

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 421
(Jap Intell No 27)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 22 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Activities of "D" Department, 5th Section
Naval General Staff.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Captain SANEMATSU, Y. chief of the "A" Department, 5th
Section of Naval General Staff, which handled economic
and other kinds of intelligence concerning United States.

1925 - Graduated from Naval Academy
1926-34 - Routine Naval duties
1934-36 - Naval War College
1936-37 - Aid to Naval Minister
1937-39 - Attached to Naval General Staff
1939-40 - In United States where he studied at Princeton
school of politics and history.
1941-42 - Interned in United States
Aug. 1942 - Aug. 1945 - Head of "D" Department, 5th Section
Naval General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building, Room 554

Interrogator: Major R. S. SPILMAN, JR., AC.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY:

1. The "A" Department of the 5th Section of Navy General
Headquarters was responsible for intelligence concerning the U.S.
covering:

- a. Overall economic capabilities
- b. Morale of the U.S. public
- c. Effectiveness of political leadership
- d. Production and capabilities of U.S. equipment except air.
- e. Propaganda
- f. Japanese bombing of U.S. industry

2. Principal sources of information were:

- a. Military attaches in foreign countries
 - b. Interception of U.S. broadcasts
 - c. U.S. publications
 - d. German estimates of U.S. economic
- Secondary sources were U.S. prisoners and captured equipment

3. Navy intelligence on U.S. is considered more thorough than
Army intelligence since the navy had been preparing for war with U.S.
for years while the Army had been pre-occupied with RUSSIA.

RESTRICTED

421-1

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Captain SANEMATSU, Y., IJN.

Q.1. Describe the duties of the "A" Department of the 5th Section and distinguish between duties of "C" and "D" Departments.


A. The "D" Department followed American Air both Army and Navy and the order of battle, strength capabilities of U.S. Air.

The "C" Department followed production of equipment other than Air, its capabilities and order of battle of ground and naval forces.

The "B" Section was vacant.

The "A" Section followed the overall economic capabilities of the U.S., the morale of the people, the effectiveness of political leadership, had charge of propaganda, and generally the ability of the U.S. to wage war. It furnished much of the background for the estimates made by the "C" and "D" Departments.

Q.2. Give the organization and strength of the "D" Department.



Q.3. How were the reserve officers of your section chosen?

A. Personnel assigned them. We asked for men who could speak English and had a background of knowledge of U.S. Personnel however, had other offices who wanted men with the same background and most of the men we got were not too well qualified.

Q.4. What were your best sources of information prior to the War?

A. Military Attaches gave us nearly all. I was not in the Department then and have not served as military attache so I know little about it.

Q.5. What were your best sources of information during the War?

A. Your radio broadcasts. These were analyzed by us and after some experience we could distinguish between fact, propaganda and attempts to mislead us. Other Departments listened to the broadcasts, transcribed them and sent them to my section which analyzed them.

Newspapers and publications were very helpful. We got few of them physically, but they were analyzed by our men in neutral countries and the gist of them sent by radio to us.

German estimates of U.S. economic capabilities. At first I thought the Germans underestimated your capabilities, but just before the Normandy invasion I thought they had begun to overestimate your power. This was very significant to me.

Q.6. When did you begin to think we could make more than 75,000 planes per year?

A. That is hard to say. We had to figure on such things as raw materials, new factories, manpower, coal production and the number of shifts you worked, and it was sometime before we came to the conclusion that you could build vast numbers of planes and ships.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Captain SANEMATSU, Y., IJN, (contd)

Q.7. Did you have any means of communication with South America other than by radio?

A. No, not even before ARGENTINA broke off relations. Before that we got some information by radio, but it was not very good since the people who were sending it were experts on ARGENTINA, not U.S.

Q.8. Did your Department keep maps and charts of U.S.?

A. We were responsible for this and tried to keep up but had little success.

Q.9. Did you question prisoners of war who had worked in war plants before coming into the Army about the work in the plant, etc.?

A. In a few instances we did but got very little information.

Q.10. What information as to production did you get from study of captured equipment?

A. We got some information from this source, but it was obtained by the "C" and "D" Departments and I don't know much about the methods used.

Q.11. Did your section keep detailed files on Naval Officers?

A. We tried to but had little success.

Q.12. Considering the sources of information available to you, did you consider your organization adequate?

A. No. It was extremely inadequate. It was not so much a matter of number of men - I often had more than I could train properly - but it took a year to teach a man enough for him to be of much help.

Q.13. Did the Naval War College give any courses in the kind of economic intelligence you were working with?

A. No.

Q.14. Did your department make an estimate of how much damage our bombardment could do to your own industry?

A. No.

Q.15. Did you make any estimate of what you could do to our industry?

A. Yes. By the time I got there the only method of bombing your industry was with submarine borne airplanes. I knew that if we could wreck all industry on your West Coast it would be worth while, but I knew we could not do it and repeatedly advised against small raids since I thought we could do little damage and a small attack might make the civilians work harder. I recommended that any air power we possessed be used against advanced bases.

Q.16. What pre-war information concerning U.S. industry was in the files when you took over the "A" Department?

A. A substantial amount, but not enough. We had such things as your government publications concerning industry, trade journals, etc.

Q.17. Did submarine based aircraft reconnaissance give you any information?

A. No.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Captain SANEMATSU, Y., IJN, (contd)

Q.18. Which did you consider the better, Army or Navy intelligence concerning U.S.?

A. Navy was better. When, during peace, the Navy was preparing for war the only real possibility was war with the U.S. so we concentrated on that. The army was preparing for RUSSIA. As a result the Navy was better informed on U.S. Also I think the Navy attaches were better qualified than those sent by the Army.

Q.19. When you took over the department did you think the War would last long?

A. I did, and I still think it would have lasted longer if we had handled the war properly. Both military and civilian agencies fell down.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO 412
(Jap Intell No 28)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 16 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Division.

Subject: Squadron (Army) Intelligence Procedure.

Personnel interrogated and background:

Major SAEKI, Akito graduated from Officer's School in 1938 and, following a course at HAMAMATSU Flight School, was assigned to the 7th Air Regiment. In July 1939 he was a bomber (KI 21) pilot in CHINA. SAEKI returned to JAPAN for further air training and remained until May 1943 when he was sent to the WEWAK Area, NEW GUINEA, as Commanding Officer of a squadron of KI 49 bombers. He returned to Army Staff College in December 1943 and was in the General Affairs Department of General Air Headquarters since February 1945.

Where Interviewed: Room 528, Meiji Building

Interrogator: Major R. S. SPILMAN, JR., AC
Lt. Comdr. PAINE PAUL, USNR

Interpreter: Major JOHN PELZEL, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY:

Major SAEKI was a pilot in CHINA in 1938 and 39 and was Commanding Officer of a squadron of HELEN aircraft (KI 49) based in the WEWAK area from May 1943 to December 1943.

No intelligence officer was attached to the squadron and intelligence information was passed to and collected from pilots by Major SAEKI. Orders from Air Headquarters went to the Division, thence to the Regiment, where the various squadron commanders were assembled and given the mission with such photos and intelligence as were available. The Division is the lowest unit to have an officer whose primary duty is intelligence, (usually a Major or Lt. Col.) but he had received no special Intelligence training.

Briefing was confined almost entirely to essential flight data such as approach and withdrawal, radio frequencies, route to and from the target, and weather, if available. A navigation chart with a route indicated thereon and a photograph of the target, usually without annotation, were carried on the flight.

Brief reports were made orally to higher headquarters immediately after each mission and detailed reports were made later in writing.

Very little information was received from higher headquarters and, in NEW GUINEA, due either to a shortage or ineffective use of reconnaissance and photo aircraft almost nothing was known about Allied airfields or installations.

Major SAEKI appeared intelligent and to have a thorough knowledge of his duties in the squadron.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Major SAEKI, Akito, Japanese Army.

Q.1. What was the primary mission of your squadron in NEW GUINEA?

A. Mostly against ground troops. A little night bombing of air-fields.

Q.2. What was the briefing procedure?

A. An operations order from Air Headquarters was sent to the Division, thence to the Regiment (SENTAI) where Squadron Commanders were called together and given the order and available intelligence. The Squadron Commanders then passed this information to their squadrons.

Q.3. What material such as maps, etc. did you carry in your planes?

A. We carried no documents but did carry aerial photos. In CHINA, these were annotated but in NEW GUINEA they were not.

Q.4. Did you have several scales of photographs?

A. Most were 1/40,000 to 1/20,000.

Q.5. What were the facilities for taking photos?

A. A reconnaissance squadron attached to the Air Division took most of the pictures. On the few daylight missions flown in NEW GUINEA, the bombers also took photographs.

Q.6. Did you have photo interpreters?

A. Some interpretation was done at the reconnaissance squadron, but I believe by the squadron officers and not by special interpreters.

Q.7. Did your squadron make an attack on PORT MORESBY?

A. One night attack but clouds prevented bombing.

Q.8. What other intelligence was included in the briefing?

A. Very little besides aerial photos. Sometimes, in a day attack, reconnaissance aircraft were sent out 30 minutes ahead and reported back by radio. This was never done for my squadron, however.

Q.9. Did you have special target area maps (target charts) for briefing?

A. The use of such maps was part of pilot training but we had none either in CHINA or NEW GUINEA.

Q.10. Were FLAK positions annotated on photos?

A. Yes, if they were known, but we had almost no information in NEW GUINEA.

Q.11. Were no navigation maps carried?

A. My squadron carried navigation maps, scale of 1/2,000,000 to 1/3,000,000. These were made in TOKYO from all land surveys and navigation charts available.

Q.12. Did Headquarters have larger scale maps?

A. Yes, for the LAE - SALAMAU and PORT MORESBY areas. We had 1/500,000 maps which were captured, U.S. I believe. Distances were shown in feet.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Major SAEKI, Akito, Japanese Army, (contd)

Q.13. At SENTAI Headquarters was a war room situation map kept?

A. Nothing elaborate. Intelligence and operations were not separate. In the regiment the Commanding Officer performed intelligence functions. At the Air Division level there was an Intelligence Staff Officer, a Lt. Col. or Major, and about 3 Officers or NCOs as assistants. He had no special Intelligence training.

Q.14. At SENTAI level was an Officer assigned Intelligence duties whether or not he was called an Intelligence Officer?

A. No. All that type of duty was done by the Commanding Officer. At the Brigade level some had an officer assigned Intelligence duties, some did not, but they were never called Intelligence Officers.

Q.15. What type of reports were made by CHUTAI following a mission?

- A. 1. Results of bombing
2. Situation on the ground (aircraft, etc.)
3. Weather enroute.
4. Action of enemy aircraft

Q.16. Over the target did you attempt to check actual AA positions against photo annotations?

A. We tried to locate them after returning.

Q.17. Did AA reports go up thru command channels?

A. Yes.

Q.18. Did you receive printed Intelligence material from higher commands?

A. Yes, a report from the Division about every 10 days (The general war situation, results of bombings, future predictions).

Q.19. Did you give information to pilots prior to a mission, on the following subjects?

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Rendezvous. | a. Yes. |
| 2. Weather. | a. We received the best available, if any. In the air we sometimes received weather from various stations but communications were very poor. |
| 3. Approach attack and withdrawal, specific information? | a. Yes. |
| 4. Was consideration given to wind direction and velocity? | a. We usually had no wind information. Determining factors were: 1 the lay of the land 2 the best way to avoid fighters 3 the best way to avoid AA 4 the most effective bombing approach. This was the main factor since we often had no information on the others. |
| 5. Navigation - was a specific route drawn on a map? | a. Yes. We carried it with us. |
| 6. Communications, frequencies etc. | a. Yes. The communications member of the crew was so briefed. |
| 7. Air-Sea rescue facilities and survival information? | a. No instructions were given but some survival equipment was carried. |
| 8. Were pilots given specific ditching instructions? | a. No special instruction was given to pilots. No procedure was outlined. |

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Major SAEKI, Akito, Japanese Army, (contd)

Q.21. What was the specific nature of reports made by the squadron?

A. First a verbal report was made then a written one which contained details of fuel consumption, ammunition expended, results of bombing, etc. (This was a very full report on forms prescribed at Brigade level and seems to have included nearly everything contained in our detailed reports from squadron and group level).

Q.22. Could we get one of those forms?

A. These were made up by each Regiment or Brigade and were not standardized.

Q.23. In your pilot training was any study made of Intelligence procedure?

A. None. We learned something of enemy tactics and plane capabilities, however.

Q.24. Did you think that the information you received (considering what was available) was adequate?

A. In the Japanese Army, not enough thought was given to Intelligence.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO 374

PLACE: TOKYO

Jap Intell No 29

DATE: 17 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Procedure and functions of Aviation Unit of Section Five, Naval General Staff, 3d Department.

Person Interviewed and Background:

TAKITA, N., Commander, IJN.

1932: Graduated from Naval Engineering School at MAIZURU.

1932-1940(May): Duty aboard CHOKAI, IZUMO, YAGUMO and SORYU.

1940(May): Sent to Boston as a language officer and studied engineering at Harvard.

1941(Nov): Sent to BRAZIL as Assistant Military Attache.

1942(August): Returned to JAPAN.

1942(Sept): Became Staff Engineering Officer of DesRon One.

1943(July): Became Staff Engineering Officer for CruDiv Eight.

1944(Jan): Joined OPFAMA Air Group as training officer. This label was a guise to permit the Commander to study aviation engineering.

1944(July): Became Staff Engineer and Maintenance Officer of CarDiv 4(ISE and HYUGA)

1945(March): Attached to Naval General Staff.

1945(June): Placed in charge of "D" unit(aviation) of Section Five(Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI), 3d Department Naval General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None

Summary:

Commander TAKITA spent 18 months just prior to the outbreak of War in Boston during which time he studied engineering at Harvard. In November 1941 he left for BRAZIL where, as Assistant Military Attache, he combed American newspapers and magazines for useful information until the Japanese Embassy in Brazil was closed late in January 1942.

When, two months before the War ended, he became the officer in charge of unit "D"(aviation) of Section Five, 3d Department, he continued the program of this subdivision--regular estimates of U.S. Navy air strength on both carriers and land bases. None of his 15 reserve officers was specially trained for the job.

The main sources of information relied upon by this aviation unit were news broadcasts from San Francisco and call signs found in crashed planes. Crews of crashed planes, both Army and Navy, were interrogated, but almost no useful information resulted.

RESTRICTED

374-1

Interrogation of Comdr. TAKITA, N., IJN.

Q.1. Are you a flier?

A. No.

Q.2. You spent some time in U.S. How long were you there?

A. Eighteen months in Boston from May 1940 to November 1941. I studied engineering at Harvard, having been sent by the Navy. Our Embassy made the necessary arrangements.

Q.3. And you were in BRAZIL, too?

A. Yes, from 3 December 1941 to 3 July 1942. I was Assistant Naval Attache until the Embassy was closed at the end of January 1942.

Q.4. When you joined the Naval General Staff in March 1945, you were in Part "D" of Section 5 of the 3d Department?

A. Yes. Fifteen officers were in "D" with responsibilities divided thus: 3 worked on planes, 3 on dispatches, 3 on radio news, 2 on European questions, 1 on CHINA, and 2 on Order of Battle. They were Reserve Ensigns and Lieutenants (jg). I was the only regular. These officers had no previous specialized training before joining the Section. Some were established in economics and law, but most of them were just out of school. They had no training in mechanical engineering.

Q.5. Why were you chosen as head of the Section?

A. For no other reason than that I had spent 18 months in the U.S. and was an engineer.

Q.6. What was the relation between your Section and the comparable Army one?

A. The Sixth Section, 2d Division did the same work in the Army but we did not work or confer with it.

Q.7. How did you work with KOKU HOMBU?

A. We sent them raw materiel without processing or evaluating it. It was mailed to the general affairs Section of KOKU HOMBU.

Q.8. What were the sources of information for each subdivision of your Section?

- A. (1) Radio news came from 3d Department and DOMEI.
(2) Magazines and news articles from neutral sources.
(3) Captured documents from downed planes.
(4) Interrogation of Prisoners-of-War.
(5) Dispatches from the field.

I was only in the Section the last 2 months of the war, but I think the sources of information were the same earlier.

Q.9. Of these sources, which was the most useful?

A. Radio news.

Q.10. What radio news helped you most?

A. San Francisco short wave broadcasts. These were general news broadcasts on which we based our statistical studies.

Q.11. Did you accept as true these San Francisco broadcasts?

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. TAKITA, N., IJN (contd)

A. We felt they were padded and based our conclusions on an analysis of records kept over a long time.

Q.12. How much did you believe the figures were padded?

A. In general we thought they were doubled.

Q.13. Was the greatest effort of the 15 Officers in your Section placed on the study of these broadcasts?

A. Yes.

Q.14. How would you use the transcripts of news supplied you by the 3d Department and DOMEI?

A. We would compare the broadcast figures with figures we knew, such as the number of planes we counted on the raids described in your broadcasts.

Q.15. After you completed your studies and made your analysis what did you do with your reports?

A. We turned them in to the Chief of the 5th Section who turned them in to the head of the 3d Department.

Q.16. We would like to have copies of these reports.

A. They have been burned.

Q.17. We found some documents, IJN, at KOFU. Do you think any copies of your reports may be included among them?

A. No.

Q.18. Were specific requests made to you for particular studies?

A. Yes, on infrequent occasions. They might ask us, for instance, the Allied plane strength at a particular base.

Q.19. Who made such requests?

A. The Staff of the Combined Fleet. Requests were usually made and often answered by telephone.

Q.20. On what did you base your estimates?

A. The number and size of fields, the U.S. Units based at the field, and our knowledge of the number of planes you had in your units.

Q.21. Did you keep regular up-to-date estimates of Allied plane strength on various bases.

A. Yes, we made monthly estimates and in this way we kept our figures revised.

Q.22. In making these estimates how did you know what units we had on what fields?

A. San Francisco broadcasts and use of call signs picked up in crashed planes.

Q.23. You mean that you got the names or numbers of U.S. Units on particular fields from San Francisco Broadcasts?

A. We got that data from call signs; the crashed planes would sometimes have the call signs of fields as well as the call signs of air groups.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. TAKITA, N , IJN, (contd)

Q.24. How many fields were there on TINIAN?

A. Commander YOKURU, my predecessor, would know. I don't remember.

Q.25. You have been talking about land based strength. Did you also estimate enemy strength based on carriers?

A. Yes.

Q.26. In October or November 1941, how many planes did you estimate the U.S. Navy had? You were in Boston at that time.

A. I didn't know and made no estimate.

Q.27. At the close of the War how many planes did you estimate the U.S. Navy could operate? How many operational B-29s did you think the U.S. Army had in the Pacific?

A. 3,500 Navy planes
900 B-29s

Q.28. How many B-29s did you estimate were being produced monthly at the end of the War?

A. 150-200

Q.29. From what sources did you base your estimates?

A. U.S. newspapers.

Q.30. Which papers?

A. Not papers. News broadcasts.

Q.31. You are an engineer. Did you study the technical features and performance of enemy planes?

A. KOKU HUMBU and YOKOSUKA technical group were responsible for such information. We got nothing from them.

Q.32. What ship were you on in the Second Battle of the Philippines Sea?

A. HYUGA. We had no planes. I was engineering and Staff maintenance officer of Car Div Four.

Q.33. At OPPAMA did you study aircraft engines?

A. Yes. My job was to acquire enough information to enable me to serve as a staff engineering officer on Car Div Four.

Q.34. What in your opinion was the best U.S. fighter plane?

A. P-51

Q.35. What did you consider the best Japanese fighter plane?

A. SHIDEN (George II).

Q.36. What new Japanese planes were planned at the end of the War?

A. I did no work on such planes myself, but I knew we were developing a jet propelled plane.

Q.37. Did you think the U.S. was interested in jet propelled planes?

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. TAKITA, N, IJN, (contd)

A. We knew of the P-80 from your news releases and were waiting for it.

Q.38. What did you think was the state of development of the Atomic Bomb?

A. I knew nothing about it.

Q.39. We want to know about your work in BRAZIL.

A. I got there on 3 December 1941 and War broke out on 7 December 1941. Until I left for JAPAN on 3 July 1942, I was confined, once the Embassy was closed at the end of January.

Q.40. What were your duties before the Embassy closed, your duties from 3 December 1941 to the end of January?

A. Collecting information from American magazines and newspapers.

Q.41. What sort of data did you get from these sources?

A. Ship sinkings, riots in California, etc. I would underline the important things in red and pass them to the Naval Attache.

Q.42. What were your instructions upon reporting to BRAZIL?

A. I had none.

Q.43. Who was the Naval Attache?

A. A Navy Captain. I forget his name. I was a Lieutenant then.

Q.44. What sort of reports did the Attache make and to whom did he send them?

A. Reports were sent by dispatch to the Navy Ministry. I don't know their nature.

Q.45. Did you aid in interrogating prisoners at the end of the War?

A. Yes.

Q.46. What questions did you ask them?

A. I asked them to what unit they were attached, where they were based, and what their strength was.

Q.47. How many times were you at OFUNA for interrogations?

A. Three to four.

Q.48. How many Prisoners-of-War did you query?

A. 20-30. I questioned the new arrivals, including both Army and Navy.

Q.49. How many of the 20-30 were officers, how many enlisted men?

A. I don't know. I questioned more officers than men. I don't know their ranks. One was a regular Navy Commander. Mostly they were Junior Army Officers.

Q.50. Did they tell you their units and where they were located?

A. Yes.

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. TAKITA, N., (contd) -----

Q.51. How did you get information from them.

A. Just interrogated them.

Q.52. And they answered you questions?

A. Yes, the routine ones.

Q.53. And what would you do to make them answer questions that were not routine?

A. Nothing. They almost never had really useful information and we were not too interested in prisoners. There was not enough respect for intelligence by the Japanese. Personnel were supplied haphazardly and they were untrained. There was no system and not much of an audience in high places for intelligence once it was obtained.

RESTRICTED

374-6

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO 455
(Jap Intell No 30)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 27 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USSRS.

Subject: Activities of Naval Attache Staff, Washington,
Before Pearl Harbor Attack.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Rear Admiral YOKOYAMA, Ichiro.
Dec 1, 1930: Promoted to Lt. Comdr, Attached to the
Navy Ministry (Bureau of Military
Affairs).
May 1, 1931: Language Officer in the U.S.
May 2, 1932: Assistant Naval Attache to Washington
Oct 1, 1933: Recalled to Japan
Nov 16, 1933: Attached to the Navy Ministry
(Bureau of Military Affairs).
Nov 15, 1935: Promoted to Commander
Dec 15, 1936: Staff Officer of 5th Destroyer
Squadron
Aug 15, 1940: Attached to the Naval General Staff
Sept 10, 1940: Naval Attache to Washington
Nov 15, 1940: Promoted to Captain
Aug 21, 1942: Returned to Japan by the exchange
ship, the GRIPSHOLM.
Aug 26, 1942: Attached to the Naval General Staff
Nov 14, 1942: Captain of the "U A" (light cruiser)
Oct 5, 1943: Secretary to the Minister of the Navy
May 1, 1945: Promoted to Rear Admiral
May 20, 1945: Attached to the Naval General Staff
Aug 14, 1945: Attached to the Navy Ministry

NOTE: Rear Admiral YOKOYAMA, first went to Washington in
1932 and again in 1940 and was included among the surren-
der Envoys to MANILA.

Where Interrogated: Heiji Building, Room 712

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACELFORD

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY

Allied Officers Present: None.

RESTRICTED

455-1

RESTRICTED

SUMMARY

Rear Admiral YOICUYAMA was the Naval Attache in Washington during the year preceding the Pearl Harbor attack and according to him his instructions from the Naval Ministry upon leaving Japan were to concentrate his attention upon preventing war with the UNITED STATES. In addition to working with the Ambassador toward this end, he and his two assistants performed the usual Japanese function of collecting what information they could from magazines, newspapers and other publications. Reports were made to the Naval General Staff not periodically, but when information warranted. On the subject of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the former Washington Attache said that it came to him as a surprise and that he had provided none of the information used in connection with the blow.

Q.1. What were the most important sources of information and information-gathering agencies for military operational information, in the order of their importance.
a. before the war; b. after the war had started?

A. Speaking in terms of military intelligence, I feel that the primary thing is the future. You can employ spies and other various means, but one of our primary worries was that spies would turn counter-spy and be picked up by counter-intelligence. America being what it is with freedom of the press, etc., a great deal of material comes out in magazines and newspapers. By this method, we picked up much information. Accordingly, that is where I laid my primary stress.

Q.2. Would you say that applies equally to the periods prior to, and after the war started?

A. Before the war. I had no connection with the intelligence system after the war started because I came back by the exchange boat, the GRIPSOLM.

Q.3. Were your Naval Attaches fairly effective in gathering military information before the war?

A. Before answering that question, I would like to explain that when I got my orders to leave for Washington, Admiral OIKAWA, then Navy Minister, informed me that "usually the job of naval attaches was to secure military information; that was their primary aim. However, the situation being what it is now, I want you to proceed on the basis that we are not wishing to fight with America; we do not want to; we are not going to. I don't care anything about military information. What I want to get across is the fact that there will not be war between the U. S. and Japan." I left on the 4th of October 1940, after the Tri Partite Pact was signed. I understood Admiral NOGURA would probably become Ambassador to Washington, and I was to assist NOGURA to the greatest extent I could in aiding a peaceful solution. Admiral OIKAWA explained further that despite the signing of the pact, the American people feeling toward the Pact as they did, the situation was becoming worse. He wished me to help solve the matter in peace. As Naval Attache, I had permission to assist Admiral NOGURA to the full extent, regardless of gathering information. I did not attempt primarily to collect military intelligence. Accordingly I passed along information appearing in newspapers and magazines, but did not create any extra organizations aside from those that were already on hand.

Q.4. What was the size of your Naval Attache group in Washington at that time?

A. Two assistant Naval Attaches and about five secretaries.

Q.5. What were their primary duties?

A. To collect information from magazines and newspapers and to aid me in my primary task of helping the Japanese-American situation as much as possible.

Q.6. I understand that when you came back to Tokyo, not possibly immediately but later, you came into the position where you were in charge of Naval Attaches. I want to speak generally about Naval Attaches, not especially in Washington, but the general organization. What was the approximate size of the Imperial Japanese Navy Attache

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd) - - - -

Corps before the war started? How many officers would have been assigned to that type of duty?

A. The position I had here as Secretary to the Minister of the Navy had no immediate connection with information-gathering from foreign sources. I think you are misunderstanding the position I was in.

Q.7. Do you know, from any sources, how many officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy were assigned attache duties before the war started?

A. I submitted a list of all naval attaches some time ago. I believe if you look over that list, you will find your information there.

Q.8. Do you know how, and by whom, attaches were selected and assigned?

A. The selection is made by the head of the Bureau of Personnel, but in consultation with whom, I do not necessarily know. He must certainly have discussed these with the Minister of the Navy and the Head of the Naval General Staff. To repeat, the selection is made by the Head of the Bureau of Personnel.

Q.9. To whom did you submit your reports when you were in Washington?

A. Usually, to the Head of the 3rd Section of the Naval General Staff. Sometimes, to the deputy head of the Naval General Staff.

Q.10. Who issued instructions to you?

A. The Navy Minister and the Head of the Naval General Staff.

Q.11. Did naval attaches have any special training before they left for their foreign posts?

A. No.

Q.12. When you say there were no instructions given, am I to understand that there was no indoctrination of any kind or any short course as to what might be expected and desired of them?

A. Prior to leaving, they were attached to the Naval General Staff and given a desk in the 3rd Section. At that time, they have an opportunity to look over the files and brush up on the general situation in the country to which they are to be assigned.

Q.13. What routine reports were required of you while you were naval attache to Washington?

A. None.

Q.14. Did you report whenever you considered it necessary?

A. Yes, whenever I wanted to report, I did. There were no periodical reports.

Q.15. What type of thing did you report?

A. My principal mission was to assist Admiral NOGUCHI in

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd)

the achievement of a peaceful settlement of the difficulties between our two countries.

Q.16. Did you report from time to time on the progress of that?

A. The main issue was dispatched by Admiral NOGURA. I reported the general trend, especially its important aspects, making some suggestions. In line with my principal mission, given to me by Admiral CIYAWA, I was in favor from the beginning of commencing negotiations as soon as possible. I dispatched reports to that end to the Navy in Tokyo, suggesting they get conferees over as soon as possible. Reports aside from those I have mentioned were mostly factual information which appeared in periodicals and newspapers.

Q.17. Were any other reports, centering interest in these other sources of information, made by the Naval Attache's Staff in addition to your own reports?

A. Everything went through me; no other reports were made by others.

Q.18. Did you, as a matter of policy, include in your reports findings of your two assistants and other members of your staff from newspapers, magazines, etc.?

A. Yes.

Q.19. Would the ambassador send your reports directly to the Naval General Staff or to the Navy Minister?

A. I had a direct line to the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff. I did not have to go through the ambassador.

Q.20. You would send all your reports directly, and never by the ambassador?

A. I did not believe there were any reports that were of sufficient importance to go through Admiral NOGURA's hands.

Q.21. In the light of your own career as a naval officer, would you consider that you sent back to Tokyo, from Washington, any information that was of particular military value?

A. I believe I submitted the most important report after coming back to Tokyo. In it, I stated that the Japanese Government and people were too confident of victory. I knew the vast capacity of American production, the Navy and Air Force. I expected a severe counter-attack was imminent and I warned Japan's officers of this.

Q.22. How was this report received in the "higher councils" here in Tokyo?

A. Anybody could see it. It was not a special report. Naturally, however, I had to report to the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. They could take that material as they wished. I do not know how they disseminated my report.

Q.23. Wasn't it a rather unpopular sort of report?

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of R. Adm. YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd).

A. Yes, I believe so. But I knew America as I had spent some time there.

Q.24. When did you learn of the plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. After the operation had been executed, from American radio broadcasts. It was a complete surprise to me.

Q.25. With regard to the wider and more general field of naval attaches and the gathering of information, did you feel that naval attaches were able to gather much militarily important information before the war?

A. I am not qualified to answer that because I was only conversant with Washington and how it worked there. I believe it was really inadequate, the quality of information that was received from abroad.

Q.26. Were there any particular reasons why it was inadequate?

A. In Washington, I believe it was inadequate. Our primary mission was to avert war. If we had attempted to gather military information, we could have done more, but our primary concern was to avert war, and most of our efforts were in that direction.

Q.27. At what time did you feel that war with the U.S. was inevitable?

A. I never dreamed that the Japanese would strike America first. I thought that as negotiations broke down something might happen in SIA or possibly in the PHILIPPINES or MALAYA, but I never believed "they" would make such an attack. Until Secretary of State HULL's message of 26 November, I felt quite hopeful.

Q.28. Did you believe there was a chance of averting war until the time of this message?

A. If I were premier, I could have done that. I was helpless as a naval attache.

Q.29. Did you feel that the situation could have been saved and that war was an unwise move for Japan?

A. If both countries had considered the situation very coolly, I believed the war could have been prevented.

Q.30. Looking back on your experience in Washington, what did you consider the outstanding causes or issues which precipitated the war? What were the issues that could not be settled?

A. The China problem was the most difficult. Free trade and other difficult points also contributed, but I felt they could be solved.

Q.31. What concessions by the U.S. at that time did you feel might have averted war? Did you have any specific instructions? Your primary mission was to assist in these negotiations. Were you being instructed from Tokyo?

A. The ambassador was instructed by the foreign minister, and he asked my opinion, and I assisted him.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of R. Adm YOKOYAMA, IJN, (contd)

Q.32. What concessions on the part of the U.S. might have saved the situation?

A. Compromises regarding the China program.

Q.33. What would that involve?

A. As President Roosevelt told Admiral NOGURA, the president would become the intermediary in the negotiations between China and Japan.

Q.34. Did you have Lt. Comdr. TANAKOTO in your office in Washington?

A. He was there with me in 1933, when I was assistant naval attache.

Q.35. Did he remain in Washington after you left?

A. I believe so.

Q.36. You know Lt. Comdr. TANAKOTO?

A. Yes. He died.

Q.37. Do you know when he left Washington?

A. I do not remember.

Q.38. Well, when was it approximately? Was it 1933? 1939? Later than that?

A. I do not know when he came back to Japan.

Q.39. He is the officer who briefed the Pearl Harbor striking force at "TAMAM DAY" before the attack. Where did he get his information?

A. I do not know anything about that.

Q.40. Did Lt. Comdr. TANAKOTO spend several years in Washington?

A. I do not believe so.

Q.41. Looking back on your experiences in the U.S., particularly to the moment you heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you think Japan had a fair chance of winning a war with the U.S.

A. The attack was quite a shock to me. I did not consider whether it was a "winning" or "losing" war. My principal concern was with regard to my position. I was not familiar with the situation in the home front at all. Accordingly, I did not attempt to estimate the Japanese Government's confidence. As the war progressed successfully for the Japanese, after two or three months, I felt a little optimistic. According to my conclusions, however, Japan had no way to reach "Washington" and destroy all American fighting power. I felt Japan might not lose the war, but she could not win the war, resulting perhaps in a negotiated peace.

Q.42. Recalling specifically your experiences in Washington up to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, did you feel that your work had carried on your work had the strike on Pearl Harbor not been made?

RESTRICTED

455-7

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of R. Adm. YONOHAMA, IJN, (contd).

A. I did not know the real situation in Japan, so my judgment may be a little defective, but, considering my mission, it was my desire to continue negotiations despite the attack.

Q.43. You felt that there might have been some hope in carrying on negotiations?

A. Yes, if Japan would make great concessions and request the U.S. to make concessions - give and take. Then, we could save the situation.

Q.44. What battles or action did you see, if any when you were Commanding Officer of the "IUA".

A. I transported military regiments to RAFAEL. On my way back, a submarine torpedo was fired at my ship, but I made a good evasion and slipped away. It was dark night and raining, and I couldn't see the submarine at all. After that, I was bombed by 16 B-24s at CILABE, "ACACAR". There were no direct hits.

Q.45. How high were the B-24s at that time?

A. About 4,000 metres.

Q.46. What was the approximate date of this attack?

A. May 26, 1943.

Q.47. What was your particular assignment when you were attached to the Naval General Staff in May 1945?

A. Nothing. I was on the waiting list and I had a lot of free time. I had no specific duties with the Naval General Staff.

Q.48. In August you were attached to the Navy Ministry. What was your particular assignment there?

A. I was involved with the ending of hostilities. I was sent to MANILA, to YOKOSUKA to see Adm. SP UANCE, to see Gen. SUTHERLAND in YOKAHAMA.

Q.49. During your naval career, have you had any particular connection with naval intelligence or information systems other than attache duties?

A. No.

Q.50. Did you get any preliminary information that led you to suspect the submarine or B-24 attack previously mentioned?

A. It was a surprise.

Q.51. As Commanding Officer of the "IUA", were you provided with any estimates as to the number and location of submarines in your areas of operation?

A. "I got information that such and such was torpedoed in a certain place, that there were so many enemy planes thought to be in an area and that sort of thing".

Q.52. Where did you get that sort of information?

A. From the 2nd Southwestern Area Fleet.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of R. Adm. YAMAGATA, IJN, (contd).

Q.53. Were you in any further action after the B-24 attack?

A. One of the ships, the cruiser MUKO, suffered a near hit and my ship convoyed her.

Q.54. What was the nature of these missions at that time?

A. Transporting men and materiel.

Q.55. While assigned in Tokyo, while it was not your job to analyze the reports that came in from the attaches, did you read over those reports from time to time?

A. The senior secretary to the Minister of the Navy was very busy, and I didn't have enough time to read over all detailed reports. I merely initialed papers and rushed them through.

Q.56. You didn't read even sample reports?

A. They came in large numbers, and were usually unimportant. I had to sign all papers which were issued from the Navy Department to the Navy, which involved considerable work, so I didn't pay much attention to the attache reports.

Q.57. On your ship, who did the intelligence work?

A. There was no intelligence officer.

Q.58. Did anyone assume intelligence duties as extra duties?

A. A staff officer of the fleet was in charge of the information work, but there was no special intelligence officer on each ship.

Q.59. What were the primary duties of this staff officer who also handled these intelligence duties?

A. Staff torpedo officer.

Q.60. When was the particular nature of those reports from the 3rd Department?

A. They were so comprehensive, I cannot pick out a particular portion of it. Generally they consisted of military information, judgment of situations, organization and location of enemy forces.

Q.61. Were they quite voluminous?

A. Yes, and when they came in, they were in large amounts.

Q.62. Was Admiral ONO or Admiral NAKASE head of the 3rd Department at that time?

A. Admiral NAKASE.

Q.63. Did he visit the Navy Minister very often?

A. No.

Q.64. The information for the Pearl Harbor attack was very specific and complete. Have you any idea as to where and how that information was collected and compiled?

RESTRICTED

~~RESTRICTED~~

Interrogation of R. Adm. YAMAGUCHI, IJN, (contd)

A. I believe that was the duty of the Naval General Staff.

Q.65. From August 1941 until December 7, 1941, were you called upon for any particular reports or unusual information, specifically, requests such as to the whereabouts, size, ability, intentions, etc. of the U.S. fleet?

A. I do not recall.

Q.66. If there had been such, do you think you would have recalled it? Were you asked for specific information very frequently?

A. No, not particularly.

Q.67. Any further information on the Attack at Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I have nothing further to add.

~~RESTRICTED~~

455-10

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, S.F. FRANCISCO

I. TELEGRAPHIC NO. 449 PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell No. 31) DATE: 26 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section,
G-2, USFBS.

Subject: Intelligence Instruction in the Army War
College.

Person Interrogated and Background:

ANNO, Hideo, Major

In Section D, 2nd Division, General Staff. He
lectured several times at the War College.

- 1935 Graduated from Military Academy, assigned
to 43rd Infantry Regt. in HIKOKA.
- 1937 With 1st Infantry Regt. in Tokyo.
- 1939 In Kwantung Army, was in North China for
two months as company commander.
- 1941 Army War College.
- 1943 Kwantung Army - on army headquarters intelli-
gence staff.
- 1944 To 2nd Section Army Staff Headquarters.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Major R.S. Spilman, Jr. AC
Lt. Cmdr. Peino Paul USNA

Interpreter: Major John C. Pelzel, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Major ANNO reported in response to a request
for an instructor in the Army War College. It developed
that he was an occasional lecturer and had little know-
ledge of the courses given in the War College. He was
interrogated on the sources of intelligence concerning
Russia and, in the main, substantiated information
received from other officers previously interrogated.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW: (AMPC, MAJOR)

Q. 1. What intelligence training was given at the War College?

A. There formerly was specialized intelligence training but this was dropped in recent years; some years before the war. I don't know the details of the course. In recent years any intelligence training was a part of general courses. No emphasis was placed on the intelligence end. I don't know much about the War College courses.

Q. 2. What intelligence training was given in the communications course?

A. In communications course we had training in radio intercept and radio security. I don't know the details of the course. When I was a student in 1937 the instruction was very general.

Q. 3. What instruction was given in preparing enemy order of battle information?

A. Instruction was that order of battle is gotten by radio intercepts, P/W interrogation, etc., but no details were given. Although in the Staff College general types of sources were mentioned, the details were worked out in the field.

Q. 4. When you were called on to lecture at the War College what subjects did you cover?

A. The principal things were general economic, political and military strength; tactics and locations of units, etc. I gave only 7 lectures of an hour and a half.

Q. 5. What were your principal sources of information concerning Russia in the Headquarters.

A. Principally (1) Communications intercept; almost no others from Japan. (2) Field Army, its sources were communications intercept, TONINA KIKAN, spys, captured Russian spys, observations posts, etc. This was gathered by Kwantung Army and sent to Headquarters. Reports were sent in every 10 days, both written and by telephone. Headquarters had no special agents; these were operated by the Kwantung Army.


Q. 6. Were agents in foreign countries the only headquarters source not available to the Army?

Yes. These were not very satisfactory, but such reports as were received were sent every 10 days and important information was sent by radio. Russian intelligence was the primary responsibility of the Kwantung Army.

Q. 7. Give staff organization of Kwantung Army Staff?

A. (See Chart on Page 3)

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW: (AUGUST 11, 1945)



In addition a number of officers were attached from time to time. There were sometimes as many as 25 to 30 officers in Section II. Some 20 to 30 civilians and 10 to 12 NCO's were also attached to the second Section.

Q. 8. How much of this staff had primary duty of supervising economic development of Manchuria?

A. A rather large part of the staff. The general section was primarily concerned with military intelligence, terrain intelligence and maps and some economic work. Propaganda section tried to incite many races against Russia by radio, publications, etc. Tokuma Kikan handled undercover agents.

Q. 9. Wasn't the Kwantung Army Staff larger than the staff of other area armies?

A. Yes. This was largely because of the economic duties of the army.

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO: 384
(Jap Intell No 32)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 19 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Organization and Operation of First Naval Air Technical Arsenal.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN

- 1932: Graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo in Aeronautical Engineering. Entered the Navy upon graduation as a regular Naval Officer.
- 1942: Received three months of indoctrination training at the Naval Air Base at Tsingtao in Northern China.
- 1943: Joined the YOKOSUKA First Air Technical Arsenal, 2d Department, KOKU HOMBU (Air Headquarters) and worked with the Airframes Unit to the end of the War.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Mr. KAWAKITA, S.

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY:

The 1st Section of the 2d Department of KOKU HOMBU (Air Headquarters) was organized into technical subdivisions concerned with every phase of aircraft development and research. During the course of the War it studied a crashed F4F, F4U, SB2C, TBF, TBM-1C, and PB4Y-1 and testflew a captured F6F, P-40E, and A-20A. The comparable section in the Army testflew a captured F2A, Hurricane, PBO, B-17D, B-17E, and PBM. On the basis of such studies and flights, detailed information was compiled concerning the performance of enemy planes.

In the case of an enemy plane shot down or crash landing in the Home Islands, the Naval Air Technical Arsenal (1st Section of KOKU HOMBU's 2d Department), if interested, would send experts to analyze it and in some instances they brought back the crashed plane or parts of it for further study at the main office in YOKOSUKA. Only once were technicians sent overseas to make similar studies and that was early in the War when a rather unprofitable trip was made to BURMA to examine a DeHaviland Mosquito oleo. Army technicians, however, made such studies throughout the War and supplied the Technical Arsenal with copies of their reports.

The same organization that developed Japanese aircraft made all of the studies of crashed or captured enemy aircraft until late in the War when a small unit of 3 Officers and 12 to 14 men was specially created to devote its time exclusively to analyzing such planes.

When the War ended, the Technical Arsenal had two experimental jet propulsion planes - the SHUSHI based on plans of the German ME 163 and the KIKI designed by the Arsenal. The SHUSHI employed a liquid rocket engine designed to use hydrogen peroxide for fuel and KIKI had two turbo-driven jet engines.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN.

Q.1. You helped design the KEIUN ("Beautiful Cloud"). Describe it to us.

A. Commander OTSUKI was the chief designer and I helped him. KEIUN was a twin seater, single-engine experimental scouting and reconnaissance plane produced in late 1944 by YOKOSUKA First Air Technical Arsenal. It had an AICHI KEN No 1 engine (AEIT) behind the pilot. The one experimental model was manufactured in late 1944 and test flown in January 1945, but was never flown in combat. The tempo of war was too fast to warrant production of the plane for combat use. Some of its performance features were as follows:

Ceiling: 36,000 feet
Critical Altitude: 30,000 feet
Speed: 400 Kts
Wing Span: 14 Metres
Length: 13.05 Metres
Height: 4.24 Metres
Horsepower: 3,000
Operational Range: 1,500 - 1,600 Nautical Miles
Rate of Climb: 30 minutes to 10,000 Metres

Q.2. When was your plane test flown?

A. January 1945

Q.3. How did the plane perform on the test flight?


A. Satisfactorily, but the engine caught on fire. A safe landing was made, however. Only this one Plane (KEIUN) was ever built.

Q.4. What kind of technical intelligence organization did you have for testing and checking crashed or captured Allied aircraft?

A. I was in the 1st Section of the 2d Department of KOKU HONBU (Air Headquarters). Captain TERAI, K. Was in charge of the Section.

Q.5. Just what was the organization of the Section?

A. I will draw you a diagram. After each subdivision, I will give you a rough estimate of the number of Officers in the unit.



I was in the Airframes subdivision.

Q.6. You have given us a chart showing the organization working on the technical development of your own planes. Was there a similar organization for technical analysis of enemy aircraft?

RESTRICTED

384-2

Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN, (contd)

A. No, but the head of each unit in the organization I have outlined was interested in enemy aircraft and would analyze such parts of the plane as concerned his specialty.

Q.7. What would you do with an enemy aircraft that was shot down or made a forced landing?

A. A B-29 was shot down in ARIAKE BAY on 10 November 1944 and I went along with 10 Officers to study it. They represented the Airframe, Engine, Propeller, Material, Bomb, Machine Gun, Instruments, and Electrical Sections. A pilot and an aircraft engineer from YOKOSUKA also were in the party. It was down in the Bay 1,500 feet from the base. We raised it up and took as much of it as we could to the shore. Small parts were brought back to YOKOSUKA and were studied for about three weeks. The larger parts were left at ARIAKE for study by a second party which later went down there.

Q.8. What interested you most about this B-29?

A. The gun turrets, Norden bombsight, radar (which was examined only by the Army), and communications equipment.

Q.9. Were the bombsight and radar in good condition?

A. The radar was not. The calculating box of the bombsight and some of the communications equipment were alright.

Q.10. What struck you as outstanding about the B-29?

A. I was surprised at the very skilled workmanship and was impressed by the efficiency of the plane. We had examined a B-29 earlier shot down in Northern KYUSHU. In that plane we found a chart giving operational details of the B-29 and some photographs. In the pocket of the pilot was a notebook containing useful data regarding the plane and its performance. From the photographs, we secured dimensions of the plane.

Q.11. Just what information did the operational chart contain?

A. Such data as speed, rate of climb, gasoline consumption, etc. There were many graphs illustrating details.

Q.12. What design features did you find helpful?

A. From the construction standpoint, we were impressed by the rugged character of the plane, its ability to take punishment. Also we were struck by your lavish use of all materials. Unlike us you seemed to have no problem of critical shortages. The machine gun construction was of such a nature that you had remote control which we thought very good.

Q.13. Did you have remote control of guns in any of your planes?

A. No.

Q.14. Did anything else strike you?

A. Yes, the electrical equipment and the turbo supercharger. We had had much trouble with our own supercharging equipment.

Q.15. In earlier years of the war did you study enemy aircraft?

A. In early 1942 we captured, at JAVA, I think, a P-40E which was studied in the same way as we studied the B-29. In addition we test flew it. At about the same time, we also captured the following:

Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN, (contd)

Douglas A-20A
Martin PBM
Brewster F2A
Hawker Hurricane
Lockheed Hudson PBO (1 and 2)
Boeing B-17D, B-17E

All of them were testflown, although the Navy test flew only the P-40E and A-20A. The Army flew the rest.

Q.16. Were any other enemy planes captured or shot down during the War and test flown?

A. Yes, an F6F was taken and flown in OKINAWA. The data was sent to JAPAN. Also shot down and studied (but not flown) were an F4F, F4U, SB2C, TBF, TBM-1C, and PB4Y-1 (B-24).

Q.17. Which of these wrecked planes were brought to YOKOSUKA?

A. F4U, SB2C, TBM-1C. Not much time was spent studying them because we had so much else to do at the time.

Q.18. Did any group devote itself exclusively to studying enemy planes?

A. Toward the end of the war about 3 officers, 3-4 non-coms, and 9-10 men were taken from the Airframe Section to devote all their time to analyzing enemy aircraft.

Q.19. Were any technicians sent to examine enemy planes in outlying areas?

A. In 1942, we sent some to BURMA to study the DeHaviland Mosquito also. The trip was not very successful and we never sent anybody else outside the Homeland. The Army did, however, and supplied us with copies of its reports.

Q.20. What was the relation between the Arsenal and KOKU HOMBUR?

A. We sent our reports to the Headquarters of KOKU HOMBUR.

Q.21. Were regular reports prepared?

A. Yes.

Q.22. Were the reports detailed?

A. Yes, very detailed - drawings, blueprints, etc.

Q.23. To whom in KOKU HOMBUR did the reports go?

A. To the chief of whatever section would be most interested in the report - fighter, dive bomber, torpedo bomber, transport and heavy bomber sections.

Q.24. Who was the intelligence officer of KOKU HOMBUR?

A. Comdr. NOMURA, Suetsu first and then Comdr. IWAYA, Eiichi.

Q.25. Would a copy of the report go to the Naval General Staff?

A. Yes, to the 3d Department - the Aircraft Unit of the 5th Section. They were not very interested in our reports because they were not technical minded.

Q.26. From your study of U.S. planes which fighter did you conclude was best?

Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN, (contd)

A. P-51.

Q.27. Which of the Navy carrier-based planes?

A. F6F.

Q.28. Which of your fighters did you think was the best?

A. SHIDEN, Modified (George II). We didn't have in action any carrier-based planes in the last phases of the War. In the early phases I liked the ZERO 52 (ZEKE 52).

Q.29. What was your program for developing jet-propelled planes?

A. We had plans of the Me 163. We built the SHUSHI from these plans, using a liquid rocket engine. It employed hydrogen peroxide for fuel.

Q.30. How did it perform on its test flight?

A. It went up on first flight to 9,000 feet and the engine stopped. On landing, the plane crashed into a building.

Another jet plane was called KIKA which was to be used as a fighter. It could be employed either as a KAMIKAZE plane or as a standard fighter. One engine was carried in each wing, a bomb under the fuselage (250 kilogram load). It used turbo driven jet engines.

Q.31. What was the top speed of KIKA?

A. 365 Kts at 6,000 metres.

Q.32. How was the performance of KIKA?

A. KIKA had 2 turbo driven Jet engines as compared to SHUSHI's one liquid rocket engine. SHUSHI was designed primarily for attacking B-29s at high altitudes. It could climb to 10,000 metres in $3\frac{1}{2}$ minutes. The endurance of SHUSHI was 5.5 minutes at 430 Kts after reaching 10,000 metres. KIKA's endurance was 37 minutes when flying at sea level at 324 Kts. At 6,000 metres its endurance was 49 minutes at 365 Kts.

Q.33. What equipment or engineering principles that you found on enemy aircraft were used on your own aircraft?

A. We learned that your planes were mass produced and by examining them we found out how to employ certain of your techniques. Examples:

- (1) Stamp forged instead of machine cut parts.
- (2) The elimination of certain washers.

Q.34. How about engines?

A. Our engines were troubled with oil leakage which yours were not. I think we learned something on this point from you, too.

Q.35. Did you gain anything from enemy radar?

A. The Army gained a great deal, but the Navy studied the radar in your crashed planes very little. On the whole, I thought your radar was much more delicate (sensitive) than ours.

Q.36. You have with you some notes and blueprints of the performance of enemy aircraft, performance of captured enemy planes, and data on your own experimental planes. May we have the notes and copies of the blueprints?

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN. (contd) -----

A. Yes, but may I have the notes back when you are through with them? I will get the blueprints to you within a week.

Q.37. We will return the notes. Who in your opinion are the leading Japanese aircraft designers?

A. Comdr. YAMANA (dive bombers) and HORIKOSHI (fighters).

RESTRICTED

384-6

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 431
(Jap Intell No 33)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 20 November 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Operational Intelligence.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Comd. T. SATAKE was assigned to the Communications Department of the Naval General Staff in April 1941 and served there until the end of the war, except for a year (April 1943-April 1944) when he was hospitalized for tuberculosis. Listed as one of his duties was "Part of communication and intelligence concerning U.S."

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS GARY, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. SATAKE discusses methods of communications analysis which produced information useful for operations planning.


RESTRICTED

431 -1-

Transcript of Interrogation of Lt. Comdr. SATAKE, T.

Q.1. Describe the method of analysis of communications volume used by the special section of the Communications Department.

A. This, I believe is the way it operates. This chart shows how we were set up:




The transmissions were received at OWADA and broken down by area. One officer was responsible for making the analysis of transmissions originating in his area, but this man may have up to ten additional officers assisting him depending on the importance and volume of radio traffic originating in that area. The organization was fluid and officers were shifted from one section to another as necessary at the beginning of the war. We had an average of two officers plus some enlisted men making this analysis for each geographical section. This average was later increased to four officers.

Possible methods of analysis of radio interception were:

1. Call Signs
2. Differentiation of Codes
3. Plain Language
4. Volume of Traffic
5. "Procedure Signal"
6. Priority - "urgent", operational priority", priority", "routine", and "deferred"

Volume of traffic and priorities were plotted on a chart, one for each area, something like this:



Transcript of Interrogation of Lt. Comdr. SATAKE, T.

Priorities were plotted with colored pencils and the total volume with a black one. All priorities were plotted, although only two are shown on the preceding page.

We performed the same analysis of transmissions from other countries, Russia, China, etc.

Q.2. Could you describe in greater detail the extent to which you were able to locate the exact area of transmission from a group of Allied ships?

A. Almost invariably we were unable to tell whether the transmission had come from a ship or shore station, but we could tell the general area of the transmission. When you started an operation in the MARIANAS, for instance, you would break radio silence, and we would start a new search in the MARIANAS Area. As far as determining whether transmissions came from a group of ships, we were unable to do this.

Q.3. Let us assume a group of ships is at HAWAII and is going to move to the SOLOMONS. If we assume that the ships are not maintaining radio silence, could you plot the progress of these ships to the SOLOMONS by the direction from which the broadcast is coming?

A. If we bothered to, we could tell by RDF. Also we used characteristics of your operators and other information we could put together. If for instance, the NEW JERSEY was going from one point to another, it would be likely to have a larger volume of communications than another ship. If the call sign did not change for 24 hours, we were able to follow it for 22 or 23 hours. Our operators often became familiar with your operator's idiosyncrasies and the general type of information sent. We could always pick up such information as address, date-time group, addressee, etc. A large unit will often collect or sent out weather information. Such characteristics of units make them easy to identify.

Q.4. Suppose the force is observing radio silence. Communications are directed to the force from its base in HAWAII, but the force is not answering back. Could you tell the movement of these forces by the direction and intensity of broadcasts from HAWAII to this force?

A. Four or five days after the force reached its destination we knew because of the greater volume of transmissions. It was always a question as to the extent on which we could rely on our conclusions.

Q.5. What did a peak in volume of radio transmissions mean to the people at OWADA? What was their interpretation?

A. It represented a crisis, but what type of crisis was completely dependant upon the tactical situation. We could not tell where that crisis would materialize. In addition, you "padded" communications. It was difficult to estimate where you "padded". Take OKINAWA as a specific example. A month before OKINAWA, BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships) had a notable increase in transmissions. Ten days before the OKINAWA operations, there was a marked increase in submarine reports. These are easy to spot because we could get good RDF fixes as they are close in. When submarines changed from routine operational communications to "Urgent", we deduced that perhaps an air strike or landing might be in the offing, depending upon the tactical situation. The BAMS call sign

Transcript of Interrogation of Lt. Comdr. SATAKE, T.

is changed only once monthly, so we could follow it. We could for instance, follow such shipping from the West Coast to HAWAII, and then to the SOLOMONS.

Q.6. Were you able to get information with regard to specific ships, or specific groups of ships, from the interpretation of the BAMS code? In other words could you learn the names of the ships from an interpretation of the BAMS code?

A. Yes, we could.

Q.7. Were you ever able to tell the position or geographic location of a group of ships to which the BAMS transmission was directed?

A. We had to wait until San Francisco stopped and HAWAII, MIDWAY, or the place of its destination started.

Q.7. What were your duties as communications officer of an air group?

A. I was a regular communications officer, mostly concerned with routine air group matters.

Q.8. Did you do any flying?

A. I am not a flyer at all.

Q.9. Where was the air group located during the time you were with it?

A. It is the SAEKI Air Group. The term "air group" is larger in Japanese terms than yours.

Q.10. How many planes were usually attached there on an average?

A. Six flying boats, 12 Kates. SAEKI was one in a series of training fields. Often 20 or 30 men in a training flight would drop into SAEKI. SAEKI was a rendezvous point for flights to the south and had good anchorage.

Q.11. Did you have any assistants in your communications Dept?

A. There was a warrant officer and 26 enlisted men assisting me.

Q.12. In April of 1941 you came to the Communications Dept. of the Naval General Staff (TOKUMU HAN). You were there from 1941 until the end of the war. When did you first learn that definite plans had been made for the attack on PEARL HARBOR?

A. The night before the attack. I was prevented from going home that night. No details were given as to what was pending.

Q.13. Were communications from the consul at HAWAII received at OWADA?

A. I do not know.

Q.14. Were you able to tell from communications which fleet commander was commanding from broadcasts that were received?

A. Admiral HALSEY would use a much greater volume of communications than Admiral SPRUANCE.

Q.15. How were you able to tell whether it was HALSEY or SPRUANCE who was broadcasting?

Transcript of Interrogation of Lt. Comdr. SATAKE, T.

A. We knew which one was at sea from announcements of your radio and press. In addition, we could tell a change in fleets by another method. For a month previous to a change, there would be a preponderance of the "Z" call sign,--consisting of the letter "Z", a numeral, and a blank. There was also a "K" call sign, consisting of "K" and three other letters. The 5th Fleet communications officer had the reputation of being a better man.

Q.16. To what department in the Naval General Staff did you distribute the information developed by the communications Dept?

A. The material that was of immediate importance was sent out from TOKUMU HAN to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, to various other concerned agencies, and a copy always went to the 1st Dept and the 3rd Dept. Our whole analysis was based on probabilities; there was nothing of a definite nature. There was not necessarily a great deal of urgency connected with our estimates. There was wide-spread, varied opinions of the reliability of our estimates.

Q.17. Did the Army have a communications organization performing functions similar to the TOKUMU HAN?

A. At TENASHI the Army had a somewhat similar organization, but we had no liaison with them.

Q.18. Did this organization do analysis and interpretation of naval communications, or did they confine themselves entirely to the Army?

A. I believe they concentrated on air matters.

Q.19. How did the Army get the information developed by TOKUMU HAN?

A. If the Army had a request for information, it probably went to the office of Admiral OZAWA (Chief Combined Naval Force).

Q.20. With reference to the organizational section of the chart, you stated that you had two to four people in each of these divisions. Did you have enlisted men and other people working there also?

A. There were some enlisted men.

Q.21. Were you located at the Staff College throughout the war?

A. We were located at the Navy Ministry until the middle of 1943. We were then moved to the Naval War College, third floor, because it got too full at the Ministry. I was at the Naval War College until the end of the war.

Q.22. How far is it from the Naval War College to OWADA?

A. 50 minutes by car.

Q.23. Was the information brought in by an officer daily, or did you keep up with affairs at OWADA by telephone?

A. We had a direct line and three trips a day.

Q.24. Could you let us have a copy of one of these charts for our files?

A. I believe they are all burned. FUKUSHIMA may be able to obtain a copy and has just arrived from KOREA.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY - RESTRICTED -
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 452

Japanese Intell. No. 34

TOKYO

DATE: 26 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intell. Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Instruction at the KEMPEITAI School at
NAKANO Ku, TOKYO.

Person interrogated and background:

Lt. Colonel NOZAKI, Tatsuo - an instructor at the KEMPEITAI School in NAKANO Ku, TOKYO since 1940. Lt. Colonel NOZAKI graduated from the Military Academy in 1936 and had routine military duty until 1936, then he went to the KEMPEITAI School at NAKANO. He served with the KEMPEI in CHINA and was the KEMPEI representative on the Military Government at SINGAPORE after its fall. Thereafter he came back to Japan and was assigned as instructor at the NAKANO School.

Where interrogated: Meiji Bldg.

Interrogators: Lt. Commander Faine Paul, USMR.
Major R. S. Spilman, Jr., AC.

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Gary, USMR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

S U M M A R Y

1. The KEMPEITAI School on NAKANO Ku, TOKYO, taught no courses covering general combat intelligence.
2. The duties of KEMPEI in the field were solely those of military police, counter-intelligence, and as a part of the military government in occupied areas.
3. Instruction of KEMPEITAI did not cover interrogation of prisoners of war, and if this function was performed in the field, it was upon order of the theater commander.

R E S T R I C T E D

452 -1-

T R A N S C R I P T

Q.1. What subjects did you teach in KEMPEITAI School?

A. Civilian and homeland defense; that is looking after emergencies after bombing, etc. If the military were called in to quell riots, KEMPEI would take over. The primary duties of KEMPEITAI were those of MP's.

Q.2. At what school did you teach?

A. At NAKANO Ku; TOKYO.

Q.3. Are there any other schools for KEMPEI?

A. None in the Empire. There are some schools for enlisted men in CHINA and MANCHURIA, but they do not teach officers.

Q.4. What other courses were taught at NAKANO?

A. Two general duties (1) Military Police (2) Civilian police in forward areas and in Japan. Other topics would include law, thought control techniques, general indoctrination, general police methods, etc.

Q.5. Who was commanding officer of the school when you were there?

A. Lt. Gen. KINOCHITA, Eiichi was head of the school.

Q.6. To whom did he report? Who was his immediate superior?

A. The War Minister.

Q.7. How were candidates selected for the school?

A. In 1936, for the first time, a real school was opened. The primary purpose was to train officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men. Warrant officer training was dropped during the war. Men for KEMPEITAI were chosen for physique, character, and mentality.

Q.8. Did men volunteer or were they assigned to the school?

A. There was a time when most KEMPEI were volunteers but this turned out to produce men who wanted desk jobs rather than real army service. In recent years, both volunteers and assigned men were taken for a 6-8 month course for officers, and a 8-12 month course for enlisted men. At the end of the war there were about 50 officers and 400-500 enlisted men; organized in three companies at the NAKANO School.

Q.9. Describe the organization of the KEMPEITAI.

A. KEMPEI Headquarters is directly under the War Minister; has no connection with the Army General Staff. Under the KEMPEI Chief are the various KEMPEI units.

Q.10. Who handled assignments of graduates of the KEMPEI School?

A. The War Minister makes assignments; he requisitions from the head of KEMPEITAI.

R E S T R I C T E D

Q.11. Describe the operations of KEMPEI in the field.

A. I am not too familiar with field operations, but KEMPEI supports the troops, especially with regard to the activities of the local population. In SINGAPORE I was the only officer on military government duty and was not directly connected with normal field KEMPEI. The Military Government headquarters was in SINGAPORE. It was attached to General TERAUCHI's Area Army with headquarters in SAIGON.

Q.12. Did the Army at SINGAPORE have a regular KEMPEITAI section?

A. Yes.

Q.13. What were your duties in SINGAPORE?

A. My principal duty was to work with MALAYAN police. Mine was a desk job with the Military Government.

Q.14. Whom did you report to directly?

A. Lt. Gen. KURODA who was head of Military Government in SINGAPORE.

Q.15. Did the instruction at MAKINO cover combat intelligence methods and procedures?

A. Only spy activity and counter intelligence generally.

Q.16. Did KEMPEI operate in plain clothes in the field?

A. Not so far as I knew.

Q.17. What have you to say concerning statements of a KEMPEI man captured in the PHILIPPINES that he was given general combat intelligence training at MAKINO, that KEMPEI often operated in plain clothes, etc.?

A. I think there is considerable latitude in KEMPEI operations in different theaters. I know of no general intelligence instruction at MAKINO. Any instruction concerning field intelligence was extremely general.

Q.18. What was taught with regard to treatment of prisoners of war?

A. With regards to prisoners of war, the instruction at MAKINO was that they were to be respected. They were to be turned over to the proper army. This was what was taught. I don't know how it worked in the field; I don't know whether KEMPEITAI did interrogations or not. KEMPEI was under control of the commanding general of the area army.

Q.19. Did KEMPEITAI have many English speaking men?

A. Not many. We employed interpreters.

Q.20. What did you need interpreters for?

A. For contact with the local people, for handling prisoners of war until they got to POW camps, and in connection with such English as had to be spoken in occupied British areas.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 402. PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell. No. 35) DATE: 21 November 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Organization and Procedure, Japanese Army.

Person interrogated and background:

SUGITA, Kazuji, Col.

1920-1922 Military Preparatory College.
1922 For 6 months attached to 37th Unit OSAKA.
1922-1924 Military Academy-graduated a 2nd Lt.
1928-1931 Staff College(as 1st Lt)
1932-1936 General Staff, 2nd Department.
1937-1938 In America as exchange officer.(spent 5 months
with 26th Infantry at Plattsburg)
1938-1939 Traveled through England, Germany, Poland
and the Balkans.(on War Department orders)
1939-1940 General Staff, 2nd Section.
1940 Traveled in U.S., Mexico, Canada. (on War Department
Orders)
1941 Staff Officer with 15th Army, French Indo China.
1942(April) Returned to General Staff.
1942(September) To Rabaul, as Liaison Officer,(2 months
at Guadalcanal with 17th Army)
1942(November) Staff Officer with newly organized 8th
Area Army.
1943(May) Returned to General Staff, 2nd Department,
6th Section.
1945(August) Ordered to Korea as staff officer.(returned
to Japan 3 days after surrender)

Where interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Major R.S. Spilman, AC.
Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul, USNR.

Interpreter: Major J.C. Pelzel, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

NOTE: Col. SUGITA spoke fairly good english. He was
cooperative and the information is believed to
be entirely reliable.

R E S T R I C T E D

402 -1-

SUMMARY:

The Headquarters Organization in the Area Army at the beginning of the war, consisted of the Commanding Officer, Chief of Staff and deputy, over 2 sections:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| (1) G-1 (Rank of Colonel) | (2) G-2 (Rank of Colonel) |
| (a) Operations(2 officers) | (1) Transportation(1 officer) |
| (b) Intelligence(1 officer) | (2) Supply (1 officer) |
| (c) Personnel(1 officer) | (3) Communications(1 officer) |

The entire staff included 10 to 12 officers. A similar organization may exist in a large army (GUN) but all functions are usually combined into a single section. As the war progressed an attempt to increase the number of junior officers (and NCO's) assigned to intelligence was only partially successful due to the shortage of staff officers. By the end of the war, however, all Divisions and most Regiments were assigned an Intelligence Officer or NCO.

Before 1943 Area Army Intelligence in the Solomons was poor and inadequate for operations. The only sources of information were the Navy, which had the only planes in the area and infrequent reports from infantry units. According to Col. SUGITA there was a lack of coordination within the Army, a lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy and a general deficiency of knowledge of modern methods of warfare.

Prisoners captured at Guadalcanal were few and those taken on New Guinea only 2 filtered back to the Area Army at RABAU. An order from the Area Army to forward all captured documents was ignored by troops in the field. The small amount of equipment captured was not sent back to TOKYO for research due to a shortage of transport facilities. No special communications intercept unit was attached to the Area Army.

Aerial photography, after an army air division had arrived in 1943, was confined almost entirely to mapping. A little interpretation was done by officers not specially trained for it. Observation posts and natives supplied some information as to air attacks and movement of troops. No TOKUMU KIKAN unit was attached to the Area Army at RABAU. A KEMPEI TAI Unit of about 100 men was used to police natives and did not contribute operational information.

A consolidated report was distributed to both higher and subordinate commands at regular 10 day intervals.

When Col. SUGITA was in the 6th Section (1943), it was the largest in the 2nd Division having 20 to 30 officers. The Russian Section was a close second.

Transcript of Interrogation: (SUGITA, K. Col.)


Q. Were you chief of the 6th Section, charged with U.S. Intelligence for the General Staff in 1943.

A. No. Col. YAMAMOTO was chief. I succeeded him after 6 months and was chief for 5 months.

Q. In the Japanese Army what is your definition of intelligence (JOHO)?

A. JOHO means evaluation of information. Agencies collecting special types of intelligence are CHOHO (communications), SENDEN (propaganda) and BORIAKU (agents). Liaison must be close throughout these branches. This division is actually followed in the General Staff.

Q. Was an intelligence section set up in at KOMEN GUN (Area Army) in the field?



Q. Below the Area Army is there a similar organization?

A. No. In the GUN (Army) there is only 1 Section combining Intelligence, Operations, Communications and Supply. An especially large Gun might have both sections.

Q. Was the staff organization of the Gun designated by the Area Army or from Tokyo?

A. From Tokyo.

Q. What was the Division (SHIDAN) organization?

A. A Chief of Staff. (Col. or Lt. Col.)
 1 Operations officer.
 1 Intelligence officer.
 1 Supply officer.

This was the set up at the beginning of the war. Later, when Staff Officers became scarce sections were consolidated. In the 17th Army at Guadalcanal there were 3 junior officers in intelligence. In 8th Army Headquarters at RABAU there were 5 or 6. This was finally increased to 10 at my request.

Q. Is the Division Intelligence Officer assigned by the Area Army?

A. He is assigned by the Division Commander, but the Table of Organization is set up in TOKYO.

Q. Are there Intelligence Officers in units below the Division, e.g., a Regiment?

A. At the beginning of the war there were not. Sometimes even the Division lacked one even though one was called for in the table of organization. This was due to the success in CHINA and the ease with which information was acquired there. Toward the end of the war Intelligence Officers or Non-Commissioned Officers were assigned to Regiments and sometimes to Battalions. The 8th Area Army was assigned 5 to 10 Non-Commissioned Officers for intelligence work in the later stages of the war.

Q. In the 8th Area Army, what were your duties?

A. I was at first with the 2nd Division and had great difficulty getting information about your forces at GUADALCANAL from the 17th Army Headquarters at RABAU. So I established liaison with the Navy which had planes and fleet units operating in that area. The Army had only radios, some information from natives and a little from prisoners of war. I interrogated a few.

Q. Did you capture any documents of value?

A. Very few. Some officers were returned to RABAU from GUADALCANAL, to recover from illness and gave us a little about tactics.

Q. Did you have instructions as to the handling of prisoners and documents?

A. Troops were supposed to send documents to Headquarters but it was difficult. They were more interested in carrying food. Headquarters issued orders but the troops didn't carry them out.

Q. What were your duties at Guadalcanal?

A. I went there with 17th Army Headquarters as liaison officer. My main purpose was to acquire information as to the numbers of your divisions and general strength. We got a little from documents and more from break through of our 2nd Division on 14 October.

Q. Were any prisoners taken from the infantry?

A. I don't know. Some aviators were captured.

Q. What other methods did you use to get information?

A. We set up an observation post on the mountains to count planes on the field and the number taking off. In general our information was very poor due to the lack of aircraft, lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy, lack of coordination within the Army itself with small isolated units scattered over the Pacific and a lack of knowledge of modern warfare and equipment.

Q. How did you estimate the strength of the reinforcements we landed?

A. Our information was poor. Observation posts saw a little; reconnaissance aircraft from Shortlands scouted the area and landed at Rennel Island. We estimated also from the number of ships that arrived.

Q. What information did you obtain from wire tapping or radio intercept?

A. Not very much. In RABAU we intercepted and understood some of the reports of your planes to base.

Q. Did you get advance warning of air attacks on RABAU through radio interception?

A. No. An observation post at the tip of the island was able to warn us by radio 10 to 15 minutes prior to an attack?

Q. Was there radar warning?

A. I'm not sure. None that was effective.

Q. Was captured equipment examined and were reports made?

A. Very little equipment was captured and that came under the Supply Section. I don't think it was sent back to TOKYO. The only transportation was by air and space was limited. Some captured documents may have been sent back. I didn't send any.

Q. What information did the 8th Area Army receive from higher headquarters?

A. Most was the general situation at home, in Europe and America. A little on American tactics but we already had the best information on that.

Q. What reports did you send up?

A. After the 8th Area Army was organized (26 Nov. 1942) we sent up, through the Chief of Staff, to Headquarters, information about U.S. forces on Guadalcanal and New Guinea, data on your air attacks. These went out by radio, daily; no written reports. I tried to get more information about your ships, airdromes and aircraft from subordinate units but they failed to make reports.

Q. To what extent did you take aerial photos?

A. Only the Navy had planes in the area until 1943. After that we took photos mainly for mapping purposes since we had no maps of the SOLOMONS or EASTERN NEW GUINEA. Reports were made through the 8th Army to the 6th Area Division which filled them if they could. Some pictures were taken of ground units but they were not satisfactory.

Q. What interpretation was made?

A. This was done at 6th Division Headquarters by officers who had no special training. Changes appearing since previous photos were annotated. Interpretation of infantry positions was not very useful.

Q. What information did you attempt to get from prisoner interrogation?

A. About 3 English speaking civilians were attached. We wanted the number of regiments, dates of arrival, ship movements, aircraft movements and the situation in America (or Australia, or New Zealand).

Q. What prisoners were taken?

A. Most were Australian pilots from New Guinea, captured at New Britain. Only 1 or 2 infantrymen were sent back to RABAU and I did not see them.

Q. What information did you get from natives?

A. Natives came to Rabaul from Buna and Bougainville by canoe with information about your coastwatchers and parachute troops. Natives were friendly until we evacuated Guadalcanal and Buna then they became unfriendly. Those on New Britain remained friendly.

Q. Did you keep a situation map?

A. Yes, showing daily changes in the front lines. We summarized the enemy situation every 15 days and sent a written report to higher headquarters and to units under us. If there were great changes we made special radio reports. Sometimes estimates of the situation were made by conference of the staff or by the Intelligence Officer alone. They were usually accepted.

Q. What communications intelligence did you have in the 8th Area Army?

A. There was no special unit but some monitoring was done.

Q. Did you have a TOKUMU KIKAN Unit at RABAU?

A. No.

Q. Did you have a KEMPEI TAI?

A. Yes - about 100 at RABAU.

Q. Did they acquire Combat Intelligence?

A. No. They obtained information about natives, whether they were friendly or not. They were in uniform. A small unit was attached to the 17th Army but not to units below that.

Q. In what areas were TOKUMU KIKAN Units operating?

A. In CHINA and MANGCHUKUO but none in the Pacific.

Q. What were relations between KEMPEI TAI and Army Intelligence?

A. We had a daily conference which included both units and Navy representatives and either commands present.

Q. Did you send out technical intelligence information to the field?

A. Yes - what little we had about heavy equipment, bulldozers, large tanks and gun calibres. These reports were sent out once or twice a month to all armies.

Q. What else did these regular reports contain?

A. The enemy situation, friendly situation, location of ground and air units, the general situation and predicted enemy movements.

Q. How many were in the 6th Section?

A. About 20 officers at the start of the war and about 30 at the end, very few enlisted men.

Q. Was this Section divided into sub-sections?

A. Yes but it changed frequently. When I was there, there were:

- (1) American Section.
- (2) British Section.
- (3) General War Situation Section.
- (4) Northern, Central and Southwest Pacific.
- (5) A special Air Section (part of the time).

Q. Was the 6th Section the largest in the 2nd Division?

A. The Russian Section was nearly as large. Many of our officers had studied in Europe but few in America. Our American Section was relatively poor.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 397
(Jap Intell No 36)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 21 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Activities of TOKUMU KIKAN.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Major General HARADA, Hisao, was chief of the Nanking Branch of TOKUMU KIKAN.

Previous to 1939: Had a normal Army career.

1939-1940: Head of Bampa Branch, TOKUMU KIKAN.

1940 (June) to 1944 (Mar): Head of Nanking Branch of TOKUMU KIKAN

1944 (Mar) to end of war: Head of Nanking Liaison Commission with Chinese (Successor to TOKUMU KIKAN)

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Major R. S. SPILMAN, Jr., AG

Interpreter: Major JOHN G. PELZEL, USMC

Allied Officers Present: None.

Note: It is the opinion of the interrogator that while the statements made by General HARADA as to the activities of TOKUMU KIKAN are correct as far as they go, its activities were much broader than indicated by HARADA. His professed ignorance as to the policy is hard to reconcile with his rank and position in the organization.

SUMMARY:

(1) TOKUMU KIKAN was organized by the Commanding General of the China Expeditionary Force and while General HARADA believed that general policies were probably fixed in TOKYO, he could not, or would not say what body in TOKYO fixed them. Military personnel were assigned by the Commanding General of the China Expeditionary Force and civilian personnel were recruited both in China and JAPAN by the Area Army Commander.

(2) In China, the TOKUMU KIKAN had no functions connected with military intelligence according to General HARADA. Its only duties were:

(a) Provide for the physical welfare of the Chinese.

(b) Conduct propaganda and education of the Chinese.

(3) General HARADA stated that all military intelligence was under the control of the Chinese and all counter intelligence was a Chinese responsibility.


RESTRICTED

397-1-

Interrogation of Major General HARADA, Hisao

Q.1. Give the organization of the TOKUMU KIKAN in China.

A. The TOKUMU KIKAN was under the 13th Army which was directly under the China Expeditionary Force. The Nanking Division of TOKUMU KIKAN of which I was chief, reported directly to the 13th Army. The organization is shown below:



Note: The highest TOKUMU KIKAN representative was at 13th Army level. The 13th Army was under the China Expeditionary Army (HO MEN GUN).

Q.2. When was TOKUMU KIKAN established?

A. The various provincial sections were formed as each province was occupied. The TOKUMU KIKAN followed closely behind the Army.

Q.3. Upon whose orders were TOKUMU KIKAN units established?

A. Upon orders of the Central China Army Group. However, upon organization it reported to the 13th Army.

Q.4. Was there any coordinating body to which TOKUMU KIKAN from the various armies under the Central China Army Group reported?

A. Basic policy came from the Army Group Headquarters and directives from the Army Group through the Armies to the TOKUMU KIKAN head. The Chief of Staff of the Army Group issued orders to the Army TOKUMU KIKAN, but there was no real TOKUMU KIKAN at Army Group level.

The main functions of the TOKUMU KIKAN was government. This fell into the following divisions.

(1) Physical welfare of the Chinese.

Interrogation of Major General MARADA, Hisao

(2) The education and indoctrination of the Chinese.

Most of the actual work was done by the Chinese police and the HOANTAI - a special organization for these purposes set up by the Chinese government. The HOANTAI wore uniforms and carried arms. It was organized in each province under the provincial government except that the Nanking organization reported direct to the Nanking government. It had two principal functions:

- (1) Encouragement of industry and agriculture.
- (2) Education, indoctrination, and public health of the people.

Q.5. On what basis were Army officers assigned to TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. Knowledge of China and general economic and political background.

Q.6. Who selected them?

A. The Commanding General of the Area Army. I don't know why I was selected.

Q.7. What training was given the Japanese civilians employed by TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. No training. They were selected on the same basis as the officers.

Q.8. Some civilians were sent from JAPAN. How did the field General get qualified men from JAPAN? Who in JAPAN selected them?

A. A representative was sent to JAPAN who selected men from universities and business. Many came from Japanese civilians in China.

Q.9. What is the relation between the Army Headquarters in TOKYO and TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. So far as I know, there was none. I don't know what went on above Army level. The general policy must have been settled in TOKYO, but I don't know how or by whom this was done.

Q.10. We know that TOKUMA KIKAN was in charge of undercover agents in Manchuria. Did the China Army have a similar organization?

A. No such thing was done in China. We did receive some information of possible military value from the prefectural branches, the police, Chinese people, etc., but we never used undercover agents. Some branch chiefs and the Chinese government may have had agents, but I never did. If any military information came to me, I reported it, but not much came to my attention. The type of information I got was the kind that General MCARTHUR is now getting; the attitude of the people, the cooperation of the leaders, the activity of our own army, etc.

Q.11. Did any information concerning our air activities around CHENG TU or KWEILIN come over your desk?

A. No. I saw no operational information.

Q.12. Did TOKUMU KIKAN have anything to do with air raid warning?

A. No.

Interrogation of Major General HARADA, Hisao

Q.13. Do you know anything about the operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in the Philippines?

A. I don't even know whether there was an organization there.

Q.14. What was the relation between TOKUMU KIKAN and KEMPTE TAI in China?

A. The KEMPTE TAI were organized in China in about the same way as the TOKUMU KIKAN, but the chain of command ran direct to the Area Army. There was liaison between KEMPTE TAI and TOKUMU KIKAN at all levels, however.

Q.15. What part did TOKUMU KIKAN play in the apprehension of agents for the Chiang government?

A. None. If a spy came into the area it was up to the Chinese authorities to act. If I happened to get information I would pass it along to the Chinese governor for action.

Q.16. What, exactly, were the duties of your government Section?

A. The function was to provide advice to the Nanking government to see that the activities followed Japanese policy as to:

- (1) Improvement of living conditions of the Chinese.
- (2) Education and indoctrination. Purely military matters did not concern the TOKUMU KIKAN and apprehension of spies was purely the responsibility of the Chinese.

Q.17. Wasn't some Japanese agency vitally concerned with whether or not the Japanese army was being spied on?

A. This was purely a matter of the Chinese.

Q.18. What was the relation of TOKUMU KIKAN with the Chinese?

A. We worked only through the head men in the Chinese government; the mayors, the prefectural governors, the heads of public safety bodies, etc. Our consultations were on purely civil matters.

Q.19. What changes were made when TOKUMU KIKAN was changed to a Liaison unit?

A. The change was made in March, 1943. After that the TOKUMU KIKAN was a liaison section only, but the organization and internal command channels did not change. The main difference after the change that before, local TOKUMU KIKAN units could deal with local government officials while afterwards local TOKUMU KIKAN units had to come to me and I dealt with the Chinese. Also after the reorganization no Japanese body could deal with the Chinese except through TOKUMU KIKAN.

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SUREVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 442
(Jap Intell No 37)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 22 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Information Available to the Navy.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Mr. E. SONE - A member of the Foreign Office, has served many years in diplomatic work, for the most part in the home office in Tokyo. He has had further experience in the field, however, in SHANGHAI, and in FRANCE.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Major JOHN C. PELZEL, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY

Mr. SONE gives a picture of the low estate of intelligence in Japan during the war, due largely to the suspicion of Army and Navy authorities to the diplomatic agents abroad. Contrary to the American opinion that the Japanese citizens resident abroad with business or diplomatic business were all part of the gigantic spy ring, Mr. SONE maintains that there was no coordination of such information to the advantage of Japanese Military Intelligence. He was not connected with the military interests abroad, and therefore takes no interest or responsibility for anything they did or might have done, and dismisses the whole problem as the concern of someone else.

To illustrate this attitude, he says that it would be up to the military and naval people to report on such matters of intelligence duties as the attaches were merely kept informed of the limited side of such activities. What information was collected by the military agents was jealously guarded by the military interests, even from the military and naval attaches. Such information as came from Germany was discounted for possible Nazi propaganda, and in general the intelligence was discredited whenever it reflected unsatisfactorily on the success and welfare of the Greater East Asia movement. TOJO did not wish to have home-front morale influenced by any form of bad news, and all such intelligence as would become "bad news" was kept in the higher echelons.

Transcript of Interrogation of Mr. SONE, E.

Q.1. What are the specific duties of the Military Attaches assigned to posts in foreign countries?

A. It is rather up to the military and naval people to report fully because they are aware of all the activities of the military and naval attaches abroad, and we are kept informed of the limited side of the activities of these people abroad. They are very jealous that the information is collected by their own agents abroad. As to the military intelligence and information collected by these military and naval personnel abroad, I do not believe, in general, that the foreign office was kept informed. The only exception was, perhaps, in Germany because of their good relationship with Lt. Gen. OSHIMA, the Ambassador. The information collected by the Empire and military and naval attaches office there was exchanged very freely; but in other countries, I do not remember any important military reports being given to the foreign office. I do not know if they reported to their own chiefs in Tokyo; but as to the foreign office, I do not recollect any important or valuable military information given by these people. On one occasion, there was a military attache in TANGIERS, but after the severance of the diplomatic relations between Spain and Japan, he was interned in Spain. That was a very important post. The people there can report the movement of transports and naval vessels around GIBRALTER. Otherwise, it was very difficult for the attaches in other countries to collect information, in countries like SWEDEN, SPAIN, PORTUGAL, SWITZERLAND. The collaboration between the military and naval attaches office and diplomatic missions varied according to the relationship between the diplomats and the officers there.

Q.2. At the beginning of the war, you were the Consul General in SHANGHAI? Did you have military attaches attached there at that time?

A. CHINA is in a unique position. We had our troops there. We had some amount of military and naval officers for intelligence and so forth; but we had troops and the Japanese fleet there, too, and these people, on land in the offices, were not ordinary attaches. The situation is similar to that of the U.S. troops in Japan. Normally, we had military and naval attaches in NANKING, but they were concurrently staff officers of the headquarters. In SHANGHAI, we had a military and naval officers' Bureau, but in diplomatic language they are not exactly naval attaches. For instance, they are not listed in the China Diplomatic Corps; they are not members of the diplomatic corps. They had, naturally, in China several sources of information like the Japanese KEMPEITAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, and others.

Q.3. Did the Navy have an organization similar to TOKUMU KIKAN in China?

A. They did not have a TOKUMU KIKAN in various places, but they had a kind of TOKUMU KIKAN or Resident Officers' Bureau in important places like SHANGHAI, PEKING, and RANGOON, I believe. Even before the China incident they had a naval resident officers' Bureau in these places but their activities were not so extended in general as those of the Army TOKUMU KIKAN. These officers were primarily concerned with the liaison between themselves and the naval landing party or the naval units around that place. These places are posted primarily in important ports. They collected intelligence and so forth. They were not so much interested in administration, but the Army was very keen on it. The Army TOKUMU KIKAN interfered very often in administration by the Chinese local government, but the Navy was not so much interested.

Transcript of Interrogation of Mr. SONE, E

Q.4. What was the primary purpose of the Army TOKUMU KIKAN in China?

A. Before the China incident they were primarily concerned with military intelligence because there were no Japanese troops over there except in the Japanese garrison, which like the U.S. garrison was recognized by the BOXER Treaty. Even before the China incident, I remember part of North China was occupied by the Japanese Army. In those places, under the Japanese occupation, or more exactly where Japanese troops are present, the activities of TOKUMU KIKAN are much more extended. They consisted not only of the military intelligence but also various diplomatic and political activities. After the China incident, Japanese troops were all over there, then TOKUMU KIKAN is an agent of the Japanese Army of Occupation for the administration of the occupied territory; but soon, the Chinese government, local or regional, was set up, and then the activities of the TOKUMU KIKAN were transferred to the supervisory position of the activities of the Chinese government. (Political control). When there is no Chinese government, then the TOKUMU KIKAN is the administrator rather than the controlling body, but after the occupation naturally some kind of local or regional government is set up. The relationships between China and Japan are diplomatic. Although China is occupied by Japanese troops, the troops must keep themselves out of local activities. However, it so happens that the Army did not keep aloof from administration.

Q.5. Did the foreign office have any direct administrative connection with the TOKUMU KIKAN, or was it purely under Army control?

A. It was purely under Army control. There was another body that was responsible for the administration of China side by side with the foreign office. It is the body called the "China Development Board" under the cabinet, under the prime minister. This board had its agents in China, not only in NANKING, but in various places. This body was more directly connected with the Army. Before setting up the Greater East Asia Ministry, which is also outside the foreign office, the foreign minister could, for purely diplomatic questions, supervise or direct the activity of the ambassador and his agents. Japanese agents in China were, moreover, under the direct control of this board, which in turn is more directly connected with the Army and Navy because the president of this board was always a general or admiral. Its branch office in China also had an admiral or general as chief and the other officers of the Navy and Army participated in the administration of this board.

Q.6. Have you ever visited the United States?

A. No, never.

Q.7. You learned to speak English through study?

A. In SHANGHAI. I was in France and my French is better than my English. I have been in France, Tokyo, and SHANGHAI.

Q.8. What contribution did the military attaches in ARGENTINA, MEXICO, and SPAIN make in the way of military intelligence?

A. As I told you, when I came back to Tokyo, our diplomatic relations with South America were already severed, except in ARGENTINA; but even there the relationship was practically severed, so I am not in a position to tell you about our diplomatic missions activities. In SPAIN or PORTUGAL, however, we naturally collected

Transcript of Interrogation of MR. SONE, E.

information, including military information, but this came primarily from the study of papers and magazines and so forth. I believe that in LISBON, for instance, we had somewhat more important matters to study: economic questions, and political questions. We found it rather difficult in Japan to get magazines and papers; and these outposts in Europe collected papers, some of them being sent by post to Tokyo. They studied the questions on this post in LISBON, MADRID, and SWITZERLAND. Concerning questions of the new world, especially the UNITED STATES, the best places for such study are LISBON and SPAIN, with SWITZERLAND and SWEDEN next best. This distinction is not too strict, but roughly speaking, LISBON and SPAIN were America-minded while other places are RUSSIA-minded or EUROPE-minded. But we are not primarily concerned in military intelligence. That is the business of these naval military attaches. We are more interested in political, economic questions. We naturally studied what is the strong point or weak point of American resources, etc. The sources were rather open. By studying the papers and magazines and books, we collected more precise information than the information as given by Spanish people or other international agents who sell information. These sources are not very good, generally speaking.

Q.9. During the time that you were able to keep a diplomatic mission in ARGENTINA and MEXICO, your contacts would naturally have been wide with many people. What provision was made for keeping in touch with those contacts after diplomatic relations were severed?

A. There can be no contact possible after diplomatic relations are severed. It is not possible.

Q.10. Prior to the war various Japanese interests sponsored meetings for the purpose of polling U.S. public opinion on questions relating to the Japanese. Was this arranged through diplomatic channels?

A. I am not in a position to tell you, but generally speaking, I believe that the foreign office also was interested in organizing or giving facilities and assistance to such meetings for the better understanding between that country and Japan. I do not think that was very important, but we are interested in the promotion of character understanding and development between Japan and each country, every country. As to the cultural activities of Japan and the U.S., I am not versed in the matter. We had other agencies of the government also concerned with the propaganda of Japan. For instance, I believe, Mr. MAEDA who is the present ambassador of Education was posted in NEW YORK. He was head of the "Japanese Cultural Institution" in the U.S. We had such associations for cultural development and promotion in foreign countries, called "Association for the Development of International Culture". We had one such, a civil organization, but naturally it obtained subsidies from the government. Such associations are not interested in collecting information or intelligence. Their activities are naturally open, nothing concealed. You cannot compare Japan to the Nazis. Diplomats are agents of the government, and according to the govt instructions, we are interested in intelligence also.

Q.11. Did the representatives of Japanese industry who had offices in the U.S., report directly to your embassy there on information which they had secured?

A. I know approximately nothing about our activities in the U.S. Generally speaking, they are not ordered to report to the embassy. Their activities are quite free, and if there is no understanding between these concerns and the government, there is no reason these

Transcript of Interrogation of Mr. SONE, E.

people have to report to the embassy. There might be some local understanding between the Embassy and these branch offices in each country as to the extent of the information, but generally speaking, these people are not assigned to such duties of collecting information.

Q.12. Would it be possible for the Japanese foreign office to assign personnel to the American branch offices of manufacturing concerns for the purpose of securing better sources of information for the Japanese foreign office?

A. Such an idea cannot be excluded as a means of getting information, but I do not know if such occurred in reality. Getting information does not exclude such devices. Generally speaking, Japanese diplomats are not as expert in collecting intelligence information as that.

Q.13. What useful information did you receive from Germany?

A. We received from the Military and Naval Attaches Bureau of our Embassy in Berlin various kinds of information including military information. We were keen about Germany's ability to continue the war, and defeat Russia. Our diplomats over there were instructed to report as fully and as objectively as possible. The general impression we had was very bad as to the activities of these people for most of them are influenced by Nazi propaganda and this information which they collected was always tainted with propaganda. That was the impression we had in Tokyo. It is impossible to convert these people. We always had to discount Germany's ability to keep up the war. To the information we got from these people about the damage done by Allied bombing and so forth, we had to add more damage. That was the general impression. They were in good relations naturally with the German government, but information collected from these sources was not so accurate. There was always an element of propaganda.

Q.14. What about technical information?

A. We naturally had an exchange of technical knowledge between Germany and Japan, and military technical questions were fairly well exchanged between Japan and Germany, mostly by the military and Naval Attaches Bureau. We got "samples" through the submarines. Operations in that field were not unsatisfactory, but information about German policy was very poor. In Germany, it is very difficult to get information from sources which are not Nazi or government sources. Even if these Japanese agents tried very hard to be objective, and if they are not influenced by Nazis, it is also difficult to get accurate information in a country so regimented.

Q.15. Was Germany successful in sending in technical people and equipment to Japan after Germany surrendered?

A. I do not believe any submarines or any airplanes came from Germany after the defeat. I recollect a report in Allied newspapers that one German submarine surrendered with two Japanese Naval technical officers on board who had committed *hari-kari*. I believe that is correct. It was naturally intended by the Japanese navy to get as many submarines as possible from Germany after the defeat. This was not successful at all, and we could not get any technical men or equipment or patents. I believe my statement is correct although I am not in a position to ascertain.

Q.16. That is true of the period prior to German's surrender?

Transcript of Interrogation of Mr. SONE, E.

A. I am not very sure about that. I do not know if some submarines came from Germany. There were no airplanes. I think it must have been very difficult for German submarines to come to Japan during that period. They came more freely before; 6 months before, I doubt if one submarine came from Germany during that time.

Q.17. The purpose of the conversation this morning is to develop the contribution of the Japanese Diplomatic activities to Japanese military and operational intelligence. Do you care to add to the remarks you have already made?

A. I am not inclined to gainsay what ARISU and these people told you, but in fairness to this question, I must emphasize I am not representing in any way, the Japanese foreign office. You should question army and navy people because, as I told you at the outset, owing to the peculiar interpretation of the situation, our army and navy kept a position independent of the government; and the military and naval attaches abroad also worked independent of the foreign office. Their activities were quite independent of the diplomatic mission so we are not at all in a position to tell you about the activities of these military and naval agents. Perhaps the only exception, as I told you, is in Germany. The ambassador was set up by the army - OSHIMA.

Q.18. Was Admiral ABE there?

A. Yes, he was the naval attache.

Q.19. Was he as effective as General OSHIMA?

A. He could not represent, in any way, the Japanese government, because he was not an ambassador. The collaboration between OSHIMA and ABE was very good. I think you would get better information on military attaches if you would question General ARISUE.

Q.20. I believe that covers all of the questions. Do you wish to add anything?

A. I believe that Japan was not very well equipped with military intelligence after the war began. I believe that is partly the case because of the army's "blind-mindedness". For instance, if we talk about the B-29, its design and mass production, General TOJO was displeased because he thought that we were U.S. propaganda agents. Mentality is very important to consider in evaluating the military intelligence activity after the war. If I am not mistaken, I saw in the STARS AND STRIPES, a statement about Japanese military intelligence after the start of the war, and I think the writer said that generally speaking Japanese military intelligence was very poor. That is true. We diplomats are not interested in military intelligence. We did get some information about American plane production, especially the B-29, which might very well bomb the Japanese mainland. We were inclined naturally to emphasize the importance of the B-29 activity, but military people never like that. They are inclined to ignore such unpleasant news which might make them lose prestige. If the military people are so inclined, they cannot objectively collect good information. They are rather inclined to ignore the dark side of the war. I do not think the military people were very effective in military intelligence after the beginning of the war. We had a better picture of the dark side of the war with diplomats who can see objectively, but unfortunately, we were not equipped to collect military intelligence, so the net result is that military intelligence during the war was very poor.

The Japanese High Command is very capable, I believe, able to study the question with the information collected through diplomatic mission, but from open sources. They may, perhaps, have other sources, such as communications that might help their study, but I do not think it means that military intelligence or operational intelligence was very effective. That was due to the ability of these people to study and estimate your communications. That can be studied with the information which can be very well collected in reading newspapers, etc.

Q.21. There is a popular conception concerning Japanese Intelligence which claims that you were successful in securing information by devious underground means, in addition to the open means you mention. In your opinion, is that conception wrong?

A. I do not say so, but I should like to say that before the outbreak of war, I believe that the Navy was very keen on military intelligence because it was necessary for them to strike a heavy and, if possible, fatal blow on the American fleet. I believe the intelligence then was very much better. Afterwards, owing to the wrong and optimistic picture of the army, owing to the successful continuation of the war, they were not so much interested in military intelligence as they were before the war began. I believe the effectiveness of military intelligence was very much lower after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Q.22. Would you say the reason for that might be the success of the attack?

A. That is one cause of the poorness of military intelligence. Another was that secret military intelligence cannot be successfully planned owing to this physical handicap: We cannot succeed in sending a Japanese spy to the U.S. Had we been Germans, we could very well have sent spies or saboteurs to the U.S. by submarine.

Q.23. However, were there not available to the Japanese a rather large number of westerners friendly to the Japanese who could be obtained in Japan to do that work for them?

A. Yes. That is quite true.

Q.24. Was that possibility ever exploited?

A. Not as far as the diplomatic mission was concerned. As for the army and Navy, I do not know. That is the only source of secret information.

Q.25. The Pearl Harbor attack was well planned, was it not?

A. It was rather a mental surprise for the U.S. to think that Japan would stake her fate on that surprise attack. I think your country was aware of the possibility of attack by Japan against the Philippines, but open attack and the declaration of war which came after the attack was rather too bold for Japan according to your own appraisal.

Q.26. The factor that has interested me most about our conversation were your remarks about the mental attitude of the Japanese and the attitude of the military toward the subject of intelligence, and the fact that the military rather resented information which made the picture look dark.

A. General TOJO was especially very much interested in keeping

Transcript of Interrogation of Mr. SOME, E.

all the dark opinions out of the reach of Japanese general public. I am sure that General ARISUE's division was much more enlightened than the General Staff, but he couldn't very well exploit his information. General TOJO was very much afraid of defeatism in Japan. We in the foreign office got information from our missions abroad, in neutral countries, and also from the listening posts we had in Japan. These were very important.

Q.27. Was short wave or intermediate broadcast more valuable to you?

A. The short wave was the quickest source of new information for Japan. We also had other sources of information more complete.

Q.28. Did you receive the intermediate broadcasts here in Japan?

A. I think so.

Q.29. Who was your favorite news announcer?

A. I was not very keen about that. We were much more concerned with information rather than comments.

Q.30. Would you care to say anything about the mental qualities of the Japanese or why it was that the Japanese did not put greater emphasis on intelligence than they did?

A. An important thing on that point is due to the political non-preparedness of the army and navy to exploit good information, even though it was diminishing in quantity with the general public as well as army navy personnel. You must evaluate important statements side by side with the fact that in Japan, especially during the war, there was no freedom of press, and so the public was kept ignorant of the world situation, and the strategically decisive and dark picture of the war. The War Ministry was trying very hard to exterminate any kind of defeatism in Japan. It must be very difficult for the army intelligence office to confess to General TOJO or the War Ministry the real picture of the situation, and to emphasize the importance of intelligence. If the army was not so much interested in internal administration, it might have been much more observing. As you told me, generally speaking, the military and naval people were very keen on military intelligence. They kept attaches, particularly in countries where such things were possible - they kept resident officers in China to collect military information, so there is no reason why the Japanese military and naval people lacked knowledge or appreciation or importance of military intelligence. When these people are running the Japanese government, they are inclined not to divulge decision of the military situation to the people. Suppressing the information that came into Japan, and influencing the public was second nature of the Japanese military people, and gradually they became blind to objective intelligence.

R E S T R I C T E D
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 411
(Japanese Intell. No. 38)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 21 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Organization of Naval Attache Staff in Berlin.

Person interrogated and background:

SUZUKI, M. Captain.

1922 Naval Academy.
1935 Technical Officer in Navy Technical Headquarters.
1939(March) Assistant Attache in Berlin in charge of
Technical Matters.
1939(Sept.) Returned to Tokyo.
1941(May) Inspector for Ministry in NAGASAKI.
1942(March) Returned to Naval Technical Headquarters.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford, USNR

Interpreter: Major J.C. Pelzel, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

The Naval Attache Staff in Berlin was comprised of an Attache, who was also Chief Technical Inspector, 7 officers as Inspectors, one assistant attache as paymaster, three assistants in the Information (Intelligence) Section, and one (Captain SUZUKI) in the Technical Section. The Technical Section sent inspectors to German plants for information and received from representatives of private Japanese companies copies of and translations of German technical manuals. These, when appropriate, were sent to Naval Technical Headquarters in Tokyo.

END SUMMARY

Q. 1. You have worked on technical matters during most of your career in the Navy?

A. Yes, in the administration of technical matters.

Q. 2. Are you familiar with the organization of the Naval Attache Staff in Berlin?

A. Yes, generally.

Q. 3. When you were in Berlin in 1939 what personnel did the Attache Staff have then?

A. Under the Attache were the following assistants:
Paymaster
Information Section--3 assistant attaches
Technical Section--1 assistant attache (Capt. SUZUKI.)
Inspector--1 assistant attache

Under the inspector were 1 civilian and 6 officer technicians--shipbuilding, engineering, electrical, torpedoes, instruments (civilian), aircraft fuselages, aircraft engines. Each of the officers had a civilian assistant.

Of the assistants in the Information Section, one worked on general intelligence and two on aircraft.

Q. 4. Are you familiar with the work of the "Information Section"?

A. I did not work with it and do not know the details.

Q. 5. Tell us what you know about this "Information Section".

A. When I was in Berlin, they spent most of their time helping prepare the Tripartite Agreement. They also devoted some time to getting information on German aircraft and other weapons.

Q. 6. Did the organization as you have described it remain the same during the war?

A. The number of personnel remained, I think, the same. However, I don't know for I was in the Naval Technical Headquarters upon my return to Tokyo.

Q. 7. Is there anyone in Tokyo or Japan now who has been in Berlin during the last 3-4 years?

A. No one that I know.

Q. 8. What were your duties in Berlin?

A. We were interested in buying high speed long range AA guns and I worked mostly on this project. Insofar as the technical inspectors were concerned, I gathered together and passed along their reports.

Q. 9. What were your instructions when you left Tokyo?

A. I was to be an administrative officer. Prior to my assignment, there had been no administrative officer in Berlin. My job was to pass along the reports of the Technical Section and of the inspectors.

Q. 10. Who gave you your instructions?

A. Chief of the Technical Headquarters of the Navy Ministry.

Q. 11. From whom did the "Information Section" get their instructions?

A. The Naval Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Q. 12. Did you send back many reports to Tokyo?

A. Yes, a great many.

Q. 13. And these concerned technical details of guns, ships, aircraft, and other weapons?

A. Yes.

Q. 14. What were your sources of information?

A. Technicians visited factories and plants in Germany and from them got reports.

Q. 15. Did you spend much time studying German Technical publications and did you send these back to Tokyo?

A. I didn't because my knowledge of German was limited. Neither did others in the Embassy devote much time to them because few knew German well enough. These publications were studied by representatives of MITSUBISHI, OKURA, MITSUI, NYK, YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK, JAPAN BANK, OSAKA STEAMSHIP CO. They would translate them and send the translation back to their companies in Tokyo. Also they provided us with copies of translations which we would send back to the Ministry.

Q. 16. Did such companies have similar representatives in the U.S. at the same time?

A. Of course.

Q. 17. Did you see any U.S. technical publications while in Germany?

A. No, and very few English ones. We were interested in German publications.

Q. 18. Did you work closely with officials in your Embassy?

A. They helped us very little. There was poor feeling between the Embassy and the Naval Attache Staffs because of the Tripartite Agreement. The Embassy Staff worked more closely with the Army Attache Staff than with the Navy one.

Q. 19. Did you receive any reports from the "Information Section" of the Naval Attache Office?

A. No. I gave them copies of my reports, but did not see or handle theirs.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO 422
(Jap Intell No 39)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 23 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Organization of Naval Attache Staff in ARGENTINA.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Captain SHIGEHIO, Atsuo, IJN.

1917: Graduated from Naval Academy.
1938: Appointed Naval Attache to ARGENTINA.
1939: Promoted to Commander.
1941: Promoted to Captain.
1941(Oct): Appointed Naval Attache to BRAZIL.
1942(July): Returned to JAPAN and became Chief of Personnel
Section, YOKOSUKA Naval Base.
1944: Chief of the Personnel Replacement Division in MANILA.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Mr. F. Y. Nakayama

Allied Officers Present: Lt(Jg) EDGAR SNOW, USNR

SUMMARY:

The Naval Attache Staff in ARGENTINA devoted its time to gathering information from American publications and attending diplomatic and social functions. Although TOKYO required monthly reports, they were sent very infrequently and then only when matters of importance were involved, such for example, as the ARGENTINA Neutrality Declaration and movements of U.S. escort vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

RESTRICTED

422-1

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Captain SHIGEMIRO, Atsue, IJN.

Q.1. Is the Officer who replaced you as attache in Argentina now in Japan?

A. No.

Q.2. On what basis does the Imperial Navy choose its Attaches?

A. I was sent to Argentina because I spoke Spanish.

Q.3. Did you have any special training for your duties as Attache?

A. No special training, but I was on the Naval General Staff.

Q.4. Have most of your Attaches had experience on the General Staff before serving as Attaches?

A. Many of them, yes.

Q.5. What were your duties as Attache?

A. I collected information on the Argentina Navy, assisted the Ambassador and added prestige to the Embassy.

Q.6. What were your instructions before leaving JAPAN?

A. To investigate conditions of Naval affairs in South America.

Q.7. Was there any collection of Naval affairs concerning the U.S.?

A. No.

Q.8. What were your sources of information?

A. I collected much data from U.S. publications, newspapers, and magazines.

Q.9. What papers and magazines did you read?

A. New York Times, Army - Navy Journal, News Week, Time, and anything else I could find.

Q.10. Who assisted you with this?

A. No one.

Q.11. Did you examine technical manuals, reports and publications?

A. No.

Q.12. Was there anyone else there who studied such technical manuals and publications?

A. No one from JAPAN.

Q.13. What was the size of your entire diplomatic corps in ARGENTINA?

A. One secretary, one interpreter, three chancellors, one military Attache, one Naval Attache, one Consul, two Assistant Attaches.

Q.14. Am I to understand that you spent most of your time reading American publications, newspapers and magazines?

A. Much of my time, yes. I also attended diplomatic and social functions.

Q.15. What use did you make of these studies of American publications?

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Captain SHIGEMIRO, Atsuo, IJN, (contd)

A. I made only a few important reports.

Q.16. Weren't periodical reports required?

A. Yes, monthly reports, but I neglected to make them.

Q.17. What information were these monthly reports intended to carry?

A. Movements of U.S. fleet units to the Atlantic or Pacific, primarily.

Q.18. What were your sources of information for these reports?

A. Only American publications.

Q.19. Did you get any good information from this source?

A. Not very good.

Q.20. To whom were you intended to make your reports?

A. The Naval Ministry.

Q.21. How many Japanese nationals were in ARGENTINA?

A. Approximately 6,000.

Q.22. How many Germans?

A. I don't know the exact number. I heard there were several ten thousands.

Q.23. When you left ARGENTINA, who relieved you?

A. Rear Admiral YUKISHITA, Katsumi.

Q.24. Did the Admiral bring a staff with him?

A. Yes.

Q.25. How many?

A. An assistant attache.

Q.26. You went from ARGENTINA to BRAZIL?

A. Yes.

Q.27. What were your instructions there?

A. About the same as upon going to ARGENTINA.

Q.28. What happened to you when BRAZIL broke off diplomatic relation with JAPAN?

A. "Soft internment." I was confined to my home, but could go out during the daytime.

Q.29. In ARGENTINA did you attend many meetings?

A. Yes, of a social nature, mostly.

Q.30. Did you know many Argentinians?

A. No many, but some.

Q.31. Did you employ any Argentinians?

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Captain SHIGEHIO, Atsuo, IJN, (contd)

A. No, I didn't.

Q.32. Did the Embassy use any of them?

A. Not many. I don't know how many.

Q.33. What was your relationship with the foreign office representatives in both BRAZIL and ARGENTINA?

A. I acted under the Ambassador. He gave me orders on diplomatic affairs.

Q.34. What kind of orders?

A. For example, at the inaugural of a President I would go along with the Ambassador.

Q.35. Is this the type of orders you mean?

A. Mostly.

Q.36. What other type of orders did the Ambassador give you?

A. I don't remember.

Q.37. Did you receive any orders from the Japanese Foreign Office or the Naval General Staff or the Naval Ministry?

A. No, except once I was asked to send in the monthly reports that I had been neglecting.

Q.38. Did you comply with this request?

A. Yes, I sent in a report on U.S. ship movements. I got the data from U.S. newspapers.

Q.39. What movement was that?

A. The problem of movement of convoys across the Atlantic and whether escort units of the Pacific Fleet should be moved to the Atlantic.

Q.40. List for me the Japanese Agencies that were in ARGENTINA and BRAZIL.

A. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Okura, Osaka Steamship Co., Toyo (Eastern Cotton Co.) was represented in BRAZIL only. I don't remember the small concerns represented. An Embassy was in both countries. One Consulate in ARGENTINA, and 3 or 4 in BRAZIL. Each country had military and Naval Attaches.

Q.41. Any representatives of TOKUMU KIKAN, such as you had in MAN-CHOUKUO and the PHILIPPINES?

A. No.

Q.42. You were in charge of personnel at YOKOSUKA when you returned to JAPAN, were you not?

A. Yes.

Q.43. What intelligence (JOHO) Officers were listed in your files? Through what levels of Command?

A. There were none other than Rear Admiral HIRAIDE.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Captain SHIGEHIO, Atsuo, IJN, (contd).

Q.44. What was his function?

A. To curve the National Opinion.

Q.45. Was he in the 3rd Department?

A. He was Chief of HOKOBU (Propaganda Ministry).

Q.46. A part of what organization is HOKOBU?

A. DAIHONET (Imperial General Headquarters).

Q.47. Have you had much experience on ships?

A. Half of my Naval career - 15 years on ships.

Q.48. What type of ships?

A. Everything but subs and carriers.

Q.49. In what capacity have you served on BBs, CAs, CLs, and DDs?

A. On DDs as gunnery Officer and torpedo Officer. On BBs as 1st Lieutenant. On Cruisers as gunnery Officer.

Q.50. On any of these ships did you have any special officers to deal in information (intelligence)?

A. No.

Q.51. And there were none during the War?

A. I don't know for I was not on a ship during the War.

Q.52. Tell us what you know about the training of "YOMUSHI"?

A. I'm not familiar with YOMUSHI.

Q.53. You have said that you sent in only important reports while you were in ARGENTINA. What were these?

A. Examples were:

- a. The Argentina Neutrality Declaration.
- b. Severance of diplomatic relations by BRAZIL.
- c. U.S. occupation of GALAPAGOS ISLAND.
- d. Movements of escort vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic for use in connection with convoys.

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 450 PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell No. 40) TIME: 23 Nov. 45

Division of origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USSBS.

Subject: Japanese Intelligence at Army Level.

Person Interrogated and Background.

OHMURA, Sakai, Lt. Colonel.

A staff officer of the 25th Army on SUMATRA from
July 1942 to December 1944.

Oct. 1932 Commissioned, Sub-Lt., attached to 1st
Imperial Guard Regiment.
Dec. 1937 Promoted to Capt., admitted to War College.
Nov. 1939 Graduated from the College.
Dec. 1939 Instructor at the Army Academy.
Feb. 1941 Staff Officer, 27th Division, TIENTSIN,
Anti-communist campaigns.
Oct. 1941 Major
July 1942 Staff Officer, 25th Army. SUMATRA.
Dec. 1944 GSC, GHQ.
June 1945 Lt. Colonel.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Major R.S. Spilman, JR. AC

Interpreter: Major John C. Pelzel USMCR


Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

1. The intelligence of the 25th Army in MALAYA consisted of 2 officers and 4 or 5 NCO's with one or two additional officers attached temporarily from time to time.
2. Principal intelligence sources for the Army were:
 - (1) Study of U.S. Submarine movements.
 - (2) Study of U.S. Aircraft movements.
 - (3) Information furnished by natives.
 - (4) Aircraft search.
 - (5) Patrols.
3. The Army sent radio intelligence reports to Division daily and a weekly summary as far down as the regiment. General monthly summaries were also published.
4. Patrol areas were prescribed for the various echelons of command. There was no special patrol units.

Q. Give the organization of the staff at army level.

A.



Some additional staff officers were assigned from time to time. The number varied with the availability of staff officers, and was never more than 12 to 15.

Q. At the Army level what were your principal sources of intelligence.

A. There were four:

- (A) Movements of Submarines They were observed by coast watchers, ships at sea and airplanes. We made statistical analysis of submarine movements and tried to deduce from them the direction from which an attack would come and where it would take place. In an area where there were heavy submarine movements we thought this might be an attempt to cut off supplies prior to an attack we also thought you might be planting agents prior to an attack
- (b) Movement of Aircraft These were located by observation posts and the amount of air activity was charted.
- (C) Prisoners: Most of these were natives and Chinese who were not considered strictly speaking prisoners-of-war. Occasionally we would get an Englishman. No. U.S. pilots were captured in my area while I was in SUMATRA. We got little information from them. Our instructions were not to mistreat prisoners, but to send them to Area Army Headquarters at SINGAPORE. We interrogated them first at Division and then sent them to the Area Army. They were usually no trained interrogators below Division although in a few instances Regiments had some. We captured some documents, chiefly maps which were sent to Division where they were assessed and if though important was sent to higher echelons.

(D) Communications Intelligence: We computed the volume of traffic from enemy ships and planes and thus found out where concentrations were. We did not break your codes but from volume could estimate the number of planes or ships in the area. We also listened to broadcasts from local stations and from U.S. An effective source was the Indian and Burma Armies on the Japanese side. They gave location of units, fortifications and other combat intelligence which came to us from the Area Army at SINGAPORE.

Q. What reports were sent down from Army Headquarters?

A. Daily reports on enemy situation were sent by radio to division. A weekly summary was printed and enough copies made to go to Regiments. A more general summary was prepared monthly. Radio reports were sent when urgent information was received. Patrol information occasionally went direct to Regiment through usual channels.

Q. What pre-war information of the SINGAPORE-SUMATRA area did you have?

A. At the beginning of the war, only small scale maps of SUMATRA were available but we captured some good ones from the British which were reprinted. I heard that our Singapore information was good. This came from Chinese and native agents. Since the natives were not too friendly with the Dutch and British we got some good information from them.

Q. Was there a TOKUMU MIKAN unit in your area?

A. No. There was no need for one.

Q. What use was made of photographs?

A. In the Singapore campaign some use of photos for reconnaissance was made. Later on the main use of air photographs was for photo mapping of SUMATRA.

Q. What were the channels for distribution of photographs to ground units?

A. Requests for photographs went up through ground channels to Area Army. Area Army sent the request to Air Army, which then attached a reconnaissance unit to the Ground Army. Thereafter, both requests for photographs and distribution was direct. If planes were not attached requests went up through ground channels to Area Army and then down through air channels to the photographic unit. Distribution took the reverse channels.

Q. How effective were airplanes in gathering information?

A. In the early days of the war we had sufficient planes to conduct good searches from SUMATRA. The search areas were determined by Army, Area Army, Air Army, and Navy in cooperation. Army searches were carried out by the Air Division. After your landing in the Philippines, all planes were drawn out of our area so searches could not then be conducted.

Q. Were air officers attached to ground forces for control in ground support?

A. Ordinarily only at Army level although occasionally there might be an air officer at Division level.

Q. What were the duties of the liaison officer?

A. He would advise on the use of air and of the army controlled small liaison planes used as passenger planes by the Commanding Generals and General Officers of the Army.

Q. Describe mechanics of air support of ground forces.

A. Close support was directed by Division through air liaison officers at Division Headquarters. Front line troops put out panels showing their lines and Division ordered bombing from gridded maps. Main grids were 1 Km square and subdivided into 100 m sub-squares. Maps at 1:10,000 scale were preferred, but 1:25,000 were usually the only ones available.

Deep support was ordered from Army level using the same kind of maps.

Q. Did the Navy planes ever support ground troops?


A. No.

Q. Were planes used for artillery spotting?

A. Yes. The plane flies along the course from the battery to the target and corrects by observation of the bursts. Planes were also used for locating batteries for counter battery fire.

Q. What use is made of patrols in the ground forces?

A. General coordination of patrolling is a Division responsibility. However patrol areas are broken down as shown below.



Areas numbered 1 are company responsibility. Areas numbered 2 Battalion, Area 3, Regiment. In addition Division patrols were sent out to specified points. The personnel for patrols ordered by commands higher than company came from front line troops since the higher headquarters have no special patrol units. There were no special patrol units in the Japanese Army.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (OHMURA, S. Lt. Col.)

Q. Did Engineer Units have a special intelligence organization?

A. No.

Q. Were special wire tapping patrols sent out?

A. Yes, but since few men in front lines could understand English these were not very effective. For the same reason interception of radio messages was not effective in lower units.

Q. Did you have special intelligence communications channels?

A. No.

Q. Were situation maps kept at Army level?

A. Yes, and they were reproduced and sent to both higher and lower echelons if possible. In practice the transmission of these maps was irregular.

Q. What type of reports were published at Army level and what distribution was made?

A. A daily report was sent as far down as regiment and up to the Area Army. This included much general intelligence and ended in an estimate of the enemy situation and intentions.

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 423
(Jap Intell No 41)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 23 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Organization and Operation of Naval Attache Staff in Mexico.

Person Interrogated and background:

WACHI, Isuneze, Captain, IJN.

1922 Graduated from Academy.
1922-1924 Attache staff in Australia.
1925 Served on heavy cruiser
1925 Participated in Jubilee in San Francisco.
1926-1927 Studied Spanish in Tokyo Foreign Language School.
1927-1928 Served on a tanker.
1929 Served on MUTSU.
1930 Served on DD.
1929-1930 Served on gunboat.
1931 Naval Wireless School.
1932-1934 Served on CA NAKA.
1934-1936 Resident Officer in Shanghai for General Staff.
1937 Executive Officer of Tokyo Radio Station of Navy Dept.
1938-1939 Staff Officer of Naval Training School.
1939-1940 (Fall) Communications Department of General Staff.
1940 (Feb)-1941 (Dec) Assistant Naval Attache in Mexico.
1942 (Feb) Returned to U. S.
1942 (August)-1944 (Feb) Communications Department of General Staff.
1944 (Feb)-1944 (Oct) Garrison Commander IWO JIMA.
1944 (Dec)-1945 (Feb) Naval Attache to Philippines.
1945 (Feb)-1945 (Sept) Commander 32nd Assault Unit
(Small suicide boats).

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Major J. C. FELZEL

SUMMARY

The Naval Attache Staff in Mexico considered entertainment of high ranking Mexican Officers its most important duty and devoted much Sake and Sukiyaki to this end. Reports, based on American Publications and conversations with Mexican authorities, were sent to the General Staff in Tokyo every 2 - 3 months and concerned such matters as Mexico's attitude toward Japan and relations between the U.S. and Mexico.

R E S T R I C T E D

423 -1-

Transcript of Interrogation: (WACHI, I, Capt. IJN) _____

Q.1. Tell us of your duties as Assistant Attache in Mexico?

A. I was Spanish language officer and the general assistant to the Attache. Our area was from Mexico south to Colombia. We tried to get a more favorable Mexican attitude toward Japan.

Q.2. Did you travel widely in this area?

A. I made one round trip to Bogata.

Q.3. To whom did the Attache report?

A. The General Staff.

Q.4. Were reports made regularly?

A. Yes, every two or three months, although the reports should have been monthly. We were short of help and for this reason reported only every 2 to 3 months. The reports were excerpts from U. S. publications.

Q.5. What were your exact duties?

A. They were mainly social. We went to many functions and gave sake and sukiyaki parties. Research was important, but we had little time for it. We had close relations with our other attaches in South America.

Q.6. What did you regard as your most important duty in Mexico?

A. Entertainment of ranking Mexican officers from whom we attempted to get any data concerning anti-Japanese feeling in Mexico. There was some rivalry between our Staff and the U. S. Embassy in entertaining the Mexican generals. We thought of the Mexican as a somewhat low class people who could be best appealed to through entertainment.

Q.7. Why were you interested in creating pro-Japanese feeling among the Mexicans? Was this important to you?

A. To keep them out of the war and keep them as neutral as possible. Yes, we considered that of importance to us.

Q.8. Do you think you were successful?

A. Successful to the extent that only Colombia immediately declared war. Although other countries did later, they were not too active, as you know.

Q.9. Were you interested in and did you report shipping going through the Panama Canal?

A. No, we had no agents for such information.

Q.10. Were you interested in such shipping?

A. We had no way of getting into the area. I thought a more effective way of securing such data was by radio intelligence in TOKYO.

Q.11. How many Japanese were in Mexico?

A. About 2,000. Mostly, they were people of some substance. Roughly, 200 of the total were in Mexico City.

Q.12. Did you get over to the lower California Peninsula?

A. No. I did get to Manganillo.

Q.13. How many Japanese do you think were on that Peninsula?

A. Fishing, under pressure from the U.S., had been stopped along lower California before I got there. The personnel who remained were evacuated by the Mexican Government before the war.

Q.14. How many people were engaged in this fishing business?

A. I don't know. I think the American emphasis on our fishing industry as a source of information is comical.

Q.15. What did your reports to the General Staff contain?

A. I don't recall the details, but they contained such general information as the relations between the US and Mexico and certain pertinent information gathered from your publication. The General Staff didn't put too much emphasis on our reports.

Q.16. Did you receive any special instructions from the General Staff while in Mexico?

A. Yes, occasionally concerning special matters. Examples concerned the Japanese fishing industry and our oil interests in Mexico.

Q.17. Did you get any special instructions upon leaving Japan for Mexico?

A. I received my instructions from the General Staff and Naval Ministry, instructions telling me to create a pro-Japanese feeling in Mexico.

Q.18. Were you shipping much oil out of Mexico to Japan when you were there?

A. None. Our construction was stopped before any oil was produced.

Q.19. Were you directed from TOKYO to secure any other specific information in Mexico in addition to what you have mentioned?

A. No.

Q.20. In your work, you say that you studied newspapers and magazines?

A. Yes, both Mexican and U.S. publications (New York Times, Life, Time).

Q.21. Did you study any technical publications, manuals, etc?

A. No.

Q.22. Did you have any special service representatives in Mexico, such as the TOKUMU KIKAN that you had in Manchouchuo and the Philippines?

A. No.

Q.23. What Japanese firms were represented in Mexico?

R E S T R I C T E D

Transcript of Interrogation: (WACHI, I, Capt, IJN) -----

A. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Kato, Pacific Oil Company, Nagauchi, N.Y.K., Yokohama Specie Bank. Once a month, representatives of these met at the Embassy to discuss business problems.

Q.24. Did you work closely with representatives of the Foreign Office?

A. Yes. I was actually an assistant of the Foreign Office. We also had close relations with your Embassy Staff.

Q.25. From the Naval and Military point of view, do you think you sent valuable information back to JAPAN?

A. From Mexico, no. From Washington, yes.

Q.26. Were you familiar with the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor?

A. No. The first I knew of that was when the news was announced at a bull fight that was watching.

Q.27. Did you work with Rear Admiral OBAYASHI who commanded a Special attack unit at YOKOSUKA?

A. No. I was in KAGOSHIMA (S. Kyushu).

Q.28. How many suicide boats did you have?

A. I had 250 at the end of the war and expected to increase this to 500 before your landing.

Q.29. When you were on Iwo Jima, what advance information did you have of incoming raids?

A. If it were an air attack, we usually knew of it when it was 200 kilometers away; if a raid by surface vessels, 30-50 kilometers away. Our sources of information were radar dispatches from the General Staff, and intercepted transmissions between your planes and between your subs.

R E S T R I C T E D

Transcript of Interrogation: (WACHI, I. Capt, IJN) -----

A. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Kato, Pacific Oil Company, Nagauchi, N.Y.K., Yokohama Specie Bank. Once a month, representatives of these met at the Embassy to discuss business problems.

Q.24. Did you work closely with representatives of the Foreign Office?

A. Yes. I was actually an assistant of the Foreign Office. We also had close relations with your Embassy Staff.

Q.25. From the Naval and Military point of view, do you think you sent valuable information back to JAPAN?

A. From Mexico, no. From Washington, yes.

Q.26. Were you familiar with the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor?

A. No. The first I knew of that was when the news was announced at a bull fight that was watching.

Q.27. Did you work with Rear Admiral OBAYASHI who commanded a Special attack unit at YOKOSUKA?

A. No. I was in KAGOSHIMA (S. Kyushu).

Q.28. How many suicide boats did you have?

A. I had 250 at the end of the war and expected to increase this to 500 before your landing.

Q.29. When you were on Iwo Jima, what advance information did you have of incoming raids?

A. If it were an air attack, we usually knew of it when it was 200 kilometers away; if a raid by surface vessels, 30-50 kilometers away. Our sources of information were radar dispatches from the General Staff, and intercepted transmissions between your planes and between your subs.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 425
(Jap Intell No 42)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 23 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Aircraft and Ship Recognition.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Commander NAKAGAWA, Toshi, IJN

Commander NAKAGAWA bombed a cruiser in the attack on Pearl Harbor; he also compiled the books on recognition of Aircraft and Shipping. Then he was assistant to the Senior Staff Officer of Air Operations, but had no specific duties, and he did not continue with staff instruction. At the end of the war all copies of his recognition manuals were destroyed. He has altogether 1500 hours of flying time. A

Japanese interpreter was present during the interrogation.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR

CHRONOLOGY

1937 Graduated from Naval Academy
1938 (July) Training Air Group at KASUMIGAURA
1939 YOKOSUKA Air Group
SAIKI, Kyushu Air Group
14th Air Group in China (HAINAN)
1940 (November) HIRYU Carrier
1941 Participated in Pearl Harbor Attack
1942 YOKOSUKA Air Group Instructor
1944 Staff Officer, Combined Naval Force
1945 Bureau of Personnel Affairs

RESTRICTED

425-1-

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Lt. Comdr. NAKAGAWA, Toshi, IJN

SUMMARY:

In November of 1940, the Commander was assigned to the HIRYU Carrier. By the time of leaving HOKKAIDO, he knew a projected attack on Pearl Harbor. He was a Division Chief, and piloted the first of 9 planes. While at sea he received a navigation chart of Oahu. He knew Captain FUCHIDA who lead the Pearl Harbor attack, and learned the date and hour of the attack the night before it was to take place. The HIRYU was 170-180 miles from Oahu at this time. After leaving the carrier, he received instructions by radio to drop his single 250 kilogram bomb on a cruiser, which he did. After the attack he made an oral report to the Captain in charge of the HIRYU, but to his knowledge there was no written report made.

After Pearl Harbor, the Commander returned to Yokosuka, retired from active flying, and became an Air Group Instructor. He taught dive bombing, and the operation of flying boats, and after 1942 organized a course in recognition. When he came to Yokosuka, there were the following types of planes, about 100 of all types:

- Carrier Torpedo Planes
- Carrier Fighters
- Carrier Bombers
- Land-based Reconnaissance Planes
- Land-based 2-engine Torpedo Planes
- Flying Boat for Recon, 4-engine
- 3-seater 2-float Plane
- 2-seater 2-float Plane
- Single-float Fighter Plane

The course of recognition was organized as follows: The Commander assembled from non-classified magazines and newspapers, Janes registers of shipping and aircraft for 1941, and what files were on hand in the Navy Dept., the Gunnery School, and the Torpedo School, such pictures, silhouettes, and data necessary to teach his subject. Toward the end of the war, he also used wooden models in his classes. The pictures were presented as projected slides. There were no moving picture facilities available. The course lasted over a year and the students of the course were 40 EM, 15 Naval Academy officers, and 200 Reserve officers receiving from 1 to 2 hours' special instruction.

The following American Planes and Ships were taught:

F4F, F4U, P40, P38, P51, B17, B26, Grumman Torpedo Bomber, TBD, SBD, SB2C, OS2U, F6M, PB2M, PB7, PB7S; and, by the end of the war, F6F, and B-29. Certain classes of DD, BB, CV, and others.

Early in 1943, the Commander began to assemble his two books of pictures. These included front, top, and distance views of planes and of ships; 5000 copies of each book were printed and distributed to lower echelons. Both Japanese and Allied planes and ships were listed: American, British, and such French ships as were turned over to the Allies; but there were no Russian ships included.

Navy recognition instruction of planes was difficult, but recognition of ships was somewhat easier to teach, and the results were more satisfactory. Altogether, the Navy plan was more successful than that of the Army, for the Army anti-aircraft school at Chiba taught plane recognition by sound only.

Late in 1944 the Commander finished his instruction, and as his books were published and distributed, no one succeeded him teaching recognition; subsequently, he was concerned with duties at the Combined Naval Force Staff Office and the Bureau of Personnel Affairs.

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: (NOT ASSIGNED) PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell No. 43) DATE: 28 Nov.45

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USBS.

Subject; Intelligence for Attack on Pearl Harbor.

Person Interrogated and Background:

FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Capt. IJN.

Captain M. FUCHIDA, IJN, graduated from the Naval Academy in 1924. He became a flier in 1927, training at KASUMIGAURA. He entered the Naval War College in 1935 graduating in 1937. Then in September he became HIKOTAICHO aboard the RYUJO. In October 1938 he became Staff Officer at SASEBO. In November 1939 he boarded the AKAGI as HIKOTAICHO. In October 1940 he became Staff Air Officer of the 3rd Carrier Division. In August 1941 he boarded the AKAGI again as HIKOTAICHO. In November 1941 he was promoted to Commander. (The AKAGI participated in a number of raids--Pearl Harbor, Rabaul, Port Dawson, Ceylon, Midway, etc.) At the time of the battle of MIDWAY he was aboard but was operated on for appendicitis and so was hospitalized til October when he went to the YOKOSUKA Air Group as instructor in tactics. In December 1942 he was given additional duty as instructor in tactics at the Army and Navy War Colleges. In June 1943 he became the Senior Staff Officer of the 1st Air Fleet. In April 1944 he became, with the advent of Admiral TOYODA as CINC Combined Fleet, the Combined Fleet Air Officer. In October 1944 he was promoted to Captain.

Captain FUCHIDA has had 3000 flying hours as pilot and observer.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford USNR

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

RESTRICTED

-1-

SUMMARY

Captain Mitsuo FUCHIDA, IJN, a pilot with 3000 hours, led the attack on Pearl Harbor as Air Group Commander of the Group based on the AKAGI and claims for himself a direct 800 kilogram hit on one of the battleships. He was in one of the 50 torpedo planes that bombed from about 10,000 feet in the first wave which was comprised, in all, 190 aircraft. In the second waves there were 170 planes.

The pilots were first briefed at Etorofu Island, Tankan Bay on 23 November 1941 (Tokyo time) and on this date were given one map of the Hawaiian Islands and another of Oahu. It was then estimated that the target would include 4 CV, 8BB, and 17-18 cruisers, and the exact location of this shipping was indicated. This briefing was handled by Lt. Comdr. KANAMOTO, a former assistant Naval Attache in Washington, who was sent specially for the purpose by the Naval General Staff and who, Captain FUCHIDA thinks, had just come back from Hawaii enroute from Washington to Tokyo.

On 3 December (Tokyo time) the pilots were told that the attack on Pearl Harbor was definite and that it would be launched on 8 December (Tokyo time). A day later warship figures were changed from 8 BB to 7, from 4CV to 1 and from 17-18 cruisers to 10. Again on 7 December the figures were revised--no change in BB's, from 1 CV to 0, from 10 cruisers to 7. Two hours before takeoff the pilots were given last minute information and on mimeograph sheets the warships around Ford Island and in the Navy Yard were identified by position and, for the most part, by name.

The Pearl Harbor mission as outlined on 23 November was to incapacitate for six months the U.S. Fleet by sinking or seriously damaging 4 BB and 4 CV. After the attack it was estimated that 3BB (Including the Utah) were sunk, 2 more greatly damaged and 3 moderately damaged. Also reported were 2 cruisers, 3DD, and 2 transports damaged and 250 planes destroyed.

Captain FUCHIDA was operated on for appendicitis the day his carrier (AKAGI) sailed for the Battle of Midway, but he did attend the briefing on Midway before his task forces sortied. The staff intelligence officer, the staff communications officer and an air officer handled the briefing, outlining the plan for neutralizing the Midway Airfield and occupying the Island. It was estimated that they would be attacked by 100 multi-engine bombers and 200 fighters, with no U.S. task force opposition expected until the 3rd or 4th day after Midway was hit. Still in bed recuperating during the Battle, Captain FUCHIDA disclaimed knowledge of any of the details except that his carrier was hit with all planes aboard after the first wave had returned for refueling.

In comparing the administrative and intelligence work of HIKOSHI (pilots who are regular officers) with YOMUSHI (reserve officers), Captain FUCHIDA expressed the opinion that the former were more competent and handled a number of duties as contrasted to the YOMUSHI who usually were limited to handling a single problem.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION(FUCHIDA,M. Capt. IJN)

Q. We are interested in obtaining certain information for historical study purposes, especially concerning operational intelligence and information. To begin, will you tell us briefly about your navy career and background, commands you have held, numbers of hours you have flown, etc.?

A. (Answer under background on first page and number of hours flown 3000 (as pilot and observer)).

Q. I understand you were the lead pilot in the Attack on Pearl Harbor. In what other battles or strikes did you take part?

A. Rabual, Port Darwin, Ceylon, Columbo, Trincomalee. I then came back to Japan after which I was at Midway.

Q. In which carrier were you on, on the Pearl Harbor Attack?

A. AKAGI.

Q. I know that you have been interrogated before. I would like you to check and confirm some of the information as shown here.

Q. How many aircraft used in the attack?

A. A total of 350.

Q. What types were employed?

| | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-------|
| A. In the first wave: | 50 High Level | Kates |
| | 40 UTB | Kates |
| | 50 Dive Bombers | Vals |
| | 50 VF | Zekes |

| | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|-------|
| In the second wave: | 50 High Level | Kates |
| | 80 Dive Bombers | Vals |
| | 40 VF | Zekes |

Q. How many aircraft were lost?

A. 29 in all. (9 VF in the first wave and 15 dive bombers and 5 VTB in the second wave.

Q. Which units of the fleet participated in the Pearl Harbor Attack?

A. BBs HIYE, KIRISHIMA
CVs AGAGI, KAGA, SORYU, SHOKAKU, HIRYU, ZUIKAKU
CAS TONE CHIKUMA.
CL NAGARA.
DDs 20(Large Type)

Q. How many aircraft were employed as CAP over the Task Force?

A. 50 VF from CVs plus 12 float planes from the BBs, CAS and CL.

(NOTE-The rest of the questions on this recheck are on next page.)

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN.)

- Q. Were they in addition to the 350 planes used in the actual attack at Pearl Harbor?
- A. Yes.
- 8 Q. How many were on station at a time of the CAP?
- A. About 1/3 of the 50 aircraft were airborne at a time.
- Q. Any losses from CAP, either VF or float planes?
- A. None.
- Q. Any additional planes employed as ASP?
- A. None, VF served as ASP as well as CAP.
- Q. How many pilots were lost in the attack?
- A. A total of 29---none were recovered from the 29 aircraft that failed to return.
- (NOTE--The following questions were asked directly to Captain FUCHIDA.)
- Q. In what type of plane did you fly at Pearl Harbor?
- A. In a type 97 Torpedo plane (Kato).
- Q. You were the lead plane in the attack?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Are these figures correct on the planes that took part in the attack? Are there any others not included?
- A. Three groups of 18 planes each, 54 in all, flew CAP over the Force. There were 350 planes actually attacking. 50 of these flew CAP over the target at the start and later went in on the attack.
- Q. Will you give us a general description of the attack?
- A. (See Chart #1 attached)

FIGURES QUOTED:

270 Nautical miles at 0130 Tokyo time.
Spotted OAHU, KAHUKU POINT at 0310
Formation, 50 at high level, 10,000 feet,
fighters all around.
Fighters sent to various points.
Attack at 0330.
Rendezvous at KAENA POINT, 0430.
Back to carriers at 0630 (First Group)
Course of second group shown on chart.
Lost 10 planes in first phase of attack, 19 in Second
Second group left carrier 0215 Tokyo time.
KAHUKU POINT reached at 0400
Rendezvous point KAENA POINT 0530
Back at carrier 0730 - all planes back by 0900.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN)

Q. Did you believe you were sighted (carrier force)?

A. At 0830, after the attack, we believed one of our submarines was spotted by a flying boat. We had a submarine picket line 20 miles below our task force between the force and KAHUKU POINT. One of these subs sighted an enemy flying boat.

Q. Did the submarine break radio silence?

A. "By radio telephone". Yes, he opened up.

Q. Coming back to the activity going on aboard the carrier before you took off this particular morning at this point (indicating in chart a point 230 miles north of KAHUKU POINT) for the attack, of what did your activity enroute consist?

A. No planes were flown at all. There was a little working on instruments (bombardier's).

Q. When did you first learn of the plans to attack Pearl Harbor, and how long did you have to prepare for the attack?

A. On the 23rd of November, all officers to participate in the attack were gathered together aboard the AKAGI, at TANKAN BAY and were told. The preliminary briefing was on the 23rd.

Q. You sortied TANKAN BAY on the 26th of November. While you were enroute to Pearl Harbor, did you study this area in here (indicating Hawaiian Islands in chart), its geography? What other information was given you?

A. We were drilled all day the 23rd on conditions at OAHU. We got three maps; HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, OAHU, PEARL HARBOR.

Q. And what other information was given you?

A. The plans were gone over carefully and in detail. The initial plan was to prevent fighters from getting off the ground. The main function for the second wave was to hit HICKAM FIELD so its heavy planes couldn't get to our task force.

Q. All this information was given to you on the 23rd?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave you that information?

A. A special man from Naval General Staff did the briefing. He was a Lt. Comdr. who I think just came back from HAWAII by liner. I think he was assistant to the Naval Attache in Washington. His name was KANAMOTO. He has since died, from sickness-not combat.

Q. Had you ever been to HAWAII yourself, before the attack?

A. I was there in 1924 during my midshipman's cruise.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN.)

Q. Do you believe that many of the pilots in the attack had been to HAWAII before?

A. Not one specially as far as I know.

Q. These (referring to maps attached) were given you in the lecture on the 23rd and then on the 26th you sortied TANKAN BAY. While enroute, was any more information given to you concerning the target (Pearl Harbor)?

A. We were given approximate information of what composed the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. 8 battleships, 12 heavy cruisers, 5 or 6 light cruisers, 25 destroyers, several submarines, and 4 aircraft carriers, the LEXINGTON, 2 of the ENTERPRISE class, and the SARATOGA. We were informed the SARATOGA was on the west coast but might be back.

The orders were to incapacitate the Pacific Fleet for at least 6 months (orders of the 23rd). That was the objective of the attack. On the 24th and 25th, we held discussions and games on planning the attack. In order to incapacitate the U.S. Pacific Fleet for six months, we figured we would have to sink or seriously damage 4 battle ships and 4 aircraft carriers. We were told that cruisers were in the East Loch. There was room for 12 here. On the 24th and 25th, we discussed in detail how to best run our attack. We were told that there were battleship berthing facilities here (indicating SE side of Ford Island on chart).

Q. Was the date for the attack set on the 23rd?

A. We were told on 3 December that the attack would take place on the morning of 8 December (Tokyo time).

Q. Was there any one officer who gave you all this information, or did many different officers give you this information?

A. All information was given us by Lt. Comdr. KINAMOTO.

Q. When you sortied TANKAN BAY, what other information was given you while you were enroute?

A. On the 3rd, we were told that we would attack on the 8th. On the 4th, we were told that there were 6 battleships, the UTAH, one aircraft carrier, and about 10 cruisers. Four cruisers were in this general area (indicating East Loch), and one aircraft carrier in this general area (indicating NW end FORD), 4 battleships in the battle ship berths (Ford Island), 2 battleships and 4 cruisers in the Navy Yard. For target designation purposes, the southeast side of Ford Island and the Navy Yard were designated Target Area "A". The northwest side of Ford Island and West Loch Area were designated Target Area "B". East Loch, Target Area "C". Middle Loch, Target Area "D". The area to the south and east of Ford Island was designated Target Area "E". On the morning of the 4th, we were told that there was nothing in "E" area. We were also told that there were about 10 mine sweeps in "D" area, cruisers and destroyers in "C" area, the UTAH and one aircraft carrier in "B" area, about

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN.)

4 battleships on the Ford Island side of "A" area, and 2 battleships and 4 cruisers on the mainland side of "A" area. We were informed they might be lined up double, and after thinking it over we decided that one would be on each side of the berthing facility. When we made the attack, however, we found they were both on one side of the berthing facility tied together. As I recall, this information was said to be about two weeks old at the time it was given to us.

Q. Where did you suppose that information was gotten?

A. The information was so ancient, at the time we thought perhaps it was gotten from somebody who had come from HAWAII, and had passed the word, and that it had been passed to us merely incidentally.

Q. Who gave you that information, the Commanding Officer of the ship or another officer?

A. The captain informed me and I, in turn, informed my men.

Q. What other specific information was given you while you were enroute?

A. At 2330 Tokyo time on the 7th, word came in from Imperial Headquarters through the commanding officer of the ship, that they believed there were no aircraft carriers, no heavy cruisers, 4 "B" class (medium heavy) cruisers, 3 light cruisers (OMAHA Class), 17 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders, 3 seaplane tenders, 2 tankers, 2 repair ships, 4 submarines, 1 submarine mother ship ship in Pearl Harbor for the weekend. Cruisers are broken up into "A", "B", and "light cruisers" according to size.

Q. On board your carrier while enroute, had there been daily sessions when you lectured to the pilots?

A. We had a session on the 4th. On the afternoon of the 7th, we had "skull practice".

Q. Approximately how many flying hours did most of those flyers have?

A. An average of 2000 hours, perhaps.

Q. Did you have an intelligence officer or an officer especially charged with information and intelligence to work with you, attached to the group?

A. We had a "HIKOTAISHI", a Lt.(jg) who got together all the intelligence material and distributed it. Information picked up on patrols and information from higher headquarters was disseminated by this officer.

Q. Did the HIKOTAISHI fly?

A. He is a flyer but while doing this type of work he does not fly.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN)

Q. Did he go on the Pearl Harbor Raid?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall exactly what sort of information the pilots took with them in their planes when they went on the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. (Here, 3 sizes of charts were described). Included, in mimeographed charts, were all possibilities for the attack. We marked off specific targets (docks and beaching areas) "A", "B", "C", "D", etc for communications and target designation purposes. Each anchorage was designated.

Q. Did all pilots carry these or only lead pilots?

A. Yes, all pilots carried them. One was also passed out for LAHAINA. We had already written off LAHAINA as a possibility, however. LAHAINA had not been used recently as an anchorage at all for any fleet activities. Two hours before we took off, the last intelligence "roundup" was given us and word was passed that nothing was in LAHAINA. The fleet would be either in Pearl Harbor or to the south of Pearl an hour's plane ride from OAHU. The fleet usually left on Tuesday and came back on Friday, or left on Saturday and came back in time for liberty the next week-end. Every other Sunday was spent ashore.

Q. If you had not found the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor, did you have sufficient gasoline to go one hour out to sea and make the attack there, and then return to your carriers?

A. Yes, we had sufficient gasoline to do that. Four cruiser planes left a half hour before the attacking force, at 1 A.M., to reconnoiter this area to the south. The attack planes were prepared to go as far as 150 miles to the south of Pearl Harbor, in which case our carriers would come in closer. As a protectional measure, the four planes from the cruisers made this preliminary reconnaissance.

Q. Were communications opened up, reporting back to the carrier?

A. They reported directly to me in the air. As a matter of fact, I had actually seen Pearl Harbor before they reported in, however.

Q. Is this the type of information you carried in your planes (indicating Page 18, CINCPAC Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 22, dated 8 December 1944)?

A. Yes, that's it.

Q. Where do you suppose this information was gathered and prepared?

A. At First Air Fleet Headquarters.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN.)

Q. These were mimeographed and handed out to the pilots?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you describe the scene on your carrier just before takeoff. What final instructions were given, who gave them, what time?

A. The Commanding Officer of the carrier simply said, "All right, all the plans are made, let's get going".

Q. Was your plane the first one off the deck?

A. No. The fighters took off first, then the dive bombers, the high level planes, then the torpedo planes. This was our spot on the flight deck. I had the high level group in the first phase attack.

Q. Were there communications with the carrier after you were in the air or did you observe silence on the approach to the target?

A. There were no communications until we saw Pearl Harbor. We were instructed that should it prove necessary there would be communications from the ship to the planes.

Q. What was your first report back to the ship?

A. I handled communications for the entire flight myself. My first communications back to the carrier was at 0333, at which time I reported that the attack was progressing. At 0320 I had ordered all forces to attack. At this point the torpedo bombers, the high level bombers, and some of the other planes pulled away to hit the various targets.

Q. Did you yourself attempt to maintain coordination of the entire attack? Did you direct it after your initial order to attack?

A. I commanded up to here (indicating a point off WAIALAE on the chart) and was in direct charge after that of the 50 plane high level formation. Other formations were under immediate command of other pilots.

Q. Did you find those ships in Pearl Harbor where you expected to find them?

A. By and large, yes. We did not have to change our original plans radically. We expected a lot more anti-aircraft on this side (indicating SE side, Battleship Row) of Ford Island than there was.

Q. What types of bombs were carried in your high level bombers?

A. Armor piercing 800 Kilogram bombs.

Q. Did you take photographs?

A. There were pictures taken by portable camera, none by fixed cameras.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: FUCHIDA, M. IJN, CAPT.)

Q. Did you report the success of the attack while enroute back to the carrier or did you report after you had landed?

A. At about 0350, I reported back to the carrier, just on my 50 plane high level part of the attack. "Attack completed - damage great".

Q. Did you run into much anti-aircraft fire?

A. We got some anti-aircraft about 0333. There was no AA from Barber's Point. As we started to make our run, we got some anti-aircraft from Pearl Harbor. My plane sustained a hit about 4" in diameter. The second plane was hit in the bomb carriage, releasing the bomb prematurely.

Q. Did the ships put up much anti-aircraft fire?

A. The ships were the first to respond.

Q. Which type of ship put up the most accurate fire and in greatest quantity?

A. Cruisers and destroyers. Battleships - not so much.

Q. Did ground anti-aircraft bother you very much?

A. Ground batteries began firing at us on our way back to the carrier, starting about the time the first wave was leaving.

Q. Was there much airborne opposition?

A. About 5 or 6 fighters were in the air but did not bother us much.

Q. What type of planes were those in the air?

A. I was told by some of the fighter pilots after the attacks that they were P-40's.

Q. Were you surprised at the lack of greater opposition?

A. I was surprised by the quick reaction.

Q. Where and when do you think you were first discovered?

A. About the time we reached WAIALEE. It was so overcast that we had to come quite close to KAHUKU POINT. I thought we would get some AA fire about the time we got to BARBER'S POINT, but we didn't. After being discovered at WAIALEE, I thought about half our planes would be damaged by the time we were ready to make our runs, but as BARBER'S POINT did not throw up any AA fire, such was not the case.

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt., IJN.)

Q. What was your priority of targets?

A. We figured as follows: We wanted to get 4 battleships and 4 aircraft carriers. We had 50 high level bombers, 40 torpedo planes, 50 dive bombers, plus 50 fighters on the first flight, so we would hit WHEELER FIELD to offset fighter opposition. In the second wave, 80 dive bombers would come in on the carriers, and 50 to HICKAM FIELD to keep "big stuff" (heavy bombers) from getting out to the task force. The reason battleships actually became priority targets was because there were no aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers had turned into battleships for us as targets because the carriers were not there. The No. 1 priority target originally had been the carriers, to keep their fighters from coming out to attack our task force.

Q. Will you describe the scene back on the carriers after you landed? What was your estimate of damage? Who made the report?

A. I was one of the last to come aboard because I waited around here (indicating rendezvous area off KAENA POINT) to rendezvous with the fighters. By then, the HIKOTAISHI was collecting the information. We collected all information and made reports to the Commanding Officer of the ship.

Q. What was your immediate estimate of the damage?

A. From my observations during the attack, and from the opinions of the pilots, I felt that at least 4 battleships had been either seriously damaged or sunk, at any rate, were out of commission for 6 months. I knew further damage had been done, but this was the report I handed in.

Q. What was the total damage report?

A. The night of the attack, after all reports were in, before developing of photographs, the damage was estimated at 2 battleships and the UTAH definitely sunk; 2 battleships greatly damaged, 3 battleships slightly damaged, 2 cruisers moderately damaged, 3 destroyers greatly damaged, 2 transports greatly damaged, 250 fighters destroyed. After I turned in my report, the first wave prepared to take off again. By that time the reports from the second wave had already come in, then Admiral NAGUMO decided we would not attack a third time.

Q. Do you know when the task force first broke radio silence to report back to Tokyo on the success of the attack?

A. The second day, as soon as we believed ourselves out of range of any attacking possibilities, we communicated the report as given above. 4 or 5 days after the attack, we sent another report which included results as shown by our photographs.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN.)

Q. Did you have many pictures of the strike?

A. We had about 20 pictures.

Q. They confirmed the damage reported in the earlier estimate?

A. About the same, yes.

Q. On what course was the retirement made?

A. We gave MIDWAY a 400 nautical mile berth to the south of our formation.

Q. To what port in Japan did you return ?

A. Through BUNGO CHANNEL to the INLAND SEA.

Q. At what speed was the retirement made after the attack?

A. 24 knots for 24 hours and then 16 knots the rest of the way.

Q. Were you attacked at any time during the retirement?

A. I believe we were attacked by a U.S. submarine, but there was no damage. We had planned to attack MIDWAY on the way back, but because of weather conditions Admiral MAGURO decided not to.

Q. Were you sighted by any enemy force during the retirement?

A. Only by the submarine.

Q. Did you deliver an attack?

A. Yes, we sent up 8 planes to attack it. I do not know if they sank it. 4 of these planes were from the KAGA, 4 from the AKAGI. Our course fell off to the south after we were sighted by this submarine.

Q. Where did you get these 3 charts that were given you on the 23rd of November?

A. We got two at TANIAN BAY. We kept these two and printed a third, a detailed map of Pearl Harbor which was passed out on the 4th.

Q. Was a revision of this map made on the basis of information received on the last day?

A. We did have some details of Pearl Harbor, of the anchorages there and of LAHAINA. We made up another one on the 4th, including the latest information.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN)

Q. The one on the 4th was not changed again?

A. The one on the 4th was 2 weeks old at that time and was passed out as background material. The dope 2 hours before the attack (take-off) was passed out and properly considered in a "skull practice" session.

Q. Did Lt. Comdr. KANAMOTO, who briefed you, go along on the mission.

A. No, he returned to Tokyo.

Q. From what altitude did the high level bombers drop?

A. At 10,000 feet.

Q. Did your plane drop a bomb?

A. Yes. My bomb hit here. (indicating stern of south western most outboard BB).

Q. Were all of these bombs 800 Kilograms?

A. Yes. We worked in 5-plane formations (U "Shaped, or "Horseshoe Pattern" of bomb drop). We estimated that we would get one direct hit within each 5-plane formation if we bombed at 3,000 meters. We estimated further that within 10 five-plane formations, 5 of the bomb formations would straddle a ship. Within one straddle, one hit would be certain. Within 50 planes, there would be 5 hits.

Q. What bombs did the five bombers carry?

A. 250 Kilogram bombs.

Q. In the Pearl Harbor Attack, how many aircraft were on the 6 carriers?

A. About 450.

Q. How many of the 450 would you estimate were flyable? (operational).

A. About 10 were out of commission. 40 were "port" planes. Usually later in the war about a third of our planes were inoperative. We took special care, however, with this Pearl Harbor group.

Q. When you attacked PORT DARWIN in May 1942, where were you based at that time?

A. KENDARI in the CELEBES.

Q. How many Japanese planes were lost in that attack?

A. 15.

Q. What damage did you inflict at DARWIN?

A. 7 transports, 3 destroyers, 20 planes.

R E S T R I C T E D

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN)

Q. On the subject of Midway, on what carrier were you based in the MIDWAY attack?

A. AKAGI.

Q. Will you tell us about the attack and occupation information you received concerning the MIDWAY plans?

A. I was operated on for appendicitis the day we sailed for MIDWAY and did not participate in that attack.

Q. Before you were operated on, and before the task force sailed, had you received details regarding the MIDWAY attack?

A. Yes, I know of that.

Q. What information did you receive?

A. We were instructed to attack and destroy the air power at Midway and do what we could to damage the airfields. We planned to come up thru the MARSHALLS from the south to take it (transport forces).

Q. In the course of that briefing, did you get detailed maps of a nature similar to those obtained for the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. We received one chart and a mimeographed sheet of instructions which had as much detail as could be gathered in addition to the chart.

Q. Who supplied you with this information? Who briefed you?

A. Staff Communications and Air Intelligence officers.

Q. Do you remember the name of the Staff Intelligence Officer?

A. Lt. Comdr. YOSHIOKA.

Q. Is he still alive?

A. He was down at CLARK FIELD. I do not know if he came through.

Q. Who was the air officer who briefed you?

A. GENDA, Minoru.

Q. Is he still alive?

A. Yes. He is in KYUSHU.

Q. How many days before MIDWAY was your operation?

A. 28 May 1942. I was operated on the night we sortied for MIDWAY.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN)

Q. As you recovered from your operation, did you get any more data regarding the attack?

A. No.

Q. When your ship was sunk were you still in bed?

A. I was transferred, by stretcher, to the NAGARA, a light cruiser.

Q. What opposition did you expect from U.S. Forces in the battle of MIDWAY?

A. We believed you had 100 2-engine and 4-engine planes and 200 fighters (land based). We did not expect to have to deal with your task force until the 3rd or 4th day after we hit MIDWAY.

Q. After you were transferred from the AKAGI did you get any reports of the battle?

A. I was put into the dispensary, and did not get much word of its progress.

Q. Were many planes caught on the deck of your carrier when she was hit?

A. The first wave had gone and were back for refueling. The carrier was hit at that time. Everything was aboard. I heard this later.

Q. We are especially interested in your intelligence officers and their work with operational information. I understand you had intelligence officers only down through the staff and fleet levels. Is that correct?

A. Yes, Nothing below staff officer level.

Q. You have had a great deal of experience with carrier based and land based Naval aircraft. Did you normally have sufficient information on which to base attacks?

A. I was never really satisfied with the information until I was actually over the target. Our attack information was poor as was our reconnaissance.

Q. Generally speaking, did you make much use of photographic reconnaissance?

A. We did not use very much of it.

Q. What in your opinion was the turning point of the war as far as the Japanese Naval Air Forces were concerned.

A. When we lost the initiative in the MARIANAS.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN)

Q. What were your "YOMUSHI"?

A. They were used as administrative personnel. This probably because they were trained too late.

Q. How many were trained?

A. Approximately 4,000.

Q. What was the original plan for training them?

A. To relieve regulars for more important positions.

Q. All of these "YOMUSHI" were reserves?

A. Yes.

Q. How much training did they get?

A. 6 months as YOMUSHI. After that they might be sent to various places for further training or direct to assignments.

Q. Was it planned that they be attached only to the Naval Air Force?

A. No. It was intended they be used within the Navy for general service. On ships too.

Q. What were the "HIKOSHI"?

A. They were not specially trained. They were pilots picked from the squadron or group. They were regulars.

Q. What were their principal duties?

A. To pass on the orders of the commanding officer of the group and to find out the next days program. To help the commanding officer.

Q. How were the duties of the "HIKOSHI" different from those of the "YOMUSHI"?

A. The HIKOSHI were capable, with actual experience, and handled a number of problems. The YOMUSHI handled one problem and were not flyers.

Q. Looking generally at the Naval Air Forces, toward the end of the war, what would you say was the single, most critical item - fuel, pilots, airplanes, engines?

A. Fuel. We had enough for operational purposes but not enough for training purposes.

HEADQUARTERS R E S T R I C T E D
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO.

INTERROGATION NO. 451
(Jap Intell No. 44)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 24 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USSEBS.

Subject: Intelligence Organization and Operation in
51st Army (Honshu Island)

Person interrogated and background:

KIMURA, Toshio, IJA(Infantry)

1936-38 China

1938 Infantry School at Chiba

1938-1941 Army War College

1941-1943 Staff Officer 16th Division

1943 Instructor of Tactics at Military Academy

1944 Intelligence Staff Office at Imperial Headquarte.
(6 months general duty in 6th Section,
American Section, 4 months in China Section)

1945(April) to 51st Army as Intelligence Officer
(Headquarters at MITO for 3 months,
moved to village near SUICHIURA)

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul. USNR.

Interpreter: Major, J.C. Pelzel. USMCR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

Note: Major KIMURA appeared intelligent, cooperative
and to have been intensely interested in
developing an effective closely unit organiza-
tion, beyond that usually conceived of in a
Japanese Military Organization.

R E S T R I C T E D

451 -1-

R E S T R I C T E D

SUMMARY:

The 51st Army appeared to have a well knit Intelligence Organization, although undermanned in lower echelons, with close liaison throughout lower echelons and unusually close liaison with higher headquarters. This situation was due to the strenuous efforts of the intelligence officer and his Chief of Staff who had himself, been in intelligence work and was convinced of its importance. Plans for defense in the event of a U.S. landing in the KANTO PLAIN, although still in the formative stage, were carefully thoughtout as were the details of the operation of the intelligence section and those of subordinate units.

The duties of the 6 officers assigned to the Section, under Major KIMURA, were:

- (1) Statistical
- (2) Air Intelligence.
- (3) Other Intelligence. (Sea and ground forces)
- (4) Procurement of Maps and Intelligence material.
- (5) Use and annotation of maps and photos.
- (6) Meteorological.

Intelligence duties in Divisions under the 51st Army were assigned to a Staff Officer who was assisted by 1 officer, an NCO and 2 privates. Regiments, although directed to have an intelligence officer in the table of organization, could not spare personnel and assigned the duties as corollary to one of the officers of the staff.

Officers in the Intelligence Section of the Army had received no intelligence training prior to their assignment, but were being put through a fairly intensive course by Major KIMURA in the 3 months after organization, prior to the end of the war.

Photographs of all beaches in the 51st Army's Area were taken and processed by an Artillery Intelligence Regiment attached to the 51st Army. The Regiment was made up of a Headquarters, Survey Co., Plotting Co., Photo Platoon and Meteorology Platoon, with a total personnel of 600. Major KIMURA believed that all armies had such a regiment. Aerial photographs were supposed to be requested through channels but this method was slow and requests were made directly to the Air Training School at SHIMOGHIZU which took and processed them. The Army had no photo laboratory.

Intelligence sources, during an operation, would have included:

- (1) Sentry outposts along the coast and radar, both in direct communication with the 51st Army, although under the Area Army.
- (2) Reports received directly from Naval Units in the area.
- (3) Reports from the Eastern Area Army including communications intelligence, reports of reconnaissance aircraft, general reports from the Navy and from adjacent armies.
- (4) Reports from subordinate units of 51st Army.
- (5) Interrogation of prisoners (15 officers and enlisted men had been drawn from 51st Army to study English for this purpose.

SUMMARY:(Contd.)

Daily (Radio) reports and bi-weekly, written reports, were received from the Eastern Area Army. A conference of operations and intelligence officers of the 51st Army and through all higher headquarters, including Imperial Headquarters, was held in June, and close liaison was maintained thereafter.

No KEMPEI TAI Unit had yet been assigned to the 51st Army but a unit would have been attached in the event of a U.S. landing in the area.

-END SUMMARY-

Q. What is the organization of the Intelligence Section of the 51st Army?

A. There were 6 officers under me; 5 NCO's and a few privates (used as communicators). This was larger than the personnel usually assigned to Army Intelligence Sections. Only the heads of sections are named in the table of organization. The number of assistants is up to the Chief of Staff of each Army.

Q. What area is under the 51st Army?

A. IBARAKI prefecture (W.E. of TOKYO-on coast).

Q. What were the operations of the Section?

A. Little actual operations were done. My assistants (both reserve officers and NCO's) were young, untrained, and inexperienced. I spent from 3 to 4 months teaching them their duties. We would have been fully prepared by the end of August. Since April, when my unit was organized, I spent a great deal of time in study, planning and gathering intelligence material.

Q. How did you teach your assistants?

A. By having them work with basic American tactics, organization and equipment, technical matters, statistical analysis, and the methods of gathering intelligence.

Q. What duties were the 6 officers assigned?

A. (1) Statistical (2) Air intelligence (3) Other intelligence (sea and ground forces) (4) Procurement of maps, etc. (5) Use, handling and annotating of maps and photos (6) Meteorologist.

Q. What was the source of your maps?

A. Maps came from higher headquarters, also local sources in IBARAKI Prefecture. We had 1/50,000 scale maps for combat use but preferred 1/25,000 for beaches when available. Artillery used the same scales.

Q. Where were photographs procured?

A. Ordinarily they should have come from higher headquarters but we were getting few that way, so I went directly to the Air School at SHIMOSHIZU. They took pictures and printed them for me. We had no photo laboratory in Army Headquarters. There was one in the Artillery Intelligence Regiment of the 51st Army which could process photos.

Q. What was the organization of the Artillery Intelligence Regiment?

A. Commanding Officer (A Major)

| | | | | |
|----------|--------|----------|---------|-------------|
| Head- | Survey | Plotting | Photo | Meteorology |
| quarters | Co. | Co. | Platoon | Platoon |
| (60) | (300) | (200) | (20) | (20) |

Total personnel was about 600. The Regiment was directly under the Artillery Officer of the 51st Army. All armies had similar regiments.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPTION OF INTERROGATION: (MINURA, T. Maj. IJA)

Q. What was the organization of the Intelligence Section of a Division under the 51st Army?

A. 1 Staff Officer (who also had additional duties) and officer assistant, 1 NCO and 2 privates.

Q. Did Regiments have intelligence officers?

A. Higher headquarters directed them to have one but personnel was scarce and an officer would be assigned intelligence as an additional duty. This applied also to Battalions. Army Artillery Headquarters had 1 intelligence officer. Engineering Units were assigned intelligence as additional duty. There were no special reconnaissance units in an army headquarters.

Q. What were the relations of intelligence with the rest of the staff? How was it regarded?

A. I reported directly to the Chief of Staff. He had formerly had experience in intelligence work and I had his whole hearted support. Ideally, intelligence and operations should work together. This was not the case in most units but in the 51st Army we were very close. I was fortunate in that respect.

Q. How did you expect to gather intelligence during an operation?

A. Our sources available were:

- (1) Sentry posts along the coast (4 to 8 kilos apart).
- (2) Radar - This belonged to the Area Army but in some installations could report directly to the 51st Army by telephone. This also applied to the observation posts.
- (3) Reconnaissance aircraft, flown from Tokyo.
- (4) Reports from the Navy. Navy units in the Area communicated directly with 51st Army. Communications were good. We made more use of telephone than radio communications but the radio equipment was improving.

Q. What were your other sources of intelligence?

A. We received reports from the Eastern Area Army, Headquarters at Tokyo containing information on:

- (1) Communications intelligence.
- (2) Results of reconnaissance flights.
- (3) Naval Reports.
- (4) Reports from adjacent armies, other area armies and the 1st General Army. (we were under the 12th Area Army which was under the Eastern Area Army)

We also received reports from our subordinate units and from reconnaissance aircraft via the 12th Area Army.

Q. Was there a special communications intelligence unit attached to 51st Army?

A. There was none. The 12th Area Army had a small unit and was able to monitor broadcasts from IWO and the MARIANAS.

R E S T R I C T E D

451 -5-

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (KIURA, T. Maj. IJA)

Q. How were requests made for aerial photos?

A. The 51st Army went through 12th Area Army and the 1st General Army to the 1st Air Army. They were taken and processed there. Actually this procedure was slow and I often went direct to the Air School at SHIMUOIZU.

Q. What photos did you need; those of your own beaches?

A. Yes. We had pictures of most of the IBARAKI Coast and wanted to complete it at a scale of 1 to 10,000 for mapping purposes. This was the main duty of the commanding officer of the photo platoon in the Artillery Intelligence Regiment. He had already annotated most of the photos we had. Our main use of aerial photos was to be in terrain studies and for operation use and orientation. After your troops had landed we would have been unable to take photographs.

Q. What were plans for interrogating prisoners-of-war?

A. We had drawn a total of 15 officers and enlisted men from 51st Army to study English at the Eastern Area Army School in Tokyo to become trained as interpreters. At the end of the war they had attended 2 months. In the meantime I looked for English speaking civilians in IBARAKI but found only 5. We would have been unable to interrogate them until the 15 had completed the course. Prisoners would have been sent back to the Eastern Area Army as soon as possible.

Q. What would you have done with captured documents?

A. Sent them to Eastern Area Army also.

Q. How did you intend to use the civilians?

A. In areas to the rear of your forces as a people's army to gather information; but, by the end of the war these plans had not been developed.

Q. What liaison existed between your section and intelligence sections of subordinate units?

A. They were all assembled at 51st Army Headquarters, once or twice a month for briefing and to solve existing problems of intelligence. I wanted to assemble them every week and believe that such a plan would have developed effective competent intelligence officers and a good organization. I was close to all the intelligence officers and they cooperated fully in my plans.

Q. How were intelligence personnel selected?

A. In units below an Army, by the Chief of Staff or Commanding Officer of that unit. In general poor men were selected. I tried to get the best men for my organization, in order to do the best possible job if you had landed. In this I was supported by the Chief of Staff.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW: (KIMURA, T. Maj. IJA)

Q. How much intelligence material were you able to get in the way of specific estimates from higher headquarters?

A. We received daily reports from higher headquarters by radio and weekly or bi-weekly written reports. These dealt with immediate rather than long range plans.

Q. Did you include your estimates in reports to your subordinate units?

A. No, but I would have had we got into an operation.

Q. How did you arrive at an estimate of enemy intentions and capabilities?

A. In Japanese intelligence we differentiate between what the enemy can do and the probabilities, listing what he can do in the order of its danger to us.

Q. In estimates you received from higher headquarters what were believed to be U.S. plans?

A. We thought KYUSHU would be the most likely landing place. We had thought you would land at SHANGHAI or Southern KOREA and the SAISHU Islands. Near the end of the war SHANGHAI was ruled out. Prior to the KYUSHU landing you were expected to take small islands N.E. of OKINAWA (e.g. AMAMI-O-SHIMA). The next move after KYUSHU would be on the KANTO area.

By the end of the war we had determined on 3 likely landing places in the KANTO Area.

- (1) HITACHI South to CHOSHI. (51st Army Area)
- (2) CHOSHI South to OHAMA.
- (3) In SAGAMI Bay.

In my opinion had the U.S. landed on the north stretch (51st Army Area) it would have been from ISCHAMA to HOKOTA; next most probable was HOKOTA to KASHIMA and 3rd, ISCHAMA north to HITACHI. If you had landed on the 1st beach (ISCHAMA to HOKOTA) you would have moved directly SW to TOKYO. If you landed on the HOKOTA to KASHIMA beach you would have secured it and landed perhaps the main force to the north and used KASUMIGAURA for shipping.

Q. To what extent did your staff cooperate in forming such an estimate?

A. An intelligence estimate is the job of the intelligence officer who is more familiar with the enemy situation than is the operations officer. In combat there should be daily meetings with the Chief of Staff at which the Intelligence Officer gives the enemy situation and the operations officer gives our situation.

In general the Commanding General and Chief of Staff agreed on the estimate which I described as to your landings. However they differed on the 2nd beach (HOKOTA to KASHIMA). Prior to July the opinion was that the U.S. wouldn't land there because it was a narrow neck of land backed by water. I worried about it though. With your air superiority and landing craft the water inlet would be no barrier. Tokyo agreed with me but my Commanding General did not.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (KIMURA, T. Maj. IJA)

Q. Did you send your estimates to Tokyo?

A. There was no clear written estimate but in June there was a meeting between Intelligence Officers of Imperial Headquarters, Eastern Area Army, 51st Army and two other adjacent units at which this was discussed. This estimate was still in the formative stage and we continued our liaison and discussion with higher headquarters.

Q. Did you keep or intend to keep a situation map?

A. Yes. In an operation we planned to keep such a map.

Q. What training did intelligence officers get?

A. Intelligence officers received no training prior to their assignment.

Q. Had a specific operation plan or order been issued for the defense of your area?

A. The plan was still in the formulative stage.

Q. In such a plan did you include an intelligence section?

A. Ordinarily not in the body of the plan itself, but an appendix might be added. This usually had to do with the gathering of intelligence. There was no situation map in such a plan. If we had got into combat I expected to attach a situation map to my daily report.

Q. To whom would your intelligence reports be sent?

A. To Divisions, Regiments, and units directly under the army.

Q. What is your estimate of the U.S. Intelligence System?

A. I have great admiration for it. There were 2 reasons why we couldn't develop as effective an organization.

- (1) The way in which ours was looked down upon.
- (2) The inferiority of our communications.

Q. In what respect were your communications inferior?

A. In 4 respects:

- (1) Too small an organization.
- (2) Inadequate training.
- (3) Inferior equipment.
- (4) Attrition from your bombing.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (CHURA, T. Maj. IJA)

Q. Was a KE PEI TAI unit attached to 51st Army?
Were such officers ever assigned to an Army Intelligence
Section?

A. No unit was attached to the 51st Army. If we had
got in combat one would have been assigned to the Army,
however. Duties in the preparatory period are mainly
counter espionage among civilians and among the military
but none having to do with the production of intelligence.
During an operation they might contribute to intelligence
in 2 ways

- (1) Handling of prisoners of war.
- (2) Guiding activities of the peoples army in
collecting intelligence.

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 432
(Japanese Intell.#45)

PLACE: TOKYO
TIME: 24 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Selection and Assignment of Intelligence Personnel.

Person interrogated and background:

ITO, Taisuke, Captain, IJN.

1923 Graduated from Academy.

1941-1942(Nov.) Staff of Fifth Fleet.

1942-1943(April) Board of Awards and Decorations.

1943(May)-1943(July) Central Pacific Fleet Headquarters on
Saipan.

1943 61st Air Flotilla.

1944(2 Months) 20th Combined Air Flotilla.

1944(Nov.) to war's end Personnel Division of Naval Ministry.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford USNR

Interpreter: Major J.C. Pelzel

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Tables of Organization of the Combined Fleet, Naval General Staff and the Eight Air Fleets called for an intelligence officer but organization tables of other commands throughout the Japanese Navy did not. Usually in such lower levels intelligence duties were assigned to communications officers as additional duties. In no case were officers specially trained for intelligence work.

The Division of Personnel in the Naval Ministry usually assigned intelligence personnel on the basis of qualifications of: (1) foreign travel, (2) knowledge of foreign languages, (3) personal interest in such work. Oftentimes intelligence officers would be men of rather delicate health. In choosing the intelligence officer for the Naval General Staff, sharpness of mind was emphasized and it was preferred that he be a graduate of the Naval General College. Aptitude for intelligence work was considered in selecting communications officers for lower commands such as small fleets, air groups, and flotillas.

R E S T R I C T E D

432 -1-

Q. 1. In your Personnel Office were you generally familiar with tables of organization of Fleets, Air Groups and Ships?

A. Yes.

Q. 2. Tell us which of these tables of organization called for intelligence officers.

A. Outside of the top fleet commands no table of organization calls for intelligence officers. Such Commands calling for an intelligence officer were:

Combined Fleet

Eight Air Fleets (1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13)

Naval General Staff

One or two additional officers and several petty officers were assigned to intelligence in the Combined Fleet, but this was on the initiative of the Command itself.

Q. 3. Is your Personnel Office in the Navy Ministry responsible for assigning all Naval Officers?

A. Yes.

Q. 4. Upon what basis were intelligence officers assigned by personnel?

A. These are the controlling factors:

- (1) Foreign Travel.
- (2) Familiarity with foreign languages.
- (3) Not in vigorous health.
- (4) Personal preference.

Intelligence officers for the Naval General Staff are chosen for their sharpness of mind and because generally they have gone through the Naval General College.

Q. 5. Who performed intelligence duties in the lower levels?

A. In Air Groups, flotillas and smaller fleets, such duties were usually assigned to communications officers as additional duties.

Q. 6. Did such officers with intelligence duties in Air Groups, flotillas, smaller fleets have any special intelligence training?

A. Our intelligence organization was a sparse, scanty affair. I don't know but I think communications officers received a little general training. Others got none.

Q. 7. Since intelligence duties were largely assigned to communications officers in your lower levels, did you take aptitude and ability to perform intelligence duties into account in assigning your communications officers?

A. Yes, we considered that fact and chose communications officers with aptitude for intelligence provided their qualifications for communications duty were satisfactory.

Q. 8. Did the Personnel Office assign Naval Attaches?

A. Yes, but as I am a flier I was concerned with the assignment of aviation personnel primarily. I believe, however, that the attaches were chosen on the basis of the following qualifications:

- (1) Sharpness of mind.
- (2) Knowledge of language.
- (3) Graduation from Naval General Staff College.

Q. 9. Did officers in the Naval General Staff College receive intelligence training?

A. There was a statement of the general nature of intelligence and some uses to which it might be put, but nothing beyond this.

Q. 10. Tell us what you know about the "YOMUSHI", their selection, training, assignment, and general effectiveness.

A. They are reserve officers. For the most part they are graduates of specialist or regular colleges. They were sent upon graduation from civilian colleges, to four air groups where they were trained. The Personnel Bureau had nothing to do with their training. The four air groups where they were trained were: TSUCHIURA, SHIGA, KAGOSHIMA, MIE.

Q. 11. About how many YOMUSHI were trained?

A. I don't remember, but I will find out for you. (Information later supplied 3662.)

Q. 12. What were the duties of YOMUSHI?

A. A variety of duties mainly of a clerical or administrative sort. Toward the end of the war we had too many on account of our loss of carriers and bases.

Q. 13. When did you start your YOMUSHI program?

A. Two or three years ago, I think. It was an imitation of your reserve officer program.

Q. 14. Were other reserve officers used in the Navy?

A. Yes, but usually they were trained at special schools. These became deck officers, communications officers, aerologist and other such specialists.

Q. 15. Was the YOMUSHI program effective?

A. Yes, My only regret is that it was started too late.

Q. 16. What were the ranks of YOMUSHI?

A. The highest rank of any YOMUSHI was lieutenant.

Q. 17. We notice that you were at SAIPAN for a short time. Did you have an intelligence officer?

A. I think so, but don't know.

Q. 18. Are you familiar with the duties of any such officer who might have been on SAIPAN?

A. Compiling, assessing, and distributing intelligence. General intelligence work. There was no communications intelligence unit in the Central Pacific Fleet Headquarters.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO 433
(Jap Intel No 46)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 24 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence duties of a Communications Officer on Staff
of Destroyer and Cruiser Squadrons.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Commander HANDA, Nikichi, IJN.
1930: Graduated from Academy.
1936: Graduated from Communications School.
1941(Oct): Communications Staff Officer of 3rd Destroyer
Squadron.
1943(May): Communications Staff Officer of 5th Cruiser
Squadron.
1944: Instructor at Naval Communications School.
1945(May): Communications Staff Officer, YOKOSUKA Naval District.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. F SHACKELFORD, USNR.

Interpreter: Mr. J. H. Taji.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

Commander HANDA, as Staff Communications Officer for Destroyer
and Cruiser Squadrons, devoted about 10% of his time to intelligence
duties which consisted mainly of estimating enemy strength, disposi-
tion and location. There was no intelligence Officer on the Staff
of either destroyer or cruiser squadron.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. HANDA, Mikichi, IJN.

Q.1. What were your duties as Staff Communications Officer for the destroyer and cruiser squadrons.

A. Supervision of communications work for the Staff.

Q.2. To what extent did your work concern intelligence?

A. I devoted about 10% of my time to such duties.

Q.3. And just what were those duties?

A. Based on dispatches from the General Staff and from the fleets and based on my own experience, I would estimate your disposition, location, strength, speed and course. I did not prepare our action reports. This was done by the Senior Staff Officer.

Q.4. In what actions were you engaged?

A. MALAY STRAITS and MIDWAY.

Q.5. And what opposition did you expect at MIDWAY?

A. 250 landbased aircraft which my senior officer thought was too high, and one to two carriers. But so far as your carriers were concerned we thought we could disable them before you struck us. I was on the DD SENDAI at the time.

Q.6. What reports of battle damage did you receive?

A. We received two reports, each saying that 2 carriers were on fire. Communications then broke down and the messages became badly garbled. I didn't know that four of our carriers were sunk at MIDWAY until a year later.

Q.7. Was there an intelligence officer on the Staff of either the destroyer or cruiser squadron to which you were attached?

A. No.

Q.8. Insofar as you know, what Japanese ships had intelligence officers during the War?

A. None of them except possibly the carriers late in the War. Some of them may have had YOMUSHI.

Q.9. Who were YOMUSHI?

A. They were reserve officers trained at the YOKOSUKA Communications School for six months. Each new class was divided into two entirely separate groups, one studying communications and the other code. Those who didn't do well in code or who were disinterested in it were designated YOMUSHI. I don't think these latter really ever did much intelligence work after leaving the School. They handled paper and administrative details.

Q.10. How many reserve officers were trained as YOMUSHI during the War?

A. I don't know, but I think about 250.

Q.11. You became communications officer of the YOKOSUKA Naval District in May of this year. What were your duties?

A. Maintenance and construction of communications equipment. We were so busy devoting our time to preparing our communications for the defense of the Home Islands, I had no time for anything else.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. HANDA, Mikichi, IJN, (contd).

Q.12. Did you do any intelligence work at all at the District?

A. No, and in my opinion the Navy never placed enough emphasis on intelligence throughout the War.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO 437
(Jap Intel No 47)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 24 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Operational Intelligence in the Second Fleet.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Comdr. OTANI, Tonosuke, IJN, a naval officer of 18 years experience, was Staff Operations Officer, 2nd Fleet, from August 1943 to December 1944, at which time he became one of the three Secretaries to the Navy Minister, a post which he held until the end of hostilities.

1928: Graduated from the Naval Academy.

1942: Naval War College.

May 1943 to August 1943: Staff Officer 12th Air Flot.

August 1943 to December 1944: Staff Officer (Operations) 2nd Fleet.

1 May 1944: promoted to Commander.

21 December 1944: Secretary to Navy Minister (one of three).

NOTE: It was desired in this interrogation to interview the Intelligence Officer assigned to Second Fleet Headquarters., but that officer, Lt. Comdr. OZAWA, was killed on OKINAWA, and Comdr. OTANI, the Operations Officer of the Second Fleet, volunteered that he was thoroughly familiar with OZAWA's assignment and duties and offered to provide such information.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building, Room 748.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt.(jg) S. HALPERN, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

RESTRICTED

437-1

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, T., IJN.

SUMMARY:

Although each Fleet has an intelligence officer assigned to the staff, lower echelons normally do not and the communications officer in any lower echelon does intelligence work as additional duty.

The duties of intelligence officers on the Fleet level are purely tactical or operational with all strategic or background information coming from higher echelons of command.

There was no special training of intelligence officers for this duty.

Specific duties of the Fleet Intelligence Officer included:

1. Communications plans
2. Intelligence evaluation
3. Code officer for the Fleet

Specific sources of intelligence or information in the surface Fleets were such things as the following:

1. Radar
2. Monitoring of enemy transmissions
3. Aircraft reports
4. Submarine reports

The information sent down to the Fleets from Combined Fleet Headquarters included such material as:

1. Changes in frequencies used by enemy radio and radar
2. Suspected changes in codes
3. Estimates of enemy intentions, changes in organization and location, etc.

Comdr. OTANI then speaks at some length and in considerable detail of the Second Fleet in the Battle of LEYTE GULF or the Battle of LEYTE-SAMAR (Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES SEA, 25 October 1944).


RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, T., IJN. (contd).

Q.1. What was the organization of intelligence or information officers in surface Fleets?

A. Each Fleet has an intelligence section attached to the Staff. As a rule the Communications Officer doubles as Intelligence Officer. Under him there is generally one officer who is a Lt. or Lt. Comdr. charged directly with intelligence. He has two or three assistants of the rank normally of Lt.(jg) or Ensign. Then there will be 16 or 17 petty officers included in the section. Squadrons under the Fleet do not ordinarily have their own intelligence section.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION CHART



Fleet Intelligence Sections

Chief: Staff Communications Officer
Collateral Duty: Staff Intelligence Officer
1st Lt. or Lt. Comdr.
2-3 Lt.(jg) or Ensigns
16-17 Petty Officers

Q.2. What were the duties of Intelligence Officers?

A. All duties of Fleet Intelligence are purely tactical (Operational) and all strategic information comes from higher echelons. Results of Fleet Headquarters intelligence work is passed down to subordinate units. Specifically, the duties of the Fleet Staff Intelligence Officer include (a) communications plans, (b) intelligence evaluation and (c) code officer for the Fleet. This, by-the-way, refers only to our own codes. We could listen to enemy coded broadcasts but would send these to higher echelons for attempted decoding. The subordinates I mentioned did the gathering of information and passed it along to the Fleet Intelligence Officer for his evaluation.

Q.3. Were these Intelligence Officers specially trained for intelligence duties?

A. No, there was no special intelligence training in the Japanese Navy. The only specialized courses in intelligence training I can think of might be the course in the Navy Communications School where they have a "Special Communications Section" (TOKUSHIN HAN). During the war this course was possibly six months in length. Not all communications officers took it, but some of them did, and this was the only specialized intelligence training we ever had.

Q.4. Did surface units (BB, CA, CL and DD) have Intelligence Officers?

RESTRICTED


RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, T., IJN. (contd).

Q.1. What was the organization of intelligence or information officers in surface Fleets?

A. Each Fleet has an intelligence section attached to the Staff. As a rule the Communications Officer doubles as Intelligence Officer. Under him there is generally one officer who is a Lt. or Lt. Comdr. charged directly with intelligence. He has two or three assistants of the rank normally of Lt.(jg) or Ensign. Then there will be 16 or 17 petty officers included in the section. Squadrons under the Fleet do not ordinarily have their own intelligence section.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION CHART



Fleet Intelligence Sections

Chief: Staff Communications Officer
Collateral Duty: Staff Intelligence Officer
1st Lt. or Lt. Comdr.
2-3 Lt.(jg) or Ensigns
16-17 Petty Officers

Q.2. What were the duties of Intelligence Officers?

A. All duties of Fleet Intelligence are purely tactical (Operational) and all strategic information comes from higher echelons. Results of Fleet Headquarters intelligence work is passed down to subordinate units. Specifically, the duties of the Fleet Staff Intelligence Officer include (a) communications plans, (b) Intelligence evaluation and (c) code officer for the Fleet. This, by-the-way, refers only to our own codes. We could listen to enemy coded broadcasts but would send these to higher echelons for attempted decoding. The subordinates I mentioned did the gathering of information and passed it along to the Fleet Intelligence Officer for his evaluation.

Q.3. Were these Intelligence Officers specially trained for intelligence duties?

A. No, there was no special intelligence training in the Japanese Navy. The only specialized courses in intelligence training I can think of might be the course in the Navy Communications School where they have a "Special Communications Section" (TOKUSHIN HAN). During the war this course was possibly six months in length. Not all communications officers took it, but some of them did, and this was the only specialized intelligence training we ever had.

Q.4. Did surface units (BB, CA, CL and DD) have Intelligence Officers?

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, T., IJN, (contd).

A. No, but sometimes men from the Fleet Headquarters who were in the intelligence section there might be attached to Squadron Flags for a limited time. Individual ships, however, did not have intelligence officers.

Q.5. Would you say that in individual surface units the Commanding Officer acted as his own intelligence Officer?

A. No, I would say that each Commanding Officer received his operational information from the Fleet Headquarters. The intelligence work was done there.

Q.6. How effective would you say you were in your work in operational intelligence?

A. We were never able to get any specific information. It was mostly general. For example, preceding the LEYTE Operation, we knew the enemy would attack the PHILIPPINES, but we did not know where the attack would come. It might be DAVAO, LINGAYEN or any one of a number of other places. So we could lay out only the most general plans and we would have to change them as occasion demanded on the spot.

Q.7. Could you tell the time of attacks very accurately beforehand?

A. Yes, we did fairly well on that, I believe. We could estimate fairly well -- within the month, say, when a major landing would take place.

Q.8. Tell me what type of information was sent from Combined Fleet Headquarters down to the various Fleets.

A. This information was more of the general or background type. Included, in more specific information from them however, were such things as: (a) changes in frequencies used by enemy radio and radar (b) suspected changes in codes and (c) estimates of enemy intentions, changes in organization, location, etc. These latter estimates were based for the most part on traffic analysis done by Imperial Headquarters, the Naval General Staff, and Combined Fleet Headquarters.

Q.9. Explain the operation of your intelligence work in preparation for that 2nd Battle of the Philippines Sea when the 2nd Fleet came through San Bernadino Straits on 24-25 October 1944.

A. In general, intelligence data was used only in estimating the time that the enemy would start the operation and also what enemy fleet units would probably be present and brought to bear. We knew, of course, from repeated air strikes, primarily, from TAIWAN on down through the PHILIPPINES. Our overall strategy was prescribed in Combined Fleet Headquarters and our objectives and dates and times of attack were set for us by them. I myself planned the operational aspects for the 2nd Fleet. We sortied LINGA on 18 October.

Q.10. Did you then know the location and strength of the U.S. forces?

A. No, we did not have any such detailed information, but from the fact that you were launching repeated air attacks -- and their location -- we could estimate fairly accurately the approximate forces and their positions, and we could determine that something would happen somewhere in the PHILIPPINES in 4 or 5 days.

Q.11. Where did you go after you sortied LINGA?

A. We went to BRUNEI BAY, arriving there on 20 October. We departed BRUNEI on 22 October.

Q.12. What was the composition of your force?

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, Tonosuke, IJN, (contd)

A. At BRUNEI we had the following:

BATDIV 1 - YAMATO
MUSHASHI
NEGATO

BATDIV 2 - KONGO
HARUNA

CRUDIV 4 - ATAGO
TAKAO
CHOKAI
MAYA

CRUDIV 5 - MYOKO
HAGURO

CRUDIV 7 - KUMANO
SUZUYA
TONE
CHIKUMA

DESRON 2 - NOSHIO (CL) F
10 DD

DESRON 10 - YAHAGI (CL) F
8 DD

Q.13. How many of these came out of San Bernardino Straits on the morning of 25 October?

A. The following:

YAMATO
NEGATO
KONGO
HARUNA

CHOKAI
MYOKO
HAGURO
KUMANO
SUZUYA
TONE
CHIKUMA

NOSHIO plus 7 or 8 DD

YAHAGI with 8 DD.

Q.14. What time did you sortie San Bernadino Straits?

A. We were scheduled at 1800 24 October but did not actually make it until 2300 to 2400 24 October.

Q.15. At that time did you know the location and strength of U.S. forces?

A. We had no communications intelligence on this. We had some plane reports. In general, we knew there were 3 striking forces off Northern LUZON. And we knew there was a BB group covering the landing. We got Army reports that there were 150 to 200 ships in the Bay, but we thought maybe 100 or less. Army reports were always much exaggerated and they could not identify ships correctly. We also knew there was a CVE force covering the landing, didn't know how many, probably 3 or 4.

Q.16. How did you get this information?

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, Tonosuke, IJN., (contd).

A. Our most effective means was air reconnaissance but this was cut down because of bad weather. Also we made estimates from your continued air strikes from FORMOSA on down.

Q.17. Did you have many reconnaissance planes out of fields in the PHILIPPINES?

A. I do not recall accurately, seems we had some reconnaissance out of MOROTAI and we did get some reports from MANILA but I believe those were estimates rather than direct sighting reports.

Q.18. Did you have photographic reconnaissance?

A. No - I think it was all visual - and there were many mistakes.

Q.19. What were the 2nd Fleet objectives?

A. To get into LEYTE GULF and sink any shipping there: Our target priorities were:

(1) Carriers, (2) transports, (3) combatant surface units. We didn't figure we'd get any carriers actually in LEYTE GULF so our primary objective ~~really~~ ~~was~~ transports. We were also prepared for shore bombardment. This was because the Army was most insistent in this; so we were set up for 2 or 3 hours - but we could not carry it on, so we would not have been very effective in this. To have done shore bombardment adequately would have required several days. We were prepared only for several hours, and this only because the Army was so excited about it.

Q.20. What was your first contact?

A. 25 October 0640.

Q.21. How?

A. Visual. From the lookout in the crow's nest of the YAMATO.

Q.22. What did you see?

A. A petty officer made the first sighting. There followed some discussion as to whether it might be our own SURIGAO forces. We ordered the Staff Gunnery Officer to gunnery control, then we saw planes on the flight decks and knew they were enemy.

Q.23. How many ships did you see?

A. I went up myself. First, I saw two carriers. The ship's Gunnery Officer reported 4 to 6 carriers. We saw no surface units at this time. We later saw also 1 cruiser and 2-3 DD. This was when they started laying smoke. We had not seen them before they started doing that. I gave orders on the assumption there was a surface TF with the carriers.

Q.24. What was your first estimate of this enemy force?

A. I thought this was a replenishing force bringing in replacement airplanes. I estimated also, 1 Car Div and 8 to 12 DD. Our Gunnery Officer's 3rd report or so, reported what he said was one BB also in the enemy force.

Q.25. When did you open fire?

A. Our first sighting was at 30,000 metres at 0640. 5 to 10 minutes after this first sighting, YAMATO opened up. This was at 0645 or 0650 at a range of 28,000 metres.

RESTRICTED

Q.26. Had you seen any planes before your sighting?

A. The Chief Staff said he did; I did not. I was very surprised to be running into this force. He said they were enemy, but did not estimate whether they were carrier or land based. He thought you might be using Tacloban airstrip by this time.

Q.27. Was your intention at that time to go around this force on into LEYTE GULF?

A. Since this force was there, we decided to go after that then go on into LEYTE GULF.

Q.28. Did you think you could eliminate this force fairly easily?

A. We didn't think we'd have much trouble. We were very powerful.

Q.29. What went wrong?

A. The main troubles were weather (squalls) and the smoke screen put down by your cruisers and destroyers.

Q.30. When did you break off the engagement?

A. At 0915 we ordered our forces to reassemble because of the scarcity of targets. About 1000 we were reassembled. We discussed whether to proceed on into LEYTE GULF but decided not to.

Q.31. Why did you decide not to go on into the GULF?

A. Our reasons were these:

- (1) We had already accomplished considerable results.
- (2) We were very much delayed in our schedule.
- (3) We thought if we went in we would be subject to land-based air attack.
- (4) We would face surface attack in the Bay.
- (5) We thought a reinforcement force was expected. We had intercepted 7th Fleet message in plain language calling for air strike support.
- (6) We thought by this time most of the transports would have gotten out of the Gulf anyway.
- (7) We were low on fuel. This was not critical, but we were low.

Q.32. What was your estimate then of damage to the enemy force?

A. Our summary to Imperial Headquarters was this:
Sunk: 4 Carriers

Q.A. What kind?

A. We had silhouettes of your ships, but could not identify these particular ships. I thought the ones I saw were "regular" carriers - about 17,000 to 18,000 tons.

2 - 3 cruisers sunk.

Q.A. What Kind of cruisers? A. Heavies.

2 - 3 DD sunk.

Also, more damage to other cruisers and carriers.

Q.33. What was your damage?

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, Tonosuke, IJN., (contd).

A. We received practically no damage from surface fire. Later, planes came over. There were a fairly large number of shell splashes. One hit on the YAMATO.

Q.32. What size?

A. 20 cm which was discovered when we returned to BRUNEL.

Q.34. What was your damage from enemy planes?

A. From 1300 to 1530 we had our heaviest air attacks. CHIKUMA sunk, I don't know whether by bomb or torpedo. CHOKAI, hit by a torpedo, went dead in the water, we torpedoed her with one of our own destroyers. SUZUYA, something happened; torpedo stopped her dead in water and we had to sink her. All of our ships received some damage. 4 DD were still afloat but inoperative.

Q.35. Was your damage primarily from bombs or torpedos?

A. Most (60% - 70%) from bombs.

Q.36. What size?

A. 250 Kilo.

Q.37. How many on YAMATO?

A. 2 hit on bow, one torpedo on port bow.

Q.38. Was there much strafing by enemy fighters?

A. Yes, a great deal, the worst damage from this was on the NAGATO, where we lost many AA personnel.

Q.39. How many enemy aircraft did you shoot down?

A. About 10%.

Q.40. How many planes did you estimate were in the attacking force?

A. On the 24th - 1,000. On the 25th - 800 to 900.

Q.41. And you shot down 10% of all of these?

A. Yes.

Q.42. What did you estimate as the speed of the enemy Task Force?

A. Around 30 knots - 28 to 30. Our own top speed was 28 and we weren't closing very fast. We were fighting on the "external lines" and hence had difficulty closing.

Q.43. What was the closest range of any of your forces?

A. For the YAMATO it was 28,000 metres, the range at our first sighting. During your torpedo attacks, when YAMATO was maneuvering to avoid torpedoes, we lost ground; some of our cruisers may have been under 15,000 metres.

Q.44. Did the YAMATO have radar fire control?

A. Yes. It was the first time we had used it.

Q.45. How did it work?

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Comdr. OTANI, Tonosuke, IJN., (contd).

A. The Gunnery Officer felt that for using it the first time, though many things were wrong, still it worked well. He was most favorably impressed and felt that with practice and development it would become excellent.

Q.46. How many rounds did YAMATO fire?

A. We did not use more than 1/3 of our ammunition. I don't remember how many rounds we carried. We were well stocked on ammunition, though. That was not at all critical.

Q.47. Did you as operations officer for the Staff, 2nd Fleet, normally have adequate information? What is your evaluation of your Naval Intelligence?

A. As far as overall strategical considerations are concerned, intelligence was greatly lacking always. But that is always true. Tactically, I felt that our intelligence work was quite good.

NOTE: 2nd Fleet was in ATAGO on BRUNEI sortie. Transferred to YAMATO at approximately 1700 on 23 October 1944.

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO. (Not Assigned) PLACE: Tokyo
(Japanese Intell. No. 48) DATE: 27 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section,
G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Instruction Relating to Intelligence at
the War College.

Person Interrogated and Background:

SHIMIZU, Takeo, Col.

1923 Graduated from Military Academy
1931-1934 Attended War College.
1937 With 10th Army at outbreak of China War.
1937-1941 Instructor at War College.
1941-1944 Asst. Military Attache in Berlin.
1944 Military Attache in Bulgaria
1945 (April to August) Instructor at War College.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Major R.S. Spilman, Jr. AC.
Lt. Comdr. Paine Paul, USNR.

Interpreter: Major John Pelzel, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

Prior to the war with the U.S., the War College gave a 3 year course to regular army officers. By the end of the war the course had been reduced to 6 months and reserves were admitted.

Instruction was of a general nature, the main courses being basic tactics, tactics in the division and military history. No course in intelligence was offered. Specialized subjects such as Supply, Communications, etc. were treated in general terms only and were intended to be supplemented by attaching students during summer months to specialized units.

Q. What courses were taught at the War College?

A. Before the war it was a 3 year course. Those who graduated in August 1945 received only a 1/2 year course. The main purpose was to train staff officers for divisions. Courses were Tactics, Military History and general instruction on Communications, Supply, etc. No intelligence course was given. Specialized training as required by communications was given by attaching students to such a unit during the summer months.

The tactical training included general instruction in some of the duties of a staff intelligence officer. Sometimes intelligence officers from the General Staff gave lectures, at most a total of 10 hours.

Q. What other courses bearing on intelligence were offered?

A. The class that graduated in August 1945 dealt mainly with anti landing tactics directed against American forces. Army headquarters officers gave lectures on general American tactics and general information about American equipment.

Q. Was there no instruction as to how to arrive at enemy order of battle, enemy capabilities?

A. No special training. Training was done in the field. After graduation an officer might become a company commander, then a communications officer, i.e. a general duty tour before becoming a staff officer.

Q. Were intelligence officers taken from graduates of the War College?

A. Not recently. Formerly they all were.

Q. What instruction was given as to the handling of prisoners-of-war and captured documents?

A. Textbooks included this briefly and in general terms. These books weren't used in the courses, however, students were supposed to be familiar with them upon entry. Particular texts for courses were prepared by the instructor.

Q. What was the method of teaching?

A. By lectures and problems, including field problems. The making of an intelligence estimate is a matter of practice, not instruction.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (SHIMIZU, T. Col.)

Q. What importance was attached to the use of aerial photos?

A. Recently no instruction was given. Formerly we gave about 1 week of practice in the operational use of aerial photos as map substitutes. No interpretation was taught.

Q. Was instruction given in the use of interpretation after it had been done?

A. Only the fact that photos could give valuable information.

Q. Was any instruction given as to how to organize natives?

A. Only the value of natives as spies. No details as to how to organize.

Q. Was this also true of radio interception, wire tapping, writing of reports?

A. Yes, General instruction only.

Q. There was a communications school near the end of the war. Do you know of any other special training schools?

A. I haven't been in Japan enough to know.

Q. How much stress was given to setting up of an organization to gather information about the enemy?

A. It was emphasized formerly, but near the end of the war, time was too limited.

Q. Were candidates for the War College all Regular Officers?

A. They were intended to be but, late in the war, reserves were admitted.

Q. How large was the faculty?

A. There were 30 to 40 instructors. About 3/5 taught tactics, about 1/2 of the rest taught military history and the remainder taught supply, personnel, communications, aircraft transportation, etc.

Q. What did the aircraft course include?

A. It was intended to give staff officers a common sense appreciation of the use of aircraft and organization of the air force.

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO Not Assigned
(Jap Intell No. 49)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 17 Nov 1945

Subject: KEMPEI TAI

Personnel Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col. YAMAMURA and 2nd Lt. OGATA
Military Career of Lt. Col. YAMAMURA:
1919: Graduated from military academy and assigned to 70th Infantry Regiment
1924: Military Academy Staff - Administration
1929: Attended KEMPEI School at NAFANO, Tokyo
1930: Officer in Charge of KEMPEI at MAIZU (Naval Base).
1932-39: KWANTUNG ARMY, KEMPEI TAI Staff Officer
1939-44: Officer in Charge of students at KEMPEI school, NAFANO
1944 (Mar): Assigned to GAIJI-DU (foreign bureau)

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Major R. S. SPIRMAN, JR., AC
Lt. Comdr. PAUL PAUL, USNR.

Interpreter: Major JOHN PHILLIP, USICR.

Allied Officers present: None.

SUMMARY:

All KEMPEI TAI training for Officers in Japan, Korea and Formosa was given at the NAFANO, (TOKYO) school. There were, also, schools in CHINA, MANCHURIA AND MALAYA. Selection of candidates was made on the basis of physical and mental tests and family eligibility. No course was given in Military Intelligence.

Armies sent to overseas areas were assigned KEMPEI units prior to departure from Japan. KEMPEI Headquarters in an area army would have a personnel complement of about 20 with an approximate total of 1,000 in the entire Area Army. Of this total, about 20 made up the Division Headquarters including a Major and a Company Grade Officer. KEMPEI units come under the jurisdiction of the Army units to which they are attached, except in the home islands where they are directly under the Tokyo KEMPEI Headquarters.

In a field unit KEMPEI functions included:

- a. I.P. duty
- b. Discipline
- c. Security
- d. Counter intelligence, surveillance of civilians.

YAMAMURA stated that prisoners of war were first turned over to the KEMPEI unit for preliminary screening only (name, job, etc.), to prevent their escape, and to protect them from civilians. Interrogation was conducted by the Intelligence Unit of the Army.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Lt Col YAMAMURA, Japanese Army.

In the field, natives were sometimes hired to act as spies and to locate enemy spies. To some extent, the operations of KHEI PEI TAI overlapped with those of TONGTU FIFAN resulting in considerable friction.

Lt. Col. YAMAMURA agreed to supply a copy of the KHEI PEI TAI Organization Chart.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

/Interrogation of Lt Col YAMAMURA, Japanese Army, (contd).

Q.1. What positions in the IHI PFI did you two Officers occupy?

A.a. (Col. YAMAMURA) I was in charge of external security (foreign) bureau, (GAIJI) to guard military and state secrets.

b. (2nd Lt OGATA) I collected intelligence concerning air raid casualties.

Q.2. Is Col YAMAMURA a regular Army Officer?

A. We both are.

Q.3. How long have each of you been connected with IHI PFI?

A. About 15 years each.

NOTE: The rest of the interrogation was addressed to Lt. Col. YAMAMURA.

Q.4. Has the IHI PFI submitted an organizational chart to any allied group?

A. Yes. It was completed last night, is being translated and will be sent to General Headquarters.

Q.5. Will you send us a copy?

A. Yes, I will.

Q.6. What connection did the IHI PFI have with General ARISUI's Intelligence Section?

A. None. Liaison only.

Q.7. To what extent was the top IHI PFI command composed of Army and Civilians?

A. There were no Civilians. Workers, drivers, etc. were the only civilians attached.

Q.8. We want as complete an outline of the duties of IHI PFI TAI as possible as it relates to combat and military intelligence, both at home and abroad.

A. IHI PFI didn't collect intelligence, their work was counter-intelligence. When prisoners of war were captured, IHI PFI held them for questioning as to Name, Rank, and Serial Number, protected them from civilians and turned them over to the Area Command for interrogation.

Q.9. Outline the duties of IHI PFI TAI in connection with field commands.

A. They come under the field unit (Army) jurisdiction.

Q.10. Is there a IHI PFI TAI organization separate from the Army organization which would stem back to the Area Army? (A parallel organization reporting back to its own head rather than through a Division Commander?)

A. It would report to the Division Intelligence Office. It would almost never be attached to a unit as low as a regiment?

Q.11. List the duties of IHI PFI in a field unit.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Lt Col YAMAMURA, Japanese Army, (contd).

- A. 1. I.P. duty
2. Discipline
3. Security
4. Examine civilians in line with counter-intelligence. They don't attempt to get operational intelligence, not being a fighting unit.

Q.12. Did IEMPEI ever send agents in advance of the Army to MALAYA, NEW GUINEA e.g., to sound out the people?

A. I don't know of any such cases. My department got information from civilians, if they came under military police, however the civil police did most of it. My department may have held prisoners but the questioning was done by experts from the Area Office. However, Americans and British civilians in Japan were questioned by IEMPEI.

Q.13. When armies were sent overseas were IEMPEI units attached? Take a specific example.

A. Yes, in Tokyo. A Major and 1 Company Officer, with a total strength of 20 would be attached to a Division.

Q.14. Would it be organized as a separate IEMPEI detachment?

A. They received orders from the Division Commander but were a separate section. In the case of a Navy landing force, no IEMPEI was attached. IEMPEI TAI differs from military police in that it has authority over civilians. JUNRA (Navy S.P.'s), are strictly military police, exactly like American S.P.'s.

Q.15. In the Philippines were natives recruited as part of the organization?

A. Yes, some were hired. They were used as spies, and to locate spies.

Q.16. Did any civilians or regular IEMPEI Officers go behind the lines to determine strength, etc. in the Philippines?

A. I don't believe they did. I think that would be a job of TOKUJUN KIKAN. I don't know how strong TOKUJUN KIKAN was in the Philippines.

Q.17. How about in MANCHURIA, in your experience?

A. In MANCHURIA both were under the Area Army but the organizations were frequently at cross purpose and there was much friction. To avoid friction KEMPEI TAI Officers were sometimes attached as liaison to TOKUJUN KIKAN.

Q.18. Where TOKUJUN KIKAN did not operate such as in the Philippines, Java, New Guinea, did IEMPEI TAI take over those duties?

A. I don't think so. The Area Commander would have set up an organization similar to TOKUJUN KIKAN to handle them.

Q.19. Were prisoners, at the time of capture, turned over to IEMPEI? What was the routine procedure?

A. In the field, after capture, prisoners of war are turned over to IEMPEI until orders are received to turn them over to the Army Headquarters. A KEMPEI guard might accompany prisoners being sent back to Japan.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Lt Col YAMAURA, Japanese Army, (contd).

Q.20. What routine questioning was done by KEMPEI TAI?

A. Prisoner's name, his job, etc. - simply a screening process.

Q.21. Who received prisoners (Airmen) captured in Japan?

A. Orders were to turn them over to the Area Army Headquarters. Civilian police would do the same.

Q.22. What other schools than the one at NAIANO did KEMPEI operate?

A. NAIANO was the only one in Japan, but there was one in China, Manchuria and Malaya. The NAIANO school trained for Japan, Korea and Formosa.

Q.23. Who was most recently head of NAIANO?

A. Lt Gen JINOSHITA.

Q.24. Who was the administrative head in charge of students?

A. Colonel KITAHAI. He may have been replaced.

Q.25. What other training was offered at NAIANO? Army Intelligence?

A. There were no such courses.

Q.26. Did such organizations as coast watchers come under KEMPEI?

A. They might have but I doubt it.

Q.27. Where the Japanese Army withdrew, retreated were the individuals left behind KEMPEI men?

A. They might be KEMPEI or might be TOEI JAPAN.

Q.28. What was the school at ANASAKA-IU?

A. I don't know. It wasn't a KEMPEI school.

Q.29. What were your specific duties?

A. To ferret out detrimental rumors etc. I warned the populace of expected bombings, based on your propaganda leaflets. Toward the end of the war your propaganda was having a great effect. It was my job to attempt to keep these leaflets away from the people.

Q.30. We understand that considerable prestige was attached to membership in KEMPEI. On what basis were men selected?

A. Special intelligence tests were given to select them out of the volunteers. Families were investigated etc. Officers were sometimes assigned directly to KEMPEI from the Military Academy if they volunteered for it. In the Empire (home islands) KEMPEI Units came directly under the Tokyo KEMPEI Headquarters.

Q.31. What was the strength in an Area Army?

A. It might be a total of 1,000.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Interrogation of Lt Col YAMAMURA, Japanese Army, (contd).

About 20 men in an Area Army Headquarters. Various men in the field would report to this Headquarters Staff. At the Area Army level KEMPEI is part of the Army Headquarters; in units below that, attached KEMPEI units reported direct to their Headquarters at the Area Army. There is much friction between KEMPEI men and the Army. KEMPEI men are usually let alone as much as possible.

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (NOT ASSIGNED) PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell. No. 50) TIME: 28 Nov. 45

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USSBS.

Subject: Training and Duties of YOMUSHI.

Person Interrogated and Background:

YANAGITA, Masuo, Lt. Comdr. IJN.

1938 Graduated from Academy.
1938(April - July) Yagumo (Trainer)
1938(July) 1939(March) Yinu (Cruiser)
1939(March) 1939(Oct.) Oboro (Destroyer)
1939(Nov.) 1940(May) Chiyoda (Seaplane Carrier)
1940(May) 1940(Nov.) Katori
1940(Nov.) 1942(April) Naval Academy gunnery instructor.
1942(April) 1943(Sept) Kumano (Cruiser)
1943(Sept.) 1945(July) Tsuchiura Air Group
1945(July) Navy Department, Transportation, Main Sect.

Where interviewed : Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford, USNR

Interpreters: Lt. Comdr. F.B. Huggins, USNR
Lt. Otis Cary, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

The YOMUSHI program was established by the Naval Air Arm in September 1943 to train reserve officers to become ground officers with air groups and squadrons, personnel officers, athletic instructors, classification officers at flight schools, and liaison officers at aircraft factories. Approximately 1600 officers were graduated, before the war ended, from three schools which in their 4 month courses taught aeronautics (tactics and important related subjects), personnel work and watch officer duties.

The YOMUSHI assigned to air groups and squadrons but not to carriers were the closest thing the Japanese Navy had to intelligence officers in the lower echelons. Without any special training for the job, they nevertheless did, before a flight, compile target information which the air group or squadron commander used in briefing the pilots and they interrogated them upon returning from combat or search missions. In no sense, however, did they concentrate only upon intelligence duties for much of their time was devoted to assigning planes to pilots, regulating takeoffs and landings, keeping records and handling routine administrative matters.

Q. Are you familiar with the YOMUSHI program?

A. Yes, generally. While with Tsuchiura Air Group in 1944-45, I worked with the program for two months.

Q. How long a training course did they have?

A. Four months.

Q. Where were the YOMUSHI trained?

A. MEI, SHIGA, TSUCHIURA.

Q. What courses did the curriculum include?

A. Aeronautics (tactics and related subjects), personnel, watch officer duties.

Q. Were the YOMUSHI reserve officers?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were trained in all?

A. About 1600, 1st Class 200, 2nd Class 400, 3rd Class 1000.

Q. When did the YOMUSHI program start?

A. September 1943.

Q. What was the reason for starting this program?

A. People returning from Guadalcanal felt that ground officers should be trained for ground duties. There were not enough fliers to go around, not enough to perform ground duties and fly at the same time.

Q. On what basis were candidates selected for the YOMUSHI program?

A. The following qualifications were usually necessary.
(1) Good physiques but disqualified for flying.
(2) College graduates.

Q. Did you take part in instructing the YOMUSHI?

A. Yes, for two months in 1944-45 when with the Tsuchiura Air Group.

Q. What courses did you teach?

A. I was administrative and personnel officer for the school. I was not a regular instructor, but occasionally taught classes in administration.

Q. Was Capt. WATANABE the head of the program?

A. No, not the entire program. He was in charge of the school at Tsuchiura. Commander Muto KENICHI, I think, was in charge of the program while Commander EMURA, who had been on Guadalcanal, conceived the idea.

- Q. What was done with the YOMUSHI after they graduated?
- A. They filled the following five billets:
- (1) Work in the field with air groups.
 - (2) Running classification tests at flight schools.
 - (3) Personnel officers.
 - (4) Athletic instructors.
 - (5) Semi-liaison officers at aircraft factories.
- Q. Did Commander TERAI have anything to do with the program?
- A. Not directly. He may have had something to do with promoting the program. I'm not sure.
- Q. What were the duties of the YOMUSHI who were attached to air groups in the field?
- A. They selected the planes the crews would fly, regulated takeoffs and landings, handled affairs between the ground personnel and the pilots, kept records of the flights.
- Q. Were YOMUSHI assigned to carriers?
- A. No.
- Q. Just what sort of flight records did they keep?
- A. They kept the flight time of pilots and crew members, and prepared the combat and sighting reports.
- Q. What information was included in the combat reports?
- A. Time and place of combat, number of rounds fired, results of combat.
- Q. Who gave the YOMUSHI such information?
- A. The pilot himself.
- Q. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the YOMUSHI program?
- A. It came too late. It was some help but not too much.
- Q. If the YOMUSHI had been developed earlier, do you think it would have been effective.?
- A. Yes, very much so.
- Q. Was it planned to train additional YOMUSHI when the war ended?
- A. No. There were more pilots than planes and pilots could do the job of the YOMUSHI, so it was not intended to start another class after the one that graduated in August 1945.

R E S T R I C T E D
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (YANAGITA, M.Lt. Comdr.IJN.)

Q. Before a combat mission, did the YOMUSHI brief the pilots on weather and targets?

A. No, the air group or squadron commander would brief the pilots on the basis of the data given him by the YOMUSHI.

Q. Would the YOMUSHI prepare information on the performance of enemy aircraft?

A. Not necessarily. It depended on whether the squadron commander wanted him to perform the duty or not.

Q. Would they prepare data on a target that the pilots were to attack?

A. Yes. Photographs were turned over to the YOMUSHI who interpreted them and gave the information to the squadron or group commander.

Q. Did the YOMUSHI have any training in photo interpretation?

A. Only such graduates as went to the YOKOSUKA Photo Interpretation School.

Q. Were YOMUSHI assigned to squadrons as well as to Air Groups.

A. Yes.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY -RESTRICTED-
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (NONE ASSIGNED) PLACE: TOKYO
Japanese Intell. No. 51 DATE: 28 Nov. 45.

Division of Origin: Japanese Intell. Sec., G-2, USSBS

SUBJECT: Intelligence in the Japanese Ground Forces at
Army Level.

Person Interrogated and background:

Lt. Colonel TOKUNAGA, Hachiro was in the intelligence section (2nd Division) of the General Staff from April 1942 to March 1945, and thereafter until the end of the war was Chief of intelligence for the 57th Army defending the southeast coast of KYUSHU. The principal events in his army career follow:

Commissioned June 1931 and attached 15th Inf. Regt.
Army Officers School - August 1935.
Army College - June 1938.
Graduated 1940.
Staff 24th Division August - KWANTUNG Army - May 1940.
Staff of 5th Army in MANCHURIA - 1941-42.
2nd Division, General Staff - April 1942.
Chief, Intelligence Section, 57th Army in
Southern KYUSHU, March 1945 to end of war.

Where interviewed: Meiji Bldg.

Interrogators: Major R. S. Spilman, Jr., AC

Interpreters: Lt. (JG) L. H. Gorham, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.


SUMMARY

1. When the Japanese ground forces defending the Homeland were reorganized in the spring of 1945, the intelligence section in most was given to young officers who had been in the Intelligence Section of the General Staff. These men set up large and well organized sections which, while not prescribed by the General Staff, were approved by it. The Intelligence Section in the 57th Army charged with the defense of the eastern and southern sections of KYUSHU is described.
2. Little change in the intelligence staffs of Division was made at this time although there was some talk of assigning a regular intelligence officer as far down as Regiment.
3. Places for defending southern KYUSHU against our landing, expected in October, are discussed.

TRANSCRIPT


Q. 1. Give the organization of the staff of the 57th Army.

A. See chart.



Q. 2. Break down the Intelligence Section.

A. See chart.



There were only two regular staff officers in the Intel-
ligence Section, but about 20 attached officers and a-
bout 20 NCO's and enlisted men were in the section.

Q. 3. Was this a larger section than most Army Intelligence
Sections in the beginning of the war?

A. Yes. When I was with the 5th Army in 1941, there were
only 11 officers on the staff, and only 2 in intelli-
gence.

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION (Lt. Col. TOKUNAGA, H.) -RESTRICTED-

Q. 4. Did most of the armies have as large an intelligence staff as this at the end of the war?

A. I think so, though the location of the army might make some difference. The newer armies in the Homeland had large staffs. My intelligence staff was large but I made it so because none of the men had intelligence training, and I wanted to make them specialists in a narrow field. When I organized the section, I did not have a single man with any intelligence training. In June I got a man who had worked in General Staff Hq. Intelligence:

Q. 5. Did the 57th Army make any intelligence estimates or were they received from the General Staff?

A. Many of the facts on which the estimates were based, such as over-all estimates of fleet units in the area, air strength in the PHILIPPINES and OKINAWA, withdrawal of troops from Europe, etc., came from Headquarters, but we made our own estimates. We added our own information such as submarine activities, analysis of air strikes by your forces, communications activities, etc. We found that after a period of intensive communication activity, when it almost stopped an attack could be expected.

Q. 6. What areas were defended by the 57th Army?

A. East KYUSHU from MIYAZAKI south and the west side of KAGOSHIMA Bay.

Q. 7. Was Headquarters or the 57th Army responsible for making the estimate of our landing date?

A. Headquarters made the general estimate, but the 57th Army would be charged with estimating the exact day. This could not be done more than a few days in advance.

Q. 8. What was the best estimate of the landing date?

A. Any time in October.

Q. 9. Were reconnaissance planes attached to the 57th Army?

A. No. The Navy furnished our reconnaissance. We had formal liaison with the Navy base at KANOKA, but in practice, informal liaison consisting of daily visits by my men produced the best information.

Q. 10. Did Headquarters make any estimate of the force which would land in KYUSHU?

A. The estimate in April was that you would land on the east coast of KYUSHU with 7 or 8 divisions, even before OKINAWA was secured. In June this was revised, and we then thought that you would land 15 or 16 divisions in October in KAGOSHIMA BAY, ARIAKE BAY, possibly near KANOKA, and on the plain south of MIYAZAKI.

Transcript of Interrogation (Lt. Col. TOFUNAGA, H.) -RESTRICTED-

Q.11. What was the principal factor which caused the change in your April estimate that we would land in June?

A. We at first thought you would land on KYUSHU before the OKINAWA campaign was over, but when you did not, we concluded that you would assemble a very large force before landing. We thought it would take you until the middle of October to do this. I was afraid you would make several landings in KYUSHU, and we would not know which was the main one. I was also afraid you might bypass KYUSHU and go direct to the HANTO Plain. However, I had no responsibility for estimates as to landings anywhere other than KYUSHU and was prepared to meet you on the plain south of MIYAZAKI, in ARIAKE Bay and in KAGOSHIMA Bay.

Q.12. Do you think our landings would have been successful?

A. We did not plan to resist your landings strenuously, although we did plan to put up more resistance than you found at OKINAWA. We had strong centers of resistance a mile or so inland and mobile reserves back of this line. If enough of your ships were sunk off the coast, we thought we could destroy your army after it got ashore. We expected FUJIKAZE planes to destroy or disorganize at least 1/3 of your attacking force and hoped to raise the figure to 1/2.

Q.13. Did the ground army have any part in planning the FUJIKAZE attacks?

A. We were informed by the Air Force of the plans, but had no part in making them. We knew that the Air Force expected to expend itself against your ships and that we would have no air support after you got ashore.

Q.14. How did you expect to bring your reserves into action with no air support?

A. We did not think you could destroy all our equipment, but we did expect all bridges to be out. We stored ammunition and supplies in many small dumps where they would always be available. We also built prefabricated bridges and hid them at critical stream crossings. We expected to do most of our moving on foot at night.

Q.14. How much growth in the Japanese intelligence system was there during the war?

A. I am not very familiar with this since I was not in intelligence before the war. However, I think there was very great growth in the lower units but not much in Headquarters.

Q.15. At what stage of the war did the increase take place?

A. It began in the southern areas in 1943; in the Homeland not until late 1944 or early 1945. One reason for the growth of the system in Japan was that each Army was afraid it would be cut off from intelligence sources at Headquarters and therefore tried to make itself self-sufficient.

Transcript of Interrogation (Lt. Col. TOKINAGA, Hachiro)

Q.16. How satisfactory did you consider your organization?

A. I thought it was good but, of course, it was never tested. My organization was the result of a lot of thought. Prior to 1945, there were a number of officers at General Staff who thought the intelligence system in the Japanese Army was weak. We thought a great deal about a good organization and discussed it among ourselves. When the Homeland defenses were reorganized in the spring of 1945, several of us were assigned to the field, and we had a chance to set up the kind of organization we had so often discussed. I thought mine was the best, but the other men probably thought theirs were.

Q.17. These other intelligence organizations set up by your friends from Headquarters; do you know enough about them to say whether they were much like yours?

A. I know enough to say that they were organized along the same lines. In minor particulars, I am sure there were differences, but I don't know what these differences were.

Q.18. Were these organizations ordered by the General Staff or were they worked out in the field by you and your friends?

A. These organizations were not ordered, but the plans were approved after they were drawn up.

Q.19. Were any orders as to intelligence organizations sent out by the General Staff?

A. While I was with the General Staff, there were none, and I received none after I went to the 57th Army. Occasionally, General Staff would send a representative to the field to advise, but he could not order.

Q.20. Was any effort made to increase the intelligence staff at Division.

A. Yes. In the Homeland intelligence, officers from Division were brought together and given lectures on the need for a better organization. However, this did little good since the Division staff was always small, and Intelligence was the last section to get new men.

Q.21. Was any effort made to assign intelligence officers below Division?

A. There was some talk about it, but nothing was done before the end of the war. It was hoped that a full time intelligence officer might be assigned as far down as Regiment.

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section
Tokyo, Japan

RESTRICTED

9 December 1945

REPORT ON JAPANESE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUBMITTED
3 NOVEMBER 1945 BY LT. GENERAL ARIKUE, SEIZO, IJA,
CHIEF OF G-2, ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

This report was submitted in response to a written request, dated 1 November 1945, from the G-2 Section, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey. It is reproduced here in question and answer form.


THE WRITTEN REPORT FOLLOWS:

A. ORGANIZATION

Q. 1. What was the organization of Army Intelligence? Include charts and tables showing organization and command relationship.

A. At the end of the war, the organization of the 2nd Division, General Staff Headquarters, i.e., the Army Central Intelligence Section, was as follows

CHAIN OF COMMAND AND LIAISON CHANNELS




NOTE: Though there were some changes during the war in Intelligence, they were not extensive.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

CHAIN OF COMMAND AND LIAISON CHANNELS



Note: Chain of Command

- - - - - Liaison Channels

- NOTES: (a) In the KWANGTUNG Army, Southern Army, Chinese Expeditionary Army, N. China Area Army, BURMA Area Army, etc., intelligence is allotted to the 2nd Division of the Operations Department, with one colonel (or Lieut. Col.) as chief of section and two officers of the rank of Lt. Col. (or major) and captain.
- (b) In other Army General Headquarters, area armies, and armies, there is one intelligence section under the Chief Intelligence Staff Officer. Personnel vary, depending upon local conditions, but generally there are several officers and as many enlisted personnel as needed.
- (c) In the division, and below, there are several officers and non-commissioned officers under the Chief Intelligence Staff Officer.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

(d) In addition, the Central Special (Communications) Department - directly under the Chief of Staff - at Tokyo - is charged with radio intelligence and code deciphering. The Southern Army, China Expeditionary Army, KWANGTUNG Army, and 5th Area Army (HOKKAIDO) also have Special (Communications) Intelligence Departments.

(3) Attaches resident abroad played an important role.

Q. 2. To what extent were Army intelligence activities integrated with those of the Navy, and with government agencies; with Army Air Forces; with Naval Air Forces?

A. Army intelligence activities maintained close relations with its respective Naval opposite numbers. In addition, every week on Saturday afternoon for about two hours, meetings were held in the 2nd Division of General Staff Headquarters among the several interested staff officers of General Staff Headquarters including the staff officers of Naval Headquarters concerned with the U. S., the Air General Headquarters, the 1st Army General Headquarters, the Army Central Special (Communication) Intelligence Section, Navy Units, the Surface Escort Force, etc. In these meetings, we effected an exchange of intelligence and sought for a synthesis and a decision.

There was no special liaison with government intelligence agencies. Exchange of intelligence was, however, accomplished by mutual study of current DOMEI communications and by personal liaison with civilian and military intelligence organizations.

Q. 3. What methods and aids were used to train officers for intelligence duties?

A. In the Japanese Army, as a result of its experience in the operations against CHINA, intelligence duty was generally looked down upon, and there was no special officer training. Towards the end of the war, however, we got together and trained for about two months, in the 2nd Division, some forty expectant officers, graduates of the Reserve Officer's School. Moreover, in addition to schooling officers intended for important intelligence positions (Army General Staff College graduates or equal), as far as possible we brought them into TOKYO before they left for their posts, either separately or in groups, and gave them liaison and educational duties. In the field, officers gave intelligence training to non-commissioned officers from time to time.

Q. 4. How were intelligence personnel selected?

A. In the selection of officers, we aimed principally at getting persons with skill in English and with unusual enthusiasm, but the results did not always turn out that way.

RESTRICTED

Q. 5. Describe the duties of staff and field intelligence officers at each level of command, including briefing, interrogation, escape and evasion, technical intelligence, etc.

A. The Senior Staff Officer in the Headquarters (units below Army Staff Headquarters) and the 1st Section, synthesized, statistically and analytically, the intelligence gathered and put in shape by the officers under him. He then made a decision, and presented his decision, as an opinion, to his superior, to the commander, and to interested parties.

Intelligence officers were generally respectively allotted such subjects as aircraft, ships, special intelligence, and ground situation. In accordance with these duties, they developed their daily intelligence, and when there was a significant change or, if no significant change, after a specific period (generally 10 days), they consolidated available data, sought for the pertinent decision, and used it as the material with which to judge the enemy's plans.

The duties and leadership of the Special (Communications) Intelligence Department is shown in Appendix A of this report.

Q. 6. Give number of personnel assigned either on full or part time duty with intelligence in each echelon.

A. These figures are shown in organization table (answer to question 1 of this section).

B. OPERATION

Q. 1. What were your sources of information? List them, in order of importance and reliability.

A. (a) Communications intelligence and code deciphering. (Army: Central Special Intelligence Department. Navy: Special Section).

(b) Reports from field units.

(c) Prisoners of war and captured documents.

(d) Reports of attaches and diplomatic representatives abroad. (Army, Navy, and State Dept.)

(e) Broadcast monitoring.
DOMEI Communications (Intelligence Office).

(f) Newspapers, magazines.

Q. 2. How was the information processed and used after you received it?

A. There was a great deal to produce, from the above sources, reports, and important intelligence. We planned the collection of intelligence; we examined it comparatively, arrived at decisions, and after study by the interested staff officers, reported the results to the areas concerned.

RESTRICTED

Q. 3. Give in detail methods of estimating:

- (a) U. S. strength.
- (b) U. S. losses.
- (c) U. S. intentions.

A. (a) The determination of U. S. strength was customarily derived principally from numbers of transports and estimated total tonnage. To this was added reports from field units.

It was determined that for one U. S. division 300,000 tons, more or less, of transport shipping, including military supplies, were usually required. Moreover, the reports from field units generally divided shipping into large, medium, and small types. On the basis of a large type being over 5,000 tons, a small type under 1,000 tons, and the remainder being the medium type, a rough estimate of shipping volume was made.

- (b) U. S. losses were mainly based on reports from field units; moreover, it was necessary to arrive at a decision by estimating the character of the battle, etc. We had the impression, however, that personnel losses inflicted on the U. S. forces were greater than our own.
- (c) We think we were generally able to make an accurate decision on U. S. plans from the communications intelligence materials shown on the sheet attached hereto. (See Appendix A).

Q. 4. What means did you have for disseminating or exchanging intelligence information with:

- (a) Other intelligence activities?
- (b) Operational and combat units in the field?

A. (a) Liaison was effected by radio and in writing, along the normal chain of command. In addition, generally, at the Army level and above, 10-day intelligence summaries were exchanged. By such means, and by reporting estimates regarding changes in the air raid and general situations, we planned to consolidate our thinking on these matters.

- (b) Liaison in the field was effected by meetings of chief intelligence personnel and missions by staff members. Moreover, once or twice a year, in the spring and fall, chief intelligence staff officers met together. In addition, we sent interested staff officers to field units to effect any necessary liaison. -- Though operational and combat units in the battle areas made reports on intelligence as outlined before, there was no special intelligence communications net.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Towards the end of the war, as a result of the deterioration of the general situation and the congestion of communications, we adopted an intelligence broadcast system with Imperial General Headquarters at the center. We expected to extend it successfully to the several field armies and to see good results from it, but before it was successful in field armies, the war was over.

Q. 5. What was the procedure in extracting information received from:

- (a) U. S. prisoners of war?
- (b) Captured documents?
- (c) Natives in country where battle was fought?

- A. (a) U. S. prisoners of war were chiefly of low rank; consequently, though we were generally able to trust the information, such as it was, that we were able to get from them, there were very few cases where we were able to get important information on account of thorough U.S. counter-intelligence measures. We did not consider any special methods of interrogation; that depended on the intelligence officer's ability.
- (b) There were few captured documents of value. We were able to learn the capabilities of shot-down planes from the planes themselves. We obtained an organization chart of American naval units from a plane shot down in an air raid on Japan early this year. From this we constructed a clear picture of U.S. Naval power.
- (c) We were able to pick up nothing in the intelligence line from local inhabitants. We felt strongly, on the other hand, that you were able to get intelligence of our situation from such sources.

Q. 6. What Army, Navy, and other intelligence publications were published? Please inclose copy of each, if available.

- A. (a) The following were distributed regularly at General Staff Headquarters:
- (1) Publication every 10 days: - mainly changes in the combat situation in various areas.
 - (2) Air intelligence: - publication every 10 days on air operations.
 - (3) Intelligence monthly on America: - Assembled intelligence on America.
 - (4) American Battle Report: - lessons and outstanding points on American tactics, based on combat experience in the field.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

In addition, as changes occurred in the situation, we gathered the intelligence, used it to make an estimate of the situation and a timely estimate of enemy plans, arrived at a decision, and dispatched the gist of it to the armies concerned.

- (b) Armies in the field: As in General Staff Headquarters, armies in the field usually published intelligence, concentrating on distributing important information received from higher headquarters, particularly data relating to U. S. tactics.
- (c) Navy: Material acquired from the Navy was chiefly military material concerning the American Navy, such as U. S. Naval organization, materiel, and tactics.

Q. 7. To what extent did German intelligence on Allied or U. S. Air Forces and equipment aid the Japanese?

- A. Intelligence received from Germany came principally in the form of cabled reports from our attaches in Germany and concerned, for the most part, U. S. organization and materiel. Although we depended almost entirely upon this type of material from friendly sources at the beginning of the war, it is doubtful whether it was especially profitable. Moreover, since the degree of accuracy of intelligence in our files on such matters as the organization and location of any particular unit (concerning all U. S. forces) was unsatisfactory, the results of any evaluation or estimate were unsatisfactory. In the SCIO-MONO area, Japanese and U. S. forces fought in close contact, so, gradually, we were able to make out the real state of affairs in the U. S. Forces.

C. EFFECTIVENESS

Q. 1. How successful and accurate was your intelligence organization in making periodic estimates of Allied and U. S. air strength, capabilities, and intentions?

- A. On the basis of communications intercept reports, outlined on the attached sheet (Appendix A), we were generally able to determine rather accurately the time and scope of any U.S. operation about two weeks in advance. We had, however, a good deal of difficulty in determining the location.

We usually determined air strength accurately from the number of front-line airfields and planes making air raids and the frequency of the latter.

Q. 2. What provision was made for analyzing captured equipment, including crashed aircraft? How was such information disseminated?

- A. Captured material such as shot-down aircraft was collected and studied by Air Headquarters and the research agencies concerned. The end of the war came, however, before we could satisfactorily utilize this information. We regretted that our materials on ground ordnance, particularly as pertained to amphibious operations, were not satisfactory.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Q. 3. How reliable was the technical intelligence on Allied and U. S. equipment?

A. We received no special intelligence materials other than those obtained from Germany. (The Technical Section of Air General Headquarters analyzed captured equipment chiefly for the purpose of using the data for the improvement of Japanese aircraft).

Q. 4. How effective and successful was the interrogations of U. S. airmen and other prisoners of war?

A. We received fragmentary information from U. S. flyers and other prisoners of war, but very little which was pertinent to the issue.

D. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY

Q. To what extent did the Army rely on photographic intelligence? Comment on its effectiveness.

A. We made considerable efforts to utilize photos, but there were many instances in which we were inferior in air strength and felt the "pinch" in command of the air. We were, however, able to estimate accurately in each area, through air photos, the condition of U. S. front-line air bases. Also, we put considerable effort into making maps of operations areas and of unmapped areas, but it cannot be said that we attained our aim satisfactorily.

E. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO THE WAR

Q. Summarize Japanese intelligence activities prior to the war, using A, B, and C as a guide for detail or information desired.

A. Intelligence sources before the war were exceedingly scanty, and the sum total of intelligence obtained added up to only a few items gathered by attaches and diplomatic representatives abroad.

NOTE: Appendix A follows on page 9.

RESTRICTED

Materials for Estimating American Operational Plans, based on special data provided by American Communications.

SUMMARY:

We monitored American ship and air unit radio communications, made a systematic statistical investigation and analysis of this communications data, and compared it with past examples. When we made an estimate, we could turn out a general one concerning the scope and inception of a new American operation about one month before, and concerning the projected operations area about 1 to 2 weeks in advance. Specifically, this was tactical (strategical) intelligence effective against American operations.

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--|---|
| 1. BAMS | <p>IWO (19 Feb) The number of ships that turned up daily conspicuously between the end of January and the first of February, leaving us to infer positive plans for the beginning of a movement.</p> | <p>OKINAWA (1 April) After the latter part of February the number of ships turning up increased steadily. We inferred that a new operation in the CPA was being initiated, subsequently to the IWO JIMA Operation.</p> | <p>EXPLANATION When we studied the number of ships turning up in each ten day period statistically and compared any increase or decrease with previous samplings, we were able to estimate the time and scope of a projected American operation about 1 month in advance.</p> |
| 2. Assembling of Ship Units | <p>The number of ships counted at advance bases in the Marianas and Marshalls increased <i>pari passu</i> with the increase of ships that turned up in BAMS. Thus we knew previously of the assembling of ships at these bases.</p> | <p>The number of ships counted at Leyte, in the Marianas, and Marshalls increased <i>pari passu</i> with the increase of ships that turned up by BAMS. We inferred that the Marianas and Philippines were deployment areas for a subsequent operation.</p> | <p>Based on the assembly of ships at advance Central Pacific bases, the transport situation with regards to deployment of forces, we were able to estimate the time, scope and general direction of a new operation 2 to 3 weeks in advance.</p> |
| 3. Task Force Activity | <p>We inferred plans for the beginning of a new operation subsequent to the raids on the Japanese Homeland by task forces on the 9th and 10th of February.</p> | <p>We inferred plans for beginning a new operation from raids carried out continuously on the homeland and Okinawa during the early and middle parts of March.</p> | <p>On the basis of our experience of the fact that Task Force became active in the prelude to a new operation, we were able to take it as the sign that an operation was impending and to figure out the operational area from the area of activity.</p> |

R E S T R I C T E D

- | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| 4. Location of Commanders. | About the 1st part of January the Submarine Commanders of the Pacific and NIMITZ's Head quarters moved to Guam. | After the latter part of February the movement of Base Air Unit Commanders into the Philippine and Marianas bases became more and more common. | The displacement of Commanders forward accompanied plans for the inception of a new operation and, according to past experience, inevitably occurred several days to 1 month before the operation. |
| 5. Base and Air Unit Condition | The increase in base air strength in the Marianas between the end of December and the first part of February was striking. | From the latter part of February on, the increase in air strength in the Philippines, especially Luzon, and in the Marianas was very striking. | When positive operational plans were in progress, it was usual for there to be a steady movement (of planes) to forward bases 2 to 3 weeks in advance. |
| 6. Transport and supply aircraft. | After the first part of January there was a noticeable gathering of transport and supply aircraft from America at the advance Mariana and Philippine bases. | After the Iwo Jima operation assemblage of supply and transport craft at advance Marianas and Philippine bases was increasingly obvious. | It was customary for such aircraft to become very active 1 to 2 weeks before a new operation, though, of course, this varied with the Army and Navy aircraft stationed in these areas. |
| 7. Changes in weather Communications. | Weather broadcasts of Marianas base air units on Iwo Jima, Okinawa and the Japanese homeland increased markedly after January. | Weather broadcasts of Marianas and Philippines base air units, especially B-29's, on Okinawa and the homeland increased markedly. | We were able, by a statistical analysis of weather communications, to determine their focal point and the objective of an operation. |
| 8. Changes in communications origins. | In the first part of January, the call signs of aircraft and bases were totally changed in the Central Pacific area only. | In the first part of March, some of the ship and unit call signs were changed. | There were many instances when the change in communications originators clearly showed a new, definite plan for an operation, such changes coming generally about 1 month before. |

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

9. Commu- The frequency of operational broad- as in the case of We were able to
nic- casts from Honolulu the Iwo Jima oper- determine the area in
ations end the Admiralties tion, the noted which the American
Hand- decreased markedly Army was interested
ling. after the Philippines from the handling
operation and comm- of communications.
unications handled Subsequently we
in the Central could determine the
Pacific Area increas- definite operational
ed greatly. ially in the objective.
10. Appear- In February tele- After the first We were able to
ance of graphic traffic port of March, determine the gen-
special with special unit eral outline and
unit code names became scope of an oper-
code noticeable. There ation from the
names was a great in- increase or de-
(Tele- crease in new unit crease of main unit
phone or code names. code names, for
KU chan- these materials
nels). were useful for
inferring the
beginning of a
definite new
operation.
11. Acti- Search and reconn- Reconnaissance of By analyzing search
vity of sistance of search Okinawa and the aircraft sector units
scout- aircraft units from Homeland by search statistically and
ing air- Mariannes bases of aircraft based on determining their
craft. Iwo Jima and the Luzon and Mariannes, focal points, we
Homeland increased. especially by B-29s, could determine
B-29-led reconn- the direction of a
aissance, especially subsequent operation,
just before the frequently several
operation, suggested days to a week
the objective. before the operation.
12. Sub- Submarine activity At this time, the According to past
mar- around Iwo Jima was scope of submarine example, submarine
ine marked from the end concentrations
Act- of December into occurred against
ivity January. After the the landing point
1 month prior to
the landing and
activity fell off relatively just
before the landing.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

SUMMARY

IWO JIMA:

1. Time of Operation: From consideration of points 1 to 12, especially 1 to 8, it was determined, around the end of the 3rd week in January, that operations would begin after the middle of February.
2. Scope of Operation: Comparing examples since the ATTU campaign under point 1, forces to be used were estimated around the first part of January at two to three divisions.
3. Operational Area: From raids of task forces and activity of our search aircraft and submarines, the objective area was estimated about the end of January, to be Iwo Jima.

OKINAWA:

1. Time of Operation: From points 1 to 12, especially 1, the time of this operation was estimated, early in February, to be in late March.
2. Scope of Operation: Estimated in early part of February, from point 1, that forces used initially would be about three divisions. In the early part of April it was estimated that subsequently the total would be increased to six divisions.
3. Operational Area: About the middle of March it was estimated that the objective would be Okinawa, from the deployment and assembling of forces, from the raids of task forces, and from search aircraft and submarine activity.

R E S T R I C T E D

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section
Tokyo, Japan

RESTRICTED

5 December 1945

REPORT ON JAPANESE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITTED
20 NOVEMBER 1945 BY CAPTAIN OMAE, TOSHIKAZU, IJN,
JAPANESE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

This report was submitted in response to a written request, dated 6 November 1945, from the Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2. It is reproduced here in question and answer form.

THE WRITTEN REPORT FOLLOWS:

A. ORGANIZATION

- Q. 1. What was the organization of Navy Intelligence? Include charts and tables showing organization and command relationships.
- A. Table of organization is attached as Annex A.
- Q. 2. To what extent were Naval Intelligence activities integrated with those of the Army? With government agencies? With Army Air Forces? With Naval Air Forces?
- A. Army intelligence, including Air Intelligence, was usually available, but much of this information became available too late for use. All the reports concerning the Navy which were obtained from the army units during an operation were always sent to us. No information from any other government intelligence bureau was used for operations. Operational intelligence from the naval air units were put to the best use. (The above concerns only the extent to which operational intelligence was used.)
- Q. 3. How many intelligence personnel were assigned each unit afloat? Officers? Enlisted?
- A. In every important fleet there was stationed an Intelligence Staff Officer (a commander or lieutenant commander, and, in general, this was just an additional duty for a staff communication's officer); under his supervision a communications intelligence group was organized (which ordinarily consisted of a chief, who was a lieutenant commander or lieutenant), 2 reserve officers, and several non-commissioned officers. A fleet below a division (sentai), however, was not generally equipped with such a group.
- Q. 4. Describe in detail the organization of intelligence in the Naval Air Arm?
- A. A Base Air Fleet was equipped with a communications intelligence group, almost the same as the more important fleets. Air Units below a base air division (sentai) were provided with certain personnel from a group, but a special communications intelligence group was not attached.

B. OPERATION - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

- Q. 1. Describe in detail the duties of Intelligence Officers, both Staff and in units afloat, including, in the Air Arm, briefing and interrogation of pilots, escape and evasion, technical intelligence, etc.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- A. An intelligence staff officer combined and organized all intelligence data in order to estimate the situation.-----The intelligence officer, of every ship (generally, by Captain's order, the Communications Officer held this post as additional duty) performed this duty, but of course he was inferior to a staff officer in his ability as a Communications Officer.-----
An air staff officer or an air officer made it a rule to discover and explain the situation of the arrival and departure of each plane or air unit, but he must maintain close liaison with an intelligence staff officer or intelligence officer.
- Q. 2. What were your sources of information? List in order of importance and reliability?

Information Channels

- A. (1) Search and reconnaissance by units during operations and reports collected by units in operation.
(2) Information directly collected by central intelligence facilities.
(3) Reports from officers resident in foreign countries.
(4) Information from communications sources.

The above mentioned information was combined and arranged in the 3rd Department of the Naval General Staff.

Other Information Sources

- (1) Statistical research of past experiences.
(2) Examination and analysis of public broadcasting in every part of the world.
(3) Documents and letters from enemy ships, airplanes, bodies of war dead and others.
(4) Prisoners of War.
(5) Material from Army and various information sources connected with the Navy.
(6) Informations from communications sources
(a) Variation in volume of traffic according to the statistical investigation.
(b) Change and deviation of cryptographic signs and symbols.
(c) Radar and R.D.F.

Evaluation of Information

Confirmed information was, of course, the most reliable, but each separate piece of information had to be examined carefully. The degree of reliability was as follows:

- (1) Enemy documents and letters.
(2) Combined statements of prisoners (the statement of individual prisoners must be confirmed carefully by other sources)
(3) Information from communications
(4) Reports from public broadcasts and officers residing in foreign countries (these were often doubtful and had to be compared and judged.)
(5) Reports by units engaged in operations (these were exaggerated after the middle of 1942, and their judgment caused much trouble.)

(My standards of evaluation were as follows: In cases of attacks on shipping, I took into consideration the type of target, the amount and weight of shells expended, the general attack situation and the reliability of the witnesses.

RESTRICTED

My evaluation of damage or losses sustained by shipping was ordinarily in the neighborhood of 50% of reported damage, or losses. My evaluation for losses reported in the case of airplanes was 50% (when the total reported shot down was 10 or below) 33 1/3% for losses estimated from 10 to 50 and 25% for 50 planes or above. In my opinion, even after these deductions, the reports were still exaggerated.)

- (6) Information from army sources was generally exaggerated, and, particularly, reports of results were quite unreliable. If they were not examined carefully, they might prove quite misleading.

Disposal of Information

- (1) After deciphering a message, the officer sent the important messages, without making a clean copy, to his seniors concerned.
- (2) When clean copies of general information were made, they were distributed to those who were interested, with such related information as necessary.
- (3) When it was necessary to disseminate intelligence, the staff officer was required to send his dispatch for investigation, together with correlated information, to the chief of staff and his highest senior.
- (4) Disseminated intelligence was arranged and kept by a communications staff officer and communication officer.
- (5) At specified intervals or according to the quantity of information, combined intelligence studies were always made.

Distribution of Information

Dissemination of information for the navy at large was handled by the 3rd department of the Naval General Staff. Ship units were serviced by local fleet headquarters.

The 1st department of the Naval General Staff might also transmit such information connected with important operations.

Regarding distribution of important information, the 1st department and 2nd department of the Naval General Staff consulted with each other beforehand, but only in urgent cases, was there mutual exchange.

Estimate of Situation

- (1) Our judgments were based upon a statistical research of past experience together with various other intelligence and estimates of damage, loss, and the possibility of repairs. In addition, communications intelligence sources supplied us with valuable data concerning damage, loss, and repair. BAMS statistical research was also very useful in the estimation of army strength.
- (2) American losses were assessed after the careful examination of reports from individual attacking units.
- (3) American operational and strategic planning was studied in the light of investigation of all sources and materials outlined above. In addition, the following factors were considered: the world situation, America's preparations for the operation, the development of the war situation, the influence of astronomical and meteorological phenomena, the character of the American commanders, the personnel participating in the conferences prior to the operation, time, the speeches and actions of important Americans.

RESTRICTED

Accordingly, by observing the preliminary actions of American units, for example, submarine activity, air recon, agents landed by submarines and so on, we could estimate the operational objective; on the basis of readiness for combat and the concentration of military units, we could determine the time of the operation and, in general, estimate the enemy plans. We based our judgment on the above method, always weighing the additional available intelligence data from communications sources.

Q. 6. What was the procedure used in extracting information from:

- (1) U.S. Prisoners of War? -- Answer unknown.
- (2) Captured documents? -- Answer: these were examined by the Central Bureau. Important matters were reported at once, and afterwards they were carefully examined and distributed as ordinary information.
- (3) Natives -- Answer unknown.

Q. 7. To what extent did German intelligence on Allied or U.S. Air Forces and equipment aid the Japanese? Was any other German intelligence useful to you?

A. It is said that German technical reports were used to good advantage but details are unknown.

Q. 8. What provision was made for analyzing captured equipment, including crashed aircraft? How was such information used? How was it disseminated?

A. If important material, necessary to the coming operation or fighting was discovered, the unit which discovered it was required to inform every activity concerned. According to the provisions of the Central Department orders regarding the disposal of the material, we always had it removed and examined by specialists. On such investigations, the Central Department made a report and submitted it to military units, government offices, government factories and so on.

Q. 9. Did you gain any useful intelligence through capture of any U.S. mail? From letters or diaries taken from bodies of U.S. officers or men or from Prisoners of War?

A. We have never heard about any case in which we obtained material from American mail, nor have we ever heard of any case in which letters and diaries were obtained from planes shot down. Many official documents, however, were obtained from sources other than these.

Q. 10. Describe sources of information in arriving at the Japanese estimate of U.S. order of battle and enclose copy of estimate as of December 1941 and also estimate as of 1 August 1945.

A. Information which these estimates were originally based upon ~~may~~ long exist. (Situation estimate for 1 June 1945 was, however, loaned to USSBS Japanese Intelligence Section).

C. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED ABOARD FLEET UNITS.

Q. 1. Large Combat Aircraft Carriers (CV)

- (a) What were the sources of information which provided data used in briefing pilots prior to attacks on land targets, combatant and merchant ship targets? Describe type, volume and usefulness of the information received from each source.

RESTRICTED

- (b) Who did the briefing of pilots?
- (c) How was information secured from pilots on completion of an attack mission. Who interrogated them?
- (d) Describe procedure in evaluating and disseminating information received from pilots on completion of an attack mission.
- (e) Provide copies of all report forms used by aircraft carrier air groups for the reporting of post-attack information.
- (f) Were ship or air group personnel assigned on a full time basis exclusively to intelligence duties? On a part time basis? Describe their duties, qualifications, training and assignments.

- A. (a) In case of group attack, necessary orders were given according to aerial photographs taken beforehand and available maps were distributed. In case of attacking battleships or merchant ships, our formation of plans was determined by available reconnaissance reports. The composition of enemy forces was determined by judging all reports available which America had made public.
- (b) Staff Air Officer or Air Officer.
- (c) Same as (b).
- (d) After examining the report of every one of the flight personnel and checking it for contradictory and unlikely statements, the Staff Air Officer or Air Officer estimated the reports and informed the departments concerned of its important points.
- (e) No standard type of report form was used.
- (f) A designated officer was engaged in arrangement of reports and making records as an important additional duty, but the qualifications and training for these duties are not known.

Q. 2. Small Carriers (CVE)

- (a) Provide information (a) through (f) requested in per 1 above with respect to small carriers.

- A. (a) Small carriers did not differ from large carriers in respect to questions (a) through (f) of per 1.

Q. 3. Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers:

- (a) Were officers assigned to full, or part time intelligence duties aboard:
 - (1) Battleships
 - (2) Cruisers
 - (3) Destroyers

If so, what were their qualifications, training and duties?

- (b) What were the sources of information used for:
 - (1) Current operational purposes
 - (2) For long term planning

Aboard

- (a) Battleships
- (b) Cruisers
- (c) Destroyers

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- (c) Describe the operation of the Communication Intelligence Unit aboard Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers with regard to Number and training of personnel (officer and enlisted men) assigned, sources of information, volume and reliability of information, method of dissemination of information.

- A. (a) All of these kinds of ships were equipped with intelligence officers who had this as additional duty similar to the case of the aircraft carrier, but we have never heard details as to their qualifications and training.

- (b) There were the following intelligence sources:


- (1) The objective of the immediate operation was clearly shown in operational orders of the higher commands.

- (2) Long term planning

No information was obtained by battle-ships, cruisers or destroyers except those which were so instructed by the orders of the Imperial Headquarters and combined Fleet.

- (c) A radio intelligence group was not assigned to ordinary ships because of the shortage of personnel. A communications officer was usually made responsible for the making up and submitting of reports. No special personnel were assigned to this duty, and no particular training was given to officers exercising this function. Radio communications themselves were handled by a special duty group and other communications units. No reliable material was available in respect to the amount or reliability of radio intelligence information.

Means of submission of reports:



D. FLEET STAFF INTELLIGENCE

- Q. 1. For each echelon of command in the Fleet from Fleet Headquarters down to the lowest including individual ship units, please provide the following information:

- (a) Intelligence functions
- (b) Who performed these functions.
- (c) How many officers and men were assigned to full and/or part time intelligence duties with Fleet Staffs in each echelon of Command?
- (d) What special training did they receive and where were they trained?
- (e) What were their sources of information? Describe each as to usefulness and reliability.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

(f) What was the nature of the reporting system for dissemination of information regarding:

- (1) Current operational information
- (2) Reports of engagements with Allied Forces.

The officers responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence were either staff intelligence officers, or staff communications officers (who were assigned intelligence functions as additional duty). Such officers were attached to the headquarters of the Combined Fleet, Area Fleets and Air Fleets.

Excepting for the training program for higher course students of the Naval Communications School, no particular training was given, even to officers of the regular navy. The special knowledge concerning intelligence was acquired by the officers themselves from available materials. Reserve officers were given a basic training course of four (4) months at the Naval Communications School. Petty Officers and non-rated men were put through a six (6) months ordinary course and a six (6) months higher course in addition to their ordinary training period. These courses were given at the YOKOSUKA Naval Communications School.

The number of officers and men assigned a Fleet Headquarters intelligence group is shown below:

Fleet Level Intelligence Organization

| Tactical Assignment | Staff Intel- ligence Off. | Officer Reserve O. | Special Duty Officer and Warrant O. | Non-com- missioned Petty O's and men |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------|---|---|
| Combined Fleet Headquarters | Specialist (1st) | 3 | 1 | 35 |
| Southwestern Area Fleet Headquarters | 1 (additional) | 15 | 15 | 270 |
| Note: specialists devote themselves to this single assignment | | | | |
| Middle Pacific Area Fleet Hqs | 1 (additional) | 10 | 10 | 250 |
| Southeastern Area Fleet Headquarters | 1 (additional) | 10 | 3 | 170 |
| China Areas Fleet Headquarters | 1 (additional) | 10 | 5 | 150 |
| Northeastern Area Fleet Headquarters | 1 (additional) | 8 | 3 | 100 |
| Air Fleet Headquarters | 1 (additional) | 3 | 2 | 35 |
| Other Fleet Headquarters | 1 (additional) | 2 | 1 | 15 |
| Air Attack Force Headquarters | 1 (additional) | 2 | 1 | 15 |
| Surface Escort Fleet Headquarters | 1 (additional) | | 1 | 15 |

Remarks: The number of this list shows the standard complement; this temporarily increased or decreased according to the operation.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Sources of intelligence used by the personnel included radio intelligence material supplied by special duty groups and by individual communications units, together with additional material obtained by various other types of intelligence channels for reference.

The degree of reliability of intelligence was impossible to estimate but generally speaking, reliability was assessed at about 60%.

As for the dissemination of available information regarding current operations, the TOKYO Communications Unit were responsible for broadcasting important operational intelligence and combat reports concerning the entire ocean areas to the whole Navy, while the local communications units were responsible for broadcasting items concerning their own localities to their own local units. Every headquarters was responsible for submitting combined intelligence to the units under its command.

E. ANALYSIS OF U.S. ANTI AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, METHODS AND ANTI AIRCRAFT GUN POSITIONS

- Q. 1. What information was given aviators regarding U.S. anti-aircraft weapons and methods, and locating anti-aircraft gun positions?
- Q. 2. How was this information secured?
- Q. 3. Were personnel assigned on full or part time basis to the task of collecting and analyzing data on U.S. anti-aircraft weapons and their location?
- Q. 4. Enclose available manuals, charts, or documents used in this work.
- A. 1. Information was made available to aviators by means of aerial photographs and studies of previous experience showing density and effectiveness of gun fire.
- A. 2. This information was secured by aerial photographic reconnaissance and records of past reconnaissance and attacks. No mathematical calculations were made as to density of gun fire according to course or altitude.
- A. 3. No personnel were assigned particularly for this purpose.
- A. 4. No materials were supplied.

F. EFFECTIVENESS

- Q. 1. How successful and accurate was the Naval Intelligence organization in making periodic estimates of:
 - (a) Allied and U.S. Air Strength?
 - (b) Location and composition of U.S. Naval Forces and Ground Forces?
 - (c) U.S. capabilities?
 - (d) U.S. intentions?
- A. (a) The approximate strength of American and Allied Air Power in the Pacific was judged by the published reports of airplane production and the allotment ratio for the Pacific Coast Areas.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

The base air power was estimated by the potential capacity of individual air bases. Number of carrier and sea plane tender based aircraft was estimated by the capacity of the ships. We found from experience in operations that our estimates were not greatly off the mark.

- b) Information regarding the operational ability of the American Army was obtained through our general knowledge of America's war policy. Our senior personnel felt that the overall strategy of the American army was to reduce casualties as much as possible in so far as tactical situation permitted. These plans had been evaluated almost entirely correctly since the Solomons operation. Large troop movements were generally known beforehand, as were amphibious landings, with the exception of the surprise landing at Guadalcanal. For example, we had made preparations based on our belief that Iwo Jima would be attacked about January and Okinawa about March.

Situation and Organization of U. S. Naval and Ground Strength

According to information published, the estimation of newly built ships was clarified and added to the power already possessed. Thus we estimated the total strength. The present strength was estimated when the actual loss was subtracted from the total strength according to combat reports.

Estimates necessary to operations were provided as follows:

ESTIMATES OF U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH AS OF FIRST PART OF MAY 1945

Main Surface Forces.

| | End of May | End of June | End of July | End of August |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Aircraft Carriers | <u>13</u> 26 | <u>20</u> 27 | <u>25</u> 28 | <u>26</u> 28 |
| Escort Carriers | <u>58</u> 75 | <u>64</u> 80 | <u>70</u> 85 | <u>74</u> 89 |
| Battleships | <u>20</u> 21 | <u>21</u> 22 | <u>23</u> 23 | <u>24</u> 24 |
| Cruisers | <u>16</u> 49 | <u>25</u> 56 | <u>35</u> 64 | <u>36</u> 64 |
| Destroyers | <u>202</u> 289 | <u>222</u> 308 | <u>244</u> 324 | <u>254</u> 331 |

1. This chart is based on the figures announced by America at the end of April and as further affected by "TEN" operations. The denominator indicates ships on hand and numerator the ships available for use against JAPAN.
2. In regard to ships believed damaged or sunk the most pessimistic view was taken and aircraft carriers were considered only badly damaged while escort carriers were considered as half being sunk and half as being damaged.
3. In regard to badly damaged ships it was considered that half could be made ready for action in two to three months and half in from three to four months.
4. It was considered that the new carrier ANTIETAM would be ready for action at the end of June, the TARAWA at the end of July and the BOXER at the end of August. The SARATOGA and RANGER were believed to be used for training and not included.
5. In the figures for ships on hand, vessels loaned to BRITAIN and ships lost before the OKINAWA operation are included.

-RESTRICTED-

ESTIMATES OF U. S. ARMED STRENGTH

| Classification | End of April | End of May | End of June | End of July | End of August |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| A Infantry Division | $\frac{43}{90}$ | $\frac{44}{90}$ | $\frac{44}{90}$ | $\frac{53}{90}$ | $\frac{70}{90}$ |
| R Armored Division | $\frac{4}{22}$ | $\frac{4}{22}$ | $\frac{5}{22}$ | $\frac{7}{22}$ | $\frac{10}{22}$ |
| M Air Transport Division | $\frac{2}{10}$ | $\frac{2}{10}$ | $\frac{2}{10}$ | $\frac{3}{10}$ | $\frac{4}{10}$ |
| Cavalry Division | $\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Total | $\frac{50}{134}$ | $\frac{51}{134}$ | $\frac{52}{134}$ | $\frac{64}{134}$ | $\frac{85}{134}$ |
| Marine Division | $\frac{5}{10}$ | $\frac{6}{10}$ | $\frac{7}{10}$ | $\frac{7}{10}$ | $\frac{3}{10}$ |
| Total | $\frac{57}{144}$ | $\frac{59}{144}$ | $\frac{61}{144}$ | $\frac{71}{144}$ | $\frac{95}{144}$ |

1. This list was made according to the following supposition:

- (a) After May, every month 2 divisions were sent by reinforcement from America to the operation against Japan.
- (b) Out of 60 divisions on the European front, about half were sent at present for the same purpose.

| The No. of times and order | Strength number of Divisions | Departure from Europe (Date) | Arrival at Philippines Area (date) | The completion of Operation |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1 | About 10 | Middle end of May | Till the end of July | End of August |
| 2 | About 20 | June | Till the end of August | End of Sept |

Note: The necessary amount of equipment for the transferred strength and necessary munitions for the operation were sent to the Philippines directly from American homeland.

2. In the strength at the end of every month, the denominator shows the whole strength possessed, while the numerator shows the strength allotted to the operation against Japan.

ESTIMATES OF U.S. AND ALLIED AIR STRENGTH (PACIFIC AREA) AS OF MAY 45

| REGIONS | | End of May | End of June | End of July | End of August | End of September |
|---|---|---------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Northern Part | Alaska | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |
| | Aleutian Is | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Middle Pacific | Ellise, Gil- bert & Samoa Areas | 300 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| | Marshall Is | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| | Marianna Is | 850 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |
| | Pelilieu) Ulithye) | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 |
| | Iwo Jima | 275 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 |
| | Hawaii | 800 | 800 | 900 | 1200 | 1500 |
| | Transport Planes | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| Philippines | | 1850 | 2150 | 3100 | 4100 | 5100 |
| Southwestern Islands | | 240 | 500 | 600 | 650 | 870 |
| New Gui- nea and Austra- lian Areas | East New Guinea | 400 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| | West New Guinea | 750 | 600 | 600 | 600 | 600 |
| | Australia | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 |
| South Pacific | Solomon Is | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| | New Caledonia) and Espiritu) Santo) | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| | Fiji | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | New Zealand | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| India and Burma Areas | | 1000 | 1000 | 1500 | 2000 | 2000 |
| China | American Air Unit | 700 | 700 | 700 | 800 | 800 |
| | American and Chinese Combined Unit | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| Transport Airplanes Between India and China | | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |
| Fleet Air Power | | 3500 | 3600 | 3700 | 3800 | 3800 |
| TOTAL | | 13515 | 14150 | 16000 | 17850 | 19370 |

Remarks: A portion of Allied air power from the European theatre was expected in the Pacific by the end of July.

RESTRICTED

ESTIMATE OF ALLIED AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO
PARTICIPATE IN FINAL BATTLE FOR JAPAN

| Area Date | Marianna Islands | Iwo Jima | Southwestern Islands | Philippines Area |
|--------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| End of May | B-29 x 650 B-24 x 50 PB4Y x 20 fc x 80 Shipborne planes x 100 | B-29 x 40 (Forced landing) P-51 x 200 P-61 x 25 Others x 10 | P-47) x 100 (P-51) Shipborne planes x 100 PV x 20 Unidenti- fied x 40 | (P-47 P-61 fc(P-51 F6F x 900 (P-38 F4U fb B-24 x 450 PB4Y x 100 PV x 50 B-25 x 200 A-20 x 100 Others x 50 Total: 1850 |
| | Total: 800 | Total: 275 | Total: 240 | |
| End of June | B-29 x 700 Others the same as above | B-29 x 50 B-24 x 150 P-51 x 200 P-61 x 30 Others x 10 | P-47) P-51) x 250 P-61) Shipborne aircraft x 100 B-24 x 50 PV x 20 Unidenti- fied x 40 | fc x 1000 fb x 1100 (B-29 x 150 in- cluded) Others x 50 Total: 2150 |
| | Total: 950 | Total: 500 | Total: 460 | Total: 2150 |
| End of July | B-29 x 850 Others the same as above | The same as above | P-47) P-51) x 300 P-61) Shipborne planes x 100 B-24 x 150 PV x 30 Unidenti- fied x 40 | fc x 2000 fb x 500 (B-29 x 300, in- cluded B-17, B-24 increased 70. except these items same as above.) Others x 50 Total: 2150 |
| | Total: 1000 | | Total: 600 | Total: 2150 |
| End of Aug ust | The same as above | The same as above, B-24 may take place of B-29 | P-47) P-51) x 300 P-61) Shipborne planes x 100 B-24 x 200 PV x 30 Unidenti- fied x 40 | fc x 2000 fb x 2000 (B-29 x 400 in- cluded, others the same as above) Others x 100 Total: 4100 |
| | | | Total: 650 | Total: 4100 |
| End of Sept em ber | The same as above | The same as above | P-47) P-51) x 400 P-61) Shipborne planes x 100 B-24 x 300 PV x 30 Unidenti- fied x 40 | fc x 2500 fb x 2000 (B-29 x 500 in- cluded others the same as above Others x 100 Total: 5100 |
| | | | Total: 870 | Total: 5100 |

RESTRICTED

G. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND RECONNAISSANCE

Q. 1. To what extent did the Japanese Navy rely on photographic intelligence?

2. Comment on its effectiveness.

3. Describe the method of securing and disseminating photographic intelligence.

4. How many squadrons were engaged exclusively in this work?

5. How many planes were assigned to such squadrons?

6. Comment on Japanese aerial reconnaissance stating number of aircraft engaged in this work, its effectiveness, method of exchange of information between aircraft and their bases. Enclose copies of Search Sector plans for each stage of the War (each campaign).

7. Describe the procedure followed in taking action on sightings reported by reconnaissance aircraft.

A. 1. The Japanese Navy tried to make the best possible use of photographic intelligence, but could not carry the program out effectively because of the general failure of aerial fighting power and a bad custom of making light of reconnaissance before the war.

2. Until the middle of 1943, effective and successful use was made of reconnaissance, but afterwards results were very poor, owing to the shortage of trained observer personnel.

3. The reconnaissance plane group always took photographs and processed them, distributing copies to the units concerned. The Southeastern Areas Fleet was equipped with a photographic section about August 1943.

4. A reconnaissance plane group was attached to each air group. A fleet, accompanied by aircraft tenders, was equipped with about 30 reconnaissance planes.

5. A reconnaissance air group normally consisted of "SAIUN" (Myrt) for operations. 32 planes were planned as complement, but in practice the number was usually much smaller.

6. At the outbreak of the war the Imperial Navy, for a comparatively long time, used land type attack planes, Type 97 (Kate), and large flying boats (Emily) together with seaplanes based on the large warships, and carrier planes. It was found, however, that the performance of these types was poor, which led to the development of specialized reconnaissance planes of high performance. Carrier reconnaissance planes and "SAIUN" (Myrt) for land based use were developed. The "SAIUNS" (Myrts) were at first attached to the First Air Fleet and had been highly esteemed since the Mariannas operation. The quote for "SAIUN" (Myrt) planes was filled only by April 1945, but the planes' actual maintenance record, at the time of the Okinawa operation, was very poor, only 8 out of 32 planes on the average standing up through the continued operations. It may be said from the outbreak of the war until its termination the Imperial Navy was suffering from a shortage of reconnaissance planes.

"SAIUN" (Myrt) could maintain almost the same speed as enemy fighters at a height of 5,000 meters, but maintenance was poor.

RESTRICTED

A Type 2 large flying boat (Emily), Type 1 land attack plane, (SHIDEN—George) and Type 100 (SHITEI) were used to compensate for the shortage of the SAIUN (Myrt) type and a Type 2 flying boat (Emily) and Type 1 land attack plane (Betty) were equipped with radar. Considering their performance, they proved useful as night reconnaissance planes.

"SHIDEN" (George) owing to a lack of communications facilities and Type 100 (SHITEI), owing to its weakness as an overwater plane, were chiefly used for close distance reconnaissance.

7. Regarding communications, reconnaissance planes exchanged information with its base and with Centre Hqs by radio. After a sighting the reconnaissance plane would make the following reports:

- (a) First report -- type of enemy forces, position and time.
- (b) Second report - warships by types, number, formation, course, speed and weather.

At night friendly forces are often guided by dropping parachute flares or transmitting on long wave circuits.

The radius of the various types of reconnaissance planes used were as follows:

| | | |
|--|-----|----------------|
| (1) SAIUN (Myrt) | 550 | nautical miles |
| (2) Type 2 large flying boat (Emily) | 800 | " " |
| (3) Type 1 land attack plane (Betty) | 650 | " " |
| (4) Type 2 KANTEI (warships recon plane) | 350 | " " |
| (5) SHIDEN George) | 200 | " " |
| (6) Type 100 SHITEI | 350 | " " |

H. GENERAL

- Q. 1. What were the outstanding accomplishments of Japanese Naval Intelligence immediately prior to and during the war?
2. At what stage or stages of the War do you consider Japanese Naval Intelligence was most effective? i.e. Aleutians? Solomons? Bismarck Sea? New Guinea? Marshall's? Mariannas? Phillipines? Iwo-Okinawa? etc? At what time or times was it poorest? Reasons?
- A. 1. The Japanese Naval Intelligence organization contributed greatly to the Japanese War effort by effective work based upon materials on hand and developed.

As there were no secret Japanese organizations in Allied or neutral countries it was impossible to render greater services.

Serious obstacles often stood in the way of carrying out intelligence functions as a result of weaknesses in operational intelligence organization as well as in reconnaissance activities.

2. We cannot tell exactly which was the most effective period of Japanese Intelligence functions. Reconnaissance activity, however, was most effective in the opening phases of the war and contributed to the overall contribution of intelligence.


RESTRICTED

ANNEX A:

RESTRICTED

I. ORGANIZATION

Flow Chart--Japanese Naval Intelligence



Key: ----- Denoting Intelligence Relation
 ----- Intelligence Channel
 ===== Combined Intelligence Channels

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO.

INTERROGATION NO: (ADDENDUM TO INTERROGATION
No. 384. Lt. TOYODA, T. IJN)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 26 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS
Subject: Organization and Operation of First Naval Air Technical
Arsenal.

Person Interrogated:

Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Mr. KAWAKITA, S.

Allied Officers Present: None.

NOTE: This is additional information supplied by
Lt. TOYODA.

ITEMS CONCERNING INVESTIGATION OF CAPTURED AIRCRAFT.

No aircraft captured by the Imperial Navy during the Greater East Asia war, were operational. Two planes—a Curtis P-40E and a Douglas A-20A—which were picked up by the Army early in the war were used in flying tests, described below. Toward the end of the war tests were carried out by units, or arsenals on the spot, using planes shot or forced down in the SW Pacific Area. Although investigations had been conducted since the beginning of this year by the authorities concerned, on carrier-based aircraft forced down in air raids and at the end of last year on B-29's, the war came to an end before they could be coordinated and reports made. The investigations of these aircraft were the province of the Army and the Navy merely received reports from them. Investigations brought technical scrutiny to the following: fighting performance, equipment, construction and parts and provided reference material for research and design.

Subjects of Investigation.

(1) -Measurements of fuselage.

We determined measurements of those (planes) left generally in their original model (unmodified), checked them against plans obtained from other intelligence sources, carried out tests and obtained results which were practically the same.

R E S T R I C T E D.

ADDN. 384 -1-

(2) Engine identifications.

We carried out comparisons of actual horsepower based on engine construction, measurements and actual surveys with horsepower determined from other intelligence sources. In cases when we obtained graph curves of horsepower we carried out tests on these and generally obtained results conforming to actual conditions.

(3) Performance.

It was the Army's job, mainly, to make tests of performance, using undamaged fuselages; e.g. take-off speed, continuous cruising range, rate (time) of climb, ceiling, taxi distance on take-off, landing speed and landing taxi distance, stability, and maneuverability. In addition we carried out research on the dog fighting performance of fighters against Japanese; disappearing (3-) wheel construction medium bombers; and the exhaust turbines on B-17's.

(4) Construction.

Discussed type of construction of fuselages upon which various flying performances tests were completed, and those which were damaged. From a general point of view, construction was very durable and was thought to be suitable for the most reckless action. Various types and materials were used throughout and since they were able to command large scale precision metal work it was thought that little difficulty was encountered by designers; furthermore it was believed that sufficient thought had been given to large-scale production.

(5) Construction Materials.

Discussions were carried out concerning raw materials, namely, light metals, iron, and rubber. It was thought that materials used in Japan were not greatly different but the Al-alloy (T.N. sic. Probably "Aluminum-alloy") used in the B-29 propeller was superior.

(6) Equipment (Ordnance), Camouflage, and Safety Equipment.

Discussions from the standpoint of persons concerned were carried out in re: Instruments, optical equipment, radar, effectiveness of camouflage, oil pressure, "window" (TN: denkisgise) etc. Since "window" and radar equipment developed slowly in our country relative to the enemy it was thought these should be taken as examples. There was much to learn about camouflage, ordnance, and instruments.

(7) Aircraft Instructions and handling Manuals.

Investigation of Plane Types: Facts and opinions.

(1) P-40E

Using a plane picked up by the Army about 1942, made complete observations concerning flying performance and ability pitted against the Zero type Fighter. Although the Zero demonstrated a qualitative superiority in fighting performance, it did not match the speed of the P-40E. Under technical items for investigation, aside from the fact that a main undercarriage was recovered, i.e. its construction and shock absorbability investigated—no special comments.

- (2) Douglas A-20A (Boston).
Plane which was picked up by the Army in the same year as the P-40, used mainly to determine the load of the tricycle landing gear. There were no definite test facts, in this country and a logical conclusion on load calculation of the tricycle landing gear, in terms of study of basic materials or ground strength tests, had not been arrived at. We dismantled only the nose and undercarriage and carried out tests on nose vibration. Using KUBU (T.N.: Japanese A.C. designation) as a prototype, plans were laid out, using exactly the same measurements even to the "damper". When airborne, there was practically no oil leakage from engine or propeller; no observations of equipment in and about the fuselage. The extreme ease of handling received favorable comment.
- (3) B-29
November 10, 1944: Since there was one plane, shot down in ARIAKE-WAN, with an undamaged nose (T.N.KUBI: may mean engine head) remaining, assumptions of great value in re: principal facts of various characteristics were made quite clear with this; further, equipment in great numbers were captured and one by one examined by personnel concerned. Since the B-29 had actually become the No. 1 miracle, as far as we were concerned, when the first raid was carried out on Northern KYUSHU in 1944, the Army and Navy in collaboration carried out an investigation concerning (B-29) performance at high speed, assuming the fact that violent raids would be carried out. At the same time, despite the fact that a captured "operational Chart" was extremely accurate, it was evident there was unanimous agreement that raids would develop in completely convincing fashion, numerically. Nor was there a single idea as to defensive grouping against this plane which flew at the high altitude of 10,000 meters, 320 knots.
- (a) Construction: Suitable for most reckless action. Fact that they planned extremely bold raids. Use of various types of materials and precision metal work, U.S. planes. It was agreed that enemy had superiority in engineering ability. Pressurized cabin construction was subject of research by experts. Since at this time our country had as a goal a completely pressurized cabin, the point that this plane had a semi-pressurized cabin was considered logical for a military plane.
- (b) Engine and Gas Exhaust Turbine.
Concerning method of installation and effective camouflage of exhaust turbine, in brief; although there was much to learn, since at this time we were entirely in a fog in terms of methods of camouflage of exhaust turbines it was impossible definitely to decide what points to investigate
- (c) Concerning various capacities, we were in agreement as to the value to be obtained from assumptions of other intelligence sources.

- (d) Ordnance & Equipment.
Gunnery: HS electrical remote control mechanism set an example because of its extreme superiority in stern attack tactics.
Bombing Equipment: We were able to obtain no data.
Optical equipment: Obtained calculator kit for the Norden bomb sight.
Instruments: No special equipment.
Radar Equipment: Since Radar was the Army's responsibility, no special comments.
Communications Equipment.
(e) Operating instructions.
Captured an Inspection Manual from plane shot down in TOKYO BAY, spring, 1945. Since this inspection manual had an illustration arranged on one side, drawn with scrupulous care, even the inexperienced could easily comprehend it; it was compared with ours and we built one easily, exactly like the original. Thenceforth errors in our handling operations manuals were indicated and this was used as a prerequisite model in design.
- (4) F6F Hellcat.
Investigation carried out by force on the spot of a plane shot down in OKINAWA, autumn, 1944.
- (5) F4U Corsair.
Spring, 1945: Captured on Coast off ZUSHI and in vicinity of KASUMIGAURA. Investigation of parts, one by one, was under way. We were surprised in that there places on the wing covered with fabric. Used as reference for our plan to use substitute materials.
- (6) SB2C Helldiver
Forced down in KAURA about the first of the year, 1945. Were in the process of investigation. No comments which deserve special mention.
- (7) TBM-1C Avenger
Forced down in SOERABAJA, 1944. Was investigated by (Naval) Air Depot at same place. Transported to YOKOSUKA about 1945. Extremely strong construction. Were in midst of investigation of parts.
- (8) B-24 Liberator.
Flight Manual, 1944, summer.

General Opinions.

- (1) Superiority
 - (a) Since (U.S.) planes were durable and suitable for reckless tactics, time for upkeep and handling was unnecessary.
 - (b) Standards for variety of parts, engineering of production superior.
 - (c) "Jamming" (T.N. DENKIGISE) was simple.
 - (d) General technological ability was harmonized and synthesized and demonstrated in the special performance of the aircraft.
 - (e) Various types of handling manuals were adequate and there was a handful of the vital parts.

- (d) Ordnance & Equipment.
Gunnery: HS electrical remote control mechanism set an example because of its extreme superiority in stern attack tactics.
Bombing Equipment: We were able to obtain no data.
Optical equipment: Obtained calculator kit for the Norden bomb sight.
Instruments: No special equipment.
Radar Equipment: Since Radar was the Army's responsibility, no special comments.
Communications Equipment.
(e) Operating instructions.
Captured an Inspection Manual from plane shot down in TOKYO BAY, spring, 1945. Since this inspection manual had an illustration arranged on one side, drawn with scrupulous care, even the inexperienced could easily comprehend it; it was compared with ours and we built one easily, exactly like the original. Thenceforth errors in our handling operations manuals were indicated and this was used as a prerequisite model in design.
- (4) F6F Hellcat.
Investigation carried out by force on the spot of a plane shot down in OKINAWA, autumn, 1944.
- (5) F4U Corsair.
Spring, 1945: Captured on Coast off ZUSHI and in vicinity of KASUMIGAURA. Investigation of parts, one by one, was under way. We were surprised in that there places on the wing covered with fabric. Used as reference for our plan to use substitute materials.
- (6) SB2C Helldiver
Forced down in KAURA about the first of the year, 1945. Were in the process of investigation. No comments which deserve special mention.
- (7) TBM-1C Avenger
Forced down in SOERABAJA, 1944. Was investigated by (Naval) Air Depot at same place. Transported to YOKOSUKA about 1945. Extremely strong construction. Were in midst of investigation of parts.
- (8) B-24 Liberator.
Flight Manual, 1944, summer.

General Opinions.

- (1) Superiority
 - (a) Since (U.S.) planes were durable and suitable for reckless tactics, time for upkeep and handling was unnecessary.
 - (b) Standards for variety of parts, engineering of production superior.
 - (c) "Jamming" (T.N. DENKIGISE) was simple.
 - (d) General technological ability was harmonized and synthesized and demonstrated in the special performance of the aircraft.
 - (e) Various types of handling manuals were adequate and there was a handful of the vital parts.

(2) Points for Reference.

- (a) Fuselage designers were unconcerned about weight, i.e., compared with Japanese planes, weight was extremely great. They gave careful thought to whichever was their aim: producing in large volume or choosing to carry excessive weight when loaded; in any case, wing pressure, etc. were made excessively large.
- (b) Compared with the great horsepower, performance was poor; i.e., Ylex was extremely low. It was thought the fuselage designers were practically unconcerned with the profile of the planes.

NOTE: The following letter was written to Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer by Lt. T. TOYODA, IJN.

Lt. Comdr. Botzer:

26 November 1945

I was very glad to attend the meeting with you last Monday, because we could talk over various airplanes of Japan as well as of the U.S.A.A.F. Frankly speaking, the unconditional surrender of our country to the Allied Powers was the most regretful matter we ever had, and for some period since that time I had a dislike even for seeing the airplanes belonging to the U.S. Army or Navy. But I could not forget beautiful and splendid features of airplanes and now I am glad to see airplanes of U.S.A.F. flying in clear autumn sky. So, I was very glad last day.

I have the honor to send you the following documents, which, at that time I replied to submit you later.

- a. List of Principal Dimensions and Performance of Experimental Airplanes of I.J.N.A.F.
- b. Specification and performance of Service Airplanes, I.J.N.A.F.
- c. Document about the 1st Naval Air Tech. Arsenal and outline of researches and experiments of this Arsenal. (excluding that of Branch)
- d. List of Flight Test Data of captured U.S. Airplanes.
- e. Summaries about Special Purpose Planes.

The last documents is submitted to supplement my explanation about "KIKKA" and "SYUSUI". But you will find another special attacker named "BAIKA" and "TOKA" in this paper. These are the planes planned for purpose to attack the vessels which neared the JAPAN proper as well as KIKKA. The salient features of these are that construction is extremely simplified and materials used in them are very easy to obtain even in that time in our country. The reason why we were so enthusiastic about the special attacker was, as you knew, that, owing to damage of airplane factories and their cooperating sub-contracting companies, reduction of output of aluminium alloys, shortage of fuel and transportation disturbances by air raids of B-29 and carrier based planes and P-51, and blockade of submarines and phonic mines, we could not manufacture the ordinary airplane. The defeat of our country is mostly due to these facts. In other words, we had too insisted the power of spirit and had forgot the power of material and intelligence which control them.

At any rate we must cultivate our minds and reconstruct our country so as to follow the advanced nations as close as possible at present. We Japanese, must sweep the all hatred in the war time from our minds, and if we conduct as one of the most civilized nation in future notwithstanding the ugly status which seem yet to be kept between the most powerful countries as to some matter, we will be accepted by all the nations, and can walk brilliant highway.

Last Monday, as I, for the first time, called on foreign officers, I couldn't say what I intended. I fear you were very disappointed in my report, especially in my explanation about what we learnt from the captured planes and the points we utilized in development of Japanese planes. As it was indicated in my draft papers concerning the captured planes, the tricycle undercarriage of A20-A (Boston) was imitated in detail by us. I myself designed tricycle undercarriage of "KEIUN", land based local scout plane, and dissolved its nose shock strut, shimmy damper and drew the picture. As we had no data as to load factor in landing cases of nose wheel plane; so the flight test of this plane as well as ground test was done for long period to obtain the fundamental data.

Also, the first all-metal airplane in this country was manufactured by NAKAJIMA Airplane Company as "97" carrier based torpedo bomber, which prototype was Northrop's airplane. So it can be said that we learnt all the modern fundamental conception about metal plane from U.S. and we may say that all of the Japanese planes were influenced in the methods of designing and constructing, by U.S., though lately greatly advised by Germany.

We had not spent much time on studying the captured planes. It was very regretful matter because there were many points to study in their components rather than in airplanes themselves. The reason of this shortage of study was due to the fact that we were too busy about the plan and building of special purpose planes stated above, and we could get so many intelligence from German authorities about the planes of Allied Air Forces. Seeing "Die Ergebnisse der Beauftragte Antwortung" issued from "Deutsche Luftwaffe" I often thought that we must organize more powerful intelligence section in the 1st Naval Air Tech. Arsenal or Air Hq. or Office of Imperial Naval General Staff.

But there were many matters to be done. Especially, since the defeat in Saipan, the attention of almost all officers and enlisted men and workmen was focused to so called new weapons, such as OOKA. So the study of booty planes was sent to background.

A few years ago, it was said in Japan that the air was where man should go. It is my regret that we can not manufacture an airplane in Japan, and that even studying aerodynamics and sciences about airplane were strictly prohibited. Lamb's Hydrodynamics, Goldstein's Modern Developments in Fluid Dynamics, Fuch-Hopf-Seewald's Flugdynamik, Prandtl-Tietjens's Hydro-und-Aerodynamik, and Kármán's Vortex Theory, and boundary layers, Theory of plates and shells, have no meaning to me at present. This is very sad matter.

R E S T R I C T E D

ADDENDUM: INTERROGATION NO. 384(Lt. TOYODA, T., IJN.)

But aviation is one of the most valuable gifts which we have ever enjoyed. So I hope that you will develop "Know-How" (I fear this word is not adequate) of the airplanes to their extreme extent, as the representatives of human-beings.

I believe airplanes such as present types can't be main weapons in the future warfare if it occurs. But we must develop this not for preparation of warfare but development of welfare of human beings.

I fear that you will misunderstand my sentence because it is written in broken English.

Would you please send my kindness to Lt. Comdr. Sharkowitz. (This may refer to Lt. Comdr. Shackelford)

Yours truly,

Lt. T. TOYODA
I.J. NAVAL AIR HQ.

R E S T R I C T E D

ADDM. 384 -7-

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section
Tokyo, Japan

RESTRICTED

14 November 1945

REPORT ON JAPANESE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITTED BY
REAR ADMIRAL TAKEUCHI, KAORU, IJN, CHIEF OF FIFTH
SECTION (U. S. and LATIN AMERICA) OF THIRD DEPARTMENT
(NAVAL INTELLIGENCE) OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

This report was submitted in response to a written request
to Admiral TAKEUCHI from the Japanese Intelligence Section. It
is reproduced here in question and answer form.

Further information on Japanese Naval Intelligence
obtained from Admiral TAKEUCHI is contained in Interrogation
No. 222 (Jap Intell #4) of 3 November 1945.

THE WRITTEN REPORT FOLLOWS:

A. ORGANIZATION

Q. What was the organization of Naval Intelligence? Include
charts and tables showing organization and command relation-
ships.

A. The Third Division of the Naval General Staff was the
Central Naval Intelligence Agency. Under the Director with
the rank of Rear Admiral were five sections; viz., Direct
Control Staff, 5th Section, 6th Section, 7th Section, and 8th
Section. The organization details are tabulated as follows:

Staff Division (III)

Director Rear-Admiral N. Nekase

Under direct control of the Director

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Member A, | (1. Propaganda towards foreign nations. |
| Captain Y. Tsukada----- | (2. Collection of information concerning |
| | (international affairs. |

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Member B. | (1. Plans for collecting information . |
| Lieut. - Commander | (2. Collection of information . |
| G. Yajima----- | (3. Prevention of hostile intelligence |
| | and propaganda activities. |

Member C.
(Vacant)

| | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Member D, | (1. Part of plans for collecting |
| (Additional Post) ---- | information |
| Commander H. Ozawa | (2. Partly concerning information |

| | |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Member E, | |
| (Additional Post) ---- | Part of collecting information. |
| Lieut. - Commander | concerning international aere- |
| M. Takita | autical affairs. |

Chief Rear-Admiral K. Takeuchi

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(towards the nations in charge of the
(Section, Viz. nations in American
(Continents.
- (2. Estimation of the national affairs
(of the nations in charge of the
(Section.
- (3. Plans for collecting information in
(regard to the nations in charge of
(the Section.

Member A.

Captain Y. Senematsu -

- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and
(national affairs of U.S.A.
(Collections of informations, charts
(and maps of the U.S.A.
- (2. Part of the plan for collecting
(information .
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member B.

(Vacant)

Member C.

Lieut. Commander

N. Imsi

- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and
(national affairs of Latin American
(nations.
(Collection of information , charts
(and map of the above nations.
- (2. Inquiry of locations of military and
(naval units and part of national
(affairs of U.S.A.
- (3. Collection and arrangement of infor-
(mation , charts and maps of U.S.A.
(and her territory.
- (4. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member D.

Lieut. - Commander

M. Takita ---

- (1. Inquiry of aeronautical affairs of
(U.S.A.
- (2. Collection and arrangement of mat-
(erials concerning aeronautical
(affairs of U.S.A.

The Sixth Section.

Chief Captain S. Kobetto

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(toward China and Manchoukuo.
- (2. Inquiry of the national affairs of
(China and Manchoukuo.
- (3. Plans for collecting information
(concerning China and Manchoukuo.

Member A.

Commander N. Koshibe ---

- (1. Inquiry of naval, military and national
(affairs of China. Collection of infor-
(mation , charts and maps of this country.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting informa-
(tion .
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member B.

(Additional post)

Commander N. Koshibe

Inquiry of naval, military and national affairs of Manchoukuo. Part of collections of information, charts and maps of the country.

Report of Japanese Naval Intelligence:(Contd.) RESTRICTED

Member C,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Commander N. Koshiba

Collection of information , charts
and maps of China and Manchoukuo.

The Seventh Section

Chief Captain S. Yamaguchi

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(towards the nations in charge of the
(section.
- (2. Estimation of national affairs of the
(nations in charge of the Section.
- (3. Part of plans for collecting information
(of the nations in charge of the Sections.

Member A,
Commander Z. Okazaki

- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and national
(affairs of U.S.S.R.; nations adjoining
(U.S.S.R.(excluding Germany, Manchoukuo
(and China), Balkan nations, Iraq and
(Arabia. Collection of information ,
(charts and maps of these nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member B,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Commander Z. Okazaki

- (1. Collection of information , charts and
(maps of U.S.S.R. and other nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member C,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Captain O. Tsukada

- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and national
(affairs of Germany, naval and national
(affairs of Germany, and collection of
(same.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member D,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Captain Z. Okazaki

- (1. Inquiry of naval, military and national
(affairs of France, Italy, Belgium, Spain
(and their territories(excluding French
(Indo-China, Kwanchow Bay and French
(islands in the Pacific Ocean), Switzer-
(land, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
(Collection of information , charts and
(maps of the above-mentioned nations.
- (2. Matters concerning the League of Nations.
- (3. Part of plans for collecting informa-
(tion .
- (4. Part of propaganda campaign.

The Eighth Section

Chief (temporary) Captain K. Irie

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(towards the nations in charge of the
(Section.
- (2. Estimation of national affairs of the
(nations in charge of the Section.
- (3. Plans for collecting information of
(the nations in charge of the Section.

Member A,

Captain K. Irie

- (1. Inquiry of national affairs of British Empire and her whole territory (excluding Canada), Egypt and French islands in the Pacific Ocean.
- (Collection of information , maps and charts of the above-mentioned nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member B,

Lieut - Commander
T. Yoshida

- (1. Inquiry of national, military and naval affairs of India and Australia.
- (2. Part of collecting information, charts and maps of these nations.
- (3. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (4. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member C,

Captain T. Fukuoka

- (1. Inquiry of national, military and naval affairs of Portugal, Holland and their territory, New Guinea, Siam, French Indo-China(containing Kwanchow Bay), Philippines and Burma.
- (Collection of information , charts and maps of the above-mentioned nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Q. 2. To what extent were Naval Intelligence activities integrated with those of the Army? With government agencies? With Army Air Forces? With Naval Air Forces?

A. There were, between the Army and the Navy Intelligence Divisions reciprocal exchange of copies in regard to information of mutual interest. There was no intelligence officer holding a concurrent post in the Army and Navy Intelligence Divisions.

With reference to Government agencies, the same procedure as in the case of the Army described above was adopted with the various Ministries concerned.

There was no direct contact to the Army Air Forces, all liaison being made only through the above-mentioned Army Intelligence Division of The Army General Staff.

Aside from sending to the Naval Air Forces information of interest to them just as was done to the Fleets, there was no special relationship with them. However, the important data of the information obtained by the Naval Air Forces was sent directly to the Naval General Staff.

Q. 3. How was this integration accomplished? Describe in detail.

A. Nothing further to add to the reply given in 2.

Q. 4. Give the total number of Naval personnel assigned either full or part time to intelligence duties. How many officers? How many enlisted? How many full time? How many part time or additional duty?

Report of Japanese Naval Intelligence:(Contd.) RESTRICTED

A. Naval Personnel with Intelligence Duties
At the Beginning of war At the cessation of hostilities

| | | |
|------------------------------|----|-----|
| Officers | 29 | 97 |
| Enlisted | 1 | 9 |
| Full Time | 64 | 174 |
| Part Time or Additional Duty | 1 | 63 |
| Total Number | | |
| Full Time | | |
| Part Time | | |
| Personnel | 65 | 237 |

The above figures are for the personnel of the Third Division of the Naval General Staff; i.e., the Central Naval Intelligence Agency. At some headquarters of the front, there seemed to be Intelligence Squads: centering around one or a few officers (most frequently with additional duties) with a small number of enlisted men as assistants, but they had the principal work of processing the telegrams and documents from various areas and seemed not to engage in any duties that might be classed as independent intelligence activities. As they had no direct connection with the Central Naval Intelligence Agency, details concerning these squads are unavailable.

Q. 5. How many intelligence personnel were assigned each unit afloat? Officers? Enlisted?

A. As explained in the preceding paragraph, because their activities were not under the Central Naval Intelligence Agency's cognizance, details are unavailable.

Q. 6. Describe in detail the organization of Intelligence in the Naval Air Arm.

A. For the reason explained above, details unknown.

Q. 7. What was the proportion of Regular Navy Officers (Academy Graduates) to Reserve Officers in the Naval Intelligence Organization?

A. At the Central Naval Intelligence Agency the proportion was approximately: Regular Navy Officers, 1: Reserve Officers, 3.5.

B. SELECTION AND TRAINING.

Q. 1. How were intelligence personnel selected?

A. Proficiency in languages, experience in duties abroad, rejection from fleet duty because of poor eyesight or other reasons, the expressed desire of some to enter this service, etc., became at times the reasons for selecting the personnel. but I understand that there was no set rule for the selection of intelligence personnel.

Q. 2. Were they specially trained for intelligence duties?

A. There were examples of a few who received foreign language instruction in Japan and even a smaller number who were sent abroad for study, but in general there was no special training.

RESTRICTED

Report of Japanese Naval Intelligence:(Contd.) RESTRICTED

Q. 3. What were the specialized schools for intelligence training and where were they located?

A. None.

Q. 4. Describe the curricula in these specialized intelligence training schools. What texts or printed materials were used? Include copies.

A. None.

Q. 5. How many students attended these schools at any one session?

A. None.

Q. 6. What was the total number of students graduated from such schools?

A. None.

Q. 7. What special methods and aids were used to train officers for intelligence duties?

A. No special methods, aside from the recurrent posting of men in similar duties.

C. OPERATIONS

Q. 1. Describe in detail the duties of Intelligence Officers, both Staff and in units afloat, including in the Air Arm briefing and interrogation of pilots, escape and evasion, technical intelligence, etc.

A. Although without direct knowledge, I believe it to be as follows:

(a) Duties of Intelligence Officers, both Staff and in units afloat:

- (1) Processing and comilation of all information from the Central Naval Intelligence Agency and all Japanese Navy Units.
- (2) Processing and compilation of all information gained by own unit.
- (3) Reporting of all necessary information to the Central Agency and dissemination to all front line Units.
- (4) Replies to queries and expression of views to to the Chief of Staff or Unit Commanders.

(b) The intelligence activities of the Air Forces were conducted, I believe, under their own independent plans on a rather small scale. Because they were not in direct relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, I have no information regarding the itemized details requested in this paragraph of your questionnaire, but I am under the impression that they did not engage in any effective intelligence activities.

Q. 2. What were your sources of information? List in order of importance and reliability.

RESTRICTED

Report of Japanese Naval Intelligence:(Contd.) RESTRICTED

- A. (a) A composite picture obtained from information amassed during a long period mainly from public radio broadcasts and publications. Because of its nature as over-all information, the greatest importance was placed on this.
- (b) Documents belonging to the enemy. Most reliable, but only a small quantity available.
- (c) Information from prisoners. Neither reliable nor abundant.

Q. 3. How was information processed and used after it was received?

- A. (a) Edited, compiled and filed.
- (b) Checked with information gained from other sources.
- (c) When decided as worth to use, disseminated to the minimum limited number of officers concerned as were deemed necessary.
- (d) When untrustworthy, it was the rule not to disseminate the information.

Q. 4. Describe in detail systems and methods used in the dissemination of intelligence information: To other intelligence activities? To Fleet Units?

- A. (a) System and method of dissemination:

There is no fixed form; uncomplicated information or those requiring immediate dissemination, by telegram; others, through printed documents.

Invisible ink and other special methods not utilized.

Periodical printed information, I recall, existed toward the beginning of the war, but since the summer of 1942 their publication was suspended.

- (b) Dissemination to other intelligence activities and fleet units:
- (1) To home land-units (the Naval Station HQ and the like) ordinary mail, air mail and telegraph utilized.
- (2) To fleets abroad, air mail and telegraph.
- (3) No special air service for delivery of intelligence documents.

Q. 5. Give in detail methods of estimating:

- (a) U.S. Strength?
- (b) U.S. Losses?
- (c) U.S. Intentions (future plans and moves)

A. The estimation method adopted by the Central Intelligence Agency was as follows: The Operations Staff and the front-line units, I understand, added their own information and views to the data provided by the Central Agency and planned their operations accordingly.

- (a) The basic materials for estimates were information gained by our forces through actual combat or reconnaissance, and continuous long-term statistics obtained from enemy and neutral news reports. This materials were checked through documents on hand at the front and through information gained from prisoners.
- (b) The same method as above.
- (c) Estimates made statistically through views based on general tactics, American propaganda, and through continuous watching and tracing of the movements of Allied personnel and of craft, air, surface, and sub.

Q. 6. What was the procedure used in extracting information from:

- (a) U.S. Prisoners of War?
- (b) Captured documents?
- (c) Natives in country where action took place?

A. (a) All information gained at the front was reported to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Among the prisoners of war of the naval units, those sent to Japan proper were at first quartered at the Ofuna War Prisoners' Camp near Yokohama, where the sick and wounded were given medical treatment and after recuperation were sent to the regular war prisoners' camps that were under Army supervision.

At the Ofuna camp, aside from interrogation necessary for obtaining name and identification, there were occasions when a free conversations held to obtain data on general information.

However, most of the prisoners of war were reserve or petty officers ill-informed on military affairs. The regular officers were uncommunicative. Moreover, we made it a fixed policy not to force unwilling prisoners to reveal information. Accordingly, we did not obtain any information of value from prisoners of war.

- (b) It was the rule to send all captured documents to the Central Intelligence Agency where it was translated and used primarily for checking with information from other sources.
- (c) The Central Intelligence Agency had no connection with the utilization of natives. At the front line units, natives seemed to be questioned about the local particulars, but further than that I have not heard of any successful positive efforts for extraction of information from natives.

The natives in general seemed to be loyal to Allied Forces.

Q. 7. To what extent did German intelligence on Allied or U.S. Air Forces and equipment aid the Japanese? Was any other German intelligence useful to you?

- A. (a) I have the impression that in the Pacific War no important, directly effective information concerning the enemy had been obtained from the Germans.
- (b) Information from Germans concerning their own arms might have been valuable of technical aid to Japan.

Q. 8. What provision was made for analyzing captured equipment, including crashed aircraft? How was such information used? How was it disseminated?

A. Captured equipment was not handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, but was analyzed by the various technical experts directly concerned (for instance, the navy yard personnel). Copies of their reports were sent to all departments concerned.

Q. 9. Did you gain any useful intelligence through capture of any U.S. Mail? From letters or diaries taken from bodies of U.S. Officers or men or from Prisoners of War?

A. Unaware of any such instances.

Q. 10. What Naval intelligence documents, pamphlets, Field Manuals, brochures, doctrines, etc. were published. Enclose copies.

- A. (a) Intelligence documents and pamphlets were published non-periodically, classified according to the important countries. Because of the voluminous amount, I cannot recall the titles of separate documents, but most of them were brochures with such titles as Military Affairs, Politics, and Economics, and when necessary with sub-titles.
- (b) I recall that one or two kinds of field manuals and doctrines were published over ten years ago, but there is no extant copy.
- (c) All publications of the Central Intelligence Agency completely burnt. Investigations to date reveal that copies distributed to fleets and other units were also burnt. I regret it very much that we are unable to present copies thereof to you.

Q. 11. Describe sources of information in arriving at the Japanese estimate of U.S. order of battle and enclose copy of estimate as of December 1941 and also estimate as of 1 August 1945.

- A. (a) All documents concerning this point were burnt. Moreover, previous to December 1941, I was engaged as a government official in departments other than the Navy Department; therefore, I do not know either what estimates of U.S. order of battle were made or the sources of information for such estimates.
- (b) No general estimates of U.S. order of battle were made by the Central Naval Intelligence Agency as of August 1, 1945.

However, I recall that general estimates on the fighting strength of the U.S. Forces in the Pacific Area were made, based on former combat reports from our units, captured documents, news reports from American and neutral sources, and long-term statistics gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The estimates were as follows:

| | | |
|--|------------------|--------------------|
| Battleships ready for action: | New 8 | Old 8 |
| Carriers (regular and those converted from cruisers) ready for action: | | 16-20 |
| Escort carriers ready for action: | | 50 |
| 1st line submarines | | 100 |
| 1st line army aircraft | less than 10,000 | |
| 1st line shore based navy aircraft | | 4,000 - 5,000 |
| Army ground forces and Marine corps | | 50 to 60 divisions |

D. EFFECTIVENESS

Q. 1. How successful and accurate was your intelligence organization in making periodic estimates of:

- (a) Allied and U.S. Air Strength?
- (b) Location and composition of U.S. Naval Forces and Ground Forces?
- (c) U.S. capabilities?
- (d) U. S. intentions?

- A. (a) U.S. air strength in Pacific was estimated, I believe, within approximately 20% discrepancy of the actual strength. Allied air strength other than that of U.S. air forces and U.S. air strength outside the Pacific area was not estimated.
- (b) A general knowledge of U.S. Naval strength and the locations of U.S. ground forces was usually obtained through reconnaissance made by front-line forces. It was extremely difficult for the Central Intelligence Agency to make such estimates.

A rough estimate of the composition was made but it was difficult to obtain any worth-while detailed data.

- (c) Our Central Intelligence Agency thought that estimates of U.S. capabilities were satisfactory.
- (d) It was extremely difficult to estimate U.S. intentions. The Intelligence Agency made estimates merely as rough guesses.

Q. 2. Were you able to predict any major U.S. moves or landings? How?

A. I believe that there was no instance of any reliable, concrete prediction.

Report of Japanese Naval Intelligence:(Contd.) RESTRICTED

Q. 3. How successfully were you able to get useful information out to your fleet units?

- A. (a) On account of telegraphic congestion, not infrequently it took over 24 hours to transmit a message.
- (b) It seems that in case of printed information it took several weeks to several months in order to reach the fleet.
- (c) It seems that not infrequently the information disseminated to the fleet was neither fully understood nor used to advantage.

Q. 4. How reliable was Japanese technical intelligence on Allied and U/S equipment?

A. As far as the Central Intelligence Agency was concerned, I believe the information was not unsatisfactory from the point of reliability, but there were many instances of the information being obtained too late.

Q. 5. How effective and successful did you find interrogation of U.S. Airmen and other Prisoners of War?

A. Most of the prisoners interrogated were reserve officers or petty officers poorly informed on military affairs. The regular officers, aside from their small total number, did not reveal any valuable information. Because we did not attempt to extort replies from them, the interrogation of prisoners was unsuccessful.

E. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND RECONNAISSANCE

Q. 1. To what extent did the Japanese Navy rely on photographic intelligence?

A. It seems photographic intelligence was not relied on to any great extent. The central Intelligence Agency had no organization or personnel for this. Among the Air Forces, there seem to be some who on their own initiatives engaged in photographic intelligence activities.

Q. 2. Comment on its effectiveness.

A. I believe they were effective in determining battle results.

Q. 3. Describe the method of securing and disseminating photographic intelligence.

A. For the reason stated above, there was no special method of securing photographic intelligence.

Photographs were disseminated in copies thereof or as documents or telegrams explaining the main points to all departments concerned, but I understand there were no special methods such as the use of television.

Q. 4. How many squadrons were engaged exclusively in this work?

A. Absolutely none.

Q. 5. How many planes were assigned to such squadrons?

A. Absolutely none.

Report of Japanese Naval Intelligence: (Cont'd.)

- Q. 6. Comment on Japanese aerial reconnaissance stating number of aircraft engaged in this work, its effectiveness, method of exchange of information between aircraft and their bases. Enclose copies of Search Sector plans for each stage of the War (each Campaign).
- A. In the Japanese Navy, aerial reconnaissance was outside the scope of the Intelligence Bureau activities. I regret, therefore, that I have no knowledge that would qualify me to make any reply. There are no existing copies of Search Sector plans.
- Q. 7. Describe the procedure followed in taking action on sightings reported by reconnaissance aircraft.
- A. Regret unable to reply to this question for reasons stated above.

F. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO THE WAR

- Q. 1. Summarize Japanese intelligence activities prior to the War using A, B, and C as guides for detail of information desired.
- Q. 2. What information did you have on 7 December 1943 and prior thereto of:
- (a) Number, type, size and disposition of U.S. Navy vessels in Hawaiian waters?
 - (b) U.S. defensive installations, supply installations and their location in Hawaiian area?
 - (c) U.S. Ground Forces and their location in Hawaiian area.
 - (d) U.S. Air Forces, size, type and number of aircraft, in Hawaiian Area.
- Q. 3. How was this information gained?
- Q. 4. How was this information disseminated and to what extent to your Naval Units afloat and forces in the field?

(NOTE: The following statement was made in answer to all questions asked in Section F.)

- A. As all points mentioned here are concerning with matters that occurred while I was serving as a government official in departments other than the Navy Department, I have no data with which to reply to these points.

G. GENERAL

Q. 1. What were the outstanding accomplishments of Japanese Naval Intelligence immediately prior to and during the war?

A. My impression is that nothing particularly outstanding was accomplished by them. I was always dissatisfied with what they were doing.

Q. 2. At what stage or stages of the War do you consider Japanese Naval Intelligence was most effective? i.e. Aleutins? Solomons? Bismark Sea? New Guinea? Marshalls? Philippines? Iwo-Okinawa? etc. At what time or times was it poorest? Reasons?

A. In the progress of the war, the effectiveness of Japanese Naval Intelligence increased steadily, because those who were engaged in this work became more and more accustomed.

Q. 3. What was your estimate of U.S. Intelligence?

A. I realize that U.S. Intelligence was far more superior than that of the Japanese.