CTG 77.1
ACTION • • • REPORT

FOUNDED FREEDOM

EVACUATION OF ALLIED POW
FROM FORMOSA

139235 29 AUGUST — 9 SEPTEMBER 1945
From: Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-SEVEN (CTG 77.1) 
To: Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES Fleet. 
(1) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
(2) Commander in Chief, PACIFIC Fleet.

Subject: Report of Evacuation of United Nations Prisoners of War 
from FORMOSA (Taiwan), 29 August to 9 September 1945.

References: 
(a) PacFleet Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45 of 1 January 1945.
(b) Com7thFleet Dispatch 010140.
(c) Com7thFleet Operation Order 3-45.
(d) ComCarDiv 27 Operation Order 2-45.
(e) ComCarDiv 27 Operation Order 3-45.
(f) EscFor Instructions (TFI-1A).

Enclosures: 
(A) Subject Action Report. p. 6
(B) Annex "A" to Subject Action Report. p. 15
(C) Annex "B" to Subject Action Report. p. 17

1. Task Group 77.1, while proceeding in company with minesweepers 
from Leyte to Korea, was diverted to North Formosa to aid and evacuate 
POW before the occupation. On arrival near Klirun at 03001 5 September in 
the wake of a typhoon, two (2) DEs were detached for entry into the harbor. 
From daybreak on, aircraft patrolled, reconnoitered and dropped messages, and 
finally at 10001 began to supply POW from Matsuyama Field. The two (2) DEs 
returned in the evening with 312 evacuees. The remaining movable POW were 
evacuated by DEs the next day. At 23451 6 September the Task Group departed 
for Manila with eleven hundred and sixty (1160) liberated men.

2. The subject action report, consisting of Enclosures (A) 
through (C), is forwarded herewith.

D. KETCHAM

D. KETCHAM
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWENTY-SEVEN

FB2-27/A16-3(5)

Serial: 043

C/O Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
9 September 1945


Subject: Report of Evacuation of Allied POW from Northern Formosa
29 August to 9 September 1945.

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CTF-74
ComCarDiv-22
USS BLOCK ISLAND
USS SANTEE
ComCortDiv-57

(1)  (3)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (1)
PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

A. This action report covers the period from 29 August to 9 September 1945. In this period TG 77.1 proceeded from San Pedro Bay, Leyte, P.I., northward to vicinity of Okinawa and was then diverted to Kiirun, Formosa. Here its planes and ships participated in the evacuation of and provided medical care for twelve hundred and eighty-one (1281) Allied POW from Japanese POW camps in northern Formosa. Eleven hundred and sixty (1160) Allied POW were transferred in TG 77.1 to Manila; one hundred and twenty-one (121) were evacuated to Taihoku, and there placed under the care of British TG 111.3.

PART II - PRELIMINARIES

A. Composition of TG 77.1 follows:

TG 77.1  Air Support Cover Group - Rear Admiral D. KETCHAM, USN. (Commander Carrier Division 27).

TU 77.1.1  Carriers - Rear Admiral D. KETCHAM, USN. (Commander Carrier Division 27)*

(CVE-106) BLOCK ISLAND (F)
(CVE-29) SANTÉE

*Captain J. V. PETERSON, USN, in USS SANTÉE, Second in Command.

TU 77.1.3  Screen - Comdr. D. E. JOHNSON, USNR. (Commander Escort Division 57)**

(DE-326) THOMAS J. GARY (F)
(DE-327) FRISTER
(DE-328) FINCH
(DE-329) KETCHAM


TU 77.1.2  (AO-78) CHEPACET***

***Task Unit 77.1.2 joined 1 September and departed 3 September 1945.

B. TG 77.1 was originally ordered to provide air cover for TG 71.2 minesweepers along the route through the East China and Yellow Seas to Jinsen in the Keijo Area. This region was to be subsequently occupied by U.S. Army Forces. Enroute TG 77.1 was diverted from this mission and ordered to make air drops of food and medical supplies to POW in northern Formosa and to effect their evacuation as quickly as possible.
C. From the time of leaving San Pedro Bay 29 August until arrival off 
Kiurun, Formosa, this Task Group conducted flight operations daily 
as necessary except when prevented by weather. Then it maneuvered 
to clear the several area of the typhoon and to support the small 
craft of TG 71.2 until danger was no longer imminent.

PART III - CHRONOLOGY

A. At 1330I 29 August 1945, TG 77.1 sortied from San Pedro Bay, Leyte, 
P.I., enroute to the Jinsen area of Korea. Enroute to rendezvous 
and while operating in company, this Task Group furnished the best 
aerological information available to TG 71.2 to assist in avoiding 
the typhoon center. On the 30th routine LCAP and IASP sorties were 
flown. From 31 August through 4 September air operations were suspended 
due to heavy seas caused by the typhoon. During this period TG 77.1 
steamed various courses and speeds to escape the heart of the typhoon 
area. At 9300I 1 September TG 77.1 rendezvoused with TU 77.1.2 
consisting of the CHEPACHET, escorted by the WALTON. The AO joined 
TG 77.1, the DE proceeding on duty assigned to Okinawa. At 1630I 
the BLOCK ISLAND pulled out of formation and steamed down in order 
to facilitate an emergency appendectomy. At 1845I TG 77.1 rendez- 
voused with TG 71.2 in Lat. 25°-20' N., Long. 127°-40'E. For the 
remainder of the day and 2 September both groups proceeded on courses 
from N to NE, later shifting to SE to avoid the typhoon center. The 
disturbance center was 300 miles west moving in a northerly direction 
and showing indications of re-curving to the NE. Slow speeds were 
necessary to keep in company with TG 71.2. On 3 September TG 77.1's 
mission to Korea was cancelled and it was ordered by Com7thFleet 
to proceed to northern Formosa to evacuate as expeditiously as 
possible all POWs in that area.

At 0700I 3 September 1945, the CHEPACHET was detached from TG 77.1 
and directed to report to CTG 71.2 which then proceeded to Okinawa. 
At 1200I TG 77.1 set course for the Kiurun Area, Formosa. By 4 
September the sea had calmed somewhat and this Task Group spent the day 
preparing food and medical supplies and planning the best means of 
dropping them to the POWs. At 1500I Colonel A. D. COOLEY, USMC, and 
a landing party of Marine and Navy medical personnel of the BLOCK 
ISLAND, transferred to the GARY to depart the next morning for Kiurun 
Harbor to initiate POW evacuation.

Before dawn on 5 September planes from this Task Group took off for 
Kiurun and Tachiku. Since there had been no prior communications 
whatever with anyone on Formosa, one of the primary missions was to 
make message drops (see Annex A) in strategic places such as Admin- 
istration buildings near Kiurun Harbor, Matsuyama Airfield and POW 
camps. The purpose was to inform the Japs that we intended to land 
and would demand the utmost cooperation. These messages were expertly 
dropped by Captain James SECREST, USMC, who saw some of them picked 
up by the Japanese. As will appear these messages helped to pave the 
way for our entry. In addition our planes made a show of force, photo- 
graphic runs, reconnaissance of the entire area and covered the 
escorts.
At 0300 5 September the GARY with the KRETCHMER proceeded to Kirun Harbor with the Marine detachment and corpsmen transferred on 4 September. During their approach they were covered by planes searching for mines; four were sighted and two destroyed. Reconnaissance and photo planes reported Mutsuyama Airfield operational and also spotted three POW camps, No's 1, 4 and 6 in the Taikoku area. It was then determined to run the risk of landing one of our planes at Mutsuyama Airfield to establish liaison ashore as quickly as possible. At 1000 Captain Dick JOHNSON, USMC, accomplished this mission in a TBM-3 carrying staff liaison officer Major Peter FOLGER, USMCR, who was met by the Japanese Commander of the airfield. A car was immediately commandeered and he was driven to the prison camps to determine the most urgent needs of the POW. This information was flown back to the Flagship by one of the F6F's covering Captain JOHNSON's landing. In short order planes loaded with proper medicines and food were landing on Mutsuyama Airfield. 9500 pounds were delivered during the day.

In the meantime, radio contact with Jap Navy Radio Kirun was established by the GARY. A harbor pilot was ordered to meet the ships. The Japanese local Commanding Officer was commanded to be present ashore. Both of these demands were complied with. This was none too soon as the DCS, despite the best previous Allied Minio Information, were in the middle of off-shore minelfields. This risk had been taken due to the urgency of the situation.

On docking at 1135 I Colonel A. D. COOLEY met with the following Allied Representatives:

Commander D. L. JOHNSON, USNR, American Representative, ComGortDiv 57.
Captain J. J. O'BRIEN, USCGR, American Representative (Communications),
Marine Air support Group 48.
Chief Yeoman J. L. DICKSON, USNR, (Recorder), ComCarDiv 27.

Colonel H. J. KILPATRICK, British War Office, Hongkong (Senior Officer, POW)
Lt. Colonel H. W. GLANTLY, U.S. Army Medical Corps (Allied POW)
Major F. H. GRAZEBROOK, Royal Engineers (Allied POW)

Lt. John A. MAC LELLAN, USNR (Member, AGAS)
Lt. John L. SEKON, USNR (Member, AGAS)
Lt. William T. COOK, USA CAC (Member, AGAS)
Hwang Ten Yan, Chinese Official Adviser to AGAS POW Party, China Theatre.

Plans for immediate evacuation were discussed and adopted and later presented to the Japanese delegation which consisted of:

Commander Sra, Japanese Navy (Acting Senior Officer Present)
Captain Fujio, Japanese Navy.
Colonel Murazawa, Japanese Army.
Lt. Nishimura, Japanese Navy (Interpreter)
Gengo Suzuki, Professor of Business Administration, Government College of Commerce, Taihoku, Formosa, (Interpreter).
A request for specific medicines was radiated to the Flagship. This complemented the information received by ComServDiv 27 from the plane which had landed at Matsuyama Airfield.

As described in Annex #B a train was scheduled to pick up POW from Camp #1 that afternoon, with the result that three hundred and twelve (312) evacuees were moved aboard the two (2) DES by 1740I 5 September for transfer to the BLOCK ISLAND and SANTÉE. Colonel A. D. COOLEY and his party remained overnight in the city of Taihoku with the AGAS team. A further conference was held with Japanese representatives Major Hokamoro and Professor Suzuki and POW representatives Colonel Kilpatrick, British Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Glattly, U.S. Army, Medical Corps. Detailed arrangements were made to evacuate Camps #4 and #6 the following morning.

These arrangements were carried out exactly as planned and loading was completed at approximately 1430I 6 September. A total of eleven hundred and sixty (1160) prisoners of war were evacuated, leaving a total of one hundred and twenty one (121) prisoners of war at the Japanese Military Hospital, Taihoku, Formosa. Of these, eighty-two (82) were non-movable patients, and the remainder, doctors and medical personnel. This information was delivered to the commander of the British Task Force at Kiirun Harbor and to the AGAS team.

The prisoners of war received aboard the BLOCK ISLAND and the SANTÉE were given baths, beds, food, clothing and medical treatment and made comfortable for the night. Before dawn on the 6th our planes had again patrolled the skies over Kiirun and Taihoku. Support was furnished to the DES CARY, BRISTER, and FINCH, who left the Task Group at 0504I to proceed to Kiirun Harbor and evacuate the remaining POW. At 1001I the KREMCHER left the CVEs for Kiirun Harbor to participate in the evacuation. One mine was destroyed by VF during the DES approach to the harbor.

About 1030I this Task Group rendezvoused with British TG 111.3 consisting of 1 CVL, 2 CL, and 2 DD under the command of Rear Admiral SERVIES. At 1120I a Japanese harbor pilot was taken aboard the British Flagship, arrangements having been made the day before by the shore representatives of CTG 77.1. The British Task Group immediately moved off toward Kiirun Harbor and made entry in the afternoon. Complying with CTG 77.1’s request, the British then took over the air patrols for the remainder of the day and assumed care of the one hundred and twenty one (121) POW who had to be left in Taihoku. At 1445I all four DES departed Kiirun. By 2337I all of the POW had been redistributed and TG 77.1 left for Manila.

B. Weather.

On 1 September a tropical storm was located to the south of the formation which at that time was on course of 000° in the vicinity of Lat. 23º16'N,
Long, 127°20'E. To avoid the disturbance course was set to the northeast until 1200I 2 September when course was changed to the east. At 2000I 2 September the formation headed south till noon 3 September at Lat. 23°-55 N, Long. 130°-46'E. The center of the storm having passed to the north and west of north Formosa, a westerly course was set for Kii run. See Track Chart for path of typhoon.

### C. Positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Lat/Long</th>
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<td>23°-06'N - 139°-13'E</td>
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<td>23°-34'N - 125°-30'E</td>
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<td>22°-38'N - 123°-32'E</td>
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PART IV - ORDNANCE

A. No ammunition expended.

B. No enemy surface fire, torpedoes or bombs were encountered.

Six mines were sighted and four destroyed by VF.

PART V - DAMAGE

A. Battle damage to own units.

1. None.

B. Battle damage to enemy units.

1. None.

PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS AND INFORMATION

A. Surface gunnery operations.

1. None conducted.

B. Air Operations.

Flights conducted and availability of aircraft are shown below:

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<th>DATE</th>
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<th>BLOCK ISLAND</th>
<th>SANTEE</th>
<th>ABOARD</th>
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C. Amphibious Action.
   1. Covered in Chronology and Annex B

D. Special Comments.
   1. Combat Information Center.
      (a) General performance satisfactory.

2. Radio Communications.
   (a) By setting up patrolling aircraft as linking stations to relay
       messages on suitable frequencies, radio communications were
       rapid and reliable. This reduced the mistakes which would
       have been made in delivering supplies to POW and in completing
       arrangements for their care and evacuation. There were no
       apparent delays in receiving orders from higher authority. In
       submitting radio reports, higher precedence than usual was
       selected. It was important to get the POW out of Japanese
       control before further harm could be done them as long as
       Formosa remained unoccupied by Allied forces. Since the only
       VHF frequency available to the DEs was 140.58 megas., this
       channel had to be used for plane to DE communications as well
       as for air-sea rescue traffic even though normally it is
       reserved for the letter.

3. Use of Smoke, Camouflage, Deception.
   (a) No comments.

   (a) Location of mine fields in Kibun and Takao region were obtained
       and delivered to ComPhilSeaFron.

5. Engineering.
   (a) No engineering difficulties were encountered during the operation.

   (a) Due to weather and the urgency to arrive at Formosa only two
       escorts were fueled.

7. Medical
   (a) The medical officer of the FINCH was transferred for temporary
       additional duty to the SANTEE in order to make use of his
       professional qualifications. Only fifty (50) of the healthiest
       of the POW were left aboard each DE.

(b) From the humanitarian viewpoint the layman could not help but
    observe the delight of the POW to be free and the immediate
    improvement in their spirits and health. This was due not only
to medical care and restoration of the reasonable comforts of life, but also to the little things a man's family does for him when he is sick, hurt or exhausted. These were done by individual members of the crew for each POW. It was touching to the point of bringing tears to the eyes of the most hardened observer.

E. Special Features and Incidents.

(a) No comments.

PART VII - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. A lot down in efficiency after the signing of surrender terms might have been expected but such was not the case; all hands participated with a will.

B. One officer, Lt. Comdr. Victor GAW, 99161, NC, USNR, of the SAMTEE was swept overboard from the forecastle and drowned. His body was recovered shortly thereafter by the U.S.N.

PART VIII - LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Aerology and Air Operations.

1. Activities during this operation were curtailed because this period was the transitional stage from war to peace. The air operations scheduled were carried out by the SAMTEE and BLOCK ISLAND in a satisfactory manner. The following recommendations are made:

(a) Weather reports were meager. For operations in the typhoon belt the maximum number of weather reports must be supplied. More weather planes should be sent out to locate the actual movement of dangerous storms. Aircraft have demonstrated their value in this respect. Numerous reports from a small number of aircraft would clarify the weather conditions and in turn help to coordinate the expeditious movement of shipping. While the typhoon threatened, CTO chose courses which offered the best chance of survival to small craft in the mine sweeping group. These decisions were based on combined aerological opinion of the two CVEs and the CGs after a free exchange of information to reconcile apparent disagreement. The aerologists of both CVEs continually passed back and forth information concerning the typhoon and recommendations to avoid it. After the first day of rough weather they had informal conferences on TBS-2, pooled their ideas and information, and made their recommendations to CTO accordingly. This practice is recommend-
ated, for in one instance conflicting opinions of the aerologists were reconciled when it was ascertained that one was lacking a significant dispauch. The future path of this typhoon could not be predicted reliably so the immediate motive was to avoid the storm center, taking a course normal to its track whenever possible. By eliminating any known better choices it appeared that the best solution to the problem was obtained.
of previous fleet experience where this was not done led to this practice. Anyone who has to avoid a severe storm with 6 knot small craft needs plenty of sympathy and the best weather advice from Fleet Weather Centrals, as well as from a local aerologist. COMBINE THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND RECONCILE APPARENT DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IF POSSIBLE.

(b) Fighter belly tanks were cut and used to carry supplies for emergency drops in POW camps. Although they were not actually dropped, the idea has merit in that planes without bomb bays can be used advantageously for this or similar duty. Had it been necessary, the two carriers involved in this operation could have landed adequate supplies in a very short time by dropping the tanks in a clear area at low speed from an altitude of 20 to 50 feet.

E. Supply and Material.

This Task Group was not prepared for an evacuation mission of this type. Great shortages existed in such items as cots, mattresses, linens, and blankets. The passengers were made comfortable by "borrowing" such items as necessary from members of the crew.

Cargo parachutes were nonexistent. It was planned to use belly tanks as food carriers on the fighters. The torpedo bombers were to use canvas bags for this purpose. It is believed that these could have been safely dropped from an altitude of 50 feet had it been necessary.

Ships Stores and Small Stores of shaving articles, soap, clothing, and writing paper were greatly depleted. The fact that this mission involved a short period of time helped the supply problems greatly. Other shortages would have become evident as time went on.

Summary of provisions and stores dropped and expended from 5 September to 9 September 1945 for care of passengers:

- 12 Tons of provisions landed.
- 20 Tons of provisions expended aboard ship.
- 
- 32 Tons Total.
- 6 Tons of clothing and small stores expended.

C. Given no time or additional facilities for the assigned task, the evacuation of POW from Fornoa was carried out quickly and smoothly. However if proper radio frequencies had been assigned to the AGS group already ashore or their receiver schedule known, supplies might have been landed sooner.

D. Although free drops of food and medical supplies would be practicable, extreme care must be exercised. Four POW were killed, several wounded, and considerable material damage occasioned by apparently indiscriminate drops from B-29's several days prior to our arrival.
E. Due to the sudden diversion of this Task Group to Formosa, ACI officers had to start from scratch in the preparation of intelligence material. The necessary liaison in coordinating procedures and information was worked out by informal conferences over TRS-2 between the respective Air Operations and ACI Officers.
ANNEX "A"

TO

TG 77.1 ACTION REPORT

PERIOD 29 AUGUST - 9 SEPTEMBER 1945.

From: Commander TASK GROUP, and Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-SEVEN, United States Navy.

To: Imperial JAPANESE Commander, Army and Navy Forces, TAIHOKU-KIIRUN, FORMOSA (TAIWAN).

Subject: Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War.

References: (a) Terms of Surrender signed by Representatives of the United Nations and Representatives of the JAPANESE Empire at TOKYO, JAPAN, on 2 September 1945.
(b) Orders to Colonel A. D. COOLEY, Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Group FORTY-EIGHT, United States Marine Corps.
(c) Orders to Commander D. H. JOHNSON, Commander Escort Division FIFTY-SEVEN, United States Navy.

The Japanese Commander of the Taihoku-Kiirun Area will execute the following requirements:

1. A harbor pilot to meet two (2) United States Destroyer Escorts at the entrance of Kiirun Harbor at 0700 Tokyo Time, 5 September.

2. Three (3) harbor pilots to meet two (2) British Cruisers and one (1) British Destroyer at 1100 Tokyo Time, 6 September at 25°09' N - 122°07' E.

3. All harbor pilots must have full information on minefields in area.

4. Berths will be required for two (2) light cruisers and one (1) destroyer.

5. Communications will be established immediately with these vessels and the fleet at sea over 600 meters calling NIKU using call signs JJJ1.

6. Competent authorities will be present the morning of 5 September at Kiirun Harbor to confer with representatives of the Allied Governments embarked in the United States Destroyer Escorts relative to the evacuation of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

MESSAGE DROPPED
BY PLANES
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ANNEX "A" to TG 77.1 Action Report, Period 29 August - 9 September 1945.

7. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved. Delivery of supplies dropped and landed for United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be insured. Each camp or other place of detention will be marked with letters "P.M." 20 feet in height with yellow or black background reading Southwestward.

D. KETCHAM

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
COMMANDER TASK GROUP and
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION TWENTY-SEVEN
ANNEX "B"

TO

TG 77.1 ACTION REPORT

PERIOD 29 AUGUST - 9 SEPTEMBER 1945

5 September 1945.

From: Commander TASK GROUP, and Commander Carrier Division
TWENTY-SEVEN, United States Navy.

To: Imperial JAPANESE Commander, Army and Navy Forces,
KIIRUN, FORMOSA.

Subject: Care and Evacuation of Allied prisoners of war from FORMOSA.

References: (a) Terms of Surrender signed by Representatives of the United Nations and Representatives of the JAPANESE Empire at TOKYO, JAPAN on 2 September 1945.
(b) Orders to Colonel A. D. COOLEY, Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Group FORTY-EIGHT, United States Marine Corps.
(c) Orders to Commander D. H. JOHNSON, Commander Escort Division FIFTY-SEVEN, United States Navy.

1. Officers named in references (b) and (c), and such other officers as may be delegated to assist them, are empowered by me, as Representative of the United States Government and the United Nations, to arrange for:

(a) Care and Evacuation of Allied prisoners of war;
(b) Establishment of adequate communication facilities between the United States Naval Task Group Commander and the Commander of Japanese Army and Navy Forces on FORMOSA;
(c) Berthing or mooring of two British cruisers and one British destroyer which will arrive KIIRUN on 6 September 1945;
(d) Securing of the latest navigational charts and minefield locations in this area, and;
(e) Services of Japanese pilots to bring designated ships into KIIRUN Harbor on 6 September 1945.

2. Representatives named in references (b) and (c) are hereby empowered by the United States Government and by the United Nations to command transportation as necessary in the execution of these missions, compensation for any such transportation furnished to be made in accordance with existing international law and agreements.


D. KETCHAII
Rear Admiral U.S. Navy
Commander TASK GROUP and
Commander CARRIER DIVISION TWENTY-SEVEN.

B-1
SUMMARY

ANNEX "B" to TG 77.1 Action Report, Period 29 August - 9 September 1945.

5 September 1945.

From: Commander TASK GROUP, and Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-SEVEN, United States Navy.

To: Colonel A. D. COOLEY (O3903), Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Group FORTY-EIGHT, United States Marine Corps.

Subject: ORDERS.

1. Upon receipt of these orders, you are hereby directed as Representative of this TASK GROUP and CARRIER DIVISION to proceed to KIJIRUN, FORLIDA, in execution of the following missions:

   (a) Emergency care of all sick Allied prisoners of war, assuring as soon as possible that adequate medical supplies, food and clothing are furnished to subject prisoners of war;
   (b) Arrangement for the evacuation of all Allied combatant prisoners of war;
   (c) Evacuation of all prisoners of war other than those mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) hereof.

2. You will further have in charge the following listed officers and men of this TASK GROUP and CARRIER DIVISION to assist in execution of these missions and in the performance of other tasks as assigned:

   Captain J. J. O'HRIEN (013162), U. S. Marine Corps;
   DICKSON, J. L., 610 12 06, Chief Yeoman,
   U. S. Naval Reserve (Recorder)

3. Upon completion of assigned missions, you will take charge of the officers and men listed in Paragraph Two hereof, and return to this command.

D. KETCHAM
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
COMMANDER TASK GROUP and
COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION TWENTY-SEVEN
ANNEX "B" to TG 77.1 Action Report, Period 29 August - 9 September 1945.

5 September 1945.

From: Commander TASK GROUP, and Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-SEVEN, United States Navy.

To: Commander D. H. JOHNSON, Commander Escort Division FIFTY-SEVEN, United States Naval Reserve.

Subject: ORDERS.

1. Upon receipt of these orders, you are hereby directed to proceed to KIJURU, FORMOSA, and upon arrival proceed with the execution of the following tasks:

   (a) Establishment of reliable and adequate communication facilities between the Japanese Commander of Army and Naval forces on FORMOSA, and the Commander of this United States Naval TASK GROUP, in accordance with instructions to be given by memorandum.

   (b) Arrangement for Japanese pilots to conduct British ships safely into KIJURU Harbor on 6 September 1945.

   (c) Arrangement for berthing or mooring of two British cruisers and one British destroyer at KIJURU Harbor, FORMOSA, on 6 September 1945.

   (d) Securing of latest navigational charts which give the location of minefields, and all other obstructions or dangers to navigation in this area, such charts and information to be delivered to you immediately and to the British Commander.

2. Upon completion of the above mission, you will return to your command, and resume your regular duties.

   D. H. JOHNSON
   Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
   COMMANDER TASK GROUP and
   COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION TWENTY-SEVEN.

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ANNEX "B" To TG 77.1 Action Report, Period 29 August - 9 September 1945.

7 September 1945.

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Group FORTY-EIGHT.
To: Commander Task Group SEVENTY-SEVEN POINT ONE and Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-SEVEN.

Subject: Evacuation of Prisoners of War from Formosa - Report of.

Reference: (a) Your Orders dated 5 September 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Transcript of Proceedings of Joint Conference between Col. A. D. Cooley, USMC, and Japanese Officials aboard U.S.S. GARY at Kiirun Harbor, FORMOSA.

1. In compliance with reference (a) I proceeded aboard the U.S.S. GARY, arriving at Kiirun Harbor, FORMOSA, at 1130 HST, 5 September 1945. During the approach to Kiirun Harbor communications were established with the Japanese radio station, Kiirun. A delegation of Japanese emissaries enumerated in enclosure (A) reported aboard immediately upon docking.

2. At the conclusion of this conference, I proceeded to Camp No. One and supervised the evacuation of the 312 prisoners of war located thereat. These prisoners were placed aboard the destroyer escorts by 1750 5 September 1945, and the ships departed Kiirun Harbor.

3. I remained in the city of Taihoku with the AGAS Team until the following morning. During the evening at the hotel, a conference was held with the Japanese representatives, Major Mokamoro and Professor Suzuki, and Colonel Kilpatrick, British Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel Glatly, U.S. Army Medical Corps, prisoners of war at Formosa, and myself. During this conference detailed arrangements were made to evacuate Camps No. 4 and 6 the following morning.

4. These arrangements were carried out exactly as planned, with loading completed at approximately 1430 6 September 1945.

5. A total of 1160 prisoners of war were evacuated, leaving a total of 121 prisoners of war at the Japanese Military Hospital, Taihoku, Formosa. This information was delivered to the commander of the British Task Force at Kiirun Harbor, and to the AGAS Team.

6. While on FORMOSA I inspected and had photographs taken of all camps. Conditions of the camps were deplorable, particularly regarding sanitation. The appearance of the prisoners was particularly depressing. All were suffering from malnutrition. No detailed evidence was taken of the treatment of prisoners, but such information can be obtained from the AGAS Team and from the prisoners of war themselves. The attitude of the Japanese officials with whom I came in contact was very cooperative. They apparently have accepted the inevitable, and were willing to assist me in the evacuation.
ANNEX "B" To TG 77.1 Action Report, Period 29 August - 9 September 1945.

Subject: Evacuation of Prisoners of War from Formosa - Report of.

7. I wish particularly to call attention to the splendid services rendered by Lieutenant John A. MacRae, Lieutenant John L. Schon, both of the United States Naval Reserve, and 1st Lieutenant William T. Cook, United States Army, members of the AGIS Team. They had carried out preliminary arrangements and emergency aid to prisoners in a most efficient and intelligent manner.

A. D. COOLEY
ANNEX "B" To TG 77.1 Action Report, Period 29 August - 9 September 1945.

5 September 1945.

Transcript of Proceedings of Conference Aboard U.S.S. GARY this date between American Representatives and Japanese Military Commanders on FORMOSA concerning evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War from FORMOSA.

Present:

Colonel A. D. Cooley, USMC, American Representative;
Commander D. L. Johnson, USNR, American Representative;
Captain J. J. O'Brien, USMC, American Representative (Communications);
Chief Yeoman J. L. Dickson, USNR, (Recorder).

Lt. John A. MacIellan, USNR (Member, AGAS)
Lt. John L. Schon, USNR (Member, AGAS)
Lt. William T. Cook, USA GC (Member, AGAS)
Hwang Tin Yen, Chinese Official Advisor to AGAS POW Party, China Theatre

Colonel H. J. Kilpatrick, British War Office, Hongkong (Senior Officer, POW)
Lt. Colonel H. W. Glattly, U.S. Army Medical Corps (Allied POW)
Major F. H. Grazebrook, Royal Engineers (Allied POW)

Commander Sato, Japanese Navy (Acting Senior Officer Present)
Captain Fujio, Japanese Navy
Colonel Murazawa, Japanese Army
Lt. Mishimura, Japanese Navy (Interpreter)
Gengo Suzuki, Professor of Business Administration, Government College of Commerce, Taiboku, Formosa, (Interpreter).

Col. Cooley: Where is the Japanese Commander of Army and Navy Forces on Formosa? Is the senior officer here?

Interpreter: He is not here now.

Col. Cooley: Is one of these officers present the senior officer on the Island at the present time?

Interpreter: Yes. Commander Sato is a Staff Officer and represents the Senior Officer of the Island.

Col. Cooley: Read this paper to the representatives assembled here.

Interpreter: A translation has already been prepared and has been read by the representatives. It was dropped by a plane.

Col. Cooley: Very well. First, I want transportation to the prisoner of war camps and to the airfield.
Interpreter: How many cars will you need?

Col. Cooley: Three. I think they are available out here now.

Interpreter: Yes, we will arrange that.

Col. Cooley: I want sufficient transportation to move 348 men this afternoon.

Interpreter: On a train?

Col. Cooley: Cars and trucks would be better, but if the train is available right now, it will be all right.

Interpreter: Arrangements will be made to transport them by train.

Col. Cooley: Can you get the 348 men here by five o'clock?

Interpreter: The Division Officer of the Camps doesn't know about this matter. We will have to make arrangements with the officers in charge of the camps. Which camp do you want to move?

Col. Cooley: Camp No. One, on the way to the airfield.

Interpreter: At the latest, what time will it be necessary for the men to be here?

Col. Cooley: 1700 today. We want them all here so the ship can get underway at 1700 IEM time, which is also five o'clock Tokyo time.

Interpreter: Can't you prolong it any more?

Col. Cooley: I want to load these two ships to get out tonight.

Interpreter: The Major is going to the camp right now to make preparations but in order to get the time definite at 1700, it is not possible to say for sure.

Col. Cooley: How long will it take to transport them by train to this dock?

Interpreter: About one hour.

Col. Cooley: If they leave there by 3:30 that will give you plenty of time. It will give you three hours.

Interpreter: The Camp is about four or five miles away from the railway station.

Lt.-Col. Glattly: Suppose we had the prisoners at your station at 3:30. Then can you move them by train to here and get here in plenty of time to pull out by sunset?
Interpreter: Do you think you can get them to the train by 3:30?

Col. Cooley: Yes.

Interpreter: Are the prisoners ready to depart?

Col. Cooley: By all means! Col. Glatty, will you make preparations for enough trucks to get them to the station from the camp on time?

Interpreter: We will bring the train to the station very near the camp.

Col. Cooley: No. One Camp in the one we are evacuating today, you know.

Interpreter: Yes, we can bring the train nearly there.

Col. Cooley: You get your men going right now to arrange for trucks to get them to the train, and for the train, and we will follow it up.

Interpreter: If you are in a hurry, we can't prepare a very good train.

Col. Cooley: We want a train that will run well enough to get here with the men.

Interpreter: Do you want to send someone with the Major to the Camp?

Col. Cooley: Yes. We will send Major Graebrook. And now, tomorrow we want to transport all the rest of the prisoners except the few who cannot be moved. That will be about 900 altogether.

Interpreter: Tomorrow?

Col. Cooley: As soon as possible tomorrow morning, have them at this dock. We want them here around noon or 1300 at the latest. We want them aboard and underway by 1700 tomorrow afternoon. Use all the facilities you have and move them as fast as possible. We will need all the ambulance railway cars you have.

Interpreter: How many beds do you need in the cars?

Lt. Col. Glatty: We had two ambulance cars in our last move, but there are two other camps you will have to have cars for now. If you have two ambulance cars that can make the trip twice that would be sufficient.

Interpreter: Do you need sleeping cars?

Lt. Col. Glatty: Yes. We must get the men stretched out flat.

Interpreter: If you can give us the number of people we can arrange for the cars.
Lt. Col. Glattly: We want accommodations for about 100 such cases.

Interpreter: How many have to be carried on stretchers?

Lt. Col. Glattly: About 100. How many ambulances can you provide tomorrow to help carry men from the camp to the railway station? Or we can take trucks and fix them up.

Interpreter: We can use all ambulances and if that is not enough we will furnish trucks with mattresses. We also have a number of stretchers.

Lt. Col. Glattly: The railway station is very close to Camp Four. We would like to have the cars made available to load direct from the camp Four Hospital. (General arrangements were then concluded for details of evacuation by Lt. Col. Glattly and Japanese representatives).

Col. Cooley: Do any of you gentlemen have anything further you wish to discuss with these representatives?

Lt. Col. Glattly: I think our arrangements are satisfactory.

Col. Cooley: How many altogether, and what nationalities, are these prisoners?

Lt. Col. Glattly: About 88 Americans; a dozen Dutchmen; about 3 Australians, and the rest British. Altogether the total POW strength is 128.

Col. Cooley: Explain to these representatives that they are to remain and discuss with Commander Johnson information of a military nature which he will need during these operations. We are now ready to go to the Camps.

(Japanese representatives remained on board with Commander Johnson, and remainder of party departed for Camp No. One.)