It was generally agreed that the confusion and misunderstanding which characterized the mass registration at most centers were due to the fact that insufficient time was allowed between conception and execution of the policy to present its purposes and processes adequately to either appointive staff or evacuees. Pre-execution planning for segregation was complete and practical: it set forth in a manual a uniform conception of objectives and procedures, outlining a flexible plan of organization of the work entailed at the projects and providing the means of uniformity in essential detail while allowing latitude in project organization to accommodate special circumstances existing at the individual centers. The procedures recognized the need of a well-informed staff and a well-informed resident population.

At a conference held in Denver, on July 26 and 27, the Director and key members of the Washington staff met with Project Directors and their key staff members to clarify by discussion and unify interpretation of the segregation policy. Thoroughly conversant with the program, the Project Directors returned to their centers to meet with staff members and with representatives of the evacuee population to inform them fully of the work to be accomplished. Information was channeled steadily to the blocks through evacuee committees; project newspapers disseminated information and performed a valuable service in checking rumors.

Three categories of evacuees were designated for segregation; (1) all persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted their requests; (2) all persons who had answered the loyalty question on the registration form in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it, and who showed no disposition to change their answers or, having shown disposition to change their answers, failed to satisfy the Project Director that the change was made in good faith; (3) all persons who were found ineligible for leave clearance on the basis of individual hearings held because (a) they were the subject of adverse reports from a Federal intelligence agency, (b) they changed their answers from the negative or qualified to the affirmative on the loyalty question, (c) they retracted applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, (d) they were not recommended for leave clearance by the Japanese-American Joint Board established in the Provost Marshal General's office, or (e) there were other factors bearing upon their potential danger to the national security which required investigation. In addition to these three groups was a fourth and considerable group composed of the families and dependent relatives of the actual segregants. The people of the first two groups with their dependents were

transferred in the mass movements of September and October. Those persons classified as Group III on the basis of subsequent hearings were scheduled for transfer as individuals or in small groups from time to time.

In August a special board of qualified staff members was set up at each center to hold individual hearings for those persons who had answered the loyalty question in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it. Only those persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted them were consigned to the segregation center at Tule Lake without individual hearing. Each person who had given a negative answer (or none at all) to the loyalty question was asked if he wished to change his answer. If he said he did not wish to change, the conversation was finished at that point. On the other hand, if he said that he wanted to change to an affirmative answer, he was questioned extensively as to his motives for changing, and at the close of the hearing the board made a recommendation to the Project Director for disposal of the case.

The Welfare Department conducted interviews with segregants concerning family matters and health problems. The Chief Medical Officer determined which transferees, by reason of age or infirmity, required pullman accommodations--the regulation accommodations being coach--and which cases, by reason of health conditions, justified deferment of transfer. Detailed plans for the packing and handling of checkable luggage and freight were worked out by the Evacuee Property Office and carried out with an exactness that permitted this phase of the operations to proceed without delay or confusion.

On August 19th a field station of WRA was set up at Fort Douglas, Utah, to act as liaison between the Ninth Service Command of the Army (which was handling the transportation) and WRA officials both in Washington and at the centers. Prior to the first entrainment, a two-day conference was held at Fort Douglas, during which all military personnel, train commanders, mess officers, medical officers and other staff members received detailed instruction regarding transportation operations. The efficiency and smoothness with which these operations were carried out were attributed to the adequacy of these instructions and to the excellent cooperation of military, WRA personnel and evacuees.

Between mid-September and mid-October, 33 train trips transported 14,825 persons, 6250 from Tule Lake to other centers and 8575 to Tule Lake from other centers. Each train trip of segregants was accompanied by a military detachment of 50 persons and a WRA staff member whose duty was to be alert to safety measures, take necessary health and sanitary precautions, answer questions, and delegate to evacuee train monitors and coach captains responsibilities of getting volunteers for work en route and for keeping the cars in a sanitary condition. Evacuee volunteers served the regular meals prepared by army cooks, operated the auxiliary diners which furnished meals for the ill and infirm in sleeping cars, and maintained a high standard of

sanitation and neatness in the coaches, kitchens, lavatories and diners; car mothers looked after children, and formula girls assisted the army nurses in the preparation of formulas and infant diets. Arrangements for meals en route were made by the Army, with WRA supplying perishables, fuel for the gasoline stoves, and ice for refrigeration. In the course of these movements, 129,846 meals were served. The Army showed every consideration in providing for the comfort and well-being of the aged, the sick, expectant mothers, and with small babies. Sickness en route was at a minimum. There were no deaths or births on any train. Six persons were removed from trains for hospitalization. No case of unrest, violence, disorderly conduct, or intentional resistance was observed by military personnel or WRA train rider on any trip. In view of wartime conditions, the service of the railroads was excellent in respect to both equipment and schedules. Although some trains were delayed in departure beyond scheduled time, only two arrived later than scheduled time.

At Tule Lake the mechanical details and coordination of necessary factors of transfer operations were worked out to a point where, at the end of the operation, departure trains were being loaded and evacuees counted in 30 minutes, while arrival trains accomplished the count and unloading in 21 minutes. Housing assignments and deliveries of baggage were made in record time.

With one exception the program was carried out according to plan; it was found that housing at Tule Lake could not accommodate the total number of segregants; consequently the transfer of approximately 1900 people from Manzanar was ordered postponed until additional housing units could be constructed. When it became apparent that the movement of the Manzanar people would be delayed until mid-winter, one trip was scheduled in early November to move 290 of the Manzanar segregants whose health required that they make the trip before the onslaught of severe winter weather.

Every step in the execution of this program demonstrated the value of adequate planning and effective dissemination of information, of having a well-informed community to work with and a well-informed staff to work with the community, and of utilizing evacuee leadership.

PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION AT TULE LAKE CENTER

Like the WRA program as a whole, segregation center administration had no precedent. In speeches, articles, reports and Congressional investigations, WRA has affirmed and reaffirmed that the management in the United States of America of a population in enforced evacuation, a population composed mostly of American citizens, poses a highly complex problem--and a problem with no proved answer. Attempts to simplify that problem have tended to boomerang. Segregation, which was regarded as a means of over-all simplification, offered two knotty problems in itself: first, the basis upon which to determine who should be segregated; second, how to administer the community of the segregated.

Type of Segregant By Nativity and Age By Nativity
For 8561 Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Moved from Nine Relocation Centers to Tule Lake ^{1/}
September - October, 1943

Type of Segregant ^{2/} and Age	Number			Percent		
	:	:	:	:	:	:
	: Total	: American : : Born	: Foreign : : Born	: Total	: American : : Born	: Foreign : : Born
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	100.0	100.0
Repatriate or Expatriate	4690	3050	1640	54.8	50.1	66.1
Registration	1790	1532	258	20.9	25.2	10.4
Other	2081	1499	582	24.3	24.7	23.5
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	71.0	29.0
Repatriate or Expatriate	4690	3050	1640	100.0	65.0	35.0
Registration	1790	1532	258	100.0	85.6	14.4
Other	2081	1499	582	100.0	72.0	28.0
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 17	2290	2278	12	26.7	37.5	0.5
17 - 19	665	662	3	7.8	10.9	0.1
20 - 24	1538	1519	19	17.9	24.9	0.8
25 - 29	1051	1035	16	12.3	17.0	0.6
30 - 34	390	353	37	4.6	5.8	1.5
35 - 39	383	157	226	4.5	2.6	9.1
40 - 44	473	49	424	5.5	0.8	17.1
45 - 49	439	12	427	5.1	0.2	17.2
50 - 54	370	11	359	4.3	0.2	14.5
55 - 59	373	5	368	4.4	0.1	14.9
60 - 64	330	0	330	3.9	0.0	13.3
65 - 69	184	0	184	2.1	0.0	7.4
70 - 74	49	0	49	0.6	0.0	2.0
75 & over	26	0	26	0.3	0.0	1.0

^{1/} Tule Lake is excluded; figures not available.

^{2/} For Jerome and Minidoka the route lists contained only one code for each family, opposite the name of the first person listed; if R was the code entered, all members of the family were tallied as repatriates; if X was the code entered, members of the family 17 years of age or older were tallied as registration Segregates, and members under 17 tallied as "Other."

Source: Route lists for train trips. These figures are preliminary and subject to revision; they were obtained by hand tallies of the Segregation route lists compiled at the Central Utah Statistical Laboratory.

SUMMARY ^{1/}
Type of Segregant By Nativity, Sex, and Age
For 8561 Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Moved from Nine Relocation Centers to Tule Lake
September - October, 1943

Age and Sex	Total				American Born				Foreign Born			
	: :Total: :Expat:	:Repat: :or :Expat:	:Expat: :tration: :	:Other: :Other: :	:Total: :Total: :	:Expat- :riate :	:Regis- :tration: :	:Other: :Other: :	:Total: :Total: :	:Repat- :riate :	:Regis- :tration: :	:Other: :Other: :
Total	8561	4690	1790	2081	6081	3050	1532	1499	2480	1640	258	582
Under 17	2290	1205	1712	914	2278	1197	170	911	12	8	1	3
17 - 19	665	341	183	141	662	341	182	139	3	0	1	2
20 - 24	1538	732	540	266	1519	721	535	263	19	11	5	3
25 - 29	1051	507	407	137	1035	497	403	135	16	10	4	2
30 - 34	390	189	164	37	353	168	155	30	37	21	9	7
35 - 39	383	234	86	63	157	82	60	15	226	152	26	48
40 - 44	473	286	61	126	49	30	15	4	424	256	46	122
45 - 49	439	275	49	115	12	6	5	1	427	269	44	114
50 - 54	370	237	37	96	11	6	4	1	359	231	33	95
55 - 59	373	259	37	77	5	2	3	0	368	257	34	77
60 - 64	330	242	31	57	0	0	0	0	330	242	31	57
65 - 69	184	131	19	34	0	0	0	0	184	181	19	34
70 - 74	49	37	3	9	0	0	0	0	49	37	3	9
75 & Over	26	15	2	9	0	0	0	0	26	15	2	9
Male	5204	2933	1306	965	3632	1798	1137	697	1572	1135	169	268
Under 17	1147	610	76	461	1141	607	75	459	6	3	1	2
17 - 19	416	204	137	75	141	204	137	73	2	0	0	2
20 - 24	1016	478	426	112	1007	472	424	111	9	6	2	1
25 - 29	655	311	303	41	646	305	300	41	9	6	3	0
30 - 34	270	132	129	9	248	120	121	7	22	12	8	2
35 - 39	226	132	73	21	113	55	54	4	113	77	19	17
40 - 44	244	168	37	39	40	24	14	2	204	144	23	37
45 - 49	187	138	19	30	8	3	5	0	179	135	14	30
50 - 54	231	167	27	37	10	6	4	0	221	161	23	37
55 - 59	302	214	32	56	5	2	3	0	297	212	29	56
60 - 64	288	216	26	46	0	0	0	0	288	216	26	46
65 - 69	157	117	16	24	0	0	0	0	157	117	16	24
70 - 74	41	32	3	6	0	0	0	0	41	32	3	6
75 & Over	24	14	2	8	0	0	0	0	24	14	2	8

Age and Sex	Total				American Born				Foreign Born			
	Repat:	Regis-	Other:	Other:	Expat:	Regis:	Other:	Other:	Repat:	Regis-	Other:	Other:
	Total:	or	tration:	Other:	Total:	riate:	tration:	Other:	Total:	riate:	tration:	Other:
	Expat:											
Female	3357	1757	484	1116	2449	1252	395	802	908	505	89	314
Under 17	1143	595	95	453	1137	590	95	452	6	5	0	1
17 - 19	249	137	46	66	248	137	45	66	1	0	1	0
20 - 24	522	254	114	154	512	249	111	152	10	5	3	2
25 - 29	39	196	104	96	389	192	103	94	7	4	1	2
30 - 34	120	57	35	28	105	48	34	23	15	9	1	5
35 - 39	157	102	13	42	44	27	6	11	113	75	7	31
40 - 44	229	118	24	87	9	6	1	2	220	112	23	85
45 - 49	252	137	30	85	4	3	0	1	248	134	30	84
50 - 54	139	70	10	59	1	0	0	1	138	70	10	58
55 - 59	71	45	5	21	0	0	0	0	71	45	5	21
60 - 64	42	26	5	11	0	0	0	0	42	26	5	11
65 - 69	27	14	3	10	0	0	0	0	27	14	3	10
70 - 74	8	5	0	3	0	0	0	0	8	5	0	3
75 & Over	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1

1/ For Jerome and Minidoka the route lists contained only one code for each family, opposite the name of the first person listed; if R was the code entered, all members of the family were tallied as repatriates; if X was the code entered all members of the family 17 years of age and older were tallied as registration segregates and members under 17 tallied as "Other"

2/ Gila River had 171 persons under 17 coded as registration segregates although one person 17 years or older could register.

Source: Route lists for train trips. These figures are preliminary and subject to revision; they were obtained by hand tallies of the segregation route lists compiled at the Central Utah Statistical Laboratory.

Already WRA was detaining, if only temporarily, tens of thousands of American citizens without guarantee that such detention was constitutionally valid. No habeas corpus case had yet reached the Supreme Court to test the validity of such detention. Segregation meant a further detention under greater restrictions, and again the problem was complicated by the presence of many American citizens among the segregants. Persons chosen for segregation were those who had indicated by work or action that their loyalties lie with Japan rather than the United States. Whether or not United States citizens may be detained on the basis of administrative investigation is a question that has not yet been answered. WRA's compromise with necessity has been to conduct painstaking hearings for every individual who for any reason failed to swear unqualified loyalty to the United States, or with respect to whom there is either evidence indicating potential danger to the national security, documenting each case, and arranging for a panel composed of persons detached from WRA and politics to serve as a board of appeal.

The administration of Tule Lake Center posed an even more baffling problem. If all the segregants were aliens and all proved guilty of subversive activity, they would not be at Tule Lake; they would be in an interment camp administered by the Department of Justice. Application for repatriation has been insufficient reason in itself, under the Department of Justice standards, for interment, and more than half the people at Tule Lake are in the category of repatriates or expatriates. If the population at Tule Lake Center were 100 per cent adult, whether alien or citizen, and all proved guilty of disloyalty, it would be defensible to pattern the administration of Tule Lake upon that of a genuine interment camp. However, by the most complete figures available, 71 per cent of the people at Tule Lake are American citizens, and 26.7 per cent of the total population are not only American citizens but also minor children, of whom many are Sansei, or third-generation Americans. Nominally these children are segregants, but it must be remembered that they live at Tule Lake only because their parents or guardians applied for repatriation or did not answer the loyalty question in the affirmative. Similarly it must be remembered that many adult residents of Tule Lake are there only because they are dependent upon an actual segregant who is head of a family unit.

The policy of keeping families together throughout evacuation was enunciated by Lieutenant General DeWitt before WRA came into the picture. (See page 77 of Final Report Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942, prepared under the direction of General DeWitt). This policy has been followed consistently by WRA. To have set it aside at the time of segregation would have been to depart from the humanitarian and democratic principles so clearly stipulated in this particular instance by General DeWitt and furthermore to add to WRA's problems the establishment and maintenance of a large orphanage to care for the thousands of children affected. As the children at Tule Lake reach the age of 17, they will register and be processed for leave clearance. Those who qualify for indefinite leave will be sent

to a regular center, from which point they will be free to resume normal American life as soon as suitable work can be found for them.

Thus WRA is confronted by the necessity of maintaining at Tule Lake a rule strict enough to cope with the positively disloyal and yet flexible enough to accommodate the many young Americans who are as yet innocent of blame and whom WRA wishes to keep that way. It has proved far from easy to conduct a vital Americanization program behind the single fence of barbed wire and under the eyes of a company of military guards in an ordinary center. It is infinitely more difficult to conduct one in a center enclosed by a double, man-proof fence, with a battalion of military guards patrolling it, and with a concentration of the heretofore scattered disloyal element within the center at Tule Lake.

WRA always has recognized the fact that administrative policy under which normal centers operate could not be utilized without alteration at the segregation center. Certain changes in policy were definitely set forth prior to the segregation movement; others were anticipated. First, no indefinite leave would be granted from Tule Lake Center. Second, since Tule Lake was set aside specifically for people who believe their future lies with Japan, attendance at the public schools maintained by WRA was made voluntary rather than compulsory, and Japanese parents were given the privilege of conducting Japanese language schools at their own expense. Third, internal security at the new center was recognized as another problem requiring deviation from existing policy. (External security has always been the concern of the Army, and it was a military decision that increased the military guard at Tule Lake to a battalion, erected a double, eight-foot, man-proof fence around the center, and installed turn-stiles to make it impossible for any unauthorized person to enter or leave the center). Internal security at Tule Lake and elsewhere is completely under WRA jurisdiction. At ordinary centers evacuee wardens supervised by not more than six Civil Service internal security officers perform the two-fold function of patrolling the residence area and handling minor infractions of WRA regulations on the one hand and protecting government property on the other. The Internal Security Staff is not, and never has been, responsible for the maintenance of order within the center in the event of any mass uprising. By an agreement of long standing between WRA and the War Department, WRA is privileged in the event of serious disorder to call upon the military troops stationed at the boundary of the center to come in and maintain order.

In view of the predominant character of the population at Tule Lake, it was recognized that the number of appointed personnel on the internal security force would need to be increased and that the function of protecting government property would devolve upon such appointed personnel. Immediately after the Denver conference of July 26 and 27, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security was detailed to Tule Lake to be on hand throughout the mass movement so that he could observe the situation at first hand and make recommendations.

As a fourth deviation from over-all policy, it was generally

agreed that community government as it existed at the relocation centers would not be instituted at Tule Lake; in its place, as soon as the people had moved in and gotten settled, there would be a purely advisory council of evacuees. With the population in residence, the details of center management could be worked out on a reasonable and realistic basis. It was recognized that it was impractical to lay down any hard and fast policy for management of the segregation center before its members were actually in residence at Tule Lake. It was necessary to study the population and evaluate its temper before determining what kind of administration was required. Against the possibility that conditions might conceivably justify a rigid policy of management, was the probability that conditions would justify placing emphasis upon cooperation from the community in the problem of managing the center. If the effort to secure the cooperation of the community succeeded, it meant not only a more democratic type of administration but a smoother operation than could be hoped for under coercive tactics and also a material financial economy.

Before transfer operations began, a number of WRA staff members from the Washington office were sent out to Tule Lake to study the problem at the center and formulate recommendations. However, once the mass movement began, it was necessary to utilize all available staff, including the visitors from Washington, in the immediate and pressing matters of transfer, housing, and day-to-day maintenance operations in the disorganized center. During these weeks, there was little if any time for conscious and deliberate study of the community, but certain phenomena were noted, definite trends recognized. As of November 4th, one important recommendation had been carried almost to completion; had the construction work been completed by that date, it is not going too far to say that the incident which occurred that night could not have happened. This recommendation was for a new motor pool located in the administration area, adjacent to the military compound, and enclosed by a strong fence. Had this new motor pool been in use on November 4, the trucks which played a conspicuous part in the events of the evening could not have been obtained by the evacuees.

Toward the end of October, with the mass movement virtually completed and people getting settled in their new quarters, ideas on policy were beginning to emerge, recommendations were taking shape, and the visit of the National Director scheduled for the first of November was anticipated as an opportunity to work out with him a definite policy for the administration of the center.

BACKGROUND OF THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Struggle for Power

During the month of October it became apparent that an undercover movement to get control of the center was in progress. However, it was not until October 26 that the leaders openly declared themselves. The mass demonstration of November 1 was recognized at once as the culmination of this struggle for power; subsequent investigation produced infor-

mation and evidence which proved beyond a doubt that this was so.

The leaders were not old residents of Tule Lake, but men who had gained some prominence as minority leaders in the centers from which they were transferred to Tule Lake; chiefly they were from Jerome, Poston, and Heart Mountain. They were men who in pre-evacuation days had failed to achieve leadership in their communities, some of them having been repudiated as fanatics and cranks. Under the tensions and stresses of the evacuation, they had managed to win minority leaderships within the relocation centers, and there they had gained expert knowledge of center politics and evacuee psychology. The segregation center appealed to these men as a place where the minority groups of the ordinary center would doubtless constitute a majority and where their own desire for power and leadership could be more fully gratified. From the centers of their previous residence has come evidence that well before the transfer certain of these men developed detailed plans for seizing control at Tule Lake.

They were skilful in making capital of the discomforts and dissatisfactions common to the disorganized period when people were moving in and out of Tule Lake and every-day operations were maintained with difficulty and considerable irregularity. They were quick to recruit the rowdy element, many of whom were Hawaiian kibeis but some of whom were merely ordinary young American toughs who had been out of the United States Mainland, and use this group to intimidate and control the hesitant or antagonistic. They made appeals shrewdly calculated to win a following: one made on the basis of specific improvements in living conditions was far-reaching and as effective with the soberer element as with the hotheads. Appeals made on the basis of moral justice were potent with many: the protest against discriminatory aspects of evacuation and of segregation itself, and the stressing of the need for solidarity and loyalty to the group. They sponsored private language schools, distinct from the recognized Japanese language schools set up by an evacuee board of education. The purpose of the private schools was to indoctrinate the young with the most flamboyant Japanese militaristic propaganda, and pressure was brought upon Nisei who knew little if any Japanese to attend; the pressure was resented by the many young people who had gone to Tule Lake only for family reasons and felt that their future lay in America. The Americanized young especially resented what they characterized as "Gestapo" methods and referred to the agents of intimidation as "storm troops." Many older people were indignant at being forced into line by arrogant young strangers who behaved like gangsters. However, until a crisis brought leaders and strongarm squads into the open and resulted in their downfall, their intimidation of the opposition was effective.

At first the evidence of the movement toward political organization of the center was of an inconclusive nature. In the second week of October there was a minor labor dispute arising from the crew assigned to handling coal. Three men who were not members of the crew and who were recent arrivals from Topaz tried to inject themselves into the arbitration, insisting that they "represented the community." However,

their claims and their suggestions were ignored by the coal crew, and the dispute was settled without the would-be leaders having been allowed a part in proceedings.

On October 15 there occurred an accident which provided the aspiring politicians with a better opportunity to bring the community together and unify sentiment. An evacuee driver of a truck carrying workers to the farm attempted to overtake another truck and ran off the road, overturning his own truck and injuring a number of his passengers. One of the injured men, previously a resident of Topaz, died of his injuries a day or two later. After the accident no farm workers reported for duty. The evacuee leaders campaigned for a public funeral. Understanding that the widow preferred a private funeral, the administration discouraged (although it did not prohibit) a public ceremony. Facilities for making a large-scale public ceremony effective were denied by the administration, but finally, on October 23, the funeral was held in the largest firebreak, where a makeshift stage had been thrown together. There was an attendance of about 2000, and strong-arm squads patrolled the edges of the crowd, showing a surly temper toward the few members of the appointed staff who appeared on the scene.

In the meantime the administration's most pressing problem was to get the crops harvested before frost could spoil them. The Project Director issued a public request shortly after the accident, calling for representatives of the farm workers to discuss the matter and setting October 21 as the deadline for arbitration. No committee appeared, but it was informally suggested to the administration that the people were not interested in harvesting the crops. The administration promptly terminated the Tule Lake farm workers and recruited evacuee volunteers from the regular centers to save the crops. The recruitment was so successful that by October 26, the day set for a meeting with an evacuee committee which had belatedly appeared and asked for a meeting with the administration to discuss the farm situation, many recruits from other centers had all ready been recruited. The committee had lost its chance to effect a settlement of the current farm trouble, but the meeting was scheduled to discuss the issue in terms of future policy.

The center politicians had made full use of the interval between the death of the farm laborer and the day of the conference to organize the community. They achieved their status as negotiating committee by the force of their own determination rather than by orthodox community election. The mass of the residents remained unaware that a committee was being formed until after it materialized.

At the meeting with the Project Director on October 26, the committeemen were vague in their explanation of how their committee had come into existence. The Project Director refused to recognize them as representatives of the whole community, but stated his willingness to entertain suggestions from them and hear what they had to say. They presented five points for discussion: (1) the legal status of the segregants and a recommendation for a re-segregation at Tule Lake of those who really wished to return to Japan from those who did

not; (2) settlement of the farm situation on a basis of confining production exclusively to the needs of Tule Lake; (3) the establishment of an evacuee governing body, which they felt should be worked out among the evacuees themselves; (4) criticism of the food, with implications of mishandling in its distribution; (5) various physical improvements to be made within the center.

The committee was informed that segregant status was not a matter that the project administration could decide. It was agreed that farm production should henceforward be limited to the needs of Tule Lake Center. The administration suggested that the committee or any other group had the privilege of working out plans for a governing body and also for physical improvement of the center and submitting these plans to the administration for consideration. The committee was invited to conduct an investigation of the food situation and make a report.

In view of the attitude of this committee, the Project Director did not announce the fact that the harvest was being completed by volunteers from the relocation centers. That very night appointive staff members transferred 32,000 pounds of staple foods from the center warehouses to the farm camp for the maintenance of the volunteer harvesters. The next day evacuee warehouse workers observed that this food was missing. In San Francisco, at about the same time, the Field Assistant Director of WRA announced to the press that the Tule Lake crops were being harvested by loyal evacuees from other centers. Tule Lake politicians were not slow to connect the removal of food from the warehouses with the presence of outside workers at the farm. On October 30, an evacuee infant, playing in his mother's apartment and presence, fell into a bucket of scalding water and died after treatment in the hospital. A false report rapidly circulated among the residents of the center that the negligence of a Caucasian doctor was responsible for the child's death.

THE DEMONSTRATION OF NOVEMBER 1

At about ten o'clock in the morning of November 1 the National Director of WRA arrived at Tule Lake on a routine visit. He was accompanied by the Field Assistant Director from the San Francisco Office. No sooner had he arrived than members of the negotiating committee appeared to request a conference with him. They were received by one of the assistant project directors, who, after consulting with the National Director, scheduled a conference for 1:30 p.m. the following day. In a very short time the delegation returned to ask that the conference be held that afternoon instead of the next day; their request was denied.

At noon unauthorized announcements were made by satellites of the evacuee politicians in evacuee mess halls, urging all people to go to the administration building immediately after lunch. Some announcers said that the Director was going to make a speech to the community, others that the people should go to "back up the committee"

which was presenting demands for the betterment of living conditions. Young men posted at each block directed the people coming out of the mess halls to go to the administration building.

During the noon hour work was brought to the National Director and the Project Director that a crowd was gathering around the administration building. They and the Field Assistant Director from San Francisco got in a car and made a reconnaissance of the colony area, with a view to determining whether the situation warranted calling in the military. They saw people walking from every block toward the administration area. Old and young, women with babies in arms or in baby carriages and children of all sizes were moving in a steady stream toward the administration building. The presence of these women and small children and the aged in the crowd convinced the Directors that violence was not part of the plan. The three men went to the Project Director's office in the administration building to await developments.

By one-thirty about 5000 evacuees had congregated about the administration building. Young men at the edges of the crowd discouraged anyone from leaving. For more than three hours the crowd stood, silent or talking quietly, only children and half-grown boys displaying restlessness. Some of the latter clambered over parked cars and did some minor damage: they put dirt in a couple of gas tanks, bent a few radio aerials, and removed a few windshield wipers and radiator caps. Other than these instances, there was no destruction of property by any of the crowd gathered around the administration building. Groups of evacuee men requested appointed personnel throughout the administration area to go to the main administration building. With the exception of a few staff members who combined diplomacy with reasonable excuses for leaving, those who tried to leave the administration building were prevented from doing so. The restraint was courteously imposed except in a few instances where Caucasian men resisted instructions; these were pushed inside the building.

The organizers of the demonstration wanted to present grievances and requests to the National Director; furthermore, they wanted the bulk of the administrative staff accounted for during the conference with the Director, and they wanted the mass of the evacuee population assembled as evidence that the community was solidly behind the committee. As a result of their maneuvers, they succeeded in getting about two-thirds of the administrative staff inside the administration building during the demonstration and about one-third of the evacuee population outside the building.

A project official kept in close touch by telephone with the commanding officer of the Military Police, who stood by, ready to rush in soldiers at a moment's notice. Early in the afternoon the tanks in the military area were warmed up to be in readiness for emergency. However, the announcers in the mess halls had instructed the people to take no weapons or anything that might be regarded as such and to do nothing that might bring the Army into the picture. The most conclusive evidence that the demonstration was to be a peace-

ful one lay in the inclusion of elderly people, women, and small children in the crowd.

As soon as the crowd had assembled the negotiating committee of 17 men appeared (14 real members and three so-called "strong arm" representatives) and requested an audience with the Director. They were received in the Project Director's office by WRA officials for a meeting. Simultaneously an evacuee public address system was set up at the front of the building, and throughout the afternoon the crowd was instructed intermittently over the loud-speaker to be patient, as the committee was negotiating, and the Director of WRA would speak to them soon.

In the Project Director's office, the conference proceeded, with certain interruptions, which will be accounted for further on, for three hours. The chairman, formerly of Jerome, was spokesman for the committee. He presented the points brought up at the October 26 meeting, now enlarged and supplemented by further points. The committee attempted to get confirmation of its suspicions concerning the removal of staple foods from the warehouses, but was informed that the food was WRA property and need not be accounted for to the evacuees. An attempt was made to fix responsibility for the death of the farm worker upon the administration. The committee protested the termination of the Tule Lake farm workers, who had stopped work and failed to make use of the opportunity given them to negotiate with the administration. Protests were made in regard to food, sanitary facilities, senter dust, and hospital administration. Criticism focused upon various project officials, including the Chief Steward, an Assistant Project Director, the Chief of Agriculture, the Junior Property Supply Officer, the Chief Medical Officer and his entire staff of appointed personnel, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security, and the Project Director himself. The final demand of the committee was for the removal from Tule Lake of all the personnel listed above.

The Director stated clearly that while the administration welcomed suggestions from any and all groups, it did not operate on a basis of demands; that no terminations of personnel would be made except on a basis of thorough investigation; and that the administration was not prepared to consider the present committee as being a genuinely representative body. The chairman of the committee then asked the Director to speak to the crowd. The Director did so, repeating in general what he had said to the committee. The Project Director also made a brief speech, after which an evacuee interpreter reproduced both speeches in Japanese. A WRA staff member who speaks fluent Japanese was present and vouched for the accuracy of the interpreter's version of the speeches. A committee member who is a Buddhist priest made a short speech in Japanese at the conclusion of which the evacuee who has served as announcer throughout the afternoon stepped forward and told the crowd to bow. The majority of the people obeyed, facing the entrance of the administration building where the speakers were assembled. Immediately after bowing, the crowd dispersed.

THE HOSPITAL INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 1

No single episode of the critical period of November 1 to 4 at Tule Lake suffered more general misunderstanding and exaggeration than the Hospital incident of the afternoon of November 1. Certain inevitable omissions in the transcript of the meeting in the Project Director's office proved misleading; rumor tangled with fact, and opinion in some instances was accepted as factual evidence; there was considerable disparity between what actually happened and what some eye witnesses thought was happening. At the time when hearings were being conducted by various investigating committees, the parts had not yet been fitted into a whole, and some important connecting links were missing. Since that time, by means of a careful checking and rechecking of affidavits, statements, and testimony and a further questioning of reliable eye-witnesses, it has been possible to supply the connecting links and fit the details into proper sequence.

From the Administration Building Standpoint

On the afternoon of November 1, just as the conference in the Project Director's office was about to begin and while the Project Director's secretary was getting the names of the committeemen for the record, the Project Director received a telephone message from a doctor in the hospital reporting the one instance of violence which occurred within the center on that day. The Project Director asked the chairman of the committee what was going on at the hospital. The chairman answered: "I don't know." The Project Director informed the group that the Chief Medical Officer had been beaten and property was being destroyed. At this point every WRA staff member in the room was aware of the surprise and consternation which the news produced in the committeemen: it was obvious that this episode in the hospital was no part of the committee's plan. Recovering himself, the chairman of the committee said: "We will stop it," and sent some of his men to the hospital. Discussion stopped until the men returned and reported that the Chief Medical Officer was being cared for and that all was quiet in the hospital. The conference continued. A few minutes later, a second telephone call from the hospital reported that evacuees were milling about in the wards. Again the committee sent some men over, and again the conferees waited until the report came back that everything was quiet at the hospital. The conference continued for twenty minutes or more until another interruption occurred in the form of a message from the Medical Social Consultant who had just arrived in the outer office; the message indicated that the hospital situation required further attention. The Director asked the National Acting Chief of Internal Security to go to the hospital. The latter hurried to the hospital, being joined outside by an evacuee who elected to accompany him. In a few moments he returned to the meeting to report that everything was under control at the hospital.

As It Actually Occurred at the Hospital

About an hour before the crowd congregated around the administration building, an evacuee employee in the hospital took the Chief Medical Officer aside and informed him that there was going to be a

demonstration that afternoon but that no trouble was expected at the hospital. The Chief Medical Officer soon observed that groups of three to five evacuees who were not hospital employees kept coming in at intervals and circulating among the hospital employees presumably to get them to leave work and join in the demonstration. He told the intruders to leave, and they did so, but he noticed that fifteen or twenty were congregated on the steps outside. He commissioned another Caucasian doctor to guard the door and let no one in, and then went into his office, which is at the right of the entrance and entered by way of an outer office.

The young men on the steps pushed past the doctor at the door and began to crowd into the outer office used by the Chief Medical Officer's secretary. The secretary screamed; the Chief Medical Officer thrust his head out from his own office to see what was happening and had his glasses removed and laid on a shelf by one of the intruders. The Chief Medical Officer struck this man, whereupon the others moved up, pressing the doctor back into his office. Five of the group took an active part in the attack; the others stood on the sidelines. The assailants got the doctor down, kicked him twice, once in the side of the face and once in the body, and dragged him outside of the building. The doctor's nurse rushed out to the rescue, the leader of the gang gave the order to stop the beating, and the gang took itself off. Other hospital attendants came out, carried the doctor inside and administered treatment for his injuries, which were painful rather than serious. In the course of the attack, a railing outside the doctor's office was knocked over. There was no destruction of property.

The fight was over, the injured doctor was receiving medical attention, and the assailants had vanished when the doctor who had been commissioned to guard the front door put his call through to the Project Director's office. Naturally there was nervous tension in the hospital. Few of the hospital attendants had witnessed the violent incident, but word of such an event spreads rapidly. Despite the nervous strain, all but two or three persons remained at their posts of duty until their regular hour of release. The second telephone call to the Project Director was made by a nurse who looked down the long corridor connecting the row of wards and saw evacuees going in and out through a door midway along the corridor and opening toward the administration area. A steady stream of people entering the corridor and passing into a wing of the ward section of the building was, in view of the recent disturbance, alarming enough to make her call the Project Director. The second delegation sent by the evacuee committee investigated and reported correctly enough that there was no disorder in the hospital.

At about this time the Medical Social Consultant from the Washington office, a woman who speaks Japanese, had gone to the Out-Patient clinic, located at one side of the main entrance where the attack on the Chief Medical Officer ended. She went to the clinic to stand by and reassure nurses and attendants who might be overwrought by the recent occurrence. From her position she observed a young evacuee man

stationed in front of the hospital entrance, but fifty feet or more from the door. She addressed him in Japanese, asking him what he was doing, and he replied that he was guarding the hospital. She signified that she thought little of his method of guarding it, as his distance from the door left it virtually unprotected, and other doors leading into the hospital were not guarded at all. The young evacuee moved closer to the door and agreed to set guards at other entries. The Medical Social Consultant then proceeded toward the Administration building in company with the doctor who had telephoned the first message concerning the attack in the hospital. On the way she stopped to recover the keys of a car for the wife of the Chief Medical Officer from an evacuee who had entered the car and started away with it. Her companion was escorted to the administration building by some evacuees, but she paused to inform the wife of the Chief Medical Officer of the attack on her husband and advise her to go to the hospital. She arrived at the administration building shortly after the doctor, who had been informing the assistant project director of conditions in the hospital and asking that the Army be called in. The time of herearrival was approximately half an hour later than the time of the original message concerning the hospital. Talking with the Assistant Project Director in an office adjoining the conference room, she could look through the glass panels across the conferees and see evacuees from the general crowd going in and out of a door in the middle of the long hospital corridor, and was troubled by the situation, pointing it out to the Assistant Project Director, whereupon he delivered the message that interrupted the conference for the third time and resulted in an investigation by the National Acting Chief of Internal Security.

In subsequent hearings a good deal of attention was given to the contradiction in reports from the hospital. Unfortunately the witnesses called were not in possession of the simple and entirely natural explanation of the conflict between reports. There was no disorder in the hospital once the assailants of the Chief Medical Officer took themselves off, but there was a fairly steady stream of evacuees from the crowd passing in and out of one door which led across the long corridor to a wing of the ward section which was not used for patients but which contained class rooms and what is highly significant in this instance rest rooms. The residents, herded from lunch to the Administration area and not allowed to leave the area for more than three hours, were understandably making use of the rest rooms available within the area.

EFFECTS OF THE DEMONSTRATION


Once the demonstration was over, the reaction set in, and rumors thrived among the appointed personnel, stimulated by exaggerated versions of what had happened appearing in the press. While a substantial number refused to become excited, continuing to regard the demonstration as a peaceful one, others gave way to nerves and began to think that they had seen indications of incendiary intentions and

an assortment of vicious weapons in the crowd. According to the testimony of the more stable personnel, some of whom were consciously looking for such evidence and were in a position to see for themselves, there was no sign of straw whether oil-soaked or pure of oil; substantial clubs diminished to the walking sticks habitually carried by many evacuees; villainous knives and swords degenerated into a few jack-knives in the hands of some half-grown boys who entertained themselves during the tedious period of waiting by playing mumbly-peg and whittling.

Fully aware that the atmosphere was tense, the administration representatives went directly from the mass meeting to confer with the commanding officer of the military police and make detailed arrangements for guaranteeing protection of life and property within the center in any emergency that might arise. The military stood in readiness to take immediate occupation of the center at need, and it was agreed that authority to summon military assistance should be given any Internal Security Officer, whereas previously only the Project Director--or the National Director himself--was authorized to call in the Army.

At the suggestion of the Chief Medical Officer, the Caucasian hospital staff was relieved from duty that night and sent home to get some rest. One nurse remained on duty until the evening rounds were made, and the Medical Social Consultant from the Washington Office remained on duty through the night. A few members of the appointed staff spent the night in Klamath Falls or Tulelake (the nearest town). The next day there was a series of staff meetings, culminating in one with the Director and Project Director, during which the demand for a fence between administration and evacuee communities--certain staff members had asked for such a fence during the segregation movement. The Project Director issued an order prohibiting public gatherings of evacuees in the administration, WRA residential, hospital and warehouse areas. Nightly patrols of these areas were maintained, beginning Monday, November 1, by four members of the Internal Security staff; two guards were assigned to a night watch at the high school area; the National Acting Chief of Internal Security was on general surveillance, and the Chief of Internal Security at Central Utah, temporarily detailed to Tule Lake, augmented the others. Patrol officers checked in hourly to the sergeant of the military guard and the officer of the day with the understanding that the military should investigate any check-in more than five minutes overdue. With these precautionary measures in operation, the National Director left the Tule Lake Center Tuesday evening, November 2, as per schedule.

In general the effect of the demonstration on the evacuees was to stimulate the radical element to more open exhibitions of pro-Japan sentiment, and to make the more thoughtful group uneasy. The leaders, having failed in their attempt to obtain a promise from the administration that no more food would be taken from the center to feed the harvest crew at the farm, were none the less determined to block further appropriation of center supplies if possible. Members of the goon squads were appeared to be keeping an eye on warehouses and the motor



TULE LAKE PLOT PLAN

— PERIOD - NOVEMBER 1-4, 1943 —
 ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY, POLICE, HOSPITAL, SCHOOL
 WAREHOUSE AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS.

- LEGEND**
- | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|--|
| ① FRONT ENTRANCE AND STEPS OF HOSPITAL AND DR. PEDICORDS OFFICE. | ⑤ PROJECT DIRECTOR'S OFFICE | ⑬ LOCATION OF FIGHT INVOLVING 3 INTERNAL SECURITY MEN. BORDECK WAS HURT. |
| ② PROJECT DIRECTOR'S OFFICE. | ⑥ POST OFFICE. | ⑭ MILITARY AREA |
| ③ ADMINISTRATION BUILDING. | ⑦ ⑧ GARAGES | ⑮ ENTRANCE IN USE. |
| ④ TELEPHONE OFFICE | ⑨ PACKING SHED | |
| | ⑩ WAREHOUSE | |
| | ⑪ FOOD WAREHOUSE | |
| | ⑫ MOTOR POOL AREA. | |

pool.

On the morning of November 3, young evacuee men rounded up evacuee workers and herded them to an unauthorized ceremony commemorating the birthday of the late Emperor Meiji Setsu, grandfather of the reigning Emperor of Japan. The workers returned to their jobs as soon as the ceremony ended. That afternoon the Honorable F. de Amat, Consul of the Spanish Embassy, in the presence of a representative of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, met with a group of 21 evacuee representatives, whose chairman was the chairman of the Negotiating Committee and whose number included the leaders of the Monday demonstration. Aside from complaints about the food situation and the hospital, the major issue brought before the Spanish Consul was the clarification of the segregants' status. They petitioned the Consul to take up with the Japanese Government the possibility of bestowing Japanese citizenship upon Tule Lake nisei. On November 3, the National Director approved the construction of a fence between the Administration area and the colony.

On the night of November 3, the Acting Assistant Project Director, while riding around the project on an observation tour, saw groups of evacuees stationed in the vicinity of the warehouses and near the motor pool. The next day, details having been cleared with the U.S. Engineers at San Francisco, work began on the fence between administration and evacuee areas.

THE INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 4

On the night of November 4, affairs at Tule Lake reached a climax which resulted in the occupation of the center by the Army. The farm situation, never entirely out of the picture after October 15, figured prominently on this night. A contingent of evacuee harvest volunteers from other centers was due to arrive by train at Klamath Falls late that night, and three cargo trucks were removed from the motor pool to meet the train and transport the workers to the harvest camp. The removal of these trucks produced the situation that gave rise to violence, for the "strong-arm" element assumed that the trucks were to be used for taking more food supplies from the center warehouses to the loyal evacuees at the farm.

The acts which culminated in military intervention were committed in high temper and on the spur of the moment by young men acting on their own initiative. There is no reason to believe that the political leaders were in any way involved in the action taken by the young men; in fact, the members of the negotiating committee were engaged throughout the evening in a meeting in the mess hall of Block 15 in the colony; they had called this meeting of block representatives themselves for the purpose of electing a central governing committee. What precipitated the call for the Army happened swiftly in the dark, and at some distance from the colony. Not more than a dozen WRA staff members and the 200 or so young men and

boys involved in the performance knew that anything extraordinary was happening until the racket of light tanks and scout cars and the glare of floodlights announced the entry of the troops.

At about seven-thirty that evening, the Project Director had a brief conference with the Commanding Officer of the Military Guard and then spent an hour driving around the center, on the lookout for any signs of irregularity. He reached the warehouse area at about eight-thirty, and at that time there were no evacuees in sight. He returned to the administration area, parking his car near the administration building, and sitting in his car in the dark for a time to watch this area for signs of irregular activity. All was quiet. At about 9:15 he was joined by the Assistant Project Director, who reported that the three cargo trucks had gotten off to meet the train. At 9:30 the Assistant Project Director remarked that it was time for him to leave to meet the escort coming in on the train and that he had to drive past his house to pick up his overcoat. The Project Director went to the telephone office in the Administration building where housing records were kept at night, to check on the quarters assigned for the use of the people coming in on the train, and within a few minutes returned to his house. In about five minutes the Assistant Project Director came to the door to report that in driving past the motor pool he saw that men were hurriedly gathering in that area. The two men went outside and could see possibly fifty evacuees armed with clubs milling about in the motor pool area. The Assistant Project Director walked around the end of the Project Director's house and startled a number of men out from the shadows. The Project Director went into his house and telephoned the Commanding Officer of the military troops to come in and take over.

The actual, violent engagements of that night happened suddenly and practically simultaneously in a very short interval, roughly between the time when the Project Director telephoned for the Army to come in and the time when the Army arrived on the scene, possibly ten minutes.

To get a picture of what happened and how it happened, it is necessary to go back to 8:15 that evening when a staff member went to the motor pool to requisition the three trucks. He was refused service by the evacuees in the motor pool office. He left the motor pool and encountered the National Acting Chief of Internal Security and several other staff members. Together they returned to the motor pool. The man who had originally requested the trucks got the keys from the office and serviced the trucks himself, the evacuees looking on. Two Caucasian drivers joined him and at about 9:10 the three drove the trucks out of the motor pool and set off for Klamath Falls. No sooner had the other staff members turned away from the motor pool than an evacuee jumped in a truck and headed at full speed for the evacuee colony, unquestionably to carry word that the three trucks had been taken. The National Acting Chief of Internal Security, anticipating a reaction to the removal of the cargo trucks, stopped at the room of the

Internal Security Chief from Central Utah and assigned him to watch the broad, open space between evacuee colony and administration area for signs of action. He detailed another officer to stay with the switch-board operator at the telephone office to forestall any attempt to cut communications, and then went to the military compound to report the situation to the sergeant of the military guard and make sure that everything was in readiness for quick action. He proceeded to a building in the compound where two men from the Federal Communications Commission, San Francisco, were conducting an investigation (instigated by the National Acting Chief of Internal Security) of an illegal radio transmitter within the evacuee colony.

When word reached the colony that the trucks were taken, about 150 to 200 of the strong-arm squad rallied with the intent of preventing the trucks (already well away from the center) from being loaded with food and taken from the center. The messenger's truck and others similarly appropriated were used to carry men to the motor pool and warehouses to mount guard; auxiliaries set off for these areas on foot. Trucks darted about the center in pursuit of the missing trucks. Failure to find any trace of the three trucks baffled and enraged the young men. A number of them were armed with base ball bats, pick handles or short lengths of two-by-four lumber. Internal Security men on patrol or guard duty began to be aware of groups congregating in the shadows of the warehouses and around the motor pool. The guard at the high school called his chief to report that gangs of men were robbing the lumber pile. Two officers in a patrol car had their way blocked by a black pick-up whose evacuee driver announced that no produce trucks were going to get out of the center that night but who shortly drove away leaving the way clear. The officers headed back to the administration area to report.

In the Military Compound, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security noted that the Japanese music being broadcast over the illegal transmitter stopped abruptly at 9:25. He suspected that the cutting off of the music might be a signal. Stopping only to tell the sergeant of the guard that a request for the Army to move in would probably be made very soon, he drove into the center, stopping about 75 yards from the gates when a car approached him, shining a spot light in his face. Thinking it an Army radio patrol car, he got out and walked over to it, discovering it to be the black pick-up previously mentioned. There were evacuee men riding in the rear. One of these and the driver jumped down and tried judo on the Chief. After a brief interchange, the Chief got back into his car and headed for the Project Director's house. He parked his car across the road from the house and walked toward the house, suddenly perceiving 30 or 40 men with clubs in the shadows. Six of these attacked him, but he used the judo hold on two of these, wrenching an arm of each from its socket. In the lull following this feat, he got back to his car, hearing the men yell in English: "Get Best! Take Best!" (Best is the Project Director). He started in his car for the military area and out-maneuvered the driver of the pick-up who tried to cut him off,

reaching the military area to call in the Army, a few minutes after the Project Director had made the same request by telephone.

In the meantime the two men on patrol and the officer assigned to the area between colony and administration area reached the telephone office in the administration building intending to report by telephone to the National Acting Chief of Internal Security. The switch was open and they overheard the Project Director's call to bring in the Army. They started on foot for the Project Director's house, hearing the cries of "Get Best! Take Best!" Just outside the Administration building, the driver of the same black pick-up attempted to run them down, but they jumped out of the way and the driver had to stop to avoid hitting some posts. He and his men jumped out and a fight began, in which one of the officers was injured. The other two, re-inforced by several staff members from the administration building, fought off the others and took three prisoners in the few moments that remained before the Army arrived and took over.

In all, 18 prisoners were taken on that night, all of whom needed first aid for injuries received during their capture. They were hospitalized under guard after questioning, and were later removed to a stockade. Possibly six shots were fired (none by evacuees as no firearms have been in their possession in centers at any time) but no one was found to have been wounded by gunfire. At the entry of the Army, the strong-arm squads took to their heels. Most staff members as well as the majority of the evacuee residents were unaware that trouble was brewing until the noise of Army light tanks and scout cars indicated that something extraordinary was going on.

By agreement between WRA and the Army, once the Army is called into a center, it takes control until military decision removes the troops. As of December 31, 1943, the Army remained in control of the center, with WRA personnel cooperating with the Army in the details of center operation.

AFTERMATH OF THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Following November 1, the more responsible newspapers and wire services made an effort to verify the stories about Tule Lake, while the less reputable ones were publicizing all the rumors that were flying thick and fast. Those in the former category called the WRA by telephone, asking specific questions. The Director, on the basis of his own knowledge, was able to deny roughly half of the rumors; to the remaining questions, he replied for the most part that a check was being made but that the facts had not yet been established. Rumors multiplied rapidly while facts were established slowly, and the less responsible newspapers were quick to utilize the rumors and publish eye witness accounts which day by day displayed higher color and diminishing accuracy. For a week or so in early November, Tule Lake displaced the battle fronts in top news interest with the West Coast press.

The first version of the November 1 demonstration to reach the public was provided by the first person to leave the center after

the crowd in the Administration area dispersed. This was a rancher of the vicinity, who had at one time been employed by WRA to manage the butcher shop at the center. He had called at the center that Monday afternoon just in time to be ushered into the administration building by evacuees and remained there with staff members for the remainder of the afternoon. His not altogether objective account of the episode was soon embellished with details furnished by some of the staff members and their families who were too overwrought to remain on the center and so spent the nights in the town of Tulelake or Klamath Falls. The impressions and opinions of highly excited and frightened persons were seized upon and published as fact.

Until the Army occupied the center on the night of November 4, press representatives had their customary privilege of visiting the center for purposes of first-hand coverage if they chose to do so. By November 4, a few reporters were in the vicinity of the center, and one, a United Press man from San Francisco, was actually quartered in the center as the guest of the Project Director. From his room, one barrack away from the Project Director's house, he was in position to see such part of the action as took place within his range of vision and was not obscured by darkness. He was not permitted to wander around the area at random and was taken from the center to the town of Tulelake shortly after the Army moved in. Immediately upon occupying the center, the Army clamped down censorship on news. Again the press had little but rumor to work with, and again rumors abounded.

The facts of the November 1 episode, which had been gradually emerging and which were being released, were mild and colorless in comparison with the tales which had already been published and accepted as truth by most papers. When actual violence, justifying Army occupation, occurred on the night of November 4, the newspapers that had previously made a conscientious effort to get at the facts were left with the impression that WRA had been withholding information and that the more sensational accounts of the situation at Tule Lake Center were true.

Immediate results of the press stories were numerous resolutions and recommendations emanating from communities, organizations, state and city officials, and in some instances private citizens. These documents stressed the need for (1) further investigation of WRA; (2) permanent control of Tule Lake Center by the Army; (3) placing all the relocation centers as well as Tule Lake under the Army; (4) simply the immediate dissolution of WRA. The resolutions were effective insofar as producing investigations was concerned.

For a month or more, investigations of all kinds were made, some at Tule Lake Center, others in Washington, D. C. The Joint Fact-Finding Committee of the California Legislature sent a senatorial committee headed by Senator Hugh P. Donnelly to Tule Lake Center to conduct hearings. While these were going on, the Spanish Consul arrived to investigate on behalf of the alien evacuees. Representative Clair Engle of the Second District in California was on the pre-

mises when the Donnelly committee arrived, engaged in conducting a one-man investigation on his own initiative. He and an investigator sent out by the Dies sub-committee sat in on the Donnelly committee hearings and also talked to certain staff members and residents of the surrounding area. A little later Senator Sheridan Downey made a quick trip to Tule Lake from Washington, D. C., also on his own initiative. The FBI representatives spent some time at the center making an investigation. In Washington, D. C., the Director of WRA appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in executive session, the West Coast Congressional Delegation, and the Dies Sub Committee. In the absence of the Director, the Acting Director appeared before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Just before Christmas when the Project Director of Tule Lake visited the Washington Office, the Dies Sub-Committee re-opened its hearings on Tule Lake for the purpose of questioning him.

With the exception of the FBI representatives, the investigators who went to Tule Lake were somewhat restricted in their activities by the refusal of the Army to allow them to subpoena evacuees. The Donnelly Committee, in session at Tule Lake on November 8 and 9, summoned a carefully selected group of witnesses, including three residents of the nearby town of Tulelake who had made occasional trips to the center, and certain former employees of WRA. The committee called on the Chief Medical Officer and questioned him, making a transcript of the interview, but not including it in the transcript of the hearings. The Project Director and the Field Assistant Director from San Francisco were the only key staff members questioned at the hearings, and they were not summoned; they volunteered testimony.

Considerable time and attention were given by this committee to episodes of Tule Lake's early days as a relocation center, long before there was any thought of its becoming a segregation center and involving persons long since removed from Tule Lake. Statements unsupported by evidence were accepted and utilized by the committee in its subsequent report of findings. On the basis of these biased findings the committee telegraphed the President, the Secretary of War and the Chairman of the California Congressional Delegation, urging the continuation of Army control at Tule Lake Center and the continued exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast area for the duration of the war.

The Dies Sub-Committee, with Representative John M. Costello of California as Chairman, conducted intermittent hearings in Washington from the end of November to the 20th of December. These hearings, nominally concerned with the Tule Lake situation, appeared actually to be more in the nature of a continuation of the over-all investigation (so called) of WRA made by this committee earlier in the year, and re-opened a number of issues which had supposedly been settled during the summer hearings on WRA, the majority report and minority views on which were published in September of 1943.

The earlier investigation (covered in WRA's semi-annual report

for the period ending 6/30/43) was made on a basis of complaints which charged WRA with general incompetence, laxity in discipline within the centers, "pampering" the evacuees, specifically by providing them with food of a higher quality than was available to the average citizen, with failure to segregate the disloyal from the loyal evacuees, and with inadequate screening of those evacuees allowed to resume normal life outside the centers. The recommendations which concluded the majority report were three in number:

"1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

"2. That a board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.

"3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers."

The minority views of Rep. Herman P. Eberharter, of Pennsylvania, express his conviction that "the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven." He comments: "After all the wind and the fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations." In summation, he has this to say:

"It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism."

The second series of hearings conducted by the Dies sub-committee opened with the testimony of a physician who had been employed in the Tule Lake Hospital for ten days at the time of the Hospital incident and who turned in his resignation the following day. The second and third days were given to the testimony of Representative Engle of California, who recommended that the Army remain in control of Tule Lake Center. With the exception of a short period devoted to statements made by Representatives Lowell Stockman of Oregon and Norris Poulson of California, the fourth, fifth and six days were spent in questioning

the National Director of WRA. On the seventh day, the United States Attorney-General appeared before the committee, and after stating that the Department of Justice did not want jurisdiction over the evacuees, explained the nature of the problem WRA was created to cope with, specifically pointing out the doubtful constitutionality of detention of American citizens, a matter which, he stated, was soon coming before the Supreme Court of the United States. On the 20th of December the sub-committee went into a final session on the Tule Lake situation, in order to question the Project Director of Tule Lake Center. Majority report and minority views were expected to appear early in 1944.

PROGRESS OF RELOCATION

At the beginning of the fiscal year 1943, the flow of evacuees from the centers to the mainstream of American life was continuing to gather momentum, but while it was steadily draining the centers of the young and unattached, it was leaving almost intact the substantial group of older people with family responsibilities. It was recognized that a re-evaluation and re-definition of WRA's relocation objectives were in order; and in the first week of July all relocation officers were summoned in from the field to attend a conference in the National Office to present for discussion such problems as they faced in carrying out this basic and functional obligation of WRA to restore to private life and participation in the war effort these tens of thousands of qualified adult workers of Japanese ancestry together with their families. The conference accomplished a double purpose: it clarified and unified thinking on the entire subject of relocation, and it produced practical, definite recommendations, implementation of which had, by the end of the year, carried the relocation program to the point where it was reaching a more complete cross-section of the population in the centers.

The Over-all Problem

The major and most pressing problem confronting the WRA was the basic one of how to get the people out of the centers and back into normal life. Previously the slow-moving machinery for establishing leave clearance had retarded the advance of relocation, but as of July 1, 1943 the large majority of evacuees had been processed and were eligible for indefinite leave. Allowing for the segregation of those ineligible for leave clearance and their dependents, it was apparent that WRA would be left with approximately 85,000 people still in the centers. Thus far the relocation program had resulted in the re-settlement in private life and work of fewer than 10,000 people. The great majority of the relocated were in their early twenties, either single persons or young married couples without family responsibilities. Although WRA had from the beginning anticipated the relocation of family groups, few families were

actually relocating. The need was to determine what was holding families back and then to remove such deterrents to relocation, whether the obstructions were actual and material or whether they existed only in the minds of the evacuees. It was realized that the overcoming of obstacles to relocation would involve a revitalized education program directed not only at the evacuees in the centers but also at the public, and it was agreed that greater evacuee participation in relocation planning was essential to the future success of the program.

Deterrents to Relocation

During the summer surveys were made at several centers to find out if possible precisely what was preventing families from relocating. The most complete of these surveys was made at Granada, where the questionnaire submitted produced 2587 replies. Evacuees were asked when they wanted to leave the center to relocate and what their reasons were for hesitancy about resettlement. Only 5.9 per cent were interested in leaving at once or within a few months; 27.1 per cent said they were willing to leave after the end of the war; 33.2 per cent were undecided as to whether they should attempt relocation. The principal reason for hesitation was "uncertainty of public sentiment." Other prevailing reasons were lack of funds against an emergency, lack of information about conditions outside the center, fear of being unable to support dependents, and fear of being unable to find proper living quarters.

There were other, sometimes related, factors contributing to a lag in general relocation. An important if not serious factor was found to be the lack of a clearly defined policy concerning the readmission to the centers of persons who had relocated in the event that through no fault of their own they subsequently found themselves destitute. A very serious factor, and an outgrowth of the segregation plan, was the establishment of a "stop" list for all persons whose answers to the loyalty question during registration had been qualified or changed. The removal of a name from the stop list could be accomplished only on the basis of a painstaking hearing conducted for the purpose of testing the motive for the change and the sincerity of the evacuee. At the close of the year there were still some hundreds of cases on which a final decision as to eligibility for leave clearance had not been reached. Some of the evacuees affected were not only eager to relocate but also were heads of their family groups, with the result that upon their own relocation was contingent the relocation of the entire family. A third factor discouraging relocation during this period was the difficulty of obtaining war plant clearance. A cumbersome and delaying procedure restricted employment in war plants to a very small number of evacuees, and for a time those citizens of Japanese ancestry already working in war plants were removed pending clarification of their status. However, in October it was arranged with the Office of the Provost Marshal General that evacuees employed in war plants prior to October 14 could continue with their employment pending investigation. New applicants were to be processed by the Provost Marshal General's Office before being put to work, but it was agreed that

no Japanese American would be excluded from this work for reasons of ancestry alone, and under the new agreement, aliens as well as citizens were declared eligible for war plant clearance.

A deterrent to relocation of substantial minority of the male evacuees was the action taken by the Navy and State Departments to restrict seamen or fishermen of Japanese ancestry from sailing out of east coast harbors. The new ruling, requiring a passport in advance of sailing, barred a number of evacuees from resuming previous occupations and also beached a number of Japanese Americans who had served in the Merchant Marine for many months, some of whom had been torpedoed in line of duty.

Finally, a block to one other avenue of relocation was provided on June 23 by the Civil Service Commission's requirement of a special investigation by the Commission before it would confirm the appointment of American citizens of Japanese Ancestry to positions in Federal agencies. This additional investigation was one more deterrent to relocation, but by January 177 evacuees out of 197 had been certified as eligible for Civil Service appointments.

Steps Toward the Solution of the Problem

Evacuee Participation

Throughout the half-year period increasing emphasis was placed on evacuee participation in relocation planning. As early as July, several of the centers had Relocation Committees composed of residents. These were strengthened, in some cases by being brought within the authority of the evacuee Community Council or by being given a definite relationship to appointed staff committees on relocation. By the end of the year, two centers had functioning combined evacuee-staff relocation committees, while at all other centers the evacuees had formed their own relocation planning commissions which maintained relations with responsible members of the appointed staff. Issei were well represented in these groups. The committees have taken their responsibilities seriously, assembling the questions which needed to be answered before the greater relocation movement could get under way, and formulating practical recommendations.

In view of the fact that about 43 per cent of the evacuated people were farmers, it was to be expected that they would want opportunities to continue the work they knew best. Having sustained heavy financial losses in the course of the evacuation, they were, for the most part, in need of financial assistance if they were to start farming in a new region; or, those who could scrape together enough money to make the start, needed assurance that they might get loans at need later on. Many felt that the relocation of small groups of families in sparsely settled agricultural areas would encourage families to leave the centers and change the hazards of unfamiliar soil and climate in new farming enterprises. In relation to group farming ventures, it was considered imperative that a responsible number of the group be allowed to go out and

investigate the land before they committed themselves to working it.

Group Relocation

A letter of November 9 addressed to all projects went out from the National Office, indicating the following moves to assist group relocation:

- (1) stimulation of Credit Unions to provide resettlement loans;
- (2) aid to evacuees in securing loans from Federal and private financing agencies;
- (3) exploration of group relocation opportunities by Relocation Officers, with particular regard to agricultural possibilities.
- (4) arrangements for evacuees representing bona-fide groups to make exploratory visits.

Welfare Counseling

The surveys which had been made during the summer showed that greater emphasis needed to be placed on individual and family counseling, if families were to be relocated. It was never uncommon for persons or families planning relocation to consult the Welfare Section about personal problems, but it was at this time realized that to accomplish the relocation of families who were hesitant about relocating, it would be necessary to initiate discussions with them and help them to plan on an individual basis. At the close of the period plans were under way to establish a special counseling unit within the Welfare Section at each center, with a view both to breaking down the rationalizations of reluctant families and to gathering information which would enable WRA to plan realistically the course of its future program.

Leave Assistance Grants

To stimulate family relocation, a change in the schedule of leave assistance grants was made in October. Previously the ceiling per family unit of \$100 had proved an obstacle to the relocation of larger families. The new ruling reduced the grant per individual from \$50 to \$25, but removed the per family ceiling and was thus advantageous to families of five or more persons.

Social Security Agreement

The agreement with the Social Security Board by which relocated evacuees are eligible for service and assistance under the program for aliens and other persons affected by restrictive governmental action became operative in this period in all states except Colorado. While the number of evacuee applicants for service was not large, the designated state agencies cooperating with the Social Security Board provided assistance in a number of cases of emergency, illness, and other contingencies.

National Housing Administration Agreement

During the summer, an agreement was concluded with the National Housing Administration to assist the Relocation Officers in one of their

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

^{1/}
Reported Monthly Departures from Relocation Centers by Type of Departure
from July through December 1943

Month	Total	Seasonal Leave	Short Term Leave	Type of Indefinite Leave			Transfers between Centers	Interned	Death	Other	
				2/ General	Education	Volunteer Service					
Total	22746	7603	6611	7106	219	180	15	532	37	281	162
July	4068	1316	1160	1344	17	72	0	97	6	44	12
August	4850	1372	1471	1684	29	46	11	86	7	54	90
September	4626	1622	1106	1575	124	37	0	89	6	38	29
October	4672	2435	990	1034	29	11	0	112	0	50	11
November	2725	587	1081	862	13	10	3	99	18	42	10
December	1805	271	803	607	7	4	1	49	0	53	10

^{1/}Includes all departures irrespective of age

^{2/}Work Leave (including dependents)

Source: Form WRA-176 summary.

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
RELOCATION PLANNING DIVISION, STATISTICAL SECTION
Washington, D. C.

Reported Admissions to Relocation Centers by Type of Admission
from July through December 1943

Month	Total	Births	Transfers between Centers	Temporary Detention	Internment Camps	Institutions	Type of Leave			
							Seasonal	Short Term	Indefi- nite	Other*
Total	20008	1107	1103	24	366	71	9806	6358	1004	169
July	2225	177	98	8	79	12	652	1054	120	25
August	2932	199	80	1	18	6	1032	1413	165	18
September	2502	189	118	3	11	22	958	1048	147	6
October	2993	186	94	9	55	10	1519	982	117	21
November	6119	199	418	1	101	10	4145	971	201	73
December	3237	157	295	2	102	11	1500	890	254	26

*Other -- original inductions to WRA, etc.

Source: WRA-176

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Absences on Leave from Relocation Centers By Type of Leave
From July 1, 1943 through January 1, 1944 ^{1/}_{2/}

Date	Total	Seasonal	Short Term Leave	Indefinite Leave			
				General ^{3/}	Education	Volunteer	Sel. Service
July 1	15885	6004	553	7926	800	601	1
August 1	17834	6525	579	9248	815	666	1
September 1	20193	6856	550	11241	837	698	11
October 1	22430	7426	536	12789	936	733	10
November 1	24095	7996	505	13891	958	734	11
December 1	21263	4283	559	14702	971	736	12
January 1	20188	2825	433	15228	953	736	13

^{1/}Number who have left centers who have not returned. Includes all persons ir-
respective of age

^{2/}At end of day

^{3/}Work leave (including dependents)

Source: WRA-176

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Net Absences* / on Short Term, Seasonal, and Indefinite Leave by Relocation Center

As of December 31, 1943

Center	Total	Short Term	Seasonal	Indefinite
TOTAL	20188	441	2831	16916
Central Utah	1819	48	199	1572
Colorado River	3163	44	412	2707
Gila River	2020	17	79	1924
Granada	1899	79	288	1532
Heart Mountain	1983	95	347	1541
Jerome	1419	32	36	1351
Manzanar	1235	18	143	1074
Minidoka	2853	56	522	2275
Rohwer	1414	36	58	1320
Tule Lake	2383	16	747	1620

* / Number who have left centers who have not returned

Source: WRA-176

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Population at Relocation Centers
July 1, 1943 through January 1, 1944

Center	Total	1943					1944	
		July 1	August 1	September 1	October 1	November 1	December 1	January 1
Total	645509	96284	94461	92217	89648	88407	91546	92951
Central Utah	49724	7351	7092	6986	6936	6877	7178	7304
Colorado River	100761	15686	15353	14876	14540	13142	13432	13732
Gila River	77232	12357	12214	11902	11683	9619	9730	9727
Granada	44916	6210	6161	5846	6597	6427	6745	6930
Heart Mountain	64404	9309	9186	8936	8509	9131	9547	9786
Jerome	49577	7816	7679	7526	6736	6601 ²	68601	6617
Manzanar	59756	8686	8738	8695	8506	8179	8470	8482
Minidoka	54670	7666	7183	7164	8175	6923	8595	8964
Rohwer	48377	7662	7500	7122	6709	6406	6421	6557
Tule Lake	95732	13483	13286	13096	11198	15047	14770	14852

Source:--WRA-176

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
RELOCATION PLANNING DIVISION, STATISTICAL SECTION
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing From War Relocation Centers
On Seasonal Leave By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State <u>1/</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
: Total <u>2/</u>	:	7/31	8/28	10/2 <u>3/</u>	10/30	11/27	1/13 <u>3/</u>	
Total	7608	1263	1207	2145	2116	566	311	
Pacific	611	107	28	65	187	172	52	
Oregon	243	71	21	31	111	7	2	
California <u>4/</u>	195	0	0	0	72	123	0	
Washington	173	36	7	34	4	42	50	
Mountain	6280	1048	1067	1916	1795	326	128	
Idaho	3030	340	228	899	1326	162	75	
Utah	1291	448	177	420	119	106	21	
Colorado	1053	87	445	248	221	42	10	
Wyoming	564	74	123	253	94	11	9	
Montana	331	99	94	95	31	3	9	
Nevada	6	0	0	0	1	1	4	
Arizona	5	0	0	1	3	1	0	
W.N. Central	332	74	84	31	73	59	11	
Missouri	149	46	38	13	16	34	2	
Kansas	88	27	32	0	6	23	0	
Nebraska	53	0	1	16	28	0	8	
South Dakota	32	0	9	0	23	0	0	
Iowa	10	1	4	2	0	2	1	
East N. Central	331	29	28	84	61	9	120	
Illinois	202	18	23	23	12	9	117	
Michigan	125	9	5	61	47	0	3	
Ohio	4	2	0	0	2	0	0	
West S. Central	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	
Oklahoma	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	
Unknown	52	5	0	47	0	0	0	

1/ Those to which no one departed not included
2/ Includes Dependents
3/ Five Week Period
4/ Under permit issued by Western Defense Command
Source: Special Report Received From Centers

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State 1/	By Four Weeks		Period Ending				
	Total 2/	7/31	8/28	10/2 3/	10/30	11/27	1/1 5/
Total	7715	1414	1569	2086	1056	840	750
Pacific	317	75	55	69	47	29	42
Washington	195	39	31	42	39	19	25
Oregon	96	27	21	25	3	3	17
California	26	9	3	2	5	7	0
Mountain	2160	451	470	577	237	212	213
Utah	763	155	212	201	70	65	60
Colorado	758	170	117	195	98	95	83
Idaho	308	82	86	65	25	15	35
Montana	121	8	15	49	13	18	18
Wyoming	118	27	29	32	17	4	9
Nevada	55	55	9	22	9	6	4
New Mexico	22	3	1	9	2	3	4
Arizona	15	1	1	4	3	6	0
W.N. Central	923	129	162	288	163	97	84
Minnesota	318	38	62	123	45	31	19
Missouri	269	54	48	66	51	20	30
Iowa	163	19	30	43	29	21	21
Nebraska	121	8	15	33	36	18	11
Kansas	38	8	4	16	2	7	1
South Dakota	10	0	1	7	0	0	2
North Dakota	4	2	2	0	0	0	0
E.N. Central	3759	712	760	979	515	434	359
Illinois	1866	347	359	456	265	217	222
Ohio	970	148	199	284	141	132	66
Michigan	752	187	162	182	88	69	64
Wisconsin	115	19	23	41	21	9	2
Indiana	56	11	17	16	0	7	5
W.S. Central	85	18	17	22	12	7	9
Arkansas	33	5	10	8	4	5	1
Texas	31	8	3	10	7	2	1

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State ^{1/}	By Four Weeks			Period Ending			
	Total ^{2/}	7/31	8/28	10/2 ^{3/}	10/30	11/27	1/1 ^{3/}
W.S. Central (Cont'd)							
Oklahoma	20	5	4	4	0	0	7
Louisiana	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
South Atlantic	59	2	20	12	9	8	8
District of Col.	35	1	13	8	7	2	4
Maryland	16	0	5	2	1	5	3
North Carolina	3	0	2	1	0	0	0
Virginia	3	1	0	1	0	1	0
Georgia	2	0	0	0	1	0	1
Middle Atlantic	299	14	52	106	55	41	31
New York	211	12	38	69	39	30	23
Pennsylvania	78	1	14	33	13	11	6
New Jersey	10	1	0	4	3	0	2
New England	61	2	23	13	9	12	2
Massachusetts	45	1	20	7	6	9	2
Connecticut	13	1	3	5	1	3	0
Maine	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
New Hampshire	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Vermont	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
East S. Central	51	11	9	20	9	0	2
Mississippi	26	8	4	7	5	0	2
Tennessee	17	2	1	11	3	0	0
Kentucky	8	1	4	2	1	0	0
Unknown	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

^{1/} Those to which no one departed not included

^{2/} Includes dependents

^{3/} Five weeks period

Source: Speical Report From Centers

War Relocation Authority
Relocation Planning Division Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons Leaving All Centers
On General Indefinite Leave ^{1/}by Dependents
And Workers by Citizenship, Sex and Type of Work
Number and Percentage Distribution By Months
July - December 1943

Month	: Total		: No. of		Number of Workers :								Type Work		: Type Work Reported	
	: Lvs.		: Dep.		:								: Not Reported		:	
	: 1/		: 2/		:								:		:	
	:		:		:								:		:	
	: Total		M		F		M		F		: Total		R.O. ^{3/}		Other	
	: Total		Dom.		Agri.		Other		: Total		Dom.		Agri.		Other	
Total	7143	1817	5326	2452	2010	611	253	2552	1150	1402	2774	786	402	1586		
July	1348	375	973	524	322	94	33	320	177	143	653	181	88	384		
August	1719	477	1242	556	507	130	449	585	270	315	657	204	88	365		
September	1569	434	1135	481	442	149	63	587	270	317	548	158	62	328		
October	1050	269	781	324	310	113	34	361	175	186	420	118	72	230		
November	854	194	660	290	254	254	39	391	147	244	269	77	47	145		
December	603	68	535	277	175	48	35	308	111	197	227	48	45	134		

(Percentage Distribution)

Total	100.0	25.4	100.0	46.0	37.7	11.5	4.8	47.9	21.6	26.3	52.1	14.8	7.5	29.8		
July	100.0	27.8	100.0	53.8	33.1	9.7	3.4	32.9	18.2	14.7	67.1	18.6	9.0	39.5		
August	100.0	27.7	100.0	44.8	40.8	10.5	3.9	47.1	21.7	25.4	52.9	16.4	7.1	29.4		
September	100.0	27.7	100.0	42.4	38.9	19.1	5.6	51.7	23.8	27.9	48.3	13.9	5.5	28.9		
October	100.0	25.6	100.0	41.4	39.7	14.5	4.4	46.2	22.4	23.8	53.8	15.1	9.2	29.5		
November	100.0	22.7	100.0	43.9	38.5	11.7	5.9	59.2	22.3	36.9	40.8	11.7	7.1	22.0		
December	100.0	11.3	100.0	51.8	32.7	9.0	6.5	57.6	20.7	36.9	42.4	9.0	8.4	25.0		

^{1/} Does not include Indefinite Leave for Education or Entry into the Armed Forces.

^{2/} Persons under 16 years of age and all other dependents so specified.

^{3/} Persons leaving centers for Hostels and Relocation Offices without specific employment.

Source: WRA-178

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Evacuees on Indefinite Leave Returning To Centers
By Single Months and Six Month Periods
From Inception of Centers to Date

Year & Month		Cent	Colo	Gila	Gran	HtMt*	Jero	Manz	Mini	Rohw	Tule	Total*
1942	May	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
	June	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	
	July	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	
	Aug.	-	0	0	-	0	-	0	0	-	0	
	Sept.	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	
	Oct.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Nov.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Dec.	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
	6 mo. Total	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
1943	Jan.	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	2	6
	Feb.	2	0	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	1	10
	Mar.	4	0	0	0	6	3	0	1	0	0	14
	Apr.	1	0	1	32	6	0	0	6	3	0	49
	May.	10	5	3	40	19	7	2	9	1	1	97
	June	7	4	2	38	31	2	3	32	2	1	122
	6 mo. Total	24	9	6	113	67	12	6	50	6	5	298
	July	5	13	3	29	34	9	4	17	4	1	119
	Aug.	11	24	2	16	63	19	3	10	12	1	161
	Sept.	15	4	6	16	81	4	2	7	10	0	145
	Oct.	15	6	5	13	38	20	5	3	12	0	117
	Nov.	12	20	10	62	39	15	7	26	11	0	202
	Dec.	16	4	7	41	66	37	10	21	25	0	227
	6 mo. Total	74	71	33	177	321	104	31	84	74	2	971
1944	Jan.	10	10	8	19	13	8	0	14	10	0	
	Feb.											
	Mar.											
	Apr.											
	May											
	June											
	6 mo. Total											

* Letter from Heart Mountain as of 2-19-44 indicates that 316 persons previously reported as indefinite leave admissions were visitors. These figures will be revised.

Source: WRA 177 received in Washington office.

3- 4 -44

War Relocation Authority
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Evacuees Returning to Centers Under "Other"
Leave Category By Single Months and Six Month Periods
From Inception of Centers to Date

Year & Month	Cent.	Colo.	Gila.	Gran.	Ht.Mt.	Jero.	Manz.	Mini.	Rohw.	Tule.	Total
1942 May	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
June	-	0	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	0	1
July	-	0	0	-	-	-	31	-	-	26	57
Aug.	-	0	6	-	0	-	13	0	-	34	53
Sept.	0	0	0	0	1	-	8	19	0	2	30
Oct.	2	0	9	0	7	0	1	2	0	2	23
Nov.	9	0	12	15	11	0	1	69	0	10	127
Dec.	8	4	19	0	36	0	2	91	0	7	167
6 Mo. Total	19	4	46	15	55	0	57	181	0	81	458
1943 Jan.	1	0	1	0	2	3	0	22	0	6	35
Feb.	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	4	1	14
Mar.	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	3	1	7	15
Apr.	1	1	0	1	0	2	4	1	2	100	112
May	4	1	1	0	1	5	1	2	1	3	19
June	11	3	6	1	3	3	1	3	0	2	33
6 Mo. Total	17	7	8	2	6	14	9	38	8	119	228
July	3	1	4	7	1	3	0	4	0	2	25
Aug.	1	5	2	0	1	9	0	0	0	0	18
Sept.	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	6
Oct.	1	4	4	2	1	2	0	4	3	0	21
Nov.	4	0	2	53	0	5	3	4	2	0	73
Dec.	7	0	1	1	0	6	2	4	4	1	26
6 Mo. Total	16	10	13	64	3	27	7	17	9	3	169
1944 Jan.	6	1	2	0	1	4	0	3	2	0	19
Feb.											
Mar.											
Apr.											
May											
June											
6 Mo. Total											

Source: WRA 176

3-4-44

most critical problems. By the terms of this agreement, the Relocation Supervisor of a specific area was to advise the NHA Regional Representative of current and anticipated in-migration trends. In return, the NHA would "assist WRA in determining the acceptability of evacuees for housing in the locality", and also "be prepared to suggest the names of localities where the housing shortage is less serious and where the opportunities for housing evacuees are most promising."

Relocation Campaigns at the Centers

Pre-Segregation Program at Tule Lake

Prior to the mass movement of non-segregants from Tule Lake to other centers and the conversion of Tule Lake to a segregation center, a determined effort was made to encourage as many as possible of the eligible evacuees to avoid the move to another center by means of immediate relocation. As a preliminary step toward the accomplishment of this program, Relocation Officers in the field were asked to consult with all former residents of Tule Lake relocated in their districts concerning the relocation of relatives and friends from that center. In August a small contingent of staff workers, known as a Relocation Team, was detailed from Washington to Tule Lake to conduct meetings and interviews with the non-segregant group. An important feature of this work at Tule Lake was the first showing of a cycle of films entitled "This is America" which was booked and distributed by the Relocation Guidance Committee in Washington. Members of several divisions had participated in the previewing of possible films, the selection being made with two objects in view; (1) to give evacuees a picture of city life, agriculture, education, employment, and other features of communities in the middle west and east; and (2) to give evacuees some insight into living conditions in wartime America. The film cycle consisted of 8 program units, each of about one hour's duration. The immediate result of the promotional work at Tule Lake was the relocation of several hundred people who would otherwise have moved to another center; in addition, it created a definite interest in relocation among others not yet prepared to take the step. In the larger sense, however, this program was most beneficial in pioneering techniques for aiding center personnel with material and staff in their work of stimulating interest in relocation.

Dissemination of Relocation Information at Other Centers

In recognition of the fact that the movement of evacuees out of the center is in a sense dependent upon a steady flow into the centers of accurate information concerning job opportunities and living conditions on the outside, much attention has been given to the adequate dissemination of such information. Two ways of bringing such facts before the residents were stressed during the July to December period. First, listings of job officers and written accounts of the experiences of relocated people were sent regularly to the centers. Personal experiences were sometimes in letter form and sometimes in informal reports;

some were published in periodicals issued by the Area offices. Second, individuals thoroughly conversant with conditions in specific localities were detailed to the centers in order to give interested evacuees personal contact with persons able to answer questions. Relocation Officers visited the centers to supply this information. In November, arrangements were made for an experimental Relocation Team consisting of two Relocation Supervisors, a member of the Washington Relocation staff, and a member of the Washington Reports Division to visit the Rohwer Relocation Center. The team members addressed large general meetings and smaller meetings of specific project groups, and in addition, conducted numerous interviews with individual evacuees who sought further information. The effect of this visit and the reception of Relocation Officers at the centers resulted in plans to continue the practice of sending Relocation Officers to visit the centers and to have the Relocation Team make a tour of all the other centers during the early part of 1944.

SIGNIFICANT FIELD DEVELOPMENTS IN RELOCATION

During the latter half of 1943 the general trend of relocation was toward the Middle West and the East. Although the number of field offices showed only a slight net increase during the period, there was a substantial shift in their location. As offices in the Intermountain Region closed or were consolidated, new offices appeared in Grand Rapids, Indianapolis and Buffalo; and on the Eastern seaboard, the New England states were detached from the New York area and designated as an independent area with headquarters in Boston. The following table shows the increase in relocation during this period in the principal areas:

Number of Evacuees on Indefinite Leave who have reported Arrival or Change of Address by Relocation Areas as of June 30 and January 1,

	<u>June 30, 1943</u>	<u>January 1, 1944</u>
Total Reporting	8431	16,464
Salt Lake City.	2213	3,483
Denver.	1795	2,741
Kansas City.	461	997
Chicago	2613	5,392
Cleveland	960	2,694
Little Rock	160	244
New York	229	770
Boston	*	143

* 29 included in the New York Office report were relocated in the Boston area at this time.

Salt Lake City Area

In this area, WRA curtailed relocation to six counties in northern Utah. This action was in accord with the Authority's policy of discouraging heavy concentration of the evacuated population in any location.

This area had a small Japanese American population prior to Pearl Harbor and received a new contingent during the period of voluntary evacuation from the West Coast. Later, evacuees from the center who had entered the region as seasonal workers tended to change over to indefinite leave and settle permanently.

Evacuee farmers have relocated in fairly large numbers to eastern Oregon and Western Idaho, where they began farming on a share-cropping or lease-hold basis. Spokane, in eastern Washington, attracted a number of the evacuees, though until late in the year when certain military installations were closed, a critical housing situation discouraged many of the evacuees from attempting to re-establish their lives in that city. In Montana, a considerable number of seasonal workers were employed during this period on railroads. The year-end total showed 7669 seasonal workers in the area during the six-month period, and approximately 3500 evacuees in residence on indefinite leave.

Denver Area

Between 2500 and 3000 evacuees found seasonal work in this area during the summer and fall of 1943, most of whom returned to the centers at the expiration of their contracts. However, 324 seasonal workers converted their leave to indefinite, raising the total of evacuees resident within the area to 2806 on December 31. An increasing number of families moved out of the laborer group into the independent farmer class, by way of share-cropping agreements, lease or purchase of land. Despite their lack of experience in this section of the country, higher labor costs, and difficult marketing conditions, very few of the farm group have given up and returned to the center. Those who were obliged to return to the centers were caught in emergency situations for which public assistance would have been available in other states. Colorado was the only state in which the Social Security agreement was not operative during this period. There was indication at the year's end that the agreement would be signed early in the new year.

After July further relocation to six counties bordering on Denver was prohibited by WRA except in the case of members of a family already settled within the area. There was evidence that these localities were nearing the saturation point as far as evacuee settlers were concerned. Emphasis was placed on improving the public relations situation.

Kansas City Area

The number of evacuees in this area about doubled during the latter half of 1943, with the newcomers distributed impartially among the St. Louis, Omaha, Detroit, and Kansas City districts. On the whole, community sentiment and press relations have been unusually favorable in these communities. As the year advanced, an increasing number of professional, technical and skilled workers were finding positions in this area.

Chicago Area

This area, too, reflected a change in the types of employment offered to evacuees, with an increasing number of employers seeking evacuee help in the more skilled fields. During the six-month period the number of evacuees coming into the city of Chicago rose from 1,466 to 3,244, and it required a major effort on the part of the WRA office and cooperating agencies to locate sufficient housing to meet the influx. The number of available jobs continued to be in excess of willing takers, and qualified people in the centers were encouraged to relocate to Chicago without a specific job in mind. One group of 50 persons went to the city on that basis and the majority of them were satisfactorily placed. Because of the slowness of special war industry clearance, the Chicago Area Office, through negotiation with the Sixth Service Command, was able to clear individual plants or buildings in large defense operations otherwise restricted, for evacuee employment. Placements were made in the federal agencies including the Home Owners Loan Corporation, Weather Bureau, and Indian Service.

On the whole, metropolitan relocation in the area was more successful than agricultural. There are three probable reasons for this fact: (1) Midwestern farming is quite different from the West Coast farming to which the evacuee group was accustomed; (2) evacuees were urged to postpone buying or leasing land until after they had spent a year as farm laborers or share-croppers in order to familiarize themselves with farming techniques in this region; (3) young nisei interested in urban employment were more numerous than agricultural workers in this relocation group.

Cleveland Area

Approximately 2000 evacuees, including seasonal workers, entered this area during the latter half of 1943. In-migration started slowly, reached its peak in September and October, and then dropped off as cold weather came on and the majority of seasonal workers returned to the centers. Permanent job opportunities in non-essential lines expanded considerably during this period. In Cleveland, furniture and cabinet-making industries, sign-painting, and beauty shops were employing an increasing number of evacuees. Detroit reported a tendency toward semi-skilled and highly skilled positions as opposed to domestic and unskilled work. More and more applicants were seeking jobs with "learning" possibilities. Housing facilities continued to be the major problem for relocating evacuees in most of the cities of this area, though living quarters were more readily available in Buffalo and Cincinnati than in other cities. Public reactions toward the relocation program and the evacuees have been favorable.

New York Area

The Number of evacuees in New York City increased from 75 to 450 during the last six months of the year. Although war plant clearance here as elsewhere proved to be a long and discouraging process,

the relocating people were able to find good jobs, and those with special talents found a market for them. Evacuees have found no difficulty in securing employment as clerks, stenographers, seamstresses, dressmakers, beauticians, nursery workers and gardeners, domestics, laboratory technicians, hotel and restaurant workers, laundry workers, nurse's aides and unskilled hospital workers. Placement was more of a problem for business owners or managers, those experienced in the silk industry or foreign trade, and for such professionals as architects and engineers.

Community sentiment was very favorable throughout this period, and the local office of WRA enjoyed good relations with various A.F. of L. and C.I.O. Unions, public and private social agencies, and other cooperating groups. Although the bulk of the relocated people at first settled around Columbia University on the West side, later arrivals tended to scatter through other parts of the city. In any event, the few hundred evacuees made little impression in a city of New York's magnitude. On a smaller scale relocation in Philadelphia got underway during this period, with community sentiment favorable and a variety of jobs available to the evacuees.

Boston Area

The number of evacuees in the Boston area rose from 33 to 167 during this period, a third or more of the total number being students and many of the others young nisei who worked during the day and continued their studies at night. Although wage scales were on the whole lower than in other parts of the country, there was compensation for this situation in the lower cost of living and in the fact that employers, to a greater extent than was true in many areas, made it clear that the positions they offered were permanent and not merely for the duration. The greater number of opportunities were in the field of personal and domestic service.

Planning for Community Adjustment

Prior to this period, the main emphasis of the program in the field was upon creating favorable community sentiment and locating specific job offers. This work was done so effectively that job offers piled up more rapidly than they could be filled. Job descriptions in volume tended to bewilder the center applicants. Those who accepted employment on the basis of these job listings and without personal contact with employers often found themselves unsatisfactorily placed, and there was a tendency to change jobs as soon as a better opening offered itself to the relocated person. On August 5, Project Directors were sent a memorandum directing them to encourage relocation on the basis of a community invitation in localities where evacuee workers were wanted. Hostels operated by church groups in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati and Des Moines offered living accommodations at a reasonable figure to evacuees while they looked for employment and by the fact of their existence offered the evacuees

assurance that the community was prepared to receive them.

On November 27, a memorandum from Washington instructed Relocation Supervisors and Officers to curtail the job listings sent out to the centers, as the volume of these was more bewildering than enlightening. It was recognized that the presentation of informational material about general work opportunities, living costs and conditions, and the experiences of evacuees who had already made an adjustment to life and work in a given area was a more effective approach to the problem of relocating the right evacuee in the right location. The creation of a Reports position in each area Relocation Office and the collaboration of the Reports Division in Washington contributed to the success of this phase of the program.

From the beginning of the Relocation program, the Committee for Japanese American Resettlement and other church groups had been active in creating a local interest in the WRA program and in many communities provided the Relocation Officer with local sponsors to whom he could turn for advice and assistance. As the program broadened and more persons relocated, it became evident that a broader cross-section of community cooperation was essential, not only to assist WRA in matters of employment, housing and public relations, but also to provide in the community a solid foundation for the acceptance of evacuees on the same basis as other residents. There was need to implement at the local level national agreements worked out by WRA and other public or private agencies and to co-ordinate the efforts of other groups so that the resources they possessed might be available for the use of evacuees. At the close of the period, in recognition of this need for more far-reaching planning in community adjustment, persons on the staff of two area offices were specializing in the organization of community resources for housing, welfare, education, and health.

There are two main objectives in this painstaking work with local committees and agencies: (1) to ease the transition of the evacuee from the isolated and socially artificial centers to life in a normal community by meeting the resettler with an understanding of his total situation; (2) to encourage relocated evacuees in assisting their family members and friends to relocate. The youth and inexperience of these very young people who have gone out from the centers, generally speaking alone, to adjust to life and work in a completely strange environment, have pointed more and more to the need of having their families join them. During the fall months, there was evidence that young people in Chicago, New York, and certain other localities were beginning to bring their parents out of the centers. Where this has happened, the infusion of the older generation together with the original pre-war resident American Japanese population, was making for a more stable and better integrated social situation among the newcomers.

ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION FOR RELOCATION

A significant development during the six-month period was the

growing conviction that the relocation program is a cooperative one to which all divisions of the Authority have a contribution to make. Originally the handling of the relocation program, both in the National Office and at the centers, was the function of the Employment Division. It was not long before the conflict between project employment and relocation was apparent. As relocation progressed, the dual obligation of this division to maintain center operations and at the same time to urge all the efficient workers to leave center employment for relocation kept the division in a state of perpetual dilemma. It was understood that project employment must be subordinated to relocation. The fact remained that the Employment Division was being called upon to build up a community with one hand and tear it down with the other. Just before the July to January period began, a Relocation Committee consisting of representatives of the Employment, Reports and Community Management Divisions was set up in the Washington office and at the centers. The work of these committees in some measure relieved the Employment Division, but there was increasing awareness that relocation interests could best be served by a special division created to devote all its energies to relocation. On the basis of discussions held in the Washington Office and of suggestions received from the field, the Relocation Division was organized in November of 1943. With two exceptions this new division was assigned all functions previously performed by the Employment Division: at the project level, project employment was made a function of Personnel Management, and in the National Office, Leave Clearance was made the responsibility of the Administrative Management Division. The new division also took over the functions of the Relocation Assistance Division except those involving evacuee property which were assigned to the Administrative Management Division.

By the close of the year, the principal policy points of the new division had been outlined, and its major Manual statement of policy aims was being prepared. The Relocation Division was reviewing with other divisions their responsibility for the success of the relocation program, and was taking steps to achieve a closer working relationship with other federal agencies and private organizations at the national level. For 1944, it contemplated an increased emphasis on in-service training and field and project visits. It was planning to re-evaluate seasonal leave procedures and provide further assurances where possible in the program of indefinite leave. It was staffing relocation divisions at the centers, expanding the field program to give added emphasis to adjustment of evacuees in communities of relocation, and was giving closer attention to the exploration of suitable opportunities for family and group relocation.

STUDENT RELOCATION

According to information compiled by the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, the total number of Japanese American students enrolled in colleges rose from 1555 on July 5 to 2263 on December 31, 1943. The Council estimated that during this period 636 evacuees left relocation centers to attend institutions of

higher learning. The group included recent graduates of the center high schools at well as students whose higher education had been interrupted by the evacuation. Included in the number were approximately 200 girls who began nurse's training, the majority of whom enlisted under the U.S. Cadet Nurse Corps program. Beginning in November, Relocation Officers supplemented the efforts of the Council by exploring opportunities in their districts for evacuees to study nursing in approved hospitals and nursing schools.

Until the middle of October the Army and Navy refused admission of students of Japanese ancestry to educational institutions carrying on classified activities for the armed services. However, on October 14, a directive issued by the War Department placed responsibility with the Provost Marshal General for security measures at educational institutions important to the war effort. The directive stated that before any person of Japanese ancestry would be allowed to attend or be employed by such an institution he should undergo an investigation similar to that required for work in war plants, and that he must secure approval from the Office of the Provost Marshal General in order to qualify. Those persons already employed or in attendance at these institutions were permitted to remain pending their investigation. While these additional investigations delay the date of admittance considerably, no student of Japanese ancestry will be barred for reasons of race alone.

Responsibility was placed upon each such institution for compliance with the terms of the directive. In order that an undue burden should not be placed on the educational institutions, arrangements were worked out to permit the assumption by the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council of considerable responsibility for securing acceptance of students and obtaining the forms necessary for Provost Marshal General's Office clearance. Although the Council, in its September meeting, expressed the feeling that it had fulfilled its purpose and therefore should terminate its activities, in the light of this added function and the fact that the rate of student relocation had not decreased by the close of the year, it seemed probable that the Council would continue in business throughout 1944.

LEAVE CLEARANCE

During the latter half of 1943 substantial progress was made toward completing action on leave clearance for citizen evacuees. From the standpoint of relocation, final action on the large majority of leave clearance cases has been of fundamental importance since, despite the ruling which permitted Project Directors to issue indefinite leave prior to the issuance of leave clearance in certain prescribed cases, many evacuees have been reluctant to leave the center until notice of leave clearance has been received.

Notice of leave clearance was issued on one of three types of forms, each with special conditions attached. Form WRA 258 was drawn up to authorize indefinite leave but does not permit direct relocation

to the Eastern Defense Command or the coastal area of the Southern states; nor does it authorize employment in war plants. This type of indefinite leave was issued to persons who had not been passed on by the Japanese American Joint Board. The second type, issued on Form WRA 258-A was intended for persons whose cases have been reviewed by the Joint Board and whom the Joint Board has recommended for indefinite leave. Such recommendation constitutes Eastern Defense Command clearance, but does not clear for employment in war industries. The statement to this effect appearing on each Joint Board "Summary and Report" form returned to WRA, and intended only to convey that no special investigation to determine the individual's eligibility for war plant employment had been made was unfortunately misinterpreted on many occasions by such agencies as the Civil Service Commission and the Coast Guard to mean that the individual had been investigated and found ineligible. The third type of leave clearance, issued on Form WRA 258-B was designed for persons specially considered and investigated by the Joint Board, with a favorable recommendation, for work in war plants. Such persons of course have the right to relocate anywhere outside of the prescribed West Coast military areas. Only 491 clearances of the last type were issued, and for practical reasons the procedure was abandoned before the end of the year, leaving War plant clearance to the Provost Marshal General's Office.

The table shown below indicates the number of leave clearance grants issued to all projects since Forms 258, 258-A and 258-B were initiated. The majority of such clearances were issued after July 1, 1943.

Notifications to Projects on Leave Clearance
as of December 31, 1943

<u>Project</u>	<u>WRA 258</u>	<u>WRA 258-A</u>	<u>WRA 258-B</u>
Central Utah	490	1,688	45
Colorado River	332	4,363	78
Gila River	272	2,767	53
Granada	291	1,833	76
Heart Mountain	373	2,610	37
Jerome	646	1,746	30
Manzanar	220	1,389	29
Minidoka	311	2,353	44
Rohwer	491	1,930	54
Tule Lake	1,469	2,385	45
TOTALS	<u>4,895</u>	<u>23,064</u>	<u>491</u>

The Japanese American Joint Board

The Japanese-American Joint Board, established by a War Department directive dated January 20, 1943, is composed of one representative each from WRA, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the Provost Marshal General's Office. The Board was created specifically to assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese

ancestry under the jurisdiction of WRA, to determine eligibility of applicants for war plant employment, and to assist in the selection of volunteers for the Army. Early in the year the Joint Board decided to consider the cases of all evacuee American citizens 17 years of age and over and to make recommendations to WRA on the granting of indefinite leave.

Recommendations of the Joint Board have not, according to the terms of the agreement, been binding on WRA. However, WRA has been guided by these recommendations to the extent of making further investigations in all cases where the Joint Board recommended denial of indefinite leave; and WRA agreed not to issue indefinite leave for direct relocation within the Eastern Defense Command to any individual whose case the Joint Board disapproved. Prior to December 14, 1943, WRA did not issue indefinite leave for direct entrance to the Eastern Defense Command for private employment unless notification of Joint Board clearance had been received. The length of time consumed by Joint Board clearance had in many instances cost eligible citizens desirable job offers in the eastern states. After the mass movement to Tule Lake of those evacuees whose loyalty does not lie with America, WRA withdrew from the agreement with the War Department by which all evacuee citizens would not be issued indefinite leave directly to eastern states until notice of Joint Board approval was received. Since December 14, citizens who have met all WRA loyalty tests have been allowed to relocate to the eastern states while Joint Board action is pending.

Joint Board Actions through December 31, 1943

Approved for EDC, but not investigated for War Plant Employment.....	21,167
Approved for EDC and War Plant Employment.....	491
Approved for EDC but referred to WDC.....	2,485
Disapproved.....	11,728
Citizenship lost by marriage (no action).....	478
No action (mental cases, etc.).....	11

TOTAL 36,360

Total number of cases referred by WRA.....	37,425
Cases pending at Joint Board.....	1,065

* The cases represented by this total either have, or eventually will, appear in other totals of approvals or disapprovals. While these 2,485 individuals have EDC clearance, some will be disapproved upon receipt of the WDC check.

Project Investigations

As a result of Joint Board actions and adverse intelligence information on specific individuals it was necessary to refer 11,652 cases back to the projects for further investigation during the latter half of 1943. The purpose of such investigation has been to develop by an individ-

ual hearing at the center such factual information concerning the evacuee's attitude and loyalty as should resolve to a reasonable degree any questionable factors regarding the issuance of leave clearance or the denial of leave clearance. Leave clearance is never denied except on the basis of an individual hearing at the center, and it can be denied only by the Director of WRA. Persons denied leave clearance are transferred to Tule Lake. Those whose records appear satisfactory at the individual hearing become eligible for indefinite leave.

WRA Procedures for Determining Loyalty

The process of determining loyalties by administrative procedures has been unique in American history; no other agency of the United States Government has ever been confronted with a problem of this nature. In order to establish a procedure which would operate uniformly, it was necessary to promulgate appropriate administrative instructions to the relocation centers and field offices. The Project Directors established hearing boards, and in September, 1943, the Director set up the Review Committee in Washington with the Head of the Leave Section as Chairman. The function of this committee is to review objectively the project hearings and to make independent recommendations for or against leave clearance to the Director of WRA. As of December 31, there were 18 key staff members recruited from various divisions of the Authority who were serving in either full-time or part-time capacities.

Since July 1, 1943, preparation of transmittal letters and the assembling of material essential for the project hearings have engaged much of the time of the Leave Section. The Joint Board returned 11,652 cases upon which its action was unfavorable during the latter half of the year. The docket enclosed with letter of transmittal for each of these cases sent back to the projects for hearings consisted of the evacuee's original questionnaire, a summary of any pertinent intelligence information, copies of reference letters or any other material which had bearing on the case, and specific comments listing factors requiring special attention. Until a hearing is held and leave clearance has been approved by the National Director, the evacuee's name is placed on a stop-list and he may not be granted leave by the Project Director.

Security Records

In its many months of association with the evacuee population, WRA has accumulated a large amount of information about all evacuees 17 years of age or older. The Leave Section files contain information on such topics as education, previous employment records, relatives in Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language, investments in Japan, organizational and religious affiliations, and special aptitudes and hobbies. Reference letters are enlightening as to the evacuee's pre-evacuation history and his social and economic environment. Intelligence reports disclose contributions made to pro-Japanese organizations or affiliation with Japanese organizations considered inimical to the interests of the United States. Reports containing information on membership in Japanese

organizations have posed a difficult problem. There have been many and varied types of Japanese and Japanese-American organizations on the West Coast, many of which were completely innocuous. No equitable determination could be made in a particular case without very careful consideration being given to both the composition and the objectives of the organizations. This has been done by the Leave Section in Washington before a case involving an intelligence report has been returned to the project for a further investigation. After the hearing at the center, the case is returned with a transcript or summary of the hearing together with the Project Director's recommendation and any additional information or exhibits bearing on the case. The docket is then prepared for the Review Committee by the Leave Section.

The files of the Leave Section contained at the close of 1943 82,000 individual evacuee files. These files are used continuously for administrative purposes.

Progress of Review Committee Action.


The table below shows the number of cases reviewed by the Review Committee through December 31, 1943. Cases returned to the project for further information, or because the project hearing was considered inadequate, will be reviewed again when the essential information is returned with the docket.


Project	Hearings Received	Leave Clearance Approved	Leave Clearance Denied	Returned to Project	Total Reviewed
Central Utah	646	304	2	21	327
Colorado River	927	225	18	12	255
Gila River	439	232	25	8	265
Granada	409	203	12	26	241
Heart Mountain	584	278	20	29	327
Jerome	702	407	47	15	469
Manzanar	1,062	534	85	26	645
Minidoka	474	222	12	16	250
Rohwer	690	231	67	21	319
Tule Lake*	4	4	--	--	4
TOTAL	5,937	2,640	288	174	3,102


* Leave clearances from Tule Lake approved prior to segregation movement.

Miscellaneous Statistics


As of December 31, 1943 the Washington Office had issued a total of 1138 student leaves involving attendance at 215 different schools; 109 leaves had been granted after July 1. The FBI at the close of the year had completed and returned a total of 77,037 record checks since it began checking records for WRA, while 2,101 cases were pending at FBI. During the half-year period 1,000 persons had converted seasonal to indefinite leave.







WASHINGTON OFFICE



PERSONNEL PROGRAM

In the latter half of the year the Personnel Management Section of WRA underwent organizational changes to allow for an expansion of its functions and particularly for its assumption of responsibility for evacuee employment within the centers.

Until shortly before the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, the Personnel Management Section of WRA held final responsibility for the classification of field positions. Executive Order 9330, dated April 16, 1943, and a Memorandum of Understanding between WRA and the United States Civil Service Commission, dated June 6, 1943, transferred this responsibility to the Field Section of the Civil Service Commission. The terms of the agreement prescribed that descriptions of field positions should be submitted by WRA to the Civil Service Commission for advisory allocation. By the first of July, the majority of these descriptions for Relocation Center positions had been submitted, and the remainder were submitted by the end of August. At the close of the semi-annual period the majority of these positions had not yet been allocated by the Civil Service Commission.

Effective July 1, all relocation centers were reorganized to conform to a standard organization established for all centers according to the chart of May 13, 1943. All relocation center employees were rejournalized into the new standard positions conforming to this chart. In November the chart was revised to include changes in organizational relationships which had developed since July.

On July 3, 1943, the Personnel Operations Unit was established in the Personnel Management Section. Working with other units of the section, this unit was responsible for initiating or reviewing and coordinating all personnel procedures for Washington and the field, for directing the application of these procedures and their installation in the field, and for interpreting laws, rules, regulations and personnel policies as stated in procedures issued. It was made responsible for the processing of personnel actions in Washington and for the maintenance of the system of appointing employees under delegated authority in the field. A further function of the new unit was the compilation and maintenance in the Washington Office of all personnel records together with the proper installation of necessary personnel records in the field.

Progress of the Personnel Management Program

Major Objectives

The objectives of the Personnel Management Program for the half-year period were clearly defined. The following accomplishments were anticipated: (1) establishment of a sound promotional policy; (2) establishment of an effective standard pattern of organization for the operation of all centers; (3) development of improved personnel proce-

dures; (4) inauguration of an induction, orientation and in-service training program; (5) establishment of training programs in staff organization, utilization and management, work planning and supervision in relation to the operation of centers, relocation offices and the Washington Office; (6) selection and placement of personnel management staff at both national and center levels so that a more thorough job of recruitment, induction, promotion, employee relations and employee service could be done; (7) establishment of an employee relations and welfare program; (8) standardization of the above functions by release of handbook instructions, administrative notices, correspondence and field visits.

Accomplishment

The degree to which these aims and objectives were achieved during the half-year period was on the whole encouraging. A standardized promotional policy adopted September 17 and providing for the posting of all vacancies except those occurring in the very lowest and highest brackets and positions of a strictly temporary nature operated successfully. By the end of the year a standardized organization had been effected in all divisions at the centers except in the Operations Division. In Operations the frequency of deviations pointed to the need of a revision of the plan so that it would fit the needs of this division, and a survey was planned for the purpose of making such revision. Problems of maintaining employment standards, protection of the rights of workers, both evacuee and appointed, maintenance of a constant flow of trained workers to fill the vacancies that occurred through relocation, and encouragement of efficient work habits and worker morale were being worked out through experience gained by center and Washington staffs.

By the close of the period there was a noticeable improvement in understanding procedures, in processing of personnel actions and in accuracy of reports submitted by those centers visited. Additional help had been furnished to all centers in the form of a personnel handbook which brought up to date all personnel procedures previously issued and covered other topics, such as disciplinary and unsatisfactory service cases, and placement and termination interview procedures. Definite progress had been made, too, in the preparation of induction and orientation procedures.

In the Washington office, employee services were extended through increased financial assistance, and additional services on housing, transportation, education and recreation. Plans were shaping to give assistance to the centers in providing appointed personnel with adequate recreational facilities. While much had been done to improve such facilities for the evacuee residents, little had been done at most centers to provide for the leisure time of appointed staff members, most of whom have been as unaccustomed as the evacuees to the bleakness and isolation of center life.

EVACUEE EMPLOYMENT AT THE CENTERS

December 31, 1943

Center	Population	Number Employed and paid by WRA	Per Cent of Total Population Employed
Central Utah	7,297	2,880	39 %
Colorado River	13,734	5,953	43 %
Gila River	9,724	4,068	42 %
Granada	6,930	2,779	40 %
Heart Mountain	9,781	3,343	34 %
Jerome	6,620	2,663	40 %
Manzanar	8,481	3,327	39 %
Minidoka	8,959	3,538	39 %
Rohwer	6,559	3,135	48 %
Tule Lake	14,852	3,047	21 %*
TOTALS	92,937	34,733	37.3 %

* Sub-normal employment due to November incident.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR

The Solicitor's Office during the latter half of 1943, an in previous periods, dealt in one way or another with practically all problems handled by the WRA as a Federal agency. This has been true of problems considered not only at the Washington office, but also at the Principal Attorney's office in San Francisco and at the ten Project Attorneys' offices. This department of WRA performs what is essentially a service function, operating not for the furtherance of any specialized program or separable group of objectives, but rather as an aid to all the divisions and sections of the Authority. In fulfilling its obligations, the Office of the Solicitor has kept abreast of, and had a part in, all new developments in policy, program and procedure within the agency, and it has aided in the solution of disputes or controversies with which the agency has been concerned.

Special Assignments

Administrative Manual

The reissuance of all Administrative Instructions and related material in the form of an Administrative Manual with Handbooks dealing with specialized topics was accomplished during this period. Each section and division of the Authority was called upon to analyze and rewrite such portions of the Administrative Instructions as related to its work, bringing them up to date in terms of both policy and procedure.

Many portions of the Instructions had to be extensively rewritten, and in several instances this rewriting was done in the Solicitor's Office. In all cases, for the purposes of assuring uniformity and compliance with legal requirements, the Solicitor's Office reviewed the revised material before its authoritative issue.

Segregation

Early in the period, to facilitate the execution of the segregation program, an extensive "Manual of Evacuee Transfer Operations" was issued. This Manual included not only detailed provisions for the physical features of the transfer of segregants to Tule Lake, but also full descriptions of the tests to be employed in determining loyalty and the procedures to be used in interviewing evacuees and administratively determining which of them were to be segregated. Much of the original drafting of this Manual was done in the Solicitor's Office and the entire Manual was carefully reviewed by the legal staff. Throughout the entire segregation program the Solicitor's Office and its members at the center participated in the administrative processes whereby the persons to be segregated were designated.

Leave Clearance Hearings

In close relation to the segregation program, a complete review and overhauling of the leave clearance procedures were undertaken. After obtaining suggestions and valuable material from other interested private and Federal agencies, the Solicitor's Office made a complete analysis of the questioning employed in leave clearance hearings and prepared new instructions for members of the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards at the centers. This analysis was carried out partly in connection with the work of the Washington Office in reviewing leave clearance dockets sent in by the projects. The Solicitor's Office had reviewed a large number of these dockets and the Solicitor has passed on all cases involving denial of leave clearance. Ideas and information gained from this review of dockets have been organized and transmitted to the project directors for use by the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards at the projects.

Appeals Board for Segregants

The Solicitor's Office was instrumental in setting up an Appeals Board for handling cases in which persons denied leave clearance and transferred to the segregation center might feel that justice had miscarried. A panel of members for the Appeals Board, consisting of prominent citizens not otherwise connected with WRA, has been set up, and hearings before the Board will take place as soon as a sufficient number of appeals have been filed.

Repatriation

The Solicitor's Office assisted other Divisions of WRA and other agencies of the Federal Government in carrying out the exchange of nationals with Japan which took place through the sailing of the Gripsholm. During the half year numerous matters connected with repatriation and the

rights of repatriates, disposition of property, arrangements for shipment of property, liaison with the Alien Property Custodian, and arrangements for attending to the personal affairs of repatriates were handled by the staff of the Solicitor's Office.

Evacuee Property and Legal Problems

During the half-year, an analysis was made of the Authority's effectiveness in handling personal and real property owned by center residents and located within the evacuated areas on the West Coast. This study was to culminate in a joint meeting of the staffs of the Evacuee Property Office and the Solicitor's Office to be held early in the new year, at which meeting a thorough discussion of the work of both offices and of methods whereby the handling of evacuee property matters could be improved was to be undertaken. Also listed for discussion at this meeting were the efficiency of the attorney referral system and possibilities for its improvement. The system, initiated earlier, but carried into active operation during the latter half of 1943, made available to center residents who had need of such assistance the services of competent lawyers throughout the evacuated area and on the basis of a reasonable fee scale agreed to in advance.

Investigations of WRA

The Solicitor's Office was called upon frequently during this period to assist in the preparation of material for presentation by the Director of WRA to Congressional Committees and other official groups that were moved to investigate the past performance or future activities of the Authority.

Contacts with Other Federal Agencies.

Throughout the period the Solicitor's Office maintained its customary contacts with the major departments of the Federal Government, with emphasis upon the Justice, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments. Particularly close relations were maintained with the Alien Enemy Control Unit and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Provost Marshal General's Office in the War Department, the Foreign Funds Control Unit of the Treasury Department and other specialized sections and divisions whose work has particular bearing upon that of WRA.

Solicitor's Opinions

During the latter half of 1943, eight new additions were made to the series of formal opinions, dealing with matters of major legal significance in the War Relocation Authority:

<u>Opinion No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>
71	Establishment of cemeteries at the relocation centers; interment laws of the States in which relocation centers are located.
72	Vital statistics for relocation centers.
73	Propriety of inserting in contracts for the rental of equipment a provision making the Government responsible for loss or damage.
74	Bonding WRA employees who handle property belonging to evacuees.
75	Availability of certain funds transferred to the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, for expenditure during the current fiscal year.
76	Title and possessory instruments on which are based the War Relocation Authority's rights of possession to the various relocation centers.
77	Probate of evacuees' estates.
78	Liability of cooperatives at the centers for income tax on unclaimed patronage refunds which are donated to be used for community purposes; or which are used for the cooperatives' educational programs.

Project and Field Offices

Each Project Attorney's office continued to perform on a smaller scale such services for the Project Director and Administrative staff at the center as the Solicitor's Office performs in the National Office. At one or two of the centers where Evacuee Property Officers were not appointed until late in the year, the Project Attorney added to his own functions those of the evacuee property officer. Wherever Evacuee Property Officers were functioning, close collaboration has been maintained between the Evacuee Property Officers and the Project Attorneys. Project Attorneys have continued to assist evacuee Community Councils and Judicial Commissions in performing their governmental functions, particularly by giving advice concerning the drafting of proposed enactments and their validity, procedures to be followed in judicial hearings, and similar matters. For the business enterprises corporations and trusts functioning at the centers, the Project Attorneys do such work as would be done by an attorney retained by any large private business corporation. At most centers the Project Attorneys have served as chairman of the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards, in which capacity they have assisted in conducting hundreds of hearings, written summaries of the evidence and conclusions arising from these hearings, and advised Project Directors as to appropriate action on them.

The San Francisco Property Attorney's Office has worked on hundreds of cases covering every sort of legal problem that is likely to arise out of private property ownership when owner and management are of necessity separated.

Relationships between Offices

Close relationships and constant communication between the Washington Office, the San Francisco Office and the ten Project Attorneys' offices have been maintained by a weekly interchange of reports. In addition plans call for a visit of each Project Attorney to the Washington Office once each year, while members of the Washington staff have made a practice of visiting the centers, either to fill in for absent Project Attorneys or to advise them concerning their current problems. In the half-year period, collaboration between the different branches of the Solicitor's Office was furthered by a conference at Denver attended by all Project Attorneys, the Principal Attorney from the San Francisco Office and the principal members of the Washington staff.

Personnel

The closeness of relations between offices has been helpful in allowing smooth operation to continue in a period when sudden vacancies both at headquarters and in the field necessitated considerable shifting of personnel. An Assistant Solicitor in the Washington Office went into the United States Army; another Washington staff member from this office became an officer in the Navy; a second Assistant Solicitor resigned to go to another Federal post; and the Project Attorney at Manzanar resigned to become an officer in the United States Navy.

At the projects most of the evacuee lawyers assigned to the Project Attorneys' offices have been lost through relocation, as have almost all evacuee secretaries originally assigned to these offices. At most centers, non-lawyer assistants having experience in taxation matters, insurance or other fields of business have been employed to assist the Project Attorneys in advising the evacuees on their personal and property problems. New evacuee secretaries are being trained to replace those who have relocated.

Status of Litigation Affecting WRA

As of July 1, the conviction entered in the criminal prosecution against Fred T. Korematsu, for violation of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after being remanded thereto by the United States Supreme Court. During the period covered by the present report the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, the majority of the Court concluding that the reasons which were

given for the decision in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, were applicable in the Korematsu case also. This, in effect, was a decision that the evacuation order was adequately sustained by the same reasons which sustained the curfew restrictions which alone were passed upon in the Hirabayashi case. One of the Judges in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Denman, while concurring with the view that the evacuation order was valid, disagreed with the conclusion of his colleagues that the issues had already been in effect disposed of by the Supreme Court in the curfew case. At the close of the year a petition for the writ of certiorari, addressed to the United States Supreme Court, was being prepared in the Korematsu case.

A second case with interesting bearing on the WRA is the Endo case. At the beginning of the period, Federal Court in California had denied a writ of habeas corpus in the case of Mitsuye Endo, who early in the evacuation sought to obtain release from detention at the Tule Lake Relocation Center. Within this period appeal from the denial was filed by Miss Endo and at the close of the period was pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Miss Endo's case has been complicated by the facts that leave clearance has been granted to her and that she has been transferred from Tule Lake to the Central Utah Relocation Center. In connection with this case, the Solicitor's Office prepared a thorough Memorandum on the Validity of Detention under the Leave Regulations of the War Relocation Authority and has made copies of it available to the Department of Justice and others interested in the Authority's program.

In Arizona, the General Assembly's statute restricting business dealings in which evacuees residing in that State might engage, was tested by a case brought before the Supreme Court of Arizona toward the close of the year. In this case of the State of Arizona, by Joe Conway, Attorney General v. Tsutomu Ikeda, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Johnson Pearce Commercial Company, Defendant, the Supreme Court held that the statute (H.B. 187) was invalid.

SUPPLY PROGRAM

In this semi-annual period, the principles of the Supply program which had previously been variously interpreted, were uniformly understood and became firmly entrenched. The goal in this program has been two-fold: to determine requirements well in advance of needs so that purchase of materials can be accomplished with allowance made for delayed deliveries, shortages and price variation and to avoid the accumulation of surpluses. Since the Authority is a temporary agency, it has been a matter of policy to stock no more than 3 months' supply of any item except fuel. All requisitions for food have been placed in advance of needs with the Quartermaster Depots and Market Centers, while coal and fuel oil requirements have been handled by the Washington Office on a yearly basis. Field Procurement Offices located in Chicago, Little Rock, Denver and Los Angeles were created to aid in carrying out the work of supplying the centers and have proved a valuable asset. Economic property utilization has been accomplished by the establishment of a

well defined salvage program and by education in the proper use and conservation of material and equipment.

Mess Operations

A continual problem confronting Mess Operations at the centers has been the determination of the maximum inventory to be maintained at each center. The source of supply has been adequate but the manner of transportation and time element have presented difficult problems since most centers are not close to or adjacent to main line railroads. It has been found expedient to place requisitions with the Quartermaster Depots sixty days in advance of delivery dates. Originally it was determined that centers should maintain a 90-day inventory of staple foods. In the early period of center-occupation, with demands on Quartermaster Depots changing and transportation not fully adjusted to the demands, staple requisitions were frequently delayed. Centers often had to correct their requirements, and often before readjustments could be made, they found themselves with excess inventories. With the advent of rationing, it was necessary for WRA centers to reduce their staple supplies from a 90- to a 45-day inventory.

The Washington Office and Chief Project Stewards worked together on the problem, the Quartermaster Depots cooperating. Between July 1 and December 31 of 1943, WRA's excess inventory with OPA was liquidated. Delivery services improved during these months, centers produced many more items of subsistence, and by the close application of directives issued from the National Office, the centers were able to balance their records with the OPA.

Throughout the seim-annual period, improvements were made in dietary standards at the centers. In part these improvements were the result of increasing experience on the part of mess hall chefs, but the increasing abundance of fresh vegetables from the project farms and close cooperation between Mess Operations and Agriculture Division were influential factors. A change in employment policy which reduced the number of workers in mess halls early in this reporting period in no way impaired the quality of mess service.

THE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

The period of July 1 to December 31, 1943 covered the main portion of the harvest season in eight of the ten centers. In the two Arizona centers, it was the planting season. For most centers, this was the first harvest, as much of the land had not been reclaimed and brought under irrigation until the spring of 1943. This was a period when many new crops were being tested under conditions where their production had not been proven, and it was also a season when labor requirements in center agricultural enterprises reached a peak at the same time that the greatest number of workers were away from the centers on seasonal leave. In these months most centers either started or continued the development of livestock and poultry enter-

prises.

Vegetable Production

Plantings of vegetables during this period, primarily for harvest in the early months of 1944, amounted to slightly more than 1000 acres, while the total production harvested amounted to 36,941,000 pounds. The program was carried out with a variety of set-backs: approximately 1300 acres of planted ground had to be abandoned in Arkansas because of severe drought; freezing weather interrupted the harvest in Central Utah, Tule Lake, Jerome and Rohwer; in some regions there were losses from failure to secure stands and from the use of unadapted varieties; in some instances it was impossible to obtain strong plants for transplanting; there were insect infestations and crop diseases. However, in spite of these handicaps, it is estimated that at least 85 per cent of the total vegetable requirements of the centers for this period was produced on the project farms, with a substantial tonnage in storage or still to be harvested for use during the subsequent period. Tule Lake, despite the labor disturbance which occurred during the harvest season and necessitated the hiring of evacuees from other centers to bring in the crops, had the greatest surplus of any center. More than 6,000,000 pounds of fresh vegetables were shipped from Tule Lake to other centers, and the bulk of the 2,500,000 pounds of produce sold on the market was raised at Tule Lake.

Feed Crops

Feed crops for poultry, hogs and cattle were produced on 7300 acres of land in the amount of 15,000,000 pounds. Although it has been determined that primary emphasis should be placed on the production of food crops to supply center mess requirements, feed crop production will be increased as more land becomes available for cropping.

Hogs

Manzanar made its initial purchase of feeder hogs for center use during this period, while the other nine centers enlarged their hog feeding operations. Hogs are means of salvaging garbage from mess halls and refuse from the vegetable fields. The major portion of their diet is garbage, with grain being fed sparingly to hogs until they become accustomed to garbage, to those who have been thrown off feed and special care, and to brood sows. The general tendency is to purchase feeder pigs large enough to consume the garbage, and farrowing of pigs is resorted to only when feeder pig supplies are inadequate to the needs of the center. During this period a total of 3622 hogs were slaughtered, providing mess halls with 715,000 pounds of pork. The total hog population of the centers increased from 6017 on July 1 to 8622 on December 31.

Beef and Dairy Cattle

Beef production was carried on in four centers: Gila River, Central Utah, Granada, and Manzanar. As with hogs, the usual procedure is to buy feeder calves, feed them for several months and then slaughter them for center use. It is anticipated that Gila River, Granada and Central Utah will each be in a position to supply beef to one center other than their own when full production is attained. From July 1 to December 31, the number of beef cattle on the centers increased from 1015 to 2964. During this period 435,590 pounds of project-grown beef were delivered to mess halls.

Gila River is the only center where dairying has been undertaken by the evacuees. On December 31, 1943, there were 82 milch cows, 33 dry cows, 17 heifers, and 25 dairy calves. The average daily production of whole milk for December was approximately 800 quarts,--nearly one-third of the center's daily requirements.

Poultry

With the exception of the two Arkansas centers, all centers had poultry projects underway during this period. At Tule Lake, because of labor difficulties, it was necessary to sell the flock just as it was coming into full production. One of the limiting factors in achieving rapid expansion of poultry enterprises has been the difficulty in completing poultry houses for brooding chicks and laying flocks. However between July 1 and December 31 the number of stock increased from 55,420 to 60,902.

Looking Ahead

At the close of the year most centers had submitted their plans for 1944 production. These contemplated the production of an even larger proportion of the vegetable requirements on centers. Most of the pork to be consumed in the months to come will be produced on the centers. It is anticipated that at least 5 centers during the first half of 1944 will secure their full beef allotments, and that egg production will increase rapidly during the next few months as pullets come into laying.

As relocation proceeds and Selective Service calls more of the able-bodied men away from the centers, increasing reliance must be placed upon women and high-school children to carry out the agricultural program. Effort is being made to use center agricultural employment as a means of developing skills of workers to facilitate their return to normal life.

MOTOR TRANSPORT AND MAINTENANCE

At the outset of the second half-year period in 1943, the condition of automotive, heavy construction and miscellaneous equipment in

use at the centers was, generally speaking, poor. Most of this equipment, old when obtained by WRA and in need of considerable repair, had at this time been used for approximately a year at the centers. It has been a constant battle to keep enough of the old equipment in operation to meet the requirements of the administration and to carry on the construction, land improvements and development program. A good many units of equipment have been retired for long intervals because of inability to obtain parts and in some instances because of the unavailability of trained mechanics and supervisory personnel. Most centers have had inadequate space for housing maintenance and repair work. Shop buildings, during this period, were under construction and the work had to be carried on in warehouses or other temporary housing where shop equipment on hand could not be installed for lack of space.

In order to offset these handicaps, a more rigid control of automotive equipment use has been inaugurated at all centers. This has been effected by the enclosure of motor pools by fences, strict enforcement of a authorization procedures for the use of any piece of motor equipment, and an attempt to consolidate trips away from the center wherever possible to save mileage. The intensive campaign of training evacuee mechanics conducted by WRA since the centers opened has benefitted the relocation program rather than the center operations: there is a steady demand for skilled and semi-skilled mechanics outside the centers, and consequently as soon as an evacuee has a working knowledge of equipment maintenance he relocates to private life and work.

Despite the difficulties of obtaining parts, especially for heavy equipment, and keeping skilled workers, the Motor Transport and Maintenance Section accomplished the following repair jobs during the latter half of 1943:

<u>Type of Equipment</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Type of Equipment</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tractors, crawler	124	Passenger Cars	337
Tractors, wheel.....	297	Pickups	206
Patrols.....	22	Panels	74
Pumps	13	Stake Trucks	674
Shovels	21	Dump Trucks	242
Air Compressors	4	Cargo Trucks	246
Portable Welders	3	Fire Trucks	25
Rock Crushers	1	Ambulances	33
Cement Mixers	15	Busses	15
Trailer wagons, 2-wheel ...	65	Refrigeration semis	4
Sheep Foot Rollers	1	Semi-trailers	42
Ditch Diggers	1	Commands	6
Grain Buster Bailers	1	Station Wagons	13
Log Trailers	1	Van, Winch and Tanks	16
Scrapers	8	Racks and Hearses	2
Tractors, Grader Hitch	8	Load Luggers	8
		TOTAL	2528

During this report period an exchange of equipment was worked out with the War Department whereby 556 units of 1939 or older equipment no longer serviceable were exchanged for 550 units of equipment of the same age no longer required by the Army but still serviceable. As the period ended it was expected that WRA could continue to obtain tires, tubes, batteries and repair parts from the Army Depots and that a limited amount of repair work could be done at the U.S. Army Maintenance and Repair Shops.

CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

At the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, a great many of the projects undertaken during the previous fiscal year remained unfinished. During this report period work continued on schools, housing projects, miscellaneous food storage and processing plants, irrigation and road projects, and the subjugation of raw agricultural land. At most of the centers no developed agricultural land was available at the time of occupation; land had to be reclaimed, cleared and leveled, and irrigation distribution laterals had to be constructed before crops could be planted. This work progressed through the July 1 to December 31, 1943 half-year, but in many cases could not be completed. A number of applications to the War Production Board for activity approval and priority assistance were pending at the end of the period, and many more were forwarded to the Board for consideration in the near future.

Maintenance and operation of the centers has become an increasing problem with the aging of buildings and plants. Most of the buildings were designed for temporary use, with an estimated life of 5 years, and as their second year of use advanced were showing wear and tear. While the temporary restrictions did not apply to the equipment used in wells, sewage disposal plants and hospital boilers, they did affect the method of installation. The wells, for instance, were hurriedly drilled and poorly equipped; many of the holes were crooked, causing excessive wear on the deep well pumping equipment. Approximately 2 years of usage has brought many of these defects to light.

It has been estimated that the cost of maintenance and repair to maintain the buildings and utilities in livable and workable condition will rise sharply each year. In some centers it will be necessary to replace most of the roofing originally used; in many cases the tar paper used on the outside of buildings has deteriorated to the point where most of it must be replaced during the present fiscal year. One of the big problems in carrying on the construction program during the semi-annual period has been that of obtaining sufficient labor. A substantial training program has been continued throughout the life of WRA, but the turnover has been rapid and at no time has there been an adequate supply of skilled workmen. The recruitment of supervisory personnel through Civil Service has been slow and difficult, as higher salaries and more agreeable living conditions offered in connection with work in industries directly connected with the war effort have limited recruitment for center employment. Another difficult problem has been the maintenance in workable

condition the construction equipment on hand. Most of this equipment was used when purchased and much of it was not in good working condition. It has proved increasingly difficult to obtain necessary parts and skilled workmen required to maintain and repair construction equipment.

SUMMARY OF WRA CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Center	Established Cost Total Construction to June 30, 1943	Established Cost Work Accomplished to December 31, 1943	Established Cost to Complete Present Program
Central Utah	382,497	249,556	132,931
Colorado River	2,922,298	1,926,448	995,850
Gila River	902,359	536,770	365,589
Granada	461,070	382,172	78,898
Heart Mountain	575,434	469,644	105,790
Jerome	526,312	297,687	228,625
Leupp	15,000	15,000	(Closed)
Manzanar-	261,976	219,181	42,795
Minidoka	529,035	304,500	224,535
Rohwer	427,973	224,674	203,299
Tule Lake	1,151,663	673,585	478,078
TOTALS	\$ 8,155,617	\$5,299,217	\$2,856,390

SUMMARY OF WRA MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

July 1 to December 31, 1944


	No. of Jobs Done	Average Total No. of Employees	Estimated value of Materials Used
On Buildings	27,878	520	\$216,154
On Utilities	16,033	200	27,622

INDUSTRIES

In the July 1 to December 31 period, the major objective of the industrial program of WRA has been the manufacture or process of articles needed for subsistence operation and maintenance of the centers. In addition, a contribution to the war effort has been made by the manufacture of articles for the use of the Training Aids Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The policy of the Authority, since relocation got underway, has prohibited establishment or development of any enterprise outside these two classifications.

At the beginning of this period, some industrial work was in progress at all centers except Minidoka and Rohwer. Four of the centers have produced in their cabinet or carpenter shops furniture for use in schools, offices, and messhalls. These shops are located at Colorado

OVERALL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
FOR
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1943



River, Heart Mountain, Manzanar and Tule Lake. Cabinet work has been of very good quality and has effected a considerable saving in expenditure necessary for purchase of commercial furniture. At Heart Mountain and Manzanar, sewing shops were operated for the manufacture of uniforms and work clothing. Approximately 20 people have been employed in this work at Heart Mountain, while at Manzanar about 60 were employed in the garment factory and 17 in the repair department. A total of 15,000 garments were manufactured at Manzanar during this period. At four centers factories were in operation to process food products that are popular with the evacuees and in constant demand in the mess halls, such as bean sprouts, shoyu sauce, tofu and noodles. At Jerome and Heart Mountain sawmills, operated to saw and process rough lumber for use in necessary construction and maintenance on the projects, produced lumber valued at \$16,200 and \$33,500 respectively.

The ship model factory at Gila River, during this period, completed 550 models and shipped them to the Training Aids Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Approximately 50 people have been employed in this activity. Silk Screen Shops at Granada and Heart Mountain, aside from producing posters for the use of the Navy, processed other articles for center use. The Granada shop, employing 40 workers shipped out about 12,000 posters during the period, and the Heart Mountain shop, with 12 employees, provided the Training Aids Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel with about 4000 posters.

EVACUEE PROPERTY

The services rendered the evacuee population by the Evacuee Property office during the latter half of 1943 increased materially. Transport and storage facilities were heavily taxed, not only because of the transfer of many thousands of people in the course of the segregation movements but also because of the increasing number of persons relocating and having need of their household goods and other equipment. On August 1, a new Evacuee Property Field Office was opened at Sacramento to service most of the great Central Valley region previously serviced by the San Francisco Office, raising the number of Evacuee Property Field Offices to 5: San Francisco, Seattle, Portland, Sacramento, and Los Angeles. By the close of the year a land ownership field survey had been completed in 11 counties of Northern California and 5 in Washington and Oregon which had been selected as the areas containing the highest concentration of evacuee-owned real property. Altogether more than 3700 pieces of property have been identified, classified, cataloged, and mapped in the course of this survey.

Evacuee Property Movement

At the close of the period WRA maintained warehouses at San Francisco, Watsonville, Sacramento, Fresno, Stockton, and Los Angeles in California, Seattle in Washington, and Portland in Oregon. The total floor space provided by all warehouses was 297,165 square feet. New procedure allowed shipment in less than carload lots to a relocation

center from those warehouse districts where the volume of property either does not constitute a carload or where it is certain that a carload will not be available within a reasonable length of time. During the six-month period, a total of 1531 requests for storage and of 3227 requests for shipment were received from the centers and processed through the San Francisco headquarters of the Evacuee Property Field Offices. The Transportation Section of Evacuee Property was made responsible for the handling of all matters relating to segregation program freight shipments, with men detailed to the centers from the field offices to assist in the handling of the personal property to be transferred. The Tule Lake Center completed its outbound shipment of freight in September by forwarding 51 carloads of household goods and 10 carloads of excess baggage which could not be moved in the baggage cars that accompanied the passenger trains. By the end of November, 59 cars of household goods and 5 carloads and one truck and trailer containing household goods and overflow baggage had been received at the segregation center from other centers. In all, more than 4,700,000 pounds of freight were moved.

Cooperation with U.S. D. A. War Boards

In July an informal understanding was reached between the Evacuee Property Office and the California State War Board regarding procedure for requisitioning idle farm machinery. By the terms of this agreement, the county war boards have furnished WRA with a copy of each letter conveying a purchase offer to an evacuee. The Evacuee Property Office has then communicated with the evacuee, cautioning him that he has but 10 days in which to reply to the offer or have his property requisitioned. The State War Board has withheld action until receiving word from the Evacuee Property Office. When this office has been able to certify that an evacuee has been granted leave and was negotiating a farm lease or purchase in a relocation area, the State War Board has granted a short extension of time in which the evacuee could apply for approval of the war board in the county of his relocation, recommending cancellation of the requisition. As of December 31, evacuee owned farm machinery had been requisitioned in only 38 instances.

Business Activities of the Field Offices

Of the total number of business transactions completed by field offices, farm property represented about 17 per cent of the total; farm and automotive equipment, 39 per cent; urban and commercial property, 48 per cent.

Activity Report of All Field Offices
July 1 - December 31, 1943

Type of Activity	Number	Dollars
Farm Property		
Sales	14	\$ 54,849.30
Leases		
Cash	23	18,764.38
Share	2	414.15
Collections		
Rent	45	7,526.13
Other	19	6,023.68
Debt Adjustments		
Mortgages and Contracts	8	6,693.42
Miscellaneous Obligations	8	1,125.94
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	119	\$ 95,397.00
Farm and Automotive Equipment		
Sales		
Farm Machinery	69	23,644.27
Trucks	25	9,300.35
Automobiles	119	54,667.92
Other	23	5,060.85
Collections	34	6,916.67
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	270	\$ 99,590.06
Urban and Commercial Property		
Sales		
Hotels and Apartments	9	12,730.00
Stores and Industrial Property	2	2,659.00
Residential Property	4	930.00
Industrial Equipment, Fixtures	20	12,802.26
Merchandise	20	21,180.80
Other	31	6,230.08
Leases or Other Type Management		
Hotels and Apartments	9	3,585.90
Stores, Industrial Property	4	9,352.50
Residential Property	3	8,410.00
Industrial Property	6	2,125.00
Other	8	6,392.00
Collections		
Rents	36	2,168.57
Other	112	13,491.88
Debt Adjustments		
Mortgages and Contracts	9	62,411.24
Miscellaneous Obligations	23	8,015.24
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	296	\$172,484.47
Miscellaneous Activities*		
Miscellaneous Inquires Answered	3344	
Misc. Services Performed	5324	
Contraband Releases	15	
TOTAL NUMBER AND VALUE OF ALL TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS	9,368	\$367,471.53

* These items represent cases in which property supervisors render services of information and inspection but not involving a business deal.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

One of the more significant points to emerge from Health statistics for the latter half of 1943 was the marked increase in hospital usage coincident with a decrease in center population and a shrinkage in hospital personnel. Daily average bed occupancy of the hospitals in December of 1943 showed a 25 per cent increase over figures for the first month of the year.

Several factors have produced this state of affairs: (1) an increasing number of tuberculosis cases have been discovered in the centers; (2) the relocation of large numbers of the young and able-bodied has emphasized the high percentage of elderly persons among the Japanese population, many of whom, though feeble or chronically ill, were able to sustain barrack life as long as some family member was at hand to look after them, but once deprived of family care, have required admittance to the center hospital; (3) the heavy toll relocation has taken of evacuee professional and semi-professional personnel in the hospitals and the fact that replacements made from civil service lists have been hard to procure.

While the problem of caring for the aged and infirm has been recognized from the beginning, it is now aggravated by the departure of younger family members on relocation and the increasing shortage of professional health personnel. Heretofore, with a number of these persons cared for in family barracks, the small number who lacked such family care could be cared for in the hospital. However, by the close of 1943, hospital facilities could neither be expanded to provide for additional patients of this type nor be considered adequate to retain such patients already hospitalized. Earlier in the program plans and blueprints for remodeling barrack buildings to meet the needs of this type of patient were submitted by the Health Section to all centers. These plans provided minimum sanitary facilities and small serving kitchens for groups of 20 to 30 patients. During the July to December period, Manzanar, Minidoka and Colorado River developed such facilities which operated under the name of "Convalescent Barracks", "Hostel" or "Custodial Barracks" near the hospitals and under the hospital's direction. The opening of similar accommodations in the other centers was anticipated.

During the semi-annual period, there were 7,997 hospital admissions and 156,908 out-patient visits exclusive of optometry and dental services. In 493 instances it was necessary to send patients outside the centers for medical care. There have been no major epidemics during the period, and the vital statistics have indicated a generally good health situation, with 1,978 births and 290 deaths.

The problem of administrative assistance for the chief medical officer and chief nurse at each center was recognized in establishing the budgets for the fiscal year of 1944. Hospital administrative officers were employed at all centers by the end of the half-year period, with the result that considerable improvement in hospital

administrative practice was observed and the chief medical officers and chief nurses were able to devote their full time to their proper duties.

With the employment of trained, appointed dieticians at all centers during this period, dietetic services improved considerably. Consultations between dieticians and project stewards on general diets and in specific guidance in all special diets served in center mess halls were generally beneficial, although the problem of special diets including the feeding of young children has not yet been satisfactorily solved in some centers.

The shortage of nurses has become the most critical health personnel problem and more than any other single factor narrows the scope of medical service at the centers. During the six-month period there were 29 resignations of appointed nurses, including 6 chief nurses. Of the 35 new appointments three incumbents resigned before the close of the period. The number of registered evacuee nurses dwindled from 51 in January of 1943 to 11 in December; of 55 student evacuee nurses, only 3 remained. At the close of the year the total number of hospital personnel was 944, with the ratio of one nurse to every 32 patients. The lowest ratio which is considered safe is one nurse to 21 patients.

With this condition existing, it has been necessary to give increasing responsibility for the care of patients to evacuee nurse aides. However, the more experienced aides have left the centers and few younger women have been available to replace those who relocated. Thus the issei women have been recruited for this work. Despite their willingness, they have proved far less satisfactory than the young nisei women because of their physical limitations and their general inability to speak or understand English.

A medical social program was instituted during this period at Heart Mountain, Gila River and the Arkansas centers, leaving only one center without such service. There have been many indications that the medical social program has been of real help to physicians and nurses and that it has been an effective coordinator between the health and social welfare units. The Medical Social Consultant from the Washington Office visited all centers during this period and was on long details for special service in 2 instances, staying 7 weeks at Tule Lake to assist with the many problems arising from the segregation movement and the transfer of many patients, and 4 weeks at Gila River to carry on the work after the resignation of the medical social worker there.

Sanitation and Sanitary Engineering.

As the beginning of this period coincided with warm weather, many centers had difficulties with milk safety, food handling, garbage and rubbish disposal and sewage disposal. Sanitation problems increased

with the establishment of hog farms and slaughter houses, a few canneries and the one dairy and pasteurization unit. The early part of July found the Arkansas centers entering the most serious part of the malaria season.

In order to deal with these problems, the position of center sanitarian was established, a supervisor of malaria control and sanitation was designated to cover both Arkansas centers, and the sanitary engineer from the national office spent three-fourths of his time in the field. At 3 centers qualified evacuee sanitarians were employed, but by the end of September all of these had relocated. Lack of qualified applicants for the position of sanitarian resulted in vacancies at six centers at the end of the year. In spite of handicaps, most of these problems were solved and environmental health conditions were kept satisfactory. The milk supply situation at the Arkansas centers was improved so that it came within the requirements for milk of the Quartermaster General of the United States Army, and the malaria control program, aided by a dry summer in Arkansas, proved to be adequate. However, the need of closer supervision of sanitation by the centers themselves was clearly indicated, and at the close of the year a concentrated effort was being made to fill the six sanitarian vacancies with qualified persons.

COMMUNITY WELFARE

In the latter half of 1943 the scope of the Welfare Section's activities at the centers expanded considerably. In addition to the routine work of providing council in connection with family and social problems, arranging shifts in housing assignments, and handling the distribution of clothing allowances and public assistance grants, the Welfare Section shared heavily in the heavy and time-consuming work occasioned by the execution of the Segregation Policy, arranged for the transfer of another group of families to the family interment camp at Crystal City, Texas, and assisted with the work of getting designated evacuee repatriates aboard the Gripsholm at its September sailing.

During the segregation program, the Welfare Section at each center was given the responsibility of counseling with families and individuals to be transferred to Tule Lake. The counseling services were particularly helpful in assisting non-segregant members of the family to decide whether or not to accompany the family to the segregation center. The Housing Unit of Welfare at each center was in charge of housing assignments for those transferred from other centers. Although temporary additions to the appointed staff were authorized for each center during this period of stress, it was impossible to recruit qualified persons on a temporary basis and within the time allowed. As an emergency measure, staff members were borrowed from other sections, particularly from the Education Section to assist with this work.

In addition to these responsibilities which were related to the normal functions of the Welfare Section, at several centers Welfare was assigned other responsibilities connected with the segregation movement,

such as the preparation and construction of summary lists of persons to be segregated, analyses of family composition showing railroad fare requirements and preparation of train lists. Since the segregation program involved large-scale movements both in and out of Tule Lake, the greatest volume of work developed at that center. Temporary employees were procured for use at that center, and the head of the Washington Welfare Section spent two months there, directing the activities of the Welfare group.

Special Counseling for Relocation

Plans were completed during this period for the establishment in the Welfare Section at each center of a Special Counseling Unit to assist families and individuals in developing a plan for the future involving re-establishment in private life and work. While the main emphasis is on preparing families for relocation, the object of the counseling interviews is the assistance of all families in making long-term plans, whether or not immediate relocation is involved. This counseling is supplementary to the interviews held by relocation committees with evacuees, and not a substitution.

Statistical Data

Early in the period a reporting system to provide quantitative and qualitative data was set up in Welfare, and by the end of the period the centers had achieved sufficient accuracy and consistency in the submission of statistical reports on the work done to justify the analysis of some of the data contained. The following summary of public assistance grants authorized by 9 relocation centers covers only 5 months of the semi-annual period; procedures were not set up in time to include data for July.

NINE CENTER SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS

Month:	Center Popula- tion.	No. of Family Units	No. of Persons in Family Units	Average Size of Fam. Unit	Amount of Grant	Avg. Grant per Fam. Unit	% of Popula- tion receiv- ing Grant
Aug.	:81,108	: 3417	: 5263	: 1.65	: 37,572.81	: \$10.99	: 6.9
Sep.	:78,771	: 2927	: 5227	: 1.79	: 39,679.30	: 13.55	: 6.6
Oct.	:77,772	: 3164	: 5802	: 1.83	: 34,902.94	: 11.03	: 7.5
Nov.	:73,362	: 3173	: 5827	: 1.84	: 27,018.67	: 8.51	: 7.9
Dec.	:76,782	: 3002	: 5388	: 1.79	: 21,945.53	: 7.31	: 7.0
Total	:387,795	:15683	:27867	: 1.78*	: \$161,119.27	: \$10.27	: 7.2

* The low average size of the family unit receiving grants (1.78) indicates the high number of single, unattached individuals, who require assistance because of age or disability.

EDUCATION AT THE CENTERS

The total enrollment in center schools at the close of the 1943 fiscal year was 25,072, with 11,066 pupils in the elementary and 14,006 in the secondary schools. At the end of December 1943 total enrollment had dropped to 19,838 pupils, with 8614 in elementary schools and 11,224 in secondary schools. This low total was explained by the fact that approximately 3125 children of school age at the Tule Lake Center were not yet enrolled. The opening of Tule Lake schools in January was expected to bring the total enrollment up to approximately 23,000. This figure still represented a decrease of about 2000, 500 being accounted for by the excess of the 1943 high school graduating class over the incoming first grade enrollment. Relocation explains the remaining decrease.

Personnel Problems

The turnover in the teaching personnel at some centers ran as high as 30 per cent during the latter half of 1943. There were three changes in school superintendents, four in high school principals, and several in other school administrative positions. At the close of the year there were employed on the centers 75 school administrative personnel hired through Civil Service and 540 certified evacuee teachers. At this time there were 45 elementary and 30 high school teaching position vacancies. The shortage of evacuee teachers was in part the result of relocation of certified people and in part the result of disinclination on the part of evacuees with some college training to qualify themselves for teaching in the centers in view of the fact that teaching opportunities for Japanese Americans are very infrequent outside the centers.

School Housing and Equipment

Changes in WRA policy regarding school buildings have made several drastic reductions in the proposed school program, which originally anticipated the provision of modern but inexpensive school buildings for both elementary and secondary units. Early in 1943, by arrangement with WPB, WRA agreed to omit elementary school buildings, erecting only high school buildings. Only in Unit I of Colorado River Relocation Center, where work on the elementary school had been started, was the original plan carried out. Later, because of shortage of materials and funds, the high school building projects were curtailed, and only those centers where contracts had been let, materials obtained and construction started were permitted to have complete buildings. In other centers it seemed advisable to erect only such service units as required special space areas: auditoriums, shop, home economics and science units. This modification of plans made it necessary to revise the whole construction and maintenance program in order that the barrack type buildings could be adapted to schoolroom use.

At the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, Granada and Heart

Mountain had high school buildings completed and in use. At the close of the year the Tule Lake high school was ready to be used. During the period covered by this report, the auditorium, science and shop units at Central Utah and the science, home economics and shop units at Gila River were completed. At Colorado River, the elementary school in Unit I and several units of the high schools in Units II and III were completed by the close of the year. Rohwer had its auditorium and home economics buildings almost ready for use as the year ended, and at Jerome an auditorium was under construction and expected to be ready for the commencement exercises of the graduating class of 1944.

During the period a considerable amount of remodeling of barrack buildings was accomplished and more was contemplated. In a number of instances, school rooms were improved by painting walls and ceilings, adding more windows and electric lights, installing shelves and cupboards, and moving or removing partitions. It was planned that some of the floors should be resurfaced and stoves shielded, as part of the effort to contrive adequate class rooms out of barracks ill-suited to school room use.

During the fall semester of 1943, textbooks and other essential supplies had been obtained in quantities sufficient for a satisfactory type of operation. However, throughout the period there persisted a shortage of equipment for shop, science, home economics and commercial classes. There have been difficulties in obtaining priority releases and in finding necessary equipment, and delays in obtaining equipment from Government surplus stocks. Efforts to acquire equipment for farm and auto mechanics vocational shops were to be stressed during the early months of 1944. It was anticipated that supply costs would continue to be higher than under normal conditions.

Relocation and the Schools

The number of pupils lost through relocation during the period was not large. However, relocation played an important part in the whole school program. Class discussions, course contents and assembly programs were planned to provide the children, and through them, the parents, with specific and even detailed information on the possibilities of relocation and the problems involved. Experience gained by teachers who took part in leave clearance hearings has been valuable in that it has given them a broader understanding of the problems and conditions which affect the thinking and future planning of the evacuees and hence the school children.

School Program Improvements

All relocation centers started the fall semester with full accreditation by state accrediting agencies. In this half-year elementary and high school program patterns were pretty well established.

Teachers and pupils were more familiar with the general aims of the program and had learned to adapt themselves to frequent modifications necessitated by the changing demands of the WRA program. Substantial gains were made in developing friendly relations with the schools of neighboring communities, and inter-school contests and visits fostered good will. Nursery Schools have progressed to the point where they render valuable aid to children in overcoming language difficulties and in preparing them for regular progress in the elementary grades. The adult education program has provided adults with an opportunity to gain or increase knowledge of the English language. It has also familiarized many of these adults with conditions existing in outside communities and has helped some of them to develop specific skills which may prove profitable to them in relocation.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

During the half-year period, considerable progress was made at most centers in developing the Community Government as an instrument of community organization. Four of the centers, Gila River, Heart Mountain, Minidoka and Jerome approved Charters during this reporting period, bringing the total of centers organized under Community Government policy to eight and leaving only one relocation center functioning as an exception to the policy. Manzanar continued to operate with the Block Managers' Assembly serving as its representative body. Generally speaking the Councils made commendable progress in securing the confidence of both resident population and administration.

At the Washington office, plans were made in July for the participation of Community Councils in the process of segregation and reception of transferees from Tule Lake. Agreement was reached that the policy for Community Government would not apply to Tule Lake but that provision would be made for the establishment of a representative Advisory Council. Communications were addressed to the center Councils requesting their cooperation in meeting problems of fire prevention and requesting their recommendations as to the restoration of licensing authority to the Councils. On the basis of these recommendations, WRA restored to the Councils authority to license Business Enterprises. The authority of the Judicial Commission to penalize violators of center regulations by suspension of work privileges and clothing allowances was withdrawn, but, on the other hand the Commission was granted authority to impose fines and jail sentences. In November a Community Government Handbook was issued, setting forth functions, organization, administration, Council relationships, objectives, and problems of the community.

In conjunction with the Relocation Division, a plan was developed for the organization of staff-evacuee relationships for the purpose of aiding the relocation program. This plan was submitted to the centers in November, and provided for the establishment of a Relocation Planning Commission, its members to be appointed by the Community Council and drawn from resident groups. A staff committee with the relocation program officer as the executive secretary was to be appointed by the Project Director. These two groups were to appoint three members to an executive

board which would operate under the leadership of the Project Director in developing programs, transmitting information, and facilitating relocation in all possible ways.

At the centers, problems surrounding the movement of people to Tule Lake and the reception of newcomers from Tule Lake, the enactment of regulations, definition of relations with block managers and relocation were common to all Councils. Other problems of considerable interest were those concerned with labor relations, employment reduction, production facilities, hospitals and schools, and general center improvement.

The one disruption (and temporary) of Community Government occurred in November at Central Utah with the mass resignation of the Community Council. The Chairman of the Council, having been questioned by the FBI concerning some remarks attributed to him, resigned, whereupon the Council, after passing a resolution to the effect that statements attributed to their Chairman were not made by him at a Council meeting, also resigned. However, when an election was held to complete the last few weeks of the session, most of the former members were reelected.

As relocation progressed, removing the most capable younger men from the centers, there was a perceptible tendency on the part of the center communities to elect to the Councils older men, issei or the older nisei who had no intention of relocating in the immediate future. While this increasing predominance of the older and more permanent residents in the Councils has in some instances resulted in a less positive attitude toward relocation, it has unquestionably stimulated the Councils to take a more energetic part in improving the communities and making them better places to live.

WORK OF THE NEW RECORDS MANAGEMENT SECTION

The Records Management Section of the Administrative Management Division of WRA was established October 1, 1943. The principal functions of the new section have been the physical consolidation of documentary material, decision as to disposition of records (whether they should remain in WRA files or be submitted to the National Archives), maintaining liaison with appropriate government agencies on the keeping and disposition of WRA records, and the exercise of general supervision over mail and files in the Washington Office, including teletype, telegraph and messenger service.

The immediate value of the work of the Records Section has been in the centralization of files so that eventually all material will be in one location and more easily available to all units of the organization. The bulk of the non-record material, such as information copies of correspondence, daily leave reports and sending copies of teletypes, has been disposed of, thereby creating a saving in floor space, personnel and file equipment.

At the close of the year, the records program was confined to

the Washington Office, but it was planned to extend this program to the field by making a survey of field records including correspondence, reports, working papers, printed publications, card records, protests and petitions. This survey will include records accumulated in the past as well as records accumulating currently.

FINANCE

On July 1, 1943, fiscal services and accountings previously performed for WRA by the Central Administrative Services Division of the Office for Emergency Management were transferred to the Relocation Centers, with OEM maintaining only the Washington Office accounts. In the Washington Office, the Budget and Procedures Unit was established during the summer, and by the close of the year the new unit had revised approximately 95 per cent of the procedure for the Authority as a whole. Many of the positions set up on the personnel charts had been filled and the new employees trained on the job. A Field Examination and Investigation Unit was set up to perform the work of travelling auditors, to get at the facts and produce regularly full, objective reports on project administration, reports which indicate precisely the extent of deviations from procedures. The work of such auditors is of paramount importance to WRA, both as protection in time of official investigation and as a means of maintaining sound administration.

An evaluation made at the close of the year showed that finance policies and procedures had been about 90% adopted during the half-year period. It was anticipated that the early months of the new year would find prescribed procedures installed uniformly at all centers and operating satisfactorily.

BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AT THE CENTERS

Status of Business Enterprises as of December 31, 1943

Center	No. of Shops & Services	Gross Sales (July 1-Dec. 31)	Net Earnings (July 1-Dec. 31)	Ratio of Assets to Liabilities
Central Utah	17	\$280,223.99	\$ 43,943.51	8.83
Colorado River	16	498,400.63	60,095.55	2.61
Gila River	18	424,500.94	63,048.84	3.51
Granada	12	223,778.85	25,221.94	2.86
Heart Mountain	18	396,927.31	54,612.08	3.22
Jerome	17	276,594.07	47,284.27	4.42
Manzanar	13	394,403.82	36,895.83	2.84
Minidoka	13	338,372.06	43,372.06	2.92
Rohwer	7	182,054.70	27,582.63	3.74
Tule Lake	27	727,517.20	82,599.13	2.09
TOTALS	158	\$3,742,773.57	\$484,655.84	

By the close of 1943, 9 of the 10 Enterprises had been incorporated as cooperatives. Heart Mountain was still operating as a trust. Gila River, already incorporated, was in the process of amending its articles of incorporation and by-laws to comply with the requirements of the Arizona Corporation Commission that its articles and by-laws restrict the activities of the corporation to the center. The total number of employees at the end of December was 1750. All the Enterprises were in fairly sound financial condition, and the general policy of maintaining prices at the competitive retail level to accumulate reserves was carried out at all centers

During this period an effort was made to reach a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 3 to 1. By the end of the year half the Enterprises had passed this ratio and the others were climbing steadily toward it. Several of the Enterprises had established such good cash positions that they were able to pay a cash rebate just before the Christmas season.

In September a meeting of Enterprises' representatives was held in Chicago and a Federation of Center Business Enterprises was formed with a view to pooling the efforts of all centers in working for advancement of the Enterprises. The Federation opened a buying office in New York and selected three buyers from the Business Enterprises to do the purchasing for all Centers. The actual buying was not begun until the latter part of October; from that time until the end of the year, 512 orders totalling \$120,000 were handled. In the face of the manpower shortage and scarcity of ready-made clothing, purchases of ready-to-wear items are discouraged, and the Projects are encouraged to buy materials and make use of the labor and sewing facilities on the centers to make up the needed garments. The Federation maintains a revolving fund to facilitate purchases, as goods have to be paid for in advance of shipment. The Federation pays for goods out of the pool, notifies the project for which the purchase is made, and has the sum expended replenished by the project.

It has always been the goal of WRA to have the evacuees run their own Enterprises eventually and to cut down the amount of supervision by WRA as conditions permit. During this period the evacuees assumed more and more responsibility, and it was possible to reduce appointed staff from two to one at each center. However, the numerous changes in evacuee personnel brought about by relocation make more remote the prospect of eliminating WRA supervision entirely. A program was initiated in all centers whereby each important employee has an understudy trained to take over when the original incumbent leaves the center. Segregation too affected personnel changes in Business Enterprises, the most acute situation arising at Tule Lake where approximately 85 per cent of the Enterprise employees were transferred to other centers.

In response to the need of evacuees for banking facilities including a loan agency, Business Enterprises undertook the establishment of Credit Unions. It was necessary to obtain a special license from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the formation of Credit Unions on the centers. By the close of the year Topaz Enterprises at

Central Utah had received its charter and established a Credit Union, and 4 or 5 of the other centers were preparing to organize one.

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

Prior to July 1, 1943, foundations had been laid at all centers except Rohwer for the carrying out of Community Analysis. At Colorado River the Department of Interior had sponsored social analysis since June of 1942. During the latter half of 1943 some analysts left, and replacements were made with difficulty. Jerome, Rohwer, Heart Mountain, Colorado River and Central Utah had analysts in residence during only portions of the period. Only 5 centers; Manzanar, Minidoka, Tule Lake, Granada and Gila River had community analysts functioning throughout the period.

The analysts have rendered valuable assistance to the administration in the formulation of policies of center management and general conduct of the WRA program. They have made surveys of center opinion on controversial matters, engaged in studies to increase the general knowledge of evacuee background, cultural patterns, and reactions. They have been in a position to discover motives governing resistance to the administration, to relocation, to various programs inaugurated by WRA. All analysts were put to work on the problem of segregating the non-loyal, and their suggestions were for the most part incorporated in the Segregation Manual, unquestionably contributing to the smooth execution of the program.

Reports from the center analysts have covered details of center life, background analysis, current problems and evacuee-staff relations, and provide the Senior Analyst in the Washington Office with information for distribution and guidance for the administration.

INFORMATION SERVICES

In general, during this semi-annual period, the informational facilities of WRA were concentrated on furthering the relocation program. However, the Reports staff was active at the time of the execution of the Segregation Policy in keeping the evacuees informed on all steps of the transfer program and in documenting this major episode in WRA history. Reports Officers attended the conference of Project Directors and Washington officials in Denver in July, when plans were made for segregation movements. At this conference the importance of keeping the evacuees thoroughly and accurately informed was stressed, and information pamphlets printed in both English and Japanese were issued to be distributed at the centers. Plans were developed for giving current information through such media as center papers, special bulletins, and block manager and community council meetings. The value of careful, advanced planning was reflected in the fact that the segregation program was carried out without serious difficulties or crises

arising. The most far-reaching enterprise of the Division of Reports, however, was the expansion and improvement of information service in the interests of relocation. Real achievements were accomplished in spite of the fact that key members of the Washington Reports Office were obliged to devote most of their time and ability for two months to the assembling and preparation of information demanded by the many investigations and hearings that interrupted WRA's routine and proper obligations during this half-year period.

Relocation Reports Officers Installed

During July, Relocation Supervisors were asked to keep the centers informed on prospects for relocation in their respective areas through mimeographed releases. The burden of keeping the centers informed, of handling public relations problems, and of reporting relocation activities to the National Office became so heavy that authorization was granted for the appointment of a Reports Officer to each Relocation Supervisor's office. In November the National Chief of Reports met with the new Reports Officers in Chicago to familiarize them with the background of the WRA program, the problems involved in resettlement of evacuees, and the specific activities for which they would be responsible. These Relocation Reports Officers have kept a flow of relocation information going to the centers: press releases, special news letters, cuts of relocated evacuees and unusual job opportunities, and human interest stories concerning successfully relocated evacuees and unusual job opportunities. They have been instructed to supplement the "Facts about America" series of state pamphlets prepared by the Reports staff of the Washington Office with local studies. In the field of public relations they have been sounding out community sentiment toward evacuees, issuing press releases in relation to relocation within their areas, making press and radio contacts, preparing speeches and broadcasts. They have also assumed responsibility for the preparation of area reports to the Washington Office. At the end of December, they were asked to add to their duties the reporting to Washington of any incidents in their area which might give rise to misinformation or rumors regarding relocation of evacuees.

Photographic Program

Moving Pictures

In the first month of the semi-annual period, plans for the production of moving picture color films with commentator sound track for non-theatrical distribution had advanced to the point where actual shooting could begin. In July approximately 1600 feet of film were taken of the Japanese American Combat Team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for scenes to be included in WRA films. Movie footage on relocated evacuees was made at Denver, Chicago and Cleveland; footage on phases of center life was made at Heart Mountain, Granada and Rohwer. These films taken by the Photographic Unit of the Reports Division, located in the Denver Field Office, were completed, cut, edited and organized into 2 16mm. films, "The Way Ahead" (16 minutes) on relocated evacuees, and "Go for Broke" (12 minutes)

on the Combat team. They were shown by the Relocation Team at Rohwer early in December.

Documentary Activities of the Photographic Unit.

For still photos, the emphasis was upon evacuee relocation. Pictures were taken in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Kansas City, St. Louis, New York, and Bridgeport, and the areas surrounding these cities. Supplemental pictures of the relocation process at the centers were taken at Rohwer and Jerome. Other photographic documentation of WRA activities included one regular center picture coverage at Heart Mountain and a series of Christmas holiday season pictures at Granada. WRA photographers accompanied two transfer trains during the segregation movement to document this program. In response to the need for identification pictures for evacuee leave clearance dockets, the Photographic Unit developed a specially styled camera which was supplied to each center.

Photographic Production Figures for July 1 to December 31, 1943
Negatives added to documentary files:

By WRA Photographic Unit. . . .	549
By Project Reports Officer. . . .	451
TOTAL. . . .	1000

Total number of negatives on file December 31, 1943. . 4169

Prints made, including file-copy prints:

5" x 7"	4756
8" x 10"	3581
11" x 14"	1341
TOTAL	9678

Use Made of Photographs

All photographs of general WRA interest are sent to the National Office where permanent files are maintained by the Photographic Editor in the Office of Reports. Besides WRA photographs, pictures obtained from such sources as the Department of Agriculture, OWI, the Department of the Interior, and Chambers of Commerce have been incorporated into the collection to increase visual information on the midwestern and eastern regions of the United States. The Editor has planned and assembled visual material used by the Relocation Team and has selected photographs to be used for the illustration of publications.

One of the primary uses made of photographs has been as illustrations for official publications of the agency. In addition, exhibit prints of relocated evacuees were sent to Project Reports Officers for use in furthering interest in relocation. In August, the group of relocation advisers who went to Tule Lake to promote relocation in the interval before segregation movements took a substantial collection of photo-

graphs of relocated people and of general views of parts of the country suitable for relocation. Relocation Officers were provided with large collections of prints showing both center life and conditions of relocation to use in informing prospective employers and in public relations work. In July, 100 prints were made of the film strip, "The Wrong Ancestors", which was compiled from WRA pictures earlier in the summer. Slide projectors were supplied to Relocation Supervisors, Field Assistant Directors, and most of the centers. The film strip and accompanying mimeographed lecture were used extensively for both evacuee and public showing. Books of display prints of center life were made up during this period for the use of the Washington Personnel Section in conferences with prospective project personnel.

In addition to serving an important purpose in administrative use, the photographic collection continued throughout the period to assist outside groups and individuals interested in evacuee problems. Selections of pictures were supplied to lecturers and lay groups and committees, and 25 sets of pictures were made up for an Office of Education, Information Exchange, Loan Packet to accompany printed material on WRA and the evacuation. Pictures were supplied for publication in response to requests from newspapers, magazines, and organizations issuing pamphlets. AP and INS news stories have been illustrated with WRA photographs. The following table summarizes the distribution of exhibit prints over the six-month period:

<u>Destination</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Number of Prints</u>
Relocation Centers	Primarily Relocation	585
Relocation Offices	Public Information	2727
National Office	Publication, Relocation Team, Personnel Use, File Copies	1706
Newspapers	Publication	47
Magazines, Pamphlets		
Encyclopedias, etc.	Publication	205
Lectures	Illustration	88
Committees and Organizations	Miscellaneous	355
U.S. Office of Education	Loan Packets	400
	TOTAL	6113

Activities of Project Reports Offices

Aside from supervising the dissemination of information on segregation at the centers each Reports Officer documented carefully and fully the program as it developed at his center, submitting a report to Washington at the termination of evacuee transfers. The Reports Officers have been instrumental in setting up Relocation Libraries at most centers for the housing of material describing various areas and localities where conditions were favorable to relocation. Special attention was given to publicizing visits from field Relocation Officers and the showings of the movie series, "This is

America." Recruitment campaigns for both the WAC and the language school at Camp Savage were well advertised at the centers.

With emphasis concentrated upon segregation and relocation, it became increasingly important to keep the issei well informed. As a result of the more rapid relocation of younger nisei, consideration had to be given to the proportionately larger Japanese speaking and reading group remaining at the centers. Suggestions were made for the expansion of the Japanese language sections of the project newspapers, and for translation of evacuee information material.

Public Relations responsibilities of the Project Reports Officers were increased in July with the closing of OWI field offices, which had previously handled WRA local publicity. Several centers initiated the policy of supplying local newspapers, radio and wire services with releases on current project activities. Many of the centers held "open house" for representatives of the press in their areas. The press visitors were introduced to the Project Director and Reports Officer, given some essential information and answers to any questions they might have, and then encouraged to wander at will through the center, eating at evacuee messhalls, visiting schools, industries and farms, talking with evacuees and seeing the centers for themselves and in their own way. These visits and inspections increased friendly relations with the press and stimulated articles and radio talks that gave a fair picture of the WRA program.

In the line of administrative reporting from the projects, there were weekly narrative reports, monthly statistical report forms and narrative summaries of these forms. Evacuee members of project Reports Offices at most centers produced surveys of the first year of life in their communities, and at Central Utah a Historical Section staffed by competent young evacuees did a complete job of documentary reporting in the form of 24 special reports.

Project Newspapers

In the course of the semi-annual period, most center newspapers introduced a page or section devoted to relocation, and some outstanding editorials and "Letters to the Editor" appeared in support of the relocation program. All center newspapers suffered a considerable turnover in editorial staff, with an increasing number of the experienced writers relocating. With the responsibility for the papers gradually shifting to a very youthful group, most of whom had only highschool or junior college journalism classes as preparation, it has been remarkable that standards have been maintained so well. At Tule Lake, the Tulean Dispatch ceased publication on November 4 when the Army assumed control of the center. At the close of the year there were plans to establish a substitute for the former news sheet early in the new year.

The following table summarizes pertinent data on the ten center newspapers:

CENTER NEWSPAPER DATA

Center	Paper	Operated by	Process: Printed (P) Mimeographed (M)	Issues per week	Average no. pages	Circulation			
						July	Center December	Outside July	December
Central Utah	Topaz Times	WRA	M	3	6 ¹	2957	2871	550	521
Colorado River	Poston Chronicle	Evac. Jy., Aug.	M	6	2-4 ¹	2800	4400	225	100
		WRA, Sep.-Dec.	M	3	6-8 ¹	3811	3136	350	351
Gila River	News Courier	WRA	M	3					
Granada	Pioneer	WRA	M	2	10-12 ¹	2433	2900	550	600
Heart Mountain	Sentinel	Evac.	P	1 ²	8 ³	5000	4500	830	1120
Jerome	Denson Tribune	WRA	M	2	8 ¹	2760	3250	125	300
Manzanar	Free Press	Evac.	P	2	4-6 ³	2443	2464	357	336
Minidoka	Irrigator	Evac.	P	1	4 ³	2700	2750	700	700
Rohwer	Outpost	WRA	M	2	8 ¹	3000	2700	173	143
Tule Lake	Tulean Dispatch ⁴	WRA	M	6	JY., Aug. 4-6 ¹ 3 Sep. 6-8 ¹ Nov. 4	4500	4300	140	150

1 - Including Japanese section.

2 - Issues mimeographed; supplement when necessary.

3 - Mimeographed Japanese section in addition.

4 - Discontinued publication November 4.

COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

During the second half of 1943, national organizations were increasingly well represented in the centers, National, state and local workers of many groups visited the centers, and center delegates attended religious, social and student conferences held in various parts of the United States. The following table shows the distribution of national organizations at the centers:

Organization:	Central:	Colorado:	Gila :	Granada:	Heart:	Man- :	Mini-:	Jerome:	Rohwer:	Tule*:
	: Utah	: River	:River:		: Mt.	:zanar:	doka :			:Lake :
Red Cross	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
Jr.Red Cross:	X	: X	:	:	: X	: X	:	: X	:	:
Boy Scouts	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
Girls Scouts:	X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X
Camp Fire G.:		: X	: X	:	: X	:	:	:	:	: X
YWCA	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
YMCA	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X	:
Hi-Y	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	X	:
Girl Reserves	X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
PTA	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
AAUW	:	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:	:	:
JACL	: X	:	:	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:
4-H Club	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:	:	:	:
USO	:	:	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:

*Community Activities at Tule Lake were completely disrupted by the mass segregation movement and the subsequent incident. At the close of the year only the Red Cross Chapter of all Tule Lake organizations had re-established itself.

Relatively few new associations were started on the centers during the half-year period--evidence that the recreational program had reached a stage of maturity where emphasis could be placed on strengthening organized groups already in existence. In this period the centers were beginning to assume financial responsibility for community activities. Several centers completed plans for establishment of cooperatives or trusts to handle funds and to secure a steady flow of income for financing operations. These funds

were also used to finance the attendance of center residents at national meetings.

Communities continued to be responsible for direction of the community library at most of the centers. There was a steady increase in accessions. The collection of books and material in the Japanese language for the benefit of those persons unable to read English was heavily used. The popularity of this department of library service is indicated by the fact that with a total of 8,760 volumes for all centers, the total circulation for the six-month period amounted to 49,747. The circulation of English books for all centers except Granada reached a total of 223,540. The total number of books owned by center libraries reached 76,209 by the close of the year. Rental libraries had an additional several thousand volumes and were freely used.

With the exception of Tule Lake after August, and Granada for most of the period because of an infantile paralysis epidemic at that center, the centers maintained energetic activities, sponsoring sports events with teams from neighboring communities, programs for holidays within the center, athletic and cultural projects within the center, building up U.S.O.s for visiting soldiers, and planning recreation and entertainment essential to the well-being of the communities. It was observed that with the accomplishment of the segregation program and the removal to Tule Lake of those persons most interested in strictly Japanese cultural activities, the general character of the recreational program at the relocation centers became more thoroughly American.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

July 1 to December 31, 1943

- July 1-2 -- Conference on Relocation Policy in Washington Office continued from June 29; seasonal leave procedures revised and decisions reached to stress relocation in smaller cities and rural areas and to establish office in Boston to handle relocation in New England area.
- July 3 ---- The Director of WRA testified before the Chandler subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in executive session and approved the Downey Resolution prior to its introduction in the Senate.
- July 6 ---- U.S. Senate adopted resolution introduced by Senator Downey, of California, asking the President to order immediate segregation of disloyal persons of Japanese ancestry and calling for a public statement on relocation plans and procedures.

Arizona Superior Court judge declared unconstitutional the Arizona law requiring advertisement and posting of notice with the Secretary of State before doing business with restricted persons (evacuees).

- July 6-7 -- The Director of WRA appeared before the Dies Subcommittee, composed of Representatives Costello, Eberharter and Mundt, and

disclosed segregation plans.

- July 8 ---- WRA appropriation of \$48,170,000, as approved by the Bureau of the Budget, passed by Congress.
- July 12 --- Congress abolished funds permitting operation of OWI field offices, making it necessary for WRA to create its own channels and contacts in public relations and press distribution.
- July 15 --- The Director of WRA spoke over NBC on facts about Japanese Americans and the WRA program.
- Town Meeting of the Air, conducted in Santa Barbara, California, featured Representative John Costello and Carey McWilliams on the return of evacuees to the West Coast.
- July 16 --- The Senate Military Affairs Committee released report and recommendations on S. 444 providing for the transfer of certain WRA functions to the War Department, and on S. Res. 101 and 111 authorizing investigation of the WRA centers by the Chandler Committee.
- July 22---- WAC opened to girls of Japanese ancestry.
- July 26-27- Denver conference of WRA officials to discuss segregation plans.
- August 6 -- The Director of WRA addressed the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco.
- September 2 The exchange ship Gripsholm sailed from New York, carrying 314 passengers from relocation centers, 149 of whom were American citizens.
- September 13--Segregation transfer movements began.
- October 8 - Death of Elmer Rowalt, Deputy Director of WRA.
- October 11 --Last entrainment of evacuees in the major segregation movement.
- October 15- Accidental death of a farm worker halted harvest work at Tule Lake.
- November 1 --Relocation Division established in the Washington Office.
- Mass demonstration at Tule Lake Center and attack on Chief Medical Officer.
- November 4 --Violence at Tule Lake resulted in Army occupation of the center.
- November 8-9--Investigation in progress at Tule Lake Center by the California Senatorial Fact-finding Committee, Congressman Engle, and

a Dies Committee Investigator.

November 13-Director of WRA held press conference in Washington on the Tule Lake incident.

November 16-Director of WRA addressed American Legion state commanders, state adjutants and national officers in Indianapolis.

November 24-Director of WRA testified concerning the Tule Lake situation before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in executive session.

November 25-Secretary of War Stimson announced the casualty list of the Japanese-American 100th Infantry Battalion in action in Italy, listing decorations and mentioning high praise accorded them by their officers.

November 29-Dies Subcommittee began hearings on the Tule Lake situation in Washington.

December 1--The Director of WRA was featured speaker at the Annual Session of Massachusetts Conference of Social Workers in Boston, his subject: "A Test Case for Democracy--Japanese Resettlement."

December 2--The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court in San Francisco upheld constitutionality of the evacuation order in the Korematsu Case.

December 3- The Director of WRA held a conference with radio commentators and newspaper columnists in New York.

Rohwer school children ended bond drive oversubscribed 300 per cent, having contributed the price of 3 army jeeps.

December 4 -Leupp Center, maintained for the isolation of persistent troublemakers, was closed, its 52 inmates being transferred to Tule Lake.

December 6 -Conference on WRA Administrative Management opened in Denver.

December 6-9 Dies Subcommittee continued hearings on Tule Lake.

December 7-The 2d anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor passed uneventfully at all centers.

December 13-Arizona anti-evacuee law mentioned under date of July 6 was declared unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court.

The first evacuee girl to be inducted into the WAC, Miss Iris Watanabe of Granada, was sworn in at the office of the Governor of Colorado.

December 18-20-Evacuee Property Conference held in San Francisco.

December 20-The California State Board of Agriculture passed a resolution favoring ultimate restoration of employment privileges to persons of Japanese Ancestry and pledging its "influence to assure that race prejudice shall not jeopardize the lawful participation of this or any other group in the agricultural life and industry of the State" after military necessity for restrictions has passed. (Soon afterward the resolution was withdrawn and the Chairman who had sponsored it resigned from the Board)

The Dies Subcommittee re-opened its hearings on Tule Lake in order to question the Project Director of that center.