From the outset the wholehearted cooperation of the civil populace and the excellent cooperation by the Japanese military and naval authorities was immediately apparent. From 22 September to 30 November no serious incidents occurred and the few that were reported were believed to be caused by a misunderstanding on the part of our forces, or the Japanese, due to the language barrier. Some instances were reported of weapons and supplies not being reported but this is thought to have been chiefly because of the confusing state of affairs insofar as the Japanese forces were concerned at the time of surrender. In general, no occupation force could expect more complete cooperation from a defeated enemy. Their every effort was directed toward trying to furnish our forces everything that was required of them and comply with all directives issued. This general attitude was undoubtedly prompted by a sincere desire to have things run smoothly in order that the occupation would be terminated at an early date.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Officer/Contact</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Comb SNLF Hq</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>Vadm ABE, K.</td>
<td>Land defense of SASEBO &amp; environs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO #11 SNLF</td>
<td>2,635</td>
<td>Cmdr HIRAI, M.</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO #12 SNLF</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>Cdr HUKAI, H.</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO #13 SNLF</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>Cdr TAKEMURA, I.</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO #14 SNLF</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td>Cdr OYA, M.</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SNLF Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,325</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>10,490</td>
<td>Vadm ABE, K</td>
<td>To man CB, AA Btry's under control SASEBO N.D. Personnel were concentrated (1) SASEBO Hbr (2) NAGASAKI Hbr &amp; TACHIBANA Bay (3) KAGOSHIMA Bay. Additional personnel, equipment turned over to 16th Area Army in south KYUSHU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Def Unit</td>
<td>4,447</td>
<td>Capt YAMADA, T.</td>
<td>All minelaying, minesweeping activities in waters off west coast of KYUSHU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAKATA Hbr Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>Capt KANZAKI, T.</td>
<td>Minesweeping, HAKATA Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGASAKI Hbr Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>Capt YAMADA, T.</td>
<td>Minesweeping, NAGAS, Hbr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSUSHIMA Nav Gd Force</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>Capt FUJITA, T.</td>
<td>Coast defense TSUSHIMA and to assist TSUSHIMA Fortress in Inf defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Sub'Base</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>Cdr IMURA, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Comm Unit</td>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>Capt KITAGAWA, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUICIDE BOAT UNITS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Sp Attack Force Hq</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>Radm SHIBUYA, K.</td>
<td>Primarily a training unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAWATARA Assault Unit</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>Capt HARA, T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Assault Unit</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>Capt HIDA, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Assault Unit</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>Capt KOGA, Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,437</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Sp Attack Force Hq</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>Radm KOMAZAWA, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Assault Unit</td>
<td>4,137</td>
<td>Capt WACHI, T.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Assault Unit</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>Capt OISHI, S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Assault Unit</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>Capt NOMURA, J.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,536</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING UNITS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Barracks</td>
<td>29,314</td>
<td>Vadm ABE, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARIO Nav Barracks</td>
<td>7,444</td>
<td>Radm HAYASHI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIMOURA Nav Barracks</td>
<td>11,033</td>
<td>Capt SUGI, K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Training</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,846</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>STRENGTH</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASEBO Nav Hosp</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>V Adm ISHIGURO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URESHINO Nav Hosp</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHURA Nav Hosp</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAHAYA Nav Hosp</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) Location, description and inventory of dumps under Allied control.

(a) Ordnance.

NAS(SASEBO)

100 Aerial bombs (unknown weight)
3000 100-lb. bombs
2500 200-lb. bombs
250 Rifles
2 Bomsights
10 5-inch guns
85 Airplane machine guns
Disarmed beach mines

SASEBO Fortress Artillery Headquarters
Located in the north edge of the city proper

10 Swords
502 Rifles
1 70mm field gun - long barrel
4 15cm arty mortars
4 Boxes attachments for sub-caliber firing of 24 cm howitzer
1 Arty triangulation instrument
36,525 rounds 7.7 mm ammunition
9,000 rounds machine gun ammunition
584 Bayonets
6 Heavy machine guns
2 Type 45, 24 cm howitzers
2 88 cm howitzers

(b) Aviation.

NAS (SASEBO)

31 Seaplanes in area near GREEN Beach
1 Land plane in area near GREEN Beach
32 Airplane trainers
95 Radial airplane engines
2 Aerial cameras
20 Airplane tail assemblies
50 Airplane engines
1 Link trainer

(c) Communications.

NAS (SASEBO)

30 Radios of six different types

SASEBO Fortress Arty Headquarters

3 Wireless key sets
40 Field phones
120 Reels of field wire

(d) Transportation.

NAS (SASEBO)

5 Railroad engines

SASEBO Fortress Arty Headquarters

8 Type 92 tractors
12 Large trailers

(e) Miscellaneous.

NAS (SASEBO)

3 210-gallon underground tanks of oil
3 Underground machine shops
(1) Coastal defense and anti-aircraft positions. (See Situation Map attached)

AA and CD gun positions inspected by the V Amphibious Corps Advance Party indicated compliance with surrender terms. Breech blocks had been removed, ammunition had been removed from gun positions and white flags marked each installation.

(2) Present condition of the City of SASEBO. (From information furnished by Japanese city authorities.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Description</th>
<th>Area in sq. km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total area of the city</td>
<td>171,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old section</td>
<td>53,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New section</td>
<td>117,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total area destroyed by bombing</td>
<td>17,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses totally burned</td>
<td>12,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population prior to 29 June 1945</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population at present</td>
<td>166,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old section</td>
<td>119,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New section</td>
<td>46,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War victims</td>
<td>80,734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Local police officials state that no Japanese terrorist or patriotic organizations exist in SASEBO at present. However, local organizations for relief of civilians and liaison with American forces exist at this time. The following information was obtained with respect to Japanese militaristic and nationalist organizations formerly in the SASEBO Area:

**KEIFEI TAI** was disbanded along with other Army units on or about 15 September. Lt. Col. MIYAZAKI and the 15 remaining enlisted members are now located at HIRADO (about 15 miles from SASEBO). Headquarters and records of this unit were destroyed in the bombing of SASEBO. MIYAZAKI and his unit are now engaged in other work. The KEIFEI TAI duties appeared to have been strictly of an MF nature. The KEIFEI TAI investigated all thefts of government property regardless of whether military or civilian persons were involved. MIYAZAKI stated that the theft of government property by civilians is the only case when civilians are subject to KEIFEI TAI investigation. In conducting these investigations and surveillance of areas where government property was stored, the KEIFEI TAI investigators often wore civilian clothes and worked in an undercover capacity. All reports of investigations concerning military personnel were filed at the SASEBO Naval Headquarters. Reports regarding civilians were submitted to the civil police station in SASEBO and were filed under the suspects name. Reports on pamphlets and charts concerning information regarding the KEIFEI TAI will be available as soon as they are translated.

**TCHOKU ZAIJO GUNJIN KAI** - This organization ceased to exist on or about 15 September on orders from Gen. MacArthur's headquarters. This was solely a military fostered organization and no information could be obtained from local inhabitants.

**SHONEN DAN** - This was quite active up until the time of the bombing but is reported quiescent at present. It was headed by the mayor of SASEBO and was reported to have been mainly a civic organization.

**SEMINAN DAN** - is reported to be similar to the SHONEN DAN and is also a civic organization headed by the mayor.

The following organizations did not exist in SASEBO according to local informants:

- **TOKUMU KIKAN**
- **KOKU SHI-TO**
- **KOKURYU KAI**
- **NISSHO KAI**
- **SOTEN DAN**

Investigation is being continued to obtain further information on the above listed organizations.
SECRET

G-2 SITUATION MAP NO. 1
FOR PERIOD 0900 TO 1800, 22 SEPT. 45

PREPARED BY
AC of S, G-2
V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

OFFICIAL:

SECRET

Lt. Col. MIYAZAKI, Isamu, CO of the SASEBO MP Company reported into the 5th Marine Division Headquarters with records and rosters of his unit. A summary of this information is contained below. This information supersedes that reported in Periodic Report No. 1.

**ORGANIZATION OF SASEBO MILITARY POLICE COMPANY**

1 August 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M Ps</td>
<td>MP Ass'ts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq SASEBO</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIRADO</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AINCURA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAWATANA</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARIC</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>124</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong>: 204</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61 of these men were demobilized 18 September. By 22 September only 15 men and MIYAZAKI remained. They are currently stationed at HIRADO supervising demobilization of 100 Army personnel. The armament of the MP company included 206 pistols, 117 rifles, and 167 sabers.

According to MIYAZAKI, the Western District Military Police Headquarters is now operating at full strength at FUKUoka under command of Lt. Gen. ISHIDA, Eikuma.

The cadre left by the 122nd Independent Mixed Brigade turned over a roster of current personnel (145 on 20 September) under the command of Lieutenant General TANIGUCHI, C., the CO of the former brigade. Documents indicate that the brigade contained the 17th Heavy Artillery Regiment and the 134th Anti-Aircraft Regiment.
1. Destruction of documents by Japanese prior to our landings.

Extensive reconnaissance by 5th MarDiv reveals that careful and virtually complete destruction of all documents in the 3ASEBC Aircraft Factory and NA3 was completed sometime prior to our landing.

Rear Admiral TERAYA I., Chief Naval Inspector at NAGASAKI, states that he destroyed all classified material on or about 15 August on the basis of a secret order from Naval Headquarters. This order was also destroyed. This was confirmed by other Japanese naval officers at NAGASAKI. The General Manager of the NAGASAKI Shipbuilding Division of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited states that all classified naval ship plans were received from and returned to TOKYO. All plans on hand at the end of the war were turned over to the Naval Inspector's Office. All of the Mitsubishi Company documents have been recovered and will be reported on after examination.
C. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Persons apprehended or interned. None.
(2) Suspects. None.
(3) Subversive activities. None.
(4) Unfriendly organizations.

SASEBO Area
Local police officials state that no Japanese terrorist or patriotic organizations exist in SASEBO at present. However, local organizations for relief of civilians and liaison with American forces exist at this time. The following information was obtained with respect to Japanese militaristic and nationalist organizations formerly in the SASEBO Area:

KEFPEI TAI was disbanded along with other Army units on or about 15 September. Lt. Col. MIYAZAKI and the 15 remaining enlisted members are now located at HIRADO (about 15 miles from SASEBO). Headquarters and records of this unit were destroyed in the bombing of SASEBO. MIYAZAKI and his unit are now engaged in other work. The KEFPEI TAI's duties appeared to have been strictly of an MP nature. The KEFPEI TAI investigated all thefts of government property regardless of whether military or civilian persons were involved. MIYAZAKI stated that the theft of government property by civilians is the only case when civilians are subject to KEFPEI TAI investigation. In conducting these investigations and surveillance of areas where government property was stored, the KEFPEI TAI investigators often wore civilian clothes and worked in an undercover capacity. All reports of investigations concerning military personnel were filed at the SASEBO Naval Headquarters. Reports regarding civilians were submitted to the civil police station in SASEBO and were filed under the suspect's name. Reports on pamphlets and charts concerning information regarding the KEFPEI TAI will be available as soon as they are translated.

TEIKOKU KAI - This organization ceased to exist on or about 15 September on orders from Gen. MacArthur's headquarters. This was solely a military fostered organization and no information could be obtained from local inhabitants.

SHONEN DAI - This was quite active up until the time of the bombing but is reported quiescent at present. It was headed by the mayor of SASEBO and was reported to have been mainly a civic organization.

SEINAN DAI - is reported to be similar to the SHONEN DAI and is also a civic organization headed by the mayor.

The following organizations did not exist in SASEBO according to local informants:

FUKUMU KIKAN
KOKU SUI-TO
KOKURIYU KAI
NISSHO KAI
SOTEI DAI

Investigation is being continued to obtain further information on the above listed organizations.
(1) POW Encampments.

SAJIAZO Area

POW Camp No. 24 - This camp was located in the town of SENRYU about three miles SE of EMUKAI. Before the war the camp was used as barracks for Koreans and Japanese laborers in the mines in that area. Allied POWs during the war were under the control of the Japanese army, with Major YAMAGUCHI, Heijo, as OIC. The only other officer in the camp was a Japanese doctor, 2ndLt. FUKUI. Master Sgt. MUZUSHIMA was the ranking NCO in the camp. The total number of Japanese guards was 36, including both men and officers. The guards and the camp commander lived in buildings adjacent to the POW buildings. While the POWs were in the camp they worked for the Sumitomo Industrial Works. The majority of the POWs worked underground in the coal mine where work hours were from 0700 to 1300. About 20 or 25 worked above ground in the carpenter shop where working hours were from 0700 to 1600. There were 267 POWs when they left the camp to be repatriated. The majority appeared to be Australian and American, although some were said to be Dutch. The guards departed and control of the camp was turned over to the POWs about the second week in August.
The general condition of the camp was dirty by American standards but could not be called much worse than those of the average Japanese home. A small garden was worked by the FOWs to supplement their diet. There were no records to be found in the camp. The above information was obtained from the manager of the Sumitomo office who said that the military took their records with them when they left in the middle of August.
8. Capt. SÜCHT, CO of the AINOURA Naval Barracks reports that about 1200 men are still not demobilized. A breakdown of
these are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EIUKAI</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HINOURA</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIKURIA</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECHIBARA</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOSHII</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCSASA</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASA</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,193</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Col. Uyeshima, attached to the 147th InfrRegt Repl Unit reports the following information. At the present time, 90 officers and men are acting as a guard detachment at the regimental barracks in CMURA. 910 officers and men have been moved to KASHIMA (15 miles NE of CMURA) by order of the 58th Depot Division.

10. lstLt. Sugimoto, officer in charge of the SASEBO Hvy Arty Regt Repl Unit detachment reported the following information. About 20 years ago, the unit was called the SASEBO Fortress Heavy Artillery Battalion, later changed to the SASEBO Heavy Artillery and in 1941 to its present title. The unit had a T/C of about 400 and consisted of a headquarters and two batteries. Unit had 3 24cm howitzers. It also serviced but did not man 4 26 cm howitzers at OKUZO, SASEBO City (No verification on existence of these weapons).
EQUIPMENT AT AINOURA NAVAL BARRACKS (BASEBO) INVENTORY
BY FIFTH MARINE DIVISION

4,587 Rifles
14,400 Rounds 8.5 mm ammunition
5,970 Rounds 7.7 mm ammunition
12,000 Rounds 7.7 mm MG tracers
74 Revolvers
3,240 Rounds ammo for revolvers
4 Heavy MGs
5 LGs
59 13 mm MGs (with accessories)
2 25 mm AA MGs (with accessories)
15 8 cm rocket guns
12 20 cm rocket guns
230 Steel helmets
18 8 cm trench mortars
2 15 cm trench mortars
2 Searchlights
1 Motor boat
63 Cutters (naval boats)
5 Torpedoes
4 Torpedo tubes (twin mount)
5 1½-ton trucks
163 Sabers
(4) Unfriendly organizations.

SASEBO Area

Investigation reveals that the SASEBO TOKKO KA is a special branch of the SASEBO Police Department responsible to the Chief of Police. It is known as "Thought Police", whose principal purpose is reported "to read and control the thoughts and conduct of the people". The duties of this department are of a detective nature and its personnel work both in civilian clothes and police uniform. They carry no weapons, except a sabre, when in uniform. TOKKO KA maintains order, is responsible for control of juvenile delinquency, and apprehension of certain criminals. There are twelve special agents in this special branch of the SASEBO Police Department. These special agents go among the people and inquire as to trouble makers and are also responsible for the prevention of crimes. Preliminary information indicates that the "Thought Police" is a criminal investigative agency (similar to a detective bureau in the American Police System) and is not a "Super Gestapo" as original information indicated. Investigation continues.
C. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

A study of the local municipal organizations in SASEBO has been completed and maps obtained. There are 28 municipal sections and five adjoining districts, namely,
HAIKI, NAKAZATO, KAIZE, AINOURA, and OEC. A list has been compiled of the neighborhood associations SHONAI KAI and TONARI GUMI. Each TONARI GUMI includes about 10 houses. The larger of the two types of neighborhood associations, the SHONAI KAI, is usually composed of 5 or 6 city blocks. At the present there are 248 SHONAI KAI organizations. Before the bombing there were 280 such organizations. This information has been obtained from AKAGI, Ryozo, head of all local municipal organizations in SASEBO and outlying districts.

A press survey team interviewed TACHIBANA, Hiroshi, directing manager of the SASEBO newspaper distributing agency. He stated that the following is a complete list of newspapers published on the island of KYUSHU.

a. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN - NAGASAKI
b. NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN - FUKUoka
c. ASAHI SHIMBUN - KOKURA
d. MAINICHI SHIMBUN - MOJI
e. SAGA SHIMBUN - SAGA
f. OITA SHIMBUN - OITA
g. MIYAZAKI SHIMBUN - MIYAZAKI
h. KUMAMOTO SHIMBUN - KUMAMOTO
i. KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN - KAGOSHIMA

All of the above newspapers are published daily. An edition of MAINICHI SHIMBUN is printed in English in OSAKA. Of all editions of the newspapers examined, none were found to contain any apparent violation of the Japanese Board of Information Order regarding news publication. Acknowledgement of gratitude to the American occupation forces for specific courtesies was given some prominence in the newspapers of the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area.

According to WATANUKI, Ryoji, publisher of the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, there are only four radio stations on the island of KYUSHU. These are located at FUKUoka, KUMAMOTO, KAGOSHIMA, and NAGASAKI.
The TCWA Middle School in SASEBO (former military school for SHONEN DAN) is continuing a phase of its former militarism by requiring the children to sit at attention during all classes and by having student leaders bring them to attention for roll calls and reports.
Maps were taken from the SASEBO Classified Document Repository and distributed at a rate of about 6 to 10 boxes per family in NAKASATO (a small town about six miles NE of AINOURA). These maps were being used for paper, ceilings, etc.
Unfriendly organizations.

SASEBO

KOKORYU KAI (Black Dragon Society) exercised a sort of gangster rule in SASEBO and used both threats and coercion to force people to do their bidding and to extort large sums of money from local business concerns. Its leader in SASEBO was a third rate newspaper publisher named Masuzo YOSHIDA, who is now reported living in OSAKA.

RIKKENYOSEI KAI is reported as a political group led by Yuwaichi TATESHI, proprietor of a second-hand book store. Not much is known of the nature, functions, or organization of this group, but it is credited with widespread influence as evidenced by the fact that TATESHI was able to obtain a seat on the SASEBO City Council, allegedly on the voting strength of its membership.
Civil censorship.

News in local papers continued to be focused on the food problem. No mention was made of General MacArthur's order to the Japanese Government to remove all shackles on the press. ASAHI and MAINICHI (both local editions of TOKYO newspapers) printed the picture of MacArthur with the Emperor; and though there was no accompanying story, the translators believe the mere appearance of this picture to be a revolutionary event in Japanese history, since a photo of the Emperor has never before been printed in a Japanese paper. News items concerning the occupation were limited to strictly factual renditions of American announcements.
General attitude of military and semi-military Units.

Vice Admiral NAKAMURA, Todamu, located in OMURA, felt that the return of Japanese troops stationed in Chinese and Manchurian posts might create problems for peaceful occupation, since they are "narrow, haughty soldiers who have ... appropriated power to satisfy their own greed and have never tasted defeat".

In AINOURA 51 very arrogant newly returned overseas veterans released from MIYAZAKI confronted one of our patrols. One of these men was believed armed with a pistol, the Chief of Police is investigating this case and will confine the offenders.
(2) Suspects.

TATEISHI, Yuwaichi, proprietor of a second-hand book store in SASEBO, was reported by a confidential informant to be the sponsor of the RIKKENYOSEI KAI.

HATSUHOTO, fencing teacher in SASEBO, reported to be the local head of KOKUMIN GIGUTAI.

(3) Subversive activities.

None to report.

(4) Unfriendly organizations.

Colonel TAKATA, Chief of the FUKUOKA KEMPEI TAI has submitted rosters to this office of the "Staff List of Western Military Police Unit" as of 1 September 1945. Since that time, changes have been made due to demobilization, abolition of conscription, and transfers.

TOKUSE TSU KEMPEI TAI is described by an informant as a special squad of KEMPEI TAI which specializes in the detection of spies through the use of radio direction finders and investigation. As a rule personnel operated in civilian clothing.
KOKUMIN GIGUTAI (Nation's Volunteer Corps) is described by an informant as an organization formed in May 1945. A SASEBO Unit under MATSUMOTO, see suspects above, was formed to aid in repulsing American landings prior to the end of the war.

All civil police in SASEBO and AINOURA have been processed. Additional personnel to be employed in expansion of the OKURA police force are being processed at present time.
2. SAGA Prefecture. The SASEBO liaison committee reported the following information on the status of demobilization in SAGA Prefecture:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>LOCALITY</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>REMAINING PERSONNEL</th>
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<td>KASHIMA</td>
<td>3rd InfRegtReplUnit</td>
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<td>MAEBARU</td>
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<td>OGI</td>
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<td>TAKAGISE</td>
<td>2nd SigRegtReplUnit</td>
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<td>ASAHI</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(METATSUBARA A/F)</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>NISHIMURA</td>
<td>18th Ind ArtyRegt</td>
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<td>AOKI</td>
<td>123rd Ind Engrs Bn</td>
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<td>21st AA Bn</td>
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<td>HATTEN</td>
<td>Naval AA Btry (SASEBO NGF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEKOYAMA</td>
<td>Naval AA Btry (SASEBO NGF)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,542</strong></td>
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</table>
Located caves in SASEBO containing 250 kg. bombs, flares, explosives, 20mm ammunition, parachutes, aerial cameras, bomb sights, and radar for planes. An inventory will be submitted later.
Unfriendly organizations.

TOKUMU KIKAN. Several people were questioned to determine if this organization operated in SASEBO. None of them knew of its existence here but those who had heard of the organization stated that its headquarters was in TOKYO. To the best of their knowledge TOKUMU KIKAN did not function in JAPAN proper, but operated solely overseas.

Investigation was begun on TOKUSE TSU KEMFEI TAI, which was reported in our Periodic Report No. 11.
A prominent businessman in SASEBO stated that the local Rehabilitation or Reconstruction Committee is the most important organization in SASEBO. This informant stated that a form of government similar to that of Great Britain is advocated by the NEW JAPAN LIBERTY party. This political party is headed by Y. OZAKI, former Minister of Justice.
CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

The civilian populace continues to be docile and cooperative. From interrogation of families in NAGASAKI, the civilian population appears to be emphatic in their satisfaction over the end of the war, and they continue cooperative.
2. **ISAHAYA Area.** 2 types of semi-military organizations existed prior to surrender in this area. One was the BOEITAI, which consisted of underage and overage males. Unit was of the "last-resort-in-case-of-invasion" type and was equipped with bamboo spears. Another unit was the KEIBODAN, which was responsible for fire fighting and air raid warning.
Four of the nine daily newspapers published in KYUSHU have general circulation in SASEBO. They are the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN, the NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN, the ASAHI SHIMBUN, and the MAINICHI SHIMBUN. The leading newspaper is the NAGASAKI SHIMBUN which has a general circulation of 5,000 copies. All general news originates in TOKYO. What little local news there is remains uncensored at the present time.

The following article is quoted from a copy of the NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN dated 6 October 1945. "It is more than ten days since the Allied Army arrived.... it is a big mistake if you think they are just chewing gum and chattering. With efficiency first as their policy, their work progresses rapidly by the control of buttons" and "handles". Even their bodies are like machines. Despite the rain or darkness, they complete every proposed detail within the estimated time. It is a fact that the machinery is the source of "speed" of these large projects, but we cannot overlook the efforts of the men behind the gun." (Pictures of trucks and a bulldozer accompanied this article).
Report on HIRADO Shima.

There is sufficient food for the present but about 50% of the growing crops have been destroyed by a typhoon. There are ship building yards and a fish cannery on the island. Thirty nine unreported rifles were found in the Elementary School. It was explained that these
were used to teach military drill and bayonet fencing. Ten years ago an order was issued from TOKYO to start this and calisthenics in all schools. Two to three hours of extensive drill were conducted each week. The SHONEN DAN and the SEINAN DAN used these weapons also to give additional drill outside of school hours. The last time these weapons were used or any drills held was 11 August 1945. Militarism still prevails in the schools and saluting, marching, and group formations were observed both in the school yard and classrooms. All civilian weapons will be ready for collection on 6 October 1945 when they will be taken up and sent to HINOURA for storage in the Town House.
LEGEND
S = Suicide Surface Craft
H = Human Torpedo
M = Midget Submarine
Underlined letters indicate actual Boats or Weapons located there.
Encircled letters indicate facilities exist, but no Boats or Weapons present.

SKETCH MAP
JAPAN
BASES FOR MIDGET SUBS-
HUMAN TORPEDOES - SUICIDE
SURFACE CRAFT
REPRO. TOPO CO. VAC.
THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A JAPANESE SOURCE.
<table>
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<th>CHARGE</th>
<th>SGT. officer</th>
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<th>AMMUNITION</th>
<th>R.N.</th>
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Prepared by ACS, G-2, and Mambouros Corp.
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<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>AREA (SP)</th>
<th>AIRSTRIP</th>
<th>BARACKS (METERS)</th>
<th>AIRPLANE ENGINE</th>
<th>BOMB</th>
<th>TRENCHER (METERS)</th>
<th>AERIAL TORPEDO</th>
<th>M &amp; G CARTRIDGE</th>
<th>M &amp; G (GROUND)</th>
<th>M G CARTRIDGE</th>
<th>AA CARTRIDGE</th>
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NOTES:
- AIRFIELD
- FLOATING AIRSTRIP
- AMPHIBIOUS AIRFIELD
- TEMPORARY AIRFIELD
- AIR CORPS (NO AIRFIELD)
- UNDER CONTROL SASEBO NAVAL DIST; ALL OTHERS UNDER CONTROL 5TH NAVAL AIR FLEET

PREPARED BY ACCT. S.G.2, 5 AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO Area

NEKYOYAMA Naval Battery consists of:

- 4 dual mount 12.7cm AA guns.
- 2 range finders (1 dismantled).
- 345 12.7cm shells.
- 1,330 fuzes for above shells.
Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

1200 bombs in vicinity of KITA KATA (between SAGA and SASEBO) mountain road. It is believed these were to be used for mining the road. They have all been disarmed.
Cave in SASEBO Area completely fitted out as a radio station. This was in operation until 1200 8 October 1945.
D. CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

Civilians remain cooperative and have learned that the Americans are not the brutal, stupid people the Militarists led them to believe.

A translation of Military Police order #267, dated 4 September 1945, classified SECRET, from Military Police Headquarters, TOKYO, is outlined briefly. The order expresses concern over possible disorderly conduct by discharged Jeps and over unrest arising from post war hardships. It states that free speech and the publication of the particulars of the war will result in indignation against the Japanese Government, irreverence toward the emperor, a pro-American feeling, socialistic or communistic ideas, or general political and social unrest. The document closes stating a necessary strengthening of the police machinery of the Interior Department.
MAINICHI SHIMBUN dated 8 October 1945. "Death Ray. With the commencement of the death ray experiment by Japanese scientists five years ago, it was barely developed by the end of the war, to the point of exterminating a mouse at a distance of 30 meters in 10 minutes. Realizing the tremendous possibilities of the experiment for the future the Japanese are appropriating 100,000 yen for the year 1945 to cover the necessary funds for this purpose. American scientific research organizations are concentrating their attention toward the future possible development of this experiment. It was intended to employ the death ray to halt the Americans by means of quick extinction. If this experiment was successful it might have been applied to aircraft... The decision of the American scientific research organization is as follows: Should there be no technical improvement, the death ray is of no value as a military weapon... After being questioned as to the use of human beings for experimental purposes, the Japanese replied to the effect that one of the experiments volunteered to undergo the trial in contact with the device. Within a few seconds he was overcome by dizziness and fatigue. The effects of the experiment remained from twelve to twenty-four hours."
Field Inspection of SASEBO AA Positions.

To: OicC, Military Division, NavTechJap.

From: OicC, Team M-3.

1. The following AA batteries have been inspected by a team composed of Capt. BEnNETT, Lt. ROw, Lt. DAVIN, and interpreter and a photographer. The inspections were made from 1 October through 4 October. The installations inspected are listed below.

   a. NEKOTAMA  
   b. TENJIN     
   c. MACHATA    
   d. YUHIHARI   
   e. KIHIJAKI   
   f. FURUSATO   
   g. IONINOURA  
   h. OZAKI

   2 dual DP, 12.7cm
   4 single AA, 9cm (3"
   4 single DP, 12cm
   * 3 dual DP, 10cm
   4 single DP, 12cm
   4 single DP, 15cm
   2 dual DP, 10cm
   2 dual LP, 12.7cm

   All of the above material was of a standard type and, with the exception of the equipment mentioned below, presented no new features. The tactical layouts of each installation were similar, type for type, to those previously encountered.

2. The NEKOYAMA Battery manned a searchlight with a sound locator which was unusual due to the fact that it was of German manufacture. The angular travel device consisted of two counter rotating disk, one of which turned in azimuth with the sound locator, the other turned by a handwheel. When the two disks were turning at equal speeds the correct angular travel rate was set up.

3. The YAMIHARA Battery had a type-3 director and an S-23 radar, and their 10cm guns had an unusual fuze setter. The type-3 director was also found at FURUSATO and IONINOURA Batteries so that the following description will apply to them.

   a. The Type-3 director is the newest and best Jap AA director. It consists of a computer and a tracking head, one separated from the other. Contrary to a previous surmise this director is not electronic, but is a mechanical director of the angular travel type. The computer received present position data from the tracking head or from a radar (in the case of the YAMIHARA Battery an S-23 radar) or from both: range from the radar and azimuth and elevation from the tracker. This instrument was developed in 1943 but was not perfected and issued until 1945. The
The tracking head contained an integrally mounted type 98, 4.5 meter range finder.

b The S-23 radar has been captured previously and presented no new features.

c The method of setting fuze on the 10cm guns was both rapid and simple: the mount was equipped with two loading trays which pivoted into position. At the head of the loading trays (i.e. projectile) was a fixed rack which could engage the teeth of a geared ring on the outside of the fuze. A slight pressure was required to force the fuze gear onto the rack, and this pressure was provided by a protruding arm mounted above the rack and extending downward. The arm was moved, by a mechanical linkage, from the fuze setter's handwheel. The length of time for which the fuze gear was engaged by the rack, or by the position of the pressure arm. The fuze setter was graduated up to 40 seconds although new fuze setters were anticipated which would permit the unit to utilize 55 second combination fuzes to maximum advantage. Fuze dead time was reported as 1.7 seconds and fuze setting error as plus or minus 6.5 seconds.

4. The FURUSATO Battery consisted of 4 15cm (155mm) guns. Interrogation of battery personnel present at the time of examination disclosed that the guns had been removed from a Japanese cruiser, and that they had been installed in their present position in May 1945. Three of the guns still retained their turrets. It was also disclosed that, to their knowledge, this was the only instance of this type of gun being installed with AA defense as its specific mission.

The guns had minus 3 degrees to plus 62 degrees as limits of elevation. The revetments were of concrete, measuring approximately 20 meters in diameter, and contained 14 ready boxes. No provision for power ramming had been made and it is felt that the rate of fire of these guns would be extremely low.

Fire control equipment consisted of a Type-3 director, similar to that found at the 10cm batteries at YUMIHARI and IOMINOURA, and in addition a 4.5 meter Range Finder mounted separately. An S-24 Radar (Temporary Designation, Mark IV, Model 2, Modif 1 and 2 or S-24) was located about 420 meters from the fire control center. A searchlight, Type 96, 150cm, was located approximately 700 meters from the fire control center.
Interrogation revealed that the installation of communication cables from the radar to the searchlight and fire control center, and from the fire control center to the individual guns of the battery had not been completed.

SUMMARY

The battery layout and fire control equipment for the 8cm guns at TENJIN and the 12cm guns at MACHATA and KIRISHI were of the standard type such as has been found for those guns in the past. This also applies to the 12.7 cm battery at OZAKI.

At the NEKOYAMA Battery—two 12.7cm guns—a sound locator, made in KIEL, Germany, in 1937, was found together with a searchlight controller for the 150 cm searchlight.

An S-23 Radar was found at the 10 cm gun batteries at YAMAHARI and IOMINOURA.

An S-24 Radar was found at the 15 cm gun battery at FURUSATO.

Type-3 Directors were found at YUMIHAPI, IOMINOURA and FURUSATO Batteries.
In NAGASAKI conversations with Japanese civilians of all classes reveal a growing concern over the possible participation in the occupation of JAPAN by Russian, Chinese, and English troops. They also assert that JAPAN was defeated only by the UNITED STATES and therefore occupation by the other three countries is unwarranted. The Japanese are sure that other allied troops will not be as well controlled as the Americans.
A representative of the DOMEI News Agency in SASEBO
expressed pleasure at the abolition of the TOKKO-KA, saying that he believes that people may now feel free to express their opinions. He also feels that the local government of SASEBO should be revised. In his opinion most of the Japanese soldiers returned from overseas are glad to get home and will not cause our forces any trouble.
Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

SASEBO Area.

A tunnel with two entrances located 3 miles NE of SASEBO contains 5,000 55-gallon drums of 100A TEXACO-KOBE aircraft oil.

A building located 1 mile west of SASEBO contains:
- 189 tons of Chinese copper coins in 200 boxes and 150 bags.
- 1,500 railroad ties.
- 200 bags of cement.
- 75 bolts of silk.
OMURA Area

MIZUBUKARI Aircraft Factory (between OMURA AND ISAHAYA) began producing fighter planes for the Japanese Navy about a year ago and ceased operations at the end of the war (production figures are not available). It was directed by Lt. Comdr. UNAKA, Todo, who was supervised by Captain KATO and Vice Admiral NAKAMURA of the 21st Naval Air Arsenal in OMURA. The plant consists of 50 small buildings and 12 caves. During the war it employed 10 Naval Officers, 1000 men, 1,000 women, and 800 girls and 200 boys of middle school age.

SASEBO Area

NITTO Mfg. Co. (at OGI) made fuselages for seaplanes and has enough parts on hand at present to equip 50 planes. Labor was furnished mainly by high school girls.
Military Training in the Schools.

Interrogation of officials of the NAGASAKI Prefecture Education Department and an army officer of the NAGASAKI Regimental District Headquarters reveals that military training was conducted in all advanced schools beginning at the middle school level and that about three hours a week were spent in military training. Aviation Cadet training was inaugurated in the middle schools in the latter part of 1944.
Location, description and inventory of dumps under our control.

**SASEBO Area**

Under camouflage approximately 10 miles SE SASEBO.

- 36 - 50 gal drums of kerosene.
- 4 - 50 gal drumes of oil.

12 large caves approximately 10 miles SE SASEBO.

- 12 BAKA bombs, searchlights, navigation instruments, telescopes, compasses, and generators.
1. SASEBO Area.

a. The 5th Marine Division reports 84 Naval personnel were demobilized during the period.

b. AINOURA Naval Barracks. A completed study of this station revealed it was originally opened on 20 November 1941 under the title "Number two SASEBO Naval Barracks". Its name was changed in 1944 to "AINOURA Naval Recruit Training Station". The purpose of this station was to process recruits into general duty line sailors, and to further train those of excellent character and intelligence in the practical technical subjects of gunnery, torpedo and signaling. The average personnel on the station was 13,500. Since the opening of the station, about 141,000 sailors were graduated in 21 classes. The basic term of recruit training was six months for volunteers, and five months for conscripts. During the war, however, the term was shortened proportional to the war situation. Three months was the average course and one month was the shortest course on record. The ships used in training was the battleship SHIKISHIMA, the first class destroyer SUZUTSUKI, displacement 3,000 tons, and the destroyer YAMAGI. The destroyer was attacked 19 April 1945 by the American Air Forces off the northwest point of AMAMI, OSHIMA. Seriously damaged, it arrived at SASEBO on 21 April. After temporary repairs to prevent it from sinking, it was moored in her present location and used for training purposes.
Civil Censorship.

The SAGA SHIMBUN of 15 October announces that the Military Government Section of the 5th Marine Division has given 1500 bags each of beans and rice to the civilian population of SASEBO and that this act "has been a source of gratification to the destitute populace."

The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 15 October carried the following article: "Next year's (1946) budget for SASEBO, which must now expend every effort in recuperating from war havoc, is now in discussion in responsible quarters; but the work of restoring the vast damage has piled up like a mountain and will require corresponding expenditures. The present hope is to cut down the balance by 200,000 yen from this year forward, by national taxes and surtaxes, and to slash outgo to the utter minimum. The result will be that next year's budget figure will be cut to 73,230,000 yen. Efforts to effect these stringent retrenchments are resulting in unusual difficulty in setting up the budget.
Military Training in Schools in Nagasaki.

1. Supervision was divided between Nagasaki Regimental District Headquarters and the Kurume Divisional District Headquarters.

2. The military assigned officers to the schools to carry out training programs. Orders were communicated directly from division or regimental headquarters to these officers. Two or three civilians worked under their direction because there were not enough officers to assign one per school.

3. Training consisted principally of wooden gun drill, calisthenics, etc. until third year of middle school. From third year on training included rifle practice, tactics, sentry duty, patrolling, and marching. About three hours a day were devoted to training.

4. In October 1944 the Army inaugurated an Aviation Cadet program. The Navy inaugurated a similar program in March 1945. Cadets were usually selected from the third year of middle school. They were inducted into the Army and Navy and given preliminary training in flight and glider work.

5. Early in 1945 a program of student mobilization was started. It was fully developed in April of 1944. It included all students from third year middle school and up. Students were assigned war work, working ten hours a day, twenty-eight days a month. Aviation Cadets and physically unfit were exempt.

6. Students organized into units known as the Gakuto-Cloi, formed along military lines. Would have fought as part of the Gisu Sentendo in case of an invasion. School principals headed these organizations. The governor of the prefecture was the titular commander. Actually they were under the direction of the Home Affairs Department.
Unfriendly organizations.

A SASEBO Police Station report, dated 15 October 1945, states that Police Chief TAKEISHITA informed CIC that the TOKKA KA had received an order, dated 15 October 1945, from the NAGASAKI Prefecture which revealed that members of the TOKKO KA will cease functioning upon receiving the order. The head of the SASEBO TOKKO KA, HIGUCHI, and eleven other members are affected.
The MAINICHI SHIMBUN of 17 October reported that small American planes are flying from the bombed area in NAGASAKI to the surprise of its citizens. The old MITSUBISHI Grounds at MATSUYAMACHO was converted into an airfield for small planes within 10 days by bulldozers. It was named "Atomic Field." A similar field is also to be constructed in the city of KUMAMOTO.
The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 17 October reported that there are many war victims and others who are living in temporary shacks and dug-outs in the city of SASEBO. In order to prepare for the coming winter, the city authorities decided to erect 200 simple houses for these people.

Previously the prefecture built 250 houses as an emergency measure, but due to material shortages etc. the construction was very poor which resulted in destruction by the twice-hitting typhoons.

These homes are to be a very small affair costing about 2,500 yen each. Materials will be furnished by the city to the applicants with low rate of interest financing.
A copy of the ASAHI SHIMBUN dated 18 October 1945 is quoted. "In answer to the wishes of the occupational army the city of Sasae opened its bazaar in the afternoon of the 17th at the old commercial and industrial Economics Bureau Building. The best sellers were the lacquer wares. There were also silk dresses, women's shoes and china ware."
Internment Camp located at SHIMIZU (north of OGI). Inmates had been billeted in about 50 small dwellings. Two of the internees, namely, Edward Zillig, and Horace Nutter, were interviewed and they state that they were not mistreated but that the rations were poor. They were released with the other foreign refugees on 6 September 1945. All of them returned to their homes except Edward Zillig, who expressed a desire to remain in the camp area. Zillig, an ex-US Marine (reported G-2 Periodic Report No. 23) submitted a statement about the kind treatment received as an internee.

The following list of foreign refugees interned at SHIMIZU was received from Horace Nutter and a similar list was received from Edward Zillig.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. (Head of Family)</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Joel Alfred Julius HCHANNSON</td>
<td>April 21, 1872</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Edward Zillig</td>
<td>December 17, 1863</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zeforino Francisco Xavier GONSALES</td>
<td>August 26, 1881</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Marie Jeanne Andrei MADEIRA de CARVALHO</td>
<td>October 1, 1900</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Edmond SOMERS</td>
<td>July 30, 1873</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Peter Westerbye ULDALL</td>
<td>May 30, 1879</td>
<td>Danish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Yvonne LEPICARD</td>
<td>August 8, 1897</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Dick VIEZEL</td>
<td>April 13, 1866</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Luigi URSO</td>
<td>October 1, 1900</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Camillo URSO</td>
<td>March 15, 1910</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Lucien BRAUN</td>
<td>March 7, 1876</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Henri CAMBES</td>
<td>June 28, 1879</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Jean BOE</td>
<td>February 3, 1881</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Eduard Benjamin MURCH</td>
<td>December 10, 1868</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Alfred Frederick GABE</td>
<td>September 14, 1874</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>James Cecil SIRIWARDENE</td>
<td>February 27, 1867</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Horace NUTTER</td>
<td>May 12, 1870</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Ro länd Martin MCKENZIE</td>
<td>June 20, 1873</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Andre Marcel BOUGLY</td>
<td>April 12, 1879</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Karel Louis Van TEIJIN</td>
<td>September 23, 1877</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haruo Aiura (Trustee)</td>
<td>March 10, 1911</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Press Survey.

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 19 October reported the following. Recently among the citizens of SASEBO in spite of the fact that they have been repeatedly cautioned and forgetting their self respect as Japanese, there are some who approach the occupation forces when they want something. Further, parents cause their children to cajole the occupation troops for various things. Because the middle school students ask for tobacco and chewing gum, from now on the police of SASEBO Area will strictly control this misconduct.
Especially they will instruct the people to put into careful practice the following points:

Obey traffic regulations.
Do not stop to watch workers on the road under any circumstance.
See that your clothes are neat.
Under no circumstances go out after 9 PM.
See that doors are shut and do not leave one woman all alone at home.
Do not go near or enter a storehouse or storage space of the occupation force.
Do not give liquor or food to the occupation troops.
Three caves in the southern edge of SASEBO had been used for making high powered binoculars and telescopes.
They now contain lens grinders, cutting and polishing machines, and chemicals, all of which are in good condition. Up to this time the cave entrances had been flooded.

Four caves in the southern edge of SASEBO served as radio and machine shops. The caves contain 100 lathes and small tools in fair condition.

A small room under the road in southern SASEBO disclosed a large barrel of motion picture film. Subjects consist of bomb construction and assembly, launching of destroyers, machinery and factory scenes, religious ceremonies, arsenal news, troops on the march and women at work. The film, formerly belonging to the SASEBO Naval Arsenal, is Eastman Kodak 35mm, printed on nitrate film, and for the most part labelled "Super-sensitive".
The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of Oct 20 reported the following. "It is expected that the people of NAGASAKI, returning from various foreign lands, will be landed in SASEBO in the future so the prefecture has decided to establish an office in SASEBO to help the returning citizens. It is expected that about 10,000 will arrive from KOREA soon."
A Col. Wilson stepped into a barber shop in SHIOMI-MACHI, SASAKI, talked the proprietor out and started to cut the hair of the many waiting American customers himself. He was once a barber by occupation so his venture became very popular.
The KYOCHI SHINBUN of 23 October reports "Since its arrival, the occupation army has been lending a big hand toward the transportation of much needed food in NAGASAKI; now it is assisting the city in the reconstruction of the various schools damaged by the atomic bomb and typhoons. Major Cooper of the headquarters granted the authorities the use of bulldozers, tractors, and other equipment for this purpose. The authorities are very grateful for this equipment."

"The people of SAGA are very grateful to the occupation army for the reconstruction of its highways under the supervision of Captain Cain. Another request to rebuild the bridges in AMOPI county has been forwarded to the Prefectural Engineering Department. Upon survey, they expected to complete these projects in two hours."
TOKKO KA. All members of the TOKKO KA in SASEBO, AIKOURA and KAKI have been dismissed. However, the members are being carried on the payrolls in a sort of unemployment compensation status. The SASEBO Chief of Police states that all TOKKO KA records were destroyed in the fire bomb raid 29 June 1945. He states that from that date to the end of the war, 3 or 4 air raid alarms were sounded daily.
The NAGASAKI SHINBUN dated 20 October 1945 reported: "As announced previously, Mayor KOURA of SASEBO tendered his resignation... and notified the governor accordingly. In the meantime the governor sent the resignation to the Minister of the Interior... Until investigation is completed, SASEBO will be without a Mayor."

"In memory of the atomic bomb victims and to remind the future generations of the value of the atomic bomb in restoring world peace, the city of NAGASAKI is planning to build a memorial tower with the fund of 250,000 yen by the late Mr. KUSAKI, Tomisaburo and donations from the people. The intention of Mayor OKADA, who is sponsoring this project, is to make this town sacred with the souls of victims and make this memorial one of the famous sights of NAGASAKI. As for the upkeep of this tower, it is planned to charge admission and sell post cards."
SASEBO Naval Prison.

An investigation of this prison was made, and the warden, Lt HANANAKA, Seichi, was questioned. He states that prior to 6 October 1945 he received an order to free all political prisoners. In compliance with this directive he freed 13 Koreans and 1 Japanese. Of this number, all returned to their homes except 6 Koreans who were retained by the warden on the pretext that transportation to Korea would be provided for them in a few days. Upon the advice of an American Medical officer, these 6 men were placed in the SASEBO KYOSAI KAI (former Naval Hospital) for temporary treatment.
These 6 Koreans were interrogated and it was learned that they had been taken in KOREA, mostly on the all-inclusive charge of violation of the rules of good order. After preliminary beating by regular police who took them into custody, they were turned over to the KEMPEI TAI whose method of interrogation was to tie the prisoner to the ceiling with his arms above his head and his toes barely touching the floor. They were then beaten with clubs, rifle bolts, and leather slippers. At other times they were forced to assume the "Push-up position" and then they were beat about the head, back, buttocks, and legs with a 6 foot pole. They were given a Court Martial in KOREA but no defense by, for, or on their behalf, was provided or permitted. After sentencing of from 1 to 3 years of hard labor they were sent to SASEBO for imprisonment. Here they were forced to sit in the Japanese manner and if any of them moved from this position it was considered reason for another beating. These 6 Koreans all report that Lt. YAIIMAKA told them that although the Japanese had lost the war, JAPAN would one day regain her military strength.

Subject: Plan of Air-Defense in NAGASAKI PREFECTURE.

1. The Governor especially appointed the following mayors and village headmen to head air-defense committees:

   A. Mayors of NAGASAKI, SASEBO, OMURA, SHIYABARA, ISAHAYA.
   B. Village headmen of SAKITO, KAWATANA, SEGA, TAKASHIMA, TAKAHAMA, KOYAGI.

   The above mayors and village headmen must set up the defense plan for the year and must have the permission of the Prefectural Governor.

2. Air Defense equipment is to be completely set up this year in cities and villages in the following order:

   A. SASEBO, NAGASAKI.
   B. OMURA, KAWATANA, KOYAGI, FUKAHORI, SHIYABARA, ISAHAYA, SAKITO, SEGA, TAKASHIMA, TAKAHAMA.

3. The heads of the police stations and fire brigade stations are to take into account loss of their members, and along with insuring the necessary replenishment of personnel, as auxiliary air-raid personnel.

4. The areas in which air-raid training is to be carried out, in order of importance, are as follows:

   A. NAGASAKI, SASEBO.
   B. OMURA, KAWATANA, KOYA I, FUKAHORI, SHIYABARA, ISAHAYA, SAKITO, SEGA, TAKASHIMA, TAKAHAMA, FUKUE, TOMI.

5. This year new air-defense observation stations will be established at KOJIRI and KANEDAKE.

6. The School Patriotic Societies of NAGASAKI Medical University and KASSUI Women's College are exempted from air-defense drafts, they will constitute rescue details.

7. Under orders of the Chief of Police, the head of the Police Station must order food and goods distributed to sufferers but, in NAGASAKI and SASEBO, mayors are responsible.
8. Without Special authorized permission, nobody will be allowed to move into NAGASAKI or SASEBO.

9. This year, emphasis with respect to air-defense will be laid on the harbors of NAGASAKI, AINOURA, and SAKITO.

10. Air-defense measures this year will be concentrated on Army and Navy controlled factories, and defense with respect to these factories will be strengthened.
The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 29 October reported; "The SASEBO Middle School, which has abolished the military salute, wearing of leggings, and two column marching in an effort to clean out militarism, has further abolished the wearing of the combat cap and students who have the former student cap in their possession are asked to wear them."
The principal of the IMARI High School, MUROHASHI, Ryuza, is reported to have stated in an address to his students that the Atomic Bomb, not bullets, caused...
the defeat of Japan; and that by the time the present pupils are old enough to be soldiers, JAPAN will be well on its way to her place among the military powers of the world.
HISHUZAN, Japanese wrestler and native of SASEBO, who resigned from the NIPPON Wrestling Association last June, sent in his suggestion to entertain the occupational men with SUMO (Japanese wrestling) to the SASEBO Police Station. This show will be given on November 4th.
The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 31 October reported; "SASEBO Police Station previously ordered the citizens to obey the traffic regulations, refrain from scandal and to stop entering the sentry posts, but there are still cases of robbery and the entering of sentry posts without permission, (injuries and deaths have resulted from this), so they requested further obedience of orders."

The NISHI NIPPON SHIMBUN of 31 October reported; "The Americans are very studious. Those who visit the city hall and police station of KURUME are very earnestly studying Japanese with the aid of dictionaries and interpreters. At this rate they will pick up Japanese faster than the Japanese are picking up English."
8. NAVY SUICIDE BOAT UNITS. The following information was reported by the 5th MarDiv from interrogation of:

- Capt. HARA, Tameichi, CO KAWATANA Assault Unit
- Cmdr. TAKEUCHI, Juji, Exec.O. KAWATANA Assault Unit
- Cmdr. SHIKANO, Seinosuke, Sen.StaffOff 3rd Sp Att Force
Lt. Cmdr. HAMAGUCHI, Genkichi Staff Off. 3rd Sp. Att Force

a. KAWATANA Assault Unit. This unit was composed of 5 detachments:

USHIBUKA, AMAKUSA Island. CO was Cmdr. HIRAHATA. Strength was about 800, 75 of which were boat crews. Equipment consisted of 5 torpedo boats and 25 large type suicide boats.

MAKISHIMA, TACHIBANA Bay (5 miles due E of NAGASAKI). CO was Lt. Comdr. MIZUTANI. Strength was about 600, 100 of which were boat crews. Equipment consisted of 2 torpedo boats and 50 small type suicide boats.

OGUSHI, KAWATANA. (See next paragraph)

b. KAWATANA Storm Unit. This unit was originally organized on 1 May, 1944 as a temporary Torpedo Boat Crew Training School with a strength of 15 Officer instructors, 300 maintenance unit, 400 R.O. Students and 800 enlisted students. On 1 September 1944, the training of suicide boat crews was begun. On 1 March, 1945 the name of the school was changed to the Navy Department to NAGASAKI Storm Unit. The unit has always been a training rather than an operational base, though it had tactical control of the USHIBUKA and MAKISHIMA Detachments. Captain KABA has always been CO, except for a period from December, 1944 to April, 1945 when R.Adm. MATSUBARA, Hiroshi was in command.

c. Training program. Torpedo boat training courses lasted 2 months for enlisted personnel and 5 months for officers. The officer's course included 160 hours - torpedoes, 200 hours - navigation, 40 hours engines, 40 hours - anti-submarine arms and depth charges, 120 hours AA guns, 80 hours - signal communication, 40 hours - tactics, and 70 hours unspecified. The suicide boat course included 50 hours - navigation, 90 hours - engines, 50 hours - suicide boat explosives, 25 hours - tactics, 150 hours - assault training - 35 hours miscellaneous, including spiritual training. 1300 suicide boat crewmen and 3,200 maintenance personnel were graduated from the school. Students came from all parts of JAPAN as volunteers. Selection was made by the Bureau of Personnel on the basis of physical fitness and seamanlike qualities. Average age was 18 to 19. Graduates were automatically promoted 1 rank or rate, had increased pay, more supplies, better than average living conditions, and other minor privileges.

d. Equipment. Suicide boats were built at NAGASAKI and were of two types. The small type boat had a crew of 1; 1 six-cylinder 60 HP. DA truck motor and 1 propeller; for armament it had 2 12cm rockets mounted on crude wooden troughs and 1 270 Kilo....
powder charge in the nose which could be exploded either by contact or by pulling a handle in the cockpit; maximum speed was 23 knots and maximum range was 70 to 80 miles at full speed without use of reserve tanks. The large type boat had a crew of 2, 2 six-cylinder TCYODA truck motors and 2 propellers; for armament it had 2 12cm rockets, 1 13mm AA MG, and 1 270 kilogram powder charge. Maximum speed was 25 knots and maximum range was 100 miles at full speed without use of reserve tanks.

e. Tactics. Suicide boats always operated from land bases. They were organized into boat divisions with 24 large type craft and 48 small type craft. Night was considered the best time for assaults and top priority was given transports because of their light armor. The following estimate of the distribution of boat divisions from KAWATANA was made from memory:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>about 4 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KYUSHU</td>
<td>about 15 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIKOKU</td>
<td>about 5 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>central HONSHU</td>
<td>about 3 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eastern HONSHU</td>
<td>about 4 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>northeastern HONSHU</td>
<td>about 1 division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WHY WE LOST THE BATTLE FOR THE PHILIPPINES

(Translation of a DOMAI release in an October issue of the YAGASAKI SHIMBUN).

There were many times of critical decision in the Great Eastern War, but there should not have been so many of them. Many were fabricated by our army to cause the people to keep their fighting spirit. Strategically viewed, there is no doubt that the truly crucial point was in the Philippines after our army had retreated from Guadalcanal. Upon his departure from the Philippines, General Caruth said, "I shall return". Although all the Filipinos believed this statement to be true and were awaiting the return of the American Army, the Japanese had forgotten their duty of defense and had lived idly for two years. Around February of 1944, the United States Army had captured Makin and Tarawa, and were marching toward the Philippine Islands. In spite of that, men and women in pre-war dress were chatting around ice-cream tables and listening to melodies from electric phonographs in the meat tea rooms and restaurants along the waterfront streets of Manila. Every night drunken soldiers and civilians attached to the service were singing loudly in the "pleasure" streets. Some Japanese and Filipinos looked in rapture at the tender, movie-house love scenes. There was no sign that they saw the next battle stealthily approaching. The view of the war situation taken by all soldiers, civilians attached to the service, and other citizens in the Philippines was that the enemy was still loitering in New Guinea and the Gilbert Islands.

Soldiers were indulging in sexual pleasures with their mistresses in Manila. Most of the girls of mixed Spanish and Philippine blood in Manila were living with the Japanese in order to make a living. Japanese dressed in gay American-made suits were enjoying their clandestine meetings and dinners. Soldiers dressed in white, devoted much time to making their toilets, and entered the commissary restaurants from fine cars. Many soldiers who drank too much sat absent-minded at their desks at headquarters. Though the smell of the thick powder smoke of the approaching battle was not pleasant to them, they seemed utterly unable to give up their habit of negligence. The commander at that time (Lt. General Kuroda), accompanied by several military policemen confessed that they were quite sick of having been kept standing around all day long on hot days with nothing to do.

Rumor got around that the commander had brought his mistress from Saigon by plane. In order to provide himself with (funds for) amusement, he bought and sold various Army Club properties in the name of the Commander. It is not surprising that upper-circle
Atmosphere had its effect upon lower circles. Not a few scandals were noise abroad. But he did not strengthen defenses against the American army's impending approach. Even in February he was loafing—a deaf ear turned to the military situation. His troops had fallen into the way of life there and were lax. Even the shallow-minded Filipinos held them in contempt. No sooner had the Japanese army settled down among the inhabitants than they became a part of them and lost their spirit. Before they were aware of it they had lost the ability to defend themselves in the decisive battle in the Philippines. Such was the army selected to be stationed along Leyte Gulf where the Americans first landed. Within a few days after the American army landed only three of fifty cannon were left—the rest had been carried back to the mountains. Those who had been in the Philippines for a long while had no core backbone than a jelly-fish. A good example is offered by the Davao Naval Unit; at the end of September they mistook our ammunition supply units for American landing craft and retreated from Davao after having burned it to the ground.

As that as it may, the regular plan of deploying the army was effected in May. The general plan of the operation was to draw the enemy close enough to smash him with one blow from the air; consequently plans to build more than a hundred necessary airfields in the Philippines were laid too late. Due to poor administration the public was upset, laborers did not come to work, and the quality of materials was very poor. Conditions were unsatisfactory. All residents were required to construct airfields, but no soldiers or civilians attached to the service worked in labor parties. As before they were surrounded by wine and women.

Meanwhile the entire army of the South began to speed up defense measures from Singapore to Manila, but the Army of the South Headquarters was quite angry upon finding that the lazy Army of the Philippines had done nothing. Headquarters had the Army of the Philippines recklessly hasten the strengthening of defenses. At that time the enemy had begun to spy on Morotai, Palau, and Yap. The Navy got excited about completion of the defenses by October at the latest. Alas, 30 percent of our transports which came over to the Philippines were sunk. Moreover 90 percent of those which were dispatched from Luzon to Mindanao were heavily damaged. Our military strength was concentrated on Mindanao which was supposed to be the enemy's landing point. After having disposed of the defense of Mindanao for the time being, they were to set about installing defenses on Leyte and Samar Islands. Soon after, the American Army rushed upon Leyte like a typhoon. It was too late to prepare a defense of the Philippine Islands. At the end of August, General Yamashita majestically arrived here. The ground, however, was too wet to permit him properly to show his ability. One failure in an operation leads to another, and he was finally compelled to retreat into the mountains of Luzon.
TOKUMU KIKAN. An informant, formerly in the Japanese Army, stationed in KOREA stated that there were three zones or offices of the TOKUMU KIKAN, at SHANGHAI, at HARBIN, and at NAGASAKI. Each office conducted a language school for the development of espionage agents. The office at SHANGHAI was directed against the Chinese, at HARBIN against the Russians, and at NAGASAKI against the ENGLISH and AMERICANS. The informant said that personnel for TOKUMU KIKAN were selected by regimental or division commanders on the basis of education and linguistic knowledge and sent to the nearest TOKUMU KIKAN branch office. According to him the TOKUMU KIKAN always operated in civilian clothes and had apparently unlimited funds. He knew of no distinctive credentials carried by their personnel. He was told by a friend that when the Russians entered the war and occupied the Harbin Area all TOKUMU KIKAN, because of their knowledge of the language, went to work for the Russians in that area. TOKUMU KIKAN personnel were very secretive about their work and often their own friends and families did not know they were members of the organization. He claimed that Japanese victories over the Chinese were due to intelligence work of the TOKUMU KIKAN. Personnel of TOKUMU KIKAN were usually Japanese although some White Russians and occasionally Koreans would be used.
The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN of 4 November 1945 reported: "The pine root oil distillery of HIRADO-MACHI (in the northern part of NAGASAKI Prefecture) stopped its operation at the termination of the war. This fuel is of great necessity, especially to the fisherman as fuel for boat engines. The farmers who previously also needed this fuel are now not so keen about its production since they are getting heavy oil from the military authorities. On the other hand, the military's heavy oil is not being distributed to the fishermen, so they are requesting more production of pine root oil. They are expecting the Standard Oil Company, and other oil companies of America to come in to help."
The NAGASAKI SHIMBUN OF 5 November 1945 reported; 
"SASEBO food distribution agency criticized for 'Officialism'. 'I bet there isn't a place more bureaucratic than the food distribution agency.' These words of discontent expressed by the bewildered SASEBO populace against the food distribution agency. For example, their official rest periods, cases where more rice was sold to one and less to another by a mere difference of one day. Families with both husband and wife working making it necessary to purchase during the lunch hour were refused attention because it was the rest period of the distribution office."
PRESSE SURVEY AND NEWS TRANSLATIONS

1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted. Translations of local news items of possible interest are presented.

2. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN - 7 November 1945 (published in NAGASAKI). With the approaching winter, the war victims, large and small, are facing great difficulties. Since the work on Easy Homes is not progressing, only those with money can afford to do repairing in spite of the fact that they are compelled to pay overwhelming prices.....

One of these victims had this to say:
"My home was completely burned. Clothing nor anything else was salvaged. I was able to rent a small house, but the roof leaked, so I had to get a contractor. Only two or three squares were needed to be repaired, which took three men ½ day each. I had to pay ¥500.00 for this work."

This is only one of the cases as "black market" is prevailing all over the city. The authorities are investigating and are intending to regulate with strict price control. The carpenters working on the Occupational Army projects are being paid ¥15.00 a day while the laborers get ¥9.00 a day.

The population of the city of Sasebo is estimated to be 150,000 at the present time as compared to 350,000 in previous years. However, the City's Reconstruction Committee sighted the need of speedy revival of a greater city and sent the following proposals to the Ministry of Interior for approval:

1. The total war torn area is 300,000 tsubo. With the addition of neighboring area, we intend to erect a new city with 500,000 tsubo, of which 50,000 tsubo will be planned for parks and play grounds and 450,000 tsubo will be planned as business and residential districts.

2. In general, all the roads and highways will be widened, making the national highways 35 meters instead of 20 meters and the other streets 15 meters wide.

3. All the buildings in the central section will be of reinforced concrete. No frame buildings will be allowed.

4. The business section, presently occupied by the Occupational Force, will be erected upon the relinquishing of the premises by the O.A.

5. The foregoing city planning with an area of 500,000 means an increase of 20 tsubo per man as compared to 15 tsubo per man prior to the bombing.
The closing ceremony of the Kyushu Area Administrative Government will be held on the 7th at 10:00 in the presence of Supt. Tozuka and the entire members of the staff.

3.  NISHI NIPPON SHIMEUN - 7 November 1945 (published in FUKUOKA). The citizens of Sasebo, especially the women under middle age, are becoming very careless with the traffic regulations these days. The Marine Headquarters of the WAC in Sasebo, therefore, forwarded the following instructions to the Police Dept on the 1st.

1.  All pedestrians must walk on the left side of the road.
2.  More than two must not walk together where the traffic is heavy.
3.  Freight wagons must pass on the extreme left side of the road.
4.  Immediate right-of-way must be given to emergency cars.

The children of war torn Nagasaki are continuing their studies in the damaged school rooms and temporary school buildings toward the reconstruction of New Japan. Here are two excerpts gathered from the children's writings.

Nobuyuki Fujita, 5th grade, writes:
"We fought very hard, but Japan was defeated and the war ended on August 15th. I cannot forget the noon of that day forever...... Can the citizens of Nagasaki forget August 9th? We desire no war. War hurts the people and destroys humanity. When did the Greater East Asia expand to such an extent? If I think the war brings such sadness, I'd rather have peace.

Since the arrival of the occupational army, many things reflected on us. Their tractors cleaned the mess in few hours, and they extinguished a large fire before we could say, "ah". Everything they do is speedy. The newspapers say we are short of food, coal and other things. We are small, but we must do our best to help the crisis and build New Japan so that we can live in peace."

Miss Sumi Fuji, 6th grade, writes:
"The end of the war was announced by the Emperor on August 15th. Japan became a defeated nation. We don't know what to think of this defeat, as Japan's history was unblemished for the past 3,000 years. Japan is way back in civilization. We learn this through the activities of the occupational men. However, we must not cry over our defeat. We must study hard and work in order to rebuild Japan."
5. SAGA SHIMSUN (published in SAGA) 8 November 1945.

"The Engineer Unit of the O. A. has shown remarkable speed in its work of repairing highways. In less than a month, they completed the Arita-Tosu highway. In addition, they completed 4 bridges between Saga and Kanzaki, and one bridge between Kanzaki and Kurume."
A recent survey of public opinion concerning women's suffrage was conducted by the 403rd CIC Detachment among business people, rural townspeople, and farmers in the SASEBO Area. Of 300 persons questioned 52 2/3% were in favor of women's suffrage, 41 1/3% against it, 34 2/3% had no opinion, and 81/3% had no knowledge of the subject. The interviewers noticed a great reluctance to discuss the matter on the part of women when there were Japanese men present.
HYUGA NICHIGA NICHIGA SHIMBUN (published in MIYAZAKI)
7 November 1945. "The O. A. in Omuta built a hospital in the city of Aroa as a present for the citizens of Omuta and Aroa. It will be formally opened soon with the cooperation of Lt. Jameson, Army doctor. The outstanding feature of this hospital is to carry on its business in American ways. Unlike the old-fashioned Japanese style, the doctors will enter the patients into the hospital, visit the patients at regular intervals, and use the hospital facilities to the fullest extent. Hospital fees will be taken from rich patients but absolutely no fee will be taken from the poor people. It is the intention of the management to make the people appreciative. Lt. Jameson will be the superintendent of this hospital. Several nurses will be sent from the Mitsui Hospital to assist him."
The following report concerning the attitude of Japanese Christians in the CITA Area is summarized from reports made by officers in that area: The majority of the Japanese say that with the end of the war there is an opportunity to carry out a number of reforms in Japan. However, most of them are unwilling to take any active part themselves or to express any outspoken opinions; they feel that as soon as the American Forces leave CITA, the militarists and former officials will quickly return to power and take revenge on those who showed open approval of the reform policies. They do not expect American Occupation Forces to remain in this
Area over an extended period. In this they appear to be influenced by the belief that pressure from the States for early return of troops will necessitate reduction of occupational police garrisons in outlying areas such as this one.
Startling reports of rice selling at 80 times the fixed government price and impending starvation of the poor were made by well-known SASEBO personages, who even involved local police and the Japanese Navy, when questioned concerning the black market by military government officials of the 5th Marine Division. First interviewed was TERADA, Kenichi, chairman of SASEBO Board of Education and one-time girls' high school principal, a man of distinctly liberal convictions.
He implicated the local police and accused high officials of encouraging the black market. Furthermore, he reported that since war's end the Japanese Navy had thrown considerable food, clothing and other supplies on the black market. He believes, an uncontrolled black market would ruin the future of the nation. KITAMURA, Tokutaro prominent in reconstruction work and long-time local banker was questioned next. It was his opinion that the black market is the inevitable result of an insufficient ration. The average adult receives 1040 calories per day and must patronize the black market to survive. (150 lb man not working or exercising requires 1800 calories per day.) As food supplies dwindle, black market prices will rise. Rice has sold for 80 times its government-fixed cost. This winter may bring starvation for the poor who cannot afford these exorbitant prices. Unlawful buying is accomplished in the country by persons satisfying their own needs or by merchants who re-sell their produce in the city. Two reasons why control of the black market has been unsuccessful were cited by KITAMURA. Firstly, the armed forces have no respect for the law. In SASEBO the Navy openly and "officially" paid black market wages to employees and made extra food and supplies available to them. Secondly, the police made no effort to control prices. Early in the war sporadic, half-hearted attempts by the police to keep down costs were made but these have long since dwindled to inactivity. When the Navy was in power the police were recognized by the people as an oppressive instrument of the Navy and were traditionally hostile to civilian interests. Now with the Navy demobilized the police have lost face entirely with the populace. Asked if strong, vigilant police action was the solution to black market problems, KITAMURA's answer was an emphatic negative. The entire police system should be reorganized, said he.

TERADA was interviewed again with reference to KITAMURA's opinions. Rice prices reached a maximum of 20, not 80, times the official cost but are usually only 10 times as much, depending upon the market which one patronizes. He agreed on the other counts but was inclined to believe more black market transactions were executed in the city itself than in the country as KITAMURA claimed. More often contrabrand rice to the city and sell to a selected list of customers. He concurred with KITAMURA's
opinion of the police, classifying them as uncultured, uneducated, and unable to cope with the problem. The present chief of the SASEBO police is typical, he volunteered. He is more interested in politics than in justice. Even the yrs of the occupation forces are more popular with the people than local police officers. TERADA confirmed KITAMURA’s statement that the Navy dispensed black market wages and supplies but seemed especially concerned with two other evils resulting from policies of the armed forces. The first: Former civilian employees of the Navy, pockets full of cash, are seriously endangering the economy of small communities. The second: Demobilized offers and NCOs, who have received huge bonus payments, consider themselves above work, and are living a life of playful inactivity. (Both the bonus and the inactivity mentioned in this statement have been checked against records and found to be entirely true).

Both the Mayor of SASEBO and the Deputy Mayor, when interviewed, expressed concern over certain conditions in JAPAN, recognizing the black market as both their cause and effect. They told of farmers selling their personal shares of rice on the black markets and of others who failed to declare the full amount of their harvest. To date only 47 percent of the expected rice crop has been reported.

Investigation of the black market in this Division’s zone is continuing. Indications are that high Japanese officials take an active part in illegal exchanges of government equipment and food. Most transactions take place in metropolitan areas such as SASEBO, KURUME, and SAGA. Some sources link the control of these black market rings with a military underground consisting of both active and retired officers of the Japanese Military.
3. NAGASAKI SHIMBUN (published in NAGASAKI) 13 November 1945. "Due to the existence of a black market through the purchase of articles from occupation forces at a high price, and, especially in the cities, through their resale at an illegal price, the SASEBO police have received a request from the occupation force to crack down on the Black Market, and are confident of the thoroughness of their measures."

"On November 6, they arrested MATSUDA, Gentaro (52), of SASEBO City, TOYAMA MACHI, for purchasing 10 cartons of cigarettes for 500 yen from occupation personnel. He is under guard in FUKUISHI MACHI."
3. NISHI NIPRON, 14 Nov., 1945. (FUKUOKA Edition) "The American refuse dumps at HIU in SASEBO have become known as the scene of activities for a whole city of beggars, it seems. Thongs of people crowd around to pick up or wheedle what they can: abandoned boxes, empty cans, workout clothing, old containers, everything. This has come to such a sad pass that special police squads have had to be dispatched from the SASEBO force.

"Sympathy is of course extended to those who have been left poverty-stricken by war havoc. But since the occupation forces are apt to mistake these items salvaged by the people for stolen government property, an order has been issued forbidding all such conduct."
Search of Safe Guards.

At 0900 15 November, 5th Marine Division search parties struck simultaneously at 41 shrines, temples, and
school buildings in the SASEBO Area. These establishments which had, to date, been isolated from the surveillance of our forces by "off Limits" and "safeguard" signs. The raid was conducted in an effort to locate caches of weapons, documents, or military materiel. As of 1200, 15 November, there were 11 reports of contraband found, 23 negative reports, and 7 not heard from. At the Naval Cemetery documents were found enumerating men killed as follows: on the HATSUSE, IVATE, TOKIWA, and TOMOZURU; in the SHANGHAI Incident of 1932; in the Second Special Fleet; and on small craft in the vicinity of SASEBO. These documents are duplicated in the records on file at the SASEBO Naval Personnel Office. Certain of the schools yielded small amounts of weapons and wooden rifles. Certain shrines contained small amounts of swords and one had a pile of 125 burned rifles. One school had 2 eight-foot, 150 pound range finders in poor condition; assorted transformers and switches in a storeroom; semaphore flags; and maps of the Greater East Asia Co prosperity sphere. Another school had a military library containing about 300 volumes of military works of the MEIJI Reign (1867-1911). Searches of out of bounds installations in the SAGA and KURUME Area were executed concurrently. This headquarters has requested the 5th Marine Division to furnish details on the search to include: specific places and type of installation in which contraband was located; names and civil positions occupied by Japanese authorities responsible for reporting these items.
CIVILIAN ATTITUDE.

URSO, Luigi, and Italian national released from an internment camp near OGI (6 miles NW of SAGA) stated that in his
opinion, the common people of Japan, the small farmers and merchants, the factory workers and the fishermen, are, generally speaking, persons of good will, friendliness and sincerity. He believes that the Allied Occupation Forces could rely on the word of these people. It is among the ranks of the militarists, civilian police, former members of secret civilian and military police societies and organizations, government officials who served during the war, and among the big businessmen that the "foreign-haters" are to found. These are the persons who are paying lip-service to democracy today, and who will be the Imperialists, militarists, jingoists and anti-democrats as soon as the occupation forces leave JAPAN. He said that most of the common people of JAPAN are now realizing that a Japanese victory in this war would have meant little more to them than a continuation of their state of political and economic slavery. The Allied Occupation of JAPAN has given to these people a chance to improve their lot, and they are duly grateful. However, at the present time, many of these people are hesitating to express themselves publicly for fear that the occupation of JAPAN will be of short duration, and that public statements and political action on their part now would mark them for later reprisals. He declared that democracy could not be established in JAPAN in the short period of 5 to 10 years, but that it would have to be nurtured for at least a generation.

In regard to the Emperor of JAPAN, he stated that before Democracy can be fully developed and reforms be permanently brought about, the Emperor must be removed and the Imperial myth destroyed. He did not think that the immediate removal of the Emperor would have beneficial results, because too many of the Japanese people still deeply revere the Emperor's person and implicitly believe in his divinity. Rather, the powers and wealth of the Emperor should be taken away gradually, and the prominence of the Imperial institution should be diminished in reverse proportion to the development of Democracy.
2. ASAHI SHIMBUN, (published in KOKURA), 24 November 1945.

"The SASEBO Naval Station combined funeral services for the late Rear Admiral OSE Hisao and other war dead of the Greater East Asia War will be held at the HIGASHI-HONGANTI Temple, SHIMASE MACHI, SASEBO City, at 0930, the 27th. This will be the last such combined funeral services and will also include services for war dead whose remains have not yet returned."

"According to a release on the twenty-fourth from the American Headquarters' Liaison Office, Brigadier General KRAMER of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, which is the occupation force for SHIKOKU, has issued the following strict orders to all policemen of SHIKOKU:

'Savage behavior of the local policemen will cease. Violent acts such as hitting a child with full force in the face must cease immediately. If such acts occur in the future, the American Military Police will immediately take the offending policeman into custody.'"

"The factories of SASEBO received little damage from air raids because they were away from the main district, but since the end of the war almost all seventy-three of them have been idle. However, forty-five of them have converted speedily from the manufacture of war materials. In the ITOKUMI Iron Foundry, even now pots and axes for family use are being manufactured. In the food factories, SKOYO and MISO (food sauces) are being made. Bicycle parts and boat repair parts are speedily being manufactured to accelerate transportation of vitally needed food products."
1. No apparent violations of the Japanese Board of Information press news directive were noted in today's papers. Translation of local news of possible interest are inclosed.

2. KAGOSHIMA SHIMBUN, (published in KAGOSHIMA), 24 November 1945

"I am the wife of a soldier who is duty on IWO JIMA. Nearly two an one-half months have passed since I received word that my husband was killed in the fighting there. However, sometime ago I noticed in a newspaper report that there are approximately 3,000 military personnel remaining on that island. I have also heard the same report from many people. Since hearing the above I have been doing some very serious thinking. Wouldn't it be wise, without further delay, to publish a list of the names of the men who are still held on that island? Or furthermore, wouldn't it be possible to inform the family of such men, by telegram, that their loved ones are still alive? Wouldn't we continue to live not knowing the fate of our men? With each passing day our troubles become greater and greater. I implore you to consider this carefully. Each day I pray to the gods that those people remaining on IWO JIMA will without further delay be returned safely to their homes."

(Wife of a Deceased Serviceman).

"According to a release from Supreme Headquarters of the Occupation Forces, General MACARTHUR'S Headquarters has ordered the Japanese Government to furnish allied occupation forces with a detailed report on the locations of bodies, graves, or remains of all military personnel who met death in JAPAN during the war. Since American and allied searching parties are unable to ascertain the exact locations of graves and remains of allied military personnel, this order is being published in all newspapers. It is hoped that any person who has any knowledge of the location of graves or remains of allied military personnel will furnish such information to the Japanese Government. Such information will prove of great value in supplementing the incomplete records of our government concerning the above matter."

Daily requests are received from the occupation forces for laborer to assist in essential construction work for the occupation forces, but they are scarce. On November 26th an urgent request for male workers was made by the occupation forces, and as a result, Mr. KAWAHARU, SASEBO Labor Department head, urges bringing in laborers from other places on a large scale.

Since SASEBO is the headquarters for all American troops in KYUSHU and the chief port where supplies are unloaded, it is an extremely busy place, and as a result a great many laborers are required. All available personnel in the SASEBO area have been gathered, including especially demobilized personnel, but in cases where other persons cannot be obtained to do the necessary work, there is no recourse under the order promulgated October 16th other than to put additional duties upon some persons.
G-3 Operations Report

SECRET

From: 1800I 21 September 1945,
To: 1800I 22 September 1945.

No. 23

Map: KYUSHU 1:25,000.

1. Location of Troops:

a. VAC Headquarters and VAC Troops afloat SASEBO Harbor.

b. 5th Marine Division. The following elements of the 5thMarDiv have landed and are in the process of occupying their assigned area:

- RCT 26
- RCT 27 (-)
- ELT 2/28
- Div Arty Gp Hq
- 1st & 2d Bns 13th Mar
- 5th Tk Bn
- Shore Party Gp
- Co A 5th Med Bn

c. 2d Marine Division at sea enroute to NAGASAKI.

d. 52d Infantry Division - no change.

2. Weather and Visibility SASEBO Bay.

Overcast skies with light, intermittent rain. Visibility 8-10 miles, except where reduced in precipitation to 3-5 miles. Winds variable, from Southeast, velocity 8-12 knots, smooth sea.

3. Our Operations for the Period:

a. V Amphibious Corps landed units of the 5th Marine Division commencing at 0900 in the SASEBO Area according to the VAC Second Alternate Plan after preliminary arrangements had been made with Japanese representatives ashore by VAC advance party. By 1800 an estimated 10,000 troops of all arms had been landed without incident. At 0830 the Corps Commander interviewed the following Japanese officers aboard the AGO-7: Vice Admiral Abo, Commandant SASEBO Naval Base and Commander
Naval Forces, SASEBO Area; Major General Kogo, Vice Chief of Staff Western District Army; Rear Admiral Ishi, Chief of Staff Naval Base & District; Captain Iakahashi, Vice Chief of Staff Naval Base & District. The CG VAC left AGC-7 at 1345 and in company with General Krueger, Major General Decker and Major General Bourke, inspected the Naval Station, the City of SASEBO and SASEBO Naval Air Station. The Commanding General returned to AGC-7 (CP) at 1630.

b. 5th Marine Division landed in echelon at the Naval Air Station, Aircraft Factory and in the SASEBO Harbor Area. Units ashore commenced establishing guards over military installations, arms and stores in assigned areas replacing Japanese guards. Movement to assigned areas was continuing at the end of the period. Shore parties were established for general unloading at the docks. Sanitary conditions of selected billeting areas ashore are deplorable and corrective measures are being taken to improve conditions prior to occupation of these areas. The Advance 5th Division CP was established ashore at 1215.

c. 2d Marine Division at sea enroute to NAGASAKI.

d. 32d Infantry Division - No change.

4. Casualties:

None.

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG SMITH Army
CG TEF Pac
ComPhibGp 4
CG 2dMarDiv
CG 5thMarDiv
CG 32dInfDiv
**DAILY LOCATION STATEMENT**

**Map:** KYUSHU 1:25,000

**UNIT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>CP Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>H&amp;S Bn, VAC</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.5-12.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq, Shore Brigade</td>
<td>SASEBO Naval Base (77.0-14.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Service Regiment</td>
<td>Dock Area, SASEBO Naval Base (78.3-12.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th Mar Dep Co</td>
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<td>Sasebo Nav 1 Base (77.5-12.5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Sep Engr Bn</td>
<td>§ mile NW of Sasebo Naval Air Station (78.7-9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Engr Tech Int Tm(C)</td>
<td>§ mile NW of Sasebo Naval Air Station (78.7-9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1112th Engr Cons' Gp</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base (77.0-14.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCG-1</td>
<td>Adv. CP FUKUKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th MT Bn (Prov)</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;S Co, 20th Amph Trk Bn</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;C&quot; Co, 20th Amph Trk Bn</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Co, 20th Amph Trk Bn</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>5656th QM Trk Co</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq Det Prov Med Gp</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92d Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93d Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Hq &amp; Hq Det Mil Govt Gp</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo Fortress arty En (77.3-15.3)</td>
<td>Sasebo Naval Base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

UNIT

95th Hq & Hq Det Mil Govt Gp
37th Hq & Hq Co (Mil Govt)
29th Hq & Hq Co (Mil Govt)
2d Bkry Plct (Prov)

BLT 1/26

BLT 2/26

1st Bn, 13th Marines
2d Bn, 13th Marines
3d Bn, 13th Marines

4th Bn, 13th Marines

5th MT Bn

5th Recon Co
5th Lion Bn

33d Mar Dep Co

34th Mar Dep Co

8th Mar Ammo Co

3d Plat Bomb Disp Co, H&S Bn V.C

VMO-5

2d Mar Div

Div Arty

2d Tank Bn

CP LOCATION

SASEBO Fortress Arty Bn Hq (77.3-15.3)
SASEBO Naval Base
SASEBO Naval Base
Dock, SASEBO Naval Base
Moved to (78.4-17.1) 2½ miles N of
SASEBO Naval Basin
Moved to (78.6-11.7) SASEBO Ammunition
Storage area
Moved to (82.5-12.8) KARITATE
Moved to (82.5-12.8) KARITATE
Moved to (80.8-10.9) SASEBO Aircraft
Factory
Moved to (80.8-10.9) SASEBO Aircraft
Factory
(76.3-13.2) 500 Yds N of SASEBO Naval
Basin
Naval Training Station (76.3-12.9)
(76.3-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval
Base
(76.3-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval
Base
(76.3-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval
Base
(76.3-12.9) Dock Area, SASEBO Naval
Base
SASEBO Naval Air Station
(76.3-12.9) Dock Area SASEBO Naval
Base
Moved to Customs House, NAGASAKI
(94.6-62.3)

IS-HAYA

NAGASAKI

W. W. WENSINGER,
Colonel, USMC,
ACofS, G-3.
e. Port Facilities.

(1) Although there are many ports on the island of KYUSHU only two were used primarily. Nagasaki provides limited berthing space, so was only used to a small extent. The port of Sasebo was suitable for landing the majority of supplies for troops of the Occupation Forces, and they were distributed by rail from there. The harbor itself is excellent, but warehousing and freight handling facilities are meager. The hills slope sharply into the bay so that there is no marginal space which could be developed into storage yards. The most suitable area for open storage was the burned out center section of the city of Sasebo, which the 8th Service Regiment bulldozed into shape, and converted into a storage yard. Prior to embarkation, estimates of the area required for warehouse and open storage had been submitted; adequate allocations of space were not made on landing. Wharves and nearby areas were found to be piled high with junk and shops and warehouses were full of stores, equipment and machinery. Gradual improvements were made in the dock area, but vigorous action was not taken to clear the buildings and aprons so that cargo could be handled expeditiously, and the 8th Service Regiment was left largely to its own resources. It had neither the personnel nor the equipment to prepare the area as rapidly as required and all supply functions were seriously hampered by the congestion in the unloading area. The basic organization for port and stevedoring activities is believed to have been faulty and warrants careful study.
4. **ENROUTE TO TARGET AREA:**

a. All ships carrying 5th Marine Division and Corps Troops sailed in convoy from the HAWAIIAN Area and arrived at SAIPAN on 13 September 1945. Medical Plans were revised and integrated with military plans by conferences with various staff sections and by discussions between the Corps Surgeon and the Surgeon of Amphibious Group Force.

b. On 16 September 1945, an Advance Reconnaissance Party, including an officer from Headquarters Provisional Medical Group, departed for SASEBO in an APD. This party was to make a study of the target area prior to the arrival of the Occupation Force. The information obtained by the medical representative in this party proved very valuable in locating hospital installations ashore and in preparing to combat the poor sanitary conditions found in the target area.

c. The convoy sailed from SAIPAN on 17 September and arrived in the target area on 22 September 1945.
c. Headquarters of the Corps Surgeon opened ashore on 23 September 1945.

d. On 24 September, Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 landed at SASEBO and opened at the Japanese Naval Arts Training School and on 28 September the first patients were received.

e. On 25 September the VAC Medical Battalion landed at SASEBO and was installed in the former SASEBO Naval Hospital. On 27 September the first patients were received by this unit.

f. On 30 September Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 3 began landing in support of the 2nd Marine Division at NAGASAKI and moved to ISAHAYA where it was installed in the Naval Hospital. On 3 October this unit began receiving patients.
Upon arrival at the target area it was found that all buildings suitable for office or billeting space were heavily infested with fleas, lice, and bedbugs. Details were set to work and all such structures were cleaned out, scrubbed and sprayed with DDT solution prior to occupancy.
WAR TROPHIES.

a. In addition to disposition matters the Corps Disposition Section was charged with the issuance of war trophies to personnel of Corps Troops and units operating directly under Corps control. Initially all swords, pistols, and binoculars were classified as controlled items pending allocation by higher headquarters. Rifles and bayonets were issued to all enlisted men leaving this area, initially the issue of swords was restricted to officers leaving the area, pistols were not issued and field glasses were restricted to general officers. On 9 November this Corps was given a definite allocation of these controlled items and sub allocations were made, on 29 November additional allocations were made. Division Commanders were directed to issue the more desirable items on a basis of overseas service, officers and enlisted men both to be considered in arriving at this basis. These controlled items were made available to subordinate commanders on an average of 62.8% of their commands.

b. One constant source of bother and annoyance was the matter of trophies for U.S. forces afloat. Initial SIXTH ARMY directive prohibited the issue of any Japanese Army trophies to U.S. Naval personnel, and present directives prohibit the issue of Japanese Army type controlled items (swords, pistols, and field glasses) for this purpose. Japanese inventories showed that approximately 2503 Japanese Navy swords were surrendered in this area. One thousand of these were turned over to CTF 55 in late October for issue as directed by him. The remaining 1500 have recently been turned over to forces afloat. These 2503 swords did not meet the demand for these items. Personnel afloat could not understand this action and the Corps Disposition Office was constantly placed in the position of
a. The Procurement Section, Fifth Amphibious Corps, was formed on 28 September, 1945 in accordance with the provisions set forth in Corps Administrative Order Number 8-45, which made this Section the sole procurement agency for the City of Sasebo, including the Navy Yard proper and its surrounding installations, and assigned the responsibility of issuing and disseminating general instructions and policies governing the procurement of Japanese supplies, real estate, equipment and facilities. The organization of this section was modified to conform with changing requirements. The organization as shown in enclosure (A) proved to be the most satisfactory.

b. Procurement of services, supplies and equipment from local Japanese civilian sources was negligible. This condition was brought about by the following two factors:

1. The City of Sasebo was supported by and subordinated to the Japanese Navy and no surplus stocks of any commodity were carried. The population
consisted almost entirely of navy yard workers. Allied bombing had completely destroyed the greater part of the business district and part of the residential area of the city causing a critical shortage of housing facilities.

(2) The Sasebo Navy Yard has sustained little or no damage from Allied bombings, which made adequate housing facilities available to our forces. The Navy Yard contained numerous warehouses filled with supplies and equipment which were formerly the property of the Japanese Navy. These supplies were used by our forces to fill operational requirements, thus causing the demands on the local civilians to be much less than might have been expected.

e. All requests for supplies, equipment, and real estate from local civilian sources were made to the Sasebo Liaison Committee, which was very cooperative and exceedingly willing to comply with demands of the Occupation Forces in so far as it was physically capable. Some delay and confusion was encountered initially due to the lack of organization and coordination of this committee. While great improvements were made, it is believed that a certain degree of confusion will always prevail as long as there is an element of Japanese thinking concerned.
5. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS

a. Preliminary Reconnaissance.

Preliminary reconnaissance was negligible. The Signal Section was allotted one enlisted man in the advance party which left SAIPAN on 14 September and arrived at Nagasaki on 16 September. MTSgt. BOATRIGHT, Signal Battalion Wire Chief, was able to obtain some information on status of pole lines and general lack of long lines as of that date due to a recent typhoon. He brought back photographs of naval switchboards, maps of line routes and much general information that was of value to the Signal Officer.

b. Narrative of Occupation.

22 September, 1945. Small advance party ashore at 0900. Temporary message center established on beach. Radio communication using radio jeeps established by 1030.

23 September, 1945. NCO club at SASEBO Naval Station selected for Corps CP. Balance of advance
message center ashore at 1000 and in full operation at 1400. Class 5 crypto allowance's ashore at 1100. Visual tower in operation. Commanding General assumed command ashore at 1600! Complete MTC-2 switchboard installed by 2400.

24 September, 1945. Cable installed to 5th Marine Division. Radio teletype in operation to MT. MCKINLEY. Permanent radio station established in Headquarters building.

26 September, 1945. Two spiral four lines begun to OMURA. Cable to NAS SASEBO installed. Radio link installed to 2nd Marine Division at NAGASAKI.

27 September, 1945. MT. MCKINLEY sailed. Port Director ashore. Telephone directory issued. Japanese military and navy authorities ordered to furnish complete information regarding facilities in the Corps zone. Five pair cable completed to new 5th Marine Division CP at AINOURA. Executive Officer, Signal Section, to FUKUOKA with advance party.

28 September, 1945. 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions authorized to skeletonize ASCOS (281435). Cable laid to MT. SASEBO radio relay station. Radio link to OMURA complete.

29 September, 1945. SIXTH Army asked to assist in arranging telephone circuits to KYOTO (2911501). Telephone communication established to FUKUOKA and KANOA through commercial facilities. Cable to OMURA completed.

30 September, 1945. Assumed guard for Port Director SASEBO on George Fox. Tiger Blue exchange in operation (BOQ). Radio relay station at MT. SASEBO complete.

2 October, 1945. FUKUOKA Occupation Force CP opened. Communication to 2nd Marine Division at NAGASAKI by commercial lines. Radio link detail left for FUKUOKA.

3 October, 1945. C Company, 60th Signal Battalion to FUKUOKA.

4 October, 1945. Radio link to FUKUOKA installed.
6 October, 1945. OMURA-SASEBO spiral four line completed.


10 October, 1945. Extensive damage to NAGASAKI-SASEBO cable line by storm as well as to the KAGOSHIMA-KANOYA commercial facilities. Other minor damage quickly repaired. V MarSol issued, cancelled Annex HOW to Operation Plan No. 2-45.


16 October, 1945. Underwater line installed to USS WICHITA.

20 October, 1945. Directed all units stop amateur radio transmissions in their zones, (201503I).

22 October, 1945. Commenced installation of radio link to SIXTH Army, air reconnaissance made.

24 October, 1945. Ordered Corps units to coordinate requests for Japanese telephone lines through V Amphibious Corps. FUKUOKA Occupation Forces relieved of communication guard by 32nd Infantry Division.

25 October, 1945. NAGASAKI spiral four cable previously damaged by storm repaired and placed on carrier system.

28 October, 1945. BLT 1/127 at KANOYA secured from Corps command net and turned SCR-299 over to 2nd Marine Division (280915I).

30 October, 1945. CUB dispatch recommended establishing naval radio station Amami to relieve
4. Combat Engineer Missions.

a. Initial Preparation of Beaches. Reconnaissance groups landing first found the seaplane ramps at the Naval Air Station at SASEBO to be suitable beaches for the unloading of tracked vehicles and heavy equipment from LST's, LCT's and LSM's. At NAGASAKI, a small amount of dozer work cleared the beach sites for LST unloading.

b. Access roads were, in general, very narrow and unsuited for the type traffic necessary. Initial dumps at all landing points needed clearing of debris and rubbish. The condition of abandoned machinery and piles of scrap around all landing areas became a major problem. Individual units such as the 7th Naval Construction Regiment used empty hangar space for initial dumps. Often these buildings were in such poor condition that they could be considered little more than open storage. Undoubtedly the bad condition of access roads retarded the initial unloading. Open clear areas for initial dumps were particularly hard to find and in some cases materials committed to open storage were piled along the sides of roads until dump areas could be cleared. It was only the expeditious clearing of these initial dumps that prevented a pile up of organizational supplies.
c. Bridge and Ford construction and repair.

1. Fixed bridges - Combat bridge construction was not necessary. Neither our military operation nor Japanese defensive measures had destroyed bridges. However, bridge capacity was variable and never adequate. Most bridges had to be reinforced to take even the lightest military traffic.

2. Floating bridges - none.

3. Use of fords - none.

d. Road construction and repair. Because of the condition of access roads as indicated in paragraph 4b, immediate and continuous maintenance and repair had to be carried on by each and every engineer unit to move organizations within their areas of responsibility.

e. Cub Strips. A Cub Strip at Green Beach (Naval Air Station, SASEBO) was immediately occupied and put in dry weather operation after the grass had been cut. A large parade ground at the Naval Training Station, SASEBO, was also used as a Cub Strip. At NAGASAKI a Cub Strip was constructed for the use of the 2d Marine Division. At the end of the period of this report the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was ordered to rebuild the SASEBO Cub Strip to a 2600 x 100 runway of pierced planking.

f. Enemy Obstacles. The only enemy obstacles encountered were the tremendous amount of debris and machinery that littered dock areas, open storage areas and a number of buildings.
d. Road and Bridge construction and repair.

(1) As noted above the first important engineer missions were those of access road rehabilitation. As soon as the initial movement stabilized, the road construction program resolved itself into individual jobs each of great importance. The detailing of jobs and areas of responsibility to subordinate units was automatically prescribed by the situation. The 2d and 5th Division Engineers improved the roads within their respective areas.

(a) Roads within the dock area at SASEBO were at all times of primary importance. Consequently all road building facilities of the 98th Naval Construction Battalion were thrown into that particular project.

(b) To facilitate communications between the 2d and 5th Marine Division areas, and the usable airport at OMURA, the road from SASEBO to OMURA was repaired for very light traffic which was the immediate concern. The 31st Naval Construction Battalion is now further improving and maintaining this road.

(c) The 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade initially utilizing the 1688th Engineer (C) Battalion, was charged with the rehabilitation of roads within the 32nd Infantry Division area to facilitate the unloading and
reception of that division when it arrived. With the accomplishment of this mission the 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade continued the improvement and maintenance of roads within the 32nd Infantry Division Area.

(d) With the accumulation of troops in the FUKUOKA area and the continued closure of FUKUOKA harbor, the SASEBO-SAGA-FUKUOKA road became an important supply route. The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was therefore charged with the improvement and maintenance of this road. Bridge repair was extensive and 90% of the road had to be graded to make it capable of carrying even light military traffic (1W 15' 15T). The narrow right of way between dwellings and rice paddies prohibits the development of this road into a standard Corps road. As the engineering units attached to 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade arrived in the SASEBO Area they were ordered to the FUKUOKA area as soon as transportation became available. At present there are sufficient engineering troops in the FUKUOKA Area to carry on the missions as outlined in SIXTH Army Annex 8/2 to FO 75, and the 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade has been put under control of the 32nd Infantry Division.

(e) With the movement of the 5th Division to AINOURA, and the likelihood of the camp becoming a permanent billet, the SASEBO-AINOURA road became an important line of communication and the 5th Engineer Battalion was charged with its improvement to a 2W 15' 40T road, and completed the project before being inactivated. With the readjustment of units at the end of the period of this report, areas of responsibility for road maintenance were reassigned as follows: to the 31st Naval
Construction Battalion, roads of military importance within the SASEBO area from AINOURA to HAIKI; to the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, the road from SAGA to HAIKI; and to the 32nd Infantry Division with 5201st Engineer Construction Brigade attached, all roads between there and north of SAGA.

(2) All major projects were in constant use during construction.

(3) Dates of completion of major road projects are indefinite because of continuous improvement and heavy maintenance.

(4) Difficulties encountered in road construction were innumerable. Japanese bridge capacities are thoroughly inconsistent, and individual bridges reduce the capacities of long stretches of road. The narrow right of way through closely populated areas restricted the width to which main arteries could be developed. The fact that all routes are lined closely with rice paddies cause persistent unstable sub-grade conditions. However, the most serious difficulty is the absence of suitable gravel deposits within reasonable hauling distances to the projects. Small amounts of gravel in the beds of fast running streams are generally inaccessible and too small to warrant development. As noted above most rock crushers were lifted from organizational equipment in shipping allocations. This left one over-worked crusher in the SASEBO area. Road improvement has been accomplished but has been difficult because of the use of poor grade materials.
7. Engineer Units and Personnel.

a. Training of units. The short planning period for this operation precluded any specific training program for this operation. The unusual possibilities of this type of operation called more for widely experienced engineer troops rather than those trained for a specific mission. This requirement has been forced because of the lateness of arrival of specialist organizations. The continuation of the occupation will result in the need of specialists of more experience than those found in combat or general engineer organizations.

b. Productivity of Units. Under the difficulties explained in paragraphs four (4) and five (5), the productivity of units was extremely surprising. As an example: working on an original estimate that it would require fifteen (15) Battalion months to place the SASEBO-FUKUOKA road in shape as a standard Corps road, the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion produced a road suitable for light military traffic to take care of the immediate needs of the 32nd Infantry Division in a period of approximately one (1) month, and maintained the road constantly open during construction. The 98th Naval Construction Battalion produced similarly in the
SASEBO Dock area. Taking a job of clearing debris and improving dock roads in a congestion of material that seemed endless, this unit worked around the clock and effectively put all docks in favorable operating condition in a period of approximately three weeks. Here again all facilities were maintained in use during construction. Both these units also accomplished all work as assigned to them while working on these jobs. The miscellaneous construction described in paragraph five (5) is not apparent and the true productivity of units is mostly apparent to those who have checked closely on the numerous small jobs. The one large factor that has cut deeply into the productivity of units is the extensive demobilization of experienced personnel, most pronounced in the final six weeks of the operation covered by this report.
8. Miscellaneous.

a. Japanese labor has been used extensively during this
operation on projects under Corps Control. All utilities within the area are maintained and repaired by Japanese labor under Japanese supervision and American control. Large details have been used for such projects as cleaning petroleum storage tanks and littered areas. Prefectural road maintenance crews have been organized by Prefectural Engineers and work under the direction of the units designated as responsible in that area. Engineer troops have been conserved for important assignments by procuring and detailing Japanese maintenance crews for minor repairs to individual buildings and areas. True business arrangements with Japanese were extremely difficult at first but the inherent problems have been worked out one by one.

On 4 October, 1945 the mission of rehabilitating the 86 miles of highway from Sasebo to Fukuoka to take minimum military traffic of vehicles of not greater than 15 ton gross vehicle load was assigned this battalion. On 5 October, 1945, Company "B" moved equipment to the job site and began grading and surfacing the first 5 miles of the road from Sasebo towards Saga. On 6 October, 1945, Company "C" and Company "A" began moving equipment to Saga to new billets in that city. On 7 October, 1945, Company "A" began work on the road from Saga towards Fukuoka. Company "B" located bridge sites and spotted materials. All three companies continued work on the Sasebo-Fukuoka road from 8 October, 1945 to 30 November, 1945. On 10 October, 1945, Company "A" constructed a 40' single-single Bailey bridge 3.5 miles east of Saga. On 13 October, 1945, Company "A" began
construction of a timber bent bridge 4 miles east of Saga. On 14 October, 1945, Company "A" completed work on the timber bridge 4.5 miles east of Saga. Several existing bridges were reinforced. Sign posting on the entire road was about 25% completed on this date. On 14 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced a timber bent on a bridge 10 miles east of Saga. 900 Jap laborers were used on road and bridge work. On 15 October, 1945, Company "A" opened a borrow pit near the Fukushima airfield. 150 Jap laborers were used on ditching work and 900 were used on other road work. Road between Tade and Tosu was closed because of washout, and a detour was reconnoitered from Tade to Kurume to Tajiro (2 miles above Tosu). On 16 October, 1945, Company "B" completed construction of the detour from Kitakats through Ogi, and Kubata to main road. Company "A" opened the Kurume detour for traffic and started maintenance work. Both detours became permanent parts of the road. On 17 October, 1945, Company "A" constructed a 90' double-single Bailey bridge 5.5 miles east of Saga. The road work from Sasebo to Saga was completed on this date. Maintenance was continued. On 18 October, 1945, Company "C" constructed a timber bent bridge 1 mile west of Yamaguchi. On 19 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced the deck of a timber bridge near the Fukushima airfield and improved the approaches to three existing Bailey bridges. On 23 October, 1945, Company "A" replaced the deck of a timber bridge on the road through Kurume, 4 1/2 miles west of Kurume. 30 Jap laborers were used in this work. On 6 November, 1945, and 7 November, 1945, Company "B" constructed a 40' single-single Bailey bridge 5.9 miles east of Arita. Company "B" completed construction of a steel I-Beam, wood, bridge, 7 miles east of Arita. Japanese personnel and materials were used as far as possible and were obtained from the Saga Prefecture Engineer. Sign posting, road improvement and maintenance was continuous throughout this period.