

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when
filled out)

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT No. **48**

VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1 NONE				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
NONE				

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
F3P-5	250	250	3.7	400	350		15,320			16

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over			X	
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm				X
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm				X

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudes

TURN
DIVE
CEILING
RANGE
PROTECTION
ARMAMENT

No Comparison.

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Machine shops S. of Omura A/P (b) Time Over Target(s) 1700 I (Zone)
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target Haze
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Haze (e) Visibility 10-15
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide Bomb Sight Used M-23
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run 6 Spacing salvo Altitude of Bomb Release 2500 yds. slant range.
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed X Probably Destroyed X Damaged X

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

Four divisions, diving from north to south with some variation for tactical reasons, were briefed on and took as their targets machine and/or replacement shops south of the A/P. Photos taken by Bom Com III revealed same undamaged. Direct hits were made and one building known to have caught fire. The planes however did not hang around to observe results.

SugarAble Sugar left burning and PT boats left dead in water.
(See Narrative).

(p) Were Photographs Taken? _____ Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " " " Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " " " Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

Omura A/P, assigned to AC-12 among others to be covered by fighter sweeps, presents a controversial issue. The fighter sweep herein reported observed three planes S/E near the Hangars and five Bettys in revetments East of the field. Photo coverage made the same day but not available for this flight revealed some 200 planes in all, some 40 being on the field. The pilots were briefed to make one dive only, fire their rockets, rendezvous and return. The reasoning behind the briefing was that according to orders they were first to observe Sasebo and then proceed to Omura. It was thought that with a radius of 250 miles and a long return over the Japanese homeland at dusk a reserve of gas was wise in case opposition was encountered. Sasebo was duly observed and 2 large unidentified warships reported, there being a smoke screen over the entire harbor. After the dive on Omura, shipping was observed, one Sugar Baker left burning furiously aft from a strafing and 4 large (75'-100') and 4 small (25'-40') out of 26 fast torpedo boats left dead in the water. A/A at Omura was intense and accurate and reported by pilots as worse than Rabaul or Truk.

The criticism was made by some not in authority that there was no excuse for only one dive being made and for not observing the planes that were there, and that intense A/A was the determining factor which pointed to dereliction of duty or was at least no excuse. It is suggested by this ACI Officer that due to the length of the hop, location, time of day, and lack of knowledge that the briefing was not faulty. It is a well known fact that when firing rockets a pilot gets his target in his pipper and sees little else. It is interesting to note that a flight of 18 fighters the following day, from WF-12, knowing exactly where the planes were made but one run and destroyed not more than 10 planes. It has also been indicated unofficially from higher echelons, that Omura with all its installations is not a target for carrier based fighters on a sweep.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor, Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

No Comments.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

T. H. MORDAN, Lt., USNR
A. C. I. Officer.

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

APPROVED BY:

R. H. DEMOFF, Lt., USNR
Commanding Officer.

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

13 May 1948

DATE