

- Q. The Communications Dept. at OWADA performed statistical analyses of communications interceptions. Can you tell us how many people were assigned to this work?
- A. I have been to OWADA only two or three times and have not seen it completely. I believe that the Statistics Section had quite a number of men.
- Q. Can you tell us anything, in addition to what you have already, described, about the methods of statistical analysis work done at OWADA?
- A. I think it would be better if you asked directly at the 3rd Section for this information as I am not able to give you a great deal.
- Q. Did the TENGO Plan, as originally written in January or February of this year, cover the estimate as to possible landings on the Japanese homeland?
- A. The TENGO Plan covered only OKINAWA and the Southern Area, but the KETSUGO Plan covered the eventuality of any landings on the Japanese homeland, did not include KARAFUTO or the KOREAS.
- Q. Was the TENGO Plan revised from time to time as further information was secured?
- A. It did not change. It was a plan, was set up, and not changed.
- Q. Was there a further estimate or plan made on 1 June regarding the estimates in connection with the defense of the Japanese mainland?
- A. There was a plan made up at that time. However, I was not specifically concerned with it. I believe it was in June.
- Q. Were you not in the 1st Section of the 1st Department in June of this year?
- A. Yes. I was in the section at that time.
- Q. What was your estimate then as to where and when the Allied landings would occur on the Japanese mainland?
- A. Our estimates were always a little bit earlier than the actual facts, inasmuch as the decision as to when and where the American forces would land was a matter of higher authority, and my estimate was only an estimate. However, in my opinion, I thought that the American forces could make a landing possibly as early as the early part of August, that it depended upon the status of the weather as it pertained to the utilization of bombers. Actually, in my personal estimate, I expected landings in the first part of September. However, there were several opinions, and the opinion of certain members of the General Staff was that it would come in the first part of October. That pertained to KYUSHU. It was my opinion that landings would be carried out in the Southern part of KYUSHU on either the East or the West coast, in either the ARIAKE BAY or MIYAZAKI Areas. This opinion was also held by the Army.
- Q. Upon what information was this opinion based?
- A. This was a strategic decision. It depended, in the first instance, on air superiority being obtained in the OKINAWA Area. This was a judgment based upon no particular piece of information. I based my decision upon the past experiences of the war, particularly such a factor as the fact that as KYUSHU was an island, air superiority could be obtained over it. And it was almost without communications, particularly railroad communications with the rest of Japan. Moreover, it lay strategically between the main part of Japan and China.

- Q. Based on this, how many divisions of Japanese troops were moved into KYUSHU?
- A. I do not remember. I was not directly concerned. The operational information on the movement of our own troops, and similar matters, was not a matter within my province. My job was specifically that of estimating American intentions.
- Q. Inasmuch as the communications were poor, especially railroad with regard to transportation had the estimate been wrong, the results would have been most serious for Japan. Isn't that so?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You must have been very sure of your estimate then.
- A. It is true that the results would have been disastrous if my estimate had been wrong. However, based on my past experiences, I felt sure that the American army would land nowhere, in this initial operation, except on KYUSHU. I did not feel that it was at all likely that the Americans would land on HOKKAIDO, and the landing in the Tokyo area, I felt sure, would be subsequent to KYUSHU.
- Q. In addition to what you have already told us, would you further elaborate on your reasoning and the information which brought you to this conclusion?
- A. In addition to what I have already said, there was practically no other method of reasoning that I used, but my method of reasoning was purely a tactical judgment.
- Q. Was it upon this judgment alone then that the deployment of Japan's forces was based for the defense of the home islands?
- A. It was not my decision alone. As I have explained before, the final decision was arrived at by a comparison of the decisions of all of the officers working on this subject in the 1st Section - TOMIOKA, OHMAE, and others. The final decision was that believed by the group to be wisest by them after considerable discussion.
- Q. Based upon this decision, was a plan for the defense of KYUSHU and Japan drawn up?
- A. The plan for the defense of KYUSHU was an Army affair since, after all, they were the ones primarily concerned. However, inasmuch as we had practically no Navy left at that time, and inasmuch as our air force was greatly depleted, the ends of both the Army and Navy were practically identical. Consequently, all of the Naval Air, as well as the bulk of the Army Air, was concentrated, as a result of this estimate, in the Western part of the island, from the KYOTO Area West and South. The KEISUGO Operation Plan applied only to air operations inasmuch as outside of air operations against the fleet prior to its landing, there was very little we could successfully have done. The plan did not apply beyond such a time as the American forces might have secured a firm foothold.
- Q. Was that plan drawn up by the 1st Department?
- A. It was made up by the Combined Fleet.
- Q. What was the date of that plan?
- A. I do not remember.

- Q. Was it about the first of June?
- A. As this is a matter of aircraft, I do not recall.
- Q. However, the estimates in the plan dealing with the time and place of the expected landing were furnished by you, were they not?
- A. The Combined Fleet was of the same opinion as we were.
- Q. Did the Combined Fleet go through the same procedure as the General Staff did?
- A. The actual decision was worked out between the General Staff and the Combined Fleet. Inasmuch as I was not directly concerned with the conferences carried on between the Combined Fleet and the General Staff, I do not know where or when meetings were held, but conferences were carried on frequently between the two.
- Q. What was the basis for your estimate that landings at KYUSHU might be made at ARIAKE?
- A. On the basis of the opinion of the LEYTE landings, it was quite likely that landings would be made in this area. Another reason was that ARIAKE is the only place in KYUSHU where a fleet can go close to shore.
- Q. In the plan that was developed, of which Capt. OHMAE gave me a copy, the numbers of ships in various classifications available for the landing was given. We would like to know upon what information those estimates were based.
- A. This estimate came to us from the 5th Section which is the section in the 3rd Department concerned with American fleet strength, based upon their past information of the fleet, plus information gathered at OKINAWA. Such information was quite easy to gather inasmuch as we were able to observe landings there and to observe fleet units throughout the majority of the campaign.
- Q. Are you familiar with a document produced by the 3rd Department of the Navy General Staff in March 1944 in which U.S. carriers are listed by name, together with the numbers of air groups assigned to these carriers? It must have been a well known document to everybody in Planning. It would have been basic.
- A. I am familiar with the information obtained. I am not familiar with the document itself. This was made up by the 5th Section.
- Q. Did captured documents provide the information given here, or was it some other method?
- A. I do not know what information it was based upon.
- Q. To what extent did aviators shot down over Japan provide useful information in making the estimates we have just discussed?
- A. That was a matter of the 5th Section, and I have not heard of any particularly important information. Such persons shot down would not have had much information on future operations.
- Q. What did you estimate the U.S. moves would be after the landings on KYUSHU?
- A. The U.S. landings would be on the KANTO PLAIN.
- Q. How long after the KYUSHU landings did you estimate it would be before that operation took place.
- A. Three to four months after the end of the KYUSHU Operation.

- Q. Were all members of the Japanese Merchant Marine members also of the Japanese Imperial Navy?
- A. Those that had training in navigation and similar subjects entered the Japanese Navy after the war began. These personnel were very few in the Merchant Marine.
- Q. Were not officers of the Merchant Marine also officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy?
- A. Yes. All officers were reserve officers in the Japanese Navy.
- Q. That was true prior to the war also?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Could you tell me what system the Navy employed for securing information from Merchant Marine officers? Were regular reports made (prior to the war)?
- A. I have never heard of any being made inasmuch as I came into the section in October of last year.
- Q. As Commanding Officer of a destroyer during the latter part of the war, what is your estimate of the adequacy of information furnished you which you required to do your work?
- A. While I was captain of a destroyer, I received practically no intelligence information. Intelligence is, after all, more a function of the Fleet Headquarters. Furthermore, the only way to receive it at sea is by wireless, and my wireless was always full of operational reports. Such matters as American naval strength and movements of American vessels I did not receive information on. However, during the period of the GUADALCANAL Operations, we received a little information as to the sightings made by reconnaissance aircraft. Outside of that, practically nothing.
- Q. Were your communications facilities satisfactory?
- A. Communications were good until the time of the SOLOMONS Operations. After that, we found it progressively more difficult, due largely to enemy action. For example, in my destroyer squadron, the lead ship was sunk, another ship was sunk, and under such conditions, which were frequent, communications became very difficult as the war wore on.
- Q. What was the date of your departure from Japan to participate in the occupation of WAKE?
- A. The early part of November 1941.
- Q. Did you know at the time of your departure what your destination and mission was?
- A. No. I had no information.
- Q. What did you think it was?
- A. I felt sure that some sort of engagement was in the offing. I had no information, however, of the objective operations against PEARL HARBOR. All such matters were kept strictly secret. The first information I had at the beginning of the war was in the early part of December, the 7th or 8th. I did not participate in the GUAM operations. They kept such news very secret so I naturally had no information.

- Q. Were there transports in the force which you accompanied?
- A. There were neither transports nor troops in the convoy.
- Q. What made up your force?
- A. They were all combatant ships.
- Q. Where and when did the troop ships join your force?
- A. The troop ships did not meet our force.
- Q. Did your force participate in the occupation of WAKE?
- A. Our itinerary was from Japan past GUAM, TRUK, KWAJALEIN, and WAKE where we participated in the occupation. Because your force put up such a magnificent fight, we thought there were many more than there actually were. We left in the early part of November to participate in the WAKE Operation. At the time of the RARAU occupation, in March of 1942, my force was in the BISMARCK Sea, but we did not actually participate in the occupation.
- Q. Was your defense of OKINAWA upset by the fact that the assault was made on 1 April instead of the last part of March as you had expected?
- A. We thought that you would land in the middle of March. Consequently, the fact that you delayed your landing by even such a small period helped us in our preparations somewhat. If you had come in March, we would not have been as nearly well prepared for you as we were. If you had delayed one more month, we would have been able to win.
- Q. What made you so sure that the landing would be attempted on OKINAWA rather than other islands in the RYUKYU Group?
- A. Because OKINAWA is an excellent place for airfields and fleet anchorage, and the others are not.
- Q. To what extent was the TOKUMU BU helpful in furnishing useful information?
- A. No such unit in the Japanese Navy that I know of. At the time of the CHINA incident, the Army had the TOKUMU KIKAN. During the war I believe this was disbanded even in the Army. There is no such organization in the Navy.
- Q. Did you ever hear of Admiral CHUDO?
- A. I have heard his name, but I do not know him.
- Q. Do you know through what sources you got any specific details as to what air groups were aboard which carriers?
- A. That was a job of the 5th Section. I do not know. I had no dealings with anything of that kind.
- Q. Did you have in your section other people under you who helped you with the analysis of the great quantity of material flowing in to you?
- A. The work in the section was done by a number of officers working together -- Capt. OHMAE and other officers. The statistical work was done by Headquarters. We all worked together in the same room, OHMAE, TERAU, and a number of other officers. In writing my conclusions, I found that I needed a certain piece of information, and I would say, "Let me have your data on this". I do not know where they got it. I was Capt. OHMAE's assistant in all these matters -- air, army, navy.

- Q. Where was the organization that screened the great amount of information coming in from all sources? Who summarized all the information that Adm. TAKEUCHI received and passed on to you?
- A. There is only the 5th Section. The 5th Section had charge of analysis, statistical work, etc. The Combined Fleet staff received the same information that we did directly from the 5th Section and OWADA.
- Q. From the questions that have been asked today you have some idea of the purpose of our conversations, and what we are trying to put together concerning the relationship between source of information and planning. From your knowledge, what occurs to you that has further bearing on the subject?
- A. I want to explain the setup of our physical communications which in many respects permitted a good deal of inefficiency in our operations. The 5th Section was at HIYOSHI. The Communications Section was at OWADA. The 1st Section was close by the Naval Department. Furthermore, the Army Intelligence Sections were similarly scattered out. All communications were dependent upon telephone. The Japanese telephone system is ordinarily bad. Furthermore, as a result of your bombings, oftentimes it was impossible to gain any sort of communication with these various outlying sections from which our information came. Consequently, it was very difficult to gather together information rapidly and completely.
- Q. Where was the Grand Fleet Headquarters?
- A. It was in the operations area, wherever that happened to be. In the latter part of the war, it was in KYUSHU.
- Q. Where was Adm. OZAWA located in the latter part of the war?
- A. In Tokyo.
- Q. Was he Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet?
- A. Yes. The Combined Fleet Headquarters moved to Tokyo in the latter part of the war.
- Q. How were you listed? Under what title in the Table of Organization within the 1st Section?
- A. I do not remember exactly where I was listed. I was actually Capt. OHMAE's assistant. I was carried on the list under both the Administrative and Planning Sections of the 1st Department. My job was intelligence evaluation under Capt. OHMAE.

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File

INTERROGATION NO: 372
(Jap Intell No 25)



Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.
Subject: Organization and Operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA.
Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Army Academy: 1937
1938-1940: 4th Section North China Area Army Headquarters
1940-1943: 2d Department Army General Headquarters
1943-1945: Army Attache in Moscow
1945 (May): 2d Department, Army General Headquarters

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR.

Interpreter: Major J. C. PELZEL, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

During the War Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, was attached to Army General Headquarters in TOKYO and also served as Military Attache in Moscow. Through his experience in Headquarters he became familiar with the organization and operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA, although never a member of the organization himself. On the basis of his experience and information he estimated, after the Potsdam Conference, that RUSSIA would attack JAPAN early in November. TOKUMU KIKAN was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army and obtained information on Soviet strength, movements and intentions through espionage, observation along the border, interrogation of Russian spies, communications interception, and analysis of news and captured documents. While there was no connection between this organization and Headquarters in TOKYO, Headquarters received from the Kwantung Army weekly and monthly reports of the organization and sent requests for information to the Army which were turned over to the organization for action when in its field.

Personnel for TOKUMU KIKAN were selected from young officers in the Academy and from units of the Kwantung Army.

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Interrogation of Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Q.1. You have been referred to us as one familiar with the organization and operation of the TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization).

A. Yes, I understand.

Q.2. In what way were you connected with TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I was not in the organization at all, but I grew familiar with it through my position in the 2nd Section in the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO. While in the 2nd Section, I neither supervised the TOKUMU KIKAN nor worked with it, but indirectly I did learn of its organization and procedure in MANCHURIA.

Q.3. Tell us what you know about the organization in MANCHURIA.

A. The name, TOKUMU KIKAN, was the name of the organization about three years ago. Then the name was changed to JOHOBU. Its central office was in Harbin, with branch offices at CAMTO, KEIMEI (BOTSURI), TOAN, JAMUS, KOKZA, HAIRAR (3 sub-divisions), KOAN, and APAKKA (across the border in MONGOLIA).

Q.4. I understand the organization you have just described was the intelligence unit for the Kwantung Army.

A. Yes.

Q.5. What was the connection between the organization in MANCHURIA and the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO?

A. None.

Q.6. Did the organization operate in areas other than MANCHURIA? South CHINA and The PHILIPPINES for instance?

A. I don't know. When I was in northern CHINA in 1938-40 there was an organization known as TOKUMU KIKAN, but I knew nothing about it.

Q.7. Who is familiar with the organization in the PHILIPPINES?

A. Lt. Col. OYA. I am familiar with the organization in MANCHURIA, Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI with it in CHINA and Lt. Col. OYA with its operation in the Southern Areas.

Q.8. How many people did the organization use in MANCHURIA?

A. Fifty Officers and non-commissioned officers and 150 civilians in the central office and 35 Officers and 30 civilians in the branch offices.

Q.9. What training have you had in intelligence?

A. As in the case of all members of my class at the Academy, I had 20 hours in intelligence indoctrination. However, I feel that my three years with Army General Headquarters in TOKYO from 1940 to 1943 and again from May 1945 to the end of the War qualified me for work in this field. I worked extensively with intelligence reports. My particular job during each period with Headquarters was intelligence, especially military intelligence, concerning the Soviet. During my second period with Headquarters beginning in May 1945 I was concerned with economic and political questions as well as military intelligence relating to the Soviet.

Q.10. Were any directives or orders given directly to TOKUMU KIKAN by the TOKYO Headquarters?

Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd).

A. Absolutely none. If I had a request for a certain type of information concerning RUSSIA, I would transmit it to the Kwantung Army. It, in turn would get the answer from the organization or any other unit that might have the particular information requested.

Q.11. What was the relation between the organization and the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army?

A. The organization was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army. Special surveys might occasionally be made under G-2 by others regarding particular matters.

Q.12. What type of information did the organization send back to TOKYO?

A. The most important information was the order of battle, disposition of Soviet forces, and the strength of their forces. In addition it would supply intelligence on the internal situation in RUSSIA. Outside of these categories nothing else was sent.

Q.13. Was such information supplied on the basis of particular requests or on a continuing basis?

A. The reports supplied to Headquarters were of two types:

- A.
- (1) Emergency radio reports from the Kwantung Army Headquarters in response to my directives or on the basis of information gathered independently by the organization itself.
 - (2) Printed reports - (a) weekly and (b) monthly. Prior to the worsening of relations with RUSSIA, there was no weekly report but instead a 10-day report.

Q.14. You say that from time to time you made requests to the Kwantung army. What was the nature of these requests?

A. Outside of the requests I've already mentioned, I know of none. For instance, I would ask for information of the situation in a particular area or for a general type of information regarding, say, the air force. I did not send out requests going into details.

Q.15. Was the information you received through the Kwantung Army from this organization satisfactory?

A. No, it was not nearly satisfactory. That was because the problem was extremely complicated, especially as conditions with RUSSIA grew worse. The information received was too incomplete on which to base plans.

Q.16. What system was used by the organization in collecting intelligence?

A. My knowledge is generally limited to the system used by the organization prior to the time I was sent to RUSSIA three years ago. However, the methods have remained pretty much the same. They may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Espionage, (sending agents into the Soviet). The operations of our agents became restricted almost totally to areas on the MANCHURIAN side of the Border. We could not send agents into RUSSIA because of the dangers involved.
- (2) Observation. At high points along the borders there was a series of observation posts. Since the railroad ran close to the border, we could easily determine the movements of the Soviet troops. We could also observe the

Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAI, Isemu, Japanese Army (contd).

harbor close to VLADIVOSTOK. Such sources of information were often considered sufficient on which to form a judgment as to Russian intentions.

- (3) Interrogation of Captured Russian Spies. For instance, in the summer of 1941, one hundred were taken and from these and other spies captured from time to time it was possible to assess the situation of the Soviet Army pretty clearly.
- (4) Communication Interception. This was the function of a special communication unit and not of the organization. It was the most reliable source of information. Garrisons along the border, particularly along the borders of the Maritime Province, were able to intercept almost all messages to Soviet units in their areas.
- (5) Newspapers, Magazines, Captured Documents. The analysis of these was done at Headquarters in SHINKIO.

Q.17. Did the agents of this organization work in or out of uniform?

A. It varied according to the situation. Civilians never wore them. Military personnel did or did not depending on their job at the time.

Q.18. Tell us what you know of the BORYAKU.

A. There were none in MANCHURIA. Some were in CHINA. I have had no dealings with them. They were probably operatives for the NANKING Government doing special intelligence work. Both Chinese and Japanese operatives were attached to the Chinese Government. The agents attached to the NANKING Government were called SEIJIBO and ones attached since 1940 were called GUNJI BO.

Q.19. Are you familiar with the BUNKAN?

A. The BUNKAN were Japanese hired by the army and paid by the Army. They might or might not have officer ranks.

Q.20. On what basis were personnel chosen?

A. Two bases:

(1) Selection of young officers from the Academy.

(2) Selection of young officers, captain or below, from units of the Kwantung Army in response to directives. Qualifications were general intelligence and knowledge of Soviet affairs. Final selection was made by personnel officers at the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and the candidates were trained at SHINKIO (Headquarters of the Kwantung Army).

Q.21. Do you know that there was a school at AKASAKA KU (TOKYO) for training of Special Service Personnel?

A. No.

Q.22. Was there any organization similar to TOKUMU KIKAN in the Navy?

A. It is likely but I have never heard of it.

Q.23. Who among your Naval Officer friends would know?

A. I don't know, but perhaps the Third Department could tell you.

Q.24. When and on what sources did you estimate the Soviet would go to War against JAPAN?

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd).

A. In the early part of November 1945. I reached this estimate right after the POTSDAM Conference on the basis of developments at that Conference and on the movements and disposition of Soviet troops along the border. I thought that a blow would come North of VLADIVOSTOK and that they had 5,800 aircraft available for use against us.

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