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AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

IN THE FIELD

OPERATIONS REPORT OCCUPATION OF JAPAN



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Appendix 3 to Annex DOG to Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

REPATRIATION REPORT

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

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30 November 1945.

From: The Repatriation Officer, G-3 Section.
To : The Commanding General.
Subject: Repatriation Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. When the V Amphibious Corps landed in JAPAN on 22 September 1945, no concrete plans for repatriation existed, but on that day V Amphibious Corps was designated by SIXTH Army to receive from Commander 7th Amphibious Force disarmed Japanese demobilized troop repatriates, and SASEBO was designated as a port to receive and process incoming Japanese arriving from overseas in U. S. LSTs. This represented the initial extent of repatriation plans and planning.

Because repatriation would involve the movement of large numbers of persons by foot, train and by ship, as well as the detail and organization of guards and supervisory teams, repatriation seemed more nearly a proper function of G-3 than of any other staff section. Consequently the G-3 section was assigned overall responsibility for supervision and planning in connection with repatriation throughout the Corps zone. It is interesting to note that, as an indication of the differing conceptions of staff responsibility in the various Headquarters when confronted by a totally new problem, repatriation was considered as a function of G-3 in 5th Marine Division, G-2 in the 2d Marine Division, G-1 and G-3 in the 32d Infantry Division, and as a function of the Military Government Section in the SIXTH Army. However, liaison and coordination between this Headquarters and both higher and lower echelons was excellent and continuous.

From the initial stages of occupation, in accordance with directives from SCAP to the Imperial Japanese Government, actual execution of repatriation was made the direct responsibility of Japanese authorities. These directives were likewise promulgated to V Amphibious Corps by dispatch and letter, in order that the necessary close supervision could be properly maintained. Unfortunately, many such directives reached this Headquarters a matter of weeks after they had been delivered to the Japanese authorities, so that on occasion our first information concerning some new detail of repatriation came from Japanese sources.

Soon after initial landings, investigation disclosed that the Japanese had commenced repatriation of Japanese from KOREA, and Koreans back to KOREA, using the port of HAKATA with MOJI-SHIMONOSEKI as a receiving and holding area. Small craft were

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principally employed, and processing centers, records, sanitation, and so forth were conspicuous by their absence. Confronted by the first incoming groups of Japanese, the 5th Marine Division at SASEBO set up a repatriation center at URAGASHIRA and shortly after 26 September were receiving and processing nearly 3,000 incoming Japanese demobilized troops per day. HAKATA and the receiving area at MOJI-SHIMONOSEKI were soon operating under supervision of occupation forces, and repatriation plans began to take definite shape. The ports of MOJI and SHIMONOSEKI were not authorized for repatriation shipping due to heavily mined waters in that area. SCAP issued comprehensive directives to the Imperial Japanese Government covering repatriation centers, limitations on currency brought in and out of JAPAN by repatriates, necessary medical inspections, sanitation, minimum food requirements, etc., and estimates were compiled as to the total number of Koreans and Chinese in the islands of JAPAN. Best information indicated well over a million Koreans in JAPAN to be repatriated, and immediately action was initiated to set up additional repatriation ports and processing centers, as well as to increase the daily capacity of those already in operation, where such increase was possible. After investigation, the use of SENZAKI, HAKATA, SASEBO and KAGOSHIMA as repatriation ports was determined, and the Japanese instructed to improve existing facilities and provide new ones as indicated. Meantime, SCAJAP was organized in TOKYO to authorize and control the use and movement of specified Japanese shipping to be employed in repatriation shuttles, and every effort was made to increase shipping space, which fell far short of the established capacities of the repatriation ports. Maximum daily capacities of these ports and their repatriation centers were established as follows:-

	<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
SENZAKI	2,500	2,500	5,000
HAKATA	5,000	5,000	10,000
SASEBO	3,000	3,000	6,000
KAGOSHIMA	3,000	3,000	6,000
	<u>13,500</u>	<u>13,500</u>	<u>32,000</u>

In addition to Korean repatriates and incoming Japanese, it was found that there were some 40,000 Chinese Nationals of which about 6,000 were in Corps zone, approximately 2,000 Formosan Nationals and 15,000 RYUKYU islanders also in the V Amphibious Corps zone. Higher headquarters advised that the Formosans and RYUKYU islanders (who were demobilized soldiers which constituted one half the number) could not be repatriated until some future date, but authority was received to repatriate Chinese. This movement of Chinese commenced in early October from HAKATA, using Japanese

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shipping, and it was found necessary to place U. S. guard detachments on many ships in order to maintain some semblance of order. Of all the repatriates involved, the Chinese caused most difficulty, rioting, looting, and in some cases killing. The Japanese authorities were helpless when it came to handling Chinese, and careful supervision and firm action was necessary on the part of occupation troops. The Koreans were, on the contrary, docile and relatively quiet, and gave little trouble, with the exception of their constant drift out of nowhere into the repatriation centers and their total lack of any elementary concept of individual or collective sanitation.

2. By 30 October, the Japanese Government had placed the Prefectural Governors in charge of the overall problems of repatriation in their areas, directly under the Ministry of Welfare. A representative of the Ministry of Welfare was appointed to operate at each repatriation center, under the Prefectural Governor, and occupation force supervisory teams at these centers maintained liaison with the Japanese and close supervision of Japanese repatriation activities.

Reports that they were to be repatriated spread rapidly among the Korean nationals, and they began streaming into the Corps zone by any and all means available. The Japanese officials were directed to control this influx, but it was simply a matter of too many people and too few ships. Processing center facilities were strained far beyond capacity, and sanitary conditions were for a time virtually non-existent, and this among a people accustomed to extremely primitive living and sanitary conditions. A black market developed in food, as well as shipping, and repatriation centers with a capacity of 10,000 were forced to attempt to handle as many as 30,000 waiting repatriates. As it became apparent that the Japanese were entirely unable to curtail this flow of people, SIXTH Army was urgently requested in early November to institute rigid controls on movements through HONSHU to the Corps zone, until the ports could be cleared. This was done, and restrictions imposed, these restrictions to expire on 24 November.

During this hiatus, V Amphibious Corps was able to move out the majority of the many thousands awaiting repatriation, while SCAP proposed and placed into effect a plan to make more shipping available, so that the numbers of persons moved in and out of designated port areas more nearly approached the capacity of the repatriation centers concerned.

Basically the plan called for the use of some 80 LSTs, to shuttle from CHINA to SASEBO with Japanese repatriates, and to outload Chinese or Koreans from SASEBO; and to use KAGOSHIMA in the same manner. This plan was approved, and on 24 November the first

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repatriates departed, some 2,800 Chinese, from SASEBO. The use of KAGOSHIMA however, was delayed until after the closing date of this report. Some additional Japanese ships were authorized to operate in the repatriation shuttles, and in general it was found that the increased shipping space more nearly kept up with the actual flow of repatriates into V Amphibious Corps ports from the other areas in JAPAN.

During the period between 22 September and 30 November, over 570,000 Japanese repatriates returned to JAPAN through V Amphibious Corps ports, and over 300,000 repatriates were moved out of JAPAN. Repatriation into JAPAN will undoubtedly be a continuing program for many months, because of the large numbers in CHINA and the Pacific islands at the close of the war. However, reports indicate that the repatriation of Chinese nationals will be virtually complete by the middle of December, and that another four months will see the return of the great majority of Koreans now in JAPAN.

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