JAPANESE METHODS
OF
PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION
Published for the information of all concerned.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

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**SUBJECT:** JAPANESE METHODS OF PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION

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**SUMMARY:**

1. This report, based on material available to ATIS, GHQ, to 19 November 1945, presents evidence that the Japanese Army had a high regard for intelligence obtained through the interrogation of prisoners of war; that interrogation was conducted at both the front and rear areas; that interrogation techniques varied from the gentle to the cruel; that prisoners were interrogated for the purpose of obtaining tactical, technical, and propaganda information; and that interrogation was detailed and thorough.

2. The report also gives examples of material obtained in actual interrogations.

**SOURCES:**
- Captured Documents.
- Statements by Prisoners of War.
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Section I. TIME AND PLACE OF INTERROGATION

1. GENERAL

The importance of interrogating prisoners immediately upon capture is emphasized in various Japanese Army directives.

a. Extract from a mimeographed file entitled “Interrogation of PwW” (undated, issuing authority not stated) by CO, ODA-MURA Co.

“Information obtained from PwW is essential in determining the enemy’s plan, strength, tactics, organization and equipment. Interrogation is clearly presented in ‘Field Service Regulations.’ It is classified into:

- Information while under detention.
- Immediate interrogation during operations.
- Immediate interrogation of severely wounded.”

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 255, page 1).


“Necessary examination of PwW must be conducted at the place of capture and the results will be sent back to Regimental HQ ....Prohibit further examination of PwW at the place of capture other than for special purposes.”

(ATIS Current Translations No. 83, page 8).

c. Extract from regulations (undated, issuing authority not stated, but internal evidence indicates that they were issued by 16 Army. JAVA, 1943).

“As soon as prisoners of war are captured, they should.....be examined...”

(ATIS Research Report No. 86, page 5).

2. INTERROGATION

IN FORWARD AREAS

Examination in forward areas was for immediate operational information.

a. Extract from handwritten notebook entitled “R 1 (sic) Service M” concerning intelligence and fifth column operations in total war (undated, writer and unit not stated, contents presumably copied from manual).

“PwW captured at the front line should preferably be interrogated at the spot on matters requiring the pointing out of the actual ground.”

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 271, page 25).

The interrogation was conducted by best qualified examiner available. This person might be an army linguist, an intelligence officer, a commanding officer with linguistic ability, or a high ranking Japanese civilian employee with requisite military knowledge.

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 562, pages 22-23).

3. INTERROGATION

IN REAR AREAS

Interrogation beyond immediate operational matters was carried on in rear areas. Prisoners were sent back to Regimental or Divisional HQ for questioning by a Japanese civilian employee interpreter.

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 562, pages 22-23).
Section II. TECHNIQUES OF INTERROGATION

4. GENERAL

The general interrogatory pattern to achieve the aforementioned objectives is epitomized in a series of captured Japanese manuals. The interrogation officer is instructed to approach the prisoner of war sympathetically in order to instill in him a feeling of security, to overcome his hostility, to take advantage of his youth by using flattery, and, with women, to profit by their natural shyness.


“Main point of interrogation of prisoner of war is to secure truth of everything prisoner of war knows, but prisoner may be patriotic. Needless to say, prisoners of war insist on their rights and duties in accordance with international law, and it is difficult to make them say anything against their national interests. On the whole, interrogation of prisoners of war is not like that of criminals. For a disposition, tangible proof is needed, but it is almost impossible to judge authenticity, for there are no limits to the scope of his knowledge, and if he says ‘I don’t know,’ force may not be used to get a stronger statement from him.”

(ATIS Research Report No. 86 (Suppl. No. 1), page 3).

b. The seeming injunction against duress is merely a verbal concession to propriety; in fact, Japanese orders are distinguished by the fact that the rule and how to circumvent the rule are simultaneously stated. Thus the interrogating officer is invited to use “originality and zeal... to secure truth and full details.” Lest the meaning of “originality and zeal” be misconstrued, the manual continues with the admonishment that “you must not get excited even with the PoW who are arrogant and always answer ‘I don’t know.’ Always remain calm. You must be careful when using inventive, rebukes or torture, for it will cause him to lie and make a fool of you.”

(ATIS Research Report No. 86 (Suppl. No. 1), page 3).

5. INTERROGATION WITHOUT TORTURE

To obviate situations which require compulsion against prisoners, the interrogating officer is urged to exhaust all psychological ruses. The specific psychological approach is preceded by the well-reasoned technique of segregating prisoners to prevent their fabricating spurious information. Segregation embraces the additional advantage of permitting the interrogator to ascertain the reliability of the prisoners. Known information, articles and papers on the prisoner’s person are to be applied as additional checks. The confusion and distress attending a newly-captured prisoner grants the interrogator an opportunity to elicit replies with greater ease, inasmuch as the prisoner has not the composure to dissemble. The examining officer is warned that “if the prisoner looks repeatedly and inquisitively at the interrogator’s face and steals a glance at his eyes, this is a sign that the PW is concealing vital knowledge.”

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 271, page 23).

To overcome the prisoner’s reluctance to divulge information, the interrogator is enjoined to undermine his morale. Varying the approach according to the nationality of the prisoner, the questioner is instructed to employ the following techniques:

a. Extract from captured booklet “Instructions on How to Interrogate” published in Daily Intelligence Extracts, HQ 10 Air Force, 18 August (year not given).

“Infuse anti-war sentiments. Military objective of ENGLAND and AMERICA is anti-religious. They do not seek peace or freedom. Recall enjoyable existence of pre-war days. Show corruption of public morals, deficiency of materials and frequency of strikes in their own country. With British troops—American atrocities to women in England. With American troops—state of women’s anti-war movement in AMERICA... Arouse hatred and weariness of war, e.g., do you know where your wife now lives...that district was heavily bombed by GERMANY recently. Do you know to what area she has been evacuated? BRITAIN is retreating from
INTERROGATION WITH TORTURE

If the prisoner persists in his obduracy, threats of grave physical discomforts should be made. With utter disregard for the prohibition of brutality, it is proposed, euphemistically to be sure, that “skillful methods” be applied. “Skillful methods” are not defined, but torture is succinctly described. In quaint Japanese circumlocution, brutal directives are disguised in the form of apparently factual statements.

a. Extract from captured booklet entitled “Instructions on How to Interrogate” published in Daily Intelligence Extracts, Hq. 10 Air Force, 18 August (year not given).

b. Extract from handwritten note book entitled “R1 (sic) Service M” concerning intelligence and fifth column operations in total war (undated, writer and unit not stated).

c. Extract from statement of Prisoner of War (JA (USA) 100000,) captured at KORAKO, 22 April 1944.

“At KORAKO, about 20 March 1944, PW saw a US airman tied to a tree and questioned by Lt. SETO (since killed). Answers were unsatisfactory. Japs in area lined up and beat Allied PW with clubs. He was revived after becoming unconscious and was again beaten. Following day a Japanese WO, nicknamed SAMPANG (crooked legs) by Javanese, made three attempts to behead Allied PW. Head did not come off. Another Japanese named INOUYE cut off the head after third attempt. Several Javanese witnessed the deed.”


d. Extract from statement of Dr. I. G. BRAUN, Mission Hospital at AMELE, near MADANG, NEW GUINEA.

“One officer said that the policy was to tie up the captured airmen, question them pleasantly until they would give no further information, and then require them to kneel with a broomstick inside the knee-joints. He stated that after one or two hours of this ‘most of them would talk.’ After the second interrogation was finished, they would be beaten and executed, usually by decapitation.”


Particularly revolting tortures to extract information are described as follows:

e. Extract from COIS Eastern Fleet, Abstract of Enemy Information No. 6 (dated 8 August 1944).

OO to OO; if she is soon defeated you will be able to return to your wife and child, who are saying ‘come quickly.’ Take this line particularly with those who have a wife and children.”

(ATIS Research Report No. 56 (Suppl. No. 1), page 3).

It is further suggested that the demoralization of the prisoner may be facilitated when a PW who has been previously captured or one who is of the same nationality and is already in the enemy’s hands can be made to contact him.

6. INTERROGATION WITH TORTURE

such as one experiences just before confessing matters of a vital nature.

“Interrogation should preferably be conducted in such a manner that the PW is led on to talk. However, when the situation demands speed, methods in which pain is inflicted on the PW may be used as well. In either case, consideration must be given to future use and influences.”

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 271, page 25).

Japanese sources afford too few instances of the actual application of their interrogation technique, but those that are available require no footnotes. In a Japanese diary captured at KWALEIN, the diarist describes an interrogation of three American air Pows, climaxed by a beating administered to an officer who would not “reply as asked” until “that damned officer finally let out a scream.”

(JICPOA Translation, Item No. 6437 (date unknown), page 3).

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(JICPOA Translation, Item No. 6437 (date unknown), page 3).
"The victim's stomach is filled with water from a hose placed in the throat. A plank is then placed across the distended stomach, and Japanese, one on each end, then 'see-saw' thus forcing out the water from the stomach. Many of the victims die under this torture.

"The victim's thumbs are tied together and he is hitched by them to a motor car which proceeds to pull him around in a circle until he falls exhausted. This is repeated at two—or three—day intervals.

"When KEMPEI officers become physically tired from the beating-up of a victim, a second victim is brought in. Each victim is given a stick and they are set to belaboring each other."

(ATS Research Report No. 72 (Suppl. No. 1), page 23).

f. Cruel treatment of POW of all branches of our service has been thoroughly proven in our War Criminal Trials. However, there is some indication that harsh and brutal treatment was applied more to air than to ground troops. In addition to the statement of Dr. I. G. Braun cited above, there is other evidence that airmen were singled out for harsher treatment. Hiroshi FUJII, formerly a doctor at the OMORI POW Camp, stated at an interview in Sugamo Prison that:

".....in contravention of an order issued verbally by Col. SAKABA, the Camp Commandant, that Special POW B-29 air crew were not to receive medical treatment, he secretly performed an operation on a Special POW for hemorrhoids......

"Special POWs, B-29 crew members, received only half rations or two-thirds rations on orders of Col. SAKABA......

".....When he requested the Colonel to allow him to fill out death certificate (for a Special PW), this was refused by SAKABA on the grounds that special prisoners need not be treated the same as other POWs."

(Report No. 489 of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP).
Section III. MATTERS OF INTERROGATION

7. GENERAL

Evidence concerning matters of interrogation and the comparative thoroughness with which information was obtained is drawn chiefly from two sources: documents containing lists of subjects for interrogation and documents recording actual interrogations of prisoners of war. Available translations of captured enemy material indicate that interrogations were thorough.

8. TYPES OF INFORMATION SOUGHT BY INTERROGATORS

Information sought by interrogators falls into three classes; in order of importance, these are a. information concerning tactics and operations, b. information of technical value, and c. information useful as propaganda.

a. A synthesis of lists taken from Japanese Army instructional publications shows the following to be the subjects upon which tactical and operational information was desired:

(1) Location of units
(2) Organization and equipment of units
(3) Latest orders received by units
(4) Recent supply situation
(5) Formation under which units operate
(6) Identification of personnel
(7) Last bivouac area
(8) Combat situation
(9) Functioning of line of communications
(10) Projected operations
(11) Condition of roads, tracks, airfields
(12) Routes, distances, times
(13) Methods of travel


b. Topics upon which information of a technical nature was to be obtained included:

(1) Characteristic weapons
(2) Newly issued material
(3) Unusual equipment
(4) Communications network
(5) Points emphasized in training
(6) Standards required in training
(7) Results achieved in training

(AtIS Enemy Publication No. 255, pages 3-4).

c. The importance of acquiring information useful as propaganda against the Allied Nations is forcefully emphasized in Japanese documents dealing with prisoner of war interrogation. It is in this phase of examination procedure that some of the most interesting reflections of Japanese psychology are to be found, together with evidence revealing a peculiar and sometimes amusing failure to understand the ways of the Occident. More important than these, however, is the disclosure of evidence substantiating our knowledge of certain Japanese war aims, chiefly the intent to incite and promote dissension among the United Nations.

(1) Extract from a "Memorandum on the Gathering of Material for Foreign Propaganda from P3W" issued by 4 Air Army C of S, 4 September 1943.

"Following are examples of the sort of propaganda material useful for spreading disunity between American and Australian forces and breaking down their will to fight:

"(a) Doubts cast upon the war aims of American and Australian forces.
(b) Dissension and friction between American and Australian troops in the field.
(c) Discrimination against natives, Chinese, Nici, and native troops.
(d) Enemy losses, especially personnel losses.
(e) Current situation as regards ships sunk and aircraft destroyed.
(f) Supply situation, causes of illness and condition of sick. Also situation regarding relief of front line troops.
(g) Enemy opinion of Japanese night attacks and jungle warfare.
(h) Fighting spirit of enemy troops.
(i) Enemy opinion of battle action of Japanese Air Force and fleet.
(j) Activities of PW up to time of capture.
(k) Extent of interception of field broadcasts."
(1) Effect of our own propaganda, especially in regard to dissension between American and Australian troops, native revolts and the extent to which all types of home-front unrest in AMERICA (or AUSTRALIA) have affected the front line troops.

(m) Sad plight of nurses and the women’s auxiliary army.”

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 225, page 1).

It is clear from the foregoing examples that some of the leads used in interrogation for propaganda purposes were the result of reasonably accurate, though by no means complete, knowledge of conditions among the Allies. Other leads, obviously, were vague and inaccurate, being no more than the offshoots of rumor or the results of mere supposition, if not of absolute misinformation. In particular, the reference to the “sad plight of nurses and the women’s auxiliary army” arouses curiosity, not only because of its quaint wording, but also because of its probable meaning.

It is not the objective of this paper to investigate the ways in which this material was employed as propaganda or the extent to which its use proved effective. What is of present importance is the fact that the gathering of such information was considered a vital phase of prisoner interrogation.

9. EXAMPLES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED IN ACTUAL INTERROGATIONS

Four documents which record actual interrogations of prisoners of war provide startling evidence of the thoroughness of questioning and the significance of the information elicited. It must be made clear, however, that these documents cannot be considered completely typical, inasmuch as few others are available for comparison. It must also be mentioned that the surprising detail of the testimony may be the result of more than a skillful elicitation of information by purely legitimate methods. Nowhere do these records mention the means by which prisoners were stimulated to divulge valuable facts, but in the light of our knowledge of instructions given to interrogators, it is justifiable to assume that torture may have been employed, or at least that threats were made. But it is also justifiable, since evidence is lacking, to assume that the prisoners, in violation of their training instructions, spoke freely. The possible reasons for such uninhibited disclosures of vital knowledge are numerous: a desire to impress the enemy with Allied superiority, a failure to appreciate the ability of the enemy to use their statements, a hope of comforts or concessions to be granted in reward for their testimony, an apathy toward the war and everything connected with it, or a panic fear resulting from capture. Whatever the reasons may have been, the information was given with what seems at times to be an unnecessary completeness.

a. The first of these documents is the “Interrogation Report of an American Navy Flier Shot Down and Captured (24 September 1944) near CEBU.” A brief of the contents indicates the extent of the interrogation. The comparative detail with which the information was given can best be illustrated by an excerpt from the report itself.

(1) A brief of the contents includes the following:

(a) A history of the prisoner, with a record of his training and his transfers.
(b) A record of the tactical movements of the prisoner, with information regarding operations participated in and losses and movements of carrier forces.
(c) Information regarding the organization of Task Force 38, under the following headings:
   1. Composition of 3 Fleet
   2. Organization of the LEXINGTON
   3. Number of airplanes and personnel on a carrier
   4. Names of American carriers
   5. American carrier camouflage (with sketches).
(d) Information on matters pertaining to message security, with reference to frequency used, call words, terminology.

(2) Extract from ultrasecret telegram No. 282342 containing additional information from pilot ensign of carrier LEXINGTON (interrogation conducted at HQ), Southwest Area Fleet, date of report 20 October 1944.

“(a) Recent movements and organization of the task force:
   1. Commander of Task Force 38 is Adm MITSCHER. Four groups are composed of two regular aircraft carriers and two converted cruiser carriers each, totaling 16 ships, plus destroyer escorts.
   2. The following types of ships (at-
attached to 3 Fleet) are assigned to the groups:

Groups 1 and 2—two to three battleships and three to four cruisers.

Group 3—four to five battleships and four to five cruisers.

Group 4—no battleships, four to five cruisers.

3. Adm HALSEY—Commanding Officer of PHILIPPINES Area Naval Force.”

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 402, page 2).
(Note: Examination of independent sources verifies the substantial accuracy of information obtained by Japanese methods of interrogation)

b. The second of these documents is a mimeographed booklet entitled “Tactics of the US Air Forces (KUGUN) in the SOLOMONS Area.” It bears the following notation: “In view of the present battle situation, this booklet requires immediate distribution. It was prepared from interrogation of an Allied PW. Reliability ‘A.’”

The significance of the words, “immediate distribution,” is clear enough, but an examination of the contents makes it only more evident that the material was of high importance. Although it is impracticable here to quote extensively from the document, it is possible to present a list of the main topics in the table of contents and to quote an excerpt which will convey the extent of the detail. It must be emphasized that the information given under each topical heading in the table of contents is strikingly detailed and frequently accompanied by diagrams, maps, and sketches.

(1) Extract from mimeographed booklet entitled “Tactics of the US Air Forces (KUGUN) in the SOLOMONS Area” (issued by 6 Field MP Unit and reproduced by Operations Section, 6 Flying Division, dated 7 February 1944).

“(a) Formations and Co-ordinated Operations.

Fighter and bomber formations.

Ratio of fighters and bombers in combination.

Combined use of different types of fighter planes.

Co-ordinated attack by different types of bombers.

Co-ordinated attack of ground and carrier based bombers.

Essentials in co-ordinated operations with the fleet.

Co-ordinated operations with the Air Force in NEW GUINEA.

(b) Bomber Tactics.

Measures against Japanese fighters.

Low, medium, and high altitude bombing.

Bombing by waves.

Attacking ships.

Attacking against AA fire.

Time and routes of attacks on RABAUL.

Destruction of RABAUL.

Attack by medium bombers.

(c) Fighter Tactics.

Missions of fighters.

Attack by fighter planes.

Weaknesses of Japanese fighters as seen by the US Air Force.

Attacking formations.

Attacking bombers.

(d) Action of the Air Force before and after Landing Operations.

Reconnaissance before landing.

Bombardment before landing.

Concealment of landing plans.

Co-ordination with the landing force during landing.

Bombing after a successful landing.

(e) Guerrilla Tactics.

Low altitude surprise attacks.

Use of fighters as decoys when attacking.

Surprise attack from behind mountains or hills.

Battle of nerves at night.

Surprise attack at night from extremely low altitudes.

Night raiding from several directions at the same time.

Attack against returning enemy planes.

Confusing enemy radar.

Deceiving the enemy with lights.”

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 173, pages B and C).

(2) Extract from mimeographed booklet entitled “Tactics of the US Air Forces (KUGUN) in the SOLOMONS Area” (issued by 6 Field MP Unit and reproduced by Operations Section, 6 Flying Division, dated 7 February 1944).

“Reconnaissance before landing: The Navy’s PB4Y and VD1 (photographing unit) make a detailed reconnaissance of the area where the landing is planned. Reconnaissance is begun two to three months before the planned operation. Weather permitting, reconnaissance is carried out every day. Reconnaissance is carried on in the morning for 30 to 40 minutes, when it is clear. Altitude is from 22,000 to 34,000 ft. Reconnaissance is continued until approximately one week before the actual operation. The
enemy position and enemy terrain are investigated in detail.

"Enemy plans are based on this reconnaissance and information from intelligence organizations dispatched beforehand.

"Details of the activities of the intelligence organizations are few. Men are landed near the invasion point by submarine. They seek information on enemy strength, disposition of air forces, condition of terrain and shipping...." 

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 173, page 14).

c. The third document in the same Enemy Publication is a mimeographed booklet entitled "Interrogation Report (No. 7) of an Allied Prisoner of War." It contains data on airfield construction and survey forces, airplane maintenance, ground forces and Marines in the SOLOMONS Area, enemy airplane communication, meteorological observation, billets, rest and allowances, hospital ships, circumstances of PW's crash, etc.


d. The fourth document among these examples of actual interrogations is a mimeographed file of intelligence reports on the interrogation of American aircrew prisoners of war. An extract from the brief of this publication indicates the scope of the interrogation. An extract from one of the interrogations is of interest partly as an example of actual question-and-answer, but mostly because of two parenthetical remarks by the recorder of the interrogation. The first of these throw light upon the condition of the prisoner during examination and suggests the possibility that other than gentle methods were being employed to extract information. The second is interesting both because it is a reflection of Japanese psychology and because it provides a basis for conjecture concerning the significance of the clause, "We tried to make him guess."

(1) Extract from brief of Enemy Publication No. 280, presenting contents of mimeographed file of intelligence reports on interrogation of American aircrew prisoners of war (issued 16 December 1942 to 3 June 1943 by GO Gp (SHUDAN) Staff Section).

"Information contained in interrogation reports includes circumstances of capture; personal history and training of PW; route taken from AMERICA to SWPA; condition of airfields; types, numbers and capabilities of American planes in use or being built; organization of Fifth Air Force; methods of bombing and effectiveness of RABAUL AA fire and searchlights; conditions in AMERICA and public attitude toward the war; Australian-American relations, etc."

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 280, page A).

(2) Extract from "Allied PW Interrogation Report" dated 23 February 1943, 81 Navy Garrison Unit (KEIBI) GO Force Staff Section. (The prisoner was captured on the shore south of RABAUL HANABUKI (TN: TAVURVUR) Mt. by Destroyer MAKINAMI.)

"Q. What did you think of doing after bailing out from your airplane?

"A. I thought of escaping. However, after being taken a PW, I wanted to be sent back.

"Q. If we were to return you, where would you go, AMERICA or PORT MORESBY?

"A. AMERICA. (PW eobbed for a while.)

"Q. Do the troops now at MORESBY like war?

"A. All of them hate war.

"Q. How about you?

"A. Naturally, I hate war.

"Q. Do you hate the Japanese?

"A. As I have never spoken to a Japanese, I do not know. I do not even know if they are strong or weak.

"Q. Are any citations given to aircrews who return from RABAUL air raids?

"A. Those who perform especially meritorious deeds are given medals.

"Q. Are there any who have received such medals?

"A. There are those who probably received them, but I have never received any.

"Q. Do you believe that AMERICA will win?

"A. I don't know about the future. (Naturally we do not know what the future holds. We tried to make him guess, but he persisted; he did not know.)"

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 280 pages 16-17).

Further evidence of the thoroughness with which interrogation was carried out can be found in the following:

ATIS Enemy Publication No. 76, pages 6-7

ATIS Bulletin No. 1283, Item No. 4, pages 3-5 (mimeographed pamphlet entitled "Information on Enemy High-Speed (PT)
EXAMPLES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED IN ACTUAL INTERROGATIONS

Boat," presenting data obtained from crew members:
ATIS Bulletin No. 1250, pages 1-2 (Allied PW gives information on F51)
SOPAC Translation No. 9075, pages 7-15 (report on interrogation of US aviator)
SEATIC Translation Report No. 17, Item No. 609, pages 17-19
SEATIC Translation Report No. 19, pages 9-14
ATIS Enemy Publication No. 145, Part I ("Intelligence Reports, Maps, and Sketches Operations in NEW GUINEA, April 1943 to August 1943"), pages 38-46 ("Records of American and Australian Prisoners")
ATIS Bulletin No. 2068, Item No. 8, pages 15-22 (mimeographed record of interrogation of American Infantry Officer).
Section V. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Japanese Army had a high regard for intelligence obtained through the interrogation of prisoners of war.

2. Interrogation was conducted at the time and place of capture for the purpose of obtaining information of immediate operational importance. Later and more detailed interrogation was carried on in rear areas.

3. Interrogation techniques proceeded from the gentle to the cruel, with the distinct condonement of torture and with a tendency towards greater harshness in treatment of airmen.

4. Prisoners were interrogated for the purpose of eliciting information of tactical and operational value, information of a technical nature, and information useful as propaganda.

5. Interrogation was detailed and thorough.

Cruel treatment of PsW of all branches of our service has been thoroughly proven in our War Criminal Trials. However, there is some indication that harsh and brutal treatment during interrogation, often ending with decapitation, was applied more to air than to ground troops. Our air forces initially turned the tide and assisted all of our operations by gaining air superiority and contributed greatly toward obtaining Naval superiority; both of which were so essential to the success of our amphibious operations. Perhaps the brutal treatment of captured airmen is at least partially explained by Japanese realization of this and a desperate desire to obtain all possible information with which to combat it. Evidence indicates that such treatment commenced in the early Southwest Pacific Campaigns—