

RESTRICTED

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VI. SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

1. Introduction

a. Beyond the scope and concept of Japanese Army and Navy operational intelligence, which has been the focal point of this study, there existed an intricate and somewhat fabulous system of intelligence embracing not only the military but also the political, commercial, and cultural aspects of espionage and counter-espionage.

b. The most apparent organization within this system was that cloaked in the ambiguous title of "Special Service Organizations"—the Tokumu Kikan, admittedly a partner in Area Army intelligence functions; and the Kaigun Tokumu Bu, the counter-part which reportedly existed sotto voce in the Navy and, from all evidence, diminished in importance after the war began. On a parallel and sometimes conflicting basis under Army parenthood, the Kempei Tai was the Japanese Gestapo whose duties as military police ran the gamut from discipline to spying.

c. These organizations were confined, during the war, to the Asiatic theater of operations; the Special Service Organizations were rampant in Manchuria, China, Burma, and the Philippines, and the Kempei in the Homeland and the Pacific battle zones. Their contribution to military operational intelligence with regard to the United States was a negative factor.

d. Far more nebulous were the countless "residents abroad" in official or commercial capacity, with or without portfolio, who contributed no little weight to the theory that every Japanese was an undercover agent of the Foreign Office. Such a theory is not, of course, based on fantasy. The Japanese philosophy of intelligence is such that the undercover school was more highly regarded than the operational methods as we understand them. There were Westerners and pro-Japanese sympathizers of other races who added credence to this philosophy.

e. Because of this feeling, it is not strange that some Japanese military leaders, in recognizing the success of American military intelligence, attributed such success to methods they themselves idealized. The Navy General Staff, accord-

ing to Rear Admiral Tomioka, its war plans officer, thought the Allies had "some fifth columnists or spies" on Okinawa prior to our landings there; "we caught some suspects," he said, "but we were not able to determine conclusively that they were your agents." Another General Staff officer—Commander Imai, member of the 5th section of the intelligence department—observed that "in theory, the U. S. method (guerillas, etc.) in the Philippines is the ideal" method of obtaining intelligence.

f. It is the purpose here to examine these so-called "Special Service Organizations" and related intelligence activities in the light of their contribution to military operational intelligence. Investigations of a more detailed nature have been or are being conducted in the Japanese theatre by the Counter-Intelligence Section, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Pacific, and by other interested agencies.

2. Tokumu Kikan and Tokumu Bu

a. The activities of the Japanese Army's Tokumu Kikan—and its reported Navy equivalent, Tokumu Bu—were as flexible as the title itself: Special Service Organization or Department. In usage, the terms stand for any organization that is carrying out special work for the military services without actually being a formal part of the military framework; this special work may be military government or liaison duties, and intelligence may be a full-time mission or a collateral issue.

b. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the SSO was the "supreme authority for all long-range intelligence activities of the Japanese government," according to a special report of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, GHQ, AFPAC, issued 20 August 1945. This report also credits the SSO with being the nucleus for a wide network of agents throughout the world in the period from 1937 to 1941.

c. There is no other evidence, however, to connect the SSO with long-range intelligence or with the foreign agents operating under the guise of assistants or clerks in consulates and embassies

as students, or employes of commercial firms operated or subsidized by the Japanese government. During the war, the SSO appeared on the surface only in Asia and there in the roles previously defined.

d. A certain amount of mystery enshrouded the Special Service Organizations. Those who dared speak of it in Japan, or in the field, for that matter, did so at the risk of arrest. This attitude never asked Tokumu Kikan for anything directly, but asked the area army for information; if the area army went to Tokumu Kikan, Tokio headquarters looked the other way. This attitude was carried to the extent that few knew the identity of those engaged in Tokumu Kikan duties. Says Takeo Araki, a Japanese newspaperman with a professed intimacy with the SSO and its workers: "No records were kept; it was the rule to pass on the names of these secret agents to one's successor, but, of course, this was sometimes unintentionally or intentionally forgotten. This made it rather difficult for the men to continue."

e. The Navy attitude toward the SSO was far more elusive than that of the Army. Those in the General Staff and in other key positions who were questioned about Tokumu Bu exhibited either complete ignorance or studied surprise about the whole matter. There is evidence, however, that a Navy SSO existed in various forms—resident officers, wireless intelligence, etc.—but not on the scope of the Army's organization. There is a possibility it existed in the Navy on a wide scale prior to the war, but after Pearl Harbor it was a minor consideration.

3. The Army SSO

a. Liaison, Incidents, Intelligence

(1) Organization and activities of the Tokumu Kikan in the Japanese Army varied according to the area in which it was working. The character of its operations varied according to the character of its commanding officer. Often the Tokumu Kikan might not bear that exact title; sometimes it was known simply as Kikan preceded by the name of the area in which it operated or the name of the man in command, and sometimes as Renraku Bu (liaison department) or some similar innocuous nomenclature.

(2) But it seems clear there was no direct control at Tokyo high command level except to send

to the area concerned a regular Army officer of field grade or better to organize and command the SSO in the field. In some cases, picked Army officers and Imperial civilian appointees who had given up family, name and identity for the cause, went along with the SSO commander to his post in the field. But once there he was free to choose the bulk of his organization from the Japanese and native population in the area, and to operate as he saw fit.

(3) Broadly sketched, the scope of Tokumu Kikan in the Army covered espionage and intelligence, propaganda, and liaison with and supervision of the provisional or puppet government in the area concerned. Fifth column duties involving sabotage and conveniently arranged "incidents" were a part of the agenda. Army officers familiar with SSO work insist that tactical intelligence was not a major duty, although it was inevitable that some should reach the hands of the SSO and be passed along; other sources lend credence to this statement except in the case of the Kwantung Army's Tokumu Kikan, which was a major source of all forms of intelligence about Russia.

(4) Inasmuch as it is impossible to examine any one Army Tokumu Kikan and label it as typical, those on which detailed information is available will be outlined here with emphasis on their relationship to operational intelligence.

b. Kwantung Army: The Border Patrol

(1) The outstanding example of operational intelligence performed by the Tokumu Kikan was its work with the Kwantung Army. There, on the border of a nation with whom an uneasy peace treaty existed, Tokumu Kikan relinquished most of its normal duties of military government to become the principal intelligence unit for the Army, and changed its name as well, assuming about three years ago the title of Johobu (intelligence department).

(2) Its 50 officers and noncommissioned men and 150 civilians in the central office at Harbin, plus 35 officers and noncoms and 80 civilians in 12 branch offices, had the same detached relationship with Army General Headquarters in Tokyo as any other Tokumu Kikan: GHQ knew they were there, but neither supervised nor worked with their organization.

(3) This laissez-faire policy toward the SSO is

accented in a report on Tokumu Kikan issued by the Japanese War Ministry at the request of SCAP and translated by ATIS. Of orders issued the Kwantung SSO it says:

"Although there was an order from Grand Imperial Headquarters to the Kwantung Army regarding strict observation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the nature of the order presented to the Intelligence Bureau (sic: Tokumu Kikan or Johobu) by the Kwantung Army is uncertain. However, it is presumed that the Kwantung Army also gave the above orders to the Intelligence Service Bureau."

(4) That the Tokumu Kikan in Kwantung was in fact the intelligence organization of the Kwantung Army, as stated by Lieutenant Colonel Asai, a GHQ staff intelligence officer familiar with its work, is by no means hard to understand. Long before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Army concept of action was war with Russia; Army intelligence activities were concentrated toward that concept, and increased rather than diminished after hostilities began in the Pacific.

(5) In its Kwantung role, the Tokumu Kikan furnished Army General Headquarters with a continuous flow of information on order of battle, strength, and disposition of Soviet forces, and intelligence on Russia's internal situation. The flow was not via direct channels. Printed reports were made by the Kwantung Army on the basis of Tokumu Kikan investigation, at weekly and monthly intervals (just prior to complete breakdown of relations with Russia, the weekly report was supplanted by a 10-day report). Other spot reports of significance were sent by radio from Kwantung Army Headquarters, either on the basis of information gathered independently by the Tokumu Kikan, or in response to requests from Army General Headquarters; such requests were not addressed to the Tokumu Kikan, but to the Army.

(6) Sources of information utilized by the Kwantung SSO were (a) *espionage*, which gradually became restricted almost totally to the Manchurian side of the border; (b) *observation* from high points along the conveniently located border railroad and along the harbor close to Vladivostok; such observations, according to Lieutenant Colonel Asai, were "often considered sufficient on which to form a judgment as to Russian intentions"; (c)

captured Russian spies (100 were taken in 1941, for example), interrogation of whom made it "possible to assess the situation of the Soviet Army pretty clearly"; (d) *newspapers, magazines, and captured documents*, analyzed at headquarters.

(7) Selection of personnel to perform these duties, insofar as the military were concerned, was from young officers from the Academy or from those in the Kwantung Army with a high degree of intelligence and a knowledge of Soviet affairs. Training was at Shinkio, headquarters of the Kwantung Army. Uniforms for military personnel were optional, depending on the job of the moment; civilian agents never wore them.

(8) Despite its scope, the intelligence received from this organization was "not nearly satisfactory," if Lieutenant Colonel Asai's opinion can be taken for that of Army General Headquarters, where he specialized in Soviet intelligence. For the record, he offered this as an estimate based on reports of the Kwantung SSO: That the Soviet would go to war against Japan in the early part of November 1945, based on developments at the Potsdam conference and on movements and disposition of Soviet troops along the border; that the blow would come north of Vladivostok, and that the Soviet had 5,800 aircraft ready for use against Japan.

c. China: Government and Information

(1) The role of Tokumu Kikan within China proper can be divided into three phases. At the outset, when no Japanese forces were present except those on garrison duty, its duties were primarily those of collecting intelligence through whatever guise was necessary. After the "China incident" in 1937, the SSO in China was charged, to quote the War Ministry, "with the supervision, aid, and revival of the peace preservation organs (and) simultaneously * * * with the collection of intelligence materials." In 1942, under the "Basic Policies Toward China" directive of self-administration (i. e. puppet government), the SSO bowed out of the picture as Tokumu Kikan, only to re-enter as Renrakubu (liaison department). But Tokumu Kikan remained the best-known title.

(2) On the basis of available information, it would be impossible to estimate the number of military and civilians engaged in SSO work in China. It functioned, as elsewhere, without control from Tokyo but under the control of the Area Army,

with Tokumu Kikan units attached, in independent fashion, to armies, divisions, and independent brigades. At division, or independent brigade level, a colonel and lieutenant colonel headed the detachment of from 11 to 35 enlisted men and civilians in four sections—administrative, government liaison, economic and political, and intelligence. The latter consisted of one lieutenant and 5 to 10 enlisted men.

(3) Functions of the China SSO, according to Lieutenant Colonel Yamazaki, member of the China section of Army General Staff intelligence, were to assist the Army in governing the population, to insure food and medical care for the civilian population, and to obtain information as to the attitude of the people. Thus, when Tokumu Kikan changed its name in 1942-43, its personnel "became a sort of liaison pool between the Japanese and the Chinese troops friendly to them," and performed military government functions.

(4) A further discussion of Tokumu Kikan duties in China was obtained from Major General Harada, chief of the Nanking Branch of Tokumu Kikan under the 13th Army, which was in turn under the China Expeditionary Force. Basic policy, he states, was set (in his case) by the 13th Army, and if there was direction from Tokyo, he professed ignorance of it. The main function was government "physical welfare of the Chinese" and "the education and indoctrination of the Chinese."

(5) But according to General Harada, the Tokumu Kikan merely saw that these functions were carried out. The Chinese police and the Haotai, a special organization of the puppet government, did the actual work. As to undercover agents, espionage, and counter-espionage, says the General: "No such thing was done in China (by the Tokumu Kikan). We did receive some information of possible military value from the prefectural branches, the police, Chinese people * * *. The type of information I got was the kind that General MacArthur is now getting—the attitude of the people, the cooperation of the leaders, and the activity of our own Army, etc. Purely military matters did not concern the Tokumu Kikan and apprehension of spies was purely the responsibility of the Chinese."

(6) The metamorphosis of Tokumu Kikan into a "liaison department" in 1942-43, however, would

seem to have increased, rather than diminished, its importance. Organization and internal command channels remained the same, but after the change no Japanese agency could deal with the Chinese except through Tokumu Kikan.

(7) Although no conclusive evaluation of the contribution of Tokumu Kikan in China to Japanese operational intelligence can be made on the basis of information forthcoming from the Japanese, it is self-evident that the contribution was worthwhile. An organization with as firm a hold over puppet Chinese leaders working to remain in its graces as was enjoyed by Tokumu Kikan would have little trouble in finding out what was in range of puppet eyes and ears. This was undoubtedly good reason for the attitude of the Army General Staff, which, as with SSOs in other areas, was not to ask the Tokumu Kikan directly for information, but to request the commanding general of the area to get it "from intelligence sources available to him."

d. The South: Liaison, Infiltration, Assassination

(1) Details of the Tokumu Kikan picture begin to fade in the Southern regions of Japan's domination.

(2) In Burma, the Army Tokumu Kikan, usually headquartered at Rangoon, sometimes was known as the Kawashima Force, sometimes as Minami Kikan or Kikari Kikan. The latter is sometimes identified with the Japanese Navy. There were numerous other Kikans embellished with geographical names or the names of their leaders.

(3) The Japanese War Ministry document prepared for SCAP groups such activities under the head of "our liaison organization in the Provisional Independent Indian Government," with approximately 90 officers and civilians heading up the 8 headquarters sections and the 3 branch bureaus in Malay, Thailand, and Saigon. (Only "high-ranking officials" were tabulated in the Japanese figures, which counted a headquarters intelligence section of 4 officers and 4 civilians.)

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(4) At least 5 Kikans are identified in the Burma, or Southern, area by South East Asia Command and India Command in its Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 179 of 6 April 1945, although it seems possible these could be off-shoots of a central organization.

(5) Basic duties of the Kikan were "conduct of intelligence warfare against India, Indian troops, and Indians in the Far East," according to SEAC. But independence of action and scope was the rule among the satellite Kikans. The term "military activities" embraced employment of local natives for assassination of important Allied persons and for sabotage, and to infiltrate "static and mobile agents behind our lines," using among others, women, Buddhist priests, traders, and small boys as operatives. Fruits of these endeavors did not appear great. Captured documents show that in the summer of 1944, the local Kikans were having difficulty in "obtaining safe infiltration routes" for their agents, in shortage of funds, in morale, and in the high rate of desertion among the native hirelings.

(6) Japanese officials in Tokyo familiar with the Army Tokumu Kikan lacked knowledge of its existence in areas other than Manchuria, China, and Burma. In New Guinea, for instance, its duties are reported to have been handled by the Kempei Tai, as described later in this study, and no evidence has been found to the contrary. In the Philippines, however, captured documents disclose the presence of Kikans in the Luzon area, with at least 3 organizations—Nammei, Kirishima, and Takesaki—identified.

(7) Once again, evidence on which to evaluate the contribution of the SSO activities in the Philippines is lacking, although a fairly complete picture of such operations during Japanese withdrawal can be obtained. The examples below are taken from the Nammei Kikan Operation Order No. 1, dated 20 January 1945 at Manila, as quoted by the AFPAC special report:

"Japanese counterintelligence activities within Manila before and after occupation by the Allies (which the SSO Operation Order apparently assumed as a foregone conclusion); communications by wireless and runners, with emphasis, after occupation, on military intelligence to facilitate fifth column activities.

"Extermination of 'extreme pro-Americans while carrying out political, economic, and ideological fifth column activities' prior to Allied penetration; disruption of the 'enemy's rear' after occupation, by military, economic, and psychological sabotage.

"Collection of information, prior to occupation,

by arrest of "infiltration agents and [sic: Allied] fifth columnists' betrayed by 'dancers and entertainers'; by interrogation of captured air personnel—men will be instructed not to kill the prisoners of war'; by captured documents; by 'arrest and interrogation of persons with pro-American tendencies and persons caught eavesdropping'; by guerilla activities in Manila and environs.

"Collection of information, after penetration by the Allies, on the 'military and political situation and the state of pacification within the city,' such information to be transmitted by mobile wireless station left behind; on the military situation, especially airfields, harbors, ships, communications, etc., such information to be presented in the form of sketches and transmitted, apparently, by runner network."

4. The Navy SSO

a. Whatever the Japanese Navy had in the way of a counterpart of the Army's Special Service Organizations during the war was limited in scope and in intelligence value.

b. The Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, GHQ, AFPAC, in its special report, previously referred to herein, cites an SSO supervised by the Imperial Navy and usually listed as Kaigun Tokumu Bu (Navy Special Service Department). The report adds: "The various Navy SSO's in the field, such as the South China SSO and the Burma SSO, are normally headed by a rear admiral or captain. All SSO's in the field answered directly to the Naval General Staff in Tokyo and the respective geographic section of the Intelligence Division."

c. The Navy also is identified, in the AFPAC report, with a Special Service Organization in the Homeland, conducted as a foreign affairs section of city police departments. Officers on this duty wear civilian clothes, even in wartime, and on the basis of information available, would appear to have duties similar to our own Naval Intelligence within the United States.

d. A further description of the Navy's SSO activities during the war was given by Mr. Sone, of the Foreign Office: "The Navy did not have a Tokumu Kikan in various places, but had a kind of Tokumu Kikan or Resident Officers' Bureau in important places, such as Shanghai, Peking, and Rangoon, I believe. Activities were not so extended in general as those of the Army Tokumu

Kikan. The Navy (SSO) was primarily concerned with liaison between themselves and the Naval landing parties or naval units in their area. They collected information, and so forth. They were not keen on administration like the Army, which interfered very often with the administration of the local Chinese government."

e. A brief report submitted by Lieutenant Commander Hino, a liaison officer between the Japanese Navy and USSBS, identifies a Tokumu Bu in China which was disorganized after the occupation of China by the Japanese; a Hainan Tokumu Bu which existed during the war for government and "peace intelligence" of Hainan Island; and resident officers (Kaigun Zaikin-Bukan) at Shanghai, Nanking, Peipin, Hankou, Amoi, and Kwangton who were under partial command of fleets in the area for "business work on land" but were under direct command of the Chief of Naval General Headquarters for intelligence work.

f. The one indication of Navy SSO activities on a plane with those of the Army's Tokumu Kikan is forthcoming in an interview with Rear Admiral Chudo, a former member of the Naval General Staff who became Naval Attaché at Rangoon when Burma was granted "independence" and in February 1945 was assigned as liaison officer with the Southern Army. In his report, issued by Headquarters, South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, on 5 October 1945, Admiral Chudo describes the Hikari Kikan (also reported as an Army organization; see above) as the intelligence organization in the Southern Areas which preceded the Indian Provisional Government. Although there is a possibility that, because of his liaison duties with the Army, he is referring to an Army organization, his reference to dates would indicate working knowledge of the Kikan prior to his affiliation with the Southern Army. As for results, he says "information of operational value was extremely scarce and of what there was, some had been sent by the British in the names of our agents that they had interned, and some was sent by agents who had taken fright and were reporting from safe areas. Thus really valuable information was negligible. I have heard it said that no information that influenced operational plans was ever received."

g. There is strong reason to assume that the Navy's SSO existed on a larger scale prior to the

war when its "resident officers" could operate throughout the world instead of limiting their activities to Asia. There was ample opportunity for collecting intelligence through agents masked as representatives of Japanese business firms. Naval attachés disclosed that such commercial representatives met with the embassy officials monthly, and that in Germany, at least, they studied and translated technical publications, giving copies of such translations to the attaché for forwarding to the Navy Ministry.

h. Whatever contribution the Navy's minor wartime Special Service Organization made to operational intelligence was a very meager one, indeed, and was of negligible, if any, value to the Naval General Staff.

5. Kempei Tai

a. The Japanese Kempei Tai, often referred to as the military police and by the Japanese as the gendarmerie, had powers nearly as broad as those of the Nazi Gestapo. Although in the field it worked with the Army, it was under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and controlled both administrative and judicial police and, as a military organization, was divided into administrative and judicial sections. It had wide powers, vested with the right to exercise Japan's authority over military personnel and the general public alike.

b. Headquarters were in Tokyo for training and for the organization in Japan, Korea, Formosa, and the South Seas; there were separate headquarters (and training) in China, Manchuria, and Malaya. Selection was rigid, based on physical and mental tests and on family eligibility; training covered special investigation, administration of justice, organic law, administration, geography, history, self-defense and the art of making an arrest.

c. In the South Seas, the organization was broken down into gendarmerie sections, each embracing general affairs, police affairs, special investigations, and judicial affairs, for each area or island. Apparently the work of Tokumu Kikan was carried out by the Kempei in this area. Elsewhere, outside of Japan, each area army was assigned Kempei units at headquarters and division level, with the Kempei being on its own below that level. Total Kempei complement for an army is

estimated at 1,000, 20 of whom are at top headquarters echelon.

d. Counterintelligence was a primary function of the Kempei, and in areas where Tokumu Kikan also functioned, there was an understandable overlap. To avoid friction, a Kempei officer was sometimes attached to the Tokumu Kikan for liaison duty.

e. Particularly in New Guinea and areas in which Tokumu Kikan was nonexistent, the Kempei performed a valuable role for operational intelligence, mostly by use of natives utilized both as spies and for counterintelligence. Statements by Army and Navy high command that natives were generally valueless because of lack of knowledge or friendliness to the Allies are true insofar as intelligence for planning level is concerned, but the Kempei found good use for them in ferreting out Allied positions, observation posts, and even, in some instances, intentions. Examples of such use-

fulness in the way of tactical intelligence are appended (exhibit A).

f. Kempei doctrine did not call for active participation in prisoner-of-war interrogation work. The teachings called for the Kempei to handle preliminary screenings of the prisoners to prevent their escape and to protect them from civilians. This, however, was not the practice. The Kempei in the field was under control of the commanding general of the area army, and there is ample evidence from our own repatriated prisoners-of-war that their treatment—or mistreatment—was delegated by the Army to the Kempei.

g. Its work with prisoners-of-war was Kempei's principal contribution to Japanese military operational intelligence. The secondary contribution, use of natives for scouting, spying, and counterintelligence was to front-line intelligence of immediate tactical importance, rather than to long-range planning.

VII. ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND PLANNING

1. Introduction

a. Investigation of Japanese military and naval intelligence has disclosed significant information concerning the Japanese estimates of American and Allied intentions, strength and capabilities made at various stages of the war. Important aspects of the part which intelligence played in Japanese operational planning and conduct of the war are revealed in the information at hand.

b. The primary objective of this part of the report has been to analyze the Japanese estimates of the situation, and their consequent planning, as disclosed in the interrogations and statements of Japanese command and staff officers and in documentary material now available. In order that the accuracy of the estimates and their effect on operations may be gaged, certain facts and figures from U. S. Navy and War Department records concerning U. S. plans, forces, etc., are utilized herein for comparative purposes.

c. This is not purported to be a full historical account of each operation or campaign discussed here. Ordinarily, only the aspects of these operations which are pertinent to the Japanese estimates under examination are recounted, although additional facts are sometimes set forth to show the surrounding circumstances and to facilitate a better understanding of the problems involved. For historical accounts of the war in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre, reference is made to the reports of the Military Analysis and Naval Analysis Divisions of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

d. The greater part of the material forming the basis for this analysis was developed from interrogations and questionnaires directed to command and staff officers of the Japanese Army and Navy by USSBS. Information developed from Japanese sources by other agencies also was used as indicated.

(1) The majority of the estimates concerning existing and potential U. S. air power, naval power, and merchant marine, purportedly prepared by the Japanese at and shortly prior to the start of hostilities for use in their military plan-

ning, were obtained from the office of the chief secretary of the Japanese Imperial Privy Council. Others were collected from various military and government officials concerned with such matters. These sources did not appear to have had any prepared estimates as to existing and potential U. S. military ground forces except the figures furnished by the Privy Council as to present and anticipated Marine Corps personnel strength as a part of the estimates of Navy personnel strength.

(2) The data concerning *actual* U. S. strength, production, etc. which have been used for comparison with the Japanese estimates, were obtained from the following sources:

(a) Navy Department, Air Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, which compiled the information concerning U. S. naval air strength, naval strength and fleet disposition and damage.

(b) War Department, Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces.

(c) War Department, Operations Division, OPD.

2. Summary and Conclusions

a. The enemy intelligence estimates and planning are discussed in the chronological order of their development, commencing with the estimates and plans made in preparation for the war and continuing through the succeeding operations and campaigns. The degree of consideration given intelligence aspects of the various operations was determined by the amount of pertinent information which had been developed from Japanese sources. Certain conclusions are suggested by the analysis of enemy intelligence estimates and planning through the various stages of the war.

b. The Japanese were in possession of intelligence concerning U. S. air and naval forces in the Pacific areas prior to the commencement of the war—information which was timely, adequate in coverage, substantially accurate and in considerable detail. The relatively economical and expeditious completion of Japan's major offensive operations within the first few months of the war can be largely attributed to this. The contribu-