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My name is Klaas A. de Weerd. I am a Major in the Artillery of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

I was born in Roermond, Limburg, the Netherlands, on 6 April 1904. I am of Netherlands nationality. *Tonari Sumi P 42*

After having studied law at the University of Leiden (the Netherlands) I entered a lawyers' office at Sourabaya (Java) on 28 August 1929 and practised in the Law Courts of East-Java, Bali and the South East of Borneo until the middle of 1937.

In 1938, after having been on leave in the Netherlands, I was employed for nearly a year in the Labour Office (Labour Legislation Section) of the Department of Justice of the Netherlands Indies Government at Batavia. From the beginning of 1939 I entered into partnership in a lawyers' office at Medan (Sumatra).

On the 12th of December 1941 I was mobilized as an officer of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and served as such with the Staff of the First Division in West-Java.

After the capitulation of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, I became a prisoner of war of the Japanese and was confined in several camps in West-Java until the middle of September 1945. From the beginning of this period I acted as Camp translator of the Java newspapers in the Malay language. The Japanese camp authorities allowed Malay language newspapers to be brought into the camps until the end of January 1944.

As the situation in the islands interested me in particular I spent much time in translating these items extensively into Dutch and, together with several friends, I indexed these data according to personalities and to subjects.

Our intention was to prepare several studies concerning the Japanese occupation, treating subjects such as Administration, Propaganda, Civil Affairs, Central Government, Labour, Policy, etc. as well as to gather personal data about Japanese authorities

Econ - plans 9-14.

I had already prepared notes for several of these studies when it became increasingly difficult to keep this work secret from the Japanese guards. As in January 1944 it became clear that we would shortly be moved to another camp we soldered copies of our compilations and indexes in tins and buried them in various places in the camp grounds.

From February 1944 until September 1945 I kept abreast of actual developments in the Netherlands East Indies by reading Malay or (translated) Japanese language newspapers occasionally smuggled in, and by listening-in secretly to the Japanese local broadcasts in Malay. During that period I continually exchanged information and observations with new arrivals and through every other channel available.

After 15 August 1945 I once more regularly received Malay newspapers and in the beginning of September 1945 I recovered one complete copy of my compilations and indexes from their hiding place. In the middle of the same month I was released from the prison camp and was assigned to the Political Section of the Chief Commanding Officer of the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration), later called the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch, for Java, in order to complete my work of collecting data about the Japanese occupation. A special section with a staff of twenty was created for this purpose under my direction; this section became a special branch of Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (Headquarters at Batavia) in January 1946.

In close cooperation with the Japanese Affairs Section of said N.E.F.I.S., with S.E.A.T.I.C. (South East Asia Translators and Interpreters' Corps) and other offices and bureaus I collected such data regarding the Japanese occupation as were available. These data were contained in, inter alia, the practically complete newspapers and the complete Official Gazette "Osamu Kan Po" of the 16th Army in Java, and a fairly complete

set of the official gazettes of the other islands, edited during the occupation period, further reports and surveys by Japanese, Dutch, Indonesian and other military and civilian authorities and private persons, seized Japanese and Malay official and non-official documents, interrogations of Japanese and Indonesian authorities, etc.

In May 1946 I joined the Office of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, with the special task of collecting such documents as would be needed for the preparation of the Prosecution of suspected Japanese Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo and in this capacity I continued my work of collecting data on the Japanese occupation of the East Indies.

In the middle of September 1946 I arrived at Tokyo as a representative of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, to continue my search for further data here.

From this collected information I have prepared the attached report, entitled: "the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies".

PREPARED STATEMENT

of

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Major R.M.I.A.

Subject: (The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies.)

International Prosecution Section
Netherlands Division
November 1946.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies for convenience has been chronologically divided into five phases,

- I. The period from March to August 1942, which can be designated the transition period.
- II. The second phase, which is characterized by the consolidation of Japanese rule, lasting from August 1942 to July 1943.
- III. The period from July 1943 to September 1944, which is governed by an attempt at winning over the population by promises.
- IV. The period from September 1944 to the beginning of August 1945, involving further development of the policy of promises.
- V. The period from the beginning of August 1945 to the end of September 1945, involving at the last moment an attempt to create a state, friendly to Japan, in the South.

The phases mentioned above have been more and less arbitrarily divided into periods and consequently these limits must be treated as being approximate. Occasionally for a better understanding a certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one of the phases, even if the events in question extended beyond a particular phase.

Japan's policy in regard to the Southern Regions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions alike, so that only insignificant local modifications were made, and then solely in the application and not in the principle itself. Therefore, what happened in Java is treated as basic and mention will only be made of modifications in other regions of the Netherlands Indies which reveal important deviations from events in Java.

I. THE TRANSITION PHASE

Beginning of 1942 to approximately August 1942.

Throughout the East Indies, the entire Occidental group of influential persons in the administration and in commerce, industry etc., was immediately and systematically interned in prisons and camps hastily prepared for that purpose.

Exceptions were provisionally made in the case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be replaced by Japanese. As soon as the Japanese replacing them arrived, this group was also interned. A small remaining group of workers was also confined in separate camps, and their contact with the outer world was as much as possible restricted.

In addition a large group of prominent Chinese, mainly on the ground of ^{their past support of} the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-Japanese attitude, was interned.

The policy of internment became stricter in the course of time and from July 1942 these measures were, moreover, gradually applied to Occidental women.

By the end of 1943 the position had become more or less stable, so that it may be said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands Indies, both male and female, had been interned, with a few local exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or 70 years of age. Moreover, all Occidentals born in the Netherlands Indies who still showed ^{apparent} affinity with the Occidental world were interned, and those Asiatics, too, who were "suspected" of having Occidental sympathies were confined in camps. According to official Japanese returns as of 1 September 1945, 62,532 persons (i.e. 20,676 males, 28,169 females and approximately 13,687 children) were interned in Java. Besides, all Occidental military personnel were made prisoners of war; this involved 45,000 men who, with the exception of 6,107 men were drafted from Java for slave labour elsewhere.

Of the former Western community, only three groups were still "free"; namely, the group of Axis subjects (who were not interned until after the defeat of their fatherland), few neutrals and a category of non-interned Eurasians. These groups were rigidly spied upon, and prevented from the exercise of their "freedom" in many other ways.

This non-interned Occidental community was subjected to very heavy pressure. Besides being spied upon by the Japanese Military Police (Kempei) and its henchmen, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and by the fact that interrogation by the Kempei as well as the treatment accorded by Japanese Courts Martial were such that the victims were deprived of all rights, and abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation methods.

Occidentals were, whenever possible, dismissed from their official and private positions and appointments, thus depriving the greater part of this section of the community of its means of livelihood. All bank balances were immediately frozen, Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage payable in respect of liquidation was withheld from Occidentals. The few non-interned Occidentals were faced with practically no alternative than gradually to sell all their possessions. They were further handicapped by the fact that the Japanese requisitioned whatever took their fancy, generally without payment of any compensation. By introducing compulsory registration and the payment of registration fees - (150 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military authorities made the position still more difficult for these communities.

Along with this, the use of Western languages was soon forbidden in public and business communications, and in certain places the speaking of Western languages was prohibited even within the home. Those who spoke a Western language at home, were suspected by the Kempei, and subjected to methods employed by that organization.

At the same time, the Japanese immediately began to close down all schools. During the second period Occidental schools and education remained definitely banned.

In April 1942 a ban on listening-in to radio broadcasts from outside the East Indies was promulgated. This prohibition was enforced by compulsory sealing and registration of all wireless sets, to make them unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts from abroad. In July 1942, sentences were pronounced and published by the Japanese Court Martial, that persons who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter alia, sentenced to death.

Throughout Japanese occupation, persons suspected of having failed to comply with this prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei, tortured and sometimes tried.

The possession of certain numerous specified books in enemy languages constituted a punishable offence. Such books had to be handed over and were burnt.

Old monuments, - reminders of former Occidental influence - were carried away, partly destroyed, or otherwise stored in warehouses.

In most places, the names of streets and towns were changed into Japanese, or sometimes Malay.

Names of shops, commercial concerns, trademarks, etc., could no longer appear in Western languages, but had to be transcribed into Japanese or Malay.

Since the Kempei-methods were practised not only on the Occidental community, but also upon members of the other communities, all expression of democratic or pro-Occidental sympathies was silenced.

All existing Councils wherein, hitherto, the opinion of various communities could be freely expressed on problems of administration were abolished.

The first to be dissolved was the Peoples' Council, established in 1918, which exercised legislative and budgetary functions.

Next, in Java, the Provincial, Municipal and Regency Councils, which similarly had legislative and budgetary powers, were abolished.

In regions outside Java, too, the various councils which had been established on a democratic basis to give the people an opportunity of participation in the administration of their country, were liquidated.

By Ordinance No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 29 April 1942, all existing law courts were abolished, and in their stead Japanese "Law Courts of the Military Government" (Gunsei Hoojin) were established. This new judiciary was provisional and was later replaced by a definitive organization.

There was no provision for appeals. The decisions in all pending cases of the lower courts were declared to be deemed to have been affirmed by the Appellate Court.

By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 and 20 March 1942 respectively, all meetings, associations etc. were forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their respective associations.

The only associations excepted were those concerned with sports and recreation, and scientific, cultural, charitable and distributing organizations.

Even associations not prohibited were restricted in their activities; they were subjected to police supervision, and could only resume their activities after obtaining permission from the police, and registration. Meetings had to be authorized by the police.

In practice, activities were permitted only those associations, which accepted Japanese leadership and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as, e.g., the Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian Sport League).

From the outset, the Japanese authorities built up a very extensive propaganda machine.

Along with the first troops to land on Java, came the vanguard.

These Japanese propagandists, organized in the Propaganda Section ("Barisan Propaganda") of the Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish immediate contact with Indonesian and Chinese politicians, known to be disaffected. With the assistance of these dissatisfied persons, in April 1942 the so-called "Tiga A" movement was established. Local committees of Indonesians were set up to carry on the activities of this movement; but such committees had no function other than to carry out activities planned by the local Japanese propagandists.

These propagandists immediately seized control of all means of public expression. All public and private radio broadcasts and cinematographic activities as well as the entire Press were immediately placed under their control. For about two months after the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers were still permitted to be transmitted and to appear in Dutch. As soon as the propaganda machine had been sufficiently organized, all newspapers were forbidden, and in their stead new papers were introduced in the Malay language under the direction of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen by the Japanese propaganda service. On the Emperor's birthday (29th April 1942), the first new Malay language daily paper in Java, the "Asia Raya" (Greater Asia) was established, and continued to appear regularly until 9 September 1945, as the most important organ for voicing Japanese propaganda. At first it was under Japanese direction;

but after the Indonesian staff had proved themselves "matured" the direction was officially handed over to them; but in reality, the direction remained in Japanese hands.

Other places in Java soon followed suit, so that ultimately Japanese controlled newspapers in Malay were issued in five places in Java.

In addition a Japanese language paper, the Java Shimbun, was published in Batavia.

In her propaganda Japan referred to herself as the "liberator", come to establish a "New Order". It stated, that "New-Java" was to be educated to become a worthy member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

The Japanese instituted a rigid censorship, which not only affected all postal-, telegraphic- and telephonic-communication, but also extended to all photographs given to professional photographers for development.

Furthermore, all public utterances were subject to censorship. This did not alone extend to all radio broadcasts and the press, but also to the theater, sermons, etc. Gradually theatrical companies, etc. were taken over by the propaganda service.

The publication of books was also subject to censorship, and only works emanating from the propaganda service appeared during the period of occupation. By these methods the Japanese had control of all expressions of public opinion.

During the period now being treated Japanization of the Southern Regions was begun. For instance, the use of Japanese words was immediately introduced for designating official services, offices, etc. and this usage gradually became prevalent during the occupation, so that ultimately the reading of a Malay language newspaper was scarcely possible without knowledge of the offices, services, institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred to by Japanese words.

The Japanese authorities introduced the Japanese system of dating years, the Japanese time system and the Japanese budgetary year.

The police wore the Japanese flag for cap badges. Emperor worship - offensive to Mohammedans - was introduced. All public gatherings and meetings began with the obligatory bow in the direction of the Tokyo palace. Most meetings ended with the words: "Tenno Heika - banzai". All Japanese days of celebration were introduced. The display of any flag other than the Japanese was forbidden. On the Japanese days of celebration the Japanese flag had to be flown on all official and private buildings under strictly prescribed rules.

Portraits of members of the Dutch and Allied Governments were forbidden. These had to be handed over and were burned.

The possession of portraits and other pictures of the Japanese Imperial family was governed by rules aimed at ensuring that there should be no "lese-majesty".

Postage- and revenue- stamps were marked "Dai Nippon", and later new stamps were issued with texts in Malay and Japanese reading "Dai Nippon".

The Japanese at once began to establish schools which taught only the Japanese language. When later schools for Indonesians were reopened the curriculum was revised to meet Japanese requirements and important subjects in the new schedule were Japanese language and Japanese songs and dances, etc.

Economics In the fields of finance and economics the programs applied in the East Indies were similar despite the fact that some areas were administered by the Army, and some by the Navy.

Java and Sumatra were occupied by different Japanese armies and Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor, etc., were occupied by the Japanese Navy, with practically no contact with each other. Nevertheless the basic principles upon which these regions were administered were entirely similar in reality.

The first Ordinance of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 7 March 1942, No. 1, introduced Japanese military paper currency with the text in Dutch, reading: "The Japanese Government. One half guilder". Paper money was issued similarly in other denominations. The East Indies guilder was reduced to the value of the yen. At first, the paper money already in circulation was retained; but later, when this old currency had considerably greater value in the open market than the Japanese occupation money, it was withdrawn and its possession constituted a punishable offence. The Japanese paper money revealed differences in the various occupied areas. In Sumatra, which was originally under the same military administration as Malaya, the same text appeared on the same background as in the case of the paper money issued in Java, but in English, whereas in the other regions of the East Indies, and in Portuguese Timor, the Dutch text was used.

currency

In 1944, new paper money was designed and printed in Batavia, with the text in Japanese and Malay.

This paper money was issued in unlimited quantities without backing, which soon led to inflation, which began early in 1943 and continued to increase at an ever faster rate, until by the middle of 1945 this paper money only had about a fortieth of its original purchasing value.

3 | All banks, both official and non-official, were closed
down at once. During the course of 1942 and 1943 the Java Bank (the circulation bank) and private banks were liquidated. The Post Office Savings Bank and the Peoples' General Credit Bank which largely had Indonesian clients, were reopened under Japanese names and under Japanese direction, but the balances due at the time of the closing remained frozen. Later, the cash deposits of Indonesian clients were partly unfrozen while the deposits of Occidentals and internees and prisoners remained frozen, and were transferred to the Japanese established Enemy Property Administration Bureau (Tekisan Kanibu), which

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was charged with the "custody" of enemy property. This institution liquidated nearly all confiscated property, and credited in its books the owners thereof, when known, with the proceeds in Japanese paper money.

Banks
+
currency

Later, after May 1945, this liquidation was hastened. In Batavia the Kenpei and its members were frequently the purchasers at so-called public auctions, and the proceeds in Japanese occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the real price for the same article in the same paper money in the open market.

All stocks of Occidental importers, as well as private possessions in the form of movables and claims for payment (when capable of realisation) owned by Occidentals were translated into claims in Japanese paper money on the above-named Tekisan Kanribu. Possession of "enemy property" constituted a punishable offence and the holder was obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned Eurasians were considered enemy nationals, so that rents, due them, had to be paid to the Japanese. Unsold property was delivered upon request to Japanese officials and individuals, and their proteges.

Property

Before the war, in the Netherlands Indies, big capital, chiefly contributed by Occidentals, had been invested in agricultural enterprises and industries. The agricultural enterprises (excepting sugar-factories, which were organized in the "Java Togyo Rengo Kai") were brought by the Japanese under the "Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan". This organization had charge of the administration of "enemy" agricultural concerns under the Tekisan Kanribu and the control over all other agricultural enterprises including those operated with Indonesian or Chinese capital. Little attention was paid to the interests of owners. This body executed a policy directed towards carrying out a rigorous war effort and to the maintenance of production required by the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Enterprises and industries which were of no importance

to the immediate war effort, were whenever possible switched over to other production, or when that was not feasible, were retained if such retention were deemed worthwhile from the point of view of the anticipated requirements of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at the end of the war. Tea- and rubber-plantations suffered seriously, because the Japanese, during the later stages of the occupation, gave precedence to foodcrops. Tea-plants and rubbertrees were chopped and used for firewood, the estates being parcelled out amongst local farmers to increase areas for foodcrops.

A large part of the Western-owned agricultural enterprises was liquidated. The entire sugar industry was allotted in 6 or 7 blocks to the large Japanese sugar companies, and was exploited by them under the continued direction and control of the abovementioned body.

Sugar production was reduced considerably and the machinery belonging to the unworked sugar-factories was partly scrapped or carried off, when the factories were not switched over to produce other commodities more important for the war effort, such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

The possession of immovable property belonging to Occidentals or governmental institutions, was transferred by the Japanese to the "Hudoosan Kanrikoodan" established by them, which handed over the property as required to the Japanese military or civil authorities for business and for personal purposes.

Ownership of immovable property was drastically changed by the Japanese.

The so-called "private estates" were appropriated by the Military Government without the payment of any compensation to the owners, under Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 1 June 1942.

In the other islands too, such expropriations took place, as for instance in the Celebes, by virtue of an Ordinance No. ii of the Minseifu (the Civil Administration), dated 20 March

Property

Public utilities, including those privately owned, were seized by the Military Administration and were operated without compensation, and in some cases were allotted to private Japanese companies.

Private railway, tramway and bus companies were amalgamated with the State Railways. The equipment of private railway companies was for a large part shipped to the Burma Siam railway. Direction of railways was unified under the Rikuyu Sookyoku (Railway Head Office), and all trace of former independent operation by private companies was obliterated. The personnel of these companies was pooled and Japanese rank designations and terminology were introduced.

Private or semi-governmental gas- and power- companies as well as privately owned mining concerns were taken over and operated by either the Military Government or Japanese companies.

The policy of exploitation of natural resources of the East Indies ^{was} carried on partly by the Military Administration itself, partly through monopolies granted to certain big Japanese business concerns and partly by Japanese "national policy companies".

The Southern Development Bank (Nanpoo Kaihatu Ginko), an entirely government owned and operated bank had as its chief function the financing of the development and exploitation of natural resources in the Southern Regions and the control of circulation and finance in those areas. This bank was directed by the Ministry for Greater East Asia and it acted in the Southern Regions as cashier to the Japanese Army.

The Japanese Government also divided up natural resources in the Southern Regions between the various Japanese applicants and allotted each of them part of those areas, usually according to their monopolies.

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Gas - Power mines

NAMES ?

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Domei

Domei was granted a news service monopoly although a local agency had started first.

Press monopolies in the Southern Regions were divided among various big Japanese newspaper concerns. Asahi Shimbun (Slo)

In the field of banking, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank were chartered to operate in Java, and took over the functions of private Occidental banks.

The liquidation of these banks and the introduction of Japanese banks was effected, inter alia, by compelling the bank debtors whose debts were declared to be claimable on 25th November 1942 to apply to the Japanese banks for new credits backed by the securities pledged to the Western banks.

The old debt was consequently paid off with the new

credit. The Java Sugar Industry has already been mentioned as an example of the division of the natural resources of Java amongst the big Japanese Companies.

Get

Domei
Asahi
Yokohama Specie Bank
Taiwan Bank

II. THE SECOND PHASE

August 1942 to July 1943

During the period just discussed the Japanese administrative machinery was relatively simple. The Chief of Staff to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java was concurrently Chief of the Military Government (Gunseikan) and was assisted by a simple "central organ" and by three Army officers each administering his respective area in East, West and Central Java. Administration was carried on locally by Commanding Officers of occupational detachments.

Original plans drawn up in Tokyo, envisaged sending out parties consisting of Japanese experts in colonial administration, technical sciences, and economy, immediately following the occupational troops. It was not, however, until the beginning of August 1942 that the provisional set-up was succeeded by a regular Administration.

The Military Government, which at first was part and parcel of the Army, was next developed into a separate body.

The gist of its functions was laid down in Ordinance No. 1 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, dated 7 March 1942, in which he assumed all powers which hitherto had been exercised by the Governor-General. The military administration (Gunsei) was divided into nine Departments under the supervision of the Gunseikan. The Departments were Soomubu (General Affairs), the guiding and policy making body; Naibunbu (Internal Affairs); Zaimubu (Finance); Sihoobu (Justice); Keimubu (Police); Kootubu (Public Works); Sangyojibu (Economic Affairs); Kaikoi Kantokubu (Audition); and Sendonbu (Propaganda).

In addition from time to time a number of Bureaus, and other governmental bodies, without the standing of the Departments but under the Gunseikan and equally independent, were created to handle various matters, such as the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Bureau), the Zoosen Kyoku (Ship-building Bureau), the Tokisan Kenribu (Enemy Property Bureau); the Toogyoo Rengoo Kai (Sugar Producers' Corporation) etc. From time to time some changes were made, which did not affect the system.

The structure of the pre-war Central Administration was changed thoroughly and in its entirety. Neither a General Affairs Department nor a Propaganda Department had formerly existed. Police were under the Internal Affairs Department, while Public Health, Education and Labour (now under Waimubu) were handled by separate Departments or Bureaus in the pre-war establishment. Religious Affairs had been handled by the Education and Religion Department.

The Government Secretariate, the Council of State for the Indies and the Governor-General's Cabinet disappeared altogether. The former Departments of general administration, corresponding in name with the new Japanese Departments (e. g. Justice Department) were reorganized along Japanese lines.

All leading positions in the Departments were occupied by Japanese.

According to official Japanese information, on 1 September 1945 23,242 Japanese nationals were employed by the Military Government in Java, amounting to half the number of service personnel proper stationed there.

Legislative powers were exercised by the Imperial Government at Tokyo, the Supreme Commander in the Southern Area, the Commander-in-Chief of Java, and the Chief of Military Administration (Gunseikan). The laws and ordinances of the first two bodies were not published locally, although thousands were arrested, tortured and sentenced under them, while those of the two last mentioned organs were published in Java, in the Osamu Kan Po, the official bi-monthly Gazette, printed in Japanese and Malay. Some secret ordinances appeared only in the Japanese edition.

The institution of Advisory Councils at a later stage did not affect the legislative position in any way.

Ordinance No. 27 issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 5 August 1942 laid down an entirely new system of local administration. Under this Java was divided into 17 "Syuu", comparable geographically to the former "Residencies" and one "Tokubetu Si" ("Special City Area") comprising Batavia. The four Sultanates in Central-Java were administered by two "Kooti Zimu Kyoku" (Sultanates' Bureaus).

The former "Provinces" of West-, Central- and East-Java were eliminated. In early 1945, the Commander-in-Chief, Java, instituted three "Gunseisibu", coinciding geographically with the former Provinces but entirely differing in kind, as the Commander-in-Chief pointed out in an official statement.

All these local bodies supplanted the former decentralized and autonomous local administration, and were placed directly under the Gunseikanbu in a rigidly centralized system. Local councils were not mentioned in the Ordinance, and popular participation in local administration came to an end.

The Syuu were subdivided into smaller units in accordance with the Japanese pattern. These were given Japanese names such as Ken, Gun, Son, Ku, Si and Siku. During this second period the organic laws governing the functions of administrative bodies under the old system were abolished, and replaced by Japanese regulations, on which the centralized new administration was based.

The position of the Syuutyoo (comparable to the former "Resident") and of other local officials was, on one hand, considerably strengthened, and on the other made far more dependent on the Central Administration. The Fuehrer-principle was introduced. These officials, responsible only to their superiors, had a large measure of liberty in the execution of their duties: they had powers of dismissal and appointment, and almost unrestricted disciplinary powers over their staffs.

They were empowered to issue regulations to implement ordinances promulgated by higher authority and also regulations concerning matters not yet covered by such ordinances. However, they were subject to the authority of their superiors and were responsible to them in all cases. According to statements by Japanese Syuutyoo and similar authorities, the object the Japanese had in mind was to build up an administration which in its final form should be on the same lines as those followed in their colonies in Formosa and Korea.

The four ruling Sultans were maintained, not, as having hereditary title to their positions, but as newly invested Rulers called "Ko" owing allegiance

to the Japanese Army in the same way as all civilian officials did.

All key-positions in the new establishment were occupied by Japanese. From the Gunseikan down to the Syuu Office, the staff was almost entirely Japanese. From the Ken Office downward, the Indonesian staff was almost wholly maintained. The Benteng, however, was, from 1944 onward, assisted by Japanese advisers.

The composition of the Administrative Corps was modified later pursuant to Prime Minister Tojo's promises. However, leading positions remained in the hands of Japanese and if an Indonesian held an important post there was always a Japanese who was the real executive.

It was not until the end of August 1945 that Japanese officials handed over actual authority to their Indonesian colleagues.

According to the biographies of the Japanese officials, published by the propaganda service, this corps was assembled chiefly in colonial Formosa and Korea, and some had been engaged in administrative functions in Japan proper.

The establishment of a new administrative system in islands other than Java developed along the same lines.

In the initial stage, Sumatra along with Malaya formed an administrative unit under an Army Commander at Singapore, but later Sumatra was placed under a separate Gunseikanbu.

The 16th and 25th Armies (Java and Sumatra respectively) came under the 7th Area Army with Headquarters at Singapore, commanded in the final stages by Itagaki, Seishiro. This 7th Area Army came under the Southern Theatre commanded by Field Marshal Terauchi.

The Military Administration operated pursuant to both orders issued through the ordinary channels of command and issued directly from the Ministry of War.

In the Celebes, Borneo and all islands east of a line running north and south through Bali and Macassar Straits the Japanese Navy was in power. While the terminology varied, the system was not substantially different. The same principles of centralized administration were applied and relations between Japanese and Indonesian officials were the same.

Administration in territory under Naval Occupation (Minsei) was executed by the Minseihu (Headquarters) at Macassar (Celebes).

The Minseihu at Macassar was under the command of the Officer Commanding the Second Southern Squadron, whose Headquarters was at Sourabaya. This Headquarters fell under the Officer Commanding the 7th Southern Squadron at Singapore.

Parallel with reorganization of the Administration, the Judicial System was entirely revised. In addition to the Gunsei Hooiin (Courts of the Military Administration), set up in the first period to replace the former Courts, there were the Gun Kaigi, a Court Martial proper, to try Japanese service personnel and others subject to Court Martial, and the Gunritu Kaigi, a Court Martial to try violations of the Army Ordinances.

The Gunsei Hooiin itself had jurisdiction to try violations of Military Government Ordinances and Regulations, and former Ordinances declared in force by the Military Government. This jurisdiction was shared with the Gunritu Kaigi.

Ordinance No. 14, of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 26 September, 1942, gave the Gunsei Hooiin their final form.

Eight type of courts were set up, all bearing Japanese names, and including the Saikoo Hooiin (Final Court of Appeal) and the Kootoo Hooiin (Intermediary Courts of Appeal), the personnel of both of which at first was entirely Japanese. The lower courts comprised the Police Court, the District Court and other local courts corresponding to the local administrative subdivisions, and two special religious courts, all manned by Indonesians and directly controlled by the Intermediary Courts of Appeal.

To each court a Kensatu-kyoku (prosecution Section) was attached. This system was strongly centralized under the Justice Department. At a later stage it was detached from the Justice Department, and combined with the police force under the Police Department which was renamed Public Security Department (Tianbu).

In criminal courts with Indonesian members a representative of the Korpai attended the sessions, seated next to the representative of the Kensatu-kyoku.

In the initial stages the former Penal Code was maintained. Having determined that this criminal law was based on excessively democratic foundations the Japanese introduced a new Penal Code in 1944, in which criminal acts were defined in vague terms, leaving wide scope for interpretation. High minima of punishment were introduced for special offenses.

During the Japanese occupation interference by the Japanese Administration occurred frequently in trials by Indonesian courts. In practice it was the Kempei representative, attending criminal sessions, who determined the sentence in criminal cases.

During the session only Japanese and Malay languages were allowed.

Trials by the Courts Martial proper were conducted in Japanese and proper interpretation was seldom available.

In the other islands of the East Indies judicial powers were administered in the same manner. Former courts were abolished and new Japanese courts established.

At the outset of the occupation the Japanese authorities took over the Police School at Sukabuni, Java. Also in the capitals of the various Syuu, permanent courses for the training of police personnel, led by Japanese, were established. Finally propaganda courses for personnel already in the service were conducted regularly, in which the ideals of Greater East Asia and Japan's right were taught. A system of corporal maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the police station, for the settlement of minor infractions was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for insignificant offences was seen daily in the streets. A certain section of the Indonesian Police Force adopted the tactics of the Kempei.

A separate Police Department, later the Public Security Department, was established along centralized lines and all executive functions were taken over by the Japanese.

The existing Force was felt to be insufficient by the Japanese authorities. Various ways to remedy this situation were attempted.

The Kempeihoo, an Indonesian extension of the Kempei, trained by Kempei personnel in Kempei methods, was organized. It was both feared and hated by the people.

In April 1943, a Keiboodan (a sort of Village Guards) was organized as an auxiliary police force in all villages and municipalities. This reinforced the regular police by approximately 1,300,000.

The Keiboodan had a variety of duties. It had to go into action in case of fire or other calamities, it had to assist the regular police in apprehensions of crashed allied air crews, paratroopers and others, did 24-hour guard duties in its area, turned out in force during public propaganda meetings etc. Its main duty consisted of spying, chiefly in a general campaign against enemy spies.

In 1945, these Keiboodan were used to train the population in guerilla action, such as cutting lines of communication, destruction of small enemy detachments, etc., with wholly inadequate weapons such as bamboospears. This training taught the simple farmer fear of foreigners and hate for Occidentals and led to barbarous display of cruelty to these foreigners.

A third force auxiliary to the police, was set up early in 1945, and called Keibootai, which operated only in towns and served the same purposes as the Keiboodan. Its members were recruited chiefly from among the Chinese.

The Kempei-Hoo was part of the Kempei, while both the Keiboodan and the Keibootai although Japanese-led, and trained, formed no part of the official Army organization. The members of the two latter were "volunteers", if the required numbers were not filled, the remainder were drafted.

The prison system was similarly reorganized under Japanese instructions. Courses were held for the training of newly recruited personnel as well as for the "improvement" of personnel with previous service. Japanese designations and Japanese markings were introduced. The treatment of prisoners was inhumane.

The Military Government proceeded to lay down a revised educational program with a view to reopening schools for Indonesians.

Elementary education in the People's Schools was revised. Instruction in the Japanese language, songs and dances, and the Japanese type of physical training was introduced. Instruction in reading and mathematics, was substantially reduced and the remainder of the curriculum abolished.

The several types of intermediate schools, with their varied curricula, were abolished to make place for one standard type of intermediate school with a uniform curriculum. This school was divided into a First and a Higher School. The curriculum was very much simplified with foreign languages and general history dropped to make place for Japanese language and history. Textbooks on the history of the islands were burned and a new textbook was introduced, which emphasized racial affinities and ties of common destiny with Japan.

An entirely new subject was the "Seisin" (Spirit), which taught Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ideals to the younger generation, such as the Spirit should be able to overcome all material obstacles. In this vein youngsters were exhorted to fight tanks and other modern weapons, with bamboo spears if necessary.

Vocational schools were reorganized to conform with Japanese conceptions.

Batavia Medical College was reopened on 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the "Foundation of New Java", under the name of Ika Daigaku. Its first president was a Japanese professor, assisted by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most of them former associate professors at that College. Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors were demoted to associate professors and succeeded by Japanese professors, brought from Japan, who lectured in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese language had been obligatory from the outset.

The students pledged themselves to enter the Japanese Military Government service after graduation. Students were billeted and were subject to a strict and semi-military regimentation under specially appointed Japanese, who instructed them in the greatness of Japan and the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The curriculum of the Medical College was reduced from six to four years.

The Literary, Law and Technical Colleges were not reopened. However, in 1944, again on 9 March, a sort of higher vocational school with a limited program covering three years was opened. Students were subjected to the same routine.

Law College was supplanted by one year courses for the training of civilian officials and lawyers. Much time was spent on instruction in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideals and the greatness of Japan. Same regimentation of students was in force. Instruction in the Japanese Language played an important part.

Private education remained taboo for a long time. In 1943 and 1944, certain former private schools for Indonesians and for Chinese were allowed to reorganize but the curriculum had to conform to the official program.

Western teaching and education to Occidentals were prohibited throughout the occupation. This prohibition was strictly enforced, and the mere suspicion of having taught Occidentals was sufficient to involve the suspect with the Kempeitai.

Considerable numbers of Indonesian College students as well as graduates and prominent personalities from the Indonesian community were sent to Japan. A party of journalists from all the islands were taken to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia Journalists' Conference.

All sections of society were organized into corporations along fascist lines.

The organization and political coordination of society was carried out among all racial and political groups as well as among practically all professions and trades, practically all economic sections of society, all cultural groups, all religious groups, the younger generation, sports organizations, and women's movements. The Japanese authorities kept a close grip on a particular social group through these organizations and used them to command aid and support from its members for the Army or the Military Government. The corporations were required regularly to turn out in force during mass meetings. They were utilized for disseminating propaganda among the members. The Japanese used these corporations to keep abreast of public opinion and to conduct espionage.

The Propaganda Department maintained close relations with these organizations. Addresses by Indonesian officials in these organizations were not only pre-censored, but were usually even drafted by the Propaganda

Department. These corporations were under close and strict supervision by the Gunseikanbu. The various corporations, all serving uniform purposes and all modeled on the same lines, were instituted by Ordinances issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java. Article I of these Ordinances read the same for practically all corporations, and stated that the corporate objective was support to the Japanese Military Government.

The executives in these corporations were appointed by the Japanese authorities; Branch executives were responsible to the central executive; Both were assisted by advisory councils appointed by, or with approval of the Japanese authorities.

The executive body within a corporation was authorized to lay down regulations binding upon its members and membership was obligatory for all within a given group.

A typical example is provided by the organization of physicians, dentists and dispensers in the Java Izi Hookookai (Corporation for the Public Service by Medical men in Java), established by Ordinance No. 28, of the Commander in Chief in Java, dated 3 August 1943, which provided inter alia:

"Article 1.: The Java Izi Hookookai is established with the purpose of coordinating those engaged in the field of medicine in Java, to train their knowledge and character and to broaden and raise their capability in curing, and the care for sanitation, so that in this way they can give their contribution to the utmost to the Dai Nippon Army in medical affairs.

"Article 4.: Physicians, dentists and medical experts in Java, who are not Japanese nationals, must become a member of the Izi Hookookai, except enemy nationals.

"Article 8.: Besides what has been mentioned in Article 7, the Izi Hookookai carries out special work necessary for conducting the Military Government at the order of the Gunseikan.

"Article 9.: The Head of the Izi Hookookai can issue orders and instructions necessary for carrying out the work stipulated in Articles 7 and 8 to the members after obtaining

approval from the Gunseikan.

"Article 21.: The Izi Hookokai is supervised by the Gunseikan.
The work of the branch officers is supervised by
the Syuutyookan (Japanese Local Governor)."

The lawyers, newspapermen, and most, if not all, other professions were similarly organized into single corporations.

In all fields of economic activity there was the same picture of obligatory membership, unilaterally binding regulations, uniform objects and Japanese executives.

All artists and scholars were organized in the Keimin Bunka Sidosya.

The importance of a truly Oriental artistic expression was emphasized and Occidental influences were considered inimical. Paintings and other artistic expressions were to be and were adjudged, not on their artistic value, but solely on their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This organization, established in March 1943, showed the same characteristics as the other corporations: Japanese executives, obligatory support to the Army and the Military Government, etc.

The Japanese attached much importance to the spiritual moulding of youth and they took the matter into their own hands completely. The Indonesian Youth Movement, which at the outset had been authorized, was prohibited in the middle of 1943.

As early as December 1942 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Java declared that the training of the younger generation to be good citizens of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was of such paramount importance that the best Japan had to offer was not considered good enough. The matter of guidance and training of youth was kept an exclusively Japanese concern. The organ of control was established by the creation in April 1943 of the Jawa Seinendan (Java Youth Corps).

Its aims were laid down as follows:

"In order to convince the youth of Java so that they will energetically cooperate with the Military Government and render assistance in the building up of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia, it is necessary that they be given guidance and training."

In every Syuu a Japanese Training Centre for local instructors was established, and a Central Training Camp was opened near Batavia, all under the direction of Japanese.

Later, a Seinendan was organized in every Ken and Si, each approximately at battalion strength. Some factories had their own Seinendan. These were organized into the Jawa Rengoo Seinendan, (United Youth Corps of Java) on military lines and commanded by Japanese officers of the Army and the Military government.

Age limits were set at 14 to 25 and if insufficient volunteers were forthcoming more were drafted. Only the physically fit were admitted and those were tested as to their enthusiasm for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The official training comprised instruction in the Japanese language oral and written, spiritual and military training, Japanese physical training, air raid precautions, Japanese music and dances, etc.

The manpower for the Booei Giyu Gun (Defence Volunteers Corps), which was organized in September 1943, largely came from the youth corps. Soon after its establishment all other youth organizations were prohibited.

Sports were also brought in line. On 21 August 1943 the Tai Iku Kai was organized. The Tai Iku Kai provides the same picture as other corporations. In the official explanation of the applicable Ordinance it said: "The Jawa Tai Iku Kai will cover the sports-world of all Greater East Asiatic nationals in Java, from office-employees to school-children, and also that of the Kaiboodan and the Seinendan. Considering how important sports is for our spiritual and corporal training, for learning and developing discipline, and for strengthening the spirit and the determination to work, this Tai Iku Kai is of great importance to the War of Greater East Asia."

In every Ken and Si a branch was established; these branches were organized in their respective Syuu and these again were all subordinated to the Jawa Iku Kai.

FUJIN

The Indonesian women of Java were organized in the Huzin Kai, founded in August 1943.

Its objects and duties were laid down as follows:

"The purpose of this organization is to help the Dai Nippon Army with efforts befitting the position of the women of the original inhabitants and also to raise the women's virtue.

In order to assist in the conduct of the Military Government, the Zigyoma (Working Section), is created within the Hujin Kai; this body has to carry out work necessary for the improvement of conditions behind the front-line and in the field of savings, education, public safety and public health.

In order to deepen the conviction of women in their duties towards the efforts of the defence of the country in wartime, in the first place to give instruction in first aid the Hujin Kai shall be allowed to organize lecture meetings and courses and to establish a close contact with the Seinendan and Heiboodan in conducting exercises so that in future when there is an enemy attack the work can be done as well as possible."

Developments in the other islands, were roughly parallel to those in Java. However, the Japanese living among less advanced peoples, with a lower standard of efficiency among their own Japanese personnel, and at the same time less dependent on the cooperation of the local population than they were in Java, their chief granary and supply base, they tackled the process of political coordination more sketchily.

III. THE THIRD PHASE

From July 1943 until September 1944.

As early as in the first period, there was some activity by Japanese authorities in the political field, but the policy adopted locally was characterized by the Naval Liaison Officer at Batavia as a policy of "wait and see."

Immediately after the occupation a prohibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance No. 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 March 1942, which read as follows:

"Until further notice it shall be strictly prohibited to commit the following acts:

"a. participation in any organization; attending any meetings; conducting propaganda in favour of the enemy; the posting of printed or illustrated placards."

By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942, it was further prohibited to "discuss, engage in activities, encourage, or make propaganda concerning the organization and structure of the Government."

By virtue of these prohibitions certain Indonesian nationalist leaders were arrested by the Kempei in April 1942, some of whom were only released much later.

In December 1942 to January 1943 a large scale round-up was conducted of Indonesians who had engaged in any underground activities of a kind that might possibly be construed as being anti-Japanese. They were - except for those who had been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not released until September 1945. Even after January 1943, the Kempei scrupulously continued to guard against and spy upon all underground activity, which cost a very large number of victims.

In 1942 the Japanese initiated the "AAA" Movement. This name was announced on big placards displaying the following slogans:

Nippon Pelindung Asia (Japan the Protector of Asia)

Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader of Asia)

Nippon Chahaya Asia (Japan the Light of Asia)

The AAA for Asia were printed larger and in a more striking colour than the other letters. The themes which this movement elaborated were "Asia for

the Asiatics" and hate against "foreigners belonging to the white race" and against the "Western exploiters". The Japanese, on the contrary, were stated to be of the same race and stock as the Indonesians. The language "the Indonesian people who have the same ancestors and are of the same race as the Japanese," appeared in Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, dated 7 March 1942. Western influence was represented as being a corruption of the Eastern soul; Japan was represented as the Saviour of Asiatic peoples, and the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia under the "paternal" leadership of Japan was represented as liberating the Asiatic peoples. Apart from the slogan "New Java" or "a New Order in Java", the meaning to Java of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was not defined. Use of the word "Indonesia" in a political sense was not permitted. In most official publications the Indonesians were referred to as "the original inhabitants."

While the AAA Movement was in full swing, further contact was sought with the Indonesian world, and especially with those who were dissatisfied with the former rule and the rate at which that rule prepared for independence.

Chief among these was Sukarno, who was brought to Java by the Kempei in July 1942, and who formed the so-called "Ampat Serangkai" (four-leaved clover) with three other nationalists. These became the leaders, under Japanese supervision, of those nationalists who were prepared to cooperate with Japan. The four Serangkai saw in the Japanese promises a means of attaining the early independence for which they were striving. They believed in these promises and advocated complete cooperation with the Japanese Military Government.

The Japanese also sought to approach the group of Indonesian intellectuals who were not discontented with the former rule and had held high office thereunder. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief set up, in December 1942, the 'Kyuukan Seido Tyoosa Iinkai' (Committee for the Study of former Customs and Political Systems): "in order to survey and study the customs and the former governmental systems of the country, and to contribute towards the Administration of Java." Nine Japanese including the chairman

and ten Indonesians, including the "Four-leaved Clover" and certain former Chiefs of Departments, former professors and members of the former People's Council, sat on this Committee. It never played an important role and was abolished by the Japanese in November 1943.

The first request to the Japanese authorities made by the "Four Serangkai" was to be allowed to form a party. This request was considered until 8 December 1942, when at the commemoration of Pearl Harbour, a big propaganda meeting was held in Batavia, and the Commander-in-Chief publicly promised that a single party for Indonesians only would be permitted. The fulfillment of this promise had to wait for a decision from Tokyo.

On 9 March 1943 the "Putera" Movement was created, deriving its name from a symbolic abbreviation of "Pusat Tenaga Rakyat" denoting "Center of the People's Spiritual Power," while "Putera" means "knight's son."

Its aims and policy were approximately similar to those of the previously discussed corporations, except that the name of this people's movement was not Japanese, but Malay. The Putera was not a party, but only a "movement" with leaders and advisory councils.

The leaders were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and were assisted by the advisory council in which there were approximately equal numbers of Japanese and Indonesians, the latter being nominated by the leader with the approval of the Gunseikan. Local leaders were appointed by the Leader, with Japanese approval.

The organization of the Putera was governed by rules laid down by the Commander-in-Chief, and its aims were officially described by the Japanese as follows:

"The object in arousing the strength and efforts of the people is
"no other than to support all measures for winning final victory in
"the Greater East Asia War. Since the work of this Movement is very
"closely linked with the policy of the Dai Nippon Military Govern-
"ment, all leaders must bear in mind that they should have a
"profound knowledge of, and faith in, the aims and objectives
"of the Dai Nippon Army."

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In this address the Putera leaders were further urged:

"Do your utmost always to be fully aware of the existing limitations
"in the present situation, and never lead the common people astray.
"I hope you will do your best to fulfill the aims and objectives
"of this Movement, and that you will cooperate in the establish-
"ment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia and build
"a New Java to be a member in the family of nations within the
"Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia."

The functions of the Putera were officially set out in the following ten points:

1. To impress upon the Indonesian population their duties and responsibilities in regard to the establishment of a "New Java."
2. To eliminate Occidental influences.
3. To participate in the defence of Greater East Asia.
4. To foster self-discipline in bearing all mental and physical privations necessary for winning ultimate victory.
5. To deepen mutual understanding between the Japanese and Indonesians.
6. To encourage the study of the Japanese language.
7. To raise the standards of the Indonesian population and develop their capacities and character.
8. To encourage the care of health and sport in order to improve the physique of the population.
9. To encourage thrift and savings.
10. To encourage higher production in every field and to develop a love of work.

The Putera was only for Indonesians. The new social hierarchy introduced by the Japanese comprised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2. Indonesians; 3. other Asiatics; 4. mixtures of Indonesians with other groups; 5. Europeans. Thereby, Indonesians, being the "original inhabitants", were treated as a privileged category, while groups 3 to 5 were treated as foreigners, with the Europeans and Eurasians receiving the worst treatment.

About the same time as the institution of the Putera, the restrictions on travel by so-called "foreigners" were strengthened. Moreover, it was ordered that everyone must immediately inform the police when lodging someone from outside the place of his residence. "Forbidden zones" were introduced, covering the entire South coast and the two Eastern and Western extremities of Java, where no "foreigners" were allowed to enter and for which even Indonesians needed a pass.

The first great enthusiasm for the Putera dwindled when it became apparent that the activities of this body, to which the population had looked forward, were to be entirely restricted to the basic principles laid down by the Japanese propaganda service. There was great disappointment when the originally planned Youth Movement of the Putera was forbidden, and the Japanese authorities set up instead their own youth movement.

Meanwhile, outside the East Indies great changes had taken place. Japan had been forced from an offensive into a defensive position and lines of communication were seriously threatened.

Against this background, on 16 June 1943, Prime Minister Tojo made a speech in the Diet wherein, inter alia, he stated that in view of the fact that the people of Java had shown their readiness to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration, they should be given participation in the government. On this occasion Tojo also promised so-called independence to Burma and to the Philippines.

In pursuance of this promise, Prime Minister Tojo visited the Southern Regions in person.

Enroute to Java, Tojo called at Manila and Singapore, repeating the promise of "independence" for the Philippines and Burma. In Java no "independence" was promised, but only participation in the government. The promise was coupled with the conditions that there should be complete co-operation with the Japanese Military Administration in order to win ultimate victory.

Following this promise, in August 1943, an Indonesian was appointed Chief of the Syuumubu (Department of Religious Affairs), but actual control remained in the hands of Japanese section heads; and two others were appointed Syuutyoo (Chief of a Residency) in the two smallest Residencies of

Java, with actual power in the hands of the Japanese Vice-Chief. Furthermore, a number of Indonesians were officially appointed to lower positions, which they had held before, and were incorporated into the Japanese Administrative Corps and were accorded corresponding Japanese rank.

The "San-yo Seido" (Adviser System) was introduced, and Indonesians were nominated to be adviser to seven Departments. The San-yo only acted when questions were referred to him for advice.

In all Residencies and also in the Special Municipality of Batavia an advisory body, the Sangi Kai, was established to advise the Resident in matters of local government, by Ordinance No. 37 of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance prescribed the numbers of members of each Sangi Kai to be appointed and elected, respectively. The "elections" were indirect with nomination of the candidates not public and the ballot not secret. The function of the Sangi Kai was to answer questions concerning local government put to it by the Syuutyoo with the right to make suggestions on the referred subject. It could only meet on orders from the Syuutyoo, and sittings were opened and closed on his orders. Officials of the Syuutyoo office could attend and participate.

The sessions were only public for the opening address, which was drafted and censored beforehand, and for the closing session. The sessions proper were held behind closed doors. At the final session motions, discussed and settled during the closed meetings, were put to a mock vote and always passed unanimously. Sessions scarcely ever lasted longer than four to five days. The Chairman was appointed from amongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo. Every Sangi Kai sent representatives to the Tyuuo Sangi-In, the Central Advisory Council of Java.

This was established on 5 September 1943, by Ordinance No. 36, "for the speedy and efficient execution of the measures of the Military Government." Twenty-three out of forty-three members were nominated in advance by the Commander-in-Chief. Of the remainder, eighteen were "elected" by the various Sangi Kai, and two were nominated by the Sultanates. The procedure was the same as that of the local Sangi Kai. They were only empowered to offer advice in respect to questions put by the Commander-in-Chief

or the Resident, and to make suggestions relating thereto.

The actual direction of affairs rested with the Head of the Record Office, called the Tyuuoo Sangi-In Zimu Kyoku Tyoo, who was a Japanese, as were also the other officials of his office. The function of this office was to deal with incoming and outgoing correspondence as well as to exercise internal supervision over the activities of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In. The Head and his staff were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and the first Head was the then private secretary of Prime Minister Tojo.

Similarly, the Secretary of the local Advisory Council was always a Japanese from the Syuutyoo's office. From the very beginning these organizations were used as an instrument of Japanese propaganda to recruit labour and "Volunteers" for the military organizations and to encourage the population to increase agricultural output and to deliver the crops to the Military Government.

As a further local participation measure wider administrative powers were given to the Sultans of Central-Java in elementary education, local government at lower levels, public health, and farming, etc.

Almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Central Advisory Council, as was later officially declared by the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese Military Administration took the view that the Indonesian population of Java ought to give concrete expression of its appreciation of Prime Minister Tojo's promise now that it had been translated into fact, and that it was their duty to demonstrate their preparedness to support the Japanese Military Administration by organizing a Volunteers' Corps.

The Propaganda service ensured that it should appear to the outside world that the inhabitants themselves were desirous of having their own army.

At the end of August 1943, an old friend of Sukarno forwarded a petition, signed "with his own blood," to the Commander-in-Chief of Java for permission to set up a Volunteers' Corps as the first of a large series of such requests. The Commander-in-Chief declared in the beginning of October 1943 that he was favourably disposed towards these petitions, and that he considered, moreover, that the population of Java was very rightly desirous

of offering some return for Tojo's promise; and by Ordinance No. 44, dated 3 October 1943, he instituted the Kyodo Booei Giyu Gun (Army of Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland). The aim of the Corps was "to call upon the original inhabitants (i.e., Indonesians) for the defence of Java, based upon the principle of the joint defence of Greater East Asia."

Art. 4 laid down:

"The Volunteer Corps should be thoroughly convinced of the ideals and importance of the task of defending the homeland, and it is its duty to partake in the defence of the home country in the respective Syuu against the Allies under the leadership of the Dai Nippon Army."

By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of Java. It was emphatically stated that this Corps was not to form part of the Japanese Army and would have its own officers, but it would be trained by Japanese instructors. It would not be used outside Java and would consist of volunteers.

Recruiting for the first levy started immediately, but with the following levies it appeared that there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each new levy each Regency was told how many "volunteers" were required in order to bring formations up to strength. One of the chief activities of Japanese propaganda was to encourage enlistment in this corps. In October 1943 the training of the "officers" was started and lasted three months.

The object was to form one or more battalions of about 1000 men per Syuu (Residency) which would together make up a unit for the defence of the Syuu. At the time of Japan's capitulation this object had been achieved. In the defence of the Syuu, the task of the Giyu Gun was mainly one of guarding road junctions, bridges and other strategically important points. Weapons were only supplied to these "volunteers" for the duration of the drills, and training mostly took place with wooden guns. The Beppan, a special section of the Headquarters of the 16th Japanese Army, an intelligence organization, was charged with training, and at the same time made use of it both for spying upon the new volunteers as well as using them as spies.

Prior to this, the Japanese had made use of Indonesians as auxiliary forces. Shortly after the occupation many Indonesian soldiers were partly recruited and partly compelled to serve as a "Heiho" (auxiliary soldier). These units formed part of the Japanese Army and were issued a Japanese uniform. They were generally used in the Ordnance Corps, and to guard camps occupied by women and civilian internees. Heiho were sent off the island.

The Japanese Navy similarly made use of Indonesian Heiho.

Both the Giyu Gun and the Heiho were taught to speak Japanese. Commands were issued in Japanese, and the regulations were written in Japanese. They wore Japanese insignia. An important part of the training was instruction in "Seisin" (Spirit).

One of the important aims of Japanese propaganda was the increase of farming crops and their delivery to the Japanese Military Administration. The island of Java had to provide large quantities of food for the Japanese occupation troops and troops fighting in the East. Besides the Japanese army of occupation was laying up large stocks of supplies. Java, which before the war had barely been able to meet the essential food requirements of its own population, was expected to produce more. This increase in production was obstructed by the lack of proper supervision over irrigation works, due to the replacement of interned Dutch experts by insufficiently trained Japanese, and by haphazard methods adopted by the Japanese in the pursuance of their ends in forcing the production of desired agricultural commodities unsuitable to the climate and geographic conditions. All this further reduced the area available for food crops.

It became less and less advantageous for the simple farmer to hand over his produce to the Japanese authorities. From the outset, the Japanese adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indies Government to stabilize the price of rice at a proper level. As the Japanese military guilder decreased in its purchasing value, the official price for rice soon fell far below its former value relative to other commodities. Articles that the farmer used to buy with the proceeds of his rice became virtually unobtainable.

The Japanese authorities ordered that 60% of the harvest of food produce had to be delivered to them. They took far-reaching measures to combat the black market in rice and other food products, such as the imposing of closed regional economic areas, enforced by checkpoints on the highways. The threshing of rice - except for individual consumption - in other than "coordinated" mills was prohibited.

The propaganda service exerted all its powers to persuade the farmers to cultivate wider areas in order to obtain more produce. It also tried to persuade the inhabitants to yield their crops to the Japanese Military Administration.

Not only in Java, but throughout the Southern Regions, Japan used labour everywhere, for the building of military fortifications, airfields, strategic railways, etc. Java was a source for such labour. From the very commencement, Japanese propaganda went all out to encourage the voluntary enlistment of these coolies. In this at first the Japanese were successful. When the inhabitants learned how these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, their desire to work for them practically disappeared. This became worse when the coolies sent out of Java did not return, and no news whatever was received from them.

The Japanese thereafter adopted conscription, whereby each Regency was informed as to how many coolies had to be drafted, both for the work in Java itself, and for labour outside that island.

In 1943 the propaganda service started a vigorous campaign in which the "Prajurit Ekonomi" (the economic warrior) was represented as fulfilling a sacred task by working for the Japanese Army. It was no longer permissible to speak of coolies; the coolie was also a soldier, and his contribution to the war effort had to be greatly appreciated. The recruiting of the coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one of these was that the houses of relatives left behind were provided with a sign "Prajurit Pekerja", and it was pointed out to the public that one should honour such houses and their occupants, whilst this sign was said henceforth to guarantee special protection. Furthermore, theoretically these relatives enjoyed certain privileges in the distribution of scarce commodities, such

as clothing, - a privilege enjoyed only after all government officials had received their share.

These labourers received less care than the prisoners of war and internees, and their condition was aggravated by their ignorance of hygienic precautions and medical care. While the correct figures of those who were transported outside Java as Romushas are not known, the official estimates of the Japanese after the capitulation indicate a figure of 270,000 men, of whom not more than 70,000 have been recovered since the war's end. Most of the returnees suffered inhumane maltreatment. Accommodation, food, medical care were not only thoroughly inadequate, but in many cases absent altogether. During certain periods, "romushas" who had died from starvation and contagious diseases were daily carried away by the cartload from certain camps.

In religious matters the propaganda service made an effort to obtain complete cooperation from the population.

These activities were especially directed at influencing the Mohammedans, who formed the large majority of the population, while propaganda among other religions was of far less importance. Priests and preachers of an "enemy race" were forbidden to conduct services except for people of an "enemy race". If an "enemy" priest or preacher noticed an Indonesian among the congregation he was to see to it that the latter left on penalty of very severe punishment.

From the very outset the Japanese made an effort to establish one organization for the Islamites to convey the Japanese aims to the people and to induce a maximum war effort through voluntary cooperation. Several attempts in that direction by the Japanese failed at first because of discord in Islamic circles in regard to religious principles. In November 1943 the Japanese succeeded in uniting the Moslem unions into one mother organization, the "Mashumi" (abbreviation for "Majelis Shura Muslimin Indonesia" - Consultative Council of Indonesian Islamites).

This coordinated the Mohammedan intellectuals. In addition there was a large number of Oelamas (expounders of the Koran) and Kiais (teachers on religious matters), not closely connected with Islamic intellectuals, but who exercised a considerable influence in the villages.

From the very beginning the Syuumubu tried to obtain influence amongst the population through these kiais and oelamas. As far back as July 1942 the then Japanese Head of the Syuumubu began to travel about Java and held meetings in each Syuu (Residency) for about 500 or 600 kiais and oelamas who had been ordered to attend by the local administration in each place. He spoke on Japanese views and aims in the usual vein and then tried to sound the opinion of his audience. He was assisted by five Japanese in Arabian dress bearing the title of Hadji in combination with Arabian and their own Japanese names. Following this tour there was a great meeting of representatives of all scholars and teachers on religion from all residencies at Batavia on 7 December 1942. The Gunseikan made a speech in which the Japanese policy in regard to the Islamites in Java was explained.

This policy embodied three principles. First, the Japanese Army declared itself to be the protector of Islam and that the Mohammedan religion would be respected.

For the second point the Gunseikan declared that religious associations would soon be authorized to carry on their activities and that they had the noble task of propagating the ideals of Great East Asia and the support of the Military Administration.

For the third point, the Gunseikan declared that the cooperation of the Islamic community in respect to education was acceptable in so far as it was directed at full support to the Japanese Army and imbued with the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With this restriction religious education would be permitted and officially supported with books and other facilities.

The Syuumubu established a permanent training centre in Batavia where courses lasting three weeks in Japanese ideology were given to groups of sixty kiais and oelamas each.

These courses were also used to test whether Japanese propaganda had any effect, and afforded a means of selecting suitable collaborators. These accomplices carried the propaganda to the simple rural population, and were responsible for the production and delivery of sufficient rice for a sufficient supply of labourers and for enlistments as "volunteer" or heiho.

The Japanese adopted the old device of working on the fanaticism of Islamites, and they tried to persuade the kiais and oelmas to declare the Greater East Asia War as a "sabil" (holy) war against the kafir (unbeliever). When the point that the Japanese were themselves unbelievers was raised, the "common ancestry," the "common race" and the "destiny common to the Japanese and the Indonesians" were pointed out.

In the beginning of 1944 religious disturbances occurred in the Indramayu district and at Garut. The Japanese held the Indonesian leader of the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department) responsible, and he was replaced by one of the oldest and most popular kiais of Java. He accepted this post and spent one day in Batavia, but immediately returned to his religious institution, leaving the direction of the Syuumubu to the Japanese heads of sections.

From November 1943 the Mashumi became the organization through which the Japanese authorities ruled the Islamic intellectual world, and through it carried on propaganda for Japanese ideals, sounded public opinion and executed espionage.

The relationship between the Mashumi and the Syuumubu was constantly strengthened until at last the Mashumi was for all purposes directed by the Syuumubu.

Besides this the Japanese established Syuumuka (Religious Affairs Sections) in every Syuu under locally prominent Kiais. They had the duty of making Military Administration policy understood in the villages. These agencies were gradually extended even to the smallest local subdivisions under a local Kiai.

The Syuumubu issued a publication called "Asshu'lah," edited in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese, but printed in Arab script, the only script the orthodox kiais could read. This periodical was distributed free of charge amongst all kiais in Java.

The Japanese also made several efforts to coordinate the Chinese who although comparatively few in number, were the mainstay of the middle class. The Japanese first tried to induce leading officials of the many Chinese associations (which had all been dissolved in March 1942) to form one big organization, but the effort completely failed.

The Japanese decided in August 1943 to establish the Kakyoo Sookai with the support of a few prominent pro-Nanking Chinese.

The Kakyoo Sookai was organized along the customary lines, with its leaders appointed by the Japanese authorities, and close cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration as the prime object. No action was taken on their own initiative and the organization was used to disseminate Japanese propaganda and as an espionage organization.

At the same time the Japanese made certain concessions, such as permission for limited Chinese private school education, and for sending small remittances to their families in Japanese-occupied parts of China. This latter permission was not kept.

The Eurasians, who occupied mainly the middle strata of technical and administrative occupations, were at first ostracized. Japanese replaced them in the higher ranks, but not nearly enough were available for the more numerous intermediate ranks, and trained Indonesians were insufficient in numbers.

The first effort to secure the cooperation of the Eurasian group was made in September 1943. The Eurasians who had been regarded as "aliens," gradually began to be treated as belonging to the indigenous population next to the Indonesian group. The Japanese stipulated, however, that the Eurasians had to realize that from then on they were to feel and act as members of the Greater East Asia community under the leadership of Japan, and had to renounce their Western ancestry.

The Japanese promised the Eurasians to admit a number of their children to village schools which had so far been reserved for Indonesian children. Separate schools for Eurasian children remained forbidden.

In the beginning of 1944 the Japanese decided to dissolve the Putera and to replace it by an organization in which all Asiatics would combine efforts to achieve ultimate victory in the Holy War.

According to the Japanese it had failed to reach the simple villager, who comprised about 80% of the total population of Java and supplied the manpower for army and labor services and the production of food crops for the Japanese. The movement became too strongly nationalistic.

Tonari Gumi

The new organization followed a pattern used in Japan and combined the propaganda machinery with the organization for the distribution of essential supplies. Starting in January 1944, the whole of Java was divided into small communities of about 20 houses each, called Tonari Gumi (Neighbours' Associations). These Tonari Gumi were organized on centralized lines. They were headed by a Kumityoo, who was appointed from above and who was responsible for the execution of the orders given to him. All existing associations, social, fire precautionary, agricultural, etc., were absorbed by the Tonari Gumi.

The duties of this institution were very extensive. Not only distribution, but also regular training for air raid defense and guerilla warfare were its responsibility. Furthermore, the head of the community had to lecture at least once a week to his people on Japanese ideology and the practical application thereof. At these meetings the Japanese aims in regard to the population were extolled according to instructions from the Japanese propaganda service. This was done mostly by Indonesians, specially trained by the Japanese who remained behind the scene.

Other meetings were held for larger units (called aza; a village was divided into two or more aza) once a month. One member of each family had to attend these meetings.

All inhabitants of the area of one Tonari Gumi, including non-interned Eurasians, had to be members of the organization. Only membership gave distribution facilities.

On March 9, 1944, when the Tonari Gumi were working satisfactorily, the Putera was officially dissolved and the "Jawa Hookoo Kai" (Corporation for Communal Services in Java), comprising all Asiatic groups was officially installed. This corporation remained as the instrument of Japanese control until August 31, 1945, when it was dissolved.

According to the official explanation accompanying the Ordinance (8 January 1944) founding it, the Jawa Hookoo Kai was set up as an organ of the Military Administration to carry out its instructions in an atmosphere of 'friendly cooperation' with all inhabitants. It was the organization's duty to see that these instructions reached all the people and it was to work in close relationship with the Tonari Gumi. Its leaders were responsible for

seeing that everyone was enlisted in the positive support of the Military Administration. According to this explanation the Jawa Hookoo Kai was in fact an executive body, based on the principle of complete coordination of all inhabitants and was, therefore, an organization of the entire populace.

The central direction of the Jawa Hookoo Kai was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and consisted of Japanese exclusively. The Executive Bureau under the supervision of the central direction had several Indonesians. Branches were established in all localities. The Ku Hookoo Kai, the smallest union, supervised one or more Iza which in turn supervised a number of Tonari Gumi.

The leader of these local Hookoo Kai was the head of the local administration, assisted by a council (Kaigi), appointed by him. A session of the Kaigi had to be held at least every six months, when ways and means of promoting assistance to the Military Government had to be discussed.

The Tonari Gumi formed the lowest bodies in the Jawa Hookoo Kai. Their task was:

- a. active support to police and Keibodden (village guards) in the defence of their country and during air raids, against enemy parachutists, enemy espionage, natural calamities, fire and crime.
- b. to make the inhabitants understand the aims of laws, regulations, etc., of the Military Administration.
- c. stimulation of increased food production; encouragement of delivery of these products to the authorities; the distribution of daily necessities.
- d. general support to the Military Administration, e.g., by protecting members of families of Heiho (auxiliary troops), volunteers and romashas (coolies) who had left their villages.
- e. mutual help and assistance.

The Jawa Hookoo Kai absorbed all organizations pursuing similar aims, regardless of nationality, including the Japanese. The Huzin Kai (Women's Corporation), the Washumi (the Islamic Corporation), the Kakyoo Sookai (Corporation of Chinese), the Tai Tku Kai (Sports Corporation), the Keimin Bunka Sidosya (Cultural Corporation), etc., mentioned before, were all incorporated in the Jawa Hookoo Kai.

The activities by the Eurasians for their mutual support brought on systematic prosecution by the Kempei-tai. Dozens of their leaders died in prison during the occupation as a result of ill-treatment, starvation, contagious diseases (caused by crowded prisons without sufficient sanitation) or sentences by courts martial.

Anyone who once attracted suspicion was tortured in such a way that false confessions were a daily occurrence; and these in turn often brought fresh victims within the clutches of the Kempei-tai. A typical example of this happened in 1944 in Pontianak on the west coast of Borneo, where more than 1200 prominent Indonesian and Chinese, including the local nobility, were executed on an entirely unfounded suspicion of conspiracy. Also in Java the Indonesians were in constant fear of the Kempei. Greatest care had to be taken in speaking since spies were around everywhere. There are hundreds of cases where people of all races were most cruelly tortured on the strength of reports of a usually entirely innocent conversation, by means of the "water-cure", electrification, hanging by limbs, use of boa constrictors, etc.

Outside Java the same policy was adhered to in regard to political and religious activities. Here again, following Tojo's promise, a number of prominent cooperative Indonesians were appointed to posts in the Administration. Bodies similar to the Sangi kai (local Advisory Councils) were established but this process was considerably slower than in Java. Territories administered by the Navy in turn were slower to follow than those under Army Occupation. In the Naval areas (Celebes, Borneo, etc.) the stage where Tyuuso Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was formed was never reached. In Sumatra, however, a Tyuuso Sangi-In for that island was installed at Fort de Kock in February 1945. No organization similar to the Putera was permitted in spite of requests from Indonesian intellectuals.

Compared with Java, propaganda in the other islands was more concentrated on the younger generation.

"Volunteers Corps" similar to the Giyu Gun were established.

The four basic aims of Japanese propaganda were given full play during the course of 1944. Using the slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" and teaching

religious hatred, the Japanese worked upon all sections of society by holding courses of instruction. The first group to be dealt with was that of school teachers, followed later by policemen, heads of villages, minor officials of the civil service, higher officials, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and personnel of all government offices. Even the smallest group was given attention in turn.

This propaganda, however crude, was to some extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions and the distress and hardships suffered by the population.

The Japanese clearly realized the potential dangers of this situation. It was the task of the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in some other direction by way of distraction from Japan's occupation. There was a constantly increasing campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially against the United States and Britain, which countries, together with Holland were held responsible for all the sufferings of the population.