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U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE SECTION, G-2

JAPANESE MILITARY AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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Dates of Survey:
1 November 1945 thru 1 February 1946

Date of Publication:

Copy No _____

FOREWORD

Japanese knowledge of Allied strength, capabilities and intentions and the contribution which such knowledge made to strategic and tactical war planning is an important consideration in the appraisal of the overall effect of the attack on Japan.

This report, prepared by the Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, is an evaluation of Japanese Military and Naval intelligence in terms of organization, procedures and effectiveness for the period immediately preceding and during the war.

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JAPANESE MILITARY AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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I INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Introduction.

a. Military and naval intelligence comprises the gathering, evaluation and dissemination of information regarding enemy strength, capabilities and intentions required for combat operations.

b. The purpose of this report is to describe the organization, procedure, capabilities and effectiveness of Japanese military and naval intelligence and to evaluate these factors in terms of their contribution to planning and combat operations for the period just preceding and during the war. Other phases of intelligence of an extra-operational character - activities of the Foreign Office and secret service organizations, for example - have been included only insofar as they contributed information used in the planning and execution of combat operations.

c. The chief sources of information for this study have been the interrogation of officials available for interview in Japan, reports submitted by the Japanese in response to directives of the U S Strategic Bombing Survey, and an analysis of documents secured by the Survey together with those captured during the war.

2. Summary

a. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack the Japanese Government had developed a vast organization throughout the world for the collection of intelligence, using diplomatic, commercial, and military representatives together with literally thousands of enthusiastic amateur spies. Their efforts were by no means confined to the uncovering of military secrets. Every activity - commercial, social and cultural - merited investigation and reporting, the natural effect of the characteristic Japanese thirst for knowledge, and his fear that his nation might not keep pace with technological developments of the western world.

b. In spite of the difficulty of properly evaluating and collating the great quantity of unrelated information secured through these channels, a reservoir of knowledge concerning her potential enemies was thus established which Japan believed to be adequate for a war of short duration.

c. With the declaration of war and severing of diplomatic relations, the most lucrative sources of information available to the Japanese became (1) analysis of Allied communications transmissions and (2) Allied short and medium wave radio broadcasts coupled with information secured from Allied newspapers and magazines

purchased by Japanese representatives in neutral countries.

d. The Japanese intelligence organization reflected the high command concept of a short war, defensive in character, following initial conquest. Specific war aims as outlined by the historical research department of the Japanese Naval General Staff envisioned a quick conquest of the southern areas, the Netherland East Indies, Malaya and Burma, and concurrently the establishment of a defense perimeter extending from the Kuriles through the Marshalls (including Wake Island), the Bismark Archipelago, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya and Burma. Predicated on a German victory in the West, and the rapid exploitation of her newly-gained natural resources, Japan believed that the United States would make a compromise peace, permitting her to retain her conquests.

e. As a result of this concept, neither the Army nor the Navy developed an intelligence organization containing within itself the means of collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence throughout all levels of command. At Imperial Headquarters level, the undermanned but generally capable military and naval central intelligence agencies served primarily as adjuncts of their respective war plans sections in the production of background intelligence, but exercised little or no supervision over the performance of the various functions of operational intelligence in tactical units. At the outbreak of war with the U S, the Army General Staff intelligence section was comprised of 17 officers. Growth was very slight until early in 1945, when a reorganization of the homeland defense armies resulted in the assignment of 40 additional officers to be trained for duty with the defense armies. The intelligence section of the Naval General Staff showed a gradual growth from the 29 officers at the beginning of the war until 1945, when a sudden increase brought the final total to 97. The increase resulted rather from a scarcity of units afloat and a consequent surplus of officers, than from an attempt to set up a central organization performing all the functions of intelligence.

f. Army tables of organization provided for intelligence officers down to and including armies, although units below area army level were organized to collect information only and not to process it. The almost complete autonomy accorded each area army resulted in great differences in size and methods of operation among intelligence units. In the Japanese Navy the functions of intelligence below the Combined Naval Force were secondary only and did not appear on tables of organization. Brief courses in the fundamentals of intelligence were included in general instruction given all army officers but no training, whatsoever, was offered by the Navy to prepare officers for intelligence assignments.

g. Nearly all of the functions of intelligence, in the U S sense, were recognized by the Japanese and performed intermittently and with varying degrees of success. In the production of background intelligence and estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions, both branches of the service at the planning level achieved considerable success by applying a common sense evaluation to information derived from a great mass of periodicals, foreign office reports, news broadcasts and communications traffic analysis and with access to a minimum of first hand information such as reconnaissance reports, captured documents, prisoner of war interrogations, and combat reports.

h. Communications intelligence was highly developed in both the Army and Navy and provided valuable information and warnings of attacks from analyses and statistical study of call signs, traffic volume, priority and RDF. Less success was achieved in the field of code breaking. Much more might have been gained from the study of communications had the Army and Navy coordinated their efforts and established an effective liaison which was, in this case, almost entirely lacking.

i. Reconnaissance was seriously neglected throughout the war, and although the lack became keenly felt in the later stages, efforts to improve it were ineffective. Certain physical handicaps, the shortage and vulnerability of the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, the inadequacy of fighter protection, and the necessity of employing all available submarines to supply bases and to attack U S warships, explain in part the failure of this type of defense at some of the most critical periods in the war.

j. Photo reconnaissance was limited by the same factors that restricted general reconnaissance plus a lack of an appreciation of its value. Following the fall of Saipan, interest in photo reconnaissance increased, in spite of which only 4 photo reconnaissance sorties were flown over Saipan and 10 over Okinawa. Photo interpretation was still in a rudimentary state of development at the end of the war, only 18 Army officers and 30 Navy officers having been so trained. The information obtained by interpretation of photographs was primarily for the immediate tactical use of the unit ordering the reconnaissance and was not given general dissemination. No central file of enemy base development was maintained.

k. Technical intelligence gained by the Japanese through a study of captured equipment was used to improve the design and performance of their own equipment rather than to devise countertactics or better means of employing existing aircraft, armament, etc, based on the known capabilities of those of the enemy. Some use was made of technical intelligence by the intelligence sections

of the Army and Navy General Staffs in an attempt to estimate production rates. During the course of the war, crashed Allied aircraft types studied and, when possible, repaired and test flown were: F4F, F4U, SB2C, TBF, TBM-1C, PB4Y-1, P6F, P-40E, A-20A, P2A, Hurricane, PBO, B-17D, B-17E and PBM.

1. Recognition training for pilots and gunners was not considered a function of intelligence and received almost no direction or encouragement from high command levels. A brief attempt to initiate a formal training program was made at the insistence of one officer, under the Navy Ministry, in which 40 enlisted men and 215 officers received about 2 hours training each. At the conclusion of the course, in 1943, silhouettes and data on Japanese and Allied ships and aircraft were assembled into 2 books of which 5000 copies were distributed to lower echelons. Some training was conducted within individual aircraft squadrons, but information and material was inadequate.

m. Flak analysis, in the sense of a mathematical calculation of the density of AA fire depending upon a plane's course and altitude with relation to known AA positions, was not developed by the Japanese military. Flak positions, when discovered from the few available photographs and from reports by pilots, were used to a limited extent by tactical commanders but were not reported to a central bureau.

n. Target analysis was necessarily rudimentary and confined to the individual tactical command immediately concerned, because of the ineffectiveness of reconnaissance and other sources of information, and because of lack of a central branch of intelligence with sufficient manpower to perform the task.

3. Conclusions.

a. Japanese military and naval intelligence proved inadequate because:

(1) The heads of the military greatly underestimated the length of the war based on the assumption of a German victory and a false estimate of Allied weakness both as to productive capacity and morale, and failed to provide for an organization adequate to meet the situation which later developed.

(2) The unfavorable military situation and in particular, the general failure of air reconnaissance, resulted in the loss of much intelligence from the most dependable sources.

(3) A lack of effective liaison between the Army and Navy resulted in the inefficient employment and loss of much of the intelligence which was obtained.

(4) No special training was given Navy intelligence personnel and only the briefest and most superficial to students at the Army War College.

(5) Inferior personnel were assigned to fill intelligence positions, reflecting the general lack of appreciation of the potentialities of intelligence, and the secondary role it played in the Japanese military.

(6) Certain characteristics of the Japanese military mentality tended to nullify the work of intelligence. Corrupted by their own propaganda, military planners, in line with reiterated statements of divinely-bestowed Japanese invincibility, over-emphasized the importance of the attack at the expense of the preparatory steps necessary for its most effective execution. Being embroiled in internal political administration, suppressing information and bending it to serve political ends became second nature to Japanese militarists, and they became blind to objective intelligence.

II ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP AT IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS LEVEL

1. A brief examination of the military command structure at top command level is presented here to show the relationship which existed between the several Japanese war agencies and to facilitate an understanding of these agencies as they appear in other sections of this report.

2. The Emperor and the Supreme War Council

a. Official head of Imperial GHQ and titular head of the Army and Navy, the Emperor was final authority for their activities. Few officials had access to him, and he had few official advisers. The Ministers of War and Navy reported directly to him, and in this sense were independent of the rest of the cabinet, although normally subordinate to the Prime Minister.

b. Official adviser to the Emperor and highest policy-forming group was the Supreme War Council (Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi), which consisted of the Prime Minister, ministers of War and Navy, chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Foreign Minister. The Emperor frequently attended its conferences; occasionally important officials were called in for direct consultation.

3. Imperial GHQ and the General Staff Departments

a. Senior authority for direction of Japanese war operations was Imperial GHQ (Daihonei), which was formed after the war began by combining (in name only) the Army and Navy General Staffs with the Emperor as nominal head. Imperial GHQ had no departments or bureaus which combined the two services, and reference by either Army or Navy officials to "Imperial Headquarters" means the respective general staff more often than it means Daihonei in its actual sense. By bringing the general staffs of the two services together, however, it insured a measure of coordination. Joint decisions made by the heads of the two general staffs were issued as orders in the name of the Emperor.

b. Army General Staff Headquarters, or Army Department (Sambo Hombu), commanded all Army forces including air, which were subordinate either directly, as in the case of the Air General Army, or indirectly through area army commanders outside of Japan proper. Concurrent office holding by several of the principal General Staff officers in the War Ministry and the Inspectorate General of Military Training insured coordination with those two organizations.

c. Navy General Staff Headquarters, or Navy Department (Gunreibu), was principally the operational planning organ of the Japanese Navy. As in the Army General Staff, many of the Navy

General Staff officers also held similar billets in the Navy Ministry, effecting coordinations between the two.

4. The Ministries

a. Although the relative influence of the Army and Navy varied from time to time, together the two services dominated the Japanese government during the entire war and for some time prior to it. The Prime Minister, therefore, was invariably an Army or Navy officer or under their control, since the refusal of the military to furnish a minister would be fatal to any attempt to form a government unacceptable to either branch. This factor, coupled with the unique privilege enjoyed by the Army and Navy ministers of direct approach to the Emperor, placed the other ministries on a subservient basis to these two.

b. The War Ministry had full responsibility for the procurement of military materiel, directed much of the Army's administrative policy and, through its subordinate agencies, supervised many activities connected with supply and services. One of these subordinate agencies was Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu), to which the ministry delegated most of its functions with regard to the air forces, although it reserved for itself the formulation of administrative policy.

c. The Navy Ministry was the top-level procurement agency for the Navy, directed the training program and performed many naval administrative functions. Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu) was one of the ministry's bureaus, but enjoyed greater autonomy than the others, handling all air training and technical matters.

d. Although intelligence departments in both the Army and Navy were a part of the General Staff (or Department) organization, attaches in foreign billets were under jurisdiction of the ministries.

e. During the war, all national policy was determined by Army-Navy demands, and the other ministries adjusted their policies accordingly. The munitions ministry, most of whose key officials were Army and Navy officers, was the only cabinet department with a direct and substantial role in air force activities; activities of civilian manufacturers and much of the national war-time economy were controlled by this department.

f. At ministry level, but an independent agency responsible directly to the Emperor, was the Inspectorate General of Training (Kyoiku Sokambu). It was tied in closely with Army and Navy training departments, but had no connection with air training during the latter stages of war.

MAJOR JAPANESE HIGH COMMAND WAR AGENCIES AS OF AUGUST 1, 1945



*Separate only because of rank of commanding officers.
Dotted line indicates liaison.

Chart 1

III MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

1. Summary

a. Japanese Army pre-Pearl Harbor planning faced more towards war with Russia than with the United States and the weight of her intelligence activities and organization gravitated in that direction. As a result of five years of war in China and preparation for possible war with the Soviet Union, the Japanese had developed an effective intelligence system in China and Manchuria under direct control of the Chinese Expeditionary Army in China and the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, referred to in both areas as Tokumu Kikan (Special Service Organization). In China this organization carried out fifth column activities in areas which the Japanese Army intended to occupy and after occupation performed liaison functions between the Chinese puppet government and the occupation army. In Manchuria Tokumu Kikan engaged in espionage activities along the Russian border and was the Army's chief source of information regarding Russian activities in that area. A similar intelligence organization operated in Burma both before and after the advent of war with the United States and there is ample evidence that the Japanese were attempting to extend and perpetuate the activities of their undercover agents through development of such an organization in the Philippines. (See part VI, Special Service Organizations)

b. The war in the Pacific afforded little opportunity for the expansion of an army intelligence system similar to that developed in China, Manchuria and Burma. As a result, the Japanese Army did not conceive nor develop a central intelligence organization embracing the various functions considered essential to effective operational intelligence. The 2nd Division of the General Staff, the highest intelligence unit in the Army consisted of 17 staff officers and 19 attached officers at the end of the war. The 6th Section of the 2nd Division, responsible for intelligence relating to America, England and Pacific areas, had a total of 27 officers assigned. Its chief function was to produce estimates of allied forces, capabilities and intentions essential to war planning. Through detailed and careful analysis of information derived from many sources over a long period of time, and by virtue of the somewhat obvious tactical situation as it developed after the landing in the Gilberts, these estimates were accurate within approximately two weeks as to the time of projected Allied landings, and the general area in which action would develop was forecast from two weeks to a month in advance, prior to the landing on Iwo Jima. As the possible alternatives open to the Allies narrowed the Japanese were successful in improving these estimates.

c. The intelligence division of the Army General Staff

made no provision for the performance of functions relating to target analysis, photo intelligence, technical intelligence or flak intelligence at General Staff level. The development of these functions in subordinate echelons lacked direction and coordination and was inadequate by U S standards.

d. The Japanese Army tables of organization provided for intelligence units in echelons down to and including Army. It was the practice for divisions to assign an officer to full time intelligence duties, but below division these functions were assigned as additional duty to an officer designated by the unit commanding officer.

e. No special schools existed in the Army for the training of officers assigned to operational intelligence duties; however, general instruction in the fundamentals of intelligence was included in basic officer training.

2. Organization

a. The Army General Staff was the highest tactical command in the Army and controlled both ground and air forces. Tables of organization issued at the General Staff level prescribed the staff sections and provided for the appointment of the principal officers in each, but the details of staff organization in the field were worked out to a very large extent by the field commanders. The General Staff prescribed an intelligence section only as far down as army (gun) in the ground forces and air division (hikoshidan) in the air forces. Even at these echelons, the tables of organization issued from above set up only the "staff" intelligence officers, and these men built up their sections with "attached" officers not called for by any organization chart.1/ Consequently, there is little uniformity in the intelligence organization even at higher levels in the different ground and air armies; differences in organization below the level at which an intelligence officer is called for by General Staff organization tables are even greater.

b. General practices at each echelon are discussed in this report insofar as they can be said to be general. Where specific practices in a lower unit are given, they are practices stated by Japanese officers to have been carried out by most units at that level of command. Since the officers interviewed are be-

1/ In the Japanese Army, "staff" officers were considered to be only those who were named on official tables of organization as such. They were the higher officers in each staff section, men who had been to the War College or the Air Officers School. The bulk of the staff sections consisted of junior officers attached to the staff.

lieved to have been above the average in the Japanese army and air forces, and since they presumably commanded superior units, it is probable that the picture of intelligence in these lower units approaches the ideal, and that the average unit fell below the standard described.

c. A simplified chart showing the army organization (both ground and air) following the reorganization for the defense of the Home Islands in the spring of 1945 is given below:

JAPANESE ARMY ORGANIZATION AFTER REORGANIZATION, 1945



Chart 2

d. Prior to the spring of 1945, the air armies defending the Home Islands were under the control of the defense armies, each of which was responsible for the defense of a given section of the Homeland. The principal changes at that time, as it affects chart 2 are:

(1) The defense army was abolished and the individual armies defending Japan proper reported direct to the General Staff.

(2) The air army in the Homeland, North China, and Korea was abolished, and the air division in these areas thereafter reported to a new staff section, Air General Headquarters, directly under the Chief of Staff. Overseas the air army was retained and still reported to the area army in the theater.

3. Pre-War Army Intelligence and War-Time Development

a. Pre-war intelligence activities in the Japanese Army relating to the United States and Great Britain were less thoroughly organized than in the Japanese Navy. Two reasons are given by Japanese Army officers:

(1) Pre-war intelligence pointed toward a war against Russia, pre-supposing a land campaign in Manchuria and Siberia in which the principal intelligence sources would be observation posts, patrols and undercover agents. Accordingly, the more elaborate intelligence system necessary in conducting a war over thousands of square miles was not developed.

(2) The campaigns in China did not point out the necessity of an elaborate operational intelligence system. There success was obtained rather easily and most operational intelligence was obtained either from Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese invaders or from undercover agents in special agencies such as Tokumu Kikan (part VI) which were under the area army.

b. As a result, the Pearl Harbor attack found the Japanese Army with only a small headquarters intelligence section, the 2nd Division of the Army General Staff. It consisted of about 20 officers and 20 NCOs and enlisted men, none of whom had received special intelligence training.

c. In the field, the highest commands were the area armies, one of which commanded each of the principal theaters of operations. The Kwantung Army (the area army in Manchuria) had a well organized intelligence system dealing with intelligence concerning Russian capabilities and intentions in Asia. Area armies other than the Kwantung Army had small intelligence staffs. The intelligence units below area army level were organized to collect information, but not to process it.

d. In the air forces, which were subordinate to the Army, very much the same conditions existed. At Tokyo headquarters there

was a small intelligence unit with 2 or 3 officers, the principal function of which was to keep abreast of enemy technical developments. The General Staff was the primary point of distribution of air intelligence as well as ground intelligence.

e. A simplified chart showing the main pre-war Army intelligence organization, both ground and air, at Tokyo follows:

JAPANESE ARMY PRE-WAR HIGH COMMAND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION



(Dotted line shows liaison. A number of officers served concurrently in both the General Staff and in the War Ministry.)

Chart 3

f. In the early months of war the bulk of intelligence data with regard to the United States and Great Britain was furnished by the Navy and apparently satisfied immediate Japanese planning requirements. Navy estimates of forces at Hawaii, the Philippines (from aerial reconnaissance of the Philippines obtained late in November 1941), and the southern areas were detailed and accurate. It was not until early 1943 when the Allied offensive in the Solomons began to gain momentum that the Japanese felt a pressing need for better ground intelligence.

g. As the war progressed the Japanese, according to statements of their Army officers, began to become more conscious of the value of an adequate intelligence system and the shortcomings of their own. A staff colonel was sent from Tokyo to reorganize Army intelligence of the 8th Army at Rabaul in early 1943. At about this period full-time intelligence officers were assigned at division level, and individual commanders in both the ground and air forces increased the number of officers in the staff intelligence sections.

h. In Tokyo, efforts made by the Chief of Army Intelligence to increase the number of officers assigned to the 2nd (intelligence) Division of the General Staff met with little success. It was not until near the end of the war that some 40 new men were assigned to headquarters intelligence.

i. In the air force the pattern was similar. Due to the nature of air force operations more emphasis had been placed on intelligence matters in lower units (by unit commanders) early in the war. As was the case in the ground forces, however, efforts of intelligence personnel at Headquarters to increase the intelligence staff were not successful. In the thoroughgoing reorganization of the air forces in April 1945, a small intelligence section (5 to 8 officers and 3 or 4 enlisted men) was set up under Air General Headquarters (Koku Sogun), the new tactical air command established at that time.

j. Throughout the entire war, development of intelligence was hampered by lack of any intelligence training program. There were no intelligence schools and no special intelligence courses in either the Army War College or the Air Officers Training School. Such training in intelligence as was given was incidental to courses in tactics, military history and communications, and officers assigned to intelligence were expected to learn their new duties in the field. In the special schools for communications officers and photo interpreters more emphasis was placed on intelligence duties than in the general schools, but even there training was inadequate by U S standards.

4. War Time Operation

a. General Staff

(1) The Japanese Army General Staff constituted the highest army command. The highest intelligence unit was the 2nd Division of the General Staff. It consisted of three sections, each dealing with specific geographical areas. At the beginning of the war it was quite small, consisting of about 20 officers and a few enlisted men. Growth was slow until early in 1945 when some 40 provisional officers were assigned both to help the headquarters section and to receive training which would qualify them for field assignments. At the end of the war the organization and strength of the 2nd Division was as indicated in chart 4 on following page:

JAPANESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
(AT END OF WAR)



Chart 4

(2) The principal intelligence sources available to the Army General Staff were:

(a) Reports from foreign attaches (part V).

(b) Communications interception reports (part V).

(c) Technical research reports (part V).

(d) Reports from area armies and Air General Headquarters (discussed in detail below).

(e) Reports from Naval Intelligence. These were received at periodic staff meetings attended by the chiefs of the several sections of the Army and Navy General Staffs and by personal contact between junior officers in the Army 2nd Division and the Navy 3rd Department. In addition, reports and summaries of mutual interest were exchanged.

(f) Reports from certain civil government agencies, such as the Foreign Office and Home Ministry.

(g) Analysis of Allied ship, plane and submarine movements.

(3) The intelligence data so received was processed, evaluated and summarized. Information thus accumulated, provided the basis for the reports and recommendations made to the General Staff by the 2nd Division and the reports sent to lower echelons, both ground and air. The principal types of estimates compiled and distributed covered:

(a) Enemy strength and dispositions.

(b) Enemy capabilities and intentions.

(c) General situation in enemy countries including production, morale and ability to wage war.

(d) Performance and characteristics of enemy equipment.

(e) Aircraft and ship recognition material.

(4) Reports covering Allied strength, capabilities and intentions were transmitted to the Chief of the General Staff whenever new information changed the previous estimate, but in any event at the weekly staff meetings. These reports constituted the principal contribution of intelligence to headquarters planning. The Intelligence Division occasionally prepared special reports at the request of other departments of the General Staff or of Air Force Headquarters and checked and commented upon Navy estimates.

(5) Reports were sent to area army headquarters and to Air General Headquarters. Urgent information concerning imminent attack or change in enemy plans was sent out immediately by dispatch. In addition, periodic reports covering enemy strength, disposition and intentions were issued at ten-day intervals, and once a month an intelligence summary covering the general situation in the U S was published. Technical Intelligence and aircraft recognition material was sent out at irregular intervals whenever available information justified.

b. <u>Ground Army Below General Staff</u>

(1) The Japanese Army organization provided for area

armies which correspond roughly to U S theater commands, and armies which were under the area armies. In stabilized theaters like Manchuria and China, the greater part of the staff work, including intelligence, was done at the area army headquarters and the Army intelligence staff was responsible for little more than transmission and filing of reports. However, in some campaigns, like the Solomons or the defense of islands which were cut off from the area army headquarters, the army had to take over the staff functions normally performed by the area army. Therefore, the intelligence functions of the area army in the stabilized theaters and the Army in areas where it was not directly controlled by the area army were virtually the same and are discussed together in this section.

(2) Area Army Intelligence. As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter intelligence staffs for area armies were prescribed by the tables of organization issued in Tokyo, but the actual composition of the staff, its functions, and its importance, varied widely with the area army concerned. There were, however, three general types represented by the Kwantung Army (The area army in Manchuria), the area armies in the Southern Areas, and area armies organized in the latter stages of the war to defend the Homeland. Within the latter two categories of area armies listed above, there were some differences, but the overall organization and function in each class are sufficiently similiar to permit uniform discussion.

(a) Kwantung Army. In the beginning of the war the Kwantung Army, which was primarily responsible for intelligence concerning Russia, had an elaborate and effective field intelligence system built around observation from the Manchurian side of the Manchurian-Soviet border and the espionage activity of special organizations like Tokumu Kikan. (part VI) This Army was unique in that it had considerable control over economic development and industry in Manchuria and consequently its staff was much larger than that of most area armies. The organization of the staff and intelligence system is shown in the following chart:

KWANTUNG ARMY STAFF AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION



(Only the "staff" officers are shown. There were sometimes as many as 30 "attached" officers, 30 civilians and 12 enlisted men in the intelligence section in addition to those shown on the chart. Most of these were assigned to Tokumu Kikan and the general intelligence sub-sections.)

Chart 5

1. In the field of intelligence, the Kwantung Army performed both the functions usually assigned to area armies and many of those performed at Tokyo for other area armies. It had its own communications interception units, its own espionage system (under Tokumu Kikan) and its own agents in Moscow, independent of the Tokyo diplomatic representatives. It had operated for several years before the U S-Japanese war under combat or near combat conditions and was considered by the Japanese to be very well informed. No extensive changes in organization were made during the war and none were considered necessary by the Japanese.

(b) Area Armies in the Southern Areas. Tables

of organization at the beginning of the war provided for an intelligence section at area army and army level which were inadequate by U S standards. A typical staff is believed to be that of the 8th Army with headquarters in Rabaul which controlled all army forces in the Southwest Pacific. The staff is shown on the following chart:

STAFF ORGANIZATION, JAPANESE 8TH ARMY



(The officers shown on the chart are the "staff" officers. In addition, 12 to 15 officers were "attached" to the staff, 3 or 4 of whom were assigned to the intelligence sub-section.)

Chart 6

1. At army level the reports from lower units, ship sightings, submarine sightings, air attack reports, prisoner of war reports, reports from captured documents, photo and visual reconnaissance reports, ground patrol reports, etc, were collected and evaluated. To this information was added intelligence originating at army level (usually including results of enemy communications interception), and that coming from Tokyo. Estimates were then prepared and sent to Tokyo headquarters and to division daily by radio, and by

written reports every 10 days. The written reports were prepared in sufficient numbers to supply regiments in the ground forces and air divisions in the air forces. About once a month a general summary of conditions in the United States was published for the same distribution. The General Staff depended to a very great extent on area army estimates of battle order and enemy intentions although, of course, their estimates were checked against information from military attaches and other sources not available to field commanders.

(c) Armies organized for defense of Homeland. After the fall of the Philippines it became apparent to the Japanese that an invasion of the Homeland was imminent, and to meet this threat the defense forces, both ground and air, were reorganized in the spring of 1945. At this time some of the younger men who had served for a considerable time in the 2nd Division of the Army General Staff were placed at the head of the intelligence sections in the reorganized defense Armies. These men were experienced and felt keenly the deficiencies in intelligence at army level. When they took over their new assignments they set up much larger intelligence units than had theretofore been found in Japanese armies. While there were minor discrepancies between organizations in the new armies they were quite similar in essential aspects. The organization of the 57th Army charged with the defense of the eastern and southern coast of Kyushu is typical. This organization is shown in the following chart:

STAFF ORGANIZATION, JAPANESE HOME DEFENSE ARMY



(In addition to the officers shown on the chart, there were some 20 officers and 6 enlisted men in the intelligence section for assignment as required.)

Chart 7

(d) Since few trained intelligence officers were available and little time was left to train them, it was desired to make specialists of these men in very narrow fields. The new army intelligence section represented an expansion of the old, and not a radical departure from former practice. The functions of all seven of the sections established in the 57th Army had been performed in the old army intelligence staffs, but on a much smaller scale. The only new work undertaken was that of the analysis section which undertook to study earlier campaigns and

examine mistakes made and effective tactics used in the past, to permit the new armies to profit by this experience.

(3) Division Intelligence. The tables of organization promulgated from Tokyo did not provide for an intelligence staff below army level at the beginning of the war. However, in the early months of the war, the need for a special intelligence officer at division level became apparent and a division intelligence officer was provided for directly under the division chief of staff. This officer was not a "staff officer" but was "attached" to the staff. As in the case in all units below army, the duties of the intelligence officer at division level were different in the various armies. However, regardless of organizational differences, certain functions were performed in nearly every division. The more important of these were:

(a) The reports from lower units concerning enemy losses and enemy strength and dispositions were consolidated and forwarded to the army.

(b) Prisoners of war were interrogated at division level by special personnel attached, and reports were prepared for transmittal to higher authority. Army doctrine provided that all prisoners were to be sent to division for interrogation.

(c) All captured documents were sent to division for examination and translation. There they were screened, and some translated and sent to higher headquarters.

(d) Captured equipment was screened at division level and that thought important was sent to higher headquarters for analysis.

(e) Situation maps were kept and revised daily. The information as to change in situation was sent by dispatch to the regiment and to the area army for transmission to Tokyo.

(f) Division was responsible for certain patrols, but had no special patrol unit. Personnel for patrols was drawn from front line units.

(4) Intelligence Below Division Level. In the ground forces the division was the lowest unit which had an intelligence unit, although there were, of necessity, some functions in the nature of intelligence performed in the lower echelons. All lower echelons from platoon up were responsible for preparing reports to the division headquarters concerning such matters as sightings of enemy troops, ships, and planes, estimates of enemy losses, the enemy situation, and for sending to division headquarters all captured enemy personnel, documents and equipment. The primary function of the sections below division was to prepare reports on the matters concerning which it received the original information and to consolidate and pass to division the reports originating in lower units. The principal sources of information of these lower units were patrols, observation posts, and natives. Doctrine provided that all prisoners and documents should be sent to division headquarters and that the headquarters should be notified of any captured equipment or crashed aircraft. In practice, the instructions regarding prisoners and captured documents were more often ignored than followed.

c. Air Force Below General Staff

(1) Air Force Headquarters Organization. Prior to April 1945, Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu) exercised both administrative and tactical control over the air force under the control of Air Ministry. At that time, however, there was a thoroughgoing reorganization of the air command and Air General Headquarters (Koku Sogun) was set up under the General Staff as the tactical head of the air forces. Air Headquarters remained under War Ministry and continued to exercise some of its original functions. The line between the respective duties of the two related air commands (Air Headquarters and Air General Headquarters) was not clearly drawn, but a general statement is that Air General Headquarters took over the operational command in the Homeland while Air Headquarters retained control of supply and training. Overseas command of the air forces was retained by the area armies. The staff of Air General Headquarters was organized into four subsections; operations, weather,

administration, and intelligence. The intelligence section consisted of a lieutenant colonel as chief, from 4 to 7 attached officers, several NCOs and a number of civilian clerks. Its principal sources of information were intelligence reports from the 2nd Division of the General Staff and reports from the lower air echelons under its operational control. In addition, near the end of the war a special reconnaissance unit was attached directly to Air General Headquarters, but the war ended before this attached unit began to function properly. Technical intelligence reports from Air Headquarters were furnished direct to Air General Headquarters. A simplified chart showing the flow of air intelligence to the intelligence section of Air General Headquarters follows:

FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE TO ARMY AIR TOP COMMAND



(Although this chart shows the technical intelligence section under Air Headquarters to be separate from the 1st section under Air General Headquarters, the same man was chief of both sections and the same staff handled the duties of both.)

chart 8

(2) Air Force Headquarters Responsibility. As pointed out above, most of the intelligence work for both ground and air forces was the responsibility of the 2nd Division of the General Staff, but the air force was primarily responsible for two matters: air order of battle and air technical intelligence. The principal sources of information used in estimating Allied air order of battle were aerial reconnaissance (both visual and photographic), analysis of Allied supply movements, plane markings reported by Japanese combat pilots, communications interception, prisoners of war, captured documents, and analysis of the number and frequency of Allied strikes. Of these, aerial reconnaissance and analysis of Allied strikes were considered the best sources. After the Marianas campaign, Allied air power prevented systematic reconnaissance, but the Japanese claim to have been able to get enough information to know at least the number of front line fields in operation and the stage of development of each. On the basis of this information, estimates of the number of planes which could be based in the combat area were made. The count of Allied planes which struck Japanese targets gave them a firm base for estimates of the number of planes in actual operation. The Japanese considered these estimates to be correct within 20 per cent. Air technical intelligence was obtained from analysis of crashed aircraft by the army air technical department at Tachikawa (which was under Air Headquarters), by civilian manufacturers, and from prisoners, captured documents and reports from foreign diplomatic representatives. Technical information was considered poor, due to lack of sources and failure to exploit properly the information which was obtainable. In addition to the two primary functions discussed above, the 1st Section of the Air General Headquarters under operations kept files on material supplied by the intelligence division of the General Staff and lower air echelons and was prepared to advise the commanding general of Air General Headquarters on intelligence matters. It was the opinion of officers connected with air intelligence that it exercised little influence on Japanese planning. Reports prepared were limited in scope.

Air order of battle estimates were kept daily and furnished the commanding general of Air General Headquarters for his weekly meeting of the General Staff. Estimates, however, were not sent direct to field commands, but were forwarded to lower echelons as a part of General Staff reports. Technical reports were prepared at irregular intervals and distributed by Air Headquarters. In addition, the intelligence section of Air General Headquarters prepared and distributed reports covering enemy air tactics and formulated doctrine for meeting them.

(3) Air Armies (Hikodan). The air army was the highest field air unit. Prior to the reorganization of the air force in the spring of 1945 an air army was attached to every area army (ground) outside of Japan and to the so-called defense armies in the Homeland. After April 1945, the organization remained the same overseas, but the air army was abolished in the Homeland, and the air divisions there reported direct to Air General Headquarters which was directly under the General Staff (chart 2). The duties of the air army were almost entirely administrative and its staff was small. Its principal intelligence function was the consolidation of reports from lower units and transmission of these to the General Staff through channels. It also served as a channel through which information from the General Staff passed to lower units.

(4) Air Division (Hikoshidan). The air division was the next echelon below the air army (chart 2). It received general strategic policy from above and issued the specific orders necessary for carrying out this policy. Most of the operational planning was done at this level. Operational orders from the air division set up each mission and prescribed the results to be accomplished, but the details were left to the next lower echelon, the air regiment. The air division staff was fixed by tables of organization issued by the General Staff. It consisted of three sections: operations, intelligence and administration. The strength of the intelligence section varied, but usually consisted of from 3 to 6 officers and a number of enlisted men headed by a major or lieutenant colonel. The duties of the in-

The duties of the intelligence section included maintenance of a war room with enemy air situation maps, target maps and general situation maps. It prepared estimates of order of battle within its area of operations using data sent to it by its subordinate echelons. Estimates of enemy intentions were compiled every 10 days and sent both to Tokyo headquarters and to lower units. The intelligence furnished by the air division to the lower units included target information, operational maps, flak location maps, and such photographs as were used. When trained photo interpreters were available in the theater they were attached to this echelon. The air division usually had its own early warning system, including rader, and often a small section for monitoring enemy operational communications.

(5) Air Regiment (Hikosentai). The air regiment corresponded in many ways to the group in the U S air forces, although it exercised some of the planning functions performed at our wing level. It received operational orders from the air division and its primary duty was carrying them out. However, the detailed operational planning, such as selection of bombs and bomb fusing, selection of aiming point, and specific approach was often its responsibility. The staff was small, seldom consisting of more than 5 or 6 officers in all. No intelligence officer was called for by the tables of organization at the beginning of the war, but there is some evidence that after the reorganization of the air forces in April 1945 an intelligence officer was assigned to the air regiments defending the Homeland. Where no special intelligence officer was called for, an officer was designated for intelligence duties. Since its duties were chiefly in the field of operations the intelligence functions were minor. No reports originated at this level. However, the operational and intelligence reports of the squadrons were consolidated and sent forward to higher headquarters and the air regiment was responsible for dissemination to squadrons of reports sent down from higher headquarters. If the squadrons were located close enough, mission briefing of squadron commanders was done at the

air regiment headquarters. Briefing consisted of designation of the purpose of the mission, the target, direction and altitude of attack and withdrawal, radio channels for the day, etc., and available information concerning weather, enemy disposition and opposition to be expected. The squadron leader gave only so much of this information as he thought necessary to the pilots and air crews who would fly the mission. Photographic squadrons were often attached to the air regiment and these had their own facilities for developing and printing. However, as pointed out, photo-interpreters, where available, were assigned to the air division and consequently no photo interpretation reports were issued by the air regiment.

(6) Squadron (Chutai). The Japanese squadron corresponded closely to the squadron in the U S air forces. It controlled a specific number of planes, the number varying according to mission and type. The authorized strength varied at different times. At the beginning of the war 12 fighters or 9 bombers were authorized as initial equipment for a squadron. Reconnaissance and photo squadrons were authorized from 3 to 9 planes. Although no special intelligence officer was assigned at squadron level, intelligence duties were performed by an officer, often a flyer, designated by the squadron commander. He kept the files, looked after reproduction, received reports from pilots and air crews who had anything to report and saw to it that studies of enemy tactics, plane recognition and equipment performance were available to pilots. This officer generally did no briefing as this was usually done by the squadron commander. No systematic interrogation of pilots and air crews was attempted following a mission but any man who had something to report was expected to do so, either to the commander or to the officer performing intelligence duties. Mission reports issued by squadrons were usually quite complete. Report forms were prescribed at either air regiment or air division level and called for such data as time of take-off and landing, gasoline, bombs, and ammunition carried and expended, time of attack, results of attack, unusual sightings, opposition encountered,

damage to planes, enemy planes destroyed or damaged, etc. This written report was made for each plane as soon as possible after the mission. Very brief operations reports were made by dispatch immediately after each mission.

IV NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Summary.

a. Although virtually all of the various aspects of intelligence, as we think of it, were recognized by the Japanese and developed to varying degrees (some negligibly), no single organization was set up to channel information throughout various command levels. No center was established to maintain permanent files of all types of intelligence for long term estimates and statistical analysis or to provide for uniform dissemination.

b. Bearing in mind the lack of organization and the equally important consideration that a nation in retreat necessarily suffers the loss of certain sources of tangible information, intelligence at Naval General Staff level (and, to a lesser degree, at Combined Naval Force level) can be said to have done well in the production of good background material.

c. War plans chiefs (and operations chiefs at Combined Naval Forces level), although handicapped by the characteristic Japanese over-emphasis on operations at the expense of preparation, were able to anticipate enemy movements with reasonable accuracy. These predictions were based on a common sense evaluation of tactical considerations; the Japanese assumed that we had full information of their strength and weaknesses from a tactical, strategic and geographical standpoint, and then guessed what moves we would make on the basis of such knowledge. Such assumptions were supported by whatever information the communications and intelligence departments were able to supply.

2. Organization.

a. Organization of the Japanese Navy's overall commands, including departments under the Naval General Staff and sub-divisions within the Intelligence Department, is shown on the following page (chart 9).

b. Directly below the Naval General Staff was the Combined Naval Force, the highest administrative and tactical command, which included the Combined Fleet (all tactical units both surface and air), naval districts and guard districts. A single staff served as headquarters personnel for both Combined Naval Force and Combined Fleet. Headquarters of Combined Naval Force was organized into 10 departments including: (1) surface operations, (2) air operations, (3) intelligence, (4) communications, (5) maintenance and supply, (6) surface kamikaze, (7) adjutant, (8) land operations, (9) convoys, (10) submarine operations.

JAPANESE NAVY HIGH COMMAND ORGANIZATION



Chart 9

c. The Intelligence Sections of the Naval General Staff and the Combined Naval Force constituted the entire intelligence organization, in the strict sense, in the Japanese Navy. Although most if not all of the various aspects of intelligence were recognized and intermittently performed in some manner in subordinate command (usually as a corollary or, more accurately, as a secondary duty) nothing even remotely resembling an intelligence organization existed below Combined Naval Force. No supervision was exercised over subordinate units nor was intelligence personnel selected for them.

d. At Fleet level (both surface and air) intelligence was additional duty assigned to the communications officer responsible only to the commanding officer of his fleet and this officer simply correlated available information for the immediate tactical use of his commander.

3. Personnel and Training.

a. At the outbreak of the war with the U S, there were 29 officers in the entire 3rd Department of the Naval General Staff and one in the Combined Naval Force. By spring of 1945, the total of officers had been increased to 97, of whom 42 were assigned to the 5th Section (American intelligence) of the Central intelligence department, and 4 to the Combined Naval Force. The increase was made possible by the surplus of naval officers, resulting from the decrease in the number of fleet units afloat. It occurred too late to be of benefit, however. The department was seriously undermanned throughout the war period, was barely able to perform the minimum functions assigned to it, and could take on none of the other functions of which it had cognizance and which are considered basic intelligence duties. (Within the 3rd Department the task of compiling all information about air units of the U S and Britain, technical, statistical, and order of battle, was the duty of one man.)

b. No estimate is possible of the total number of officers in the Japanese Navy in echelons below the Combined Naval Force who performed intelligence or related duties, since their assumption of the work was at the direction of the unit commander and was in addition to the primary duties by which they were listed in the table of organization.

c. Selection of intelligence personnel in the top command level was made, where possible, on the basis of proficiency in languages and experience abroad. In actual practice, officer assistants were frequently assigned because of an expressed preference for that type of duty or because they had been rejected for fleet duty due to a physical disability. (The 37 additional

officers assigned to the 5th Section in 1945 were newly graduated from the Naval Academy. Having no experience or training, however, they were useful only in preparing summaries based on U S broadcasts and in a statistical capacity. The ratio of regular officers to reserves was about 1 to 3.5 in the 3rd Department).

(1) In subordinate commands, the officer responsible for performing intelligence duties was given this additional duty at the discretion of the commanding officer of the unit. As has been stated, the communications officer was usually given the task, but not the title. Communications officers were said by Captain Ito of the Japanese Navy Personnel Division to have been selected for their aptitude in intelligence matters, providing their communications ability was satisfactory.

d. There were no intelligence schools operated by the Japanese Navy and no specific courses in general or basic intelligence were given in any navy schools, including the Naval Academy. In a few instances, officers in the 3rd Department had received foreign language training and some had been sent abroad for study, but not with a view toward fitting them specifically for the 3rd Department. Nowhere did it appear that there was any serious demand made for the initiation of a special course in intelligence training.

(1) Some specialized training was offered in certain activities relating to intelligence:

(a) In communications, essential technical instruction was given at the Navy communications school at Yokosuka.

(b) The communications school at Yokosuka also produced a personnel by-product known as Yomushi. They frequently were used as assistants to the communications officer or other officer who was designated to handle intelligence matters in subordinate commands, both surface and air. Yomushi were those students who had been dropped from code training because of lack of interest or aptitude but had been given sufficient training in administration to handle details and paper work. They received no intelligence training and were not highly regarded by the Japanese naval officers interrogated.

(c) Photo interpretation training was given to a small group of officers (30 had completed the course at the end of the war), but not to general intelligence officers.

(d) No training in flak analysis, recognition, or technical intelligence was given in preparation for intelligence work.

4. Functions.

a. 3rd Department Naval General Staff

(1) The principal function of the 3rd Department (intelligence) was to supply information to the 1st Department (war plans). This, together with communications intelligence (from the 4th Department) and information as to the tactical situation (from fleet units), formed the basis for estimates as to enemy capabilities and future intentions, formulated by the War Plans Department. The Intelligence Department did not participate in the making of plans or enemy predictions. Rear Admiral Takeuchi, chief of the 5th (U S) Section of the 3rd Department through most of the war period, said his section "never attempted to play the part of forecaster. We never attempted to reach conclusions, but we passed information on to those whose duty it was to deploy forces (war plans). I impressed my subordinates with this procedure." Enemy intelligence was forwarded to the 1st Department by a 3rd Department representative at daily conferences attended by naval personnel only and presided over by the Chief of the Naval General Staff. Written reports to War Plans, summing up the enemy situation, were furnished weekly by the 3rd Department early in the war, but became less frequent.

(2) Photo intelligence and flak intelligence were not considered functions of the 3rd Department and no direction whatsoever was exercised over such sporadic developments as were carried out in operational units. In turn, the 3rd Department did not receive information developed on these subjects except intermittently through contact with war plans.

(3) Dissemination of such intelligence information as was considered pertinent to fleet units was made by the 3rd Department. The nature of the information developed, however, was such that little of it was of value to units other than those engaged in top level planning. As such, the Combined Naval Force, through its intelligence officer (who was also chief of the communications section), received general information from the 3rd Department at irregular intervals. Urgent information to Combined Naval Force and fleets was sent by radio in the name of the Chief of Staff and was usually originated by the War Plans Department.

b. Intelligence Section, Combined Naval Force

(1) Although a separate section was set up for intelligence, the communications officer was head of both sections and received no officer assistants in intelligence until February 1944. Commander Nakajima, who served in that dual capacity from November 1943 until the end of the war, said his principal duty was "to make estimates of American or other Allied forces and to make deductions on their movements." His sources were the summary received from the Naval General Staff, which he described as "fragmentary and very general"; information developed by his own communications section; and that gained from access to all operational reports from subordinate units, including aerial and submarine reconnaissance which, he said, "was good, but there was not enough of it." Aerial reconnaissance was nevertheless his best source in making enemy movement estimates, in which the emphasis was on the immediate tactical situation. Photographs rarely reached Combined Naval Force, but information derived from them, when an interpretation was made at a subordinate unit, was received by dispatch.

(2) The intelligence section at Combined Naval Force level did not have charge of intelligence activities in subordinate commands, and did not disseminate its estimates either to subordinate units or to the Naval General Staff. Information and estimates were used solely by the Commander-in-Chief "to formulate policy and issue the necessary

orders."

c. Intelligence at Air Headquarters, Navy Ministry, consisted of technical intelligence developments and a brief program of training in recognition (conducted for only a year) in which 40 enlisted men and 215 officers each received about 2 hours training. At the conclusion of the course in 1943, 2 books were assembled containing silhouettes and data on Japanese and Allied ships and aircraft, obtained mainly from non-classified U S publications obtained in neutral countries; 5000 copies of each book were printed and distributed to lower echelons.

d. Summary of Functions. Nowhere among the top level commands (and certainly not in subordinate commands) was there a central agency for the collection of all intelligence, both operational and background. Without such a pool, statistical research and study for the purpose of deriving lessons from enemy tactics, use of equipment, and recommending counter measures, was impossible. Uniform dissemination was equally hopeless. Whether either could have been accomplished by such an agency without a supporting organization extending to the lower echelons is problematical. No effort was made in this direction and the concept was not held.

5. Sources of Information Available to the 3rd Department.

a. Communications intelligence was, in general, supplied by the 4th Department directly to War Plans.

b. Captured documents were sent directly to the 3rd Department and were considered the most accurate source of information, although limited in number.

c. Prisoner of war information was sent directly to the 3rd Department. This source, although discounted by all of the Japanese interrogated, contributed valuable information, as evidenced by the few Japanese documents recovered in which these interrogations were published as well as by the fact that certain data about U S forces, known to the Japanese, can be traced to no other source.

d. Technical intelligence was developed by the Naval Air Technical Arsenal under Air Headquarters of the Navy Ministry (chart 10).

e. Monitoring of U S and foreign news broadcasts furnished the 3rd Department with a great deal of information as to production, strength and losses, based on a careful analysis over a long period.

f. Study of newspapers and magazines obtained through neutral countries provided information which was too old to be of tactical use, but was depended upon in formulating long term estimates of U S strength.

g. Naval attaches proved one of the most prolific sources prior to the war but the flow dried up almost completely as diplomatic relations were severed. Attaches in Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, and Spain continued to supply delayed information obtained from newspapers and publications from America. The attache in Berlin furnished some information on German technical developments, but was considered unreliable, being over-influenced by the propaganda of the German militarists as to the weakness of the Allied position in the West.

h. Combat information from fleet (surface and air) units and reconnaissance reports (aircraft, surface, submarine) passed by chain of command to the War Plans Department and were only infrequently routed to the 3rd Department.

i. Liaison with other agencies was of minor importance to intelligence. No Navy intelligence officer acted in an official liaison capacity with the Army, although there was an occasional exchange of written information. Army operational intelligence, both land and air, was available to the Navy War Plans Department, but usually too late to be effective. Loose liaison was maintained with the Foreign Office and the Navy Ministry, but liaison was fairly close with Air Headquarters under the Navy Ministry, in the Technical Intelligence field. The latter contact was of assistance to the 3rd Department in preparing the enemy air order of battle. Within the Naval General Staff itself, a considerable lag developed in the exchange of information because of a wide physical separation of the departments and the breakdown of communications in the latter stages of the war.

j. Special service organizations and secret societies were of negligible value to the Navy. The Navy had no organization comparable to Tokumu Kikan (Army Special Service)(part VI). The existence of societies within the Empire which may have contributed information to the Navy as to the effect on the Japanese people of the conduct of the war, with a view toward preventing any interference, is outside the scope of this report.

6. Results.

a. Within the limits of the Japanese conception of intelligence, the mission of the 3rd Department, namely the production of intelligence background material as distinct from operational intelligence, was well done. In spite of a serious lack of

manpower, the tedious process of sifting through a mass of unrelated material to arrive at a series of facts or best guesses about the enemy was done with considerable success and accuracy. The Department was, further, very limited in its access to the most tangible and accurate sources, specifically reconnaissance reports, photographs, captured documents, and prisoners of war, because of the unfavorable military situation after the initial successes. Perhaps the best available evidence of the success of the 3rd Department is in the document "Organization of the U S Army and Navy Air Forces", dated March 1944, captured at Saipan, of which a translation was published in Cincpac-Cincpoa Bulletin 28-45.

7. Naval Air Forces.

a. The air arm of the Japanese Navy was not a separate entity, but depended upon the basic Navy channels for administration, supply and maintenance. The chain of command of the air and combined commands is indicated on the following page (chart 10):

b. In air units of the fleet below Fleet Headquarters, combat intelligence duties were secondary and usually haphazard, depending on the importance attached thereto by the commanding officer.

(1) Aboard a carrier responsibilities for briefing fell to the air officer. This designation applied to the commanding officer of the air group, who was not attached to the ship. In the event that a group was embarked on 2 or 3 carriers, the senior officer of the group aboard was so designated. In actual briefing he was sometimes replaced by the ship's captain and might be assisted by the weather officer, communications officer and Hikoshi (pilots temporarily grounded to assist in the operations and administration of the group). The briefing consisted of navigation data, method of attack, weather and communications. Available target information and target maps (if any) were given to pilots on the mission. Photographs were rarely available and almost never in a quantity sufficient to supply more than squadron leaders. No instructions were given pilots as to ditching procedure and no survival information was included in the briefing. No air sea rescue organization existed. Pilots forced down beyond easy rescue distance of surface vessels (usually construed to mean over the horizon) were on their own.

CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR JAPANESE NAVAL AIR



chart 10

(2) Two examples of carrier briefing in the Japanese Navy stand out in sharp contrast. For the attack on Pearl Harbor, instruction of pilots was begun far in advance of the mission. Pilots were given an approach chart, target chart and, in lieu of aerial photographs, a detailed drawing of the harbor and Ford Island showing the location of ships. This diagram was amended twice prior to the attack to conform with latest information. Briefing included specific target priority, attack formation and routine data (weather, communications, etc). The results of the attack and accuracy of damage assessment testified to the thoroughness of preparation. At the other

extreme, in the carrier attacks, in the Aleutians, pilots were sent out without maps or information about the target. Photographs taken on the first day's attack, however, were processed aboard and employed to advantage on the following day. The lack of proper briefing in this instance cannot be explained on the basis of the difficulty of obtaining advance target data. Countless similar examples of insufficient preparation must be attributed largely to a lack of a far-sighted appreciation of the advantages thus lost, to an over-emphasis on the attack, and to the familiar Japanese reliance on a timely spiritual intervention. A realization of these shortcomings by the Navy came too late to initiate a corrective program. The high-command level Japanese officers interrogated were unanimous in declaring this to have been a major weakness.

(3) Following a flight or mission, interrogation was conducted by the air officer, sometimes assisted by Hikoshi. The leader of the flight reported to the air officer in the presence of the other pilots and answered his questions, if any. A written report was then submitted, not by the air officer, but by the flight leader who had received no training in reporting and who apparently regarded it as a chore to be disposed of as easily as possible. Several Japanese who were interrogated as to this procedure stated that standard forms were used. From those which were recovered, however, there seems to have been little uniformity and treatment in the reports varied from good, in a few cases, to some so casual as to omit the number of friendly planes on the flight.

(4) No details whatsoever were included, in the reports recovered, to support claims of damage, and no confirmation was required (or included) of the number of enemy aircraft claimed to have been destroyed. The obvious result was a tendency to exaggerate greatly damage done to the enemy to a point where the figures submitted on combat reports were detrimental to future planning. Captain Ohmae of the Naval General Staff made this statement: "In cases of attacks on shipping, I took into consideration the type of target, the amount and weight of shells expended, the general attack situation and the

reliability of the witnesses. My evaluation of damage reported and losses sustained by shipping was ordinarily in the neighborhood of 50 per cent of the reported damage. My evaluation for the damage reported in the case of airplanes was 50 per cent when the total reported was 10 or below, 33 1/3 per cent for losses estimated from 10 to 50 and 25 per cent for 50 planes or above. In my opinion, even after these deductions, the reports were still exaggerated."

(5) The routing of combat reports from the field appears to have lacked uniformity. Commander Yokura of the 5th Section, 3rd Department, said "reports were by radio from the field. There were a few written reports, however, which came infrequently." Similar statements made at the Combined Fleet Headquarters level lead to the conclusion that written reports, except in unusual cases (e.g. in the case of a request for an award) were not sent above the level of the Fleet Headquarters, thus further limiting a profitable exchange of information among major fleet units.

c. Search and photo reconnaissance were regarded as the concern of operations in subordinate units, to be used to supply tactical data of immediate necessity and, as such, received little direction from higher commands. Captain Ohmae of the Naval General Staff, in a report which he prepared at the request of the Survey, wrote: "The Japanese Navy tried to make the best possible use of photographic intelligence, but could not carry out the program effectively because of the general failure of aerial fighting power and a bad custom of making light of reconnaissance before the war...From the beginning of the war until its termination the Imperial Navy was suffering from a shortage of reconnaissance planes (and) trained observer personnel." At the beginning of the war a few carrier planes were equipped with cameras, but the pilots had received no training in their use. Questioned as to the employment of the photographs so obtained, Vice Admiral Obayashi replied "I'm afraid we didn't use them for much of anything." (The pictures of Dutch Harbor taken on the first day's attack are the single notable exception cited in any of the interrogations.)

(1) Throughout the war period, despite a paper organization somewhat more impressive, the Navy had only 2 reconnaissance squadrons, both land based. All photo reconnaissance was done by these 2 squadrons, although the pilots had been given no special training in photography. Further limitations were

imposed by the extreme vulnerability of the planes used in the early stages of the war; the poor maintenance record of Myrt, reconnaissance plane used exclusively in the later stages; the lack of adequate fighter protection, and effectiveness of U S radar warning.

d. Photo interpretation was done at air fleet headquarters (there was one trained interpreter at each such headquarters), and dissemination of annotated photographs was restricted to the operating unit concerned with the target photographed. Information derived from the interpretation was dispatched to the Naval General Staff and Combined Naval Force. A program for training 100 additional interpreters to be assigned to all squadrons was brought about by squadron demand, a need for additional photographs of shipping targets at Okinawa and Iwo Jima for Kamikaze attacks, and a belated general realization of the importance of the work. The class was still in training at the end of the war. There was no attempt made to maintain a continuous photographic record of enemy base development and no photographic interpretation center to handle such a program, had it been attempted. By U S standards, the results achieved in aerial photographs and interpretation by the Japanese Navy were negligible.

e. Flak locations were, where possible, located from aerial photographs and the information was passed to the pilots. Some data on AA performance was sent down from the naval research laboratory but no analysis was made, at any level, by mathematical calculation of density depending on the course and altitude of the plane. No personnel were assigned to this task and no manuals, flak charts, or studies on the subject were used.

8. <u>Fleet Headquarters and Units Afloat</u>.

a. At fleet headquarters (surface), intelligence was an additional duty assigned to the communications officer. Such duty included the evaluation of operational intelligence and correlation of it with background material received from Combined Fleet, for the tactical use of the commanding officer of the fleet. Specific sources of operational intelligence were listed by Commander Otani, of the 2nd Fleet staff, as being: (1) radar, (2) monitoring of enemy transmissions, (3) aircraft reports, (4) submarine reports. Combined Fleet Headquarters supplied estimates of enemy intentions, changes in enemy organization and location.

b. In subordinate commands and individual surface units, the communications officer handled the relaying of intelligence except when a squadron flag was aboard. In that event an officer was assigned to the flag to perform intelligence duties. Action

reports were prepared by the senior staff officer of the squadron. Information to ships while underway consisted mainly of aerial sightings and the location of enemy ships and submarines.

9. Relationship of Intelligence to Operations Planning.

a. Naval operational plans generally originated either in the Naval General Staff or in Combined Naval Force Headquarters, and were drawn up after discussion by the heads of the two organizations. Within the Naval General Staff, responsibility lay with the 1st Department, organized as follows:

JAPANESE NAVY WAR PLANS ORGANIZATION



(Personnel shown are as required by table of organization. Due to concurrent office-holding of two posts by one officer, actual number assigned was about 20% less than indicated.)

Chart 11

b. Estimates of enemy strength, capabilities and intentions made by the planning group of the 1st Section were based on information from two major sources -- the 3rd (intelligence) and the 4th (communications) Departments of the Naval General Staff. Additional information was received direct from operating fleet forces by dispatch and from the Army as required.

c. During the early planning stages for important operations, all available information was brought together at meetings held by the 1st Department and attended by the heads of the 3rd and 5th Departments. It became the responsibility of the planning group of the 1st Department to make a comprehensive analysis of varying reports and produce the final estimate which was incorporated into the operation plan and submitted to Combined Naval Force Headquarters and, if approved, to the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

d. A simplified chart showing sources and information used in Navy operational planning is shown on the following page (chart 12).

e. Steps were taken to obtain the Navy Minister's agreement when operations were contemplated which involved the government's participation. When a contemplated operation was of great importance but did not exceed the scope of authority of the Chief of Naval General Staff, the order was issued in his name by direction of the Naval Staff, Imperial Headquarters; when the operation went beyond the authority granted the Chief of Naval General Staff by the Emperor, the plan was submitted to the Emperor for approval and then issued as an order of the Naval Staff, Imperial Headquarters.

f. The intelligence grist for day-to-day planning was supplied orally at daily conferences attended by department chiefs, and was supplemented by a weekly intelligence estimate published by the 3rd (intelligence) Department and given very limited distribution. At the daily conferences, the Chief of Naval General Staff usually presided, and a review of the general war situation based on latest dispatches was presented by the staff duty officer, who changed daily.

g. The relationship of the Naval General Staff and the Army General Staff in the conduct of war planning was mainly one of conference liaison, particularly on important plans, among key officers of both staffs. Matters conferred upon were presented to various high commanders and their instructions obtained. In highly important matters, the chiefs of the two General Staffs conferred directly with each other.

WAR PLAN INFORMATION SOURCES, JAPANESE NAVY



(There was a daily exchange of information between the 3rd and 4th Departments, both of which also received information sent by dispatch from fleet forces. Liaison on intelligence matters with the Army was achieved through semi-weekly meetings of department heads.)

chart 12

h. Liaison with the throne on operations was in the form of reports on important matters concerning the conduct of the war, such reports being presented after an agreement between the Army and Navy General Staffs had been reached. No decision was reached at these consultations.

V JAPANESE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1. Summary

a. While it is clear that a great deal of information was obtained by the Japanese from U S pre-war announcements and later from sources such as radio broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, publications, etc, their information in point of fact was oftentimes so elaborate, detailed, and of such a highly classified nature as to have come only through other channels, the more obvious of which are espionage, interrogation of war prisoners, captured documents, and communications intercepts. The following list is believed to contain, in the order of importance and reliability in the Japanese mind, their primary sources of information:

(1) Communications intelligence.

(2) Radio broadcasts from U S on both intermediate and short wave.

(3) Newspapers, magazines, periodicals, manuals, documents and technical publications.

(4) Reports from operational forces, including submarine reconnaissance, aerial visual reconnaissance, and photographic reconnaissance and interpretation.

(5) Conclusions based on tactical and strategic considerations.

(6) Deductions from enemy operations.

(7) Captured documents.

(8) Prisoner of war interrogation.

(9) Reports from attaches abroad.

(10) Technical intelligence.

(11) Information gained from Germany.

(12) Information gained from coastwatchers and natives.

b. This is a composite list made up from all sources available. No single agency or authority used all of them or, indeed, even listed all of them. It is considered natural that opinions should differ somewhat as to useful sources of information, and

especially is this considered true of their evaluation in order of importance. This list of twelve sources, however, is thought to be complete and accurate as to the channels available, or at least as to the ones used, by the Japanese in their intelligence work. If other sources were used, they were at best obscure, are now flatly and completely denied, and cannot be traced in any available records.

2. Communications Intelligence

a. It is clear that communications intelligence of all sorts was heavily relied upon by the Japanese as a fruitful source of information. That a really considerable effort was expended along these lines will be made clear by an examination of the organizations set up for this purpose.

b. Both the Army and the Navy had their separate organizations working on communications intelligence. The Navy's headquarters station was located at Owada and the Army's at Tenashi.

(1) Navy - Owada

(a) The organization of the special section (radio intelligence) of the 4th Department (communications) of the Naval General Staff, as of 15 August 1945, is shown on the following page (chart 13).

(b) This special section (Tokumu Han) in the Naval General Staff was an entirely separate administrative unit, answerable directly to the Chief of the Naval General Staff. It was Headed by Admiral Nomura who was also head of the 4th Department (communications). The executive officer of this unit, Commander Ozawa, Hideo, IJN, gave the following general statement with reference to the work of the Tokumu Han:

"Duties of the special section consisted of interception and analysis of Allied radio transmissions, and dissemination, by dispatch, of intelligence received in this manner to the proper activity for action when justified, otherwise by daily and periodic summary to the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff. Information judged to be of interest to the Army was relayed to the War Ministry.

RADIO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, NAVY GENERAL STAFF

Special Section, 4th Dept

RAdm Nomura, Head of Section
(Also Head of 4th Department)

1st Branch

General Affairs

Capt Amano (now dead)

Comdr Ozawa, Hideo

Lt Comdr and

1 reserve officer

2nd Branch

Code-Breaking Research

Capt Endo

Lt Comdr Satake (US & Britain)

Lt Comdr Nakatani (China)

Lt Comdr Funoto (Russia)

30 typists

Student trainees used upon emergency

3rd Branch

Owada Comm Unit

Capt Morikawa

Comdr and

10 reserve offcrs

120 communications personnel

(The Owada communications unit was an independent unit. Captain Morikawa had two duties - commanding officer of the Owada communications unit, and head of the 3rd Branch of the special section.)

chart 13

"The Special Section analyzed ship call signs, volume of communications traffic, routing of traffic, and RDF, and had limited success in predicting Allied operations by this means.

"Chief sources of information were air-to-air and air-to-ground transmissions by Allied forces which we were able to break some of the time, and strike reports of the B-29s. The practice of the B-29s adjusting radio frequencies prior to a raid often gave warning of an impending strike. The presence and transmissions of B-29 weather reconnaissance planes provided information by which the Japanese were 50 per cent successful in estimating the target areas to be attacked.

"The only information useful to the Special Section received from the Germans was the BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships) basic code. Use of this code permitted us to break shore-to-ship transmissions to merchant ships, and estimate volume of movement of ship traffic. It did not permit tracking, however, nor did it provide information on the exact geographic locations of individual ships."

(c) Transmissions received at Owada were broken down by area, and one officer with as many as 10 assistants was responsible for analyzing transmissions in each of the several geographic categories. In addition to volume, call signs, differentiation of codes, and precedence of traffic, analyzing was possible on the basis of operator and ship or unit characteristics. A peak of traffic volume indicated a "crisis" to the analysts at Owada, but did not tell where the crisis would materialize. A detailed explanation of the work of the Owada listening post, source of an appreciable amount of intelligence for Japanese Navy planners, is contained in the interrogation of Lieutenant Commander Satake, T., IJN, who was in this work throughout the war (USSBS interrogation 431, Jap Intel 33).

(2) Army - Tenashi

(a) The Japanese Army's organization for communications intelligence was no less thorough and, if anything, was even more extensive in its operation. Headquarters for this work were at Tenashi. At the conclusion of the war, according to a translated document titled "A Report on Japanese Army Intelligence, Summary of the Intelligence Activity of the Special Central Intelligence Department" 7 communications units doing interception and radio direction finding work were disposed in various places throughout the Japanese homeland from Sapporo, Hokkaido in the north to Fukuoka in Kyushu to the south. Translation of the document reveals the following information:

(b) The total number of messages intercepted averaged daily about 250 diplomatic and newspaper messages and about 200 U S military messages. Intercepted messages were dispatched by communication runners several times a day to headquarters. Urgent messages were sent directly to headquarters decoders by wire, printed form, or radio. When a communications unit was ordered to submit radio direction finding reports, radio was employed. It was also employed for transmitting orders to detached units based on forwarded intelligence. Partial decoding and monitoring groups were attached to distant detached units (Ono and Itakura villages).

(3) Decoding

(a) Strip and machine cipher systems of the American military codes could not be broken by the Japanese, but the 4-numeral codes could generally be decoded when in considerable quantity.

(b) American diplomatic codes could not be decoded. For the most part, the Japanese translated and utilized only plain language messages.

(c) Routine Chinese codes (heinen mitsu) used for diplomatic purposes, especially those used by foreign attaches in China, were decoded. The Aegis code used for diplomatic purposes could not be broken.

(d) Russia's Army and diplomatic codes in general use could not be solved. Earlier in the war, border garrison codes were decoded, but as these were improved toward the end of the war, they became much more difficult.

(e) French, Italian and other codes were partially broken.

(4) Results

(a) From decoding it was possible to get a clear picture of the situation in China centering around the Chungking government.

(b) As a result of monitoring, it was possible to get a fairly clear picture of the general scope and time of the Okinawa landings some two weeks before they happened.

(c) As a result of monitoring, it was possible to anticipate the B-29 raids on the mainland by about 6-7 hours and the P-51s by about 5 hours. Generally, accuracy of more than 70 per cent was obtained, but as the number of planes and the frequency of the raids increased, the problem became much more difficult for the Japanese.

(d) Since both the Army and the Navy depended to a great extent upon this type of information source, and since each had its own quite elaborate organization, it might be expected that there would have been a great deal of cooperation and productive liaison between the two. Such, however, was not the case. From interrogation of key personnel in each service it seems that the only effective cooperation - in fact the only liaison of any kind - was the occasional passing of copies by the one, which it thought would or might be of interest, to the other. The maximum possible effectiveness of communications

intelligence, carefully set up and operated by each service separately, was thus lost to the Japanese through a lack of coordination, which seems characteristic of their intelligence services.

3. Radio broadcasts from U S

a. U S radio news broadcasts also provided the Japanese with what they state to be one of their most fruitful sources of information. Rear Admiral Ono, IJN, who left the command of the BB Yamato in 1943 to head the 3rd Department (intelligence) of the Naval General Staff through April of 1945, listed such broadcasts as his "most useful" source of information "because it came in most quickly." Intermediate broadcasts for domestic consumption, he said, were more useful than short wave, although the latter proved useful to other General Staff intelligence officers, many of whom bore testimony also to the effectiveness of radio broadcasts as a source of information. The following is quoted from the interrogation of Commander Imai, IJN, who handled intelligence on North and South America:

> "Actually, radio news reports from all over the world, as we tabulated them, were the best sources we had. For example, we would hear of a conference between MacArthur and Nimitz in San Francisco, which would mean something important was coming up. Then we would hear of a conference in Pearl Harbor of front line commanders, and would try to estimate the direction of the next move.
>
> "Because of the censorship carried out by the U S, it was not possible to expect much value from information of temporary and short-lived nature, but we were able to make statistical survey by classifying information of all kinds received over long periods. We think it was sometimes possible to obtain material of value upon which to base our judgment. That was especially so in the case of broadcasts by intermediate waves intended for domestic consumption."

4. U S Newspapers and Other Publications

a. Another major source of information for the Japanese intelligence system was in U S newspapers, magazines, periodicals, documents and technical publications, second only in importance to communications intelligence and radio broadcasts, and rated by a number of interviewees as equal or even superior to those sources for "background" information. They were collected by seizure in

war zones and purchase in neutral countries. One of the more concise views of their use is expressed in the statement of Commander Imai:

> "Although they were of greater value than radio broadcasts in that their contents were more substantial, on the whole they did not reach our hands in time to be of much use in directing the war effort. They were, however, of value as material for checking the other information already received. Photographs of naval vessels and aircraft, especially among the material seized in war zones, proved valuable as technical reference material."

b. According to the statements of a number of highly placed intelligence officers in both the Army and Navy, procurement of U S newspapers and publications seemed to be one of the chief concerns of all diplomatic as well as naval and military attaches abroad for Japan. Their importance in another way was pointed out by Admiral Ono, head of naval intelligence, who said "good track was kept of technical developments through newspapers and magazines."

5. Reports from Operational Forces

a. Reports from operational forces and reconnaissance of all kinds were, of course, made use of by the Japanese, but in varying degrees and with varying degrees of effectiveness. Front line reports, according to Lieutenant General Arisue, G-2 chief at Army General Headquarters, were "considered to be reliable and accurate during and after the conflict." But reports of air losses, he said, were defective because of "the habit of reporting enemy losses as high and our losses as low, always", and it became necessary to rely on an estimate of their own attrition by "checking the large orders for parts and spares that came in...it was a very unfortunate way of doing things."

b. Aerial reconnaissance

(1) By our standards it would seem that the air reconnaissance of the Japanese left much to be desired. Especially did this become true as our attacks were pressed against them all along the line. It was not because of a lack of realization of the value of such reconnaissance. One of the more pertinent observations on this point comes from Commander Yokura, "air member" of Naval General Staff intelligence:

"I would have liked to have had more reconnaissance. I would have liked to have known the number of planes at Saipan, for instance. However, headquarters could not initiate reconnaissance. Reports from field units were scanty, and were in the form of dispatches on the number and types of planes. Little information came from bases which the U S attacked, due largely to breakdown of communications. I realized fully the lack of system in reconnaissance. I heard that the U S had special reconnaissance squadrons and thought it was a good idea. We could not put this into practice because of shortage of planes. I made some recommendations, but no attention was paid to them. I knew that the ideal source of information was reconnaissance, visual and photographic."

(2) This story of inability to properly perform aerial reconnaissance at the most vital periods is further borne out in even higher circles by Rear Admiral Tomioka, who became operations and war plans officer of the Naval General Staff in June 1944 after serving as commander, Southeast Area Fleet. Before the fall of the Marianas, as one example, despite a desire for extensive reconnaissance, the Japanese actually employed "relatively few patrols", Tomioka said. "Your Truk raid was a complete surprise; our reconnaissance was very spotty; many of our patrols failed to return. This was one reason we limited the number of our search flights." As another example, Tomioka cited the fact that after the loss of Okinawa, practically no regular patrols were flown out of the Empire "because we were unable to send them out; operational losses due to plane or pilot failure were high."

(3) A striking illustration of the ineptitude of Japanese reconnaissance came in October 1944, when the Second Fleet sortied San Bernardino Straits with such little definite knowledge of strength or position of our units that the encounter with the U S CVE force off Samar was, according to Commander Otani, operations officer, a "surprise". Elaborating, he said:

"We had no communications intelligence on this. We had some plane reports. In general,

we knew there were 3 striking forces off Northern Luzon, and we knew there was a BB group covering the landing. We got Army reports that there were 150 to 200 ships in the Bay, but we thought maybe 100 or less. Army reports were always much exaggerated and they could not identify ships correctly. We also knew there was a CVE force covering the landing, but we didn't know how many, probably 3 or 4."

c. Reconnaissance by submarine-borne aircraft

(1) Reconnaissance by submarine-borne aircraft was a somewhat novel device which seems to have produced few results. In February 1942, the I-17 completed a spot reconnaissance of the U S west coast areas. (This submarine, incidentally, was sunk in August 1943 off New Caledonia by Navy float-planes and a New Zealand escort vessel.) Sub-borne planes are believed also to have scouted New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. A captured operations order of the I-36 indicated a general plan of a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor during September and October 1943. Directions were "to proceed to the Hawaiian area to reconnoiter the enemy's condition, observe and attack his fleet and destroy his commerce." Although the sub commander was given considerable latitude in last-minute details, the over-all plan was carefully prescribed. The Jap plane attempting to survey Pearl Harbor at this time was caught by one searchlight battery near midnight on 16 October. Reported as a possible enemy float-plane, it allegedly dove towards the sea and was not again spotted.

(2) Admiral Tomioka felt that air reconnaissance was the more effective and said "submarines were unable to provide details."

(3) Another example of sub-borne aircraft and submarine reconnaissance is contained in an interrogation conducted by the Naval Analysis Section of the Survey (USSBS interrogation 97), a part of which is quoted here:

"As to intelligence of American forces, the Japanese Second Task Force (in the Aleutian campaign) had various reports from

submarine reconnaissance. From a position off the Washington State coast, a submarine had launched a reconnaissance seaplane which scouted the Seattle harbor and reported no heavy men-of-war, particularly no CVs there. About 30 May 1942 a similar plane launched from a submarine about 100 miles north of Dutch Harbor scouted that port and reported only a few small merchantmen present. This plane was damaged in landing due to the swells and could not make a scheduled reconnaissance on 3 June. Instead, Dutch Harbor was examined by periscope with a negative report on that date. Two other submarines were patrolling on a line south of Cold Bay; these made no sightings. A periscope reconnaissance of Kodiak was made about the end of May with a negative report. A submarine plane scouted Kiska about 25 May 1942 and reported no ships present. The submarine-borne planes maintained radio silence during their flights, with orders to break radio silence only if they were chased by American planes. All reports were made by the mother submarine. The submarine off Seattle and the one off Kodiak maintained station for some time. The only contact reported by the Kodiak submarine was that of sighting one large merchantman on a date which Commander Okumiya did not remember."

(4) Additional details on the Japanese use of submarine-borne aircraft for reconnaissance will be found in exhibit A.

d. Photographic Intelligence

(1) Judged by American standards, the Japanese use of aerial photography as a source of intelligence was still in its infancy at the end of the war. Japanese Army and Navy officers did not consider photography to be useful operationally beyond the immediate tactical phase, and apparently no effort was made to utilize photographs in planning or anticipating new offensives. The few officers who did realize the possibilities of photographic intelligence met with only small successes in their efforts to convince doubting superiors.

(2) Altogether a total of 18 Army officers, of whom 6 were considered competent, were trained in PI techniques; and only 30-35 Navy officers were actually assigned PI duties. Emphasis in training was placed upon the identification of airfield installations and defenses, the study of Allied base construction, and the recognition of aircraft and shipping.

(3) Both Army and Navy photo intelligence officers were attached primarily to air groups where they were concerned for the most part with airfield interpretation. Reports were meager and haphazard, coordination between air groups was nil, and liaison between the Army and Navy was lacking.

(4) The fall of Saipan marked a slight improvement in Japanese photo intelligence, for after that there was increased interest in the taking of photographs for the purpose of watching Allied ship concentrations and Allied base development. This increased interest was augmented by the fact that in the later stages of the war, photographs were one of the few sources of available intelligence concerning Allied operations.

(5) Even this increased recognition, however, did not result in any rapid advance of PI. Although the Japanese photo planes Myrt and Dinah were good, they were limited in number and trained pilots were lacking. The scarcity of PI endeavor at this time is evidenced by the fact that only 4 sorties were sent over Saipan and only 10 over Okinawa, and these were major PI efforts.

(6) Some 20 pictures were taken of the Pearl Harbor attack by portable cameras over the sides of torpedo and high level bombers. Useful information in the Aleutians landing was gained from aerial photo reconnaissance flown the day before the landing. But these two events represented the apparent "high" in Japanese aerial photo work.

(7) A more detailed report on the Japanese photo intelligence effort, prepared by the Photo Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS, in cooperation with the Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, is appended to this report (exhibit D).

6. Conclusions Based on Tactical and Strategic Considerations and Deductions from Enemy Operations

a. In a strict sense, the conclusions and deductions considered here may not embrace actual sources of information. However, since they are at least techniques if not actual sources, and since they were widely referred to in all discussions of intelligence by Japanese officers, they become a part of the broad intelligence picture.

b. An example of the use of these techniques by the Japanese and their importance in the Japanese mind appears in the interrogation of Commander Miyazaki, assistant to the chief of operations planning for the Naval General Staff. It was his opinion, he said, that the Allies would land in Southern Kyushu on either the east or the west coast, in either the Ariake Bay or Miyazaki areas (an opinion shared by the Army), and he explained that "this was a strategic decision. . .a judgement based upon no particular piece of information" but upon "the past experience of the war, particularly such a factor as the fact that as Kyushu was an island, air superiority could be obtained over it, it was almost without communications, particularly railroad communications, (and) it lay strategically between the main part of Japan and China."

c. In further explanation, Commander Miyazaki said the method of estimating movements of U S forces was "mainly common sense, by analysing previous movements of U S forces, by Japanese Army and Navy communications interceptions, and judgements out of what intelligence materials we had."

d. A detailed application of these techniques is found in a captured Japanese document, translated in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin 140-45 of 7 June 1945:

"The movements of the enemy task force which launched air attacks against the southwest portions of our main islands are not accurately known, but in view of the fact that it has been away from its home base for a long time, has suffered measureable losses at Iwo Jima, and has launched no attacks since 1 March, it can be inferred that the task force may have returned to Ulithi or the Marianas.

"It has been announced that Nimitz returned to Washington on 5 March and conferred with King. Since Halsey's participation was also announced it can be inferred with some certainty that a

conference on operations in the Pacific was held. Since statistics show that new operations occur from 20 days to one month after conferences on strategy are held, we must be on the alert during the end of March and early April, even though we do not know where the blow will fall."

The same document makes pointed reference to the fact that various Allied operations were begun from 20 days to a month and 15 days after significant conferences of Allied leaders.

7. Captured Documents

a. In many instances, the Japanese had information in great detail concerning our forces. While some of this obviously came from prisoners of war and other sources, captured documents provided significant intelligence material.

b. One of the more noteworthy results of this source was a Japanese document setting forth the organization of U S Army and Navy air forces, prepared by the Naval General Staff Intelligence Department and later captured by our forces at Saipan (CinCPac-CinCPOA Item 10,089). Although the report contains some errors and speculation regarding our strength, it is surprisingly factual and accurate in many respects and much more detailed than might be expected. It contains a list of carriers, text and charts on carrier squadron organization, estimates of plane complements, organization of patrol forces, Pacific Naval air forces, Naval Air Transport Service, Marine Air Corps, and similar material on Army air forces. Rear Admiral Takeuchi, whose section produced this document, was questioned at length regarding the sources used, brought out these points:

(1) That information for the detailed organization chart of the CV Saratoga, which was a part of the document, "must have come from captured documents." He added that the U S "roster of naval officer personnel would have given such information" but that he "would not have been able to compile such a list for a new ship."

(2) That while captured documents "and other sources of information" might pertain only to one squadron or one part of the ship's organization, such information over a period of time "enabled me, particularly in the case of older ships, to make ...detailed estimates."

(3) Among what he considered a very important

document captured by the Japanese during the war was one obtained by a Japanese ship during the Saipan operation which gave the complete organization, including air groups, of one of the task forces. "Such complete, large documents," he said, "were very rare."

(4) That after the air raids against the Empire began, "we got a great number of documents from planes shot down."

c. More complete examples of intelligence material which the Japanese military derived from captured documents is contained in exhibit A.

8. Prisoner of War Interrogation

a. Because of pending war criminal prosecutions in Japan at the time this survey was made, the testimony of high Japanese Army and Navy officers, discounting the value of information obtained from prisoners of war, is obvious. In contrast, many examples of valuable information obtained from prisoners is shown in detail, and the importance attached to this source, together with some background on techniques used, is made clear in exhibit A. The examples in the exhibit also make it evident that the importance given prisoners by the Japanese was not without justification and that this source provided a large and valuable amount of information.

9. Reports from Attaches Abroad

a. Army and Navy attaches and their assistants, as well as diplomatic representatives abroad accredited to the Japanese Foreign Office, are lumped together here as a part of the intelligence picture. Indeed, as far as the Navy was concerned, the "resident officer" system once occupied an important niche, albeit of negligible value during the war (part VI).

b. The degree of cooperation between diplomatic representatives and military attaches was not high, according to statements of Japanese familiar with both categories. The service personnel appeared jealous of their prerogatives in the military information field. Mr. Sone, for many years a top member of the Foreign Office, suggests that the low estate of intelligence in Japan was "due largely to the suspicion of Army and Navy attaches of the diplomatic agents abroad." On the other hand, Commander Miyazaki of the Naval General Staff war plans department, counters with the statement that reports from the Foreign Office "were useless...in operational planning" and "had no military value whatsoever."

c. Notwithstanding this intra-family hiatus, it seems clear that considerable intelligence of military value came to Imperial Headquarters through channels of representatives abroad, at least prior to the war. Moreover, during the war, such channels were the principal means of obtaining U S newspapers and other publications (paragraph 4, above) which were in themselves highly regarded as intelligence material.

10. Technical Intelligence

a. A rich source of information which was exploited by Allied forces with large organizations of trained and qualified personnel, the field of technical intelligence, was largely neglected by the Japanese. Although they were not unmindful of its value, an organization and effort paralleling that of the Allies is not to be found in the Japanese military.

b. The investigation of the technical intelligence field for this report was limited to the character, organization, and scope of the Japanese effort in the field of aviation; other aspects were the subject of investigations by the Air Technical Intelligence Group and by Navy Technical Mission Japan.

c. The Army's effort was centered in Air General Headquarters, Tokyo, and directed by a lieutenant colonel. Actual investigation was done at Tachikawa. Written reports on Allied aircraft received from various sources abroad (Germany, Allied technical magazines, etc) were digested at Tokyo and passed on to Tachikawa. Fresh intelligence was performed by technical officers assigned down to division level; results of field examinations were sent to Tokyo headquarters in writing, and equipment found was forwarded only when requested.

d. The Navy organization likewise was centered in Naval Air Headquarters, Tokyo, and the actual work carried out by the First Naval Air Technical Arsenal at Yokosuka, where technical intelligence was a collateral duty for those engaged in developing Japanese aircraft. Late in the war, however, a small unit of 3 officers and 12 to 14 men was created solely for technical analysis of Allied aircraft. The Navy made its own investigation of planes which crashed in the Homeland, but except for one technical mission to Burma early in the war, relied on the reports of the Army for information on planes captured or found elsewhere.

e. During the course of the war, the Japanese captured a P-40E and an A-20A, which were test-flown by the Navy, as well as a PBM, F2A, PBO, B-17D and B-17E, and a Hurricane, which were test-flown by the Army. An F6F was taken and test-flown at Okinawa, and many others were studied where they had crashed, a few being

sent to Japan for further analysis.

11. Information from Germany

a. Although Germany was a war-time partner of Japan, the geographical and physical differences of the two theaters of war lessened the value of intelligence received by the Axis member in the Pacific. The tactical intelligence from Europe, according to Japanese military leaders, was of little use for Pacific planning. Some strategic intelligence was obtained through Germany (exhibit A), but it was a minor source.

b. One major contribution, however, was in the field of communications intelligence. The Navy's special radio intelligence section, according to Commander Ozawa, a member of that section, received from the Germans the basic code of BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships), and thus was able to break "about 50 per cent of the messages transmitted from shore stations to Allied merchant ships."

c. A large amount of information was sent from Germany on technical matters; this, however, largely concerned new German developments rather than those of the Allies.

12. Information from Coastwatchers and Natives

a. The transitory nature of information obtained through Japanese coastwatchers and natives friendly to the Japanese relegated this source to usefulness only to commanders in the field, and such information rarely was of value at Headquarters planning level. Examples of such intelligence are appended to this report (exhibit A), and a discussion of the organization which tapped this source is included in the section on Kempeitai (part VI).

VI SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

1. Introduction

a. Beyond the scope and concept of Japanese Army and Navy operational intelligence, which has been the focal point of this study, there existed an intricate and somewhat fabulous system of intelligence embracing not only the military but also the political, commercial and cultural aspects of espionage and counter-espionage.

b. The most apparent organization within this system was that cloaked in the ambiguous title of "Special Service Organizations"--the Tokumu Kikan, admittedly a partner in Area Army intelligence functions; and the Kaigun Tokumu Bu, the counter-part which reportedly existed sotto voce in the Navy and, from all evidence, diminished in importance after the war began. On a parallel and sometimes conflicting basis under Army parenthood, the Kempei Tai was the Japanese Gestapo whose duties as military police ran the gamut from discipline to spying.

c. These organizations were confined, during the war, to the Asiatic theatre of operations; the Special Service Organizations were rampant in Manchuria, China, Burma, and the Philippines, and the Kempei in the Homeland and the Pacific battle zones. Their contribution to military operational intelligence with regard to the United States was a negative factor.

d. Far more nebulous were the countless "residents abroad" in official or commercial capacity, with or without portfolio, who contributed no little weight to the theory that every Japanese was an undercover agent of the Foreign Office. Such a theory is not, of course, based on fantasy. The Japanese philosophy of intelligence is such that the under cover school was more highly regarded than the operational methods as we understand them. There were Westerners and pro-Japanese sympathizers of other races who added credence to this philosophy.

e. Because of this feeling, it is not strange that some Japanese military leaders, in recognizing the success of American military intelligence, attributed such success to methods they themselves idealized. The Navy General Staff, according to Rear Admiral Tomioka, its war plans officer, thought the Allies had "some fifth columnists or spies" on Okinawa prior to our landings there; "we caught some suspects", he said, "but we were not able to determine conclusively that they were your agents." Another General Staff officer -- Commander Imai, member of the 5th section of the intelligence department -- observed that "in theory, the U S method (guerillas, etc) in the Philippines is the ideal"

method of obtaining intelligence.

f. It is the purpose here to examine these so-called "Special Service Organizations" and related intelligence activities in the light of their contribution to military operational intelligence. Investigations of a more detailed nature have been or are being conducted in the Japanese theatre by the Counter-Intelligence Section, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Pacific, and by other interested agencies.

2. Tokumu Kikan and Tokumu Bu

a. The activities of the Japanese Army's Tokumu Kikan -- and its reported Navy equivalent, Tokumu Bu -- were as flexible as the title itself: Special Service Organization or Department. In usage, the terms stand for any organization that is carrying out special work for the military services without actually being a formal part of the military framework; this special work may be military government or liaison duties, and intelligence may be a full-time mission or a collateral issue.

b. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the SSO was the "supreme authority for all long-range intelligence activities of the Japanese government", according to a special report of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, GHQ, AFPAC, issued 20 August 1945. This report also credits the SSO with being the nucleus for a wide network of agents throughout the world in the period from 1937 to 1941.

c. There is no other evidence, however, to connect the SSO with long-range intelligence or with the foreign agents operating under the guise of assistants or clerks in consulates and embassies, as students, or employes of commercial firms operated or subsidized by the Japanese government. During the war, the SSO appeared on the surface only in Asia and there in the roles previously defined.

d. A certain amount of mystery enshrouded the Special Service Organizations. Those who dared speak of it in Japan, or in the field, for that matter, did so at the risk of arrest. Army headquarters never asked Tokumu Kikan for anything directly, but asked the area army for information; if the area army went to Tokumu Kikan, Tokyo headquarters looked the other way. This attitude was carried to the extent that few knew the identity of those engaged in Tokumu Kikan duties. Says Takeo Araki, a Japanese newspaperman with a professed intimacy with the SSO and its workers:

"No records were kept; it was the rule to pass on the names of these secret agents to one's successor, but, of course, this was sometimes unintentionally or intentionally forgotten. This made it rather difficult for the men to continue."

e. The Navy attitude toward the SSO was far more elusive than that of the Army. Those in the General Staff and in other key positions who were questioned about Tokumu Bu exhibited either complete ignorance or studied surprise about the whole matter. There is evidence, however, that a Navy SSO existed in various forms -- resident officers, wireless intelligence, etc -- but not on the scope of the Army's organization. There is a possibility it existed in the Navy on a wide scale prior to the war, but after Pearl Harbor it was a minor consideration.

3. The Army SSO

a. Liaison, Incidents, Intelligence

(1) Organization and activities of the Tokumu Kikan in the Japanese Army varied according to the area in which it was working. The character of its operations varied according to the character of its commanding officer. Often the Tokumu Kikan might not bear that exact title: sometimes it was known simply as Kikan preceded by the name of the area in which it operated or the name of the man in command, and sometimes as Renraku Bu (liaison department) or some similar innocuous nomenclature.

(2) But it seems clear there was no direct control at Tokyo high command level except to send to the area concerned a regular Army officer of field grade or better to organize and command the SSO in the field. In some cases, picked Army officers and Imperial civilian appointees who had given up family, name and identity for the cause, went along with the SSO commander to his post in the field. But once there he was free to chose the bulk of his organization from the Japanese and native population in the area, and to operate as he saw fit.

(3) Broadly sketched, the scope of Tokumu Kikan in the Army covered espionage and intelligence, propaganda, and liaison with and supervision of the provisional or puppet government in the area concerned.

Fifth column duties involving sabotage and conveniently arranged "incidents" were a part of the agenda. Army officers familiar with SSO work insist that tactical intelligence was not a major duty, although it was inevitable that some should reach the hands of the SSO and be passed along; other sources lend credence to this statement except in the case of the Kwantung Army's Tokumu Kikan, which was a major source of all forms of intelligence about Russia.

(4) Inasmuch as it is impossible to examine any one Army Tokusu Kikan and label it as typical, those on which detailed information is available will be outlined here with emphasis on their relationship to operational intelligence.

b. Kwantung Army: The Border Patrol

(1) The outstanding example of operational intelligence performed by the Tokumu Kikan was its work with the Kwantung Army. There, on the border of a nation with whom an uneasy peace treaty existed, Tokumu Kikan relinquished most of its normal duties of military government to become the principal intelligence unit for the Army, and changed its name as well, assuming about three years ago the title of Johobu (intelligence department).

(2) Its 50 officers and non-commissioned men and 150 civilians in the central office at Harbin, plus 35 officers and non-coms and 80 civilians in 12 branch offices, had the same detached relationship with Army General Headquarters in Tokyo as any other Tokumu Kikan: GHQ knew they were there, but neither supervised nor worked with their organization.

(3) This laisser-faire policy toward the SSO is accented in a report on Tokumu Kikan issued by the Japanese War Ministry at the request of SCAP and translated by ATIS. Of orders issued the Kwantung SSO it says:

> "Although there was an order from Grand Imperial Headquarters to the Kwantung Army regarding strict observation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the nature of the order presented to the Intelligence Bureau

(sic: Tokumu Kikan or Johobu) by the Kwantung Army is uncertain. However, it is presumed that the Kwantung Army also gave the above orders to the Intelligence Service Bureau."

(4) That the Tokumu Kikan in Kwantung was in fact the intelligence organization of the Kwantung Army, as stated by Lieutenant Colonel Asai, a GHQ staff intelligence officer familiar with its work, is by no means hard to understand. Long before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Army concept of action was war with Russia; Army intelligence activities were concentrated toward that concept, and increased rather than diminished after hostilities began in the Pacific.

(5) In its Kwantung role, the Tokumu Kikan furnished Army General Headquarters with a continuous flow of information on order of battle, strength and disposition of Soviet forces, and intelligence on Russia's internal situation. The flow was not via direct channels. Printed reports were made by the Kwantung Army on the basis of Tokumu Kikan investigation, at weekly and monthly intervals (just prior to complete breakdown of relations with Russia, the weekly report was supplanted by a 10-day report). Other spot reports of significance were sent by radio from Kwantung Army Headquarters, either on the basis of information gathered independently by the Tokumu Kikan, or in response to requests from Army General Headquarters; such requests were not addressed to the Tokumu Kikan, but to the Army.

(6) Sources of information utilized by the Kwantung ~~SSO~~ were (a) <u>espionage</u>, which gradually became restricted almost totally to the Manchurian side of the border; (b) <u>observation</u> from high points along the conveniently-located border railroad and along the harbor close to Vladivostok; such observations, according to Lieutenant Colonel Asai, were "often considered sufficient on which to form a judgment as to Russian intentions"; (c) ~~captured~~ <u>Russian spies</u> (100 were taken in 1941, for example), interrogation of whom made it "possible to assess the situation of the Soviet Army pretty clearly"; (d) <u>newspapers, magazines, and captured documents</u>, analyzed at headquarters.

(7) Selection of personnel to perform these duties, insofar as the military were concerned, was from young officers from the Academy or from those in the Kwantung Army with a high degree of intelligence and a knowledge of Soviet affairs. Training was at Chinkio, headquarters of the Kwantung Army. Uniforms for military personnel were optional, depending on the job of the moment; civilian agents never wore them.

(8) Despite its scope, the intelligence received from this organization was "not nearly satisfactory," if Lieutenant Colonel Asai's opinion can be taken for that of Army General Headquarters, where he specialized in Soviet intelligence. For the record, he offered this as an estimate based on reports of the Kwantung SSO: That the Soviet would go to war against Japan in the early part of November 1945, based on developments at the Potsdam conference and on movements and disposition of Soviet troops along the border; that the blow would come north of Vladivostok, and that the Soviet had 5800 aircraft ready for use against Japan.

c. <u>China: Government and Information</u>

(1) The role of Tokumu Kikan within China proper can be divided into three phases. At the outset, when no Japanese forces were present except those on garrison duty, its duties were primarily those of collecting intelligence through whatever guise was necessary. After the "China incident" in 1937, the SSO in China was charged, to quote the War Ministry, "with the supervision, aid and revival of the peace preservation organs (and) simultaneously...with the collection of intelligence materials." In 1942, under the "Basic Policies Toward China" directive of self-administration (i.e. puppet government), the SSO bowed out of the picture as Tokumu Kikan, only to reenter as Renrakubu (liaison department). But Tokumu Kikan remained the best-known title.

(2) On the basis of available information, it would be impossible to estimate the number of military and civilians engaged in SSO work in China. It functioned, as elsewhere, without control from Tokyo but under the control of the Area Army,

with Tokumu Kikan units attached, in independent fashion, to armies, divisions, and independent brigades. At division, or independent brigade level a colonel and lieutenant colonel headed the detachment of from 11 to 35 enlisted men and civilians in four sections -- administrative, government liaison, economic and political, and intelligence. The latter consisted of one lieutenant and 5 to 10 enlisted men.

(3) Functions of the China SSO, according to Lieutenant Colonel Yamazaki, member of the China section of Army General Staff intelligence, were to assist the Army in governing the population, to insure food and medical care for the civilian population, and to obtain information as to the attitude of the people. Thus, when Tokumu Kikan changed its name in 1942-43, its personnel "became a sort of liaison pool between the Japanese and the Chinese troops friendly to them", and performed military government functions.

(4) A further discussion of Tokumu Kikan duties in China was obtained from Major General Harada, chief of the Nanking Branch of Tokumu Kikan under the 13th Army, which was in turn under the China Expeditionary Force. Basic policy, he states, was set (in his case) by the 13th Army, and if there was direction from Tokyo, he professed ignorance of it. The main function was government "physical welfare of the Chinese" and "the education and indoctrination of the Chinese."

(5) But according to General Harada, the Tokumu Kikan merely saw that these functions were carried out. The Chinese police and the Haontai, a special organization of the puppet government, did the actual work. As to undercover agents, espionage, and counter-espionage, says the General: "No such thing was done in China (by the Tokumu Kikan). We did receive some information of possible military value from the prefectural branches, the police, Chinese people. ..The type of information I got was the kind that General MacArthur is now getting -- the attitude of the people, the cooperation of the leaders, and the activity of our own Army, etc. Purely military matters did not concern the Tokumu Kikan and apprehension of spies was purely the responsibility of the Chinese."

(6) The metamorphosis of Tokumu Kikan into a "liaison department" in 1942-43, however, would seem to have increased, rather than diminished, its importance. Organization and internal command channels remained the same, but after the change no Japanese agency could deal with the Chinese except through Tokumu Kikan.

(7) Although no conclusive evaluation of the contribution of Tokumu Kikan in China to Japanese operational intelligence can be made on the basis of information forthcoming from the Japanese, it is self-evident that the contribution was worthwhile. An organization with as firm a hold over puppet Chinese leaders working to remain in its graces as was enjoyed by Tokumu Kikan would have little trouble in finding out what was in range of puppet eyes and ears. This was undoubtedly good reason for the attitude of the Army General Staff, which, as with SSOs in other areas, was not to ask the Tokumu Kikan directly for information, but to request the commanding general of the area to get it "from intelligence sources available to him."

d. <u>The South: Liaison, Infiltration, Assassination</u>

(1) Details of the Tokumu Kikan picture begin to fade in the Southern regions of Japan's domination.

(2) In Burma, the Army Tokumu Kikan, usually headquartered at Rangoon, sometimes was known as the Kawashima Force, sometimes as Minami Kikan or Kikari Kikan. The latter is sometimes identified with the Japanese Navy. There were numerous other Kikans embellished with geographical names or the names of their leaders.

(3) The Japanese War Ministry document prepared for SCAP groups such activities under the head of "our liaison organization in the Provisional Independent Indian Government", with approximately 90 officers and civilians heading up the 8 headquarters sections and the 3 branch bureaus in Malay, Thailand and Saigon. (Only "high-ranking officials" were tabulated in the Japanese figures, which counted a headquarters intelligence section of 4 officers and 4 civilians.)

(4) At least 5 Kikans are identified in the Burma, or Southern, area by South East Asia Command and India Command in its Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 179 of 6 April 1945, although it seems possible these could be off-shoots of a central organization.

(5) Basic duties of the Kikan were "conduct of intelligence warfare against India, Indian Troops, and Indians in the Far East", according to SEAC. But independence of action and scope was the rule among the satellite Kikans. The term "military activities" embraced employment of local natives for assassination of important Allied persons and for sabotage, and to infiltrate "static and mobile agents behind our lines", using among others, women, Budhist priests, traders and small boys as operatives. Fruits of these endeavors did not appear great. Captured documents show that in the summer of 1944, the local Kikans were having difficulty in "obtaining safe infiltration routes" for their agents, in shortage of funds, in morale, and in the high rate of desertion among the native hirelings.

(6) Japanese officials in Tokyo familiar with the Army Tokumu Kikan lacked knowledge of its existence in areas other than Manchuria, China, and Burma. In New Guinea, for instance, its duties are reported to have been handled by the Kempei Tai, as described later in this study, and no evidence has been found to the contrary. In the Philippines, however, captured documents disclose the presence of Kikans in the Luzon area, with at least 3 organizations -- Nammei, Kirishima and Takesaki -- identified.

(7) Once again, evidence on which to evaluate the contribution of the SSO activities in the Philippines is lacking, although a fairly complete picture of such operations during Japanese withdrawal can be obtained. The examples below are taken from the Nammei Kikan Operation Order No. 1, dated 20 January 1945 at Manila, as quoted by the AFPAC special report:

> "Japanese counter-intelligence activities within Manila before and after occupation by the Allies (which the SSO Operation Order

apparently assumed as a foregone conclusion); communications by wireless and runners, with emphasis, after occupation, on military intelligence to facilitate fifth column activities.

"Extermination of 'extreme pro-Americans while carrying out political, economic and idealogical fifth column activities' prior to Allied penetration; disruption of the 'enemy's rear' after occupation, by military, economic and psychological sabotage.

"Collection of information, prior to occupation, by arrest of 'infiltration agents and (sic: Allied) fifth columnists' betrayed by 'dancers and entertainers'; by interrogation of captured air personnel -- 'men will be instructed not to kill the prisoners of war'; by captured documents; by 'arrest and interrogation of persons with pro-American tendencies and persons caught-eavesdropping"; by guerilla activities in Manila and environs.

"Collection of information, after penetration by the Allies, on the 'military and political situation and the state of pacification within the city', such information to be transmitted by mobile wireless station left behind; on the military situation, especially airfields, harbors, ships, communications, etc, such information to be presented in the form of sketches and transmitted, apparently, by runner network."

4. <u>The Navy SSO</u>

a. Whatever the Japanese Navy had in the way of a counterpart of the Army's Special Service Organizations during the war was limited in scope and in intelligence value.

b. The Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, GHQ, AFPAC, in its special report, previously referred to herein, cites an SSO supervised by the Imperial Navy and usually listed as Kaigun Tokumu Bu (Navy Special Service Department). The report adds: "The various Navy SSO's in the field, such as the South China SSO and the Burma SSO, are normally headed by a rear admiral or captain. All SSOs in the field answered directly to the Naval General Staff in Tokyo and the respective geographic section of the Intelligence

Division."

c. The Navy also is identified, in the AFPAC report, with a Special Service Organization in the Homeland, conducted as a foreign affairs section of city police departments. Officers on this duty wear civilian clothes, even in wartime, and on the basis of information available, would appear to have duties similar to our own Naval Intelligence within the United States.

d. A further description of the Navy's SSO activities during the war was given by Mr. Sone, of the Foreign Office: "The Navy did not have a Tokumu Kikan in various places, but had a kind of Tokumu Kikan or Resident Officers' Bureau in important places, such as Shanghai, Peking, and Rangoon, I believe. Activities were not so extended in general as those of the Army Tokumu Kikan. The Navy (SSO) was primarily concerned with liaison between themselves and the Naval landing parties or naval units in their area. They collected information, and so forth. They were not keen on administration like the Army, which interfered very often with the administration of the local Chinese government."

e. A brief report submitted by Lieutenant Commander Hino, a liaison officer between the Japanese Navy and USSBS, identifies a Tokumu Bu in China which was disorganized after the occupation of China by the Japanese; a Hainan Tokumu Bu which existed during the war for government and "peace intelligence" of Hainan Island; and resident officers (Kaigun Zaikin-Bukan) at Shanghai, Nanking, Peipin, Hankou, Amoi and Kwangton who were under partial command of fleets in the area for "business work on land" but were under direct command of the Chief of Naval General Headquarters for intelligence work.

f. The one indication of Navy SSO activities on a plane with those of the Army's Tokumu Kikan is forthcoming in an interview with Rear Admiral Chudo, a former member of the Naval General Staff who became Naval Attache at Rangoon when Burma was granted "independence" and in February 1945 was assigned as liaison officer with the Southern Army. In his report, issued by Headquarters, South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, on 5 October 1945, Admiral Chudo describes the Hikari Kikan (also reported as an Army organization; see above) as the intelligence organization in the Southern Areas which preceded the Indian Provisional Government. Although there is a possibility that, because of his liaison duties with the Army, he is referring to an Army organization, his reference to dates would indicate working knowledge of the Kikan prior to his affiliation with the Southern Army. As for results, he says "information of operational value was extremely scarce and of what there was, some had been sent by the British in the names of our agents that they had interned, and some was sent by agents