to be given that opportunity. At least I would like to have made a part of this record the questions that I submitted and a showing that he did not answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that the questions submitted are a part of the record, that they were made a part of the record, as much as the answers. Without seeing the questions and the answers, I assume the questions would be made a part of the record just as if they had been asked in open hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't know. That is the reason I asked.

[*14252*] The CHAIRMAN. I assume so. Isn't that true, Counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. My idea would be that whatever we got from Mr. Stimson would appear in this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and the same with regard to Mr. Hull. Let's go ahead.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire if the Hull answers are here ready to be put in the record today?

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume all members received them and that they are here ready to be put in the record today. Go ahead.

Mr. LANE. The Committee sent certain interrogatories to former Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 5, 1946. We have received his answers to the interrogatories, and ask that the interrogatories, the answers thereto, and their letter of transmittal dated May 16, 1946, be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.

(The answers given by Mr. Hull to interrogatories submitted to him by the Committee follow:)[1]

[*14253*] MAY 16, 1946.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY, *Chairman*,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MY DEAR MR. BARKLEY, Reference is made to your letter of April 5, 1946, enclosing a set of 169 interrogatories which the committee desired me to consider and make such reply thereto as my recollection of the facts might warrant.

In pursuance of your request I enclose my replies to the interrogatories. I feel that most of the matters covered in my replies have already been set forth in the record of the Department of State or in my prepared statement to the committee. I trust that my replies satisfactorily dispose of the questions concerning which the committee has inquired.

Sincerely yours,

[S] CORDELL HULL.

Enclosure:
Replies to interrogatories.

[*14254*] **REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE HONORABLE HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

1. Question: Is it correct to say, Mr. Secretary, that the first specific point in the 10 points of the American note of November 26, 1941, proposed that Japan enter a seven-power nonaggression compact? (See For. Rel. vol. 2, 769.)

[1] Mr. Hull was sworn by the Chairman at the time of his appearance before the Committee on November 23, 1945. See Hearings, Part 2, p. 403 et seq.

Answer: In this Government's outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan communicated to the Japanese Government on November 26 there were listed in section 2 under 10 headings steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan of which the first heading reads as follows:

> 1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

2. Question: [*14255*] Is it correct to say that, in your conversation with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22, 1941, you broached the matter of proposing to Japan SOMETIME a broad comprehensive plan involving the collaboration of other nations? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 761.)

   Answer: On November 22, 1941, I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had in mind taking up with him sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries. Our broad approach was toward a world objective, not a local, regional, or bilateral objective. While the initial step was bilateral as between the Japanese and ourselves, what we were trying to do was to get Japan to adopt a peaceful program on world-wide lines. Had we been successful Japan would have been able to satisfy all her needs by taking advantage of the principles, for example, of the Nine-Power Agreement and the Good Neighbor policy. We envisaged, of course, the assumption by Japan of obligations along with the acquisition by her of rights.

3. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors reply that Japan was interested in a bilateral agreement with the United States? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 762.)

   [*14256*] Answer: The Japanese Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence. The Japanese, throughout the conversations, had shown apparently little thought for the rights and interests of countries in the Pacific area other than Japan and the United States. From the outset of the conversations I had endeavored to make it clear to the Japanese that this Government could not join with Japan in disposing of questions affecting the rights and interests of the other concerned powers without consulting them prior to entering into formal negotiations on these matters with the Japanese. There could not have been, however, any doubt in the mind of the Japanese Ambassador that our conversations looked to our entering into a bilateral agreement with Japan as our immediate objective even though we held to the view that other powers should be consulted.

4. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors say to you, after reading the note of November 26 and the oral statement of the 26th, that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 766.)

Answer: [*14257*] After the Japanese Ambassadors had read the documents handed to them on November 26 containing an outline of the proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement, Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end. Neither Mr. Kurusu nor Ambassador Nomura stated that the American proposal was unacceptable.

5. Question: Is it correct to say that the position of the State Department has been that the American note of the 26th was a necessary restatement of American policy as the only logical and practical means by which peaceful conditions might obtain in the Pacific Ocean? (For. Rel. 767 et. al.)

Answer: In answer to this question, I refer to my statement before the joint committee on November 19, 1945, in which I said:

> Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

In that same statement I also said:

> [*14258*] The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals.

That confusion prevailed both in Japan and the United States. We knew from Japanese acts and utterances that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was their last word and it was obviously desirable that the record of the American Government's position throughout the conversations be made crystal clear. Therefore, the proposals of November 26 were directed toward making our position utterly clear and toward keeping the door open for further conversations notwithstanding the ultimative character of the Japanese proposal of November 20. The principles set forth in our November 26 proposal were in all important respects essentially the same principles we had been proposing to the Japanese right along. Had the Japanese had the least disposition to pursue a peaceful course, a more desirable program could not have been offered to them. All Japan had to do to take advantage of our offer was to abandon her course of aggression and to adopt the accepted rules of peaceful international conduct. In the explanatory statement which accompanied the proposal there was reviewed [*14259*] briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of arriving at an agreement regarding Pacific questions on a basis of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations.

6. Question: It was stated, was it not, by the American Government to Japan in the note of the 26th that the Japanese proposal of November 20 fell short of the objectives desired? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 767.)

Answer: In this Government's communication to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated:

> The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

The Japanese asked in their proposal of November 20 that the United States [*14260*] agree to cease giving aid to China; that the United States desist from augmenting its military forces in the western Pacific; that the United States help Japan obtain products of the Netherlands East Indies; that the United States undertake to resume commercial relations with Japan; that the United States undertake to supply to Japan "a required quantity of oil"; while Japan on her part would be free to continue her military operations in and against China and to keep her troops in Indochina and to attack the Soviet Union, would have her funds unfrozen, would be able to buy with comparative freedom from the United States, would be assured adequate supplies of oil, and would be under no obligation to remove her troops from Indochina until she should have completed her conquest of China or conditions of peace satisfactory to her had been established "in the Pacific area."

Before and after presenting that proposal, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talked emphatically about the urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines was not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be most unfortunate.

What Japan asked in that proposal would, had it been agreed to by the United States, have meant condonement by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent by [*14261*] the United States to unlimited courses of conquest by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of its whole past position in regard to the most essential principles of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a position as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western Pacific and Eastern Asia.

Acceptance by us of the Japanese proposal of November 20 would have placed Japan in a commanding position in her movement to acquire control of the entire western Pacific area; would have destroyed our chances of asserting and maintaining our rights and interests in the Pacific; and in its final analysis would have meant a most serious threat to our national security. She also clung to her vantage point in Indochina which threatened the security of the countries to the

south and menaced vital trade routes. Their conditional offer to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern Indochina within a day or two, and furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they might continue to send there.

7. Question: Did our Government reject the Japanese note of [*14262*] November 20, 1941, which you described as an ultimatum?

Answer: The Japanese proposal of November 20, which I have described in response to question No. 6, was of so preposterous a character that no responsible American official could ever have dreamed of accepting it. Nevertheless, I felt that I should not be violent in my comment to the Japanese in regard to it so as to avoid giving them any pretext to walk out on the conversations.

Therefore, despite the ultimative character of the Japanese proposal, and despite the slim possibility that Japan would elect to continue the conversations, we proposed to keep alive that possibility while restating our fundamental principles. The Army and Navy were asking for more time, as they had for months past, and I had that situation very much at heart. Morever, we wanted to show our interest in peace up to the last split second and at the same time to expose the bad faith of the Japanese. Everything we said or did was with those considerations in mind. In drawing up a full restatement of our principles, we gave exemplifications of their application to the situation in the Pacific area, and we invited the Japanese to continue the conversations with that statement as a basis.

8. Question: It was stated, was it not that, therefore, the United [*14263*] States was setting forth to Japan a broad and comprehensive program under which the desired objectives could be attained? (For. Rel. vol. 2, 767.)

Answer: In this Government's oral statement to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated:

> * * * the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

As I said in my statement before the joint committee of November 19, 1945, in reviewing what I had told press correspondents on the day following the date of delivery to the Japanese of the communication under reference,

> I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear prespective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.
>
> [*14264*] There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally

preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace.

9. Question: When did you prepare the message which President Roosevelt was to send to the Japanese Emperor the night of December 6, 1941?

Answer: The idea of a message from the President to the Emperor had been under consideration by the President and myself as far back as the middle of October, as is clear from the record before the committee. The message as actually sent was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions made in the White House as well as material contained in drafts prepared in the State Department during preceding weeks.

[*14265*] 10. Question: For the purpose of a question I shall quote from the President's message to the Emperor: "Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area"—end of quotation and I ask: Is it correct to say that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina, under a neutral guarantee of the integrity of Indochina by the interested parties, was the single specific proposal of the message of the Emperor, sent by President Roosevelt on December 6? And fulfillment of it would have assured peace in the southwest Pacific, in the opinion of the President?

Answer: In the President's message to the Japanese Emperor the President stated that "both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat." The President was seeking to make a broad appeal. The withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from Indochina would have assured the creation of an atmosphere which would have rendered possible resumption of conversations looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Conversely, Japan's refusal to accept the President's proposal would expose her real purpose. Indochina was the logical and by far the most feasible jumping-off place for a Japanese movement to the south. The [*14266*] President by his proposal for the neutralization of Indochina on July 24 had already strongly tested Japan's purposes in her continued movement south by proposing that she get out of Indochina—and the Japanese Government by its clear-cut refusal betrayed its military designs on the South Sea area. This proposal also served to expose Japan's intentions not to consider peaceful arrangements with us unless we were prepared to make all the concessions. The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course, knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-off place in Indochina, which, from our viewpoint, meant that the danger of attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, the President believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear

to the American people and to the world our interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute.

11. Question: Was there anything in the December 6 message proposing a Japanese withdrawal from China—a pledge not to interfere should the United States be drawn into war by Germany—or a proposal for Japan's adherence to a seven-power nonaggression pact?

Answer: [*14267*] Inasmuch as the November 26 proposal of this Government was already before the Japanese, the appeal to the Emperor was made specifically applicable to the critical situation created by the Japanese military movement from and within Indochina which we had very much in our minds. Indochina was the seat of the most acute and imminent danger at that moment. The other subjects at issue with Japan mentioned in your question had been thrashed out over and over again during 6 months of conversations.

Throughout the conversations we had vainly urged on Japan that she abandon conquest, including the conquest of China. We also had asked the Japanese to give up her alliance with Germany and Italy which was directed against us, but they clung to that alliance like they clung to their very life. We had fully demonstrated the utter impossibility of getting Japan to budge on these questions.

Questions 12, 13, and 38 are grouped in a single answer.

12. Question: The intercepted diplomatic messages of the Japanese show that on November 26 Nomura and Kurusu requested permission of Tokyo to request that President Roosevelt wire to a Japanese official, Premier Tojo, I presume, and ask that peace be maintained for the sake of posterity and that Japan replied with a cordial message, were you aware, on November 29, that this document was in the possession [*14268*] of the American Government as decoded on November 28? (Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 180.)

13. Question: The intercepted Japanese messages show that, on November 28, the Japanese Ambassadors received from Tokyo a message that was secretly intercepted and decoded by the American Government on the same day, and which said: I quote: "I contacted the man you told me to in your No. 1180 and he said that under present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable" end quotation: were you aware of the existence of this document on November 30? (Cf. Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 195, last two sentences of No. 844.)

38. Question: You saw the intercepted Japanese messages, did you not?

Answer: I was at all times intensely interested in the contents of the intercepts. I instructed my secretaries to show me promptly any and all intercepts of material value and importance to the State Department. This, it seemed to me, they did. So far as I was able to judge, all of such intercepts were shown to me. The State Department was on a 24-hour basis and messages received in the Department after office hours in whatever form when important were delivered to

me at my home. At this late [*14269*] date, in 1946, I cannot be certain whether I received and read at the time all important intercepts or whether it might be possible that some of those I have read since that time or recently are confused in my mind with what I read at the time. I kept no records as to when particular messages reached me.

Questions 14, 82, and 83 are grouped in a single answer.

14. Question: It is proved by the intercepted messages, is it not, that Japan on November 28 had rejected the proposition of an exchange of peace messages between the heads of their respective states? (No. 844, p. 195, exhibit 1.)

82. Question: Will you please look at message No. 844, page 195, exhibit 1, and state as to whether or not that message relates to a message from the President to the Emperor?

83. Question: If your answer to the last question is "yes," then will you explain why the message was sent on the night of the 6th of December 1941, when you and the President had knowledge of the message of exhibit 1, message 844, page 195?

Answer: The intercepted message cited (No. 844, exhibit 1, p. 195) seems to refer to a suggestion by the Japanese [*14270*] Ambassador for a Japanese initiative in proposing to this Government an exchange of messages between the President and a Japanese official, presumably the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Japanese Foreign Minister, after consulting with the Navy Minister, apparently did not approve of that suggestion. In the situation in which we found ourselves grabbing at straws to save the peace, this Government believed that no possibility should be overlooked even at the last minute to appeal for peace. In any case, there was no reason why the President should not send a message to the Emperor regardless of the attitude of any particular subordinate Japanese official.

15. Question: On November 29, 1941, you rejected, did you not, as useless a suggestion of the Australian Minister that he try to mediate through Kurusu?

Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called on me and brought up the question of his conferring with the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator. I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of such a move.

16. Question: [14271] On November 30, or around that date, did you recommend to the President that he deliver a message to Congress on the subject of American-Japanese relations?

Answer: On November 29, I sent to the President a draft message to Congress, which Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox had helped to prepare, together with a draft message from the President to the Emperor. In my memorandum to the President I said:

> If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we

agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.

17. Question: What did the President say?
Answer: I have no specific recollection as to what President Roosevelt said regarding a message to Congress. But the record is that he did not send the message to Congress.

18. Question: Why did he not send it to Congress?
Answer: [14272] The President and I had for some time been communicating to various Members of Congress our views on the imminent dangers in the situation in connection with such matters as neutrality legislation and extension of selective service. A message to Congress during the last few days would have contained very little that was new without giving to the Japanese leaders material which would have enabled them to arouse their people against us all the more, a thing we wished to avoid so long as there was even the slightest possibility of keeping the discussions alive.

Furthermore, the powerful isolationist groups in this country would probably have renewed their oft-repeated charges of "war-mongering" and "dragging the nation into foreign wars." The Japanese leaders would then have been in a position to play up the situation as evidencing disunity in the United States in order to gain support in Japan for plunging ahead.

19. Question: Did it occur to you, in making such a recommendation that, either in wording or by precedent, there applied in the situation of November 30, 1941, that clause in the Constitution of the United States which provides that, from time to time, the President shall inform the Congress of the state of the Union?
Answer: [*14273*] I would say that among the considerations which led to the drafting of the message to Congress was the Constitutional clause you cite, but there was also the consideration whether sending such a message at that particular time would have been helpful or otherwise in the critical situation then existing.

20. Question: Did you tell a press conference on or about December 3, 1941, that the Japanese Government on November 12 had taken the position that these talks were not informal and exploratory, rather that they constituted real negotiations, which were in their final stages and that in the event of their failure a critical and dangerous situation would result? (Cf. For. Rel. p. 75.)
Answer: The question whether the conversations with the Japanese in 1941 constituted real negotiations was not a matter of unilateral determination. This Government had made it clear to the Japanese from the outset that our conversations must remain on an exploratory basis until we could determine whether there existed a basis for negotiations. That point was never reached. Later, the Japanese Government advanced the contention that we were in negotiation, with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo on November 12 and with us

here on November 13. On that day, I made [*14274*] the position of this Government quite clear to the Japanese representatives, as follows:

> The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–41, vol. II, pp. 731–732.)

Inasmuch as the Japanese Government did not subsequently refer to this point, it was to be assumed that it had accepted this Government's position. There was no occasion for referring to this point in conference with the press. I did, however, make clear to the representatives of the press on November 27 and again on December 3 the seriousness of the situation.

Questions 21 and 22 are grouped in a single answer.

21. Question: From page 43 of your statement, I quote: "On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador [*14275*] that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would include a seaborne expediion to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus" and quotation—I ask if you recall having any information on that day from the First Lord of the British Admiralty indicating a Japanese attack upon the United States?

22. Question: I quote from the New York Times of December 1, a dispatch from London under date of November 30: "A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, said that 'if Japan breaks with and attacks the United States we must go with the United States and I am glad we have been able to send naval reinforcements to the Far East,' end quotation: Did you see any official message to the United States of such a nature?

Answer: I do not recall receiving any information or messages on or about November 30 from the First Lord of the Admiralty or from any other official source indicating a Japanese attack on the United States or pledging support to the United States if attacked; nor has there been found in the Department of State any record of such information having been communicated to the Department of State.

23. Question: [*14276*] Was it a fact that, on November 30, and thereafter, the predominant opinion in the War Council was that the attack would come against others rather than the United States?

Answer: While it was my judgment that the Japanese were likely to attack in widely separated areas, all observable indications pointed to the likelihood that the attack would occur in the Southwest Pacific area. The most threatening activities known to our Government, so far as I saw or heard, were the Japanese movements near the jumping-off place in Indochina.

Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and Siam were well within range of attack from that jumping-off place. The competent and appropriate military officials, I believe, have spoken for themselves on this subject.

24. Question: When did you first see the cablegram from Ambassador Winant, dated December 6, and received in the State Department December 6, as to the movement of the Japanese fleet toward the Kra Peninsula?

Answer: The telegram in question, No. 5918 from the American Embassy in London, England, was received, according to the records, in the State Department at 10:40 a. m. [*14277*] December 6. In view of the message's character, of the notation that it was "most urgent," and of the fact that it was headed "Personal and Secret to the Secretary and the President," it must have been shortly after its receipt that I saw it.

25. Question: In your prepared statement to this committee, Mr. Secretary, I find no reference to your conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on August 16, the day preceding the delivery of two notes to Japan by the President; and I ask if it is correct to summarize that conversation of August 16 in these words: to the Ambassador's "pointed" request for a resumption of the conversations you stood by your position of July 23 in which you stated that because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations by its seizure of Indochina you saw no basis remaining; and after you had suggested that the Ambassador might see the President, if he desired, Nomura replied that he would be in no position to talk to the President until his Government had wired him concessions which he, as previously stated, believed his Government was willing to make in order to have the conversations resumed? (Cf. Foreign Relations II, pp. 553–554.)

Answer: The conversation of August 16 with the Japanese [*14278*] Ambassador is correctly summarized in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–41, volume II, pages 553–554:

> The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He proceeded to say that he had again read over the documents that he and I had had under discussion, that he had been in communication with his Government, and that he believed there were grounds for progress in the conversations. He said that his Government was very desirous of working out peaceful relations between our two countries and he elaborated further along this line and against the idea of war. He stated that he would favor concessions in order to avoid war and that from what he heard from his Government, it would make concessions in order to avoid war. He said that in fact it would be glad to have a high Japanese official meet a high American official half way between the two countries in order to take up the matter in its final form.

The Ambassador then pointedly inquired of me whether conversations such as he and I had been conducting could be resumed between our two Governments. I proceeded to reiterate and repeat the circumstances leading up to the cessation of our conversations and the reasons which I set forth through Mr. Welles for their discontinuance. I did not pass further on the question which he propounded [*14279*] but left it as it was. The Ambassador remarked that the

situation was critical and it was very important in his judgment for suitable steps to be taken to avoid serious developments but I still revealed no sign whatever of saying anything favorable about his request for a resumption of conversations. I said that as the matter stands Japan with her Army, Navy, and air forces was establishing many bases in and about French Indochina under her continued policy of conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, and that, therefore, this Government could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially if it should be carried forward to any further extent. The Ambassador remarked that the people of Japan did not have enough foodstuffs and went to Indochina to secure such needed commodities as rice. To this I promptly replied that if Japan had been willing to go forward with a peaceful settlement of the Pacific area in line with the principles and policies the Ambassador and I had discussed, Japan would have been able peacefully and without the use or threat of force to have equal access with every other nation to world [*14280*] markets for rice and all other foodstuffs.

The Ambassador repeatedly said that his country was very desirous of peaceful relations with this country in the future as well as now and that he believed his Government would make some concessions in order to resume conversations to this end. I expressed interest in this and again referred to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and of bitter denunciation of this country by the Government controlled press which is loudly supporting such a policy, and again I said that I would not be in a position to say anything relative to his request in addition to what I said some days ago when he first brought up the matter.

I suggested to the Ambassador that the situation was very serious and that if he desired to talk to any others on this subject or to the President it would be perfectly agreeable with me and I would not consider it as in in any way going around me, et cetera. The Ambassador said that he would not be in a position to talk to the President until he first telegraphed his country for instructions as to what concessions it might be willing to make in connection with a resumption of converations.

26. Question: In your memorandum of the conversation in the White House among the President, Ambassador Nomura and [*14281*] yourself on August 17, you state that the President requested the Ambassador to come to the White House (cf Foreign Relations 11, p. 554): my question is: Had the President been informed that on the previous day, August 16, the Japanese Ambassador had stated that he did not wish to see the President until he had received concessions from the Japanese Government which he, the Ambassador, believed his Government would make?

Answer: I find from the records that I informed the President prior to the White House conference on August 17 of the substance of my conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the previous day. I refer to President Roosevelt's

telegram to Prime Minister Churchill, of August 18, 1941, which is a committee exhibit.

27. Question: Is it correct to state that the State Department records show no offer of concessions by Japan on August 17, 1941?

Answer: This Government at no time in the course of the conversations of 1941 talked to the representatives of the Japanese Government in terms of "concessions" to be made by Japan as condition for an agreement. It made known to the Japanese Government that its willingness to [*14282*] enter into an agreement with Japan was contingent upon Japan's adopting consistently peaceful courses. At no time did the Japanese Government give any practical evidence on which this Government could rely or dependable pledges that the Japanese Government intended to pursue policies of peace.

28. Question: When did the war with Japan become inevitable?

Answer: The question of the inevitability of war with Japan involved two factors, the factor of Japanese plans and objectives and the factor of time.

With regard to Japanese objectives, it is clear from the record that following the advent in 1927 of the Cabinet of General Tanaka, who inaugurated the so-called positive policy toward China, Japan had consistently been pursuing only one fixed policy—that of expansion by aggression. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria by force; in 1933, Japan seized Jehol, penetrated Chahar and extorted from China a demilitarized zone in north China. The truculent statement of Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, on April 17, 1934, in which Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed, made crystal clear [*14283*] Japan's policies of aggression. In 1937 Japan embarked upon military operations in north China which soon developed into an all-out attack on the whole of China. On September 21, 1938, I told the Canadian Minister that I had been proceeding on the theory that Japan definitely contemplated domination, by any and every kind of means, of East Asia and the Western Pacific area. In furtherance of these objectives Japan in September 1940 entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Japan's program thus being merged into a far-flung drive for world domination of which Japan's share was to be East Asia. On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the lend-lease bill before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, I pointed out that Japan was out to establish herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific and that her leaders had openly declared their determination to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. In the light of Japan's steady course of expansion by force, it was manifest that she would attack in her own good time unless we surrendered our principles.

As I have repeatedly stated, this Government had fully taken into account Japan's record when it entered into the

conversations with the Japanese in 1941. [*14284*] Nevertheless, the American Government responded favorably to the Japanese request that we enter into conversations looking to a settlement of Pacific questions even though it realized that there was but a slight chance that thereby Japan could be brought around to adopt peaceful courses.

The second factor, that of time, was considered by us in the light of contemporary developments. Through the years that the Japanese Government was standing for policies of aggression, this Government was standing for policies of peace and of law and order with justice, as is clear from the record. These opposing policies were utterly irreconcilable. We knew that would would not surrender at any time our basic principles. As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese, we could not escape the conclusion that Japan would not abandon her policy of aggression. Our long-standing appraisal of Japanese policies and purposes of aggression and of attacking us and other countries in the Pacific area in furtherance of those purposes, was supported by Japanese utterances and acts. As regards the element of time, I was satisfied by early October from the evidence of feverish Japanese military activities and movements, the bellicose pronouncements of Japanese spokesmen and of the Japanese press, reports of growing political tension [*14285*] in Japan, as well as from what was disclosed by the intercepted Japanese messages that the time when they would attack us was rapidly approaching.

In looking back upon the developments in their entirety during the last weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor it can be clearly seen that our judgments and our methods of dealing with Japan as we did were overwhelmingly vindicated by Japanese acts and utterances as they later unfolded.

At any time prior to Japan's attack it lay within her power to avert a war in the Pacific by abandoning her policy of aggression, just as a bandit might avert a clash with his intended victim by suddenly becoming law-abiding. Up to that time there was always open to her an honorable and reasonable alternative to the courses of aggression which she was pursuing—an alternative which would have given her all she professed to seek in the way of access to raw materials and markets, as well as other rights and opportunities enjoyed by all nations. It lay solely within Japan's disposition to adopt a peaceful alternative and to revoke the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of July 2, which reaffirmed Japan's purpose of subjugating China and which called for military advance to the south to establish "the great East Asia sphere of co-prosperity", that is to say, to establish Japanese [*14286*] domination in Southeast Asia and the islands of the Western Pacific area.

Questions 29 to 33 and 45 to 47 are grouped in a single answer.

29. Question: When did you decide that further negotiations were useless and that you were going to turn the matter over to the Army and Navy?

30. Question: When did you advise either the Army or the Navy that you were turning the matter over to the army or navy or both?
31. Question: What had happened that you told Secretary Stimson you were turning the mater over to the Army and Navy?
32. Question: Had you conferred with the President on the matter of turning the matter over to the Army and Navy?
33. Question: Give date and conversation with the President on this.
45. Question: Do you recall having a conversation with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, about the negotiations with Japan being terminated and that you were turning the matter over to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, or the Army and Navy?

[*14287*] 46. Question: Will you state the date and the conversation.

47. Question: If such a conversation took place, did you consider that such conversation turned the matter over to the Army and Navy?

Answer: After this Government had received and studied the Japanese proposal of November 20, which has already been described, together with Kurusu's representation to me on November 21 that Japan had nothing more to offer, it became obvious, especially in the light of Japan's menacing military movements and of the indisputable proof derived from intercepted Japanese messages that the November 20 proposal was their last word, that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. From November 22 on it was my individual view that Japan was through with any serious conversations looking to a peaceful settlement. From that day I and my associates had reach a stage of clutching at straws in our effort to save the situation. We groped about for anything that might offer any possibility for keeping serious conversations going. We gave consideration to possible choices in an effort to determine the wisest and most feasible course.

[*14288*] From November 22 on I did not conceal my conclusions on these points. It was on November 25 at the meeting of the War Council that I again emphasized the critical nature of the situation and stated more formally that, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy." My most acurate recollection of my conversations along this line with the President and the War and Navy officials was contained in my statement of December 30, 1941, to the Roberts committee. I rely upon that statement to refresh my present recollection. The portion of that statement dealing with this point is as follows:

> On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the

Japanese might make [*14289*] the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

The expression, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy," as applied in the situation which then arose, does not imply any idea of a transfer from the Department of State to the Departments of War and of the Navy of any part of the Department of State's functions or responsibilities. Nor do I think that there was any misunderstanding on the part of the President or of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy as to the sense in which this expression was used. It seemed self-evident that the Army and the Navy would be our chief reliance in the light of the critical situation known to all of us. It was, of course, the understanding of each of us that the Department of State would continue to function and coordinate its action with that of the Army and Navy, but I emphasized that we could no longer be expected materially to control the situation.

Questions 34 and 35 are grouped in a single answer.

34. Question: Other than the Winant message, dated December 6, received by the State Department about 10:40 a. m., December 6, 1941, did you have any other information as to the [*14290*] Japanese Fleet movements as indicated in the Winant message?

35. Question: If so, will you state what the information was and when you received it?

Answer: According to State Department records, similar information was received from the Navy Department (from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet) and from the War Department (from the United States military observer at Singapore). The Navy report was available in Washington at 10:57 a. m., December 6, and I am informed that the War Department report, so far as the records indicate, came in December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning ment to the committee, the records show several telephone conversations between War and Navy officials and myself on December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning of December 7 between Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox and myself. These conversations on December 6 and 7, according to my best recollection, comprised discussion of the Japanese convoys and other information regarding Japanese military movements which we had previously received.

Questions 36 and 37 are grouped in a single answer.

36. Question: [*14291*] I show you a memorandum, exhibit 40, and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support?

37. Question: Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown by the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart?

Anwer: There was no discussion with me or with anyone else to my knowledge on the subject of advance assurance to Britain of armed American support which would have served

as a basis for the telegram from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Navy Department quoted in exhibit No. 40, or for the message from Singapore referred to in question 37. I do not know who, or whether anyone, assured the British of American armed support. However, after witnessing the suicidal experiences of countries like Belgium and Holland which had failed to confer with the Allies before they were invaded, it seemed to me but natural and necessary that the three or four governments deemed in imminent danger of attack by Japan may well have had conversations before the attack, subject, so far as we were concerned in the matter of commitments, to our constitutional limitations.

[*14292*] 38. See answer to questions 12 and 13.

Questions 39 and 40 are grouped in a single answer.

39. Question: Do you recall the one of November 7—"all arrangements must be completed by the 25th?"

40. Question: Did that message cause you to give the warning to the Cabinet?

Answer: I recall the message of November 5 (exhibit No. 1, p. 100) that, "all arrangements for the signing of this agreement must be completed by the 25th." I do not definitely recall whether the message referred to in question 39 was before me when I warned the Cabinet of the dangers in the situation on November 7. The record shows that the message in question was available on November 5, and presumably I saw it. I would say that my statement to the Cabinet was prompted by conclusions derived from a number of sources.

Questions 41 and 42 are grouped in a single answer.

41. Question: Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with our exhibit 16 and exhibit 17, wherein both Admiral Stark and General Marshall requested time?

42. Question: [*14293*] Prior to your sending the note of the 26th, were you familiar with the contents of the memorandum to the President, dated November 27, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Answer: I was familiar with the joint memoranda of Admiral Stark and General Marshall of November 5 and November 27. I do not know just when those memoranda were brought to my attention, but I am satisfied that I did not see either memorandum prior to its date. I was, of course, familiar with the views of General Marshall and Admiral Stark in regard to their desire for time, and I myself was animated by a desire to do everything I could to gain time.

Questions 43 and 44 are grouped in a single answer.

43. Question: What did you do to obtain the time as asked for by Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 and 27?

44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and what was said by the President and you in that discussion?

Answer: Generally speaking, our entire 8 months of conversations involved gaining time. There was no conflict between this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade

[*14294*] the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the Japanese in pursuance of the decision to move south, proceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military movement on a large scale.

It was obvious that the time of such attack as Japan would make would be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring circumstances. It was not within the power of this Government otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms, to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-mindedness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep always open a door to the continuation of the conversations. At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifestation of weakness which might have encouraged the Japanese to be more precipitate than they were in their action. In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time. It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the Japanese had decided to strike in their own time unless this Government should be willing to yield abjectly [*14295*] to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations with the Japanese.

45–47. See answer to questions 29 to 33.

48. Question: Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft, one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus vivendi?

Answer: A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which was labeled "Final draft," meaning that that was the last draft that was made of that document, has been furnished the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is impossible to tell what further revision might have been made if a decision had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi.

49. Question: Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of Britain, China, and the Netherlands?

Answer: The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the British, Chinese, and Netherlands diplomatic representatives was the draft of November 24. There were only [*14296*] minor differences between the November 24 and the November 25 drafts.

50. Question: I call your attention to exhibit 19, page 1, where you used the following words: "My personal view continued as on yesterday, November 28, to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy. Except for the purpose of making a record, it might even cause such a complication as Colonel Stimson and I referred to on yesterday." I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to explain what conversations you and Colonel Stimson had with the President and what was said by each of the parties in that conversation?

Answer: I do not recall precisely what conversations Mr. Stimson and I had with the President on or about November 28 in regard to the proposed message to the Emperor other than the points mentioned in my memorandum which you cite. We all realized, of course, that the Emperor at that time was powerless before the military leaders. I recall very clearly that I had in mind that the sending of a message to the Emperor might have prejudiced the situation owing to the probability that such an appeal would be likely to arouse resentment among the real leaders of Japan, because of our having gone over their heads, and moreover might have been interpreted as [*14297*] weakness, since the Japanese themselves do not normally shift from a bold front attitude to one of pleading until the situation with them is desperate. These points, to the best of my recollection, were all brought out in the discussions I had with the President and Mr. Stimson.

51. Question: What did you mean by the expression "for the purpose of making a record"?

Answer: The expression, "for the purpose of making a record," has reference to the matter of making perfectly clear to both the American and Japanese peoples then and for the future that all the efforts of this Government were directed toward maintaining peace to the very end.

52. Question: When did you first know that the President had sent a message to the Emperor?

Answer: I was in consultation with the President at all stages of the drafting of the message to the Emperor and the message, of course, was sent through the State Department. I, therefore, was aware of the message being sent at the time of its sending, about 9 p. m., December 6, 1941.

Questions 53 to 56 and 84 to 87 are grouped in a single answer.

53. Question: [*14298*] Was it before or after you learned of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 238?

54. Question: Was it before or after you learned that Japan was replying to your November 26 message?

55. Question: Was it before or after you knew the contents of any part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26 message?

56. Question: Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit 1, before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a message to the Emperor?

84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were replying to your note of November 26?

85. Question: When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part message 902, exhibit 1, page 239?

86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?

87. Question: When did you first see the message No. 844, page [*14299*] 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language: "therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This

is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off."?

Answer: I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the messages referred to were seen by me.

During the period in which those messages were being received and distributed, my attention was focused on reports of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted messages relating to Japan's reply to our communication of November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and statements during those last days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese had given clear indication as to the course they would take. Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Japanese communication announcing that the Japanese would not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the [*14300*] Government during the previous fortnight.

Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated immediate war, they could only have referred to attack by the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been watching for days.

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ultimatum on November 20, no intimations were given us that the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same time, misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us responsibility for their attack upon us.

Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.

57. Question: Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi message?

58. Question: If so, what was said about it by the President and what did you say to the President?

59. Question: [*14301*] Did you ever discuss with the President the fact that you were not going to send the modus vivendi but were going to send the note of the 26th?

60. Question: If you had such a conversation or discussion with the President about that date on the modus vivendi will you give us the conversations?

Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and consulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the details of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indicated in my statement before the committee on November 19, 1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to the President—and he approved—my calling in the Japanese

representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan.

Questions 61 and 62 are grouped in a single answer.

61. Question: Was it usual for the President to confer with Ambassadors on Sunday?

62. Question: Can you state why the meeting was held between the [*14302*] Japanese Ambassador and the President on Sunday, August 17, 1941, the day the President returned from the Atlantic Conference?

Answer: Although, during the conversations with the Japanese in 1941, August 17 was the only Sunday occasion on which the President had received them, I had conversations with them by appointment made at their request on four other Sundays: namely, May 11, June 15, June 22, and December 7. I, therefore, attached no special significance to the President's receiving them on Sunday and I do not know the reason, other than possibly the President's convenience, why the President received them on August 17 rather than an early subsequent weekday. It is true, of course, that the President did attach great importance to the communications which he made to the Japanese Ambassador on that occasion.

63. Question: Would you say that only an extraordinary matter required that the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington from a conference with the head of another Government should deliver to a third Government a note which he said, "he regretted the necessity to deliver but which he felt compelled to deliver"?

Answer: [*14303*] I would not conclude that otherwise than as indicated in replay to your question No. 62, only an extraordinary matter required the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington, to receive the Japanese Ambassador. The world was then on fire and the aggressor nations, including Japan, were wholly untrustworthy and treacherous, capable of undertaking a desperate stab at any time. Those of us in charge of foreign policy during this critical period were accustomed to spend most Sundays in our respective offices, including Sunday conferences involving both the President and foreign ambassadors.

64. Question: Was the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17, the following: Because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations, by the seizure of Indochina, the American Government had broken off informal, exploratory conversations looking to the reestablishment of traditional relations and, because of the aggression against Indochina, the American Government had broken economic relations with Japan?

Answer: An accurate description of the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17 will be found in the two oral statements handed by President [*14304*] Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

I think I should add that it was my strong opinion that the Japanese had convinced themselves that we were inade-

quately prepared and that therefore we would make sacrifices of our principles before undertaking to fight in their defense. It was incumbent on us, in justice to the Japanese as well as to ourselves, to tell them that if they pushed us too far, we would resist. I repeatedly and pointedly made this clear to the Japanese representatives in my conversations with them. President Roosevelt did likewise when he conferred with Ambassador Nomura on August 17 and agreed to resume the conversations. These representations were calculated to sober somewhat the Japanese militarists bent on aggression. But the Japanese did not take them as a threat, as the record of subsequent events shows.

65. Question: In your memorandum of the White House conversation of August 17, you say: "The President thereupon said that this Government should really bring the matters between the two Governments literally up to date and that he would therefore, offer certain observations about the position of this Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so doing but that he had no other recourse;" (cf. Foreign Relations, vol. 2, p. 555). Will you give the [*14305*] interpretation in the terms of diplomacy of the statement by the head of one nation to another nation, with whom relations are critically strained, that he regrets the necessity of a note which he is about to deliver but that he has no other recourse but to deliver it?

Answer: It seems perfectly clear to me that what the President regretted was that the Japanese should have created a situation which rendered necessary a message of the import of the one which he at that time delivered to the Japanese. The President was endeavoring, in friendly fashion, to impress upon the Japanese Government our attitude as I have described it in answer to question 64.

66. Question: Do you know of any agreement with another power which had fixed the date of delivery of this note, and the second note, to be August 17?

Answer: I do not know of any agreement with any other power which called for delivery on August 17 of the two communications which were made to the Japanese on that date. The official record shows, however, that President Roosevelt told Prime Minister Churchill at their Atlantic meeting that he, the President, planned to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately on his return to Washington.

[*14306*] Questions 67 and 68 are grouped in a single answer.

67. Question: Do you know on what date that other power took the same action as the President took in line with their agreement for the making of parallel representations to Japan?

68. Question: Have you ever seen the text of the representations which were made by the British Government on August 17, or any subsequent or preceding date, agreed upon to be made parallelly with those made by the President on or about August 17?

Answer: The Department has no record of any parallel action taken by the British Government corresponding to the action taken by the President vis-a-vis the Japanese on August 17, and I know of no parallel action taken by the British

other than the radio address of the British Prime Minister on August 24, 1941.

69. Question: The President by his action of August 16 was deciding ipso facto, not to await a bid which you had every reason to believe was coming from Japan. Did you suggest waiting?

Answer: Our judgment as to potentialities of Japanese policy [*14307*] had to be formed in the light of Japan's actions toward implementation of the decision of the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, which called inter alia for a military advance south, of Japan's rejection of the President's proposal of July 24 to neutralize Indochina, and of 3 months of searching conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. With these in mind, it was idle to expect that the "concessions" which the Japanese Ambassador suggested might be forthcoming from his Government would be addressed to the fundamentals of the situation, which from our point of view called for Japan's removal of the menace she was creating to the United States and other peaceful nations and for her desisting from her aggressive courses. If Japan had in fact any intention of revising her position and adopting peaceful courses, there was nothing in the President's communication to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17 which would have tended to discourage Japan from adjusting her position; on the contrary, what the President said on that occasion was calculated to help rather than hinder reconsideration by Japan of her policies. There was therefore no advantage whatever in awaiting a further Japanese initiative.

Questions 70, 71, and 72 are grouped in a single answer.

70. Question: I find no reference, Mr. Secretary, in your prepared [*14308*] statement, to a communication from the Japanese Foreign Minister and an accompanying commentary by Ambassador Grew received by the State Department soon after midnight on August 18, 1941: Do you recall such documents which the State Department published in Foreign Relations 11, pages 560–565?

71. Question: They establish, do they not, that at the time the President was delivering the first and then the second note of August 17, the Japanese Foreign Minister was delivering to Ambassador Grew a lengthy overture for the resumption of the conversations looking to a restoration of traditional relations? (N. B. Tokyo time, 14 hours later.)

72. Question: And in transmitting the Japanese message, Ambassador Grew quote: "With all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without every prayerful consideration . . ." also that the proposal was "unprecedented in Japanese history" and had been made with the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities of the land; that is correct, is it not?

Answer: [*14309*] There is no controversy about the contents of the documents referred to in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–41, volume II, pages 560–

565, containing an account of the approach made by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew in regard to a proposal for a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the President and a statement of Ambassador Grew's reaction. That Japanese proposal is discussed and analyzed at some length in my prepared statement to the committee, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. The President and I, together with our Far Eastern advisers, were looking at the situation with the benefit of all the world-wide information available to us in Washington. We judged that the Japanese Government had no serious expectation of reaching an understanding at the proposed meeting unless the American Government surrendered its basic position while Japan rigidly adhered to and went forward with its policy of aggression and conquest. We had fully tested out the Japanese Government by preliminary inquiries and found it adamant in its position.

Nothing in the record of subsequent developments has contradicted our judgment at that time, but on the contrary, events have vindicated it. For example, the memoirs of Prince Konoye subsequently published in serial form in the Asahi Shimbun, a leading Tokyo newspaper [*14310*] running from December 20 to December 31, 1945, state that the Japanese army leaders agreed, in writing, on August 4, 1941 to Konoye's proposal for a meeting with the President only on condition that Japan adhere firmly to its fundamental policy and that in the event the President did not see eye to eye with the Japanese, Konoye would leave the meeting place determined to make war on the United States. Konoye also disclosed in his memoirs that at an Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, the Japanese Government decided, in case there was no expectation within the first 10 days of October to gain her demands on the United States by diplomacy, to go to war with the United States, and accordingly to parallel diplomatic efforts with military preparations.

These disclosures by Konoye show conclusively that the Japanese would attack in their own chosen time unless we should surrender abjectly to the drastic Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and that if we had made no reply instead of delivering our communication of November 26, the 10-point proposal, the Japanese would have attacked just the same.

73. Question: On November 7, 1941, you warned the Cabinet they might look for an offensive by Japan at any time. What did you base that warning on?

[*14311*] Answer: My warning to the Cabinet on November 7 was based upon the acceleration of Japanese military activities and disquieting military disposals, especially in Indochina, the growing agitation in the Japanese press and among Japanese spokesmen for positive action, the pressure tactics employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing acceptance by this Government of the Japanese proposals, as well as the corroborative evidence of the intercepted Japanese messages.

74. Question: When did you draft the 10-point note of November 26?
Answer: Under the modus vivendi proposal the Japanese would have been committed to affirming that their national policies were directed toward lasting peace throughout the Pacific area and that they had no territorial ambitions therein. Its acceptance was also subject to the understanding that during its life (of 3 months subject to a further extension) there would be further conferences looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. There was attached to the modus vivendi proposal a plan of a comprehensive settlement as one practical exemplification of what we had in mind. This plan, consisting of two sections, a draft of a mutual [*14312*] declaration of policy and a statement of the steps to be taken by the two Governments, was common to both the modus vivendi proposal and the communication of November 26. Some of the material in section 1 was drafted months earlier, the remainder, including the material in section 2, in the course of a few days preceding November 26, and the latter part of the accompanying explanatory statement, which was not contained in the modus vivendi draft, on November 26.

Questions 75 and 76 are grouped in a single answer.

75. Question: At any time before it was sent, did you show it to the President or call the contents to his attention?

76. Question: If so, what was your conversation?
Answer: In the light of the foregoing explanation, it is clear that as the President was thoroughly familiar with the entire proposal, all that was called for was to consult with him about dropping the modus vivendi feature of the proposal. This I did by presenting to him a memorandum on November 26, a copy of which is in the hands of the committee, and obtained his prompt approval. I do not recall the details of any conversation on this.

Questions 77 and 78 are grouped in a single answer.

[*14313*] 7. Question: Did you see the message from General Marshall to Geenral Short on November 27?

78. Question: If you saw such a note, when was its contents called to your attention?
Answer: I have no recollection that I saw before the publication of the Roberts Report the substance of General Marshall's message to General Short of November 27, 1941.

Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.

79. Question: Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and America grow worse after November 27?

80. Question: If they did grow worse how do you account for no other message being given to the commanders in the field?
Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan [*14314*]

might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establishment could not be expected to preserve national security.

81. Question: Will you explain in detail if you were consulted in connection with the message to Short which contained the phrase "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" and also in regard to not arousing the citizens?

Answer: I have no recollection of having been consulted in connection with the considerations which entered into inclusion in General Marshall's message to Short of the phrase, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act," or in regard to the caveat against arousing the citizens. This was primarily a military question.

82, 83. See answer to question 14.

84, 85, 86, 87. See answer to questions 53–56.

88. Question: Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indicate to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and, therefore, that war was imminent?

Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United [*14315*] States to Japan's demands. The intercepted Japanese message to which you refer did no more than confirm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject surrender to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26. I said at the time that there was only the barest possibility of her accepting. She would have proceeded to attack us whether we had presented that proposal or any other proposal—unless it had been one of humiliating and abject surrender—or whether we had offered no proposal at all. Furthermore, while a number of us in the State, War and Navy Departments were desirous of grabbing at any straw and therefore hoped for favorable action on the modus vivendi, most of us agreed that the chances of its acceptance were very slim. The testimony of Army and Navy officials on this point is in the record.

The November 26 proposal was another test of whether Japan was willing to abandon conquest and to adopt peaceful policies; if she were so willing she would have seized upon our ten-point program as highly desirable.

89. Question: Where were you on the night of December 6, 1941?

Answer: I was most invariably at home at night working on [*14316*] Departmental matters. While it is possible that I might be mistaken, my best recollection is that I was at home on the night of December 6, 1941.

90. Question: When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents of the following messages in exhibit 1:

#904—page 245.
#907—page 248.
#908—page 248.
#909—page 240.
#910—page 249.

Answer: I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned of the contents of the messages you cite.

Questions 91 to 96 are grouped in a single answer.

91. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with the President?

92. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

93. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with General Marshall?

94. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

[*14317*] 95. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with Admiral Stark?

96. Question: If so, give us the conversations.

Answer: At this late date in 1946 I do not recall whether I discussed any particular messages or the details of the discussion with the President, with General Marshall, or with Admiral Stark. It is true that in many of our conversations, including those with Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and some with the President, some of us would bring up one or another of the intercepted messages. But I have no recollection of discussions of specific messages.

97. Question: Who called the meeting in your office on the morning of December 7?

Answer: As I recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested in the first instance by any one or two of us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew out of a desire to continue our dis- [*14318*] cussion of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indochina.

98. Question: Tell us with whom you talked personally, by phone, or messenger, about this meeting and what was said.

Answer: I cannot recall material details beyond what I have given in reply to question 97.

99. Question: Please state in detail what was said by the persons attending the meeting in your office on December 7, 1941.

Answer: As I indicated in my prepared statement to the joint committee as well as in my oral testimony, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and I in our conference of December 7, 1941, discussed the critical situation created by the large-scale Japanese military movement from the jumping-off place in Indochina. I cannot recall details of that discussion. Secretary Stimson has described the discussion in his statement to the Committee and that statement speaks for itself.

Questions 100 to 102 are grouped in a single answer.

100. Question: Our record shows that the President saw the 13 parts [*14319*] of the 14-part message at about 9:30 p. m., December 6, 1941. Did you see or talk to the President from that time until after the attack at Pearl Harbor?

101. Question: If so, give us your conversations.

102. Question: If you did not see him or talk to him or contact him—were you available?

Answer: I have no record of nor do I recall having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p. m. on December 6, 1941, and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to my best recollection, I was available during all of that period.

Questions 103 and 104 are grouped in a single answer.

103. Question: Did anyone from the Army, Navy, or State Departments, or executive offices contact you on Saturday, December 6, and/or Sunday, December 7, up to 2 p. m. Sunday?

104. Question: If so, give the conversations.

Answer: I was in constant contact during Saturday, December 6, and Sunday, December 7, with officers of the State Department and of the Army and Navy. As recorded in annex A [*14320*] of my statement to the committee, I had on those 2 days conferences, consultations and telephone conversations—as entered in engagement books—with representatives of the Army and the Navy, as follows:

December 6 10:45 a. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Knox.
11:50 a. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
1:00 p. m.: Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
1:15 p. m.: Telephone call from Admiral Stark.
1:50 p. m.: Captain Schuirmann.
5:15 p.. m.: Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
8:45 p. m.: Telephone call to Secretary Knox.

December 7 10:30 a. m.: Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
10:30 a. m.: Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox.
2:10 p. m.: Telephone call from Admiral Stark.

In addition, I had many conferences on those days with officers of the Department of State. It would be [*14321*] impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern Indochina was very much in the minds of all of us who were called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements, their probable destination, etcetra.

Questions 105 and 106 are grouped in a single answer.

105. Question: Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the official records of American-Japanese relations from August 28, 1941, until December 7, 1941, show that the Secretary of State never considered that the Japanese Government was bluffing in its assertions that, should no agreement be reached with the United States, Japan would strike?

106. Question: In this connection, Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the records established that the Secretary of State accepted at face value the statements in diplomatic exchange wherein

Konoye on August 28, Toyoda on September 27, Togo on November 12, Nomura on November 12, and Kurusu on November 17 and 18, indicated or said that a rupture of the conversations would mean war in the Pacific? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11, pp. 572–3, 642, 719–22, 725, 740, 747.)

[*14322*] Answer: My view, as set forth in the record of American-Japanese relations over several years, was that Japan was not bluffing but was on a steady and fixed course of conquest which would reach us in Japan's own chosen time. I believed that Japan was playing the role of an international desperado, and it is the principal business of a desperado—whether a nation or an individual—to fight. During that period Japan believed that she was exceedingly well armed for the purpose of achieving her intended conquests in the Pacific area. She likewise knew that at that time we were by no means sufficiently armed in the Pacific to resist successfully a Japanese attack. Therefore, at the time, to which your inquiry related, I was satisfied that Japan was not bluffing but rather was giving us a last chance to yield our basic principles which would enable her to continue her course of aggression and conquest without further serious risk of successful resistance.

When we realize that Japan was carrying on flagrant aggressions and ruthless invasions of peaceful countries, that the United States was pleading with her from the beginning to cease her course of military conquest in close partnership with Hitler, and that all problems in the Pacific would practically settle themselves at once [*14323*] when Japan adopted a policy of peace, it becomes apparent that she had no more right to make demands on the United States—as though we too were an aggressor, instead of a law-abiding country pleading for peace—than an individual gangster has to assume a like attitude toward his intended victim. It is in the light of these circumstances that we must view all the arguments which the Japanese used in trying to browbeat the United States into yielding, such as those described in the reference cited in your question.

Questions 107 to 109 are grouped in a single answer.

107. Question: In this respect was the Secretary's evaluation of the situation at one with Ambassador Grew's, namely that the Japanese were not bluffing but could be expected to strike suddenly and dramatically?

108. Question: Did the Secretary, with the information from Ambassador Grew that the Tojo cabinet had advised the Emperor as to how far it would go with the United States, and, with the information from an intercepted Japanese message that a deadline had been fixed for November 25, tell the American Cabinet on November 7 that a new and sudden Japanese aggression was to be looked for? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11, pp. 700–1, Intercepts, [*14324*] ex. 1, p. 100, Peace and War, pp. 135–7.)

109. Question: Did the Cabinet thereupon vote unanimously that Secretary Knox and Under Secretary Welles should deliver

addresses on Armistice Day to the end of informing the nation as to American-Japanese relations? (Cf. Peace and War, pp. 136–7; 776–87.)

Answer: In reply to these questions, I quote the first paragraph of page 29 of my prepared statement to the committee:

> On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It [*14325*] became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

I also quote a paragraph from Peace and War, pages 136–137:

> Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force. It thereupon became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, [*14326*] carrying out the cabinet suggestion in an address, stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."

110. Question: Subsequent to November 7, will the witness agree that the official records and his testimony here show that he advised high military officials of the Government and also the British Ambassador that a sudden attack anywhere in the Pacific by Japan must be anticipated?

Answer: In reply I quote from Peace and War, 2 paragraphs appearing on pages 144–145:

> On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there [*14327*] was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with

a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that, "the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy." He said further that it would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the [*14328*] peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk."

Furthermore, I and my associates were in daily consultation with the Army and Navy officials throughout the period after November 7, exchanging information and views as to the critical character of the situation.

111. Question: Is it correct to say that the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo on November 28 (No. 844, p. 195, Ex. 1) giving the reaction to the American notes of November 26, and also the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin on November 30 (No. 985, p. 204, Ex. 1) informing Hitler of Japan's intentions, confirmed the judgments you had been stating in official councils since November 7?

Answer: During this period all the information we received made clearer Japan's purpose to attack unless the United States yielded to them. In other words, Japan had no intention of yielding any part of her plan of conquest by force, but was giving the United States, by its pro- [*14329*] posal of November 20, a last opportunity to choose between yielding or fighting. Insofar as the intercepted Japanese messages cited in the question indicated that in consequence of the refusal of the United States to yield to Japan's unreasonable demands the Japanese intended to take forcible measures to gain their ends, those intercepted messages served to confirm my judgments as expressed by me in official councils, especially during those last few weeks.

112. Question: Did not the fact that Japan, without a declaration of war, attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, confirm, in their entirety, the judgments you had been offering in official councils since November 7?

Answer: Japan's attack on a number of points over a sweep of thousands of miles, one of which points was Pearl Harbor, at about the same time confirmed our judgment as to the critically dangerous character of the situation.

113. Question: Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, your meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors in your apartment on the night of November 22 in which they pressed for a reply to the Japanese note of November 20? (Cf. How War Came, p. [*14330*] 304, also For. Relations 11.)

Answer: I do recall my meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22 when they pressed for a reply to the Japanese proposals of November 20. During the month of No-

vember the Japanese representatives were insistently worrying me with their importunities for a quick understanding, intimating that otherwise something awful would happen.

114. Question: I quote in full a secret message from Tokyo to the Ambassadors, under date of November 22, intercepted by the Army at Washington and translated on the same date:

(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
(Urgent)
#812
To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond [*14331*] your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or 4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone." (Cf. Intercepts No. 812, p. 165, exhibit 1, our record.)

Did you telephone the President on the night of the 22 concerning this intercepted message? (Cf. How War Came, p. 304.)

Answer: To the best of my recollection I did not telephone to the President on the night of the 22d of November in regard to the intercepted message quoted in the question, and I find no record of having made such a call.

115. Question: Did you on November 26 hand the Japanese Ambassador [*14332*] an oral statement which rejected the Japanese note of November 20?

Answer: Please refer to my replies to your questions Nos. 6 and 7.

116. Question: Did you, at the same time, hand them a tentative 10-point proposal for a broad settlement of the Pacific situation?

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 8.

117. Question: Did the Japanese Ambassadors say that their Government would throw up its hands because of these American documents and that their nature was tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations?

Answer: What the Japanese representatives said is covered in the memorandum of my conversation of November 26, 1941, with the Japanese representatives. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan. 1931–41, vol. II. pp. 764–766).

As I saw the situation at that time, the Japanese had in fact already "thrown up their hands," and, as subsequent disclosures show, their fleets and armed forces [*14333*] were then moving for an attack on some five points extending over a vast space. The attitude evinced by the Japanese

on the occasion under reference was confirmatory of their fixed purpose of requiring us to surrender our basic policy while they maintained intact their policy of aggression and force.

118. Question: Did the reports of the Japanese Ambassadors to their Government concerning the meeting of November 26, reports known to you by the interception of the messages to Tokyo, coincide in the main with your understanding of what had taken place on November 26?

Answer: The published record of this Government (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–41, vol. II, pp. 764–765) contains a full account of the substance of the conversation which I had with the Japanese representatives on November 26. The accounts in the Japanese intercepted messages of that conversation in order to be correctly evaluated must be considered in the light of the background of the situation. It is my understanding that the main object of the Japanese Government in pressing for a reply to their November 20 proposal was to ascertain beyond any doubt whether this Government would yield to the Japanese or whether this [*14334*] Government was going to stand firm, and if the Japanese had learned that we were standing firm they would continue forward with the attack. Our position of not yielding was as clear as crystal to the Japanese Ambassadors, and all their talk of being "dumbfounded" at the nature of our November 26 proposal was a prelude to an attempt, by outrageously false statements uttered in the utmost of bad faith, to shift to this Government responsibility for what they were planning. As showing this thought was specifically in their minds, I quote from the Japanese message 1190 of November 26, appearing on pages 182 and 183 of exhibit 1, especially that portion which reads as follows:

> The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French [*14335*] Indochina. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counterpropaganda against us.

The foregoing is a virtual admission that the Japanese Ambassador recognized that responsibility for a rupture would be Japan's and of a purpose to attempt to shift that responsibility.

119. Question: There is, in the record, an intercepted message from Tokyo, No. 823, page 173, which advised Nomura and Kurusu that the deadline fixed for November 29 was to be reckoned in Tokyo time: thus when the President left Washington for Warm Springs at 3 p. m. on November 28, the time in Tokyo

was 5 a. m. of November 29; do you know if there were any coincidence in the fact that the President was leaving Washington at the time of the expiration of the deadline set by Tokyo?

Answer: I do not myself recall anything on this point. The fact was that for some days the President and I believed that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished.

[*14336*] On the day the President left for Warm Springs, November 28, he told the press that he was leaving on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it need not be before December 2, adding that he might have to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the President referred the inquirer to Tokyo rather than to Washington.

120. Question: In a talk at the Thanksgiving Day dinner at Warm Springs on the night of November 29 the President said, speaking in terms of the Thanksgiving of the following year; "It is always possible that our boys at the military and naval academies may actually be fighting for the defense of these American institutions of ours" (cf. N. Y. Times, November 30): in the circumstances would you say that the limitation to the boys of the military and naval academies was intended to have particular significance to the Japanese or to the American people?

Answer: I, myself, would not be a party to giving the President's statement the narrow construction suggested. The statement, directed toward national defense and made to an American audience, speaks for itself.

Question 121 and 122 are grouped in a single answer.

[*14337*] 121. Question: I have found, Mr. Secretary, a discrepancy in the date given by you in your statement to the committee as to an address by Premier Tojo of Japan and your telephoning the President concerning that address and other developments; on pages 43–44 of your statement the date is fixed as of Sunday, November 30; the New York Times of the morning of November 30, fixes both occurrences as of November 29 and gives this authorized statement by the President's secretary, Mr. Early, issued at Warm Springs on the night of November 29: I quote Mr. Early's statement: "As soon as the President returned to the cottage following the dinner this evening he found a call waiting from the Secretary of State, and they held a lengthy conversation. In view of the reported statement—an Associated Press dispatch by the Premier of Japan—the President tonight is of the opinion that he may have to leave Warm Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad schedule so as to arrive in Washington Monday befor enoon": In view of this record would you say that the Tojo speech was delivered on November 29 and that you telephoned the President concerning it on November 29?

122. Question: Will you give the conversation between you and the President?

[*14338*] Answer: I seem to have telephoned the President on November 29, instead of on November 30 as, by inadvertence, was inaccurately stated in my prepared statement to the Committee. The statement of Premier Tojo was, according to State Department records, delivered in the form of a message to a Japanese meeting held on November 30. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II, p. 148.) The apparent discrepancy in time may have resulted from the fact that Japanese time is about 14 hours laters than Washington time, or perhaps the message may have been available to the press prior to its delivery.

I have no record of exactly what was said in that telephone conversation. As I told the committee in my prepared statement, in that conversation I advised the President to advance the date of his return to Washington.

Questions 123 and 124 are grouped in a a single answer.

123. Question: From page 195 of the record of the Intercepts, exhibit 1, I quote:

(Secret)
From Tokyo
To Washington
November 28, 1941
[*14339*] # 844
Re your file # 1189

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de fecto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off: Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions, and that, although the opinions of your Government are not clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your No. 1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best [*14340*] you can.

The record is that this intercepted message had been decoded and translated on November 28; do you recall discussing it with the President before his departure for Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 28th?

124. Question: Did you discuss this intercepted message in your telephonic conversation with the President at Warm Springs on the night of November 29?

Answer: I do not recall discussing with the President the intercepted Japanese message quoted by you.

125. Question: Would you say that it was the Tojo address which alone prompted your call and the President's return?

Answer: The gravity of the situation was evident from many sources. As Tojo's statement reflected the extreme acuteness of the situation, in that sense it may be said that the statement prompted my telephone call and the President's return.

126. Question: Did the intercepted message of the 28th constitute the first official knowledge you had of the Japanese Government's reaction to the notes of the 26th?

[*14341*] Answer: As I have already stated, I kept no record of when particular messages reached me. I can therefore only presume that the intercepted Japanese message in question was the first knowledge I had of what purported to be the Japanese Government's reaction to this Government's proposal of November 26. This reaction was fully expected in the light of the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum on November 20 and of subsequent developments.

127. Question: The message said definitely, did it not, that the American note was unacceptable, that a rupture was inevitable within a few days, and that Nomura and Kurusu were to make a pretense of carrying on the conversations until the official word came to them of the break?

Answer: The message indicated among other things that the Japanese Government would not accept as a basis for negotiations the American communication of November 26, that the "negotiations" would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 days and that the Japanese ambassadors were to avoid giving the impression the "negotiations" were broken off. I have hereinbefore pointed ou that I considered serious conversations over after the 20th or 21st barring the very slight possibility that the Japanese might come [*14342*] back. When the full facts later came out they further confirmed our appraisal of the situation.

128. Question: Did you have in mind, in any way, the secret Tokyo message of the 28th when, on the day following, you told Lord Halifax that the diplomatic phase was over and that the situation was now in the hands of the American Army and Navy? (Peace and War, pp. 816–817.)

Answer: I do not recall whether I had the message in mind when I talked to the British ambassador on November 29. What I told the British ambassador was substantially what I had been saying to the President and to representatives of the Army and Navy for some days previously, based on conclusions derived from various sources.

129. Question: In line with your convictions as to the intentions of Japan did you accept at full value the statements expressed by Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on the 28th?

Answer: I considered this message in the light of previous instructions to Nomura and Kurusu to do their utmost to induce the Government of the United States to surrender its basic policies. In the message of November 28 the Japanese Government, realizing that the effort had ended [*14343*] in failure, was thanking the Japanese representatives for their efforts; secondly the Japanese addressed themselves to framing up a cloak to cover their attack already under way,

which cloak included what was in effect the fantastic and monstrously false charge that this Government was treating the Japanese outrageously by refusing to surrender to them.

130. Question: You have testified that on November 29, you prepared for the President's consideration a draft of a Presidential message to Congress advising that body of the American-Japanese situation?

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 16.

131. Question: Did you, on the evening of November 29, in your telephonic conversation with the President, discuss such a proposed message to Congress?

Answer: I do not recall whether I discussed the proposed message to Congress in a telephone conversation with the President on November 29.

132. Queston: In the preparation on the 29th of a proposed Presidential message to Congress did you have in mind, in any [*14344*] way, that provision of the Constitution which provides that from time to time the President shall give to Congress information as to the state of the Union and recommend to the Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient? (Cf. art. 11, sec. 3.)

Answer: Please refer to my reply to your question No. 19.

133. Question: If your answer to the previous question is "no" I ask you why such a course was considered even to preparation of a message.

Answer: In the critical situation which then existed it was deemed important to give consideration to any and all lines of action that might in the least be helpful in meeting the situation.

134. Question: You have testified that on Sunday, November 30, Lord Halifax told you that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula; did Lord Halifax tell you that the British had obtained this information through interception of a Tokyo message intended for Hitler, personally?

Answer: [*14345*] I do not recall that the British Ambassador informed me of the source from which the British Government had had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula, and I find nothing in the record indicating that he mentioned the source.

Questions 135 and 137 are grouped in a single answer.

135. Question: A message from the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin to Tokyo, dated November 29 and decoded in Washington on December 1, has the Japanese Ambassador advising his Government that Ribbentrop had informed him that Germany had information that America's stiff front had practically ended the Washington conversations; whereupon the Ambassador had told Ribbentrop that he had no official word from Tokyo as to the conversations or as to Japan's intentions; my question is: Did this intercepted message from Berlin to Tokyo fit in with the evidence of previous intercepts, and of Ambassador Grew's reports, that Japan had

been keeping Hitler in the dark as to the Washington conversations? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 200.)

137. Question: Is it not clearly indicated, if not established, by the intercept from Berlin of November 29 that on that day neither the Japanese Ambassador nor Hitler had [*14346*] definite information as to Japan's intentions toward the United States?

Answer: It would seem clear from the message under reference that the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin had not communicated from his Government to the German Government at that time a report on the current situation regarding the Japanese-American conversations. The Germans had more than one way of keeping in touch with Japan. The possibility is not excluded that Hitler and also Ribbentrop had received reports from the German Ambassador at Tokyo of the progress of the conversations. Therefore, I would not wish to undertake to interpret the message.

136. Question: November 29 was the day of the Japanese dead line?

Answer: Tokyo's message to the Japanese Ambassador No. 812 of November 22, 1941, of which a translation appears on page 165, exhibit 1, contains the following passage:

> There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or 4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you— [*14347*] twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed.

The foregoing bald confession by the Japanese Government of its plan and patent movement to attack unless the United States surrendered to the demands in Japan's ultimatum fits in with all that I said and did following that date.

138. Question: Also intercepted, and decoded in Washington on December 1, was a message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador at Berlin, dated Tokyo, November 30; Therein the Japanese Ambassador is informed that American-Japanese conversations now "stand ruptured—broken"; the Japanese Government instructs the Ambassador to see Hitler and Ribbentrop immediately and to say "very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms" and to "add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams"; my question is: Did this message and the attendant circumstances of it strengthen your [*14348*] convictions as to Japan's intentions? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 204.)

Answer: The message to which you refer was cumulative evidence of the conclusions which I had already reached in regard to Japan's intentions, and which were overwhelmingly supported by the surrounding facts and circumstances.

Questions 139 and 140 are grouped in a single answer.

139. Question: In fixing the deadline for November 29, Tokyo had secretly advised Nomura and Kurusu that after that date things would happen automatically, had it not?

140. Question: Did you consider the message to Hitler on November 30, a portentous automatic happening in the crisis?

Answer: On November 22 the Japanese Government instructed Nomura and Kurusu in regard to the extension from November 25 to November 29 for the deadline for the conclusion of an agreement and stated that: "After that things are automatically going to happen" (exhibit No. 1, p. 165). The message from Tokyo to Berlin of November 30, 1941 (exhibit No. 1, p. 204), was, of course, in harmony with what the Japanese had in mind as revealed through numerous sources.

[*14349*] 141. Question: Did the President return to Washington on December 1?

Answer: The record shows that the President returned to Washington from Warm Springs on December 1.

Questions 142 to 145 are grouped in a single answer.

142. Question: Did he direct the preparation of a strong note to Japan asking of that Government an explanation for its concentration of forces in the southern part of Indochina?

143. Question: Did the President on December 2, direct the State Department to hand the Japanese a communication in which the President stated that Japanese concentrations in southern Indochina implied the utilization of these forces by Japan for aggression against the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya or Thailand? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 778–779.)

144. Question: Was such a communication handed to the Japanese?

145. Question: Did that communication state that the Hitleresque nature of the Japanese concentrations and the broad problem of American defense had prompted the President's representations? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, p. 779, last [*14350*] paragraph of text of note.)

Answer: The President on December 2 simply directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop movements in Indochina. On the same day the Under Secretary of State, in compliance with the President's instruction, informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the President's inquiry. The record of the matter appears in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–41, volume II, pages 778–781.

146. Question: Did the Japanese military concentrations and military movements, known to the American Government in the period November 30–December 6, 1941, constitute threats to American Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan in the Pacific, and to the American sources of vital materials?

Answer: The Japanese military concentrations and military movements known to the American Government in the period November 30–December 6, 1941, so far as I could judge as

Secretary of State, did constitute serious threats to American Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan, and to American sources of vital [*14351*] materials.

Questions 147 and 148 are grouped in a single answer.

147. Question: Did such threats require that the United States immediately take any and all steps to meet them in conformity with the statement of the American Government to Japan on August 17, 1941, to-wit:

* * * this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force OR THREAT OF FORCE of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

(Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 556–7.)

148. Question: Did the Japanese military concentrations and movements of November 30–December 6 constitute a challenge to the Government of the United States to implement the position it had taken in its note of August 17 to Japan?

Answer: The purpose of the United States, in making the statement of August 17 under reference, was to tell [*14352*] Japan in a friendly way that if she kept encroaching upon our rights and interests, we would defend ourselves. This Government at that time was acutely concerned over Japan's refusal to agree to our proposal for the neutralization of Indochina, to abandon her jumping-off place there, and otherwise to desist from the menace she was creating to us and other peace-minded nations. It wholly misrepresents the attitude of the United States in the period after August 17 to allege that this Government was planning any step other than that of pure defense in the event the Japanese should attack. Other aspects of this question, for example, where, when and how we would resist the Japanese, were essentially a military matter.

149. Question: Had the Secretary of State, in September 1940, informed Lord Lothian that American actions towards Japan in the Pacific would be predicated upon a policy of doing everything legitimately possible to help England win the war? (Cf. Peace and War, p. 575.)

Answer: What I said to Lord Lothian on September 30, 1940, in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memorandum of conversation with him appearing on pages 574–575 of Peace and War. My comments to Lord Lothian [*14353*] had to do with the broad aspects of the situation created by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact but also had special reference to the winning of the war by Great Britain against Germany. At that moment Germany had already overrun much of the Continent of Europe and the British and the entire Allied cause was virtually hanging by a thread. Every rational person realizes what would have happened to this country if Hitler and his allies had succeeded in their

program. It was in these circumstances that I had my conversation with Lord Lothian. I said:

> The relations between Germany, Italy, and Japan, each having a common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each pursuing identical policies of force, devastation and seizure, have been during recent years on a basis of complete understanding and of mutual cooperation for all purposes mutually desirable and reasonably practicable, with the result that the recent announcement was part and parcel of the chain of related events.
>
> I then proceeded to say that this Government has pursued a definite and somewhat progressive line of acts and utterances in resisting Japanese aggression and treaty violations during recent years; that these acts and utterances have comprised repeated aid to China, suc- [*14354*] cessive moral embargoes, abandonment of the commercial treaty, actual embargoes under law, the sending of our Navy to Hawaii, together with appropriate statements and notes of strong remonstrance against Japanese steps of aggression and constant repetition of the basic principles of world order under law. I added that I did not undertake to predict, much less to make commitments, as to how fast and how far this Government may go in following up the various acts and utterances in which it has been indulging; that, of course, the special desire of this Government is to see Great Britain succeed in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect to the Pacific area would be more or less affected as to time and extent by the question of what course would, on the part of this Government, most effectively and legitimately aid Great Britain in winning the war.

150. Question: Had the Secretary of State in August 1941, informed Lord Halifax that a Japanese movement into the South Pacific would constitute a danger to England second only to a German invasion across the English Channel? (Cf. Peace and War, pp. 710–711.)

Answer: What I said to Lord Halifax on August 9 in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memorandum [*14355*] of conversation with him appearing on pages 710–711 of Peace and War which reads as follows:

> The Ambassador made some inquiry about the amount of aid this Government might give in case Singapore or the Dutch East Indies should be attacked. I replied that I myself visualized the problem and issue in the broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel. I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain at the same time. I said that in the event of further [*14356*] Japanese movements south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in the light of the statement I had just made.

151. Question: Had the Congress, on November 13, 1941, at the solicitation of the President and the Secretary of State, committed the nation to keeping open the sea lanes so that Lend-Lease might fulfill its function? (Cf. New York Times, November 14.)

Answer: My view of the significance of the measure passed by the House of Representatives on November 13, 1941, providing for the amendment to the Neutrality Act is contained in a letter I wrote to Speaker Rayburn and Representative McCormack on that same day.

In that letter I stated:

> The breadth of our self-defense must at all times equal the breadth of the dangers which threaten us. In the circumstances of today, we must be free to arm our merchant ships for their own protection; and we must be free, in the event of particular and extreme emergency, to use these ships for the carriage of supplies to nations which are resisting the world- [*14357*] wide movement of conquest headed in our direction. This Government would, of course, use caution in carrying out the power which it could exercise upon the passage of the bill.

I also stated:

> The greatest intermediate objective of Hitler's armed forces is to capture Great Britain and to gain control of the high seas. To this end, Hitler has projected his forces far out into the Atlantic with a policy of submarine ruthlessness. By intimidation and terror he would drive our ships from the high seas, and ships of all nations from most of the North Atlantic. Even in the waters of the Western Hemisphere he has attacked and destroyed our ships, as well as ships of other American republics, with resulting loss of American lives.

The action of Congress in amending the Neutrality Act was only one factor in promoting the broad problem of self-defense, the necessity of which at that time was urgent and compelling.

152. Question: In addition to the physical threat to the Philippines as stated in the President's communication to Japan of December 2, did the Japanese military movements constitute a danger to the commitments made by Congress in author- [*14358*] izing lend-lease and in re-establishing the American policy of freedom of the seas?

Answer: I would say that the Japanese military movements constituted a danger to the defense of free nations resisting the world-wide movement of conquest. The intent of lend-lease was to assist in that defense. The broad question of danger to this and to all peaceful countries was Japan's military partnership with Hitler for conquest. A material factor in the situation was Japan's flagrant violations of American rights and interests and the jeopardizing of American lives in China, which portended the extension of such violations over a much wider area. This Government could not afford to be deluded by Japan's false claims and pretensions which masked her designs of conquest, and to be oblivious to our own serious dangers.

153. Question: You have testified, have you not, that the decision of the Executive, in the period November 29–December 6, was not to advise Congress in a message of the state of American-Japanese relations?

Answer: In my testimony on November 26, 1945, in reply to questions by counsel as to "what the facts and circum- [*14359*] stances were which led to the decision not to deliver that message to the Congress prior to December 7, "I set forth various considerations which influenced the President and myself against acting prematurely in that matter. I have also discussed this in answer to your questions Nos. 18 and 19. The issue between isolationists and nonisolationists was then at fever heat and its line of cleavage extended through the Congress. The sending of a message to Congress at this critical juncture would have greatly accentuated that issue and would have correspondingly encouraged the Japanese militarists. The fact was that we had been doing our best to acquaint the Congress and the public with the critical dangers in the situation, and at the same time to avoid precipitating the crisis which the military people were anxi- to defer as long as possible.

Questions 154 to 156 are grouped in a single answer.

154. Question: As one reason for this decision not to send a message to Congress, you have testified that Congress only a few weeks before November 29, had by only one vote, sustained the Selective Service. Are you aware that the vote in question was in the House on August 13, 1941, 3½ months before November 29, 1941?

155. Question: [*14360*] Are you aware that the vote had to do with the matter of releasing at the end of a year's service those whose service had been limited to one year in the original bill?

156. Question: Are you aware that the House took this vote in ignorance of the fact that, a day or two before, the President, at the Atlantic Conference, was agreeing with the British Prime Minister on a course of American action with relation to Japan?

Answer: Without discussing the technicalities of the selective service extension bill under consideration in August 1941, it is still my convicition that the close vote in the House on that bill, 203 to 202, indicated the violently divided character of national opinion at the time. Furthermore, had the bill been defeated, the forces of aggression would have been greatly encouraged and the nations resisting aggression correspondingly discouraged.

In his message to Congress on this subject, July 21, 1941, President Roosevelt said:

> Today it is imperative that I should officially report to the Congress what the Congress undoubtedly knows: That the international situation is not less grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago. [*14361*] Occasional individuals, basing their opinions on unsupported evidence or on no evidence at all, may with honest intent assert that the United States need fear no attack on its own territory or on the other nations of this hemisphere by aggressors from without.
>
> Nevertheless, it is the well-nigh unanimous opinion of those who are daily cognizant, as military and naval officers and as Government servants in the field of international relations, that schemes and plans of aggressor nations against American security are so evident that the United States and the rest of the Americas are definitely imperiled in their national interests. * * *

I told the press on August 11, 1941, in response to a question whether failure of the bill would have any effect on Japan, that "the psychological effect alone on many phases of the international situation would be exceedingly bad, to say nothing of the actual results."

With regard to the President's communication to the Japanese Ambassador of August 17, 1941, the President had nothing in mind except a friendly approach to discourage Japan from attacking us. Having participated in that interview, I received no impression from the President's tone or demeanor of any suggestion of a threat. The [*14362*] President in the same friendly tone agreed that the two Governments should resume amicable conversations looking to a peaceful understanding. Such conversations were then continued in a friendly way for nearly four months. I, therefore, do not see how the attitude of this Government could in any way be construed as offensive or unfriendly or how there can be any warrantable basis for criticism of the President.

Questions 157 and 158 are grouped in a single answer.

157. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Army would be ready for war in the Pacific?

158. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Navy would be ready for war in the Pacific?

Answer: The views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations on the need of more time for preparedness as set forth in their memoranda of November 5 and November 27, 1941, were known to me at the time. Furthermore, the Army and Navy heads for some time had been representing to me their need of more time in which to strengthen the defense of the United States.

Questions 159 and 163 are grouped in a single answer.

159. Question: [*14363*] Will you advise the Committee as to who saw the final modus vivendi as prepared by the State Department?

163. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who saw your November 26, 1941, message to Japan?

Answer: The November 25 draft of the modus vivendi was of course, seen, as were all previous drafts, by the far-eastern advisers of the Department of State. It contained nothing of material substance that was not contained in the November 24 draft and the revisions it represented were largely refinements in the interests of precision. The November 24 draft was seen by the diplomatic representatives of the British, Netherlands, and Chinese Governments, and to the best of my recollection by the President and the representatives of the War and Navy Departments. I do not know who outside the Department of State saw the November 25 draft, and in any case there would hardly have been time for it to have any wide circulation before the decision was reached on the following day to withhold, in delivering our reply to the Japanese, the modus vivendi feature. On this point I refer to the three successive drafts of the modus vivendi which are a part of the record. With regard to the 10-point proposal,

it is clear [*14364*] from my reply to your question No. 74 that the contents of the 10-point proposal were seen by all who saw the modus vivendi drafts. However, I cannot say who, other than the far-eastern advisers of the State Department, saw the 10-point proposal in the exact form in which it was set up for delivery to the Japanese. To all of the modus vivendi drafts, the 10-point proposal was attached, as the modus vivendi was intended only to facilitate conversations with the proposals in the 10-point communication as a basis. Japan could not have accepted our modus vivendi draft without being prepared to take as a basis for further conversations a program along the lines of the 10-point proposal, nor could she have avoided declaring at the outset of the conversations that she would pursue a peaceful course, such declaration being set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the modus vivendi in language as follows:

> 1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.
>
> 2. They undertake reciprocally not to [*14365*] make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat or force into any areas in southeastern or northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

Questions 160, 161, 164, and 165 are grouped in a single answer.

160. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the sending of this modus vivendi?

161. Question: Will you tell us who favored the sending of this modus vivendi?

164. Question: Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the sending of this message (the November 26 message)?

165. Question: Will you advise us who favored the sending of this message?

Answer: While I, of course, consulted the military and naval authorities of this Government and with the far-eastern advisers of the Department of State on all plans for dealing with the critical situation in relation with Japan, the responsibility for decisions, except in matters which I felt should be referred to the President, rested [*14366*] with me, and I took no poll of "ayes" and "nays." So far as I am aware, however, among the top officials whose function it was to make decisions, there was no dissent at any stage of our intensive consideration in the days between November 22 and November 26 of the modus vivendi proposal or the 10-point proposal.

The situation with which we were called upon to deal between November 22 and November 26 was briefly as follows: We had the indisputable evidence of the intercepted Japanese message of November 22, referred to in my reply to your question No. 136, that the Japanese Government had instructed its representatives that there must be acceptance of its terms without any possibility of further concessions and within a definite time limit—November 29. I and my associates could not escape the conclusion from a reading of the

Japanese message that the Japanese had decided to attack unless the United States made basic concessions.

In our clutching at straws to see how far we could go toward tiding over the situation we got up the modus vivendi plan for possible inclusion as a part of our reply along with a plan for a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area. The modus vivendi plan called for the participation of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands in connec- [*14367*] tion with the provisions in the plan for the modification of the freezing measures. We consulted those Governments and also the Chinese Government which was vitally concerned. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's reaction to the modus vivendi plan as communicated to this Government was that if there was any relaxation of the embargo by this Government, or even a belief on the part of the Chinese people that such action would be taken, Chinese morale would be shattered, Chinese resistance would collapse, and the Japanese would be able to gain their ends. In the light of this serious development and of the chances being overwhelmingly against Japan's acceptance of the modus vivendi proposal, especially as we had convincing evidence that Japan was already moving forward with her military forces and had reached the jumping-off place in Indochina, consideration of all the surrounding circumstances relating to the difficulties and the imminent dangers in the situation led to a conclusion not to propose our modus vivendi draft to the Japanese.

In any event the modus vivendi plan would not have enhanced appreciably the chances of Japan's adopting our counterproposal, for what we would have offered the Japanese in the modus vivendi was mere chicken feed compared with what they were asking for, as set forth in their ultimatum of November 20. The view that Japan would not accept our counterproposal, even with the [*14368*] modus vivendi feature, was, to the best of my recollection, shared by all the high officials in the Government who are known to have expressed any views on the subject, as, for example, the following instances: On November 24 Admiral Stark, in a circular message, addressed, among others, to the Commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out that the chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction was a probability. On November 25 Admiral Stark followed up that message with a letter to Admiral Kimmel. In the letter he stated that he had held up dispatch of the letter pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull. Admiral Stark stated that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack and that they had confirmed the view expressed in the previous message regarding the gravity of the situation. Secretary Stimson in his diary entry for November 25 stated that at a meeting at the White House the President expressed the view that, "We are likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday."

Some persons, in attempting to reconstruct the situation which then existed, seem to have been misled by Japanese charges misrepresenting the character of the 10-point proposal. They seem to have completely over- [*14369*] looked the fact, which was subsequently disclosed, that by November 26 when our proposal was delivered to the Japanese, orders had already been given to their fleet to sail preparatory to the attack which was later made according to schedule. It was this movement to attack which prompted the Japanese to start preparing their utterly false and fraudulent misrepresentations, which amounted to the monstrous charge, made in the worst of bad faith, that they had been forced to fight because our statement of policy as contained in our November 26 proposal was harsh and humiliating. Neither the Japanese leaders who falsely pretended to be "dumbfounded" over our proposal of November 26, notwithstanding the fact that it was along lines we had been discussing for months, nor those who supported this Japanese contention had at any time claimed that the Japanese would make the least concession beyond their proposal of November 20, nor have they advanced any suggestion as to what further concessions the United States would have to make, short of complete acceptance of the Japanese proposal of November 20.

There was no reason for the Japanese to have come to us at any stage with their demands, nor was there any need for a new agreement between the United States and Japan. All that was necessary was for Japan to [*14370*] abandon her course of aggression and adopt one of peace, and the situation in the Pacific area would have adjusted itself almost automatically by the observance on the part of Japan, along with other signatory powers, of the Nine-Power Treaty, of the Kellog-Briand Peace Pact, and other treaties and commitments, including a commitment to respect the "open door" in China, to which Japan was a party. Nor must also the fact be overlooked that while Japan was repudiating these solemn treaty obligations by taking the aggressive and moving her armed forces toward us and other peaceful countries, we were pleading, as a peaceful and law-abiding nation, with Japan to abandon her course of conquest and likewise become law-abiding and peaceful.

Our position, as summed up in the 10-point program, was really nothing new to the Japanese. We had been discussing with them throughout months of conversations broad-gaged principles, practical applications of which were along the lines of the 10-point proposal. The proposal was not presented to them in the form of demands, but merely as an example of a kind of settlement we would like to see worked out in the Pacific area. We were not bargaining with the Japanese as if we ourselves had been offenders. The only issue or question to be settled was whether we could prevail upon Japan to abandon [*14371*] her increasingly dangerous movements of conquest and agree to become law-abiding and to adopt a peaceful course. This was the all-

important issue which the Japanese in the end sought to cover up and dodge.

The 10-point program also summed up, so the general public might understand, many of the general and special benefits which might accrue to Japan if she renounced a course of aggression; such as, enhancement of her national security through participation in a multilateral nonaggression pact and through measures calculated to stabilize the situation in the Far East, including the abrogation by the powers of extra territoriality in China and the giving of mutual pledges regarding respect for the integrity of Indochina; and an advantageous exonomic program: A generous trade agreement with the United States, removal of the freezing regulations, an agreement upon a plan for stabilization of the dollar-yen rate. What Japan was asked to do in return was to give practical application to the professions she had made of her peaceful intent by agreeing to withdraw her armed forces from China and Indochina, to support no regime in China other than the National Government of China, and to agree not to interpret any agreement to which she was a party in such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the [*14372*] Pacific area. Surely, these latter were reasonable and necessary conditions for the privileges that were offered to Japan. The 10-point proposal would have been highly welcome to Japan if she had had any intention of adopting peaceful courses. It would be a monstrous travesty of the facts and an unspeakable libel on this country if the Japanese war lords in their effort to disclaim responsibility should be permitted to screen and shift their guilt in the face of all the facts to the contrary.

162. Question: Did you agree with Ambassador Grew and others that the placing of the embargo upon Japan would mean war?

Answer: The general proposition regarding the effect of embargoes upon Japan, especially as applicable to the situation from 1938 to 1940, is set forth on page 88 of Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy. The important fact, however, which had to be taken into account in the situation at the time when this Government applied freezing measures to Japan in July, 1941, was the advance of Japan's armed forces so as seriously and immediately to imperil the security of this and other countries. At that stage, Japan was in effect brazenly demanding military supplies with which to attack this and other [*14373*] countries to the south. The question of our self-defense had by that time become supreme with us and impelled us to refuse to furnish the invader with military supplies.

Questions 166 to 169 are grouped in a single answer.

166. Question: Were you or anyone in the State Department to your knowledge consulted in regard to the military plan being drawn up by America, Britain, the Netherlands, and China, sometimes known as the ABCD block?

167. Question: If you were so consulted will you state who consulted you and what was said at the conference?

168. Question: Did representatives of the State Department participate in any of these conversations?

169. Question: If so, state the name of that representative.

Answer: From time to time I participated from the political angle, in discussions with the President and the leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to the subject of the military conversations with the British and the Dutch for joint defensive plans. No representative of the Department of State participated in those [*14374*] staff conversations, but there was a Department of State representative who participated in the conversations regarding defense which were held with the Canadians. There was no Chinese participation in the foregoing conversations.

In the discussions which I held with the President and the leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to those conversations, as made clear above, I did not pass upon the military aspect of questions, but occasionally offered comments and suggestions as a layman. The views that I expressed were along the lines I had expressed publicly as well as in talks with diplomatic representatives. I refer you to what I said in that regard in an address on March 17, 1938 (Peace and War, pp. 412–413), as follows:

> Prudence and common sense dictate that, where this and other nations have common interests and common objectives, we should not hesitate to exchange information and to confer with the governments of such other nations and, in dealing with the problems confronting each alike, to proceed along parallel lines—this Government retaining at all times its independence of judgment and freedom of action. For nations which seek peace to assume with respect to each other [*14375*] attitudes of complete aloofness would serve only to encourage, and virtually invite, on the part of other nations lawlessly inclined, policies and actions most likely to endanger peace.
>
> In the present Far Eastern emergency, we have consistently collaborated with other peace-seeking nations in the manner I have just described. I have said often, and I repeat again, that in this collaboration there is not a trace of alliance or involvement of any sort. We have scrupulously followed and we intend to follow the traditional policy of our country not to enter into entangling alliances or involvements with other countries.

On November 25, 1940, I gave my views to the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, in commenting upon his expressed view that there should be conferences between the naval experts of our two governments with respect to what each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could be no agreements entered into in this respect, but that there should undoubtedly be collaboration with a view to making known to each other any and all information practicable in regard to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where, in case of a military move- [*14376*] ment by Japan in the south or in some other direction.

There was no suggestion on the part of any of us in this Government, so far as I knew, that in the military staff conversations our representatives could go beyond, at the very most, making recommendations which, of course, would have been subject to congressional approval.