



EVACUATION AND REPATRIATION IN KOREA

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40th Infantry Division

History of

EVACUATION and REPATRIATION

Through the Port of PUSAN, Korea


28 Sept 45 - 15 Nov 45

FOREWORD

The unusual talent, initiative and ingermity displayed by the author, 1st Lieutenant John M. Bullitt, Assistant G-2, draftsman Staff Sergeant John E. Klovstad, photographer Tec 4 William P. Herzstock and illustrator Tec 5 Tong Q. Eng, Headquarters 40th Infantry Division, in the preparation of this report, merit recognition.

DONALD J. MYERS

Brigadier General U.S.A.
Commanding



MISSION

In Field Order No. 56, Hq XXIV Corps, dated 21 September 1945, the 40th Infantry Division was directed, in addition to its duties of occupation, the establishment of Military Government, the supervision of disarmament and control of Japanese within its Zone of Responsibility, to "maintain control of Japanese civilians and Japanese Armed Forces moving through the Ports of PUSAN and CHINHAE for Japan (and) to move repatriated Koreans from FUSAN to native provinces". The specific task of processing and loading aboard ship Japanese civilian and military personnel from Pier No. 1 in PUSAN was assigned to the 160th Infantry Regiment.


The problems attendant upon this projected large-scale handling of peoples whose language was known only to a few were complicated by such factors as: (1) the necessity for speed; (2) the coordination of transportation facilities of which the native organization had long been predicated on an Oriental neglect of accuracy and promptness; (3) the prevention of looted Korean wealth being transported to Japan and (4) the maintenance of health and sanitation of our own troops among a people not habituated to western standards of cleanliness.

TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EVACUEES

On 21 September 1945 the Japanese Garrison in PUSAN was notified by the advance party of the 40th Infantry Division that all troops within the city, except for specified groups such as Liaison, Medical and Supply Detachments, must evacuate PUSAN in anticipation of the arrival of the



TYPICAL JAPANESE SOLDIER



40th Infantry Division. On 23 September Hq Co, 40th Infantry Division and the 3rd Battalion of the 160th Infantry arrived in PUSAN by rail from INCH'ON. By 26 September the major portion of the 160th Infantry had arrived in PUSAN, prepared bivouac areas, and initiated the relief of Japanese guards of local installations. The Standing Operating Procedure developed by the 40th Infantry Division at ILOILO, PANAY, Philippine Islands, for the surrender of Japanese troops served as a basis for the initial processing of outgoing Japanese troops and incoming Koreans in PUSAN, Korea. Under the direction of the Assistant Division Commander, this procedure was modified to meet new requirements and the Commanding Officer 160th Infantry promptly set the machinery in motion with a composite battalion comprising Companies E, F, K and L 160th Infantry.

Troops were divided into three eight-hour shifts and each shift into inspection teams. The remaining troops of the 160th Infantry were employed in guard and police duty within the regimental area.

Preliminary conferences were held in order to establish policies of evacuation and methods of disseminating information to Japanese troops and civilians throughout the southern sector of Korea. On 24 September a conference with the Commanding Officers of the PUSAN Garrison elicited important statistical information on location and numbers of Japanese Military Forces. A Transportation Officer was assigned the responsibility for the coordination of existing transportation facilities so that troops and civilians arrived in PUSAN in adequate numbers to match the arrival and departure of refugee ships. He also had to restrain any unauthorized arrival of repatriates which might overflow the already



TYPICAL KOREAN REPATRIATE



KOREANS DEBARK ON PIER NO. I

crowded housing conditions of the assembly area. Beginning on 23 September, daily conferences were conducted by this officer with the PUSAN shipping master, a railroad executive, representatives of local Japanese Relief Societies and ranking members of the PUSAN Japanese Garrison in the dining room of the Railway Hotel. With an American Officer from the 180th Language Detachment as interpreter, policies were established which would govern transportation: Japanese troops and civilians were to be evacuated from Pier No. 1 at a rate not lower than 4,000 per day (See Chart No. 2); both troops and civilians were to remain in their own areas until called; this call was to be routed through Japanese Military Communication Agencies. Shipment quotas were planned four days in advance to make allowances for unavoidable accidents and mechanical failures of trains and engines and were based upon the estimated number and capacity of refugee ships to arrive in PUSAN as well as the consideration of retaining a 5,000 man surplus in the assembly area. After 17 October, a liaison officer from Military Government attended these conferences and calls for troops and civilians were made through Military Government Headquarters at SEOUL.

Throughout the entire evacuation process, obstacles of language, mechanical defects in material, improperly trained railroad employees, and, above all, the inability of Korean civilians to comprehend the requirements of a time schedule hampered the smooth functioning of transportation. Too frequently, such penciled notations as this were given as



JAPANESE SOLDIERS ARRIVE IN PUSAN



LT. GEN. AND STAFF PREPARED FOR EVACUATION

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SHOW-DOWN INSPECTION




TROOPS MUST WAIT FOR A SHIP

explanation for a failure to meet a quota: "engine is little no good now is improving and then shortly will depart"; interpretations of "little" might range from a misplaced nut to an exploded boiler and "shortly" could mean one hour or one day.

In spite of unpredictable delays, on 26 September the first refugee ships to leave Korea, the KCNEI MARU and the KOAN MARU, having brought 7,031 Koreans from Japan, left for HAKATA, KYUSHU with 3,675 Japanese troops and 5,341 civilians aboard. A General Officer, Sub Chief of Staff of the 17th Japanese Army Group, assisted with the Japanese military organization in exacting prompt obedience to schedules published by the Transportation Officer, and by the end of the first week 23,843 soldiers and 17,413 civilians had been evacuated.

The 40th Infantry Division had cleared all Japanese troops from its own Zone of Responsibility by October 5th, and proceeded then with the evacuation of all Japanese military personnel south of 38° North Latitude. Chart No. 1 traces the total weekly progress in the evacuation of troops and civilians and indicates how, after the first week in which control of shipments was almost impossible, the repatriation of Japanese troops predominated over the repatriation of civilians until 19 October. In order to facilitate the prompt evacuation of soldiers and to insure their speedy demobilization in Japan, civilian movements were curtailed on 7 October, thus permitting the evacuation of 55,632 military personnel from 5-18 October. By 18 October almost all Japanese soldiers stationed in Southern Korea had been evacuated. Exceptions were the PUSAN Liaison Detachment, scattered guard posts in cities such as MOKP'O

Evacuation Statistics



LEGEND-

TOTAL JAPANESE TROOPS
EVACUATED WEEKLY


TOTAL JAPANESE CIVILIANS
EVACUATED WEEKLY

COMBINED TOTAL-TROOPS AND CIVILIANS EVACUATED WEEKLY

GRAPHIC CHART

SHOWING NUMBER OF JAPANESE EVACUATED FROM PUSAN, KOREA TO JAPAN — SEPT 28 THRU NOV. 15

Evacuation Statistics





JAPANESE TROOPS


JAPANESE CIVILIANS

COMBINED TROOPS and CIVILIANS

GRAPHIC CHART

SHOWING DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF JAPANESE EVACUATED FROM PUSAN KOREA TO JAPAN - SEPT. 28 Thm NOV. 15

Evacuation Statistics



LEGEND

COMBINED TOTAL JAPANESE

AND KOREANS

TOTAL JAPANESE

---- TOTAL KOREANS


TOTAL JAPANESE TROOPS

TOTAL JAPANESE CIVILIANS

GRAPHIC CHART

SHOWING: PROGRESSIVE TOTAL OF ALL PERSONS ENTERING OR LEAVING THE PORT OF PUSAN, KOREA — SEPT. 28 THRU NOV. 15, 1945

Korean Repatriation



regend



DAILY AVERAGE NUMBER OF KOREANS

GRAPHIC CHART


SHOWING NUMBER OF KOREAN REPATRIATES ENTERING PORT OF PUSAN, KOREA — SEPT. 28 THRU NOV. 15, 1945

(MOPPO), ROSU (REISUI) and KUNSAN (GUNZAN), soldiers awaiting to accompany their families, and, finally, over 12,000 Kempei Tai and Allied Prisoner-of-War Camp Guards being investigated by CIC in TAIDEN for their possible connection with war crimes and atrocities. The 7,328 troops evacuated between 19-25 October were composed largely of soldiers who accompanied their families, and the soldier exodus of 10,771 in the week of 2-8 November resulted from the release of many Kempei Tai from investigation.


The overall trend of Japanese troop evacuation is shown graphically in Chart No. 3, where the rise in total evacuations of troops stops abruptly around 18 October, to rise slightly on 1 November when it reaches the total figure of 99,237; that only 7 soldiers were processed and evacuated to Japan from 9-16 November testifies to the near completion of a large part of this task.

uated. But with the cessation of large shipments of troops, civilian trains, loaded to more than comfortable capacity, arrived in PUSAN with increasing frequency and enabled refugee ships to evacuate to Japan 164,344 men, women and children from 18 October to 15 November. Chart No. 3 indicates the antipodal trends of troop and civilian evacuation; until 18 October civilian movements remained fairly constant and then entered a period of rapid increase while the military evacuees at first rose quickly, then after the 18th, levelled off.

It should be noted here that although the statistics of this



EMBARKATION



READY FOR DEPARTURE

- 16 -

report include the movement of troops and civilians up to and including 15 November, the mission of repatriation was not completed by that date. Japanese military personnel were not entirely evacuated until 1 November and it was anticipated that the repatriation of Japanese and Korean civilians would continue into January 1946.

PROCESSING ON PIER NO. 1

Through the narrow portal of Fier No. 1 streamed a total of 589,628 Korean civilians and Japanese soldiers and civilians (vid Chart No. 3). The reception of 291,977 incoming Koreans at PUSAN was relatively simple. Ships of all descriptions, from tiny power launches carrying 50-75 passengers to steamers with 5,000 persons aboard, brought the refugees to Pier No. 1 where they were discharged and separated into geographical groups by Korean Refugee Societies. These societies instructed the refugees in train schedules, sold them tickets and informed them of possible accommodations and sources of food and clothing. Chart No. 3 indicates the close balance between total incoming Koreans and total outgoing Japanese during the period. This balance is accounted for by the fact that the difference between the total number of Koreans arriving on one ship and the Japanese who in turn were loaded into the same ship was compensated for by the innumerable small launches which brought in civilians but did not evacuate Japanese. Chart No. 4 illustrates that, unlike the shipments of either Japanese civilians or soldiers (See Chart No. 2), the daily average of incoming Koreans sustained a high and fairly constant flow.



CURRENCY EXCHANGE



PERSONAL SEARCH OF JAPANESE WOMEN

The relatively low peaks reached between 5 October and 18 October may be explained by the prevalence of serious climatic disturbances between Korea and Japan which made difficult the passage of smaller ships.

The inequality of value between Korean and Japanese currency necessitated the establishment on 20 October of two exchange booths in PUSAN. One booth, under the egis of the 160th Infantry, exchanged for the Japanese evacuees limited amounts of Korean yen for Japanese yen while, at the same time, serving as the collection agency for \(\frac{1}{2}\)300,949,105 of excess currency voluntarily surrendered by the repatriates or confiscated in the routine search. This excess currency was turned over to Military Government and deposited under a Special Account in the Bank of Chosen. A second booth was founded to service incoming Koreans and between 21 October and 15 November a total of \(\frac{1}{2}\)39,313,000 of Japanese currency was exchanged for Korean yen.

But the most important task by far was to prevent Japanese repatriates from taking contraband to Japan. On 27 and 28 September initial CINCAFPAC Orders were received which imposed strict limitations on baggage for each individual; each civilian was permitted to carry 1,000 yen, and all military personnel were limited to 500 yen per officer and 250 yen per enlisted man; funds in excess of these amounts were confiscated, receipted for, and entered into a Special Account in the Bank of Chosen. Later directives furnished an itemized list of permissable clothing and placed additional restrictions on all jewelry obviously loot as well as financial instruments, letters of credit and other certificates of monetary value; likewise all arms were collected and sabers belonging to general officers or which evidenced

antiquity or particular value were tagged for museum pieces. On the other hand, items such as cameras, watches, and other personal possessions obviously not loot were permitted as legitimate property. These directives from XXIV Corps were consolidated and published by the 40th Infantry Division in Operations Memorandum No. 13 (see page 21 - 25).

and thorough examination. The Japanese soldiers marched onto the Pier and opened their packs while teams of 30 to 50 American enlisted men and off-cers methodically searched their persons and baggage, collecting contraband goods, dumping them into one-quarter ton trailers, and then transporting them to nearby warehouses. As one group completed this inspection, it traversed the Pier to await embarkation while a new group silently took its place. Processing teams were prepared to evacuate Japanese soldiers from Pier No. 1 at the rate of five hundred per hour twenty-four hours a day. At night, searchlights from a docked U. S. destroyer assisted in the illumination of this grimly systematic search and etched in fantastic shadows the silent and passive movement of troops and civilians across the Pier.

In the first days of the evacuation process the inspection of civilians, particularly women, was often perfunctory. The sight of homeless men, women and children carrying their pitifully inadequate possessions on their backs (when, that is, the adults were not burdened with children or ailing relatives) excited little enthusiasm among American Troops to pick among their homely relics. But from G-2 came reports that large amounts of contraband were being taken from Korea by civilians. Information from other sources gave credibility to these reports. One Japanese

HEADQUARTERS 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION APO 40

OPERATIONS	MEMORANDUM)	16 October	1945
	:		
NUMBER	13)		

PROCESSING OF EVACUEES BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRIOR TO MOVEMENT TO JAPAN

Operations Memorandum Number 12, this headquarters, subject as above, dated 7 October 1945, is hereby rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

l. In the processing of evacuees both military and civilian prior to evacuation from Korea to Japan careful investigation will be made to insure that the following is complied with:

a. Money permitted to be carried to Japan:

- (1) Commissioned Japanese Army and Navy Officers returning to Japan may carry out a maximum of 500 yen. Other grades and enlisted men may carry out a maximum of 250 yen.
 - (a) Currency in excess of such amounts will be taken up by Japanese Army and Navy Finance Officers and turned over to the American Finance Officer against bulk receipts. This money will be deposited in the Bank of Chosen to the credit of "Special Accounts, Japanese Armed Forces Personal Fund."
 - (b) All Japanese Military unit funds and funds in the hands of Finance Officers will be turned over to the American Finance Officer to be deposited in the Bank of Chosen to the credit of "Special Accounts, Japanese Military Funds." Receipts will be given and records kept showing the name of the unit, its Korean location, and the amount and description of the fund.
 - (c) The Japanese Army will perform all clerical work in connection with the above.
 - (d) When funds are turned over they will be segregated as to type and bundled in even hundreds. They will be accompanied by itemized accounts in duplicate showing source.

- (2) Japanese civilians, regardless of age, may carry out a maximum of 1,000 yen per person.
 - (a) Excess currency will be taken up against individual receipts and records maintained containing name, Korean address, proposed address in Japan, amount and description.
 - (b) Currency, when confiscated, together with pertinent records, will be turned in to the Finance Officer.
- (3) Bank of Chosen notes will not be taken out. If the Bank of Japan notes are not available for exchange, Bank of Thailand or Bank of Chosen notes may be carried out to the limits set forth above.

b. Jewelry and Securities:

- (1) Civilian and military personnel will not be permitted to carry out gold, silver, jewelry, securities, financial instruments, or other property except wearing apparel and personal possessions of value only to the owner.
 - (a) Japanese military and civilian evacuees will be permitted to retain watches, personal jewelry, and similar trinkets obviously not loot.
 - (b) All negotiable instruments including Bank Pass Books, will be taken up and a receipt given to the owner.
- (2) All such property in excess of the personal allowance will be confiscated. A receipt will be given showing the description of the article, name of its owner, the owner's Korean address, prospective Japanese address, and any information which may be used to identify the article.

c. Cameras:

All Japanese military and civilian evacuees will be permitted to retain personal cameras obviously not loot.

d. Supplies:

Troops will be permitted to retain ten (10) days medical and office supplies and rations for demobilization purposes.

e. Flags:

- (1) All Japanese battle flags, colors and standards of company and larger units will be surrendered upon departure from Korea.
- (2) Individual battle flags of value only to the owner may be carried out.

f. Arms:

- (1) No arms of any description, including swords and sabers, will be taken by the evacuees.
- (2) Swords and sabers which are confiscated will be tagged with the description of the article and identification of the owner.
 - (a) All swords which belong to Japanese General Officers or which appear to have considerable monetary value or historical background will be segregated and held. Commanders will be prepared to receive swords from Japanese Officers who desire their swords appraised for the above purposes. These swords will be tagged with the owner's name, address, and with history of sword if available. Receipts for such swords will be issued to respective Japanese Officers.

g. Miscellaneous:

- (1) Japanese military and civilian evacuees will take out only what they can carry individually, subject to the foregoing restrictions, except that:
 - (a) Baggage for Japanese Officers, in addition to authorized military equipment, will be limited to the following: General Officers, two (2) pieces all other officers one (1) piece. Officer baggage will be of the small wicker type baggage carrier or similar size.
- (2) All KEMPEI TAI and former Japanese Prisoner-of-War Camp guards will be moved to Japan when processed and released by C.I.C.
- (3) Japanese military organizational records will be screened for intelligence information, but may be retained for demobilization purposes.

- (4) Insignia, Medals, and Service Ribbons may be carried out by Japanese military personnel.
- (5) Rosters of Japanese troops will be prepared in duplicate by the Japanese for use upon embarkation. Upon embarkation, Japanese troops will be checked off by roster. Both copies of rosters will be retained for file.
- 2. Japanese troops being evacuated from Ports of Embarkation to Japan will be permitted to retain only the following articles of clothing and equipment; all other articles brought to the Port will be confiscated by processing troops of the U. S. Army:

a. Clothing and Equipment:

Article:	Amount
Shirts, cotton, Khaki	2
Underwear	2 2 1
Sox, cotton, pair	2
Cap, cloth, Khaki, peaked	1
Trousers, drill, long pair	2
Tunic, Drill	2 2 1 1
Shoes, rubber, split toe, pair	1
Shoes, leather, pair	1
Mess Tin	1
Belt, Leather	1 1 1
Water Bottle	1
First Aid Field Dressing	1
Pack	1
Haversack	1
Hold-all Canvas	1
Blanket	2 1
Overcoat	1
Raincoat	1
Leggings, wrap around, or 1 pair leather puttees	1
Uniform, wool	1
Cap, wool	1
Toilet, set	1
Underwear, set, wool	1
Gloves, pair	1

b. Miscellaneous:

Article:	Amount
Fountain Pen Pencils Writing Pad Bottle of Ink Reading Material (Books, Magaz Candles Condums Cigarettes Postal Stamps	1 3 1 1 1 ines) 5 1 Doz 1 Doz 2 Cartons 1 Box
Logiat Stamba	T DOY

MYERS Brig Gen

OFFICIAL:

WILSON G-3

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CG XXIV Corps (3)
CG
CG Div Arty (25)
CO 160th Inf (25)
G-2
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CO 108th Inf (8)
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advised his friends: "when you go to Japan have a woman carry your money as the United States soldiers are not strict in the search of women, otherwise you are only permitted 1,000 yen"; and another writer adivsed a friend that "...all surplus is confiscated...sew your money inside your pants or prepare other safer means"; and still another gave counsel "to hide your money in your cigarette pack or in your soap". From these and other sources it was also determined that soldiers frequently used civilians to carry out their excess currency and contraband baggage. Strict and exacting supervision on all inspections was then instituted and male civilians were searched with the same rigid adherence to regulations as had characterized the scrutiny of soldiers while the female civilians underwent the same procedure under the watchful eyes of Korean women.

The increased surveillance of departing personnel resulted in the confiscation of a large amount of contraband. Many repatriates, on being informed of currency restrictions, converted their money into clothing and articles valuable in Japan. One soldier had discarded from his bags all military equipment and replaced his blankets, extra clothing, etc., with an elaborate, diversified, and expensive stock of cosmetics and lingerie. Another repatriate, a civilian, converted his savings into seventy kimonos of high grade hand-stitched silk. As the inspecting teams developed their adeptness in the detection of concealed items, an increasing amount of excess currency was impounded which had been secreted in the mos bottles or baby blankets or sewed into the lining of apparel. One Sergeant was surprised when a handsome walking stick carried by a venerable old man disjointed in his hands and spilled on the Pier a cache of 80,000 yen.



A HELPING HAND



VACCINATION



ALL PERSONS AND BAGGAGE.....



....ARE DUSTED WITH DOT

Nor did the search of women prove fruitless. From the guarded doors of their inspection chamber came quantities of valuable silks and excess kimonos, and many thousands of yen which had been stitched into their under-garments or concealed about their bodies.

Another facet of the processing was the necessity for maintaining sanitation in an area flooded with transients to whom cleanliness was no habit. When the processing first began, myriad flies and mosquitoes that fed on many years' accumulation of filth, menaced the health and morale of the processing troops. Immediately upon the arrival of Japanese soldiers at the assembly area behind Pier No. 1, police details of 200 to 300 Japanese were established. These prisoners of war, with the aid of shovels, rakes, brooms, and PUSAN Fire Department pumps and hoses, first cleared and washed the Pier and surrounding areas, then sprayed in every corner gallons of DDT.

Allied with this program of sanitation was the Medical Department's insistence upon immunization of all repatriated Japanese in order to prevent the transmission to Japan of communicable and lice-borne diseases endemic to Korea. An additional link in the processing chain was forged on 1 October when all repatriates were vaccinated for typhoid and small-pox. After 20 October vaccinations were given at SEOUL to many of the evacuees prior to their departure for PUSAN which necessitated the vaccination at Pier No. 1 of only about 35% of the total refugees. Serums were administered twenty-four hours a day by members of the Japanese Medical Society in PUSAN operating under the control of the SEOUL Medical School and closely supervised by the Division Surgeon. On 20 October, a



IN PUSAN STATION KOREAN CIVILIANS.....



.... MUST WAIT FOR TRAINS

delousing program was initiated and all repatriates were dusted with DDT by hand and motor sprayers. For the many sick and ailing persons who were unable to board a ship, provisions were made for their entrance and temporary treatment in two civilian hospitals and one military hospital. When a sizable group of patients had been gathered, it was evacuated to Japan, accompanied by Japanese doctors and medicines.

For two months humanity streamed through the gateway of Pier No. Silent, passive, always obedient and subservient, the Japanese soldiers and civilians massed in PUSAN by the thousands, squatted in the open or under the inadequate shelter of leaky warehouses, quietly consumed their meager rations of fish, rice, soy beans and sake, and as silently were processed and evacuated to Japan. Despite the grim tragedy of their defeat and evacuation, life continued. Some persons, exhausted by travel and without hope for the future, arrived sick in PUSAN and occasionally died. while eight babies were born to open their eyes on a shattered Japan. Incoming Koreans, uprooted from their homes in KYUSHU, HOKKAIDO, or HCNSHU, jammed the railroad station in patient anticipation of their return to homes which many had never seen. To the American men and officers engaged in the mechanics of this operation, --- soldiers of whom one Japanese writer spoke as being "....very good, for the Americans are the most cultured of peoples" --- the homeless repatriates presented a kaleidoscopic panorama of squalor and misery, testimony of the defeat of a nation and the collapse of a conqueror's dream.

The total personnel processed at the time this report was submitted to the Commanding General XXIV Corps on 19 December, 1945 was 876,282 which includes 394,089 Japanese evacuated and 482,193 Koreans repatriated.