

IN THE MATTER OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMES AND IN
THE MATTER OF KRANJI NO. 2 CAMP, SINGAPORE.

A F F I D A V I T.

I, No. 125474 Major JAMES WILLIAM DOUGLAS BULL, Royal Army Medical Corps, specialist radiologist, with permanent home address at St. Oswald's House, Stony Stratford, in the County of Buckingham MAKE OATH AND SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. I was captured in SINGAPORE in February 1942. I was at CHANGI POW Camp from February 1942 to May 1944. I then went to KRANJI NO. 1 Camp from May 1944 until April 1945. I then moved to KRANJI NO. 2 Camp where I remained until hostilities ended.
2. I have read the affidavit of Major Bradshaw who was senior British officer at KRANJI NO. 2 Camp and I agree with him about the distinction between KRANJI NO. 1 and KRANJI NO. 2 Camps. (I was senior medical officer at KRANJI NO. 2 Camp.)
3. I agree with paragraph 3 of Major Bradshaw's affidavit which sets out the work which the inmates of KRANJI NO. 2 were supposed to do.
4. With regard to medical conditions generally at the camp I have this report to make:-

Deficiency diseases: Beri-beri was most prominent and was always on the increase. For example in April 1945 only two cases of beri-beri were unable to go to work. In May this number had risen to nine and in June to 35 and July to 43. During this time at least an equal number of people had symptoms of beri-beri but were just able to continue their work. By the end of July nearly 100 men had beri-beri symptoms. Despite repeated requests which I made for rice polishings these were only provided from mid-June to mid-July. Even so only four pounds daily was supplied which was about one seventh of the amount we wanted. A slight improvement was shown among those favoured few to whom rice polishings were given.

Malaria: No anti-malarial precautions were permitted in the vicinity of the camp and it was thought that the incidence would be very high, particularly as the second quarter of the year is the season for malaria.

Incidence: Table 1 shows the figures. No case suffered from very gross anaemia in spite of the great number of relapses in many individuals. There was one case of cerebral sub-tertian malaria which recovered. In view of the lack of anti-malarial measures it was considered that the incidence was not unduly high.

Table 1.

1945	Slides examined	Total			Relapses			Primary		
		BT	MT	TOT	BT	MT	TOT	BT	MT	TOT
April	86	25	9	34	17	4	21	8	5	13
May	265	71	11	82	47	4	51	24	7	31
June	297	85	14	99	74	6	80	11	8	19
July	370	109	16	125	89	7	96	20	9	29
To 22 August	253	84	11	95	73	3	76	11	8	19
Grand Total	1271	374	61	435	300	24	324	74	37	111

Dysentery: The camp was virtually free from dysentery until July when there was a small outbreak of a mild bacillary form. Fortunately there were no serious cases and never more than nine at any one time; thus it will be seen that the outbreak never reached epidemic proportions. However, ascaris was very common and was the cause of much diarrhoea and a variety of abdominal symptoms. It is estimated that nearly half the camp suffered from this infection.

Pulmonary tuberculosis: Two cases were diagnosed in July (strongly positive sputum). They were both very active cases and both in very under-nourished men ex-PALEMBANG. Facilities for X-ray and artificial pneumo-thorax were available within 300 yards but were repeatedly refused.

Diphtheria: There were four cases of skin diphtheria, all appearing in July. All had large leg ulcers, but none of the cases was seriously ill.

As no facilities were available for isolation the T.Bs., diphtherias and dysenteries had to be housed underneath huts. The head-room amounted to about four feet making medical examination and nursing very difficult. Furthermore much of the dust from the floor above inevitably came down on these unfortunate patients.]

Tropical skin ulcers: These were very common and left many men off work, some for several weeks. Fortunately none became very severe or developed complications and amputation of a limb never had to be considered.

Injuries: Considering the highly dangerous nature of the work being performed and the lack of proper precautions, the injury rate was relatively low. One man was buried by a fall of earth and suffocated to death before he could be dug out. No other injury incapacitated anyone for more than a month.

Hospital accommodation: This was grossly inadequate in every respect. It was impossible to obtain beds for all the patients and mattresses were supplied only to the most serious cases. In the first few

weeks no mattresses at all were available. No sheets were available at any time. There was extreme overcrowding. Not more than nine inches separated each bed-space. Only one bed pan and one urine bottle were provided for the whole hospital. No bowls or basins were provided at all.

Operating theatre: Part of a hut was improvised as a theatre and electric light was available from an engine in the adjacent camp. On three occasions, however the engine was deliberately stopped before the completion of an operation at night, and candles or burning red palm oil had to be used as illumination.

Drugs: Deficiencies were far too numerous to list, but the arrival of Red Cross supplies made an enormous difference.

Rations: These were quite insufficient and the prisoners of war suffered seriously from under-nourishment.

Camp hygiene:

i. Latrines: Bore-holes and deep trench latrines were used. The chief difficulty encountered was the total absence of a supply of wood for latrine tops in spite of repeated requests. Nails and screws were also not available. As a result living quarters had to be partially stripped to obtain wood and nails. This never became a menace in the camp.

ii. Water: The supply was adequate but the number of showers grossly inadequate - one per hundred men. There would have been no difficulty about supplying further showers but all requests were disregarded.

iii. Cooking: Facilities were grossly inadequate in every way. One small cockhouse had to feed the whole camp.

iv. Housing accommodation: Gross overcrowding existed due to the insufficient accommodation. Thirteen huts were allotted to house the other ranks (15 officers in one small hut 32 feet by 15 ft. - 32 square feet per head), and the average number per hut was 69. To alleviate the congestion a number of men were allowed to sleep under the huts, the number averaging nine perhut. The huts were of a uniform size measuring 96 feet long by 15 feet wide and having a floor space of 1440 square feet. Each man was thus allowed a space of approximately 20 square feet and when it is considered that the normal floor space is 60 feet some idea of the extent of the overcrowding can be obtained. It might also be added that a much greater space is allowed to troops in tropical stations. (Straits Settlement 100 square feet)./

Sick and working figures:

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Hospital</u>	<u>No Duty</u>	<u>Total Sick</u>	<u>Total Working Party</u>	<u>Percentage of Working Party required by Imp. Japanese Army</u>
April 1 1945	1	3	4	602	-
15	9	18	27	572	95.3
MAY 1	11	23	34	558	93.0
15	40	11	51	545	90.8
June 1	31	39	70	534	89.0
15	37	31	68	542	90.3
(Strength increased by 300)					
July 1	39	55	94	802	85.8
15	43	54	97	827	88.5
Aug. 1	56	67	123	802	85.8
15	63	84	147	796	85.1
17				737	78.8

The above table shows the hospital figures, no duty personnel, total sick, working party strength and percentage of working party required by the Imperial Japanese Army out at work. The figures for no duty personnel are extremely high owing to the limited hospital accommodation. In places where more normal conditions prevail the majority of these would be hospital patients.

In the early part of August it was obvious that the health of the men was deteriorating and that they were beginning to crack under the strain of hard work and under-nourishment. It became progressively more difficult to maintain working figures. On 17 August the penultimate working day, the working figures had dropped to 737, and had the war continued there is very little doubt that by September it would have been impossible to find 700 fit men to go out to work.

The increase in the number of sick caused very gross overcrowding in the hospital, and many patients who should have been hospitalised were of necessity treated in lines.

The incidence of traumatic leg ulcers contracted at work was ever on the increase.

Conclusions: Judging by Malayan POW working camps there is nothing remarkable to note except perhaps surprise that the sickness was not much higher. When one remembers that a man had only one day's rest in ten, that he arose from his mattressless bed three-quarters of an hour before dawn, hurriedly ate his meagre breakfast, rushed out to work, returned at dusk, ate his evening meal at, or after, dark, had a shower, then visited the medical inspection room for the dressing of his sores by very inadequate artificial light, was then left perhaps half an hour to himself before "lights out" it is very remarkable that so many men were able to continue this without interruption for well over 100 days.

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The morale throughout was excellent and the behaviour of the patients in such difficult circumstances also excellent. There were no cases of mental disease. There was some tunnel-phobia, particularly just after the unfortunate individual was buried alive by a fall.

(Practically all requests for improvements in medical conditions were refused.

An operating theatre (first-class by POW standards) existed in the adjacent camp but we were not allowed the use of it. The liver abscess was operated upon in the next camp after the Imperial Japanese Army had been at last persuaded that the man would die if he were not transferred. All other facilities such as they were at the adjacent hospital were also refused.]

Only one death occurred in the camp during the period under review (acute pancreatitis) and one case (suffocation in tunnel) was brought in dead. A doctor Lieutenant NAKI of the Imperial Japanese Army was in medical charge of the camp but never once visited it or consulted me in spite of repeated requests by me to his juniors particularly with regard to the examination and disposal of serious cases.

Comment: No change occurred in the attitude of the Imperial Japanese Army until after the capitulation. Even then the only medical concession they made was that operation cases would be permitted to be transferred to KRANJI No. 1 Hospital. The general lot of the patients was unchanged except that the degree of overcrowding was even greater than before.

5. (From 22 August onwards until the relief by British Forces early in September conditions in the camp slightly improved - for example two tons of rice polishings came in in one day. Prior to this only four pounds were issued daily for the whole camp strength of approximately 1020 and then only for about one month.

6. Furthermore [enormous quantities of Red Cross parcels and stores which had obviously been on SINGAPORE ISLAND for months if not years were sent in to us. In addition large stocks of butter from the cold storage in Singapore were sent in. This was Australian butter which had been there since the capitulation in February 1942. Powdered milk came in in large quantities. We had repeatedly asked for this for our seriously ill cases, particularly those with gastric ulceration. All our requests had always been refused. This proves that the stocks of Red Cross food and milk and butter were available on the island, and that our starvation was not due to the allied blockade. The persons I regard as being primarily responsible for this were the Camp Commandant, CSM YOSHIKAWA, who was commandant of both KRANJI No. 1 and KRANJI No. 2 camps. It was he who refused my requests for very sick people to be transferred to KRANJI No. 1, which was the hospital camp. He was an unpleasant man and made no secret of his dislike for the British and was in every way brutal and callous towards us. Another person whom I consider as much responsible as YOSHIKAWA was Lieut. NAKI, the doctor. He came to us early in June and made a speech

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on his arrival saying he would give us every assistance. In fact he gave us none. I personally only saw him once after that speech. He never came round the camp and made no effort to get YOSHIKAWA to take in our very sick people. Other personalities include Serjeant-Major MISENU who was the medical NCO. He was not actually cruel but bone idle and of no assistance whatever. Corporal NISHIYAMA acted as quartermaster and to my certain knowledge misappropriated our rations. He used to sell them in the bazaar.

SWORN by the said JAMES WILLIAM DOUGLAS BULL)
at 6 Spring Gardens in the City of Westminster)
ster this 17th day of January 1945) (Signed) J.W.D. BULL.

Before me

(Signed) A.M. BELL-MACDONALD.
Major, Legal Staff,
Military Department,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, London.

I certify that this is a true copy of the original affidavit.

(Signed) A.M. BELL-MACDONALD.
Major, Legal Staff,
Office of the Judge Advocate General.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

NO. 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHERS

ARAKI, SADA0 AND OTHERS.

1. BURNETT LESLIE WOODBURN CLARKE of BRISBANE in the STATE of QUEENSLAND, MEDICAL PRACTITIONER, make oath and say as follows:-

I was QX.22806 MAJOR B.L.W. CLARKE, 2/13 A.G.H. 7 AUST. DIVISION, when I became a prisoner of war in the hands of the Japanese Forces.

2. We were captured on the 13th February, 1942, two days before SINGAPORE fell. Our hospital was left alone until approximately 20th February, 1942. A series of Japanese came out, had a rough look over the hospital and told us we had to be moved out to SELERANG BARRACKS within five days.

3. We had approximately 1800 patients on our hands. Two thirds were battle casualties. We asked for time to allow some of these seriously wounded men a chance to recover. The Japanese refused. They supplied us with/certain amount of transport. By over-crowding the vehicles with men and material, everybody received transport to the new area.

4. On arriving at SELERANG we were given a long barrack building which we had to clean up. By cleaning up, I mean wreckage had to be shifted where shells and bombs had exploded. The space allotted to each man was 6 ft. by 3 ft. with no provision for passages between the beds which were jammed up against each other.

5. Our ration of water was one quart per man per day for all purposes. This water was infected and had to be sterilized by boiling before we could drink it. The fuel ration was 2½ lbs. of wood per man per day.

6. It was extremely hot at the time and naturally a great deal of contaminated water was drunk by the men. Dysentery followed. I am not quite certain of the figures, but I believe 5,000 out of 12,000 men got dysentery in the first three months. In addition the hygiene system had completely broken down. The Japanese did not give us any tools to dig latrines. This helped the spread of dysentery. It was approximately ten weeks before they would give us any tools or covering for the latrine pits.

7. After being in SELERANG for two weeks we were ordered to move to ROBERTS BARRACKS about one and a half miles away, the Japanese idea being to make one combined hospital in a separate area. A limited amount of transport was given for this second move, so that really only the sick were transported. The rest walked. Conditions in ROBERTS BARRACKS were worse than in SELERANG. A tremendous amount of damage had been done by bombing and shelling and we had to clean this area up in the same way as we cleaned up SELERANG. We repaired

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various buildings, using a little bluffing to get some of the things we wanted. In the meantime the Japanese had put us all on the I.J.A. ration which consisted mainly of rice. Our medical men pointed out that this diet was definitely deficient in proteins, fats, vitamins, etc., and that within two months deficiency diseases would follow, and in April 1942, a large number of men came in suffering from beri beri. This was followed in subsequent months by a great many other deficiency diseases, such as amblyopia, scrotal dermatitis, glossitis, stomatitis, pedialgia (happy feet) and various forms of paralysis. An appeal was made to the Japanese for rice polishings to counteract some of these deficiency diseases.

After some considerable delay, approximately two months, they gave us some rice polishings and told us we could buy some more from them. In my own private opinion the Japanese showed no interest in our food at all. That was the general attitude of the Japanese.

8. My own personal problem was in connection with my skin ward (I was A.I.F. Dermatologist) and with the lack of dressings and medical supplies, an appeal for dressings was answered by receipt of a truck load of old clothes, towels, various discarded bits of linen and other fabric which we had to sterilize ourselves, with no increase in water or fuel ration to help us.

9. About the end of 1942 approximately 150 men were brought in from Kuala Lumpur gaol. These men had been cut off during the war, incarcerated and, in addition to the ordinary deficiency diseases, they were covered with scabies. Up till that time we had no scabies. After this we were not able to eliminate scabies from the prison area in Changi, mainly because the Japanese would not give us any extra medical supplies or dressings. Requests for such matters as hot baths failed to rouse the interest of the Japanese. However, by careful management on our part, we could give a certain number, roughly 40, hot baths per day. More vital drugs of the Benzol group were refused. Scabies rapidly became infected and opened up the way for diphtheria involving the skin. In the early days we had brought in some anti-diphtheria serum, but the Japanese gave no replacement to my knowledge until 1945, and then only very limited amounts, so that only selected serious cases could get the serum. Certain skin diseases, such as tinea, reached tremendous proportion and after our own limited supply which we had brought into the camp had run out, the Japanese only gave us the barest minimum which was totally insufficient to cope with the outbreak of skin diseases.

10. Malaria: Before the war Singapore and lower Johore were malaria free, Japanese made no attempt to control the spread of malaria with the result that over 80 percent of the prisoners were infected with malaria. Owing to the limited supply, our treatment of malaria was totally inadequate. Large numbers of patients who have returned to Australia can tell of 30, 40, or 50 recurrences.

11. With regard to deficiency diseases, appeals were made to the Japanese.

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response was negligible, but we had been able, by what amounts to bluffing, to get the Japanese to pass over to us large quantities of Marmite which we knew was stored in the British Medical Depot in Singapore. Sometimes the quantity given was adequate, but more often it was totally inadequate. We were reduced to rationing Marmite amongst the very sick. It was impossible to use it as a prophylactic.

12. For the first five months about two ounces of meat per man was brought into the camp twice a week. This ran out about August. A Red Cross ship came in in September 1942 and the Japanese delivered to us fairly large supplies which carried us on for three months. We received food and some medicines. The food consisted of such things as bully beef, ovaltine and marmite. Personal observation here is that it was the intention of the Japanese to fatten the men up prior to removing large parties to other parts. These big parties began to leave CHANGI in late January 1943 up to May 1943. It was subsequently found that the parties referred to had been sent mainly to Burma, Thailand, Borneo, and Japan. After these parties had gone conditions temporarily improved owing to the exodus of such a large number of men. The Japanese said they were going to substitute fish for meat. The majority of the load of fish that was brought into camp consisted of little things about 2" to 3" long which appeared to be several days old and in the majority of cases, were totally inedible. We used them for fertilizer for our gardens.

13. In December 1943, a large portion of F Force returned from the Burma-Thailand Railway. These men were in a shocking condition suffering from gross attacks of beri beri in its various types, malaria, tropical ulcers and gross debility. The loss of weight was simply appalling. The average loss of weight would appear to be in the neighbourhood of 70 to 80 lbs. per individual.

14. Approximately 80 percent of these men had to be admitted immediately to hospital, and we were confronted with three serious problems - (1) The lack of beds of any sort for the men; (2) the replacement of clothing, and (3) the enormous drain on our minimum medical and food supply. To my knowledge the Japanese made no attempt to replace any hospital equipment such as beds, bedding and other important equipment until after the 16th August 1945. Many of the men who returned from Thailand F Force had to lie on bare boards or on the concrete floors. We appealed for clothing but the appeal fell on deaf ears.

15. Early in 1944 more parties were returned from other parts in the same state.

16. In April or May 1944, after many appeals to the Japanese, they decided to set up another hospital at Kranji. The remainder of our beds and bedding was sent out to Kranji where it was the intention to establish a 600 bed hospital essentially for the treatment of chronic cases such as T.B., gastric ulcers, etc. This hospital came under combined British and Australian control while we were left in Changi with prac-

ordered the whole of the area to be vacated and a hospital set up in the outskirts of Changi gaol. Here the men were housed in 100 metre huts and approximately 220 men had to be accommodated in these huts. The huts were built of bamboos, cocoanut palm and other jungle material. Many of them were not even waterproof. The men lay on platforms, the space for each bed was 6 ft. by 3 ft. for all purposes. Further appeal for some sort of bedding, blankets etc., was refused.

17. Medical supplies and dressings were almost exhausted. The Japanese refused to replenish them. Many of us endeavoured to devise means of overcoming these difficulties regarding drugs, e.g. iron as a tonic for anaemias was made in our camp by our engineers. The lack of supply of vitamin was to a certain extent overcome by extracting the juice from grass and certain local flora. The Japanese did not make any attempt to interfere with our own efforts.

18. After removing to Changi gaol area in June 1944 the food position became acute. The Japanese greatly reduced the ration so that early in 1945 the men were showing very definite signs of emaciation which gradually got worse and worse until the surrender.

19. Coinciding with this gross emaciation there was a tremendous increase in the sickness rate. The men were in such a debilitated state they easily contracted any other diseases, such as boils, many of which became infected with diphtheria; lung condition such as T.B. and pneumonia; while as a result of the shocking diet the men developed various forms of dysentery and many forms of diarrhoea which resulted in many deaths.

20. The difficulties all the time were being increased by the arrival of large parties of Dutch, British, and Australian, prisoners of war from Java, Sumatra, and other parts of the N.E.I. All of these were in an appalling condition and no help was given by our hosts regarding food, medical supplies, or the elementary requirements of an ordinary camp.

21. The lack of clothing was having a very disastrous effect on the men and in about February 1945 a disease which we regard as pellagra established a firm hold on the prisoners of war. I am definitely of the opinion that had the Japanese supplied us with reasonable clothing and reasonable food this outbreak would have been averted.

22. Right through the whole period that we were interned it was impossible to eradicate scabies, tinea in its many forms, dysentery, malaria and the general deficiency diseases such as beri beri, palagra etc. My own private opinion was that the Japanese desired to exterminate us by these means. Their attitude was one of total indifference and the results were only to be expected.

23. On approximately the 16th of August 1945 the Japanese brought into our camp enormous

blanket, one pair of shorts, shirt, boots, socks. The food supply was extremely extravagant, the rice issue jumped from 12 to 30 ounces per day, tons of butter, cheese, milk and meat were brought in such huge quantities we could not possibly handle them. I saw the mark "WORCO" on some of the butter. This food was in quite good condition and although the date on one parcel of New Zealand butter was 1933, it was still good. In addition enormous quantities of medical supplies were brought in, including vitamins atebirin, and other drugs, which we had been desperately wanting over the last three years. We believe this material had been available all the time

24. As regards the Red Cross, my observations were that a Red Cross ship came in in September 1942 and for three months good supplies were handed to us. In March 1944 a small shipment of Red Cross food was brought in which lasted about three weeks. The next was in March 1945. One Red Cross parcel, approximately 7 lbs., was distributed between 28 men on Wednesdays and Sundays. That lasted ten weeks. This food really only acted as flavour. On many occasions we saw Japanese smoking Camel and player cigarettes. The packets were quite fresh. They were similar to the ones the Red Cross issued to us after the Japanese surrender. On several occasions I saw Argentine Bully Beef tins discarded by the Japanese. Argentine Bully Beef was supplied to us after the Japanese surrender.

25. The only marking on the hospital was a Geneva flag in the middle of the camp. Lights out was at 10 p.m. and we were not allowed to use lights in the wards after this time. Japanese guards used to come to the hospital for treatment.

26. The Japanese D.D.M.S. of Changi was Capt. Suzuki. I personally interviewed him on more than one occasion. I made many requests of him; none were acceded to. I cannot recollect him granting any request.

27. In approximately September 1944 the Japanese issued three scales of diet; heavy duty, light duty, and no duty. This meant that the sick men got only half the ration of a man on heavy duty. The heavy duty ration was in our opinion, totally inadequate even for a man in a sedentary occupation. This continued until the day of surrender.

28. The Japanese also refused to pay anybody who was not on duty. In other words - no pay, no food for the sick men.

SWORN BEFORE ME AT BRISBANE ON THE)
13TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1946.)

(Signed) B.L.W. CLARKE.

(Signed) A.H. DEAKIN, J.P.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

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Evidence taken at SYDNEY before Mr. Justice MANSFIELD
on Thursday 22 November 1945.

Brigadier Frederick Gallagher GALLEGHAN being duly sworn gives the following evidence:-


I am NX70416 Brigadier Frederick Gallagher GALLEGHAN of 27 Bde. My private address is 68 Avenue Road, Mosman, N.S.W.; telephone number X13865. During the fighting preceding the fall of Singapore I was a Lt. Col. Commanding 2/30 Bn. I was taken prisoner at Singapore on 15 Feb. 42. During the fighting prior to the surrender I did not see any Japanese war crimes or atrocities.

I was a prisoner at Changi. On the departure of Maj. Gen. GALLAGHAN I became Commander of the A.I.F. Changi and I remained as such until the Japanese capitulation in 1945. Col. Holmes was in charge of Malayan Command. His actual posting was Commander British Australian Troops Malaya. I was Deputy Commander to him and for the last 18 months I was A/Comd because of his incapacity.

I was in charge of a working party in Singapore and nothing untoward happened until I was involved in the Selarang Incident. On 31 August 42 pressure was brought to bear by the Japanese on us to sign a non-escape form. The Japanese issued an order dated 31 Aug. 42 and numbered 7 which required all prisoners of war to sign a non-escape declaration. On that day they paraded Col. Holmes and the 5 Divisional Commanders who were there, showed the form to Holmes and said they required us all to sign it that day. We had no knowledge of what they were going to ask. Holmes refused on his own behalf to issue the order. It was then passed to each of the Commanders in turn and we each refused to issue an order to sign it. Some discussion took place. It was pretty obvious we were going to have to sign it. We tried to reach a compromise. Their main point was that they were going to shoot anyone who attempted to escape. We said we would promise not to attempt to escape understanding that the penalty was death, and asked them to put that on their printed form, which would be against the Convention. They refused to do that.

After a lot of talk, lasting 2 hours, they refused to make any amendment. They said the form was drawn up in Tokio and only Tokio could amend it. It was phrased, "I hereby promise" or, "I promise upon my honour not to attempt to escape". I took the objection that no soldier has power to promise not to escape. There was no opportunity of escape; it was a matter of principle. It is a soldier's duty to escape, and the Japanese, having signed the Convention, had no right to ask us to sign that.

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Evidentiary document # 5058.

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As we had refused they asked us to give an order to the troops to do it. We refused and they said the whole of the troops must have an opportunity of signing if they wished. That was on 31 Aug.

The main Japanese present at the conference were Lt. OKASAKI, who was a Staff Officer, Col. OKANE and Col. MAKIMURI. The one giving the order was Col. MAKIMURI. Up to then there had been several Jap Staff officers coming down to see us.

We each put it to the troops and they all refused, excepting one or two British who offered to sign it. No Australians offered to sign it.

On the night 1-2 Sept. we were warned that by 1800 hours the next day the whole of the prisoners of war would concentrate in Selarang Barrack Square. We had to issue orders through the night about it. It was a big move.

At 1100 hours on 2 Sept. the Japanese people called for 4 OR's, two of whom were Australians, Cpl. BREVINGTON and Pte. GALE. The instructions were to hand these 4 men over to the driver of a truck. The 4 men concerned had made an attempt to escape and had been apprehended by the Japanese. I just forget how far Brevington and Gale had got, but they had got a considerable distance and they had been back in Japanese hands since about June 42. They were taken to a camp controlled by the Indian National Army, quite adjacent to the POW Camp. I knew that these two soldiers had attempted to escape, but they had been back in camp so long and particularly as they were in hospital, one never expected anything but the routine thing, which was to take them to the Indian camp for interrogation.

killed by Jap. not army

The movement to the Barrack Square was by then commenced. At noon Col. Holmes received an order for himself and his Area Commanders to rendezvous. He had given a subsidiary order to meet him at another spot so we could all go together. Nobody knew what it was about, and we thought the Japs were probably altering their place of incarceration from the Barrack Square, which had buildings, to the beach where we would be without any shade at all. Thinking that is what it was all about I took with me my personal assistant, Capt. M.G. McCauley, and we arrived at Holmes' rendezvous to find they had moved on to the beach, about another three-quarter miles, before we arrived. I got to the beach, reported to Holmes and was informed we were there by Japanese order to witness the execution of the 4 soldiers, including Brevington and Gale.

Okasaki picked us up on the road in his car, about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from the beach. He was most polite and most friendly and didn't give me any indication as to what I was going to.

We got on to the beach before the fellows to be executed had arrived. Holmes told us that was what we were there for. An interpreter named KORACHU was there. I had a talk with him and asked could anything be done to stop these executions. He replied he was there purely under orders as interpreter, but he could assure me nothing could be done because General FUYUKE had given the orders for execution.

Later 3 of the soldiers arrived by truck from this Indian camp. The fourth man, who had been too ill to go into the Indian camp, had been picked up at our own POW Hospital and he arrived. Three of the 4, including Brevington and Gale, were in pyjamas. Brevington could not stand without the assistance of a stick.

After the 4 soldiers arrived, a truck load of what we called the Indian National Army troops arrived, 10 or a dozen of them, with picks and shovels. In the meantime, the 4 soldiers had been taken near the water's edge and were standing there in the sun without hats. The Indian troops with their picks and shovels were making as much noise with them as they could, thinking they were there for a picnic.

Later 4 more Indian soldiers arrived with an Indian officer named Lt. RAMA. Rama had been a Viceroy commissioned officer in the Indian Army.

Okasaki went to a lot of trouble placing the 4 men to be executed in what he considered the correct position, moving them from one spot to another, and then the spectators were moved around. I gained the impression this was to make the job harder for those watching. Finally the correct spot was selected. They were placed with their back to the sea. The 4 Indians who were the firing party dropped to the kneeling position. Okasaki went to the 4 soldiers and asked them did they want to be blindfolded and they refused that. They allowed the Assistant Chaplain General, Rev. Lewis Bryan, and Padre Watson, one Roman Catholic and one Anglican, both British padres, to talk to the 4. They allowed them about 2 minutes each. There were no RC's there and Watson came back. Lewis Bryan said a prayer with the 4 and then he rejoined the spectators.

The order was then given to the Indian firing party to load. Just at that time, Lt. Rama went to the 4 men. He apparently knew Gale before, because he shook hands with Gale. Subsequently he shook hands with Brevington and then with the other 2, but it seemed obvious to me he went to shake hands with Gale. He came back, ordered the No. 2 Indian of the firing party who was opposite Gale to relinquish his position, took his rifle and knelt down. Okasaki gave the order to fire by handkerchief. The whole 4 were knocked on their backs with the first shot. In my opinion, none were killed. We later thought that possibly the man on the right who was shot through the chest might have been. The men fell in all sorts of attitudes, and as soon as they fell, the firing party continued to fire at them on the ground. They fired possibly 5 or 6 shots when Brevington sat up. He said, "For God's sake,

shoot me through the head and kill me. You have only hit me in the arm." He was hit in more than the arm because they hit the whole 4 of them between the legs and in the stomachs. They fired about 10 shots and Okasaki gave the order to stop firing. Each member of the firing party was then moved up opposite the man he had killed, or was supposed to have killed, and they were all ordered to fire 5 more rounds into the body.

Col. Okane came with Okasaki and the interpreter and addressed the spectators. The general gist of what he said is, "These men have been put to death because they disobeyed the orders of the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese Army do not like to put to death POW but unless you obey our orders you must be put to death. We cannot understand why you will not order your soldiers to sign this non-escape declaration. You must understand that this is a Japanese order". We had asked, if they wanted us to sign this order, to give us a firm order. If they ordered us to sign, it relieved us of any question of obeying it on our honour. The question was immediately raised, were they ordering us to sign. He said, "No, but you must all sign". Interpreter Koriachu spoke very good English I did quite a lot of dealing with him. I said, "Look, it is no good. We are not going to sign that unless you order us to do so. You have been educated in England. You know if we are ordered to sign it, we are not bound to obey it." He said, "I think it would be better for you all if you sign. You have seen men put to death."

We were ordered into the trucks and went back to supervise the movement into the Barracks Square.

Prevington and Gale were not tried. I would say that none of the 4 were tried. Later we had men caught for attempting to escape and they did go through some form of court martial, but there had not been any court martial or anything of that nature at this stage.

The movement of the whole of the troops into the Barrack Square was completed on the night of 2 Sept. Selarang Barrack Square has the normal barrack accommodation for a British troops regular unit. It has its store, messes, kitchens, and accommodation for approximately 450 men. There were over 16000 put there.

On 3 Sept. the Commanders were sent for for a further discussion with the Japanese at their own HQ's. Again they asked why would we not obey their orders. The question was asked, "Is this an order? Will you give it to us in writing?" They said, "No, but it is an order." We said, "yes, but we have our duty to perform, and unless you can give us this in writing - and if you do that, we do not consider it binding, anyhow - we do not propose to obey any of your instructions in this regard." They then allowed us to leave. From then, in the next 2 or 3 days, we were in frequent conference with Col. Okane, who was always accompanied by Okasaki who was staff officer to the General. Okane tried to point out to us the futility of what we were doing. He said he had been in many campaigns and had had a staff appointment in the last war when we had been allies, and he felt we were doing no good and would we please sign. He got a further refusal, but we again discussed with them the question of amending

the form, but they refused to consider any compromise or alteration to the form.

Apart from the conferences with the Japs, the Commanders were in practically continual conference during the whole period. The health of the troops in the square was becoming an important factor. There was an alarming increase in the number of dysentery and diphtheria cases and to have remained in the circumstances much longer would have meant the loss of most of the people who were there. About midnight we had a conference and decided, to save life, it would be better if we agreed to issue the order. We retired for the night on that decision.

Early the next morning, Okane came again to see us. It was apparent during this conference that the Japanese were very worried and instead of adhering to our decision of overnight, we continued to ask them to amend this form or give a firm order. He went away to see Gen. Fuyuke and later, on returning, said that they would issue an order. They asked for the return of their order, No. 7, which was dated 31 Aug. It came back later with another order, which didn't say that we were to sign of our own volition but ordered every POW to sign this form. That was also dated 31 Aug. and was numbered 7. It was pretty clear it was a trick, but at that stage, we saw no point in raising that.

Col. Holmes immediately made a declaration to the effect that the order No. 7 dated 31 Aug. had been withdrawn and substituted by this further order. We also had a copy of the original No. 7 order made and had that attested to.

During the period we were in the Barrack Square no rations whatever were allowed to be supplied to the POW and Fuyuke had given an order that no rations were to go to the hospital. At first, it was decided to put all the patients in the hospital into the Square. We made representations about that and he subsequently allowed the hospital to remain, but he issued an order that no food was to go to the hospital or the POW incarcerated in the Square. The hospital got food because of the deliberate misunderstanding of the Japanese order by Capt. James, of the British Army, who was interpreter at Japanese HQ's. He was told in Japanese to send the hospital truck back to Singapore and he misunderstood that and sent them to the hospital. His reward for that from the Japs was that they thought about executing him, but nothing happened.

As the order had been issued with the Japanese signature on it ordering us to sign the form, we proceeded to order the various formations. As the Australian Commander, I could not, in the circumstances, accept Col. Holmes' order to do so, and I issued my own order that all Australian troops would sign the form. Before doing that I addressed them, explained the whole of the negotiations, and expressed the opinion that the mere fact of making the Jap change his mind over the issue of the order, was, to me, a moral victory.

They then allowed us to resume our normal quarters, but the following day took away quite a considerable amount of the accommodation. Even so, we could not complain about the accommodation as it was quite adequate.

Gen. Fuyuke himself did not come into the negotiations personally. In the Japanese Army, no matter what the business might be, you never, at any time, see a Japanese General. Order No. 7 was signed by Okasaki, Japanese Staff Officer for Fuyuke.

I don't know of any other specific atrocity in the way of executions or mass punishments of that kind in which I was personally concerned, but, prior to my taking command, the Japanese informed us that a number of Australians had been executed for attempting to escape that was about March or April 42. I know 1 or 2 of the men shot came from 18 pn. They informed Australian HQ that these men had been executed and gave their names.

We were able to save the diphtheria cases caused by the Selarang Square Incident. It is difficult to say in the dysentery cases as they would go into hospital, and whether any deaths were caused in that regard by the Selarang Incident, it is hard to say. No one actually died on the square. We were not allowed to evacuate anyone to hospital from the square. We were forced to keep all the contagious cases there. As far as the A.I.F. was concerned, we did take in a medical team. We had a hospital of sorts there to treat them. The Senior MO was Col. J. Glyn White.

The food issued by the Japanese in Changi camp was never sufficient. It commenced to decrease from the middle of 42, and it became practically a starvation diet. Without the use of money obtained by commandeering officers' pay and a small amount from the troops, and growing our own vegetables, it would have been impossible for anybody to have lived on the food. In my case, I was 15 stone, and in the years, 1942-3-4, I was 9 stone 2 lbs. I know of a case of a man of 16 stone dropping to 4½ stone. That was practically general. Everybody would be at least one third under weight.

Diseases occurred which were attributed by the Medical Officer to malnutrition. Many got beri beri. Also it was necessary to eat potato tops and a green weed called "byem". Byem is a very fibrous weed. It is comparatively pleasant with rice. On account of the fibre in it it caused considerable damage to the intestines. It caused a lot of stomach trouble. I attribute a lot of the duodenal ulcer cases that we dealt with to the diet. We got a number of cases of pellagra, which is malnutrition in an extreme form. In the end we had approximately 300 Australians in a special malnutrition ward. They were the men who had lost weight badly. The MO in charge of that ward was Major Bruce Hunt of Perth. We were trying very hard to augment the

food, but even with the augmentation we did arrange, Major Hunt told me I could anticipate a very great number of them dying in the next 4 weeks. That is just immediately prior to the Japanese capitulation.

The food, plus the living conditions, brought on a considerable amount of skin trouble; dermatitis, scabies, things like that. The Japanese provided us with very small quantities of drugs. In the years 1942-3 we got 2 lots, one in each year, but it was totally inadequate. They told us they could not obtain quinine or atabrin themselves and that they could not obtain certain other medical supplies. When the capitulation of the Japanese came, we discovered in Singapore a factory making the very thing we had been crying out for for years.

I think they could have supplied us with more rice. We had sufficient rice in stock to see us through to January next year when they capitulated, on their scale of issue. I think they could have issued us with more fish. That is plentiful about the place.

Up to about March this year their own troops were far better supplied than we were, but from March this year onwards, they were on exactly the same rations as we were, but the Japanese soldier had an opportunity of buying, which was not available to us except through a Japanese canteen. He could go into Singapore and have a meal of fowl, if he had the money.

Lack of protein was our main trouble. We started our own gardens, which were subsequently extended, with their permission, to 120 or 130 acres. We laid it out and it became a very good show. Early 1943 or late 1942, one of the visiting Japanese Generals saw it and thought it would be good for propaganda and they took it over. From then on they controlled the garden, although we were still the technical advisers. Amongst other things we had planted were several thousand paw paw trees. Just as the paw paws were coming ready for use the Japanese confiscated them all. We explained we were only growing paw paws for hospital patients. They said it was General Sato's order that they be supplied to the Japanese. The lad in charge of the garden was a Korean whose name I forget. He spoke very good English. We told him the number of really seriously ill patients we had in hospital and he arranged to give us paw paws for those patients. The rest they took and distributed amongst the Japanese officers.

Until we moved to the Changi Gaol area the accommodation they supplied us was generally reasonable, but at times it was most unreasonable. At one period we had over 10,000 who remained in the Changi area and we were most overcrowded. At one stage in my own unit we had a barrack block which normally accommodated the usual Coy. Commander's office and QM store and 150 troops and we had 998 in that block. With the movement of forces from early April 1943 the accommodation was there in space, but that was all. In a house occupied by a British officer and his family we would have to put 150, very closely

packed together. Each man would only get 18 inches of space, but he would have space to lie down. However, the ordinary kitchen in the house would be useless. Our main trouble was the cooking. They gave us nothing in the way of kitchen gear. We had to scrounge all that ourselves. The Japs issued us with no messing gear or anything to assist us in cooking. However, we had officers in the area who were permanently stationed there before the war and they could tell us where certain things were, and we either got Japanese permission to get them or just took them. When we asked for messing or kitchen utensils from the Japs, it was useless unless we could say we knew where they were in Singapore. The POW organisations would let us go and get the stuff but we were never issued with any.

All POW were concentrated in Changi Gaol and an area outside the gaol. The number in the gaol was 5800 and it went down to 3000. The gaol was built to hold 600 personnel, 550 Asiatics and 50 Europeans. That move took place in May 1944. We had built an aerodrome for the Japs at Changi. The Air Army said they wanted the whole of a certain area without any POW and the POW had to get out. Had there been severe attacks on the aerodrome we might have lost troops, but I am of the opinion that the move was only just another instance of "bloodiness".

On the credit side of that move, they moved the civilian internees out of the Gaol and we were quite happy over the move on account of that. There were some 3 to 4000 civilian internees, amongst whom were over 1000 women. These women were incarcerated in one portion of the gaol and for some months they were never allowed out of the gaol. Then they were allowed out of the gaol for a swim. The conditions they lived in were frightful. We were quite happy about that move because it meant they were moving into better quarters in Singapore.

For 2 years the Japanese gave us no boots or anything to repair the boots we had. Then they decided they would repair boots for us. We asked that they not attempt to repair them but that they give us the leather. They did that for a period, although never in sufficient quantities. Later they decided they would get the boots repaired for us to do that they had some natives working for them in Singapore. There was some propaganda in the fact that these people were repairing POW boots. For a period they compelled us to hand the boots to them for repair. We never received back one tenth of the boots sent in for repair, so we decided not to send them in but to repair them ourselves with rubber from tyres or a locally made rubber. We repaired the boots with those. They issued a few Japanese rubber boots but there would not be one man in 20 get a pair. In the first half of 1943 and the whole of 1944, 9 out of 10 of the men going to work would be wearing wooden clogs which we made in the camp ourselves. Then the capitulation came they issued sufficient boots for 1 pair per man, but not in the right sizes. They were all Japanese boots of small sizes.

We had sufficient clothing given us on 16 Aug. to make an issue

of at least 1 singlet and 1 pair of Japanese-made shorts per man, but in all the years before they told us they didn't have any.

They always promised to give us hats, but they never did so. As soon as the show was over they were able to issue us with khaki drill hats from our own stores which they had all the time, but had not issued to us. When the war was over the Japs issued boots, shorts, and singlets and some British-type hats.

The biggest task the men had was the job described by the Japs as ground-levelling. We had not been doing it very long before it took on the appearance of becoming an aerodrome. That job involved two to three miles marching, and working for nine hours. The men were away normally for 10½ to 11 hours. The Japanese, not the Koreans, were the work supervisors. They were particularly harsh and very brutal. At this stage General ARIMURA was in charge.

Representations were made to him on the score of brutal treatment, long hours, and hard work, brought a little alleviation. That, I think, was the biggest job, because it was a continuous job taking a whole year. At the time the men had no boots and no clothing. We reached the stage of having to withdraw every pair of boots from any man at all in hospital or doing any indoor job, thereby permitting men going out to work to have some boots - some of them, anyway. From January this year the number of parties all known as X-parties were distributed all over Singapore, and two of the parties at Johore Bahru, capital of Johore, were employed in digging Jap defences; and in several camps men worked as long as 14 hours a day. I cannot give you any information as to those camps - I am only quoting from verbal and written reports furnished to me later. There was another party which went away early in March 1942 to a place called Plakang Mati. They were under the command of Major Oakey, of 2/18 Pn., and they remained there until the capitulation. They had a very bad time for the first year or 18 months, but again I cannot quote from my own knowledge. I suggest that Major Oakey might be able to assist you there. They did carrying and stacking of bombs. In that camp, one man was drowned.

Captain F.E. Stahl, from Brisbane (probably in Victoria now) was in charge of one of the very bad camps; Captain Walker of the 26th Pn. was in charge of the worse of the two camps at Johore Bahru. Captain Duffey of 2/30 Pn. was another of our officers at that camp.

I saw Jap military planes using the aerodrome when it was built.

There were no visits by anyone at all interested in our welfare. There were many inspections by high-ranking officers but never anybody we were allowed to talk to. There was no visit by any representative of the International Red Cross. We made repeated requests but nothing was done. In the early days of 1942 our own Red Cross representative

was permitted to go to Singapore to talk to Mr. Schweitzer, the International Red Cross delegate, to arrange advances of money for the purpose of getting drugs and medicines, but at the end of 1942 this permission was withdrawn. From the day we went there requests were made for the International Red Cross delegate to visit the camp. I continued until the end with this request but it was never granted. I have since talked with Mr. Schweitzer and he tells me that he himself was under surveillance, and that he had his face slapped on a number of occasions.

The Japanese made demands of certain numbers of men to work. The most you could hope for by representations was a compromise as to the number. It frequently necessitated sending out fit men to work for the Japs and putting the less fit men on work within the camp itself. For instance, the Japs did not ever regard cooks as either necessary or as hard workers, and for a long time for the first three years they did not recognise cooking as work. What we did was this - we combed out the orderly room and light duty personnel and put them on to work. Finally we reached the stage where everyone working in the camp itself was actually unfit to work, and a proportion of the men proceeding to work were to a minor degree unfit for that work. But we would rather get our sick men working under ourselves and put the others out to work. Because of the Japanese order, sick men were working inside the camp.

The Japs actually made numerical demands for labour which could not be filled without making sick men work in the camp.

In representing this to the Japs I always said that there were no men in the camp fit to work, and pointed out that working on the meagre rations and under the living conditions provided was an offence against the Convention. I did all of the representations in these cases. I always warned the Japs that when the war was over we could not forget it all.

We maintained that nobody was fit to work.

Rolls of prisoners and casualties were supplied to the Japs within the initial six weeks, or about that time. They were supplied to the Japs once through my own command; and on another occasion Captain Thomas, who had been their interpreter, was being sent to Tokyo and he took a set of separate rolls of prisoners and casualties. I have spoken to him on the telephone since, and he said he had delivered them in Tokyo, and he wondered if they ever got back to Australia. From time to time the Japs were given advice as to our casualties, as a routine matter.

During the whole period we were permitted to send four postcards with 25 words on. The last one was either June or July this year. In addition, Australian prisoners were allowed to send during 1943 one broadcast message home. At that time I had 10,000 men under me, and the

whole 10,000 messages were demanded at one and the same time. The result was that although the Japs used four broadcasting stations, people in Australia received wireless messages from their next-of-kin who in one instance had been dead nine months before the actual date of the broadcast message. It took the Japs about 18 months to send the messages. Of those four to five written messages which I sent, two reached my people

I personally received 51 communications from Australia. Some were better, and yet a number did not receive any. The whole Jap system of receipt and despatch of mails was an impossible one. We were getting letters for men who were in Korea and elsewhere, and doubtless they were getting ours. First mails for prisoners, British and Australian, came to Singapore, and we requested and received permission to sort the mail into proper bundles. These we handed to the Japs for distribution.

We bundled it for Burma, Thailand, Japan and Burma. We put a label on front where it was to go - yet we still got some of those bundles back in 1945. Their system of distribution was quite hopeless.

For the first seven months, the command of the prisoners of war on Singapore Island was under Lieut. (later Captain) OKASAKI. About late July or early August the first General was appointed - he was Major-General FUKUYE. Then Fukuye came the camp commander was firstly Okasaki. There were five in succession, including Okasaki. Others were TAZUMI, TAKAHASHI, and MURA, and another one whose name I forget. The Major-General issued orders along the normal military channels of communication but very frequently the General Staff Officers would proceed to POW HQ and issue orders also, which probably the camp commander or commandant would not know until we told him. Fukuye was GOC PWs in Malaya and Sumatra. He was succeeded by General ARIMURA, followed by General SAITO.

I understand that their chain of command went to Tokyo, and not through the normal military chain of command so far as things concerning prisoners of war were concerned. It was competent for a combatant General to demand prisoner of war labour and it was competent for the general commanding PWs to reject that. It was competent for the General commanding PWs to lay down terms of work and hours. I know that, because on one occasion we were representing the question of brutalities on the aerodrome. The then camp commandant Takahashi took the matter up with General Saito and the result was that an order was issued that no prisoner would work for the Japs next day. Incidentally, that stood until 1000 hours, and then another order came out that they had to start work. Another time when a complaint was made they were given a holiday next day. So the General commanding must have had some control over prisoners, where he could resist the orders of the combatant General.

There was a GOC Singapore named ITAGAKI. His headquarters was Raffles. He commanded Singapore and portion of Malaya as combatant

General. He was under ^{CH}TERRAUKI. He was responsible for the operational side of Singapore, and carried that responsibility over us. General Saito would deal direct with Tokio. I do not know Saito's immediate superior in Tokio.

I personally know Fukuye, Arimura and Saito.

I regard Fukuye as the most inhuman man I have ever seen in command of troops. Arimura I do not think had any sins of commission; it was just that he was an old man obviously brought back from the reserve and took his job very lightly. Saito - there are no instances of brutality by Saito himself. He in my opinion was the best of the three. When our representations did get to him, actually through his own staff, he would always either act or send back and say that he was not going to do it or could not do it.

Fukuye never saw prisoners in their own quarters. I do not remember him ever being on his feet in the camp.

Arimura frequently rode round the camp in a car; he spoke English very well and on a number of occasions talked to prisoners.

Saito was round the camp at least three times a week.

I regard them in that order as criminals - Fukuye; Arimura; Saito.

The five camp commandants were carrying out orders. In no instance except that of Takahashi did I know of any of the camp commanders attempting to punish prisoners of war. The other four would always go and rattle their swords and say, "We'll leave it to you". In Takahashi's case, he punished them himself.

We have cases where Takahashi handcuffed a couple of Australians and as far as he was concerned they stayed like that for a week. But we had a skeleton key to the handcuffs and took them off at night. He himself would not take them off or give permission to let them be taken off. He sometimes saw what he considered was an offence and would clap a man into gaol. On another occasion he handcuffed a British chap to the iron gill of his cell. The handcuffs were on like that for days. He was the only camp commander who ever awarded punishments himself - the others, well, none of them were really difficult to get on with. They were doing their job and they had their orders. On the question of numbers of men required for work, Tazumi gave us a very reasonable hearing. Once I discussed the matter of physical fitness; he pulled out of his drawer a graph showing the situation as I had it; he was in a position to discuss it. He would always compromise. The only one that I regard as a nasty type was Takahashi - yet you will find that most prisoners will say he was a good man. They did not know him. He paid me the compliment of saying once that he would not deal with

me any longer - that I was far too arrogant. He introduced a Colonel named Newey, an Englishman. Against orders Newey accepted the job of representative officer - for which he has been placed under arrest and will be court-martialled at home. Takahashi introduced Newey. The result was that although Newey was bad, the troops did not realise that Takahashi was behind that move, and that it was not done for the benefit of the prisoners of war. Of the camp commanders, the only one I regard as indictable is Takahashi.

The average Jap soldier that we saw in the central administration PWs were not the people who committed the offences. They were the Japs out with the work parties who were brutal. Of course, you got the odd bashing or two within the camp. But they were cases where you could actually nail the Jap responsible and within a couple of minutes you could protest, pinning him. Generally speaking, the camp commanders reacted very favourably to this question of hitting prisoners.

Some guards have had a few hits at me but probably I think as face-savers. I personally at one stage had 40,000 men that saved me from hitting. They once beat up my interpreter for saying just what I said - he was a chap named Davey, a British man. That also was face-saving on their part. It was, they felt, safer to hit him, and not me.

When we got orders for F Force to move, the matter was the subject of a conference with the Jap commander, at that time, I believe, Tazumi. I asked where these men were going to work. I do not think he answered that day. No, he did not. He said he could not answer that question. Subsequently - next day - he said they were not going to work. Then on the question of the type of work and the numbers required, we were told that the men were going away to new camps, to a place where food was much better, and the men would not have to work. Tazumi told me this. Then the number of fit men was not enough. The matter was referred to the camp commander, who said we could include 30 per cent of sick. That raised the doubt as to what the men were going to do. Again Tazumi was asked about it. He said they were not going to work; that they would have a canteen and that we could send up our doctors and have our own hospital. He said, "It will be a camp just like this, except that you will not be in this type of building but in country where the climate is better and the food plentiful."

Count Terauchi inspected us twice. Once some Jap royalty came, but we were not permitted to look. Tojo once was in Singapore but never came out to see the prisoners.

As far as we were concerned, these inspections were not inspections of us or our quarters. We called them 'gloat parades'. We were lined up on the road and a couple of truckloads of armed Jap soldiers came along, then a car with six men armed in the back, then a big motor car with a high personage in it, followed by many other armed cars. Nobody ever walked about the camps. In July this year,

1577A

Inventory document # 5058.

14.

Itagaki came out and was the first and only Jap who ever did this - he
went to see the hospital; he actually stood at the corner of the road and
the hospital was pointed out to him. The Japs had ordered an officers'
party, and I went among the 20 to 30 officers in the hope of being able
to say something.

But he did not look at us, although obviously we had been sent
there on somebody's orders.

I certify that the above evidence is true and correct.

(Signed) F.G. GALLEGHAN.
Brigadier.

Taken and sworn before me at)
Sydney on Thursday 22 November 1945.)

(Signed) A.J. MANSFIELD.
Commissioner.

1518A

The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHERS

7.

ARAKI, Sadao and others.

A F F I D A V I T.

I, WILLIAM JOHN CAMPBELL GUEST, of 4 Lascelles Avenue, Toorak, in the State of Victoria, make oath and say:-

I was Acting Commissioner for the Australian Red Cross Society in Malaya.

I went to Malaya in October, 1941, and was attached to the Fifth Division, A.I.F. By previous arrangement, we were extending Australian Red Cross benefits to the British Forces.

I became a prisoner of war on the 15th February, 1942. I spent the whole of my time as a prisoner of war at the Changi Military prisoner of war camp, except for three weeks at River Valley Camp. I was medically unfit until September, 1942, and in that intervening period, Mr. W.E. Roberts carried on as Acting Commissioner.

On the 31st December, 1942, Mr. Roberts was arrested by the Japanese and imprisoned in the gaol at Outram Road. I took charge of the Unit next day. I immediately made contact with the Camp Commandant's office and interviewed Lieutenant Tanaka. I put before him the whole position as regards Red Cross, quoting clauses of the Convention, which I offered to quote to him in full. He stated that he had a copy of the Convention and made notes of the clauses that I had quoted. I informed him that we asked him for no extra privileges other than laid down in the Convention. On being asked whether the Japanese had signed the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention, he would give me no definite answer. However, I found from subsequent experience that they would quote clauses out of it when it suited them. I quoted to him from the Hague Rules of 1907 and from what is known as the Red Cross Convention of 1929. He took notes of these, but never denied that they applied. I also made applications in writing to the Japanese, but written applications were quite useless. They never on any occasion answered any letter that I wrote to them. I always had to follow it up personally and they took so little interest that very often, when I obtained an interview, they would not be able to find the letter that had been written to them on the subject. I was sent by Lieutenant Tanaka to see Captain Hachisuka, who appeared to be Adjutant to General Arimura. Through his office I was permitted to make contact with Mr. H. Schweizer, the International Red Cross Delegate, with whom, Hachisuka informed me, he had been in touch previously. I had made applications for money through Red Cross channels and Hachisuka eventually

informed me that I could obtain 40,000 dollars from Mr. Schweizer on a promissory note. This money I eventually obtained in March 1943. Later on in 1943, I was able to obtain another 50,000 dollars, having been told in the meantime that the question of money was not one for the Japanese, who merely acted as intermediaries, but if Schweizer was willing to lend and I was willing to borrow, that was all there was to it. They gave the impression that they would grant facilities for a continuation to the obtaining of loans, but later refused it. The particular Japanese who refused it was Lieutenant Shimokawarra. He had taken Hachisuka's place about the end of April, 1943. On being refused facilities to obtain further loans, I interviewed Shimokawarra on many occasions, pointing out to him the urgent necessity for Red Cross financial assistance for the sick and wounded and prisoners of war generally, particularly in the absence of any regular supply of Red Cross goods from outside, but did not meet with any success. Eventually, the Japanese sent for Major Shean, who was the Liaison Officer between the camp and the Japanese camp office. He was informed by Tanaka, to use their own words, that they could not observe me any longer, because I had been taken with the fighting forces. Major Shean asked if they had any personal objection to me and their reply was there was nothing like that about it. He challenged them with a change of face and asked whether it was an instruction from higher up and on whose instruction this attitude was adopted. Tanaka said it was the opinion of General Armura. He then said if there was a Swiss or Portuguese representative in Singapore, it would be different. Major Shean then repeated our oft-made request for Schweizer to come into the camp and do ordinary Red Cross work. They said they wanted this request in writing. It was given to them in writing by Colonel Holmes, who was Commander of the troops in Changi, and had taken General Percival's place. Later they sent for Colonel Holmes and told him that they could not acknowledge Schweizer because he had lived in Singapore prior to the capitulation and might be biased towards prisoners of war. There were no representatives of any other society, but the Australian in the camp, and as Acting Commissioner I had to make Red Cross representations on behalf of prisoners of war of all nationalities. After the refusal to allow me to obtain further funds, I was never again granted an interview with any Japanese official. They issued an instruction that from then on all Red Cross matters were to be done by correspondence through Colonel Holmes. I wrote several letters to Schweizer through this medium, but learnt from him after the Japanese surrender that he did not get them. Apparently the Japanese had no intention of forwarding them.

From November 1943 onwards our money being exhausted, the purchase of supplementary rations for hospital patients came to an end, and when our small stock of foodstuffs and comforts became exhausted in 1944, the work of the Australian Red Cross Unit practically ceased.

At no time was Red Cross allowed to function in the camp, except in a very limited manner, and no offer of facilities ever came from the Japanese side. Anything that we were allowed to do was only after representations had been made to them for permission, and as previously stated, our activities practically came to an end in March 1944.

As far as Lieutenant Shimokawarra was concerned, I had close dealings with him, including the arrangement of a loan of 50,000 dollars through the International Red Cross Delegate, on account of the Australian Red Cross Society. However, he would give me no facilities to go in Singapore and see the International Delegate, stating that this was again the Japanese rules. He brought the money out to the Changi Camp and I signed the documents there. He would give me no facilities to go out of the camp at all to make purchases. I took up with him the question of doing something for the prisoners of the Kempei in Outram Road Gaol, asking permission to send foodstuffs and clothing to them from our stocks in Changi, but he would not grant permission for this. He explained that the gaol was under Kempei administration and arrangements would have to be made through the Japanese High Command, as the POW administration could not approach the Commandant of the Outram Road Gaol direct. I brought this matter up with him on several occasions, but he eventually refused to listen to further requests. He admitted that the personnel were in a bad condition when they came out of the gaol, but said he could not do anything about it. I also suggested to him on one occasion, in an endeavour to get over the difficulty, that he could let the International Delegate know that there were prisoners of war in the Outram Road Gaol, and suggested that he call on the gaol commandant to see whether there was anything he could do for them. He would not do this and appeared to be more frightened of the Kempei than we were. Shimokawarra had in his office a copy of the Red Cross Convention in Japanese. On one occasion, when discussing Red Cross money with him, he said it was a matter between the International Delegate and myself. I informed him that I knew that Schweizer could loan me money and that I was quite willing to borrow it on behalf of the Australian Red Cross Society, as it was very necessary to help the prisoners of war generally as much as possible. I had been extending the service in the camp and instead of buying only supplementary rations for hospital demands, I had been allowing a small amount per head to purchase rations for all prisoners of war in the camp. He took me to task over this and I quoted the Hague Rules and Red Cross Convention and stated that the Red Cross Society looked after all prisoners of war and not only the sick ones. He referred to his copy of the Convention and started to read it. After a while, he said, "We will put that away", and placed it on the shelf in his office. He found out that it did not support his contention. This attitude was typical, not only of Shimokawarra, but of all Japanese with whom I had contact. They would quote the Conventions, even the prisoners of War Convention which they had not signed, when it suited them, but would put it aside when it did not.

Mr. Schweizer, the International Delegate, was never permitted to visit the Changi Camp until after the surrender of the Japanese, when orders were received from Tokyo that International Delegates must be allowed to function. I made many representations for Mr. Schweizer to be allowed to visit the camp, as also did the Army authorities, but we could never obtain permission either from the Camp Commandant's office or from the Headquarters of the POW Administration. Mr. Schweizer also made representations without success. As far as Mr. Schweizer was concerned

I think he tried very hard to carry out his duties as an International delegate, approaching the Japanese in Singapore on his own account quite frequently on behalf of the prisoners of war and civilian internees. He was allowed to do slightly more for the internees than for the prisoners of war, but like the Australian Red Cross Society Unit, was never allowed anything approaching adequate facilities. He appeared to me to be trying all the time, for example, when Hachisuka left the POW Administration and took his place, I called on Shimokawarra three or four days later, to inform him of what had been going on in connection with Red Cross, particularly between Mr. Schweizer and myself, and was told by him that there was no need to explain as Mr. Schweizer had already been in touch with him and explained everything.

[Apart from the money which we were able to obtain through the International Red Cross, the following shipments were received from overseas. In August, 1942, 230 tons of foodstuffs arrived on a returning diplomatic exchange ship from Portuguese East Africa. In September 1942, 1690 tons arrived on a second exchange ship, also from Portuguese East Africa.] This was put into two go-downs in Singapore, and the Japanese asked for a representative of the Red Cross in the camp to go down and supervise the distribution. I went in with the British Army representative and stayed at the River Valley POW camp for nearly three weeks. However, the Japanese did not really allow us to supervise the distribution. They laid down a plan of allocation and all we could do was to try and persuade them to make a few small alterations in this allocation, such as sending more Marmite to the civilian camp for the use of interned children. We could not persuade them to make any material alteration in their plan and appeared to be only there as a way out for them if there were any complaints in the future.

[A further small shipment arrived in February 1944 which included medical supplies. We were never supplied with any lists other than Japanese ones of the total quantities in these shipments, so could not check them properly.]

With the exception of the September 1942 shipment mentioned above goods from these shipments were just delivered into the camps on Singapore Island by the Japanese authorities, but we know that they used some medical supplies for themselves, as the greater quantity of these were kept by the Japanese A.D.M.S., who dealt it out to us from time to time.

The weight of the food parcels which arrived in February 1944, was 11 pounds gross, and they contained approximately 8½ pounds of food. This shipment came from Goa in Portuguese East Africa and the only list which was held by the camp authorities was one given to one of our supply officers by a Japanese officer, showing what was delivered to the other camps and to the Japanese A.D.M.S. I understand that the supplying of this list was quite an unofficial matter and there appeared to be no particular reason why it should be given to us, by this Japanese officer.

A fourth shipment of Red Cross supplies arrived in March 1945, comprising Canadian, British and American food parcels, a small quantity of drugs and medical supplies and some clothing. These supplies were

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handed over to the camp authorities, but as the Japanese rations were so scanty at the time, each POW in the camp was not handed out a parcel. The parcels were broken down and portioned out as an addition to rations, to make them last over a longer period. These supplies came on a mercy ship from Vladivostok, arranged by Red Cross. They were distributed without reference to the International Delegate or myself. As far as the International delegate was concerned, none of the International Red Cross shipments were referred to him by the Japanese. Working parties were sent to Singapore from Changi to handle this shipment. They reported to me that the whole of the supplies were not distributed, some being set aside, they thought, for Burma and Sumatra, and a portion left unallocated. As far as I knew at the time, the Japanese had no means of getting these supplies to Burma or Sumatra. Burma at that stage was practically out of their control and their shipping position was very parlous. The supplies were just left in store and in spite of representations which were made to them to have some of the supplies sent out to Changi Camp, as people were dying for want of proper food, the Japanese would not comply with this request. After their surrender, they sent these supplies to the Changi Camp and other camps on Singapore Island, and generally tried to ingratiate this by making other supplies they had in store available and allowing Mr. Schweizer his drugs, so that they could be delivered quicker.

Among the supplies, in addition to the Red Cross supplies, the Japanese released cheese, condensed milk and other commodities which had been in Singapore since before its capture, which shows that they could have done a lot more for us during the period of our captivity.

The Japanese also sent out further medical supplies, of which we had been very short and which they informed us they could not supply. They had been in their Red Cross store in Singapore for some months.

As far as my personal treatment was concerned, it was the same as that meted out to any other officer. I feel that I must repeat that if I and other representatives of the Red Cross had not made representations for permission to do Red Cross work, we would have been left in the camp and ignored by the Japanese. No move ever came from their side to facilitate Red Cross work. Mr. Schweizer commented on this to me during a few moments we got together on our own on an occasion when Hachisuka took me into Singapore. Also, that on no occasion had he seen any representative of the Japanese Red Cross Society there. We both had to deal with authorities to whom Red Cross work was a side line and who regarded it generally speaking as rather a nuisance. As far as I am aware, there was no Red Cross representative in Malaya, and no representative of the Japanese Red Cross Society ever visited the Changi Camp. On one occasion, I heard

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that a POW Delegation was coming from Tokyo to inspect the POW Camps.
I made application to the Japanese camp authorities to meet the delegation
but the reply was that they were not coming and we did not see anyone.

Sworn at Melbourne in the State	)	
of Victoria this the tenth day	)	(Signed) W.J. CAMPBELL GUEST.
of October 1946.	)	

Before me,

(Signed) S.E. ELDER.
A Commissioner of the Supreme Court of
Victoria for taking affidavits.

1519A 6.1*

IN THE MATTER of an investigation carried out at Japanese Military Police Headquarters, in respect of Civilian Internees of the Sime Road Camp, Singapore.

1. JOHN LEONARD WILSON, The Right Reverend Lord Bishop of Singapore, presently temporarily resident at Dunedin in the Dominion of New Zealand
MAKE OATH AND SAY as follows:-

1. I was appointed Bishop of Singapore in July 1941 and arrived in Singapore in August 1941 where I remained till the surrender on Feb. 15th 1942.

2. I remained in Singapore on parole till March 1943, when I was interned at Changi Prison, then a Civilian Internment Camp.

3. On October 17th 1943 I was arrested by the Japanese Military Police and taken to Military Police Headquarters at the old Y.M.C.A. Building in Singapore. I remained in this building until May 26th 1944 when I was released and sent to SIMI ROAD Camp where the civilian internment camp at Changi had been transferred. I remained there until the British arrived in Singapore in August 1945 when I left for Australia.

4. During August 1945 Mr. R. Collinge, the Commandant of Sime Road Internment Camp (at which I was then resident) appointed a Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the said Commission") consisting of

Mr. S.N. KING, M.C.S., a senior civil servant (Chairman)
Professor N.S. ALEXANDER, M.S., Ph.D., Professor of Physics at
Raffles College, SINGAPORE..
Mr. W.L. BLYTHE, M.C.S.

to investigate the treatment of the internees who were taken to Japanese Military Police Headquarters at Singapore in connection with the enquiry conducted by the Japanese Military Police which commenced on 10th October 1943 and extended until August 1945.

4. I was at Sime Road Camp at the time the said Commission was appointed and gave evidence before the said Commission. The Members of the said Commission were personally known to me. I saw Mr. King and Mr. Alexander sign the report prepared by the said Commission and also saw the signatures of all the members of the said Commission appended to the report and personally read the signed report.

5. Attached hereto and marked with the letter "A" is a copy of the report of the said Commission. This copy was typed under my supervision from a carbon of the original report and I can personally testify that it is a true and correct copy of the original.

6. During my confinement at the Japanese Military Police Headquarters I had personal knowledge of the conditions, torture and ill-treatment

detailed in the said report (with the exception of the matters detailed in the last paragraph of such report) and testify that the said report is a fair and accurate account of what I saw and experienced at the Japanese Military Headquarters from October 17th 1943 to May 26th 1944.

7. On arrival at the Japanese Military Headquarters, on October 17th 1943, I was placed in a cell with approximately 15 others under conditions set out in the report. On the same night I was taken to another room for investigation and received beatings on the shoulder with a rope. On the following day (October 18th) I was made to kneel with a sharp edged piece of metal behind my knees. My hands were tied behind my back and I was roped under the knee-hole of a desk in a very painful position. Japanese soldiers stamped upon my thighs and twisted the metal behind my knees so that it cut into the flesh. I remained in this position for 9 or 10 hours sometimes being interrogated, other times being left under two Japanese guards who kicked me back into position whenever I moved to try and get release. I was then carried back to the cell, my legs being too weak to support me. On the following day (October 19th) I was again carried upstairs and tied face upwards on to a table and flogged with ropes receiving more than 200 strokes from six of the guards and the Chief investigator working in relays. I was carried back to the cell and remained semi-conscious for three days and unable to stand for more than three weeks. This incident is recorded without reference to names in the report of the said Commission. After this, long investigations took place with threats of torture and death, but no more torture took place until February 1944 and then only for half-an-hour. I received medical attention and dressing for wounds for more than two months. This was given by the Japanese Doctor and dresser at the Military Police Headquarters.

8. I did not see the actual torture of other prisoners during investigation but I saw the results of their maltreatment when they returned to the cells. I also saw many cases of brutality by the Japanese guards inflicted on their prisoners. In one particular case which occurred about the beginning of November 1943, I saw Dr. Stanley, who was in the next cell to mine at the Japanese Military Police Headquarters, being repeatedly taken to and returned from the investigation room. While he was away I could hear his voice crying out in agony denying charges made against him. Sometimes he was carried on a chair and sometimes on a stretcher but the torture continued over a period of at least two weeks. One day he returned seemingly unconscious. A Japanese doctor was called and he was taken away on a stretcher and never returned to the cell. I was told by a Japanese interpreter that he had died. This case is also referred to (without reference to names) in the report. His death was undoubtedly due to the maltreatment he received. I saw people getting thinner and thinner as a result of their ordeal and lack of food, and some of them were returned to Sine Road camp either dead or dying.

9. I do not know personally the names of any of the Japanese concerned in the various incidents referred to in this affidavit or in

the report of the said Commission. On two separate days in September or October 1945 I attended at the Central Police Station and Outram Road Prison identification parades of Japanese arrested by the British Forces. I identified a certain number as being present during my confinement at the Japanese Military Police Headquarters and others who had definitely taken part in my investigation and torture. A British officer named Wild (of, I think, the rank of Major) was present with me at all identification parades which I attended and made notes of my identifications.

SWORN at Dunedin in the Dominion)
of New Zealand this fourteenth) (Signed) LEONARD SINGAPORE.
day of February, 1946.)

Before me:

(Signed) C.B.B. BARROWCLOUGH
A Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.

Certified true copy.

(Signed) R.B. LAMBE, Lt. Col.
(Lt.Col. R.B. Lambe)
AAG.
War Crimes Registry
HQ ALFSEA.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS RECORDED IN CONNECTION
WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF CHANGI CAMP BY THE JAPANESE
MILITARY POLICE.

A COMMISSION appointed by the authorities of Sime Road Internment Camp to take and record evidence from internees who were arrested by the Japanese Military Police in consequence of a raid on Changi Camp on 10/10/43, first sat on Thursday 30/8/45, having taken statements from 38 of the survivors. It was considered urgent to record this evidence prior to the dispersal of the Camp, which, it was believed, might take place as early as the 3rd September 1945.

[On 10/10/43, all internees in Changi Prison were paraded soon after dawn in the Main Yard as if for a routine roll-call. Soon after this the Military Police arrived and armed soldiers picketed all doors. A number of the internees were called out by name, labelled and segregated. Internees were then ordered back to their Block Yards where further labelling and segregating took place. Meanwhile, a search was made on the personal belongs of all internees. During this search there was looting and wanton destruction by the Japanese. The investigation finished after dusk and internees were allowed to return inside the Prison. Many of them had had no food since 6 p.m. (T.T.) on the previous day, and some suffering distress and even collapse owing to the day-long exposure to the sun without food.

In consequence of this investigation, 57 internees were removed from Changi Prison by the Military Police on or after 10/10/43. With one exception, these were all interrogated at Japanese Military Police centres in Singapore. The course of the interrogation showed that the Japanese were trying to establish that there was a spy organization in Changi Prison which received and transmitted by radio telephony, which had established contacts in the town for the purpose of sabotage and stirring up of anti-Japanese feeling, and which collected money from outside for this purpose. In fact, there was no spy organisation, no radio transmission and no attempt to promote anti-Japanese activities outside the Camp. There were, however, radio-receiving sets in the camp which were used solely for the reception of news, and money was collected from persons outside the Camp for the sole purpose of supplementing the totally inadequate rations supplied by the Japanese.

The conditions under which internees were detained by the Military Police were rigorous in the extreme. They were crowded, irrespective of race, sex, or state of health, in small cells or cages. They were so cramped that they could not lie down in comfort. No bedding or coverings of any kind were provided and bright lights were kept burning overhead all night. From 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. inmates had to sit up straight on the bare floor with their knees up and were not allowed to relax or put their hands on the floor, or talk, or move, except to go to the lavatory. Any infraction of the rigid discipline

involved a beating by the sentries. There was one pedestal water-closet in each cell or cage, and the water flushing into the pan provided the only water supply for all purposes, including drinking. It should be recorded here that nearly all of the inmates suffered from enteritis or dysentery. No soap, towel, toilet articles or handkerchiefs were permitted and inmates had no clothing other than those they were wearing.

The food supplied, normally rice, occasional vegetables, and weak tea with no milk or sugar, was less than half of that supplied by our own Prisons department as punishment diet for Asiatics. It was insufficient to support life over a long period and led to serious deficiency diseases in all cases of long detention.

Medical facilities afforded, whether visits of medical personnel or the supply of medicines or drugs, were for all practical purposes non-existent. In many cases, our own doctors sharing the cell with the sick made urgent requests for prompt medical attention on their behalf, particularly in cases where the victim was on the point of death, but these requests were invariably ignored. In one case, a Japanese doctor, who was called to see an internee suffering from a fractured pelvis and possibly ruptured kidney, remarked that the man was not sick enough. The three women taken from Changi Prison were detained in exactly the same conditions as the men and shared cells with male prisoners of all races. They were afforded no privacy, even for their most intimate requirements, and any attempt on the part of European men to screen them was broken down by the guards. They were subjected to insults and obscene gestures by Japanese prisoners in the same cell and the Japanese prisoners, with the assent of the guards, tried to compel them to perform the most sordid tasks in the cell.

The buildings occupied by the Japanese Military Police resounded all day and all night with blows, the bellowing of the inquisitors, and the shrieks of the tortured. From time to time, victims from the torture chambers would stagger back or, if unconscious, would be dragged back to their cells with marks of their ill-treatment on their bodies. In one such case, an unconscious victim so returned died during the night, without receiving any medical attention, and his body was not removed until the afternoon. In these conditions, and this atmosphere of terror, these men and women waited, sometimes for months, their summons to interrogation which might come at any hour of the day or night.

Usually interrogations started quietly and would so continue as long as the inquisitors got the expected answers. If, for any reason, such answers were not forthcoming, physical violence was immediately employed. The methods used were;

(1) Water Torture. There were two forms of water torture. In the first, the victim was tied or held down on his back and a cloth placed over his nose and mouth. Water was then poured on the cloth. Interrogation proceeded and the victim was beaten if he did not reply. As he

opened his mouth to breathe or to answer questions, water went down his throat until he could hold no more. Sometimes, he was then beaten over his distended stomach, sometimes a Japanese jumped on his stomach, or sometimes, pressed on it with his foot.

In the second the victim was tied lengthways on a ladder, face upwards, with a rung of the ladder across his throat and his head below the ladder. In this position, he was slid first into a tub of water and kept there until almost drowned. After being revived, interrogation proceeded and he would be re-immersed.

(2) Beating with iron bars, brass rods, sticks, bamboos, wet knotted ropes, belts with buckles, or revolver butts, all over the body. Whilst these beatings were being inflicted, the victims were sometimes suspended by the wrists from a rope passed over a beam. Sometimes their hands were tied behind their backs and they were forced to kneel on sharp pieces of wood or iron, while sharp-edged pieces of wood or metal were placed behind their knees so as to cut into the flesh as they knelt. While they were so kneeling the Japanese would jump on their thighs or on the projecting ends of the bar or wood behind the knees; sometimes to increase the pressure on the wood or bar behind the knees, a Japanese would perch himself on the shoulders of the victim, or the victim, with hands untied, would be compelled to hold heavy weights above his head. They were often forced to remain in this position without intermission for 9 to 10 hours, during which period interrogation would go on remorselessly, punctuated by blows. At times, the victim would be tied to a table and flogged until he lost consciousness. In one case, the man so flogged counted over 200 blows before losing consciousness. This treatment was, in some cases, carried on daily for 4 to 5 days consecutively. In one case, a European who died later was interrogated with the usual beating, for 58 hours at a stretch and another European, since dead, underwent 144 hours of beatings in all, according to the estimate of his cell mates.

(3) During interrogation the inquisitor, in many cases, burnt the victim with cigarette and cheroot ends, even on the most sensitive parts of the body, e.g., arm-pits, between the toes, on the scrotum and penis. Several Asiatics had petrol poured on their bellies and ignited, and another Asiatic had his hands tied together and immersed in a bowl of methylated spirit which was ignited.

(4) Electric Torture. There were two forms of this. In the first, an induction coil was used, one electrode being attached to the hand or foot and the other, a bare wire, was applied to various parts of the body. One victim reports that he was thrown across the room by the violence of the shock. The effect has been described as one of physical and mental disintegration. The second form, apparently more severe, was called the electric table or electric cap. There is evidence that this was used, but not on any of our witnesses.

(5) In addition to these forms of torture, the inquisitor, often employed other methods, such as ju-jitsu, twisting of limbs, bending back of fingers, twisting of sharp-edged wood between fingers, punching, repeated blows on the same spot, and so on. These methods, in many cases resulted in dislocations and permanent damage to limbs and joints. In one case, the inquisitor punctuated his questions by flicking off, with the frayed end of a bamboo, flesh bruised in a previous beating. This left a permanent scar, six inches by three inches on the victim's thigh.

(6) In several cases, victims were led to believe that their execution either by beheading or shooting, was imminent. They were advised to write a letter of farewell. Preparations for execution were carried out, up to the penultimate stage, with such realism that, in two cases, the victims fainted.

(7) Threats to families. Threats were also made to take action against the family of the victim (the wives of some internees were believed to be in Japanese custody in other parts of Asia). Torture was carried out to the limit of human endurance. One internee attempted to commit suicide by jumping over the verandah. In his fall he fractured his pelvis, but, despite his condition, his interrogation under torture was continued until just before he died. In another case, the internee asked his inquisitors for the means to commit suicide. A pistol was produced and was snatched away only when the man was about to carry out his declared intention.

Of the 57 internees detained as a result of the investigations on 10/10/43, 12 died of sickness directly attributable to the appalling conditions under which they were detained; one, as in the preceding paragraph, as a result of his fall and torture and one was executed. The survivors who returned after lengthy custody by the Military Police required prolonged treatment in the Camp Hospital for extreme emaciation (except where oedema was present), chronic dysentery, neuritis, sores, ulcers, scabies, beriberi, weak hearts, or injuries to joints and limbs.

The Commission also recorded the evidence of the three surviving member out of six of the Body Disposal Squad who were arrested by the Japanese Military Police in the Municipal Building, Singapore, in March 1942, and who were sentenced after a so-called trial, to two ~~year~~ solitary confinement, each for "anti-Japanese talk". While in prison, three of the six died without receiving medical attention whatsoever. Requests for medicine on their behalf evoked the reply "They are enemy prisoners and are not allowed any medicines".

Sine road Internment Camp,
Singapore.
3rd September, 1945.

(Signed) S.N. KING, M.C.S. CHAIRMAN
N.S. ALEXANDER, M.S., Ph.D.)
Professor of Physics)
W.L. BLYTHE, M.C.S.)
Members.

Certified true copy.

(Signed) R.B. LAMBE, Lt. Col.
(Lt.Col. R.B. Lambe)
AAG War Crimes Registry, HQ ALFSEA.

1520A

JAPANESE WAR CRIMES "DOUBLE TENTH"
CASE, CHANGI, SINGAPORE.

A F F I D A V I T.

I, CHARLES ERIC HILTERMANN, Merchant of BRINKMANN and Co., Singapore, with address C/o Hiltermann Bros., 24 Lime Street, London, E.C.3, make oath and say as follows;

1. I was in Singapore at the time of the capitulation of the British forces to the Japanese in February 1942. Immediately after the capitulation and in company with most of the other civilians on the island I was interned in CHANGI GAOL. There I stayed until 15 October 1943. - On that date and without warning I was taken to the Kempei-tai headquarters at the Y.M.C.A. Other people were taken with me and they were LIONEL GOODALL and JIMMY MILNE. We were not given any information as to why we were taken; nor was any charge made against us. We all three arrived at the Y.M.C.A. on the same day, 15 October and were at once put into various cages. All the time I was in the Y.M.C.A. which was four weeks there were anything from eighteen to twenty-five people in this cage. We just had bare boards to lie on and there was a pedestal W.C. in one corner which we had to use for all purposes, washing, drinking water and of course necessary calls of nature. Our food consisted of very limited quantities of rice, which was a starvation diet.

2. Within half an hour of my arrival at the Y.M.C.A. I was pulled out for interrogation by the Japanese. The Japanese interrogator started off by saying: "We know everything, tell us all you know". I hadn't the slightest idea what they were talking about and I said so. Without more ado I was struck by the third Japanese person, who was obviously there purely in the capacity of a beater up. The other two were of course the interrogator and his interpreter. Then they started my interrogation proper. I was accused of spying, asked the names of spies in CHANGI and agents in SINGAPORE. I was also questioned about a radio transmitter. The whole interrogation lasted from 1.30 in the afternoon until 9.30 at night, when I was carried down to my cage in a semi-conscious condition. On six other interrogations within the next 10 days I had to undergo similar treatment.

3. My memory is a little vague as to the kind of various tortures which were inflicted on me during these questionings. One of the tortures I remember was being tied up in a kneeling position with a stick under my knees and hands tied behind my back. A rope was then tied to my wrist and over a pulley in the ceiling. One of the Japanese then pulled on the rope and I was hoisted up by my wrists. While in this agonising position I was beaten with sticks and ropes. I also had the water treatment which consisted of a cloth being put over my mouth and then water being poured on it and I very nearly suffocated. In order to breathe I had to take in a great quantity of water and this distended my stomach enormously. I was, however, spared the torture of somebody jumping on me.

4. Another method they used was to tie me to a table and burn me with cigarette ends and cheroots up and down my thighs. I have the scars of these still on me. These tortures I have enumerated were the major ones. All through these interrogations I was constantly beaten and kicked and knocked about by the interpreter, interrogator and any of the Japanese who were present.

2.

5. After ten days of this they gave up trying to get any information out of me and I was left more or less in peace. After four weeks in the Y.M.C.A. I was sent over to Smith Street Detention Barracks and there I was kept in a tiny cell measuring $6\frac{1}{2}$ ft. by $5\frac{1}{2}$ ft. There were sometimes as many as seven people in there at the same time. This minute cell had also a pedestal type W.C. in it. On the occasion that there were seven people there we literally had to squat on the floor and there was no chance of stretching out. Apart from this physical discomfort there was the acute mental distress of hearing the screams and yells of other unfortunate people being tortured in other rooms in the same building, and never knowing when one was going to be called for interrogation and torture oneself. This mental torture was the worst part of the whole imprisonment which I suffered both in the Y.M.C.A. and Smith Street. It was almost worse in the Y.M.C.A. which was a large wooden building and as all the doors were open, one could hear everything that went on. It was like "bedlam" day and night.

6. Food at Smith Street was much the same as at the Y.M.C.A. It consisted of very limited quantities of rice - not enough to live on for very long. During the three months I was there nothing happened to me personally apart from the usual brutal treatment of the guards. Sometime in the middle of March I went back to the Y.M.C.A. and spent another three weeks there. I was finally released on the 8th April 1944 and was brought back to Changi where I spent four or five weeks in hospital.

7. During the time I was in the Y.M.C.A. and Smith Street, I saw a good many of the British people who were seized by the Kempei-tai during October 1943. On one occasion I saw the Bishop of Singapore who had been maltreated terribly. His legs from his hips to his ankles had been beaten to pulp. They were literally like raw meat. He could not move at all and was just about able to crawl. I also saw STEVENSON before he died. He was black and blue from beating. His body was in a terrible condition. He too could barely move himself. MIDDLEBROOK I saw while I was in Smith Street. He told me what treatment he had suffered during his interrogation and that No. 81 was the man responsible. He was in a very bad physical condition, covered in bruises and sores. FRASER I also saw in Smith Street. He had not been badly treated when I met him. He was only suffering from severe dysentery and was so weak that he had to be helped to the W.C. We ourselves were so weak at the time that we could hardly get him there. PERRY was in the opposite cell to me at Smith Street and I could see him through the bars. He was blown up like a balloon from beri-beri. CLARK was with me in the same cage at Smith Street. He too was in a very bad way from beating and general maltreatment. When he was brought into my cell I simply did not recognise him and had to ask him his name.]

8. With regard to the members of the Kempei-tai whom I saw in the Y.M.C.A. and Smith Street, I have looked carefully at the folder of photographs shown to me marked "Exhibit A" and attached to this my affidavit. In this folder of photographs I can positively identify Nos. 1, 3, 29, 30, 32, 81, 82, 67 and 84 as being members of the Kempei-tai whom I saw in the Y.M.C.A. and Smith Street.

9. With regard to these people who personally maltreated me, my memory is a little vague but I am almost certain that No. 30 was the man who interrogated me first and I am positive that No. 1 was the beater up on that occasion. The only other person I can recognise is No. 67. He used to come around the cages and rub iodine in our open sores. This was not done with any tenderness or with a view to alleviating our suffering. He obviously used to enjoy doing it and laughed at us.

10. All the Kempei-tai people were always very tidily dressed and smart in their appearance. They were usually dressed in civilian shark skin suits.

SWORN by the said CHARLES ERIC)
HILTERMANN at 3/9 Southampton)
Row in the County of London,)
this 28th day of January 1946) (Signed) ERIC HILTERMANN.

Before me,

(Signed) J. DERMOT WALSH.
A Commissioner for Oaths.

certified true copy.

(Signed) ?
Lt. Col.