

endorsed the code and expressed its willingness "to invoke further self-censorship restrictions that may become necessary in the interests of the nation's safety."⁴⁵ CBS hailed the radio code as "reasonable and intelligent." NBC said it would have a "salutary effect" on small stations that had overlooked the importance of common-sense censorship.⁴⁶

"MISSIONARIES" AND JUDGMENTS

Price and Sorrells invited representatives from five newspaper associations to counsel the Press Division and to help instruct newspapers, magazines, and other publications about compliance with the code. The group called itself the Editorial Advisory Board, and its initial members were Cranston Williams, general manager of the American Newspaper Publishers Association; W. L. Daley, Washington representative of the National Editorial Association; John W. Potter, acting president of the Inland Press Association; Charles P. Manship Sr., president of the Southern Newspaper Publishers Association; and Dwight Marvin, president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE).⁴⁷ The board met on February 26, 1942, and its first action was to urge Price to ask the press to downplay stories about prisoner-of-war broadcasts from Japan, which he did the next day. The members also decided to use their newspaper associations to informally ask editors to beware of the danger of coded messages being placed in classified ads. The board grew to have as many as thirteen members during the war and met seven times to give the Press Division advice on censorship problems.⁴⁸ Between meetings, Williams helped the Press Division by distributing censorship bulletins to the nation's daily newspapers through the newsletter of the American Newspaper Publishers Association.⁴⁹

Price asked the board to consider the wisdom of opening regional censorship offices. The California Newspaper Publishers Association, meeting on April 30, 1942, urged the creation of a San Francisco branch, and the *Hartford (Connecticut) Times* endorsed having regional offices throughout the country. However, the board rejected the idea on May 14. The Washington office could be reached at any hour by telephone or telegraph and thus was readily accessible. In addition, there were concerns that expanding the bureaucracy might lead to different branches rendering different decisions. Besides, the advisory board already had endorsed its own alternative for disseminating censorship information throughout the country. On February 26, it had asked the Press Divi-

army officials had made it impossible to continue suppressing the site of the six deaths, and they endorsed the mention of Lakeview, Oregon, near Gearhart Mountain.²² The Associated Press quickly put a story on the wire that named the victims and included an interview with Mitchell, the pastor whose wife had died in the blast.²³ The Office of Censorship continued the restriction on specifying the location of balloons for the rest of the war but offered no objection to generalities such as “the western part of the United States.” After censorship ended on August 15, 1945, many papers published the details of nearby balloon sightings during the previous nine months.²⁴

The news blackout had kept Japan from learning about the balloons’ progress after launching. The enemy could not know whether they had caused death and destruction or had fallen harmlessly. If the balloons had caused panic, Japan might have benefited from that knowledge and stepped up production or launched a propaganda campaign. However, the story was suppressed and panic was averted. Japan had no way of knowing that the balloons were nearly useless as a weapon, and for six months it invested expensive resources into their manufacture that otherwise might have been diverted to other weapons.

The news of Japanese balloon bombs was a major story unanticipated by the original *Code of Wartime Practices*. Suppressing it required civilian and military censors to recognize it as a potential security risk and to create a strategy to keep in check the public’s curiosity. While the balloon bombs posed a special challenge because they were seen and discussed throughout the West, other major stories were suppressed without difficulty. In the winter of 1942, the Office of Censorship asked journalists to “lay off” stories of Japanese cruelty to Allied prisoners of war. Press Division director John H. Sorrells explained in a memorandum to his assistant Nathaniel R. Howard on February 24 that publicity might incite reprisals against people of Japanese ancestry in the United States and provide Japan an excuse for more cruelties.²⁵ On another subject, five weeks later, Price informed journalists that the restrictions on stories about prisoners of war did not apply to news of the forced relocation of Japanese Americans. While the internment of enemy aliens was covered by the censorship code, he said, journalists were free to publicize the federal government’s internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, which had been done out of fears about their loyalty.²⁶

Other news stories unforeseen at the start of the war that effectively were suppressed included those about new treatments for malaria that