WORLD WAR II

ANALYZING THE SACRIFICE AND
ABANDONMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS
DEFENDING THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

DECEMBER 8, 1941 TO MAY 10, 1942

COMPILED AND RESEARCHED BY
EDWARD JACKFERT
28TH BOMB SQDN–19TH BOMB GRP
CLARK FIELD, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER
AMERICAN DEFENDERS OF BATAAN & CORREGIDOR, INC
**INDEX**

**PAGES**

1 Prologue  
2 Historic data on acquisition of the Philippines in 1898.  
3 Early defense forces of the Philippine Islands.  
4 Photo of General MacArthur and his headquarters—the Manila Hotel.  
5 U.S. Army forces in the Philippines prior to World War II–31st Infantry Regiment.  
6 Fourth Marine Regiment  
7 Photo of General MacArthur and his headquarters—the Manila Hotel.  
8 U.S. Army forces in the Philippines prior to World War II–31st Infantry Regiment.  
9 Fourth Marine Regiment  
10 Philippine Scouts  
11 Corregidor–Fort Drum–Fort Frank–Fort Hughes—Guardians of Manila Bay  
12 803 Engineer Battalion–Aviation  
13 U.S. Army Air Corps—Far Eastern Air Force  
14 Photos of aircraft in the Philippines prior to World War II.  
15 The Asiatic Fleet based in Manila Bay.  
16–17 Defense plans critiqued by confusion, disagreement, mistakes, sacrifice, and abandonment—President Roosevelt remarks on war in September 1940 and Defense Department on War Plan Orange which relates to sacrificing the Philippines April 1941.  
18 War warning with Japan in dispatch dated November 27, 1941 sent to Philippine defense staff.  
19 Map of Philippines showing landing areas of Japanese troops in December 1941.  
20 Defending the Philippine Islands.  
21 Photos showing discussing surrender terms with Japanese officers and a group of Americans awaiting instructions for the Death March.  
22–29 Document prepared by General Gerow on January 3, 1942 recommending no help available for the Philippine forces.  
30 Letter date January 15, 1942 by General MacArthur’s staff informing the troops in the Philippines that help was on the way.  
31 Photos of Corregidor during the Japanese attack.  
32 General Wainwright discussing surrender terms with General Homa.  
33 The Real Tragedy On Bataan and the Aftermath.  
34–39 Article from Washington Post critiquing the defense of the Philippine Islands.  
40–43 Transcript of Col. H.W. Tarkington critiquing the defense of the Philippine Islands.  
44 Synopsis—critiquing the sacrifice and abandonment plans.  
45– Historical data relating to activities of troops from December 8, 1941 to the end of the war.  
46 George Wallace’s dissertation on shame.  
51 Letter from President George H.W. Bush  
54 Letter from Senator Robert C. Byrd  
55 Documents on appreciation of defense forces  
56 Data relating to prisoners of war being sacrificed in the 1951 Peace Treaty  
57 Troops defending the Philippine Islands awarded the Bronze Star.
**PROLOGUE**

In the midst of all the confusion at home and in the Pacific prior to World War II, the heroic defense of the Philippine Islands from December 8, 1941 to May 10, 1942, stood out like a beacon of hope for the future. The Philippine defenders victory at that time was measured in survival and in maintaining loyalty to our nation, when the reward for maintaining loyalty was continued starvation and death.

Their strong heart, great spirit, and unyielding faith served as an inspiration to the rest of our nation. They placed their honor before anything else. He who dares to die, to lay his life on the altar for his nation’s need is beyond a doubt, the noblest of mankind. To love, to serve, and to die for one’s country is patriotism at the highest level. Because these patriots believed in a free United States of America to safeguard, with their lives if necessary, its spirit of freedom, those of our nation today, enjoy that legacy. Our liberties, as guaranteed in the Constitution, will continue to serve only if we and each succeeding generation, will continue to serve our country with courage, loyalty and wisdom, and to preserve forever—our spirit of freedom. Nothing can restore the dignity or physical condition of the men who suffered as prisoners of war for up to three years and five months or who died on the field of battle to their loved ones. Yet their sacrifice, living on the thoughts and deed of America, can protect this nation from the lack of foresight which brought about these tragic events.

It was of course, a story of defeat; and in defeat there is a natural tendency to hunt for scapegoats. But to do that here would be merely deluding ourselves. The mistakes that were made at the beginning of the Philippine campaign, as well as the defeat that inevitably terminated it, were all implicit in the situation existing there immediately before the war. The poverty in modern weapons, or in more than one case the abject lack of them, had its roots in the situation at home, and for that situation, the people of the United States must hold themselves accountable.

The situation in the Philippines was a close reflection of the situation at home. Undeniably, there were officers stationed in the Philippines during the prewar years who only wanted to let things ride along in the old, familiar, easy grooves. Many of them had completely failed to digest the lessons of the war in Europe, nor were they willing to accept the opinions of the men who clearly foresaw what was going to happen when the Japanese chose to strike. Too often we were willing to elect legislators who were accustomed to bind America by limits of their own constituencies and pinch pennies at the expense of our national safety. In the last analysis, it was such “economy” that was responsible for the pitiful and desperate lacks that reached their consummation on Bataan, Corregidor, and the rest of the Philippines.

The men sent out to rectify the situation in the final months before the war had neither the means nor time. The reinforcements and materials rushed to them were not enough, arrived too late, or did not reach the Philippines at all. One convoy, caught at sea by the outbreak of hostilities, had to be diverted to Australia. It is not meant to be a “glorious chapter” in our history. Glory is mostly a civilian word and unhappily, it is too often used to cover up deficiencies. In the beginning of the war we went hero hunting—if we did not have planes and guns, at least we could have heroes. So we had to have heroes, and we began to thing of Bataan and Corregidor in terms of the courage of our men, and the two names became symbols in the popular mind for something approaching victory. No amount of compensation can ever repay them for the suffering and hardships that they were forced to endure as captives in slave labor camps, and no expression of gratitude could be adequate to satisfy the debt owed them for the valiant stand they made in defending American interests in the Far East. The saga of these defenders will forever live in the annals of history.
The United States seized the Philippine Islands from Spain in May 1898 after Admiral Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, during the Spanish-American war. Formal title to the Islands was granted the United States by the Treaty Of Paris in December of that year. By the acquisition of the Philippines the United States in one step advanced its frontiers nearly 7,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean and "gave hostage to fortunes in a sense which the American people never fully realized." Possession of the Islands made the United States an Asiatic power, with full responsibility for maintaining the peace and status quo in that area.

The government of the Islands was placed in the hands first of a Philippine commission and later of a governor general, both appointed by the President of the United States. The Filipinos, once their opposition ended, were allowed in increasing large measure of self-rule and elected member of the lower house of the legislature. In 1913, they were granted free trade with the United States, and three years later, were permitted limited autonomy. Provisions were made in 1934 to recognize Philippine independence after a ten-year transitional period. During the ten years. The United States would be allowed to maintain military and other reservations and armed forces. Comprising almost 7,100 islands and islets, the Philippine Archipelago lies approximately 500 miles off the Asiatic mainland and extends 1,150 miles almost due north and south from Formosa to Borneo. Strategically situated in the geographic heart of the Far East, the Islands are centrally located in relation to Japan, China, Burma, French-Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. They lie athwart the trade routes leading from Japan and China through the South China Sea to southeast Asia and the rich supplies of oil and minerals in the Indies.

Before the establishment of the commonwealth Government in 1935, no effort was made to prepare the Philippines for their own defense. The United States assumed all obligations for national defense and maintained a garrison in the Islands for this purpose. This garrison numbered 10,000 men, half of whom were Philippine Scouts, a U.S. Army unit in which the enlisted men, with some exceptions, were native Filipinos and most of the officers were American. The Philippine Constabulary, first organized in 1901, was the national police force, but by training and organization had a military character. In 1935 and effort was made to organize a national army. General MacArthur, Majs. Dwight Eisenhower and James B. Ord prepared a plan to provide the Philippine Commonwealth with a system of national security by 1946, the date the island would become independent. This plan called for a small regular army, a small air force, and a fleet of motor torpedo boats to repel and enemy landing.
THE DEFENSE FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Before the establishment of the Commonwealth government in 1935, no effort was made to prepare the Philippines for their own defense. The United States had assumed all obligations to prepare the Philippines for their own defense and maintained a garrison for national defense and maintained a garrison on the Islands for that purpose. The garrison numbered 10,000 men, half of who were Philippine Scouts, a U.S. Army unit in which the enlisted men, with some exceptions were all Filipino. After 1913, the Philippines Department became a regular U.S. Army establishment commanded by an American general officer. The Philippine Constabulary, first organized in 1901, was the national police force, but by training and organization, had a military character. Thus, except for their experience with the constabulary, the Filipinos had no military tradition upon which to build a National Army.

By the middle of 1941, international developments had heightened the tension between the United States and Japan and made the defense of the Philippines an urgent problem. The establishment of a new American command in the Far East and the recall of General MacArthur to active duty in the U.S. Army were already under consideration when Japan moved southward in July 1941.

The immediate tasks facing the General were, first, to establish a headquarters and organize his command on an efficient basis; second, to induct and train the Philippine Army; third, to secure the necessary supplies and reinforcements to put his forces on a war footing.

General MacArthur’s plan called for a small regular army, a conscription system, a ten-year training program of two classes a year to build up a reserve force, a small air force, a fleet of torpedo boats to repel an enemy landing. On the other hand, General MacArthur’s plan relied heavily on the Philippine Army defending its homeland. However, the Philippine government knew that the United States would not stand idly if the security of the Philippines was threatened.
General Douglas MacArthur was chosen to develop the Philippine Army in the year 1935. He later assumed command of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East in July 1941. General MacArthur later assisted in defending the Philippine Islands against the Japanese Armed Forces.

The Manila Hotel, the site of General MacArthur's headquarters while developing the defense forces of the Philippines prior to World War II.
U.S. ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES

When General MacArthur assumed command of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, the Philippine Department consisted of 22,532 men, 11,972 of whom were Philippine Scouts. Of the 1,340 officers, 775 were reservists on active duty. The largest group of men—7,293—was assigned to the infantry, and the Coast Artillery Corps was next with 4,967. Almost the entire strength of the command was stationed on Luzon.

The largest single U.S. Army unit in the Philippines was the Philippine Division, commanded by Major General Jonathan Wainwright. All of the enlisted men in the Division, except the 31st Infantry and a few military police and headquarters troops, were Philippine Scouts; the 31st was the only American Infantry unit in the Islands composed mostly of Americans, numbering approximately 1,986 troops. The 41st was quartered in Manila, two battalions were quartered at Fort McKinley and one regimental headquarters at Intramuros in the old walled city of Manila.

31st INFANTRY REGIMENT

Thirty First Infantry - enlisted men and officers in July 1941 totaled 1,986 troops. The only American infantry troops in the Philippines at the outbreak of WWII.

Anti-tank company of the 31st infantry regiment.
FOURTH MARINE REGIMENT

In the year 1927, the Fourth Marines were assigned to duty protecting American interests in Shanghai, China. This assignment resulted their becoming known as the “China Marines.”

Due to the Japanese threat in the China area, the Navy Department ordered the withdrawal of the Marines from China. Two ships of the President Lines were chartered and sent to Shanghai where the majority of the Marines were stationed: while the detachments at Peking and Tienstin were to embark at Chingwanta. On November 27 and December 1, 1941, the regiment with attached naval personnel embarked on the two vessels for the Philippines. Arriving on November 30 and December 1, the regiment was assigned the mission of guarding the naval stations on Luzon, particularly the new bases at Mariveles. One of the liners, the President Harrison, was ordered back to China to transport the few remaining Marines to the Philippines. War with Japan had began, therefore, the ship was captured by the Japanese Armed Forces and became prisoners of war of the Japanese military.

The 4th Marines which had arrived from Shanghai only a month earlier, was transferred to Corregidor on the 29th of December. They had been considerably reinforced since the Japanese attack on December 8th. The 766 Marines who had escaped from China, were now organized into a two-battalion regiment. When the war came, the 4th had absorbed the Marine attachment at Olongapo and the regiment now totaled 66 officers and 1,365 enlisted men. Colonel Sam Howard and his Marines manned part of the beach defenses of Corregidor of the fortress and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese invaders.
200th Coast Artillery—Provisional 200th AA
515 Coast Artillery
New Mexico National Guard

In an attempt to reinforce the defense forces of the Philippines, the War Department transferred the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) to the islands early in September 1941. The regiment had 12 three inch, 24 thirty seven millimeter, a similar number of machine guns, and a number of 60 inch Sperry searchlights. The 200th had 1681 enlisted personnel and 76 officers. The unit, upon arrival, was immediately dispatched to Fort Stotsenberg and dispersed around Clark Field.

On the 9th of December, approximately 500 men of the 200th were dispatched to Manila and organized into a provisional anti-aircraft regiment. Also, a few of the men from the 200th were assigned to a field artillery unit of self-propelled 75mm guns.

The 200th sprang into action on December 8, 1941, when the Japanese Air Force attacked Clark Field. Considerable difficulty was experienced with their three inch gun ammunition, the most recent of which was manufactured in 1932. The 200th assisted in shooting down of eight planes which the Japanese admitted losing the initial attack on Clark Field.

After withdrawing into Bataan, the 200th was assigned the duty of protecting various air field on Bataan. The unit’s guns were also used as artillery pieces during the siege of Bataan. Near the end of hostilities, the 200th and 515th were formed into a infantry brigade in an attempt to strengthen the defensive positions near Cabacabin. The two regiments claimed a total of 86 Japanese planes shot down during the defense of the Philippine Islands from December 8, 1941 to April 9, 1942.
192nd AND 194TH TANK BATTALIONS-17TH
17TH ORDNANCE COMPANY ARMORED
NATIONAL GUARD

The 194th Tank Battalion and the 17th Ordnance company arrived in the Philippines on September 26, 1941. The unit had a complement of 54 M-3 light tanks and 54 armored half-tracks. They were immediately assigned to stations at Fort Stotsenberg. The 192nd arrived two weeks later. He three units established the Provisional Tank Group under General Weaver. Colonel Wickord was commander of the 192nd and Colonel Miller was commander of the 194th.

The primary mission upon arrival, was to defend and secure Clark Field Air Base in the event of an attack on that facility. The 17th Ordnance had the duty of providing 4th Echelon maintenance for both of the tank battalions. The ordnance unit was equipped with supplies, spare parts, and wreckers.

The units were a welcome addition to the Philippine garrison. On December 8, 1941, after being notified of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, all component units utilized their machine guns and fired upon the fighter planes attacking Clark Field on December 8 and assisted in destroying eight enemy planes on that day.

On December 22, 1941, the Japanese forces landed at Lingayan Bay in the Northern part of the Philippine Islands. The 192nd Tank Battalion was ordered to support the Northern Luzon Force in engaging the enemy. Five tanks were sent from Company C to assist the 26th Cavalry in the threatened area. The 192nd was the first to engage the enemy tanks in a direct tank battle at that location.

In the defense of the Bataan Peninsula, the tank groups were found to extremely useful in jungle warfare. The tanks were assigned the mission of eliminating pockets of Japanese soldiers using guerilla warfare tactics where they had infiltrated on the West Coast of the Bataan Peninsula.
PHILIPPINE SCOUTS

The Philippine Scout units were largely comprised of Filipino enlisted men and a few officers, mostly under the direction of American officers. They were a part of the regular United States Army, with all the tradition and esprit de corps which that implies. They held an enviable position in the Philippine society.

The first Scout unit to see military action in World War II was the 26th Cavalry, which had been sent to the Lingayan Bay area to stem the advancing Japanese troops that had landed there. The Scouts of the 26th Cavalry were the only body of troops in that area to offer serious opposition to the Japanese forces landing at Lingayen. The Scouts fought bravely and courageously in the defense of Bataan and their homeland. Scout units were always called upon to strengthen a weakening battle line or lead an attack against the Japanese forces on Bataan.
THE GUARDIANS OF MANILA BAY
CORREGIDOR—FORT DRUM—FORT FRANK—FORT HUGHES

After acquiring the Philippines from the Spanish in 1898, the United States began an enormous engineering effort to fortify the four islands across the mouth of Manila Bay. By 1914, the immense work was virtually completed and the four islands; Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and the Carabao had been transformed respectively into Fort Mills, Hughes, Drum and Frank. The fortifications were so formidable that they were justifiably called “The Gibraltar of the East.”
803rd ENGINEER BATTALION–AVIATION

The 803rd Engineers arrived in the Philippines on October 23, 1941 with 481 men. They were immediately assigned the task of building and expanding the runways at Clark Field and constructing a new air field at Camp O’Donnell, when the Japanese attacked the Philippines.

After the attack on Clark field on December 8, 1941, the 803rd immediately began to repair the bomb damaged runways at Clark. This effort was continued until December 24, despite the daily bombings by the Japanese air force. They were had the responsibility of repairing the roads and bridges on Bataan in order to keep supplies flowing to the front line.

On January 25, the company was called upon to perform infantry duty at a place called Quinauan Point, where the Japanese forces had landed behind the main battle line. Company A embarked to Corregidor on February 2, where they worked on Kindley airfield’s runway and constructed revetments. Company C was assigned to work on Del Carmen field and then later constructed air fields at Hermosa and Pilar. On March 27 to April 4, the company was called on for beach defense and on April 5, they were made a part of the last front line defense on Bataan. Company C worked on air fields at Nichols and Bataan. Prior to capitulation the battalion destroyed all motor and heavy equipment a well as their office files.
U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS
FAR EASTERN AIR FORCE

As of July 1941, the air force in the Philippines was still a token air force, unable to withstand “even a mildly determined and ill-equipped foe.” Recognizing the need of reinforcements in the Philippines the war department proposed to transfer four heavy bombardment groups, consisting of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit groups, consisting of 130 planes each.

At the outbreak of World War II, there were the following number and type of aircraft at various bases in the Philippines: 35 B-17s, 18 B-18s, 9 A-27s, 12 B-10s, 107 P-40B and Es, 16 P-26s, 52 P-P 35s and 58 miscellaneous aircraft (observation–cargo–etc) for a total of 277 aircraft at various bases on the Philippine Islands.

Despite the arrival of a few reinforcements and the airfield construction program, the air defense system remained inadequate because of the shortage of anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft warning equipment. There were seven radar sets in the Philippines at the outbreak of World War II, but only two had been set up and in operation. In the absence of the necessary equipment and personnel, USAFFE had organized a makeshift warning system. Native air watchers at strategic points reported plane movements by telephone and telegraph to the interceptor command at Nielson Field, which in turn relayed the information to Clark Field. It was a primitive system, augmented by radar sets established at Iba and outside Manila, that was in operation when World War II began. The lack of a warning system and anti-aircraft protection proved very costly by the loss of most of the aircraft in the Philippine on the ground.

Clark Field—a part of Fort Stotsenberg, it was the principal bomber base in the Philippines.
INSUFFICIENT AND OBSOLETE AIRCRAFT AND AIR FIELDS

Aircraft based at various air bases in the Philippine Islands prior to World War II. Most were obsolete. A B-17A is shown here because no photo was available of the B-18A in this role based in the Philippines. The only difference was a modification of the front area of the plane.
THE ASIATIC FLEET WAS VISITING CEBU ON DECEMBER 8, 1941 AND IMMEDIATELY SAILED FOR JAVA TO BE BEYOND THE REACH OF JAPANESE BOMBERS

ASIATIC FLEET BASED IN THE PHILIPPINES

U.S.S. Houston Flagship of the Asiatic Fleet commanded by Admiral Hart.

U.S.S. Peary-ovenage World War I destroyer.


Submarine tender U.S.S. Canopus


U.S.S. Langley- seaplane tender.

PBY Naval Aircraft-32 in operation in the Philippines prior to WWII. Most were destroyed by Japanese forces soon after the attack on the Philippines on Dec. 7, 1941.

Naval forces assigned to the Asiatic fleet consisted of 1 heavy and 2 light cruisers, 13 average destroyers, 32 PBY aircraft of patrol Wing 10, 29 submarines, 6 gunboats, 6 motor torpedo boats, and miscellaneous other vessels.
PLANS TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS RESULTED IN
CONFUSION, DISAGREEMENT, MISTAKES,
SACRIFICE & ABANDONMENT

It should be remembered that modern Japan since its opening by Commodore Perry in 1854 has displayed a penchant for initiating its wars by surprise attacks—particularly against the opponent’s navy—prior to the formal declaration of war. The most dramatic example of this tactic was the attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in February of 1904. In the case of Pearl Harbor, our own air arms had conducted dry run simulated attacks over the base, and predictions had been made that Japan would strike there in the event of hostilities between the United States and Japan.

In October of 1941, the Russian spy Sorge reported to the Kremlin of Japan’s plans to attack Pearl Harbor within 60 days should hostilities appear imminent. This report was transmitted to President Roosevelt and his top commanders in Washington.

As early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed that affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become involved in a war with Japan. On that day Admiral Richardson asked the President “If we were going to enter the war.” According to the Admiral’s account the President replied—‘that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war’. (Report of the Joint Committee (Congress), Op. Cit. Page 806 (minority report))

Although the United States had maintained military forces, including a substantial number of indigenous units, in the Philippines since their annexation in 1898, the islands were largely unprepared for hostilities with Japan. This unpreparedness was the result of several factors. As a signatory of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, the United States agreed, in exchange for limitations on Japanese shipbuilding, to halt construction of any new fortifications in its Pacific possessions. For the Philippines this meant that only the islands under the entrance to Manila Bay, principally Corregidor, were well protected. Similarly, the act to grant the Philippine Commonwealth status in 1935, with independence scheduled in 1946, meant that the defense of the islands had to evolve gradually on the
Philippine government despite its limited resources. Reflecting these realities, the U.S. Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan ORANGE, last updated April 1941, limited defense of the islands to Manila.

1922 WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY RESTRICTED CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FORTIFICATIONS NEAR THE ENTRANCE OF MANILA BAY UNTIL THE YEAR 1939 WHEN IT WAS ABROGATED

Bay and critical adjacent areas. If attacked, the U.S. Army Garrison was expected to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula, a tongue of land on Luzon forming the northwestern boundary of Manila Bay, and to the island of Corregidor. The plan did
not envision reinforcement or relief of the Philippine Garrison. **With a small army commited to continental defense and a general agreement that in the event of war it would adopt a defeat-Germanty first strategy, the U.S. Military had reluctantly concluded that the Philippines must be sacrificed if the Japanese attacked.**

As of November 30, 1941 there were only 16,643 American enlisted men and 2,504 American officers based in the Philippines when the Japanese forces attacked the islands on December 8, 1941. Of this total, only 1,956 were trained infantry personnel and 5,609 were Air Corps personnel (most ended up as infantry supporters toward the end of hostilities). Also, there were 11,957 well trained Philippine Scouts who were classified as American troops.

Generals J. Wainwright and Douglas MacArthur
Commanders Of All Philippine Forces
SECRET

Date: November 27, 1941

To: CINCPAC

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subject: War Warning

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition, probably against either the Philippines or Korea Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WP-46X. Inform district and army authorities of a similar warning being sent by War Department. Spenavo inform British.

Copy to INFO WAR DEP'T.

End of message.
The 26th Philippine Scout Cavalry, the 192nd Tank Battalion, and a regiment of Philippine Army troops were sent to the Lingayen area in an attempt to contain the Japanese landing force. Despite the heroic efforts of these forces, the Japanese troops were superior in strength and forced the Fil-American to withdraw. This forced the evacuation of Clark Air Base and others into Bataan.

During the month of December 1941, Japanese troops landed at well selected areas throughout the Philippine Archepalego. The main landing at Lingayen with its superior forces caused the withdrawal of Fil-American troops to Bataan. The first line of defense was set up on January 8, 1942 at Abucay. On January 23rd heavy pressure from the Japanese forces caused the Fil-American troops to retreat to a line set up as the Bagac-Orion line. There was a short lull on the battle lines through March. Having heavy casualties, the Japanese forces brought in thousands of fresh troops causing the Fil-American troops to withdraw to another defense position on southern Bataan during the period April 7-9, 1942, thereby forcing General King to capitulate to save the lives of his starving troops.

The men on Bataan were already defeated and had been for almost a week. Disease and starvation, rather than military conditions, had created a situation in which General King now found his forces. Three months of mal-nutrition and intestinal infections had left them weak and disease ridden, totally incapable of sustaining effort necessary for a successful defense of Bataan.
NEGOTIATING SURRENDER TERMS
The hurried withdrawal into Bataan forced General MacArthur to seek help from the defense department. On January 3, 1942, the following communication was prepared by the war department’s planning division relating to: “RELIEF OF THE PHILIPPINES” with the recommendation that “OPERATIONS FOR THE RELIEF BE NOT UNDERTAKEN.” The following document thoroughly explains the reasoning behind this decision which can be literally interpreted as “ABANDONMENT” of the American troops defending the Philippine Islands.
Empire trade routes might be severed. The isolation of China is almost certain to follow. Japan would be greatly strengthened by gaining the raw materials of the Netherlands East Indies. The full power of Japan could be directed against Siberia.

5. **Outline of Operations Required to Recover the Philippines.**

a. The general strategic concept of operations required to restore the position in the Philippines is as follows:

(1) First gain naval and air superiority south of the line Malaya — Borneo — Celebes, and prepare to extend this control northward.

(2) Gain air supremacy in the EEI and operate from EEI bases to gain air supremacy over Mindanao.

(3) Cover and supported by strong naval and air forces, land a force on Mindanao to secure bases there.

(4) Operating from bases on Mindanao, reopen the line of communications and launch a drive to the north.

b. The execution of this strategic plan would require the immediate combined effort of the available land, sea and air resources of the United States, the British and the EEI. TIME IS PARAMOUNT.

In the succeeding paragraphs, the operations and means required to carry out this general strategic concept are discussed.
4.  **AIR OPERATIONS AND MEANS.**

a.  **Total United States Forces in the Far East.**  Enroute There and Scheduled to Go.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Gp. Heavy Bombardment</td>
<td>91 airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Gp. Medium Bombardment</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Gp. Dive Bombers</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Gp. Pursuit</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 647

b.  **Estimated Capabilities of Reinforcement from Our Allies in the Far East.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Gp. Medium Bombardment</td>
<td>76 airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Gp. Pursuit</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 155

c.  **Force Required for Motor Advance Northward to Luzon from Base Area in Australia.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Gp. Heavy Bombardment</td>
<td>200 airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Gp. Medium Bombardment</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Gp. Dive Bombers</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Gp. Pursuit</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Gp. Transport</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 3,624

d.  **Difference Between Force Required and Force Available.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Gp. Heavy Bombardment</td>
<td>150 airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Gp. Medium Bombardment</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Gp. Dive Bombers</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Gp. Pursuit</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Gp. Transport</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 726

e.  **Limitations and Possible Augmentation of Above Force.**

(1) Availability of airframes would limit the size of the force which could be employed. There are some 35 airframes in this area (Northern Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Formosa, the Celebes, and the Molucca Islands) which would be available to serve the initial concentra-
are contemplated, additional airfields will have to be constructed, both in the initial area and in those areas which are seized as the advance to the northward progresses.

(3) If this operation is decided upon, the movement of Lend-Lease aircraft should be diverted to our units which will then be operating in an active theater, will be subject to attrition, and will require a steady flow of replacements.

(3) United States combat units other than those now destined for the Far East must come from areas where they have already been committed by the War Department, such as Hawaii, Panama or the continental United States.

(4) Since there would be no completely organized logistical system established well in advance of the contemplated operations, the scope of this operation would be limited, at least in its initial stages, by logistical factors. It would be absolutely vital to the success of the expedition that the lines of communication to the theater be kept open since the units could not otherwise sustain their operations, even for a limited period.

2. General Scheme of Operations.

(1) Occupy airfields south of the line Malaya – Selangor – Malacca and establish air superiority in this
(2) Occupy as soon as possible those airbases in the Celebes, the East Coast of Borneo and the Molucca Islands which have not been seized by the Japanese and establish air supremacy in this area.

(3) By combined air and surface operations, drive the Japanese out of Sarawak.

(4) Seek out and destroy by the action of combined air and surface forces the Japanese forces in the Sulu Archipelago.

(5) Execute counter air force operations against the Japanese in Mindanao.

(6) Seek out and destroy by combined air and surface action the Japanese air forces on Mindanao and the supporting Japanese naval forces operating in adjacent waters.

(7) Support a landing of a force on Mindanao.

Establish air bases on Mindanao after its seizure.

(8) Drive northward to secure additional air bases on Panay. From these closer bases, launch a combined air and surface offensive against the Japanese forces besieging the Island of Luzon.

(9) Combine all these step-by-step operations with the necessary efforts to maintain the line of communications established by the advance.

- O -
and about 18,000 (most air troops) are contemplated for early transfer to the Far East theater.

g. Estimate of Allied Forces Required.

It is estimated that a large Allied land force — several hundred thousand men — will be required to regain control of the Philippine Islands in the face of the opposition that Japan can interpose.

7. Conclusions.

a. That the forces required for the relief of the Philippines cannot be placed in the Far East area within the time available.

b. That allocation to the Far East area of forces necessary to regain control of the Philippines would necessitate an entirely unjustifiable diversion of forces from the principal theater — the Atlantic.

c. That the greatest effort in the Far East area which can be sustained on strategic grounds is that contemplated by the Chiefs of Staff in their directive AEC-4/3 (hold Malay Barrier, Burma and Australia, projecting operations to the northward to provide maximum defense in depth).

8. Recommendations.

a. That operations for the relief of the Philippines be not undertaken.
b. That for the present operations in the Far East area be limited to those envisaged in the Chiefs of Staff's directive AEC-4/3, mentioned above.

L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General, Assistant Chief of Staff.
Subject: Message from General MacArthur.

To: All Unit Commanders.

The following message from General MacArthur will be read and explained to all troops. Every company commander is charged with personal responsibility for the delivery of this message. Each headquarters will follow up to ensure delivery by every company or similar unit.

"Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The extent of arrival of reinforcements is unknown. They will have to fight their way through Japanese attempts against them. It is imperative that our troops hold until these reinforcements arrive.

"On further retreat is possible. We have more troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us. Our supplies are ample; a determined defense will defeat the enemy's attack.

"It is a question now of courage and determination. Men who run will merely be destroyed but men who fight will save themselves and their country.

"I call upon every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting every attack. This is the only road to salvation. If we will fight we will win; if we retreat we will be destroyed.

MacArthur"  

By command of General MacArthur:

[signature]

G. H. C. BELL,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

At the time this communiqué to all troops was sent (January 15, 1942), the headquarters staff had already been notified by Washington that NO RELIEF WAS FORTHCOMING. The message was deceitful to the troops when they then and therewith knew that help was not on the way—they had been abandoned.
Immediately upon the surrender of Bataan, the Japanese armed forces concentrated 24 hour shelling of the Corregidor fortress. Damage to topside on the fortress was tremendous with many casualties.
General Wainwright surrendered Corregidor on May 6, 1942 and all the armed forces throughout the Philippines on May 10, 1942.
THE REAL TRAGEDY ON BATAAN AND THE
AFTERMATH

The real tragedy on Bataan didn’t begin with the surrender on April 9, 1942
and it didn’t begin with the Death March which got underway the next day. The real
tragedy had its beginning in early January 1942.

On January 6, 1942, a general order was issued to all troops on Luzon, to cut
the meal ration in half. In fact, the ration per man was cut to one third of what it had
been. On February 1, 1942, the ration for the men on Bataan was cut again. This
time to equivalent of 1500 calories or less per day. By the end of February weight
loss was very noticeable and the inability of the men to perform military duties in an
efficient manner was readily apparent. On March 1, 1942, the ration for the men on
Bataan was cut again, this time to the equivalent of 1000 calories a day. By the end
of March the men were listless and weak and they could no longer function
militarily. Early in March, General Wainwright had ordered the horses of the 26th
Cavalry and the mules of the Mountain Artillery Batteries slaughtered and the meat
given to the troops. By April 1, 1942, each man on Bataan was down to 80% of his
pre-war weight.

Medical problems also plagued the men on Bataan. The Province of Bataan
was known before the war to be one of the most heavily infected malaria areas in the
world. Troops arriving in Bataan in January 1942 were given prophylactic doses of
quinine each day to ward off the effects of the fever. The program was effective, but
on March 1, 1942, the supply of quinine ran out. Within a few days, approximately
80% of the troops had malaria in varying degrees. At the same time dysentery started
to become a problem. Many men were affected.

By April 1, 1942, the troops on Bataan were only about 20% effective as
compared to January 1, 1942. They were sick, lethargic and unable to function in any
kind of military manner. This was the status of the men on Bataan when the
Japanese initiated their final offensive on April 3, 1942. A weak, hungry, and sick
Army was no match for the Japanese at this point. The surrender came six days later
on April 9, 1942. By this time the men were exhausted and could do no more.

The situation of the Americans on Corregidor was critical and matters were
only getting worse. General Wainwright decided to surrender, in exchange for
several thousand lives. He had concluded that nothing was to be gained by further
resistance.
THE MacARTHUR MUTINY: DID HE DEFY WASHINGTON'S ORDERS AND EMBOLDEN THE JAPANESE OUT OF LOYALTY TO THE PHILIPPINES?

Evidence had emerged that one of the towering figures in American military history—Gen. Douglas MacArthur—was in revolt against his own government's policies on the eve of World War II. This discovery came as the result of a search through the archived documents in an effort to answer one of the most vexing puzzles of the war: What happened at Clark Field on December 8, 1941? Why was half of the U.S. long range bomber fleet in the Philippines destroyed on the ground by Japanese planes 10 hours after the first alert from Pearl Harbor? Who was responsible for this colossal blunder, which left the Fil-American forces impotent against the enemy? General Arnold angrily remarked—"could not help thinking that there must have been some mistake somewhere in my Air Force command."

General MacArthur was initially bound to the archipelago by familial ties. His father, Gen Arthur MacArthur, a Medal of Honor winner during the civil war, suppressed a Filipino insurrection against American rule and later became military governor, winning the respect and affection of the Filipino people. His son Douglas was assigned to the islands fresh from West Point and later wrote: "The Philippines charmed me. The delightful hospitality, the respect and affection expressed for my father, the amazingly attractive result of a mixture of Spanish culture and American industry, the languorous lazé that seem to glamorize even the most routine chores of life, the fun-loving men, the moonbeam delicacy of its lovely women, fastened me with a grip that has never relaxed."

Promotion and honor came rapidly—the famed and greatly decorated World War I hero, became the innovative superintendent at West Point, Army Chief of staff at age 50. In 1935, MacArthur returned to the Philippines for the fourth time, charged with creating a military establishment for the new commonwealth in preparation for independence in 1946. In 1937, he retired from the U.S. Army but continued as commander of the fledgling Philippine military establishment with the rank of field marshal. In July 1941, with war threatening, MacArthur was recalled to active duty as commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

Maintaining those dual roles for the drama and loyalties became the catalyst for the drama which unfolded in the Philippines in 1941, bringing MacArthur into conflict with the paramount principle of the U.S. Military. Obedience to the nation's civilian authorities.

For years the United had tried to persuade Japan to abandon its policy of conquest in Asia. The U.S. position was hampered, however, by inadequate military
strength in Asia: a regiment of Marines (4th Marine Regiment), a regiment of Army infantry (31st Infantry Regiment), a clutch of obsolete war planes and a minuscule naval force.

The Philippines was even weaker position. In 1934, Manuel Quezon, soon to be inaugurated as the Philippines president, had told the U.S. Secretary for War George H. Dern (an old friend, as was MacArthur) that “the new nation’s military policy both by inclination and compulsion, will be purely defensive....” Yet the islands’ defenses, Quezon insisted, should be so formidable as to discourage any likely aggressor.

MacArthur assured Quezon that his goal was attainable. What the general envisaged was the development of a large pool of well-trained civilians, led by a permanent cadre of career soldiers, that could mobilize quickly to meet any threat. From the outset, however, things did not go well. Training was complicated by illiteracy and language differences. Funding was erratic because of the Great Depression. The program came under fire from politicians and officials in both Washington and Manila. Even Quezon became disillusioned. If the Chinese, with their advantages of geography and population, could not hold off the Japanese, what hope was there for a small country like the Philippines?

American policy toward Japan, meanwhile, was taking a course precisely opposite to that of the Philippines. Early in 1941, Washington became convinced that new long-ranging bombers, the B-17s and B-24s, could soon eliminate its military advantage in the Pacific and put enormous pressure on Japan. From Clark and other fields on Luzon, the bombers could threaten the empire’s bases in French Indochina (now Vietnam) and on Formosa (Taiwan), where the Japanese had 25 airfields and other important installations. They could even menace the home islands, continuing on to havens in the Soviet Union and making another bombing run on the return flight.

B-17 fever took hold in Washington. For years, career officers in the Air Force—then a branch of the Army—had argued that airplanes were not merely elevated machine-gun platforms, that air power could play a major strategic role in wartime. Now Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote to President Roosevelt that shuttle-bombing might well remove Japan from the Axis powers. Suddenly the Philippine Islands had vaulted to the top of the U.S. military priorities.

But there is no sign that Washington ever considered the new strategy from Manila’s—and MacArthur’s—perspectives. A bomber buildup might fail and actually spur Japan to attack the islands. The commonwealth’s defense capabilities were not yet ready for war. Some Filipinos even questioned whether their should be drawn
into what they saw as essentially a struggle to preserve British and Dutch colonial possession in Asia. Not only did MacArthur share these concerns, but he thoroughly distrusted Roosevelt.

The task Washington was giving MacArthur—to prepare a bombing campaign against Japan—was a great variance with what President Quezon and others had wanted him to do and would violate the general’s long-standing commitment to the commonwealth. MacArthur, the records indicate, was willing to employ the B-17s in the defense of the Philippines. He would not, however, support Washington’s aggressive new strategy of using them to intimidate Tokyo. Instead, the Far East commander began striving mightily, though covertly, to block Washington’s plan.

It was, of course, a time of furious activity for the U.S. Army air forces Far East. Landing strips for defensive fighters were constructed around Luzon at a hectic pace, but nothing was done to enhance the strategy mission of the B-17s. On the contrary, MacArthur’s efforts were restricted toward moving the bombers from Luzon and sending them several hundred miles south to the island of Mindanao where the hard fields to the Del Monte pineapple plantation could bear their weight. From there, it would be clear that they posed no threat to Japan or Formosa.

Mindanao was, in fact, on Washington’s list of potential B-17 and B-24 bases throughout the region—Singapore, Darwin, Rockhampton, Rabaul, Davao (Mindanao’s largest city), as well as Clark and two other sites on Luzon: Nichols Field, a few miles south of Manila and Aparri, at the island’s northern tip from which B014s could strike as far north as Nagasaki and return.

Washington demonstrated its special interest in Aparri in November when MacArthur asked the War Department for additional funding for air field construction included a survey of his command’s planning in this regard. The War Department dispatched a radio message asking why there had been no mention of Aparri. MacArthur responded by telegram on November 18, said the planning survey had not been intended to be all-inclusive. “An airdrome near Aparri is projected,” he added. “The terrain of northern Luzon is difficult because of a lack of communication and transportation, but every endeavor is being made to facilitate action to the north and northwest.”

Despite Washington’s interest, no American heavy bomber ever launched an attack against Japan from Aparri or Nichols. No heavy bomber, in fact, so much as touched its wheels down at Aparri or Nichols. There is no hint of any serious effort by MacArthur’s headquarters to develop them.

Indeed, as part of his efforts to shift the bombers to Mindanao, MacArthur had to make his Air Force officers understand the
Manila would not be a permanent station. As late as November, all 35 B-17s at the sprawling facility were parked out in the open, vulnerable to surprise attack. According to an official count, MacArthur told the Far East Air Force chief of staff that his security responsibilities extended only to the digging of slit trenches.

MacArthur further veiled his moves by giving his own chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, the responsibility for directing the growing air armada. The rest of the staff was left in the dark. Col. Constant L. Irwin, MacArthur’s chief of military operations who would direct day-to-day combat when war did break out, commented several years later: “...The Staff knew nothing of the orders that were issued or as a matter of fact, what was going on except by rumor and accident.”

Among those consigned to the dark was the new commander of the Far East Air Force, Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. Brereton arrived in Manila on November 3, but a week later MacArthur sent him on a mission to Australia. On his return, November 28, he was told to go to China and the British and Dutch colonies. He instead remained in the Philippines to battle his boss’s scheme for pushing the B-17s to the south. MacArthur had met the first formidable opponent to his plan.

Meanwhile, the B-17s were bringing pressure on MacArthur from another direction. Adm. Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Philippines-based U.S. Asiatic Fleet, had been pressing MacArthur for weeks for an agreement on coordination of air operations, particularly reconnaissance. MacArthur, according to Hart’s account, balked at committing himself to any form of cooperation. At one meeting, according to Hart’s testimony, MacArthur virtually ignored suggestions that the two services coordinate their actions, declaring that the “Navy had its plans, the Army had its plans....and we each had our own fields.” His “primary interest” was the anticipated land battle.

Finally, on December 1, the Army and the Navy commanders signed a reconnaissance accord. Navy surveillance planes would operate to the west over the south China Sea and toward Indochina, where the Japanese had exacted an airbase and a naval anchorage from Vichy France. The B-17s would plow north toward Formosa. (Transfer of B-24s to the Philippines was postponed for security reasons).

Pressure was also coming from Washington. On November 27 the War Department warned Manila that talks with the Japanese had broken off and that “hostile action is possible any moment.” Washington ordered MacArthur “to undertake such reconnaissance measures as you deem necessary. Report measures taken.”

MacArthur had run out of room. He radioed Washington on November 28: “Following instructions....air reconnaissance extended and intensified with the Navy.”
Even with the new policy MacArthur kept the missions on a tight leash. According to Brereton’s memoirs, MacArthur “did not consider it advisable to conduct photo missions over Formosa, and directed that our reconnaissance in cooperation with the Navy would be limited to “two-thirds of the distance between North Luzon and Southern Formosa.” But MacArthur was still not finished. On November 29, the day after assuring Washington that reconnaissance was being “extended and intensified,” MacArthur wrote Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to inform him that the bombers the United states was counting so heavily for its Pacific strategy would be moving several hundred miles to the south. They would be based, he wrote, in the “well protected” Visayan Islands in the center of the Philippine Archipelago. But since the Visayans did not yet have fields for the B-17s, the planes would be based temporarily in “the vicinity of Del Monte, Mindanao.”

What are merits of the issue? Should the planes have been sent to Del Monte”. First of all, it was basic Air Force doctrine that a concentration of aircraft should be avoided if possible so that the enemy could not strike all of them in one strike. The B-17s should not have been gathered at any one field, neither Clark nor Del Monte.

Second, the claim that De Monte was a safer place for the bombers than Clark Field is a dubious contention. Clark had antiaircraft support; Del Monte had none. Clark had the only two radar systems functioning in the Philippines; Del Monte had none. Clark had several Philippine divisions between it and the likely invasion route for Luzon; Del Monte had nothing approaching this ground protection. Clark was ringed with fields that were home to scores of U.S. fighter planes; there were no fighter planes to protect the B-17s at Del Monte.

As MacArthur himself noted in his letter to Gen. Marshall, Mindanao was a "salient"; it was exposed to Japanese attack from the naval base at Palau, 600 miles due east. The British had alerted the United States that two Japanese carriers were operating in the vicinity. As it happened, the first Japanese military action of the war in the Philippines was by planes from a Palau-based carrier----an attack on a seaplane tender in Mindanao’s Gulf of Davao several hours before Clark Field was attacked.

The deficiencies at Del Monte mount up. It had neither hangars nor maintenance facilities; planes had to go up to Clark for repairs. Only tents were available for offices, storage and crew shelters, and they were in such short supply that some B-17 crewmen ended up sleeping in their planes. Even bombs were unavailable at Del Monte in early December: planes on a mission to Formosa would have had to get not only fuel but ordnance on the Clark Field stop. Perhaps most amazingly, Mindanao for years had been the focus of Japanese investment in the Philippines, and an estimated 30,000 Japanese citizens were living in Davao Province.
on Mindanao's east coast. MacArthur, in his memoirs, recalls that in the late 1920s "thousands of Japanese were pouring into Davao. According to one historian, the Japanese "nearly controlled the whole province." On a map in the Japanese consulate in Davao City, the island of Mindanao was marked "domestic," just like Japanese-ruled Korea and Formosa. Had the planes been stationed at Del Monte for any length of time it is likely that the field would have made its way onto the Japanese list of initial targets.

Under these conditions what was the right course for the Air Force commander to follow? Brereton took the path of determined opposition. By one account it required three orders from MacArthur's headquarters to get him to comply. Even then, he sent only 16 of the 35 B-17s to Del Monte. The crews were directed to take only three changes of clothing and to return to Clark on December 8th for a combined exercise with the planes remaining there.

MacArthur would write after the war: "I never learned why these orders (to move all the B-17s) were not promptly implemented..."d the Air Force explanation had long been on the record: More that a score of additional B-17s were expected to arrive in the islands any day and space at Del Monte was being kept open for them.

The events are not without a touch of irony. Though Brereton fought hard to block the move south, he changed his tune after the war—presumably because the action saved at least some of the planes. He wrote in his memoir that the initiative came from the Air Force staff, spurred on by his own concern for the bombers' security. A 1951 letter to MacArthur from his chief of staff, Sutherland, assails Brereton's egregious lies. And recalls that Brereton was "bitterly opposed" to move the bombers. In support of Brereton's claim there is a recommendation from the Air Force staff that the B-17s should go to Mindanao. It was, however, prepared during Brereton's absence, evidently on the orders from MacArthur or Sutherland. Moreover, documents in the MacArthur files show that a decision to turn Del Monte into a major base was made the month before Brereton arrived. Yet in his 1964 memoirs, MacArthur himself went along with the fiction and stated that the bomber group was moved "upon the recommendation of General Brereton...in order to place it beyond the range of attack from Formosa.

Nor is it clear whether the move helped or harmed the American position in the Far East. Had the B-17s been assigned the reconnaissance mission earlier—and with fewer restrictions—the United States and its allies might have become aware of the dimensions of Japan's military buildup then in progress on Formosa.

On the other hand, the planes at Mindanao escaped the initial Japanese
onslaught while those at Clark were destroyed. But had all the B-17s—or even some of them—gone to Mindanao when MacArthur first ordered them there, they might have been noted by Japanese intelligence and destroyed in the first hours of war. Thus we are drawn, reluctant and uncomfortable, to a panglossian conclusion: What happened to the B-17s on December 8, 1941, was the best the United States could have hoped for.

After the war, when questions about Clark at last began surfacing, MacArthur moved quickly to silence the controversy and avoid an inquiry that could disclose his own obstruction of Washington’s get-tough air strategy. In September 1946, he issued a statement from his Tokyo headquarters denying there had been plan to bomb Formosa, attributing the confusion at Clark to local commanders and insisting that he had been well served by his Air Force: “Our Air Force...did everything possible within their limited resources...Gen. Brereton (and his command) lost, but with no discredit.” This was the defense that MacArthur would put forth for the rest of his days. ———Information from an investigation by Brad Wye—Washington Post December 3, 1996.

FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF H.W. TARKINGTON
COLONEL, FIELD ARTILLERY
UNITED STATES ARMY WHO WAS ACTIVE
IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES
WORLD WAR II

While these world-shaking attacks on outposts in Hawaii and the Orient jolted American complacency, and served to unify the opinion and will of the people, they confronted the handful of United States forces on the outposts with the grim reality of the inadequacies of manpower and equipment which American policy had lethargic consistency ignored, or blindly disregarded, through the months and years when governments precariously walked the brink of chaos.

Complete material isolation was quickly brought about by the Japanese effectively cutting our water and air lines of communication to the Philippines, leaving the defenders on their own resources, with no hope assistance along the hard, bloody road of step by step combat from bases thousands of miles distant. For those of who stood the initial shock this assistance would come too late. Perhaps too few of us on the ground realized the gigantic logistic problems involved after the first
paralyzing blow was struck. Some could never reconcile their thinking to the national policies which either ignored or inadvertently failed to provide distant areas with responsibility with the sinews of war—so many things were left undone at a time when the finger of destiny was pointing unmistakably to a world spinning dizzily toward a global confrontation. Most adopted a fatalistic philosophy, coupled with a determination that the prestige of our American democracy would be upheld to the last ditch of human effort, at all costs.

This story is not written to accuse or attach blame for the sins of omission or commission before, during, or after the holocaust of the Philippines. To accuse one would be to blame all of the people of the United States who enjoy the heritage of shaping our destiny. Rather it is intended as a plea to you, as a citizen of the greatest nation on the face of the earth, to vow that never again will the forces you charge with the responsibility of securing your national interests and way of life, lack the essentials with which to discharge that trust.

It should be remembered that the soldier does not create war. He is but a tool with which you fight. These tools must be kept bright and sharp against your hour of need. Much has been written and said on the campaign and battles of this war, yet here and there are areas which have been lightly treated or passed up altogether. Many eulogies have been penned in praise of the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor. Their proud record will remain for all time emblazoned on our nation’s scroll of honor.

But there were others where, to the south of Luzon, lie the Islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte, and Samar; known as the Visayas, and a little further south of this group, Mindanao—only slightly less in area than Luzon. These Islands too contributed to the American effort. The bitter battle which were fought there by a few thousand poorly-trained and ill equipped Filipino soldiers and a thing sprinkling of American officers and enlisted men against hopeless superiority in numbers and armament, while little more than a delaying action, may well have saved Australia—perhaps more—by upsetting the time schedule of the Japanese juggernaut.

Measured by the standards of our forces which ultimately overthrew Germans and the Japanese, these results are unimpressive, but measured in loyalty, gallantry, sweat and blood, the accomplishments are worthy of perpetuation and veneration in keeping with the highest tradition of our country.

Many Americans, as well as Filipinos, died bravely in the swamps and jungles and canyon of these southern Philippines; many others lay down their lives for their country no less truly and gallantly and heroically because they died miserable crammed in the stinking, filthy, vermin-ridden holds of Japanese prison ships; or
starve and rotted in malarial prisoner of war camps, than on a shell-torn field. Battles are over in hours—-or days—and there is food and rest. The living death of imprisonment under the Japanese was without surcease, year after endless year.

Frightful chronicle of the Japanese prison camps has been delineated. No attempt is made here to add to these ghastly records. But the war itself—the actual campaign of 1941-1942 in the Visayas and Mindanao—-has hitherto gone unrecorded.

SYNOPSIS

1. At a conference with Admiral Richardson in September of 1940, President Roosevelt remarked that the United States would not enter a war with Japan even if the Japanese attacked the Philippines.

2. The basic WAR PLAN ORANGE revised in April 1941, noted that the plan did not "envisage reinforcement or relief of the Philippine garrison". Furthermore "with a small army committed to continental defense and a general agreement that in the event America went to war, it would adopt a defeat-Germany-first strategy and the military had reluctantly concluded that the Philippines must be "sacrificed if the Japanese attacked".

3. On January 3, 1942, wherein the U.S. forces had not completed their withdrawal to Bataan, the War Planning Commission at the War Department was requested to prepare a plan for relief of the Philippine Garrison which was under attack in the Philippines by the Japanese military. In a report submitted by Brigadier General L.T. Gerow Assistant Chief of Staff, he outline the resources needed to assist the Philippine Defenders—-stating the "That the forces required for the relief of the Philippines cannot be placed in the Far East within the time available—that allocation to the Far East area of forces necessary to regain control of the Philippines would necessitate an entirely unjustifiable diversion of forces from the principal theater—-the Atlantic.----Recommendation that operations for the relief of the Philippines not be undertaken.

4. The views of Colonel H.W. Tarkington who was there and knew how the hierarchy responded in the time of war.

5. Politics such as the Washington Naval Treaty that limited fortifications in the Philippine islands until it was abrogated in 1939.

6. The article in the Washington Post describing the conflicts between those in positions of higher command which caused much confusion and dissension which caused improper orders to be disseminated.
WORLD WAR II—HISTORICAL DATA RELATING TO THOSE WHO DEFENDED THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS DECEMBER 8K 1941 TO MAY 10, 1942
COURTESY GEORGE WALLACE—EDITOR OF THE BROOKE REVIEW

Though the threat was there, America was not at war when Edward Jackert joined thousands of other patriotic young Americans who left their homes to don the uniform of the United States military.

Nearly 25,000 of them were assigned to bases in the Philippine Islands, a string of beautiful Pacific Islands to the south of Japan. These 25,000 were poorly equipped, totally unprepared for war, and uninformed of the impending horrors they would face.

Japan was emerging as an industrial nation with little or no raw materials to feed its greedy hungers of industry, so the small, densely populated nation began to invade its neighbors. Realizing that the Philippine Islands were key to its war plans, Japan immediately followed the December 7, 1941, sneak attack on an unprepared Pearl Harbor with an invasion of the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island and the Dutch East Indies.

Soldiers like Ed Jackert had little combat training, no combat experience, little or completely outmoded equipment, materials, and supplies with which to fight a war. In Jackert’s initial contact with the Japanese military he was armed with a shovel. He and his fellow GI’s of Clark Field were engineers aircraft mechanics. Most had never shot a rifle prior to World War II.

Informed that reinforcements, armament, guns and equipment were on the way, these gallant Americans fought bloody battles against troops who firmly believed it was an honor to die for their cause. Human life to the invading Japanese forces was cheap, even their own. With no reinforcements or additional support having been received, the various fronts began to fall and Americans surrendered in ignominy.

There were some 11,000 Americans on Bataan when Major General Edward P. King surrendered on April 9, 1942. Another 6,500 were surrendered to the Japanese by General J. M. Wainwright on May 6, 1942 on Corregidor.

Statistics reveal that of 27,465 Americans that became prisoners of war of the Japanese military, 11,107 died while Japanese prisoners of war. This included those that died on the notorious “death march”, the torching of prisoners of war at Palawan, prisoner of war camps O’Donnell, Cabanatuan, Bilibid, the “Hell Ships”; and prisoner of war camps in Japan, Manchuria, China, and a few other South East Asian areas. Defense department statistics reveal that 37% of the American prisoners of war surrendering to the Japanese military died while prisoners of war, whereas, only 1% of the prisoners of war in German POW camps died in their POW camps.

One of the earliest and most severe mistreatment of prisoners of war became known as the “Death March” All troops, both Filipino and American gathered at various points on Bataan after the surrender on April 9, 1942. They were then forced to march under the hot tropical sun over 55 miles from the tip of Mariveles to San Fernando, under conditions no one ever believed could happen. There was very little food, water, and no medicines for the sick and wounded. The sun beat down unmercifully on the marchers with a continuous drum by the Japanese guards to hurry. Many of the troops on the march just died from exhaustion, starvation, beatings, or executions. Seven to ten thousand troops died on the march with approximately seven hundred and fifty of them being Americans. Arriving at San Fernando, the troops were then loaded into small box cars constructed of steel, literally packed in with no room to sit down, for their last leg to a prisoner of war camp at
O'Donnell.

Thus they came to the end of the road, suffering from every disease imaginable. They were dirty, unkempt, pale, bloated and lifeless. They looked aged beyond their years and had nothing to look forward to. They were interned in O'Donnell, Cabanatuan, and Bilibid Prison under conditions that no one there could adequately describe.

As military reverses began to place greater demands on Japan’s far-flung armed forces, the Japanese Prisoner of War Bureau hastened the transfer of Americans and other Allied prisoners of war to Japan and Manchuria to replenish their industries labor pool. Most of the Japanese ships transporting POWs were unseaworthy. Some had been constructed in the early 1900s. The prisoners of war were loaded into the ship’s holds in such numbers that the men had hardly room to lay down. There was only a cup of water a day (if that) available for drinking purposes and none for bathing or other sanitary needs. On many occasions, suffering from dysentery and diarrhea, the prisoners of war had to move their bowels in the holds, adding to the stench on unkept human bodies already there. Food was scarce and troops aboard suffered from further malnutrition with many dying on the respective transports and being buried at sea.

The ships were unmarked and were attacked by American submarines and planes on their journey from the Philippine Islands. In such instances, the prisoners of war were often locked in the holds of the ships and were not permitted on deck. The conditions were shocking and inhumane. Japanese records indicate that 25 ships transporting Allied prisoners of war were sunk due to enemy action. On these respective transports there were a total of 18,901 Allied prisoners of war. Of this total, 10,853 were determined to have died because of the submarine and air attacks.

The number that died because of lack of food, sanitary conditions, medical supplies and attention, and brutal mistreatment by Japanese military, has never been revealed. The ships identified as solely transporting Americans that were sunk by submarine or airplane were the Shinmyo Maru with 550 deaths, Arison Maru with 1778 deaths, Oryoku Maru with 608 deaths, and the Enoura Maru with 692. These statistics are based on records of the Japanese Prisoner Of War Information Bureau.

Remember when you were young—hearing the far off rumbling of the approaching storm? It moved closer and closer until you could measure its closeness by counting between the strobe flash and the increasingly loud thump of thunder. With quivering voice: "one thousand one...one thousand two..."

And when it was real close and you could hear a hiss before the flash, and the boom came almost at the same time! Remember huddling deep under the covers as if the fabrics were a shield? Remember passionate prayer: the fear?

Now advance to age 19 and December 8, 1941. Still a teenager, and huddling with others like you: unarmed and listening to the fluttering and whistling as the bombs rain down their devastation and death. Bombs which make sausage of people and leaves the choking, acrid smell of death and destruction everywhere. Only those who have been there know the fear.

Meanwhile, halfway around the world, the family of Ed Jackert joined thousands of families like them around Silvertones, Philcos, and Crosley radios, listening to voices of men with names like H.V. Kaltenborn, Drew Pearson and Gabriel Heater: voices which describe bad news in terms of numbers of American dead and wounded and invasions. Unfamiliar words like "Corregidor" and "Bataan" and "Luzon" became instantly familiar. And none of the war news from the Pacific was
good.

The audacious acts of the heroic Doolittle Raiders and the great naval victory — Battle of Midway—— haven’t taken place yet. At home, families start to learn about things like rationing and saboteurs and civil defense, and school children bring pennies for the Red Cross and save scrap metal for the war cause. All of this for the young sons and daughters “over there” who fight, suffer and die for the old men who can’t negotiate their differences and settle things in a humane and civil way.

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and destroyed much of the United States Navy while ships were at port on a calm Sunday morning. A few hours later, December 8, 1941, Ed Jackfert and other personnel in the Philippine Islands were told of the destruction of America’s Navy at Hawai’s Pearl Harbor.

Meanwhile, at approximately 12:30 P.M. on December 8th, Japanese bombers and fighters (Zero’s) attacked Clark Field along with Baguio and Iba air base. Eighty men died and one hundred fifty were wounded at Clark; and destroyed while on the ground in the attack were 53 P-40’s, 3 P-35’s, 17 B-17’s, and 30 miscellaneous aircraft. One squadron of B-17 had been ordered to a base on Mindanao just a few days prior and was saved from destruction.

Ed Jackfert was there. He laid in a small revetment near his barracks while the planes bombed Clark Air Base. Later, he endured the strafing of bullets from the Zero fighter planes that raked the grounds and ripped things and people apart like a hungry chain saw. It was here that Jackfert first experienced the storm from above from which there was no escape. It wasn’t to be the last. He was only 19, far from home and heading for a nightmarish three years and four months as a prisoner of war.

On Christmas eve of 1941, Ed Jackfert and members of the 28th Bomb Squadron were forced to abandon Clark Field due to the approaching enemy. They were ordered to the Bataan peninsula to hold back an invasion of Japanese troops including infantry, cavalry, tanks, and artillery.

An aircraft engineer, Jackfert didn’t have combat gear or arms, but he and his unit were assigned as infantry with no combat training, weapons, or supplies. On December 29th they were ordered to board a small inter island vessel, the S.S. Mayon, for transport to Mindanao. The next day the ship was attacked by a large Japanese patrol seaplane, dropping six bombs at the ship, with the bombs exploding close to the ship. No damage to any of their personnel or the ship. They arrived at the port of Bugo on Mindanao where Jackfert was issued an Enfield 30 caliber rifle full of cosmoline. It was a rifle that was used in World War I. His first sergeant then announced to them that they were now in the infantry.

The Japanese had landed at Davao on southern Mindanao on December 20th, and Jackfert’s unit had been assigned the task of keeping the enemy from infiltrating to the middle of the island of Mindanao where the United States had an air base. In the middle of April they were ordered to Maramag, an air base in the middle of the island. Then around the 8th of May, 175 men of his squadron had their rifles taken away, issued shovels, and transported to a small city named Alanib to dig trenches for Philippine troops. As they neared their destination on May 10, 1942, they were attacked by an approaching Japanese patrol. No guns to fight with, they immediately retreated back to Alanib and discovered a truck with a white sheet covering the tail gate area of the truck. Arrival of a truck at that time was a God send. The driver of the truck notified the squadron that General Wainwright had surrendered the out manned and poorly equipped troops that had been sacrificed.
to hold back the Japanese military in the Philippines, effective May 10, 1942.

Thus began a three year four month-long period of captivity. Subsequently, Jackfert and his comrades, as prisoners of war, were subjected to forced war time slavery in Japanese factories, mills, mines and warehouses. His first internment camp was at a former Philippine army base at Malaybalay, Mindanao. They were housed in rickety barracks and under the supervision of American officers in the camp compound. During his stay at Malaybalay he witnessed several Filipino prisoners of war executed by Japanese soldiers for slight infraction of camp regulations. It was done to make a statement that they would punish those who disobeyed their rules and regulations and keep every one in line.

Jackfert was interned at Malaybalay until September 30, 1942 when 277 prisoners of war were selected to be transported to an unknown destination. The POWs had filled out a form identifying their skills and were selected for the move on that basis. Jackfert had identified himself as a “truck driver” and not an aircraft mechanic, not wanting to be forced to work on Japanese aircraft. They departed Mindanao on October 1, 1942 aboard a transport identified as the Tamahoku Maru, docking at Manila dock pier seven on the 5th of October. Marched to and interned in Bilibid Prison until October 8th, when once again they were marched through the streets of Manila to the dock area and boarded the “Hell Ship” Tottori Maru. A very large group of prisoners of war from Luzon also boarded the ship, destination unknown. There were approximately 1900 American prisoners of war loaded on the ship at that time.

On October 9th as the ship sailed north, an American submarine shot two torpedoes at the Tottori Maru. Luckily for those aboard, the captain turned the ship and the torpedoes passed by the stern of the ship. Most of the prisoners of war were below deck, however, Ed Jackfert saw the two torpedoes coming toward the ship and his only thought was to get to the other side of the ship hoping it would be safer. The ship stopped at Formosa on October 10th. His group had to bed down in the rear holds of the ship with hardly any room to turn around. The journey proved to be a torturous trip to their intended destination.

The ship stayed in the Formosa area until October 30 when the Tottori Maru joined a convoy escorted by one destroyer toward a northward destination. The ship arrived at Pusan, Korea on November 7, 1942. During the trip northward at least 7 of his comrades died aboard the ship and were buried at sea. On November 9th they once again pulled up anchor and the ship sailed toward Japan. The ship arrived at the port of Osaka on November 11, 1942. The group arriving at Osaka was wearing khaki uniforms and were shivering in the cold as they awaited to board a train. The train transported them to Kawasaki and all POWs disembarked, formed a column and marched to their final destination, Tokyo Area POW Camp #2, Kawasaki, Japan. There were hundreds of Japanese residents lining the streets as they marched by. They hooted and jeered at the group and the younger generation threw a few small objects at them.

The POW group was marched into an open field and indoctrinated by a Japanese Officer named Hyashi. The officer informed the group to work hard and they would get home very soon. He also notified them not to break any rules or camp regulations or they would be severely punished. Their quarters was a former office building of the Mitsui company. All rooms had been converted into sleeping quarters, with wooden slab for beds. Each room had upper and lower bunks which housed 28 prisoners of war in each section.

Within a short time the men were assigned as slave laborers for the Nippon Steel Co., the
Showa Denko chemical plant, the KYK fire brick manufacturing company; Kokosho, a former oil refinery of the Standard Oil Co., Senpaku, a coal ship unloading facility, and the Mitsui Co., where they worked as stevedores loading and unloading railroad cars with various foods and materials. On the coal shoveling detail, they at times worked 24 straight hours in order to get the ships back in action due to a ship transport shortage. At times they had to carry 120 pound bags of rice back and forth from a warehouse to a railroad car. The rice containers weighed more than half the men that were carrying the containers. There were a number of Japanese civilians working at the camp compound that were former military personnel. The meted out much mistreatment, both mentally and physically, to all the prisoners of war in the camp compound. Food was scarce, a small bowl of rice and thin watery soup for each meal. Everyone in the compound lost weight immediately. The heavier a person was the more weight he lost. Jackfert weighed about 130 pounds upon entering the compound with his weight decreasing to about 110 pounds. At least 10 of his prisoner of war friends died from malnutrition during the first 12 months in the compound.

In the year 1945, things began to get much worse because B-29s were now able to bomb Japan. There were no air raid shelters available for the prisoners of war until June 1945, and then constructed only after insistence of an American officer at the camp. The shelters were constructed at the edge of Tokyo Bay which proved to be a very wise decision on the part of the American command.

B-29s began bombing the Kawasaki area in which the prisoners of war were quartered and the industries that they worked at in January 1945. Thereafter, each and every day, an air siren blasted in the area sounding an alarm of a pending air raid. In March 1945, the B-29s flew right over the quarters of the POW group and at a very low altitude. That particular month the B-29s destroyed Tokyo by fire bombing. It was witnessed by the POW group from the windows of their quarters. The Japanese guards did not want the Americans to see the devastation from the bombing and threatened to shoot anyone that was caught looking out of the windows.

On May 29th, most of the prisoners of war were working at the Mitsui warehouse detail moving various types of materials. The air raid siren began blasting out an alarm at 7:00 A.M. Jackfert marched out with a group at 8:00 A.M. to the Mitsui Dock area for work assignments at that facility. Soon after work was initiated, the siren began blasting out short blasts, indicating that a bombing raid was very imminent. The “Dog”, the Mitsui civilian supervisor would not permit the prisoners of war on his detail go to an air raid shelter. The noise of the bombing began to be heard loud and clear at the Mitsui dock area and as the POWs looked toward Yokohama, the B-29 planes could be seen coming toward the Mitsui dock area. Despite the B-29s flying overhead, the work group at Mitsui was still not allowed to take any type of cover from the threat of a bombing raid. There was gratification and fear as the group looked up and saw the B-29s passing overhead accompanied by American fighter planes. There were a few Japanese fighter planes in the area but they proved to be of no threat to the B-29s. Looking again at the Yokohama area, there was a tremendous amount of smoke coming from the city. It appeared that the city was severely damaged from the raid.

Although the bombing raid continued every day near the Kawasaki area, there was no imminent threat to the POW quarters. However, on July 25, 1945, as the POWs were getting ready to bed down for the evening, a long wailing of the siren started. This meant that a bombing mission was on its way. Within a short time the short blasts began to sound from the sirens. This meant that
a bombing raid was rather imminent. Everyone evacuated the building and headed for the air raid shelters that had been built along the Tokyo Bay sea wall. Well, everyone except 23 of the group who had been designated for fire protection at the POW quarters. They entered a shelter near the rear of the building. No sooner had everyone entered their respective shelter, the bombs began to fall. The POW camp compound and warehouse area seemed to be the target. The whistling of the bombs as they fell grew louder and louder. Explosions of the bombs deafened the ear of those in the shelters. Several explosions sounded as if they were close by. Suddenly there was silence. The planes had gone. Slowly, all members of the group began to emerge from their respective shelters. What they saw was shocking. It looked as if the entire area had been dug up with bulldozers because of the many bomb craters nearby. The warehouse area nearby had been practically been demolished. There were bomb craters all around the shelters. They could not believe that there were no casualties at the Tokyo Bay sea wall shelter. All began to attempt to find their way back to the camp compound area. Falling over debris and bomb craters made the path very difficult. Finally, reaching the area where the camp compound building was located, it was discovered that there was no building. A bomb had made a direct hit on the building and completely destroyed it. The entire area had been decimated. Suddenly, the group remembered the shelter near the back of the camp. It had sustained a direct hit. Twenty two of the group in the shelter had been killed. One miraculously had survived and only had a broken leg. Then searching back where a shelter had been prepared for the camp staff, it was discovered that the shelter had been completely covered by dirt. Digging into the shelter, they found the body of one American, Lt. Carney, and four Japanese guards. All were dead. They had died from suffocation. These prisoners of war had lived through the most devastating period of their lives, yet only 20 days before the termination of hostilities, they had been killed during a bombing raid by their own planes.

That night and the next day, everyone was given a basket and each had the task of picking up the pieces of remaining flesh from those killed in the rear shelter. The smell of death and human flesh penetrated the entire area. The detail was completed with our basket contents placed on a large fire near the shelter area. All of the prisoners of war remarked that it was their hope that they would never experience such an event again within their life time. Everyone searched for personal belongings, however, it was a futile task because everything was covered with dirt and debris.

The following day, trucks came and transported the remaining POWs to the former Nishing Flour Mill prisoner of war camp which was approximately five miles away. The quarters were not as comfortable as those that were bombed, however, the facilities provided food and shelter.

After moving to the Nishing Flour Mill facilities, the B-29s and P-51s continually hit the area every day. The prisoners of war used the basement of the large grain silos as air raid shelter. On August 6th, the Japanese were very upset because of some sort of large bomb having been set off over Hiroshima. No one could identify the type of bomb only that it caused mass destruction. The only work performed in their new facility was filling in bomb craters and seeking water for cooking purposes. All utilities provided to the area had been totally destroyed.

On the 15th of August 1945, the prisoner of war group saw Japanese residents huddled around a small radio listening to some sort of broadcast. It was then announced that the Emperor of Japan and notified his subjects that Japan had surrendered and the war was over. The camp commandant informed the POW group that the war was over. A large PW in yellow was painted on the roof top of their sleeping quarters. Within a few days, navy planes discovered the camp and
began dropping food into the camp compound. About a week later, a B-29 dropped fifty gallon drums of food, clothing, and medicine near our facility. Since the camp was situated on Tokyo Bay, they watched as American vessels sailed into Tokyo Bay. First there were the mine sweepers and then hundreds of vessels anchored in the bay. The most beautiful sight was watching the battleship U.S.S. Missouri sail in and anchor just across the bay from their camp compound. Then on August 29th, Commander Stassen of Bull Halsey’s naval staff headed a flotilla of landing crafts to the docks of the Nissin Flour Mill camp. All POWs were waving and screaming at the flotilla with tears streaming down their faces.

The prisoners of war were then boarded the landing craft and began a journey down the sea wall area. The landing craft passed the area where their previous facility had been destroyed by B-29 bombers and all turned their heads and saluted the area where their comrades had died. Sailing through and entrance of the breakwater, the prisoners of war saw the most beautiful sight that one could imagine. It was the hospital ship S.S. Benevolence. Once again emotion ran high and tears came to their eyes when they saw the large red cross painted on the side of the ship. However, what was more moving was the American flag fluttering in the breeze on the stern of the ship. It’s beautiful red, white, and blue colors expressing to them that now they were free and could go home.

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES OATH OF ENLISTMENT

What motivated these distinguished and courageous troops who had unknowingly been sent to defend the Philippines when those in our government knew that they would be sacrificed and abandoned? It starts with the oath to enlistment which states as follows: “I, (name) do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution Of The United States Of America and defend it against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the regulations of the Uniform Code Of Military Justice. So help me God.” To those who served as defenders of the Philippine Islands, there was more than that. It was the spirit of freedom which is the legacy and birthright of every citizen of the United States of America. Our liberty, not won and preserved with ease, indifference or selfishness, rather has been forged in the fires of self-sacrifice, loyalty, courage and wisdom, with a vision dedicated to a United States of America forever free. However, let us never forget, that the freedom we enjoy everyday in these United States Of America was made possible through the sacrifice of military deaths, those wounded in battle, and with a very heavy financial burden.

THE FREEDOM PLEDGE: as shown on the following page was imbedded deeply in their thoughts as they held the Japanese forces at bay for 5 months, which by the way, probably saved Australia from an invasion and would have prolonged World War II for a more lengthy period of time. The documents shown on the following pages recognized the efforts of these distinguished heroes.

Perhaps the words of a seventh grade student which defines freedom as sincere as you can get: “People I have never known or met died throughout the years for my freedom. Almighty God originally gave me the gift by my birth in this country, but human beings have secured this gift for me. The honor of freedom will be mine all my life because of their great sacrifice and dedication to my democracy. What an honor to be an American. Freedom——my privilege forever.”
Over 700 American troops and several thousand Filipino troops died on the Death March from mistreatment in their effort to protect the FREEDOM PLEDGE.
I love America. I thrill to the flag, choke up to the anthem and tear up at TAPS.
Like father before and son to follow, I served her with pride.
But now I am ashamed of her.
America would never leave a comrade on the field of battle.
But she did.
Not once.
Not twice.
But three times.
With lies and false promises we abandoned them first to the hordes of the sons of the Rising Sun who saw cruelty as sport and the lives of American valueless.
And after nearly four months of resistance, armed with only guts and shovel and meager equipment; and precious few weapons of war, we surrendered them to the sadistic culture of captors which gave no respect, and then made sick and starving slaves of them in the mines and factories and hell-hole prisoner of war camps of the Philippine Islands.
Unaware of the fate of their sons and brothers, the embattled giant sleeping melting pot of America reared itself from its lethargy and on the sweat and outrage of working men began to build and feed a war machine.
The machine was nourished by flesh and bone lubricated by blood and it grew and became powerful and began to stop, then reverse the course of cataclysmic world war. Finally, the enemy was vanquished.
For its atrocities and unimaginable action for economic and diplomatic purposes, Japan was forgiven.
There’s no need to apologize or compensate for years at hard labor and sickness and disease and cruel punishment.
“America will take care of its own,” was the second betrayal, the second false promise. Then for decades, as America and Americans danced the Walmart waltz of growing consumerism, we were led like blind sheep down the path of denial and ignorance while the returned heroes raised a faint voice of protest.
They asked only for justice, and elusive and lost concept to those who had abandoned
them. Thus began and continued the third abandonment as leaders squandered millions of dollars, much of it on an agenda of their own. In this instance, those many leaders in this case are not worthy of breathing the same air and walking the same earth as those betrayed heroes.

“Can’t offend our partners,” they said. Wait long enough and they’ll all die and they voices will fade away.”

And dying away they are at an accelerating rate. Their voices become few and their claims fading.

Can you hear them now?
I can. Their voices an agony in my ears.

I love my America.
I thrill in the flag, choke t the anthem and tear up on TAPS
Like father before and, son to follow, I served her with pride.

But now I am ashamed of her.

They asked only for justice, and elusive and lost concept to those who had abandoned them. Thus began and continued the third abandonment as leaders squandered millions of dollars, much of it on agencies of their own. In this instance, those many leaders are not worthy of breathing the same air. But for some time, there is still time and I will raise my voice to tell this story.

At least I can do that much to ease my shame

COURTESY GEORGE WALLACE, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF THE BROOKE REVIEW.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1990

To The American Defenders Of Bataan & Corregidor:

Much of the cost of our precious freedom has been borne by the brave and selfless members of our Armed Forces. Few Americans have endured such adversity for that freedom or more fully appreciate its value than those of you who were captured and imprisoned following the battles of Bataan and Corregidor in World War II. You not only faced the hardships of a desperate fight against overwhelming odds but also suffered the most brutal and inhuman treatment by your captors.

The indomitable courage of the men who defended Bataan and Corregidor is legendary. Even when forced to lay down your arms, you never surrendered your spirits, and though your ordeal was arduous, your strength was greater. The memory of your heroism and that of your fallen comrades will endure forever in our history and in our hearts. On behalf of a grateful Nation, I salute you for your devoted service.

Barbara joins me in sending best wishes for a most enjoyable reunion. God bless you.

[Signature]
United States Senate
Office of the Democratic Leader
Washington, D.C.  20510

July 9, 1984

Commander Edward Jackfert
National Commander
American Defenders of Bataan & Corregidor, Inc.
10-201 Hillcrest Drive
Weillsburg, West Virginia 26070

Dear Commander Jackfert:

The citizens of this great nation thank you and your comrades for the beyond-the-call of duty in defending our nation’s interest in the Far East. You will always be remembered.

No American living at the time of the Bataan-Corregidor seige and the subsequent death march will ever forget the shock and horror that we all felt in those hideous days, or the anxiety that our country endured in losing the initial battle for the Philippine Islands to the Japanese Empire. No amount of compensation can ever repay you or your comrades for the suffering and hardship that you were forced to endure as captives in slave labor camps, and no expression of gratitude could be adequate to satisfy the debt owed you for the valiant stand that you made in defending the Philippine and American vital interests in those early days of World War II. The saga of the Bataan-Corregidor defenders and our other military personnel in the Philippines will forever live in the annals of American history.

Increasingly, however, historians reviewing those fateful days realize that the defense of the Philippines against the overwhelming power of the Imperial Japanese armed forces bought for our country added time for which to mobilize our strength to return for our final victory. Without that time, the outcome of the war in the Pacific might have been disastrously different, and the course of modern events would have taken a turn from which we would still be suffering. The bravery and heroic efforts of you and the other members of the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor helped America triumph in World War II and preserve the way of life that we hold so dear.

Again, congratulations on your election and best wishes in the year ahead.

With warm regards,

Robert C. Byrd
ARMY AIR FORCES

Certificate of Appreciation

FOR WAR SERVICE

TO THE DEFENDERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
DECEMBER 8, 1941—MAY 10, 1942

To you who answered the call of your country and served in its Armed Forces to bring about the total defeat of the enemy, I extend the heartfelt thanks of a grateful Nation. As one of the Nation's finest, you undertook the most severe task one can be called upon to perform. Because you demonstrated the fortitude, resourcefulness and calm judgment necessary to carry out that task, we now look to you for leadership and example in further exalting our country in peace.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO MEMBERS OF UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCES DEPLOYED IN OCTOBER 1945:

It gives me special pleasure to welcome you back to your native shores, and to express, on behalf of the people of the United States, the joy we feel at your deliverance from the hands of the enemy. It is a source of profound satisfaction that our efforts to accomplish your return have been successful.

You have fought valiantly in foreign lands and have suffered greatly. As your Commander in Chief, I take pride in your past achievements and express the thanks of a grateful Nation for your services in combat and your steadfastness while a prisoner of war.

May God grant each of you happiness and an early return to health.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE GALLANT U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS PERSONNEL
DECEMBER 8, 1941—MAY 10, 1942

THANKS to you personally to thank you for a job well done, for your war service and for your faith in the American system of government. You have been a credit to the United States and its service in war. Your sacrifices have not been in vain. By your courage and devotion, you have made it possible for the United States to achieve its objectives.

I extend to you my personal gratitude for your efforts in this war. Your bravery and tenacity have been the inspiration of all who have served with you.

May God be with you and your families in time of need.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President

[Signature]

[Signature]
WERE AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR INTERNED BY JAPAN SACRIFICED BY OUR GOVERNMENT BY INSERTING SECTION 14b IN THE PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN AT THE LAST MOMENT?

Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty states, "It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war". This authorizes reparations by recognizing war responsibility. Other claims rights and settlement of property rights, return or compensation for Allied property, compensation for Japanese mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war, resolution of the claims rights of neutral nations, and debt return from the prewar period, etc., are minutely specified in Articles 15 to 18.

However, at the insistence of the United States, Section 14b was inserted at the last moment that eliminated claims by prisoners of war which read as follows: "Except as otherwise noted in the present treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparation claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any action taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military purposes.

According to note journalist and others, one who had lived in Japan for a period of time, wrote that due to the autocratic style fo General MacArthur, he had few friends and did not perceive any understanding of economics. A highly influential lobby group in Washington, in response to this, mostly favored the swift regeneration of Japan into the world economy. It started with a lawyer named James Lee Kauffman who openly criticized the economic policies of MacArthur. This resulted in the appointment of the DRAPER-JOHNSON COMMITTEE.

Their report recommended the elimination of and cancellation of reparation requirements. The committee more or less absolved Japan of all liabilities. There had been allegations that some of the missions' members had conflicts of interests because they represented American financial organizations that had extensive pre-war dealings with the Japan’s so-called Zaibatsu, which were the industrial groups that dominated the Japanese economy in the first half of the 20th Century.

Not the least of the conflicts appears to have concerned Army Undersecretary William H. Draper, Jr. who was the mission's chairman. These same companies utilized American prisoners of war as slave laborers during the time they were interned in Japan and other Far East territories. Dillon, Read, and Co., the investment bank where Draper had worked prior to the war and where he returned after the war,
received a lucrative Japanese underwriting deal soon after the mission reported. The Draper-Johnson mission’s key recommendation were incorporated in to the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 (according to journalist Eamonn Fingleton and noted historian Linda Goetz Holmes). The committee’s recommendations included Section 14b which eliminated the possibility of prisoners of war filing claims against the Japanese government and industrial firms that utilized them as slave laborers during World War II. Therefore this section was included in the peace treaty. Subsequently, Japan always brought up the peace treaty and section 14b when they were approached to pay compensation to former prisoners of war for mistreatment and slave labor.

Also, the greatest obstacles to getting legislation passed by our Congressional bodies were the White House, State Department, and the government of Japan. The White House implied that such legislation could “damage our coalition with Japan in the Far East”. We have information provided to us that the government of Japan was paying $60,000. monthly fee to the firm of Hogan & Hartson to lobby Congress solely on historical issues related to World War II, and has been successful so far. As best can be determined, Japan’s compensation payments both to war victims and their heirs have totaled a mere $1 billion. This contrasts remarkably with Germany’s record. Already by the 1990’s, Germany’s payments to victims and their heirs had exceeded $70 billion. This contrast is all the more remarkable for the fact that Imperial Japan’s victims outnumbered those of the Nazis by at least three to one.

Yes, Japanese authorities have apologized for their past misdeeds at least on 50 occasions. However, the Diet has never passed a resolution of contrition. Also, there has never been an statement of sorrow or contrition by the industrial firms that utilized Americans prisoners of war as slave laborers in almost all areas that provided armaments for the Japanese defense forces to be used against Allied troops.
THESE DISTINGUISHED AND COURAGEOUS HEROES SHOULD AND MUST BE REMEMBERED

THEY WERE SACRIFICED AND ABANDONED WHILE DEFENDING THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND SUFFERED HORRIBLE MISTREATMENT BY THE JAPANESE MILITARY WHILE INTERNED AS PRISONERS OF WAR FOR UP TO 3 YEARS AND 5 MONTHS

HISTORIANS STATE THAT THESE DEFENDERS SAVED AUSTRALIA FROM AN INVASION AND SUBSEQUENTLY SHORTENED WORLD WAR II AND SAVED COUNTLESS BATTLE CASUALTIES

SPECIAL ORDER DEFENDERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS -12/8/40--05/10/42 27 July 1945

By direction of the President, each of the following is awarded the BRONZE STAR MEDAL for meritorious achievement while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force between 7 December 1941 to 10 May 1942.

PAS: YYYYYYYY, RDP: N/A.