

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

10 (14) (c)

22 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstie, USN.

Subject: USSBS Report Entitled "Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence",
Comment on.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Review of Japanese Intelligence by Navy Section, JSC.

1. Subject report is returned herewith as Enclosure (A). The following comments and Enclosure (B) are submitted as of possible assistance in preparation of final subject report.

a. Page 1, para 2 c (2) - Suggest insertion of "news" before "broadcasts".

b. Page 3, para 2 g - The Japanese are not considered to have "achieved considerable success" in estimating enemy capabilities and intentions. General estimates were fairly accurate; that is, they did well when they recognized the approximate area of the next assault and estimated within two weeks to a month of the target date. When they arrived at such estimates, however, it was usually too late for strategic defensive action and hence the estimates cannot be termed "successful" for the purpose required of estimates.

c. Page 3, para 2 h - The last sentence implies that coordination of Army and Navy intelligence effort was more effective outside of communications. (See subparagraph 3 a (3), page 5, which contradicts this inference.) Suggest that the last sentence of paragraph 2 h could be deleted.

d. Page 3, para 2 i - Reconnaissance was fairly good in the early stages of the war. The development and employment of aircraft carrying submarines indicates that reconnaissance was recognized as a necessity. Other types of reconnaissance which might be mentioned in this paragraph include: coastwatchers, patrols, and native scouts and observers.

e. Page 3, para 2 k - Believe this paragraph should be entitled "Air Technical Intelligence", or include information on other types of technical intelligence or a statement on the reason for the lack of same (such as "After 1942, the Japanese spent most of the war retreating; hence, captured U.S. or Allied equipment was limited for the most part to shot-down aircraft".)

Other air technical intelligence used by intelligence sections included effective operating ranges of various types of aircraft.

f. Page 9, para 1 b - The next to last sentence is not clear. If this sentence refers to quality of the Japanese estimates on all Allied landings after the Gilbert operation and prior to the Iwo Jima landing, it is not substantiated by the statements contained in Chapter VII of this report. The best estimate made by the Japanese appears to be that concerned with the Iwo Jima landing. There was only one Allied operation, Okinawa, after Iwo Jima, and their estimate for it is not considered as accurate as for Iwo Jima. Therefore, the last sentence of paragraph 1 b is considered misleading.

ld¹

Evaluation of Army-Navy-Marine Air
Intelligence in the Pacific War

(Unpublished Report)

U. S. STRATEGIC
BOMBING SURVEY

AIR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION
SECTION, G-2

EVALUATION OF
ARMY-NAVY-MARINE
AIR INTELLIGENCE
IN THE
PACIFIC WAR

SECRET