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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

3768

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Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

Date of Information acquisition by Source for paras. 9-11: 8 September, 1951; Sub-source: Elicited from TSUJI Masanobu at his home; Evaluations: (4-3)

9. UCHIYAMA Kazuya was a graduate of Army Officers' School in the 42nd graduating class, a former Major in the Army; he did not graduate from the Army War College, but he is indeed a very logical and capable officer. From the time that he was commander of his district unit and then a company commander respectively at Army Officer's School, UCHIYAMA gained a popularity and trust among his subordinates that was well deserved. (Sub-source supervised him there.) He is now living in Nagano Prefecture. He provides HATTORI Takushiro with information on the Japan Communist Party. UCHIYAMA is greatly revered by a JCP member in Nagano who is a former subordinate of his. Also, a former Thought Policeman (TOMOKO KEI) who had previously served with that branch of the Nagano Prefectural Police is now operating as UCHIYAMA's right-hand man. Former members of the Retired Soldiers Association (ZAIKO GUNJIN KAI) are also assisting him. His information from these sources concerning the Communists is really authoritative since it is procured from within the JCP. Approximately eighty per cent of HATTORI's information on the JCP is provided to him by UCHIYAMA. The condition and process of the communization of the All-Japan Seamen's Union was uncovered by penetration agents of UCHIYAMA's network. Information concerning progress and plans of the Communist movement and operations in Toyama, Niigata, and Ishikawa Prefectures also is being reported to HATTORI via the Nagano Prefectural JCP agents of UCHIYAMA Kazuya.
10. HATTORI may have intelligence networks in Hokkaido as well, but that is not known (to Sub-source). He does definitely maintain intelligence operations units in Fukushima and Miyagi Prefectures in the Tohoku area, but (sub-source has) no detailed knowledge of those nets. (Source Comment: It is probable that former Wakamatsu Infantry Regiment men are being utilized by HATTORI for intelligence work in those areas. HATTORI once commanded the Wakamatsu City regiment and is very well liked there.)
11. TANAKA Tatsuo (田中達夫), governor at present of Yamaguchi Prefecture, is the son of the late General TANAKA Giichi (田中義一), one-time president of the pre-war political party "SEIYUKAI" and Prime Minister from 1927-1929. TANAKA Tatsuo has an extremely avid interest in the investigation of Communist activity. He has two former Army officers working for him in his collection of information concerning the JCP. They are former Colonel KOTANI (or KOYA; 久谷), a former section chief in the wartime Imperial General Staff office, a classmate of TSUJI Masanobu's, who has also been on duty in both Germany and Russia, and a former (Lt. Colonel) KUWABARA (川原). The information KOTANI (or KOYA) is gathering mainly concerns the JCP, while KUWABARA has been collecting information on Communist China.

RESTRICTED

ATIS Press Analysis
No. ?

supplement to
**SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS
COMMUNIST TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES**

"PEACE" ARTICLES

Military Purges Prohibited, Anti-US War Article: Whether it is illegal for a military purge to publish an article on a hypothetical US-Soviet war--an article that blackmails the US chances for victory--is a problem now before the Supreme Prosecutor's Office. TSUJI Macanaru, formerly a member of the Japanese military headquarters, was the author of sic! an article, carried in a mid-June issue of the "peace newspaper" KOWA SHIMBUN. The Special Investigation Bureau reports that Tsuji has written several other war articles in the last five years, several of them picked up by Communist journals "to promote an anti-American movement." The SPO is said to have a case against him under the terms of Imperial Ordinance No 1, the ordinance prohibiting purges from engaging in political activities. But it is apparently postponing action until the SIB sifts the evidence for violations of Government Ordinance No 325. (Tokyo Shinbun, 1 July)

"We Must Keep Out of a USSR-US War," Says Tsuji: "A Soviet-US war means total destruction for every nation involved in it... And whenever a nation allows a foreign military base to be established on its soil, that means involvement."

How long would America "protect" Japan, in case of war with the Soviet? What are America's chances of winning? "The Soviet can mobilize 24,000,000 men; America 16,000,000. The Soviet can spare 14,000,000 or 12,000,000 for duty anywhere; America 8,000,000." "The Soviet has 50,000 tanks; America 5,000." The Soviet has the "world's greatest" coal deposits, the "world's largest" oil reserves. ("Admitted that 70 percent of the oil fields are in Faku, which is vulnerable to attack, it has enough oil in storage to last up to three years. And it is developing fields in invulnerable Sinkiang.") Against America's reported 500 atom bombs, the Soviet has perhaps 50--"but common sense tells us that it will be more effective to drop 50 bombs on (industrially-concentrated) America than to drop 500 on the dispersed industrial centers of the Soviet." This is not to mention that in the Soviet "each industry operates as a co-plot self-sustaining unit in each area--different from the American system."

"From the facts, we gather that America is not likely to win the war." Meanwhile to maintain bases in Japan, America would have to establish "a formidable Pacific defense"--all for the purpose of fighting an enemy that has "only five or six percent of its total industrial strength located in the Far East." Obviously America "could not afford to make a long stand here." And after it left, Japan would have to face the "certain destruction" according to all involved nations. The Japanese are "riding for a fall" if they don't do away with these bases now. (Koma Shimbun, organ of the Overall Patriotic Movement Council, 12 June)

RAID

X
Tsujii 14 June 65

JCP Committee Office Raided for "Tsuji Report": The JCP Minamitama district committee posted the so-called "Tsuji Report" in front of its headquarters on the outskirts of Tokyo. The report--saying that "American cannot defeat Russia" and "that leasing of military bases is dangerous"--caused a local sensation and brought on a police raid on 15 June. Charging that committee members violated Government Ordinance No 325, police seized wall newspapers, 19 copies of KOWA SHIMBUN, and one each of HEIWA NO NOSHI, SHIN MINAITAMA, and a 30 May leaflet. (Taishu No Nakao No 97, 22 June)

TSUJI Masanobu, Col

Works for POPOV thru HATTORI; close friend of [redacted]
[redacted] Asked by a Chi Nat friend to write a letter to
Japanese leaders with Nationalist divisions interned in
FIC urging them to stick through the adverse period they
were suffering, in mid-Jan 51, he, after considerable
vacillation, refused despite desire to do a friend a favor
saying that he did not want to entrust his rep as a
soldier & patriot to unknown Japanese who might take
advantage of him. Real reason his distrust of CHIANG re-
gime. Visited [redacted] end Jan 51 to ask latter's
opinion of chance of success of CHIANG invasion S China
supported by guerrillas. [redacted] ducked, but was later

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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visited by TSUJI who asked him not to mention their conversation, as did HATTORI, because of reverberations in a high quarter (POPOV) which had originally consulted them. TSUJI frequently threatened by ultra-nationalists, but even best friends doubt he is in any real danger. A symbol of old-style militarism to many, he is a loyal and patriotic Japanese gentleman of the old school. A reasonably capable strategist, despite a certain naivete; kind, honest, loyal. Personality and experience deficiencies cause him to be lost in intelligence work. Definitely pan-Asian in his thinking - all Asiatic nations cooperate with Japan & Anglo-Saxon powers to stop communism in Asia. Ultra-rightists consider him as pandering to the Americans; some consider him incompetent & childish.

PD-175 3 Mar 51

Anti-U. S. Party
Forming in Japan

Japanese Red Plans
New Anti-U. S. Party

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2003

Former Lt.Gen. Ishihara Kanji's East Asia League (Toa Renmei) activities have been in the hands of former Col. Tsuji Masanobu since 1945; activities in China have been brisk since the war's end. Ishihara Kanji's deathbed instructions have been conveyed secretly to Chiang Kai-shek. Tsuji has been quite active in dispatching former Japanese Army personnel to Taiwan from Japan.

Comment: As the above report indicates. Tsuji still is far more involved and interested in Thailand than even Source presumed.

Hope for Asia, Tsuji implies, lies in Japanese leadership following a mutually destructive U.S.-USSR war. Japan belongs to the Emperor, not to Stalin or Truman, and the author expresses his "love for...even the worst type of Japanese" as being "far greater than for a foreigner or the best type." (a)

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THREE
UNPREGDED
ESCAPE

15-7503
(not changed)

Former Col. Tsuji Masanobu (? /2398/0207), who has the reputation among the lower classes of being the closest thing Japan now has to a samurai-type hero, visited the Soviet Mission on 14 May 1952 to ask that a letter he had written to his old friend, former Col. Mishina Takaji ("Ryaji" penned in)(0005/0756/7127/2945), be delivered. Mishina is a graduate of the class of 1924 at the Military Academy, a graduate of the War College, and a onetime staff officer in political affairs with the Kwantung Army. He was a classmate of Tsuji and the two worked together in Kwantung Army Headquarters later. Mishina was captured by the Soviets in 1945 and is still a prisoner of the USSR.

there were rumors of Tsuji's close connections to personalities within the present leadership of the new party (Concordia Party). Some members of the Concordia Party have said that Tsuji was in a position to help the party, though only indirectly, since he is still purged and unable to join it. Tsuji has a distant relation by marriage (or by family?) to Ishihara Kanju; however, he seems to have no overt connection to the Concordia Party. Among the real leaders of the Concordia Party, there is a man called Wada Tsuyoshi (or Kei). He was formerly a lieutenant or captain in the Japanese Army, left it to engage in political work in connection with establishment of the Concordia Association (Kyowakai) in Manchuria and was later promoted to the rank of Lt.Gen. in the Manchurian Army. Certainly he was one of those closely linked to Ishihara. Tsuji and Wada were extremely close, and while Tsuji was carrying on secret operations in Japan, he is reported to have concealed himself at Wada's house for about three or four months. Even considering just this fact alone, it is virtually impossible to believe that Tsuji has no connection at all to the new party. Although the truth of the rumor cannot be ~~xxxx~~ ascertained,

it is said that Tsuji has promised a financial contribution to the party from the sale of his books and publications.

14 Oct. 51.

Rightist Organizations seen reviving: Atop the list of '61 reviving organizations ~~is~~ is the East Asia League, which looks upon the late Gen. Kanji Ishiwara as its spiritual pillar. A ~~preparatory~~ committee for the reconstruction of the East Asia League was inaugurated here on July 22. Former Col. Masanobu Tsuji, who was one of the ablest staff officers in the Japan Army, is presumed to be the likeliest candidate to take the reins of the reconstructed East Asia League. (FHIS, JIJD, Tokyo, 25 July 1952)

Much of the atrocities committed by the Japanese in Malay can be attributed to Tsuji. Many Japanese wonder why he was never charged for these crimes and brought to trial since others have been convicted and executed for the same crimes. (Air Intel Info. Report, 6004th Air Intel Sv Sq, Report No. C-1879, Confidential)

Subject is alleged to be connected with plans for a military coup d'etat.

He has been chosen as the front man for the group, and is reportedly under Hattori Takashiro's control (Hattori is the leader of the group)

(Field comment: Tsuji does not have the reputation of being under anyone's control. His very successful personal publicity campaign in the summer of 1952 resulted in a landslide-vote electing him to the Diet in the 1 Oct. election. Tsuji has persuaded the group that now is not the time for a coup. Apparently is capable of influencing the Hattori group. Tsuji is reported to have a faction in the NSA comprised in part of members of his own 35th class of the Military Academy. *29-10-2*

Tsuji has been getting considerable financial support from Konomi Ujitoshi, the de facto owner of the Tokyo Onsen (bathhouse), which recently caused a scandal and in which the Iwaki Cement Company invested heavily by donating cement. Konomi served under Tsuji when the latter was Chief of Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in the French-Indochina; by bribing South China Sea pirates Konomi traded between Indochina and Shanghai and also helped enforce the Japanese blockade of the South China coast. Saito Jiro, President of the Iwaki Cement Company, also met Tsuji and Konomi in Indochina, where he was manager of the company's Hanoi Branch during the war.

The South Pacific Expeditionary Forces were in action in Burma, New Guinea, the Philippines, Indochina, Batavia, and elsewhere. The war was conducted under the command of General Terauchi, Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Col. Iida in Burma, Gen. Yamashita in the Philippines, Lt. Gen. Inamoto in Batavia and many other military leaders with military forces up totalling 2,500,000 troops. At the end of the war, however, a group of these leaders were punished on charges of war crimes or they committed suicide. Another group of them with the company of 1,000 troops, who had been dispatched to Burma and wished to rebuild the Japanese militarists, took refuge in the Innan area. The second group was reported to have been under the command of Col. Tsuji Masanobu, who had been a staff officer of the War Office and later was assigned to the office of Chief of General Staff in Thailand. The rest of the above leaders were repatriated to their homeland, thanks to the good will of America. Col. Tsuji appeared all of a sudden in Tokyo this past year, but immediately afterwards covered his traces. It is rumored that the purpose of his visit to Tokyo was to get in touch with Watanabe Wataru.

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
Old Pouch	YKX-457	7 Dec 1944	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Peach Proposals (Exact copy as received from RBH Intelligence)			27 Jan 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM

4. As early as May, TSUCHII was sent to Shanghai by OKADA and KONOYE to approach HSU Ju through HO with a view to sounding out opinion in Chungking regarding the successors of General TOJO. The only two Army men in China who were in any way connected with this mission were Lt. Gen. MAEDA and Colonel TSUJI.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(35)

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Old Pouch	SOLICIT. MX-1195	DATE OF DOCUMENT 22 May 1946	ANALYST C - 7
SUBJECT Gold		DATE 2 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
1. <u>GOLD</u>			
The Japanese Army had a lot of gold. It is rumoured that they had 3 tons which had been taken from the French in F.I.C. They intended to use this to finance the government in Thailand. However the war ended and in order to get rid of it they distributed it to various Japanese companies. The idea was that it should be hidden or somehow saved from confiscation by the Allies so that in about ten years or so the Japs would have gold here to start the merry game all over again. Nearly everybody in camp is convinced that it is only a matter of time before Japan makes a come-back.			
MACHINO, Maj-Gen., head of the Financial Dept. of the GI Butai should know how much there is. It was divided into two parts:			
Part One was taken by Col. TSUJI of the General Staff and distributed among his junior officers whom he told to desert and go to their friends in Bangkok. TSUJI himself was reported as having committed suicide but everyone here believes he is hiding in Bangkok with a Chinese girl he knew.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-5-3-y	YEX-2294	4 June 46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT			DATE
Japanese Intelligence Organizations in China			26 Feb 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION
IS QUOTED VERBATIM

Section II

JAPANESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
IN CHINA

L. Headquarters and Staff Officers

.....

Prominent radicals who held intelligence posts in the CEF were
Lt. Gen. WACHI.....

WACHI served as right-hand man to General MAZAKI and with the
rank of Colonel was Chief of the Dai Ni Ka in 1938 - 1939 and had
as his assistant Colonel TSUJI. In 1939 WACHI, after promotion to
Major General, and TSUJI were removed to the front at Hankow. At
the end of the war Lt. Gen. WACHI was Assistant Chief of Staff of
Nambosogun (Southern Forces)

TSUJI, after serving in Hankow, returned in 1943 to Nanking as
Officer in Charge of the Dai Ni Ka, however, later in the same year
was dispatched to the South Pacific. Successors, such as KAWAMOTO,
OKATA and OGAWA carried on the influence of the Second Department.

The policy which WACHI and TSUJI were endeavoring to enforce was
complete military domination of China and the dividing of China into two
states, the North China Provisional Government and Taido Puppet
Regime. They strongly opposed the formation of the Wong Ching Wei
Puppet Government.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	ZJTT-25	7 Oct 1947	
SUBJECT	DOI Akio		
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
<p>1. Recent reports from a reliable informant indicate that former Japanese Lt. General DOI Akio recently returned to Japan. For the past two years DOI has been working with the 3rd Section of the National Defense Board in China. According to the informant the 3rd Section was concerned with Russian counter and positive intelligence.</p> <p>2. DOI is alleged to have been replaced by a former Japanese Colonel named <u>TSUJI</u> (fmu). TSUJI was a former Japanese Army General Staff Officer and considered a very able tactician. He was transferred to Burma in 1944 but later quietly appeared in Chungking working for the Chinese National Government. It is alleged that TSUJI's work was never revealed to the Americans and that the Chinese have him listed as a war criminal and are supposed to be conducting a search for him since the end of the war.</p>			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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FORM NO. 59-34 DEC 1952			

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TSUJI Masanobu

Following is an extract from MIS report "The Chinese Intelligence Potential in Japan: An Interim Survey", dated 10 December 1947:

"It is well established that high-ranking Japanese officers who surrendered in China are being utilized there behind the scenes in intelligence training and military advisory capacity. One source claims that about 20 Japanese general and field grade officers are employed in the Second Department (G-2) of the Ministry of National Defense, under the personal supervision of Lt. Gen. CHENG Chieh-min, successor to TAI LI as head of Chinese Intelligence. The most notable are

". . . . Not so well known but dangerously significant is the figure of Colonel TSUJI Masanobu, who, though the Japanese Demobilization Bureau reports him dead by hara-kiri, is still in Nanking according to CIC reports. A China source says that TSUJI was at one time head of the Fourth Department of General Headquarters in Nanking. This department is elsewhere said charged with over-all direction of counter-intelligence activity. CIC reports further say that Chinese intelligence-collecting in Japan is directed from Nanking under the guidance of Colonel TSUJI and that Japanese repatriating from China who intend to work for the First Section of the Chinese Mission generally bear letters of introduction from him.

"Once a young officer of the fire-eating, militarist clique, TSUJI became noted as a brilliant staff officer of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces who served in the war in China, and later in Singapore, Guadalcanal and again in China where he reportedly disappeared in August 1945. A fanatic, high-principled disciplinarian, he is said to have worked his utmost to bring about peace negotiations with the Chungking government and blamed then Premier TOJO for incompetence that Japan failed to settle the China Incident before undertaking a Greater East Asia war. Repudiated by TOJO and his home government, it is said that TSUJI's efforts won over the admiration and sympathy of many Chinese. Later he was said largely responsible for drawing up the plans that resulted in the capture of Singapore and for ordering the "liquidation" there of alleged Chinese Communists. TSUJI is wanted as a suspected War Criminal on SCAP order to the Japanese Government dated 11 September 1946."

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
44-5-1-3y	ZCS-1051	27 Mar 1948	<input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Interim Survey, "Chinese Intelligence Potential in Japan"			29 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p>XI. Sino Japanese Collaboration and Reactionary Elements</p> <p>Not so well known but dangerously significant is the figure of Colonel <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu, who, though the Japanese Demobilisation Bureau reports him dead by hara-kiri, is still in Nanking according to CIC reports. A China source says that TSUJI was at one time head of the Fourth Department of General Headquarters in Nanking. This department is elsewhere said charged with over-all direction of counter-intelligence activity. CIC Reports further say that Chinese intelligence-collecting in Japan is directed from Nanking under the guidance of Colonel TSUJI and that Japanese repatriating from China who intend to work for the First Section of the Chinese Mission generally bear letters of introduction from him.</p> <p>Once a young officer of the fire-eating, militarist clique, TSUJI became noted as a brilliant staff officer of the Japanese expeditionary Forces who served in the war in China/where he reportedly disappeared in August 1945. A fanatic, high-principled disciplinarian, he is said to have worked his utmost to bring about peace negotiations with the Chungking government and blamed then Premier</p>			
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TOJO for incompetence that Japan failed to settle the China Incident before undertaking a Greater East Asia war. Repudiated by TOJO and his home government, it is said that TSUJI's efforts won over the admiration and sympathy of many Chinese. Later he was said largely responsible for drawing up the plans that resulted in the capture of Singapore and for ordering the "liquidation" there of alleged Chinese Communists. TSUJI is wanted as a suspected War Criminal on SCAP order to the Japanese Government dated 11 Sept 1946.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
202-1868-C	ZJLA-1034	15 June 50	<i>C</i> <i>7</i>
			26 Feb 54
REFERENCE INFORMATION			
<p>The following information was obtained from the Desk Dossier on subject.</p>			

". . . it was learned that former Colonel TSUJI Maenobu, Staff Officer to General NAKAMURA, Commander-in-Chief of Burma, Siam, Malay area, recently disappeared from his residence in the Tokyo area.

"Colonel TSUJI was known as the "Strategy Demon" among his superiors and comrades and was highly considered among General Staff members. Immediately after the surrender of Japan, TSUJI disguised himself in various attire and reportedly conducted guerrilla operations as well as underground movements in Siam, French Indo-China and China. He was greatly respected by the natives of these various countries and regarded highly by Chiang Kai-shek.

"During approximately four (4) years of underground operations he was able to make numerous friends and contacts which might be of great assistance to him as well as any operations that Japan might execute in future. TSUJI returned to Japan in 1949 via Shanghai, traveling approximately 3,000 ri (7,500 miles) through Burma, Siam, Malay, French Indo-China, Chung-kink, Nanking and Shanghai.

"Colonel TSUJI decided to return to Japan and give his complete report to former General Staff members when he found out that War Crimes trials were over in Japan. Upon returning he became newspaper headline material and arranged the publication of a book known as "Senko Sansen-ri" (Traveling in Disguise for 3,000 ri) through the sponsorship of Mainichi Shimbun in Tokyo.

"Upon learning that the British were still interested and wanted him apprehended, he suddenly disappeared again during the early part of 1950. His current whereabouts are still unknown to source, but it is anticipated that Colonel TSUJI will ultimately establish liaison with certain members of the former General Staff when he definitely locates himself. It is reported that he may be heading for his old stamping grounds in Southeastern Asia via Formosa and General Chiang Kai-shek.

"Colonel TSUJI was able to cultivate excellent contacts for intelligence operations as well as underground networks in China and other countries of Southeastern Asia. According to source, TSUJI is greatly concerned with the spread of Communism in Southeastern Asia. It is TSUJI's opinion that successful guerrilla warfare can be maintained in China as long as they have leadership, which is currently sadly lacking."

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C 7
 DATE 26 Feb 54

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 Date: 2005

20 Jun 1950

(CONFIDENTIAL)

FIFTEEN TO ONE: THE DEATH STRUGGLE

IN BURMA

FOREWORD

I do not think that it is a futile effort for a defeated nation to review its battles to find a way to peace.

With sincere apology for my part in the war, it is my desire to relate the facts of the Burma campaign with thoughts of the heroes killed on the Burma battlegrounds and of their kins. If for nothing else, I wish to leave a record of my activities for my eldest son.

This book was prepared while I traveled incognito from place to place.

Of my 21 years in military service, I spent eight years on the battlefield. The final year was the most turbulent and difficult one for me.

This book is a candid record of the last year. Since this is a personal account, it may give the reader the wrong impression that I am seeking recognition or that I am/vindicate my past errors. This is not purpose.

There is no denial that the war was lost because the army was demoralized and there were many errors in battle tactics; but it is wrong to condemn all soldiers as depraved creatures or that all battles were poorly planned.

This book is based on actual facts only. Only those events which I have personally seen or experienced or facts which I have heard directly are related. There may be some discrepancies in the time and date and the strength of the army, but my conscience is clear on other facts.

(CONFIDENTIAL) -/-

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I dedicate this book to Lieutenant General Mizukami and his men who were killed in Burma. Perhaps I can offer some comfort to the relatives of the dead by relating the experiences of our battles. Therefore, I have turned over my notes to my old friend, Takamiya Taihei, for editing.

Youths who are active in this book are youths of Japan. Youths who are now wandering aimlessly and desperately without any roots in their defeated fatherland are also youths of Japan.

If this document can offer to these youth any encouragement to live and fight for peace, my wish will be more than fulfilled.

To abandon war and to establish a peaceful Japan, the people must redouble their efforts and sacrifices to preserve the peace. In this sense, it would not be useless to reflect on the turbulent past of the Burma campaign.

10 March 1950

Tsuji Misanobu

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

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CHAPTER I. FORCED LANDING IN ENEMY AREA

The Japanese military situation changed from offensive to defensive following the setbacks in Midway and Guadalcanal. Although the greater part of the nation's remaining shipping tonnage was assigned for military transport between Japan and the Southern Areas, this was totally inadequate to meet military requirements.

The Imperial General Headquarters planned to divert the flow of materiel through overland transportation to relieve the shipping shortage. In February 1944, the China Area Army was ordered to launch air attack against Kuei-lin. This was for the dual purpose to establish an overland route through Korea, Manchuria, China, French Indochina, Thailand, and Malaya and to destroy the advanced bases of the B-29s.

Yokoyama Isamu, with ten divisions totalling 100,000 men, was assigned this mission. As the chief of the Third Section of the China Area Army, I was responsible for the logistical support for army of one million men.

Within two weeks, Ch'ang-sha fell to the Japanese Army. Provisions were easily obtained locally, but ammunition had to be transported 100 kilometers on backs of men and horses.

The force pushed on to Hang-yang, but there it met unexpected strong resistance. To establish the supply line to Hang-yang for the relief of our men in seige, I had to return to Hankow to make

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further arrangements. Enroute we made a forced landing near the Yangtse River between Yo-chou and Hankow and I was taken prisoner by bandits. Through clever deception I bribed the bandits and returned safely to Hankow.

Following the withdrawal of the China Area Army's control over the economy in accordance with Premier Tojo's order, to the economic circle in Shanghai was thrown into chaos. The China Area Army was instructed by the Minister of War to cooperate with the embassy and the Wang Regime to restore economic order. In reply, I proposed ^{that} the Greater East Asia Ministry should be abolished and that the army should be given full control over all affairs, except those of purely diplomatic nature. This message was sent to the War Ministry over objections of the chief of the staff, and I awaited the reply, fully expecting dismissal for my rash suggestion.

The reply was both a defeat and a victory for me. On 3 July, I was transferred to North Burma as a staff officer of the Thirty-third Army.

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CHAPTER 2. CRUMBLING DEFENSE

Upon my arrival in Rangoon, I conferred with the various Burma Area Army Headquarters officers to reorganize the Japanese forces after the defeat at Imphal. The Imphal campaign was carried out despite adverse supply conditions. This factor probably was one of the major weakness of the army ^{was} in that it/ excessively inflexible in its thinking and unduly sensitive to its reputation. It is evident that the Imphal campaign failed because the army strove to gain fame through through vain glory and divine inspiration.

Air supremacy in Burma was already in the hands of the Americans and the British. When I requested for a plane ride to Maymyo, I was told to take a reconnaissance plane to Meiktila and then to go by automobile at night to Maymyo. When I arrived at Meiktila, I obtained the consent of the two soldiers who had come for me from Maymyo to drive during the day. Thus, I was able to familiarize myself with the tropical terrain of Burma, which differed from that of Malaya. In Malaya where there is only one narrow road running north and south, mechanized units cannot be used effectively. In Central Burma, except during the rainy season, mechanized units can operate cross-country.

I reported to the Army Headquarters at Maymyo, a resort town, for my orders. I was demoted and assigned to work under Lieutenant Colonel Shirasaki.

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While the Fifteenth Army was engaged in a fierce battle at Imphal, the 18th Division (Kiku) advanced to the Hukawng Valley from Kyitkyina to intercept the Chinese Expeditionary Force in India over the Ledo Road and to guard the right flank of the Fifteenth Army. The 18th Division, which was defeated by four American-equipped divisions of the Chinese Army retreated south and abandoned or destroyed its heavy weapons. To rescue the 18th Division, the 116th Division (Yasu) was thrown into the battle.

Kyitkyina is a strategic point connecting the Yunnan area with the Hukawng area. The four battalions under Major General Mizukami, assigned to defend Kyitkyina, were completely surrounded by the Chinese airborne troops in late June and were not expected to continue resistance beyond a month.

On the Yunnan front, the 56th Division (Tatsu), which had been guarding the Mu-chiang line for two years, was contained by 15 divisions of the Yunnan Expeditionary Army.

Since the primary objective of the Japanese advance into Burma was to cut off the overland American and British assistance to Chungking, it was a logical move to secure the Yunnan front at the sacrifice of the Hukawng area.

Before I made the final decision, I made an inspection tour of the 56th Division Front. I found that incessant enemy air activities forced the Japanese Army to move only at night.

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Chapter 3. ARMY HEADQUARTERS AT THE FRONT

When the orders for the interdiction operation were issued, the Army headquarters was moved to Hsensi in July. This site was chosen because it was located near Lashio — the terminal of the line of communications — and was suitable to direct the operations in the Kunlong, Namhkam, and Mang-shih areas. The Imperial General Headquarters expressed its desire that this operation be completed by the end of September.

Bhamo was the only remaining base from which this operation to prevent the merger of the Allied forces from India with the Chinese forces in Yunnan could be conducted. The Takahashi Battalion of the 2d Division was assigned to defend Bhamo. When Myitkyina was endangered, Bhamo was hurriedly strengthened by additional artillery, engineers, and logistical support.

When the situation in Myitkyina was considered as hopeless, Regimental Commander Maruyama withdrew his 800 men to save the regimental flag. Later, Major General Mizukami committed suicide to atone for his responsibility in the loss of Myitkyina.

I do not wish to think that Maruyama was a coward. He must have felt that it would be better to retreat and reassemble his men than to lose or burn the regimental colors. On the battlefield, it is often necessary to defend until the last man. In such a case, I do not consider it shameful to permit the flag to share the fate of the soldiers.

On 28 August, the Headquarters was advanced to Mang-shih to supervise the rescue of the 56th Division. The plan was to rescue La-meng

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by drawing the enemy to La-meng, Tang-yueh, and Lung-ling and by attacking the enemy south of Lung-ling. The rescue of Teng-yueh and P'ing-ka was to follow.

The 2d and 18th Divisions were to alternate in the defense of Namkam and reassemble at Mang-shih in late August to prepare for an attack in early September. The 18th Division was to intercept the Indian Expeditionary Army.

Fierce battles ensued. The Headquarters was further advanced to the front line. After 12 days of fighting with a force of only 1,400 men, Mang-shih fell on September 9th, followed by the loss of Tang-yueh. Despite heavy fire from the enemy, the 800 soldiers, including 150 stretcher cases, defending P'ing-ka were safely evacuated to Mang-shih.

This was the end of the Lung-ling campaign — the first phase of the interdiction operation. The total enemy strength was about 280,000 while Japanese forces numbered 18,000 — a ratio of 15 to 1. The number of enemy killed, wounded, or missing totaled 63,000. Our losses were 7,300, or a ratio of 9 to 1.

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CHAPTER 4. THREAT ON TWO FRONTS

The second phase of the interdiction operation was to check the advance of the Indian Expeditionary Army to the Namhkam area and to prevent a second attack on the Lung-ling area by the Yunnan Expeditionary Army.

Li Wong Yu, an unknown Burmese settlement located between the 56th and 18th Divisions, was the new site of the army Headquarters. Meanwhile, the 18th Division which was disposed at Namhkam, was readying itself for the second operation. The 2nd Division was transferred to the Mandalay area on 10 October.

When I inspected the Shamo positions, I found that the defense preparations were inadequate. The officers seemed unaware that the chief cause of the fall of Kyitkyina was ineffective defenses.

After the P'ing-ka battle, the 56th Division, was disposed at Wang-shih for the defense of area south of Lung-ling.

I was asked to send the main force of the 18th Division to Longmit for immediate strengthening of that city, but I asked for a delay on the ground that the Indian Expeditionary Army would strike at Namhkam. Much to my regret, the transfer was made during my absence. As I had predicted, the enemy attacked. ^{With since} _{was} the 2nd Division transferred and the 18th Division ^{was} _{understrength}, the force left for defense totaled only one division. It was to fight against the 20 divisions of the enemy.

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CHAPTER 5. RETREAT OF THE 56th DIVISION

When it became apparent that the 56th Division would not be able to defend the -ang-shih area against the expected attack by the enemy, plans were formulated for a safe retreat of the division. Time was of the essence in this move. Miscalculation meant the annihilation of the division.

The division commander was not in accord with my plans for an immediate retreat. After a personal inspection of the front, I finally convinced him of the necessity of this move. The retreat was accomplished to Che-fang on 19 November.

While the 56th Division was retreating, Bhamo was surrounded by the four divisions of the Indian Expeditionary Army. It was attacked on 15 November. It was our good fortune that we decoded the enemy's messages. By the end of November, Bhamo lost its outside support and was left to its own defenses.

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CHAPTER 6. THE NIGHT OF THE ATTACK

The defense of Bhamo was my "baby". I could not have it fail. The plan was to reinforce the Yamasaki Detachment at Namhkam with selected battalions from the 56th and 49th Divisions. Then the force was to advance on the Namhkam-Bhamo. This was to permit the Bhamo garrison to escape. To aid in this rescue, the main force of the 18th Division was to push northward from Mongmit.

This rescue campaign was successful. Although fighting against 30 to 1 odds for over a month, the 980 men of the Bhamo garrison, including 200 wounded, broke through the enemy line and returned to Namhkam on 11 December.

When I left the Mong Yu Headquarters for the rescue operation, I was instructed to deceive the enemy that our strength was large. During the fierce 8-day struggle, I had no time for such a plan, but on my way back to the Headquarters, I made an authentic operational map showing our plans for attack on Namhkam. Our force was indicated to comprise four full divisions of the 56th, 49th, 2nd, 1st and 18th. Namhkam and Wan-ting were shown to have large concrete fortifications. I left the map by the roadside as if it had been lost knowing that it would be picked up by the enemy.

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CHAPTER 7. HOLIDAYS AT THE FRONT

The Indian Expeditionary Army was quiet after the battle of Shamo and Namhyu, but the Yunnan Expeditionary Army began its drive to close in on the 56th Division. During the last days of the year, Che-fang fell and Wan-ting was surrounded.

Expecting the enemy to observe a truce on New Year's Day, at least, plans were made at Lashio for a celebration. However, in the midst of merriment, the Headquarters, which had moved to Lashio from Long Yu, was notified of a heavy enemy attack on the Imaoka unit. We had forgotten that the Chinese observed the old calendar and that their New Year was in February!

The commander of the 56th Division was in control of the front line extending from Wan-ting to Namhpakka. Our force comprising the 56th Division, Yoshida Regiment, Yamasaki Detachment, and others totaling 19,500 men was pitted against the Yunnan Expeditionary Army of 15 divisions in the north and the Indian Expeditionary Army of six divisions to the west with a combined strength of 290,000 men. The ratio was again 15 to 1.

We were able to hold the Ledo Road over the new year. If the enemy were able to recapture the Ledo Road and returned to China, the Kuei-lin area would be endangered. If the enemy pushed southward to Mandalay, our adjoining army would suffer. The last phase of the interdiction operation was to sustain our defense as long as possible.

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In spite of heavy enemy attacks we were able to hold the line until the end of January, when the 56th Division retreated to the Ilsenwi-Lashio line. All ammunition and supplies were safely transported to the rear area before we retreated.

I proceeded to Kalaw to report on the interdiction operations to Army Headquarters. I was quite surprised to find that a ceremony had been planned to award me a citation. Honors are generally bestowed upon heroic soldiers posthumously. I, who was still very much alive, and who had always voiced opposition to individual awards, protested vigorously, but to no avail. I received the award with considerable embarrassment and with a premonition that it would bring bad luck.

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CHAPTER 6. ADJACENT ARMY IN DISTRESS

After the Chinese Army regained control of the Ledo Road, my next plan was made on the presumption that the Chinese Army would be withdrawn to China. Only the 56th Division was to be left to defend the Lashio area. The 16th Division was to be assigned to the Mandalay area to assist the Fifteenth Army now in a death struggle with a superior Anglo-Indian Army on the banks of the Irrawaddy River. The plan also included my transfer to the Fifteenth Army.

Chief of Staff Yamamoto approved my plan, but Army Commander Honda objected, and in particular my transfer. When I insisted, the plan was finally approved and I was transferred to the Fifteenth Army.

Before I reported to the division headquarters at Myotha, I inspected the front-line and found that the Fifteenth Army was fighting under more adverse conditions than the Thirty-third Army. Contrary to my expectations, I was welcomed at the headquarters.

The following day, the headquarters was thrown into confusion when a large enemy mechanized column of 100 tanks and 1,000 trucks crossed the Irrawaddy River advanced to Meiktila and captured it. This necessitated a sudden change in our plan, but this was opposed by the Area Army Headquarters at Rangoon, which was directing the operations without knowledge of front-line situation.

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Permission was finally granted for the 13th Division to recapture Meiktila. I was assigned to lead the division in this operation. When this mission was accomplished, I returned to the headquarters and found that I was transferred back to the Thirty-third Army, which was ordered to the Meiktila area.

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Chapter 9. THE DEATH STRUGGLE

When I reported to the Thirty-third Army, it was in command of the 18th, 116th, and 49th Divisions. After the Meiktila battle, the military situation of the Fifteenth Army had deteriorated rapidly. This naturally adversely affected the capabilities of the Thirty-third Army.

On 25 March, the Army Headquarters was moved to Thazi; four days later it moved again to Nyaungnyan. Finally, it shifted to Pyawtwe. When the Headquarters was attacked and liaison with the 18th Division was severed, Second Lieutenant Fujimoto had to break through the enemy line to deliver orders to the division.

Later, the Headquarters moved to Pyinmana under the cover of darkness. There the remnants of the 116th and 55th Divisions were disposed in a semicircle to guard the small town. The 18th Division was guarding the right flank. The Headquarters, with its staff of 300, established defense positions 3 kilometers south of Pyinmana. This was the beginning of the death struggle.

Early on the morning of 19 April, the Headquarters was attacked heavily by planes and tanks. Under the cover of darkness, it moved again without being detected by the enemy.

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Chapter 10. THE SEVENTH WOUND

The plan of the Burma Area Army was to assemble the Fifteenth Army at Toungoo for a new campaign while the Thirty-third Army held the northern front. Eventually, remnants of the 49th, 56th, 116th, and 55th Divisions assembled at the Tenth Sector Army Headquarters east of Toungoo.

Over the objections of staff officers, I proposed a plan to assign the Thirty-third Army to defend the Sitang River mouth to assist the rescue of the Twenty-eighth isolated in the area. This plan was approved by the Area Army Headquarters. The Fifteenth Army was ordered to secure the east flank of Toungoo and to assist the southward march of the Thirty-third Army. Then it was to proceed to Moulmein.

The 56th, 116th, and 49th Divisions began their southward trek. At the bank of the Schwegyin River, the crossing operation was hampered by the swollen river and heavy enemy fire from the opposite bank. I became impatient with this delay because it might be dawn before the crossing was completed. Therefore, I plunged into the river on horseback and led the others.

It became increasingly more difficult as we pushed through the jungle in the rain. It was obvious that the Area Army was not fully cognizant of our depleted ammunition and strength.

After crossing the river, the 56th Division reduced its rest periods and pushed forward relentlessly both day and night. It reached the Sitang River mouth on 10 May, just a day or so ahead of the enemy.

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Plans were formulated for the rescue of the Twenty-eighth Army. This successful operation was primarily the work of Colonel Maruyama who was relieved of his command when he withdrew his regiment to save the flag.

On 18 May, I was ordered to the General Headquarters. On the way to Saigon, I stopped at the Area Army Headquarters at Moulmein and was requested by Army Commander Kimura to report that he was responsible for the defeat of his force. Kimura had been the target of considerable criticism for abandoning Rangoon and fleeing to Moulmein, leaving several thousand civilians to defend the city with bamboo spears. His promotion to a full general immediately after the fall of Rangoon intensified the criticism.

When I arrived in Saigon, I was astonished and disgusted with the poor discipline at the Headquarters. When I was requested to draft plans in anticipation of my transfer to the GI Army in Thailand, I rejected the suggestion on the ground that my transfer was still unofficial. I expressed the hope of returning to Burma to continue my work at the front line.

When I made a full report on the interdiction operation to Lieutenant General Numada, chief of the General Staff, I called his attention to the discipline at the Saigon Headquarters. I expected a reprimand, but to my surprise he thanked ^{for} ~~me~~ for the report and suggestion.

I immediately returned to Moulmein by plane. While hurrying back to front by truck at night, I was wounded by a bullet from the Japanese-trained Indian Army volunteers. After sustaining wounds in the Sino-

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Japanese conflict, the Nomonhan Incident, Malaya, New Guinea, and Guadalcanal, I was wounded for the seventh time. This time it was by a Japanese bullet fired from a Japanese weapon in the hands of a former ally.

Despite my serious injury, I continued to plan from by bedside. On 31 May, I received the official order transferring me to the GI Army in Thailand as a staff officer.

On 4 June, with my right arm in a sling and holding a green bamboo cane, I ^{bade} bid farewell to my friends at headquarters and carried my memories of the men who helped me in my work.

It is not likely that a staff officer in cane would be welcomed in Bangkok, but I have to fulfill my duties, even with my life.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-5-3-61	SOURCE ZJLA-1083	DATE OF DOCUMENT 13 July 1950	ANALYST C 3 v
SUBJECT JIS - Underground Activity		DATE 24 Feb 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
<p>The following information is excerpted verbatim from the desk dossier on TSUJI Masanobu</p> <p>The South Pacific Expeditionary Forces were in action in Burma, New Guinea, the Philippines, Indo-China, Batavia, and elsewhere. The war was conducted under the command of General TERAUCHI, Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Col. IIDA in Burma, General YAMASHITA in the Philippines, Lt. General IMAMOTO in Batavia and many other military leaders with military forces totalling 2,500,000 troops. At the end of the war, however, a group of these leaders were punished on charges of war crimes or they committed suicide. Another group of them with the company of 1,000 troops, who had been dispatched to Burma and wished to rebuild the Japanese militarists, took refuge into the Yunnan area. The second group was reported to have been under the command of Col. TSUJI Masanobu, who had been a staff officer of the War Office and later was assigned to the office of chief of General Staff in Thailand. The rest of the above leaders were repatriated to their homeland, thanks to the good will of America. Col. TSUJI appeared all of a sudden in Tokyo this past year, but immediately afterwards covered his traces. It is rumored that the purpose of his visit to Tokyo was to get in touch with WATANABE Watase. THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 44-5-3-61.</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT. SECRET			

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DEC 1952

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-0-2-193	ZJL-608	3 May 1951	C →
SUBJECT Reports on the rearment activities of TSUJI Masanobu and HATTORI Takushiro			28 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION		Evaluation: (Report B) C-2	
THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<u>Report B</u>			
Subject: Japanese Rearmament--Danger of Control by Former Militarists			
1. Two former Colonels of the Japanese Army General Staff, HATTORI (fmu) and <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu, are directly connected with GHQ authorities in conducting research on rearment. They are an in- separable pair, with TSUJI dominating the more docile HATTORI.			
2. It is a known fact among former General Staff officers that HATTORI and TSUJI planned and urged the hostilities which brought about World War II. They were the prime movers whose tireless efforts of convincing the General Staff finally brought the opening of hos- tilities.			
3. Both HATTORI and TSUJI are extremely irresponsible, and will not take the consequences for their actions. They have cleverly avoided all responsibility for the Nomonhan Incident, letting their superiors or other staff officers bear the consequences. TSUJI is the type of man who, given the chance, would start World War III without any misgivings.			
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4. There is sufficient feeling among former General Staff officers unfavorable to HATTORI and TSUJI that, if the latter were to be given a voice in Japan's rearmament, these General Staff officers would refuse their cooperation, knowing that they would again be led down the wrong road. These facts are being discreetly circulated among stock exchange circles, who anticipate an effect on the market when HATTORI's and TSUJI's rearmament activities become known to the general public.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-365	SOURCE FEC/MIS #3217	DATE OF DOCUMENT 1 July 1951	ANALYST C
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intell. Summ. Daily			DATE 27 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<u>SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS COMMUNIST TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES</u>			
"PEACE" ARTICLE			
<u>Military Purgee Published Anti-US War Article:</u> Whether it is illegal for a military purgee to publish an article on a hypothetical US-Soviet war--an article that blackens the US's chances for victory--is a problem now before the Supreme Prosecutor's Office. <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu, formerly a member of the Japanese military hqs, was the author of such an article, carried in a mid-June issue of the "peace newspaper" Kowa Shimbun. The Special Investigation Bureau reports that Tsuji has written several other war articles in the last five years several of them picked up by Communist journals "to promote an anti-American movement." The SPO is said to have a case against him under the terms of Imperial Ordinance No 1, the ordinance prohibiting purgees from engaging in political activities. But it is apparently postponing action until the SIB sifts the evidence for violations of Government Ordinance No 325. (Tokyo Shimbun, 1 July)			
<u>"We Must Keep Out of a USSR-US War," Says TSUJI:</u> "A Soviet-US war means total destruction for every nation involved in it...And when-			
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ever a nation allows a foreign military base to be established on its soil, that means involvement."

How long would America "protect" Japan in case of war with the Soviet? What are America's chances of winning? "The Soviet can mobilize 24,000,000 men; America 16,000,000. The Soviet can spare 16,000,000 or 17,000,000 for duty anywhere; America 8,000,000." "The Soviet has 50,000 tanks; America 5,000." The Soviet has the "world's greatest" coal deposits, the "world's largest" oil reserves. ("Admitted that 70 percent of the oil fields are in Baku, which is vulnerable to attack, it has enough oil in storage to last up to three years. And it is developing fields in invulnerable Sinkiang.") Against America's reported 500 atom bombs, the Soviet has perhaps 50---"but common sense tells us that it will be more effective to drop 50 bombs on (industrially-concentrated) America than to drop 500 on the dispersed industrial centers of the Soviet." This is not to mention that in the Soviet "each industry operates as a complete and self-sustaining unit in each area--different from the American system."

"From the facts, we gather that America is not likely to win the war. Meanwhile to maintain bases in Japan, America would have to establish "a formidable Pacific defense"--all for the purpose of fighting an enemy that has "only five or six percent of its total industrial strength located in the Far East." Obviously America "could not afford to make a long stand here." And After it left, Japan would have to face the "complete devastation" accruing to all involved nations. The Japanese are "riding for a fall" if they don't do away with these bases now. (Kowa Shimbun, organ of the Overall Peace Patriotic Movement Council, 12 June)

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-395	FEC/MIS # 3249	2 Aug 1951
FEC/MIS Intell. Summaries Daily		27 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION		
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM		
<u>SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS COMMUNIST TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES</u>		
"HYPOTHETICAL WAR" CASE		
<p><u>Orating Ex-Army Man Nailed for Purge-Breaking:</u> A government purgee is not at liberty to expound arguments favoring the Soviet Union's chances for victory in a "hypothetical" World War III, the Tokyo district prosecutors decided in the case of ex-Japanese Army Colonel <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u>. They charged that TSUJI, in so doing, had violated the purge ordinance. The case is now being explored by the Special Investigation Bureau.</p> <p>TSUJI, as a guest speaker of the Tokyo Liberalist Club last January, chose for his subject the "military and productive potential of the United States and the Soviet Union." The speech was picked up by several leftist newspapers--including the Kowa Shimbun and the Rengo Tsushin--and used to buttress Communist propaganda. (Asahi Shimbun, 2 August)</p>		
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FILE NO.	FILED	DATE OF DOCUMENT	
200-7-23-397	FEC/MIS #3251	4 Aug 1951	<input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT			DATE
FEC/MIS Intell. Summaries Daily		27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
POLITICAL REPORT			
1. <u>National and Foreign Affairs:</u>			
b. <u>Ex-Colonel TSUJI Indicted:</u> Ex-Colonel TSUJI Masanobu was indicted 1 Aug by the Attorney-General's Office for violating the Purge ordinance (Press Summary, 1 Aug 51). AGO charged that TSUJI spoke before a gathering on the analysis of the military strength of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. His indictment is based on Article 15 of the Purge ordinance banning political activities by purgees.(a)			
<u>Comment:</u> TSUJI, a former member of the Japanese Military headquarters, is the author of several best-sellers on World War II operations. In mid-jun 50, TSUJI wrote an article on a hypothetical U.S.-Soviet war minimizing the U.S. chances for victory. The Special Investigation Bureau of Japan learned that TSUJI had written a number of other war articles in the last five years....			
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FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
200-7-23-402	FEC MIS Intell. Summ. # 3255	8 Aug 1951	<i>C</i>
SUBJECT		DATE	
FEC/MIS Intell. Sum - Daily		4 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
CIVIL INTELLIGENCE			
2. <u>JCP Exploits Anti-US Speech of Ex-Army Officer; (First of Two Articles)</u>			
a. <u>AGO Indicts TSUJI:</u> The Japanese Attorney General's Office indicted TSUJI Masanobu, 1 Aug 1951, on charges of violating the purge ordinance. The Attorney General's Office charged that TSUJI, though a purgee, had given an address featuring an analysis of the military strength of the United States and the USSR; this, the AGO claimed, was in violation of the ban on political activities by purgees.			
b. <u>Anti-US Views Provide Propaganda:</u> The Communist press has used statements attributed to TSUJI, an ex-staff officer of the Japanese Army, as propaganda support of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) agitation for an overall peace treaty, racial independence and opposition to the militarization of Japanese territory.			
TSUJI reportedly gave his views in a speech to a small group of pressmen representing the "Asahi," "Mainichi" and Nihon Keizai" newspapers at a select, and supposedly secret, round-table discussion which took place on 3 Mar 51 at the "Free People's Club" (Jiyujin Kurabu) located in the Ginichi Building, Chuo-ku, Ginza, Tokyo. Two ex-Communists had sponsored this meeting: MITAMURA Shiro, one of the			
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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(35)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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-2-

earlier members of the prewar JCP, who renounced Communism in 1933 and now reportedly is a right-wing member of the Japan Socialist Party; and NAOI Takeo, onetime Communist and, during the war, an employee of the Japanese Army Staff Headquarters. NAOI presently is a free-lance writer. Talks at this meeting either leaked out or were relayed to the JCP, and this provided the party with TSUJI's speech which--from the Communist viewpoint--was timely propaganda.

c. Communist Press Voluble: The first known publication of TSUJI's alleged statements appeared in a secret Communist underground publication, "Inside information," on 3 Apr. Rengo News Agency (Kikanshi Rengo Tsushinsha), recently banned, was the first to distribute TSUJI's speech openly and widely. TSUJI apparently expressed the following views: that the US could not win a war against the USSR, that the US would eventually abandon Japan, that Japan must remain neutral and refuse the establishment of military bases. "Peace Treaty Newspaper" (Kowa Shimbun) on 12 Jun printed a more detailed report of the ex-officer's opinions. Reportedly, another pro-Communist paper "Star of Peace" (Heiwa no Hoshi) also gave the speech publicity. Not only pro-Communist journals printed TSUJI's speech, but one English-language paper "Japan News," also reported.

d. TSUJI's Background: TSUJI Masanobu, once a leading figure in the prewar military clique, had a varied career. He is said to have directed the fighting against the Russians during the Nomohan Incident in 1939, and after that served with Japan Expeditionary Forces in China. During the Pacific War he played important parts in Japanese

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-3-

war operations in Southeast Asia, serving at one time under General YAMASHITA. When the war ended he was in Siam, but went into hiding when British authorities listed him as a war-crimes suspect. It was not until Jan 50, when British war-crimes trials had come to an end, that he dared to make his reappearance in Japan. His book, "Six Thousand Miles in Disguise," recounted his experiences as a fugitive from British justice.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
C →	ZJJ-84	18 Apr 1952	C →
SUBJECT			DATE
HATTORI Takushiro			1 Feb 1954

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Evaluation: B-3

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM

6. HATTORI's closest friends and acquaintances include the following:

a. TSUJI Masanobu, to whom he has been close since 1939, when TSUJI was his subordinate in the Nominhan Incident and became his ardent admirer. He was instrumental, in 1949, in having TSUJI cleared from British charges of war crimes.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-7-15-14	ZJJA-229	27 May 1952	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT			DATE
Newspaper Clippings Concerning Prominent Japanese			2 Feb 1954

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Verbatim

2. Attached is also a review of TSUJI Masanobu's latest book, Under-ground Escape. The volume is available in English in Tokyo and can be purchased if you would like to have copies.

RI/CO Note:

See Desk dossier on subject in 2212 J for a copy of the above mentioned newspaper review. Also see FEC/MIS Intell. Summary filed 23 June 1952 in this dossier. #3575

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Nippon Times

KIYONRI TOGABAKI, President
1-chome, Uehisa-iwa-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Central P.O. Box 164, 328, 329.

Tel: (57) 5884-9.

OSAKA: Dofine Bldg. Tel: (35) 0177
SUBSCRIPTION RATE:
One month ¥200 by mail ¥230

TOKYO, MONDAY, MAY 19, 1952

BOOKS

UNDERGROUND ESCAPE by
Mitsunori TSUJI, Published by
Robert Booth and Tetsu Fukuda,
CPO Box 1688, Tokyo. 300 pages.

The author, Masanobu Tsuji, is a former Japanese army colonel who was recognized as one of its most brilliant staff officers during the period when Japan's militaristic and imperialistic sun reached its zenith and when it finally plummeted to oblivion on August 15, 1945.

Underground Escape is the first of a series of six best-selling documentary books by Mr. Tsuji. The other books are detailed and authoritative reports of the Japanese army, its problems and its activities in Manchuria, Guadalcanal, Burma and Singapore. This first volume describes Mr. Tsuji's experiences following Japan's surrender until his unexpected re-appearance in Japan three years later.

During those three years, he cast off his uniform and the authority and prestige which had long been the concomitant of being an officer of the Japanese army and traveled in the ragged robes of an itinerant Buddhist priest and the padded gown of a Chinese in a journey that covered 7,500 miles from Bangkok, through French Indo-China and into China by way of Kunming, Chungking, Nanking and Shanghai until he finally returned on May 20, 1948, to a defeated, prostrate Japan.

Of considerable interest today is Mr. Tsuji's analysis of the growing power of communism in Southeast and East Asia. The description of the internal dissension and corrupt conditions that drove the peoples in these areas to oppose existing governments and yield to the tempting promises of the Communists in their own land represents a clarification of the challenge faced by the free world in checking the aggressive advance of the Red Star throughout Asia.

In his foreword, Mr. Tsuji says: "The aim of this work has been to depict in naked reality the picture of Asia as I saw it, not with the eyes of a 'victor national,' but with the sympathetic suffering of one that tasted bitter defeat. I would deem it an unexpected happiness if from these pages the throbbing feelings and aspirations of the peoples of Asia can be caught."

Through the help of the Chungking Government underground system which controlled 1,800,000 Chinese residents in Thailand, the author, declaring his hope to meet Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his trusted adviser, Gen. Tai Li, to open the way for Japanese-China collaboration, was able to cross frontiers into China.

After months of hardships and dangers, Mr. Tsuji finally reached Chungking. But before a meeting with Generalissimo Chiang and Gen. Tai was achieved, disaster struck when the aircraft carrying Gen. Tai from Tengchong to Chungking crashed, killing the one man who was, in the author's opinion, the only person in a position to give counsel to Chiang Kai-shek. Gen. Tai was the key man in the Chinese underground and espionage system working against the Japanese army in China, but there existed a comradeship between him and Mr. Tsuji because of their common faith in the ideals of an East Asia federation though the two men had never met. Mr. Tsuji describes Gen. Tai as a man of great personal courage and integrity. With Gen. Tai's death, the author lost his hopes for achieving his dreams of Sino-Japanese cooperation, but he wrote several letters to Chiang Kai-shek, one being written in blood, and receiving favorable replies but nothing concrete came of this correspondence.

Of considerable historical interest is the revelation by Mr. Tsuji in his letters to Generalissimo Chiang of the close and sympathetic interest and desire

held by the Emperor of Japan and his brothers, Prince Chichibu and Prince Minami, to establish friendly ties with China, and concrete efforts by them during the period from 1932 to 1944 to achieve this hope are described.

Chiang Kai-shek is greatly admired by Mr. Tsuji as a simple, uncorrupt and honest leader, but he was also a leader isolated from the realities, particularly after the death of Gen. Tai, no one having the courage to proffer unpleasant information or advice.

Mr. Tsuji interprets the reasons for the failure of Gen. George C. Marshall's mission to China to lie in the American fallacy that the Chinese revolution and the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party were modern democratic revolutions. The author views the events as being merely a change of dynasties and ruling classes without the full support and trust of the people.

Having abandoned his hopes to achieve his mission in China, Mr. Tsuji in June, 1946, wrote Gen. Mao Tse-tung, who succeeded Gen. Tai Li as deputy chief of the Military Control Bureau, and declared his willingness to be arrested and handed over to American authorities as a war criminal.

However, orders came for Mr. Tsuji to go to Nanking, where he was put to work preparing manuals of operations for Nationalist troops in Manchuria and to give lectures on a composite survey of a possible third world war to high-ranking officers in the Nationalist Defense Ministry.

The author at that time predicted that the third world war would occur between 1950 and 1955 as the Soviet Union would have completed its fourth Five-Year Plan and as the U.S. aid to Western Europe would "bear fruit about this time." He also forecast that Russia would possess the atomic bomb by that time. He saw America's industrial strength outpacing that of the Soviet Union but that the latter would have dispersed its industries and adopted a policy of strategic materials while the former would be a target of concentrated cities. He deemed it wholly impossible for Soviet forces to land on American soil or to force her surrender.

The war would, Mr. Tsuji predicted, be decided by action in Europe, and the Far East would be a secondary battlefield. He saw the Soviet Union forced to limit its troops in East Asia to less than 30 divisions since the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was incapable of supplying a greater force. But this view was premised on the event that the Nationalist Government controlled Manchuria and that the United States had land, sea and air bases on the China continent. He anticipated Soviet support for the Chinese Communist in a program to create

a vast buffer zone in China and North Korea.

Underground Escape provides interesting reading—either as an adventure story or as one source of a keen analysis of Asia's troubles and problems by a former key strategist of the Japanese army. For the Western reader, the book supplies informative details of the life, habits and mentality of a section of the Asian population—G.Y. Somekawa.

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SECRET Security Information

JAPAN

FOR AMERICAN EYES ONLY
Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation,
Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Selected Items for the Information of Commanders and Staffs
of the United Nations and Far East Command

No. 3575
23 Jun 52

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE

1. "Underground Escape" by TSUJI Masanobu:

Comment: Ultranationalist TSUJI Masanobu, author of the best-seller "Underground Escape," who was once a leading figure in the prewar military clique, has had a varied career. He is said to have directed the fighting against the Russians during the Nomonhan Incident in 1939, and after that served with the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. During the Pacific War, he held important roles in Japanese war operations in Southeast Asia, serving at one time under General YAMASHITA. When the war ended he was in Siam, but went into hiding when British authorities listed him as a war crimes suspect. It was not until January 1950, when British war crimes trials had come to an end, that he dared to make his reappearance in Japan. His book recounts his experiences as a fugitive from British justice. (a)

a. Orientals Can Rule the World: "Underground Escape" has two major themes, one ideological, the other personal. Stated briefly, the author's politico-ideological argument is: Asian relationships have been bungled by Western nations and by Asians themselves, but following a titanic struggle between the U.S. and the USSR, the Oriental races, if provided proper leadership, can become the world's dominating force. In the autobiographic sense, his chief effort is to picture himself as a grand, tragic hero; a man of destiny, blessed with mighty physique, tremendous analytical powers, unbelievable courage, and exceeding charity and compassion. The aim of "Underground Escape," TSUJI says, is "to depict in naked reality the picture of Asia as I saw it." He describes Asia, with the exception of China, as the victim of two main forces; political and military "enslavement" by Western nations and economic aggression by China. As for China, TSUJI believes that, that nation has suffered from Western miscomprehension of the "realities" in China and from corruption of the Chinese themselves. Japanese policies on the Asiatic continent might have been better, he admits, but he claims that they were better than those of the West. (a)

b. Avoid Arrest or Work for Asian Unity?: "Underground Escape" is largely plotless, consisting mainly of the innumerable crises faced by the author in his three year, 7,500-mile flight through Thailand, Indochina and China. At war's end, he resolves to go underground for 10 years and work for Japan-Thailand friendship. After two months, disguised as a priest, he learns that arrest by the British is imminent. At this point, he contacts representatives of the Chungking Government and with their assistance flees through Indochina and eventually to Chungking. In two years in China he devoted himself mainly to writing: a letter to CHIANG Kai-shek explaining the Japanese Emperor's friendly feelings for China; a strategic study of Modern Topography; a basic manual on modern warfare; "Observations on World War III"; comparing U.S.-USSR strength and predicting a long, bloody struggle; a thousand-page "Evaluation of the Material and Potential of the Soviet Union"; and a 400,000-word autobiography. The latter went to his children; all other reports were prepared for the Chinese Nationalist Government. TSUJI claims that during these three years, only his courage and his desire to sacrifice his life for Asian unity kept him from arrest. He leaves the reader with the impression, however, that his primary motive, in reality, was to avoid arrest by the British as a possible war criminal. (a)

(a) Secy. Div. Japan Branch 201st F110s

J-2

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No. 3575
23 Jun.

c. General Marshall's Forces Hopeloss: Since the author claims to have worked for Asian unity and sees China as the heart of Asia, he attempts to analyze the forces which guide that country. He asserts: 1) The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty was not a true democratic revolution but a mere change of dynasties; 2) The death of SUN Yat-sen and CHIANG Kai-shek's subsequent success in subduing the warlords concentrated all power in CHIANG's hands; 3) CHIANG, though completely honest, was surrounded by corruption—corruption so extreme and widespread as to seal the doom of CHIANG's regime and assure eventual success of the Chinese Communists; 4) U.S. policy in China was ill-conceived. General Marshall's mission, as TSUJI explains it, was "to unite China into a modern democratic country, then give economic aid and military guidance, and through the stabilization of the people's lives, prevent the Bolshevikization of China." TSUJI says Marshall's efforts were hopeless from the start because there was no unity within the Kuomintang, because U.S. aid to CHIANG convinced the Communists that the U.S. was playing favorites, because the U.S. failed to realize the degree of corruption within the Kuomintang (he says one-third of military supplies sent to China were sold to the Communists), and because one or two postwar incidents involving U.S. troops created strong anti-American sentiments. (a)

d. U.S. Outdone by USSR: The USSR followed a shrewd path, TSUJI says, supplying no material aid, but offering the Chinese Communists "ideological comrades." Worst of all, says the author, were the British, who kept hands off China and to favor, in a general way, independence movements of all Asian people. The Chinese are naturally Chinese, he says, and we might have seen MAO Tze-tung develop into a "Tito" if, following the Communist victory, we had outdone the USSR in offering aid to MAO. TSUJI believes, despite our failure to follow the course he recommends, that Generals Marshall, Wedemeyer, and Stillwell all recognized the hopeless corruption within the Nationalist regime. Hopo for Asia, TSUJI implies, lies in Japanese leadership following a mutually destructive U.S.-USSR war. Japan belongs to the Emperor, not to Stalin or Truman, and the author expresses his "love for...even the worst type of Japanese" as being "far greater than for a foreigner of the best type." (a)

(a) Soto, Div. 5 Japan Branch 201 F1608

TOKYO NICHINICHI (Summary of Article)

August 1, 1952

Profile: Masanobu Tsuji

During the war, he was the most famous in the southern areas from Malay through Guadalcanal to Burma. It was not front line commanders but Staff Officer Tsuji who actually guided the operations of the Japanese army. In this sense, he ought to be the first to be resented by the war-bereaved families throughout the country.

Notwithstanding this, it is alarming that he is now a favorite of journalism, writing semi-documentary war records one after another such as "12,000 Kilometers Underground" and "the Malay War", after he suddenly disappeared from the Japanese Army Headquarters at Bangkok on the very day of the termination of the war and dramatically re-appeared in Japan with the close of the investigation of Japanese war suspects by the former Allied Forces. He is a most surprising character though this is the age of "reverse course".

At present, however, he says that new Japan who renounced war should stay out of a third world war. From this standpoint, he delivered a speech forecasting a Russo-American war at the Industry Club the other day, and in the speech he made a conclusion unfavorable to the U.S. Later the speech was exploited by leftwing elements for anti-US propaganda, but it is apparent that he is not a leftist.

Forty-eight years old, he is still a man of activity. With Japan's rearmament held imminent, there are found many pro-Tsuji persons among the old military starting various activities, especially among the young personnel of the National Police Reserve. Moreover, he is said to be connected with the old Eastern Asia League established by the late Gen. Kanji Ishihara. The reaction of the league is being watched with keen interest. No one can say for sure that it will not re-kindle Nazism which may flare up among the people frustrated by the defeat and the Occupation and tired of lukewarm political parties. NM (100) 

c. Rightist Speaks in Kyushu: "The Nagasaki Nichi Nichi" newspaper sponsored a public meeting at the Mitsubishi Kaikan, Nagasaki City, on 30 Jul 52 with TSUJI Masanobu as principal speaker. TSUJI, a well known nationalist (INTSUM 3575), spoke on the familiar rightist theme, "Asia for the Asiatics," according to a CIC report. His speech stressed complete neutrality for Japan, national "self-defense," and included remarks "bordering on" anti-American and anti-Soviet propaganda, according to a usually reliable source. The meeting reportedly drew a large crowd which was "wildly enthusiastic" over TSUJI's lecture. (e) (B-2)

*FECC Daily 7/15
2 Aug 52*

Comment: TSUJI, whose writings have attracted considerable attention in the past, apparently now is stepping up his speech making schedule; he has appeared as lecturer at several meetings in recent weeks. Although he reputedly has many loyal rightist followers, his ability to appeal to the general public has not been tested in the past. The brand of neutrality and self-defense which he advocates includes the demand that Japan cease to lease military bases and insistence on withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Nagasaki city lecture may have been part of the campaign now underway to reorganize the old East Asia Comrades League (Toa Renmei Doshi Kai); a campaign in which TSUJI is a leader.

FOR COORDINATION WITH U.S. Army

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TSUJI Masanobu

Former Army Lt. Col. I. Masanobu is again out leading a party of w.r. He says, in short: "If there is a war between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the U.S. will be beaten. Japan will be defeated again and left in ruins by the Americans. Therefore, our problems will be solved by us, the Japanese. If the American troops remain here, the Soviets will declare war -- they will not do that if the American troops leave these shores now". (TOKYO SHIMBUN, Tokyo Aug. 1, 1951-T)

Japan's Control of Asia

So far he (TSUJI) is like other so-called self-styled warlords. But when he says after these words if really honest, at any rate, in the air he says, the Soviets and the Americans will become exhausted and divided. It is then that Japan can rise up and control Asia.

This former army officer (Fascist - CPUSA) apparently cannot forget his pet dream. The "Force Defense Committee" of the communists took parts of TSUJI's talk and have distributed them all over the country, and these communists declare: "Socialists except those who are ready to support the Communists have carried themselves below the level of our standard CPUSA." TSUJI's fanatical urge seems to be of "goodwill" to the communists.

All the grounds for the bulk of the Japanese - and all the Japanese - to support the CPUSA have been collected in the following statement of the CPUSA:

ASSASSINATION PLOT

A113 R- Analy-1695-29

Police have learned of a rightist plot to assassinate TSUJI Masanobu, wartime operations colonel, from a former air force major arrested for robbery. The National Rural Police and the Special Investigation Bureau have assigned agents to check on the secret society that allegedly ordered Tsuji's death. Tsuji, after reading about the plot in a newspaper yesterday, left his home in Setagaya, telling his wife, "I won't be gone long." According to his wife, Tsuji knew shortly after he began publishing his war memoirs that his life was in danger. "Whenever he leaves the house," she said, "he tries to put on a disguise. But he has never asked for police protection." (c)

(a) Yomiuri Shimbun (b) Mainichi Shimbun

(c) Yukan Yomiuri

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FILE NO. 200-7-23-862	SOURCE FEC/MIS # 3735	DATE OF DOCUMENT 30 Nov 52	ANALYST C
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intell. Summaries (daily)			DATE 25 Feb 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION

The following information is taken from pages J-2 to J-4.

POLITICAL REPORT

2. The Independent Club

- a.
b.

c. ~~TSUJI~~ ~~Masanobu~~: (CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS)

POSITION: Member of Lower House (Independent Club)

DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Oct 02

PLACE OF BIRTH: Ishikawa Prefecture

EDUCATION: Graduate of Imperial Japanese Military Academy and General Staff College

PAST CAREER: Graduating at the top of his class at the Imperial Japanese Military Academy in 1924, TSUJI proceeded to trace a brilliant career in the Imperial Japanese Army. He participated in the Nomonhan action and the China Incident, but was particularly noted for his staff work in connection with the capture of Singapore and the defense of Burma which won him the title of "god of strategy." Although he was made a Colonel in 1943, his influence extended far beyond his rank because of his undoubted brilliance in directing intelligence and strategic operations and because of his connections with higher ranking officers. TSUJI's tendency to take control of all phases of operation and by-passing of the commanders in centering all decisions in his own hands, however, did not endear himself to his fellow officers. The end of the war found Col. TSUJI in Bangkok and on a British list of suspected war criminals for his part in an alleged massacre of anti-Japanese Chinese in Singapore. A few days after the cessation of hostilities, TSUJI went underground, and in due course made his way into Nationalist China via Indochina disguised as a Buddhist priest. He served for a while in CHIANG Kai-shek's headquarters and secretly returned to Japan in 1949. Immediately after his name was taken off the "wanted" list by the British, TSUJI reappeared in public life with much fanfare. He immediately assumed a leading position in the Japanese press, writing a great number of articles and best sellers on his experiences during the war. He became a favorite of the Japanese public, and engaged in a number of highly popular lecture tours. He became a member of the Japanese Diet in 1952.

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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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leading figures in the reconstructed ultranationalist East Asia League, and has been active in the Japan Defense Association, a league of former Army officers. TSUJI has concerned himself mostly with discussions of a military, political nature and speculation regarding the course and outcome of a Third World War. His comparison of the US and Soviet war potential led TSUJI to the conclusion that a protracted, indecisive struggle between the two great powers was inevitable and Japan should endeavor to remain neutral. TSUJI advocates that Japan build up her own defensive power, abolish the Administrative Agreement with the US and force the withdrawal of US troops from Japan to insure neutrality. While remaining aloof from Russo-American struggle, Japan should cultivate the friendship of her Asiatic neighbors and prepare for the day when the Oriental races will become the world's dominant force after the US-Soviet battle has run its indecisive course. Japan, as TSUJI has stated, "belongs to the Emperor, not to Stalin or Truman." The former Colonel's nationalist writings which stress a strong aversion to Western imperialism and speak of a future Asian unity have brought him a great deal of publicity, so that he is regarded as a focus for a Japanese military revival by large sections of the Japanese press. TSUJI's campaign for election from the First Ishikawa District drew large crowds. Running as an Independent, he received by far the largest number of votes in his district. He appealed to the electorate on the issue of pensions for ex-service men and war sufferers which he favors, and on his plan for Japan to become the Switzerland of the Far East, thereby avoiding the horrors of the Third World War. TSUJI was the only professional soldier to be elected in the recent House of Representatives elections. (d)

Comment: (CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS) Despite TSUJI's repeated anti-American statements and the use of some of his statements by the Japan Communist Party, it is almost inconceivable that he has any connection with the JCP. Rather, he is an ultranationalist with strong racial feelings who believes in the concept of "Asia for the Asians." TSUJI has stated that he wants to see the emergence of a strong, democratic self-defense force which will be under the supervision of the Diet. He quietes Japanese fears of rearmament by stressing the strategic insignificance of Japan in the event of a Third World War. If Japan pursues an independent policy by her self-defense force, TSUJI states that she can avoid becoming a battlefield, a course that many Japanese like to hear and want to believe in. Having inherited at least part of the mantle of Lt. Gen. ISHIHARA Kanji in the East Asia League, TSUJI has placed himself at the forefront of a movement, as yet small, to revive racist ultranationalism. In the House of Representatives,

he can be expected to take a very independent line of action, attacking the present government on many issues. The Lower House floor will give TSUJI an additional forum from which to publicize his already well known views. It remains to be seen whether his arguments will win him any followers in the Diet, but it is certain that his presence there will cause the government considerable uneasiness.

10 JMA SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

OLITICAL REPORT

2. The Independent Club: Part I of three parts)

a. Independent Club Holds Balance of Power: (UNCLASSIFIED) The Liberal Party emerged from the 1 Oct Lower House elections with a bare majority of nine seats. This slim margin is reflected in most of the Lower House committees (where the bulk of the legislative work is performed) in which an equal number of Liberal members and nongovernment members sit under a Liberal chairman who votes only in the case of a tie (INTSUM 3717). The precarious Liberal majority consequently is constantly threatened by death, illness, abstention, or defection from the majority party's ranks. The Progressive, Right wing Socialist, Left wing Socialist and Labor-Farmer Parties all have publicly announced that they will act as opposition parties in the Diet. This leaves the Independent Club, as the only remaining organized Lower House body, in a strong bargaining position. Its decision to support or withhold support from the government's measures may determine the fate of the fourth YOSHIDA Cabinet. The Independent Club was organized on 24 Oct by 12 Lower House members, one of whom, octogenarian KUHARA Fusinosuke, soon withdrew from the Club's membership. Of the Independent Club's 11 remaining members, seven were elected as Independents and four as minor party candidates. Each of these minor parties produced only one successful Diet member. (d)

b. Independent Club Has Heterogenous Membership: (UNCLASSIFIED) The only reason for the 11 members banding together in a club was to improve their bargaining position. As an organized body, they became entitled to one seat on a number of Lower House Standing Committees, including all of the important committees. Their political opinions appear to range from the extreme left to the extreme right so that it is highly unlikely that the Club as a whole will ever be found on one side of an issue. Three members of the Club, including ex-Col TSUJI Masanobu, (INTSUM 3653), definitely can be classed in the nationalist/rightist camp. Their voting behavior in the Diet will be most unpredictable. Four Independent Club members are conservatives (three are pro-Liberal; one is leaning toward the Progressives). Three members, including former Justice Minister KAZAMI Akira, are leftists who probably will support the Left wing Socialists in the Diet. The remaining member, TAKEUCHI Yuki, sole Reconstruction League candidate to win election, stands somewhere between the conservatives and rightists. The Liberal Party therefore possibly can count on the votes of three Independent Club members, and as many as eight if the Rightists and all conservatives back the Liberals on a specific policy. (d)

c. TSUJI Masanobu: (CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS)

POSITION: Member of Lower House (Independent Club)

DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Oct 02

PLACE OF BIRTH: Ishikawa Prefecture

(a) Kyodo News Service, 28, 29 Nov 52.

(d) Secy Div, Japan Br Files.

J-2

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

TSUJI, MASANOBU

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

FOR COORDINATION WITH

U.S. ARMY

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Special Handling - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

No. 3735
30 Nov

EDUCATION: Graduate of Imperial Japanese Military Academy
and General Staff College

PAST CAREER: Graduating at the top of his class at the Military Academy in 1924, TSUJI proceeded to trace a brilliant career in the Imperial Japanese Army. He participated in the Nomonhan action and the China Incident, but was particularly noted for his staff work in connection with the capture of Singapore and the defense of Burma which won him the title of "god of strategy." Although he was made a Colonel in 1943, his influence extended far beyond his rank because of his undoubted brilliance in directing intelligence and strategic operations and because of his connections with higher ranking officers. TSUJI's tendency to take control of all phases of operation and by-passing of the commanders in centering all decisions in his own hands, however, did not endear himself to his fellow officers. The end of the war found Col. TSUJI in Bangkok and on a British list of suspected war criminals for his part in an alleged massacre of anti-Japanese Chinese in Singapore. A few days after the cessation of hostilities, TSUJI went underground, and in due course made his way into Nationalist China via Indochina disguised as a Buddhist priest. He served for a while in CHIANG Kai-chek's headquarters and secretly returned to Japan in 1949. Immediately after his name was taken off the "wanted" list by the British, TSUJI reappeared in public life with much fanfare. He immediately set about writing a great number of articles and best sellers on his experiences and engaged in a number of highly popular lecture tours. He became one of the leading figures in the reconstructed ultranationalist East Asia League, and has been active in the Japan Defense Association, a league of former Army officers. TSUJI has concerned himself mostly with discussions of a military-political nature and speculation regarding the course and outcome of a Third World War. His comparison of the US and Soviet war potential led TSUJI to the conclusion that a protracted, indecisive struggle between the two great powers was inevitable and Japan should endeavor to remain neutral. TSUJI advocates that Japan build up her own defensive power, abolish the Administrative Agreement with the US and force the withdrawal of US troops from Japan to insure neutrality. While remaining aloof from Russo-American struggle, Japan should cultivate the friendship of her Asiatic neighbors and prepare for the day when the Oriental races will become the world's dominant force after the US-Soviet battle has run its indecisive course. Japan, as TSUJI has stated, "belongs to the Emperor, not to Stalin or Truman." The former Colonel's nationalist writings which stress a strong aversion to Western imperialism and speak of a future Asian unity have brought him a great deal of publicity, so that he is regarded as a focus for a Japanese military revival by large sections of the Japanese press. TSUJI's campaign for election from the First Ishikawa District drew large crowds. Running as an Independent, he received by far the largest number of votes in his district. He appealed to the electorate on the issue of pensions for ex-service men and war sufferers which he favors, and on his plan for Japan to become the Switzerland of the Far East, thereby avoiding the horrors of the Third World War. TSUJI was the only professional soldier to be elected in the recent House of Representatives elections. (d)

Comment: (CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS) Despite TSUJI's repeated anti-American statements and the use of some of his statements by the Japan Communist Party, it is almost inconceivable that he has any connection with the JCP. Rather, he is an ultranationalist with strong racial feelings who believes in the concept of "Asia for the Asians." TSUJI has stated that he wants to see the emergence of a strong, democratic self-defense force which will be under the supervision of the Diet. He quiet Japanese fears of rearmament by stressing the strategic insignificance of Japan in the event of a Third World War. If Japan pursues an independent policy by her self-defense force, TSUJI states that she can avoid becoming a battlefield, a course that many Japanese like to hear and want to believe in. Having inherited at least part of the mantle of Lt. Gen. ISHIHARA Kapji in the East Asia League, TSUJI has placed himself at the forefront of a movement, as yet small, to revive racist ultranationalism. In the House of Representatives

Div, Japan Br Files.

J-3

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION - TSUJI, MAPANUE

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
Not Classified	FBIS Intsum #3916	30 May 53	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT			DATE
Foreign Broadcast Information Service			24 Feb 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
The following information is taken from the desk dossier on TSUJI Masanobu.			

3916 Intsum #3916, 30 May 53

Ultranationalists Voice Opposition to TSUJI

On 17 May 53, approx 20 members of the Kansai and Shikoku Districts of the ultranationalistic POA HANNI DODI KAI held a meeting in Kobe, and voted unanimously for expulsion of ex-Col TSUJI Masanobu from the Society. The group then forwarded a communication to the national HQ and other districts of the Society for consideration. The main reason for opposition to TSUJI is ostensibly that since he was elected to the Lower House (Oct 52 and Apr 53) he has been furthering his own interests rather than those of the Society.

Comment: TSUJI, a former Colonel in the Army and once a powerful figure in the ultranationalist clique, is said to have masterminded many Japanese war operations in Siam, especially under Gen YAMASHITA Tomoyuki (executed in Manila for war crimes). At the end of the war, TSUJI was in Siam, but went into hiding when the British listed him as a war crimes suspect. He made his reappearance in Japan in Jan 50, after the British war crimes trials had terminated. Strongly anti-American as well as anti-Soviet in his policies, TSUJI is now a member of the Lower House. His most recent appearance in the public limelight occurred when he filed a strong protest with the Foreign Office (in company with a delegation of villagers from Uchinada in Ishikawa Prefecture, where TSUJI is the Representative in the Lower House), against the use of the area for military maneuvers by the Security Forces. TSUJI, perhaps the leading figure in the ultranationalist clique, is also one of its most controversial members, being supported by some and opposed by other factions in this group.

CROSS REFERENCE FORM SECRET	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(35)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

East Asia League Comrades Society (Toa Renmei Doshi Kai)

Intelligence Summary No. 3916
30 May 1953

Ultranationalists Voices Opposition to TSUJI: On 17 May 53, approximately 20 members of the Kansai and Shikoku Districts of the ultranationalistic East Asia League Comrades Society (Toa Renmei Doshi Kai) held a meeting in Kobe and voted unanimously to demand the expulsion of ex-Col. TSUJI Masanobu (INTSUM 3816) from the Society. The group then forwarded this recommendation to the National Headquarters and other districts of the Society for consideration. The main reason for opposition to TSUJI is ostensibly that since he was elected to the House of Representatives in Oct 52 he has been furthering his own interests rather than those of the Society. (B-3) (d)-

Comment: TSUJI Masanobu, a former Colonel in the Japanese Army, and once a powerful figure in the prewar military clique, is said to have masterminded many of the Japanese war operations in Southeast Asia, serving at one time under General YAMASHITA, Tomoyuki, executed in Manila for war crimes. When the war ended TSUJI was in Siam, but he went into hiding when the British listed him as a war crimes suspect. He made his reappearance in Japan in Jan 50, after the British war crimes trials had terminated. Strongly anti-American as well as anti-Soviet in many of his views, TSUJI is now a member of the House of Representatives. His most recent appearance in the public limelight occurred when he filed a strong protest with the Foreign Office on 25 May 53, in company with a delegation of villagers from Uchinada in Ishikawa Prefecture, of which he is a representative in the Lower House, against the use of the area as a firing range by the Security Forces. TSUJI, perhaps the leading figure in the present ultranationalist clique, is also one of its most controversial members, being at the same time supported by some and opposed by other factions in this group.

AF Form 112-PART I
APPROVED 1 JUNE 1948

Security Information 1701314
Confidential

(CLASSIFICATION)

COUNTRY Japan	REPORT NO. O-2179	LEADER SIGNATURE AF 56-12228
AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
SUBJECT Activities of TSUJI Masanobu Nei		
AREA REPORTED ON JAPAN	FROM (Agency) 600th Air Intel Sq	
DATE OF REPORT 11 Jun 53	DATE OF INFORMATION 6 Jun 53	EVALUATION E-2
PREPARED BY (Signature) Ko S. Sasehima, Capt, USAF	SOURCE Confidential	
REFERENCES (Copy to: Commander, Division, previous report, etc., as applicable) PEAF S.R. 6-2-15-1 USAF MAIR 1B-1. 1S-3		
SUMMARY: (Enter concise summary of report. Give identification in first two lines of paragraph. Use back of report on AF Form 112-Part II.)		
<p>1. This report, submitted by a Confidential Source on "visual" reliability, concerns recent activities of ultra-nationalist TSUJI Masanobu.</p> <p>2. According to the report, TSUJI is engaged in carrying favor with officials of the NSA to further his own cause. In doing this, he is reportedly attempting to fester anti-American sentiment among members of the NSA.</p>		
APPROVED:  EUGENE G. COOK Colonel, USAF Co, 600th AISS		
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR D/I USAF cy 1; File cy 2; G-2, HQ, AFPE, (ADV) cys 3-13; 600th AISS cy 11. D/I IM-RHQ Collections cys 15-16; USAira, Tokyo cy 17.		

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C.—31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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FOR COORDINATION WITH US AF

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960-0-91831

Security Information
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(CLASSIFICATION)

5

AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES		
6004th Air Intel Sv Sq	C-1479			

Activities of TSUJI Masanobu

Source: Confidential, 6004th AISS
(Summary of report)

Former Japanese Army colonel TSUJI Masanobu (a member of the Diet's Lower House) recently approached Chief KIMURA Tokutaro of the National Safety Agency (NSA). TSUJI met KIMURA through MAFDA Goro, member of the Lower House from Nara Prefecture (and an adopted son of former Lt Gen MAFDA, one-time Chief of Staff of the Japanese forces in the Philippines under General HONMA)

KIMURA is a skilled fencer and is known to be a man of integrity but he is somewhat naive and fancies himself a patriot. It is obvious that KIMURA can be cajoled by the treacherous, smooth-talking TSUJI.

TSUJI took advantage of his position as a member of the Diet's Cabinet Committee by requesting KIMURA for permission to "make a detailed inspection of the conditions of the NSA before the left-wing Socialists do," claiming that he could "cooperate in the NSA budget plan." KIMURA was very pleased to hear this and immediately notified NSA schools and headquarters to treat TSUJI with cordiality and to help him make a "thorough investigation to fulfill his purpose."

TSUJI was thus able to inspect facilities of the NSA as well as to interview key officials. As per usual, TSUJI created a sensation and caught the favor of the officials through his smooth talk.

TSUJI had originally advocated the abolishment of the NSA and stressed the advantages of a National Voluntary Militia. (Communist Lower House member KAWAKAMI Kan-ichi who shares the same room as TSUJI recently stated that he thought TSUJI to be a "regular guy" and that he supported TSUJI's contention that a defense power of 30,000 men was sufficient).

TSUJI's true purpose of approaching the NSA has not been made clear.

There are some among the key officials of the NSA who harbor resentment against the US military advisors. There are others who are passively anti-American. TSUJI probably intends to agitate these elements and to promote anti-Americanism.

Being a good example of an egotist and an opportunist it is conceivable that TSUJI is attempting to further his personal cause for possible appointment to the position of parliamentary vice minister and/or defense minister in the future. His activities are a source of much concern to many because of the possibilities of causing a rift in Japanese-American relations.

TSUJI is the outspoken leader of the movement against the use of Uchinada as a firing range. He personally led the prefectoral governor and local representatives from Ishikawa to the Foreign Ministry in their visit to Tokyo. TSUJI is welcomed by the right and left wing groups.

Much of the atrocities committed by the Japanese in Malay can be attributed to TSUJI. Many Japanese wonder why he was never charged for these crimes and brought to trial since others have been convicted and executed for the same crimes.

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, IN U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF.

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16-88470-1 G U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 O 91879

Security Information
Confidential

CLASSIFICATION

AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE		PAGE	
6004th Air Intel Sv Sq	C-1479	3	or	3	PAGE

COMMENTS BY THE PREPARING OFFICER:

1. TSUJI Masanobu is a well-known ultra-nationalist who came into prominence during the general elections of Oct 52 when he was returned by his constituency in Ishikawa Prefecture by a large margin. He is known to be both anti-Russian and anti-American.
2. KIMURA Tokutaro was in the limelight on 8 Jun 53 when he stepped out with a surprise statement concerning the future of the NSA to the chairman of Liberal Party leaders. The oppositionist claim in the Diet claim that the statement revealed the fact that Government always had intentions of converting the NSA into a full-fledged armed forces.

K. S. Sameshima

KO. S. SAMESHIMA
Capt., USAF

CLASSIFICATION

Profile of Masanobu Tsuji

Ex-Colonel Dietman Says U.S. Forces Should Leave

By KIYOKI MURATA

A middle-aged, bespectacled figure with a balding head spryly walks in and out of committee rooms in the Diet building, sometimes firing poignant questions at the debating legislators.

In moments of overenthusiasm he will bowl out the Dietmen in the manner of an Army officer—for a good reason. Until Japan's surrender nine years ago, he was a colonel in the Japanese Army and a brilliant strategist at that.

Now Masanobu Tsuji, 51, a man who was seven times wounded and still carries a score or so of shrapnel and bullets in his body, concedes he is an amateur as a politician.

His present status, to be sure, was something he never dreamed of in his wildest dreams as he conquered Malaya under General Tomoyuki Yamashita and as he fought against overwhelming odds and malaria on Guadalcanal.

Born in 1902 in Ishikawa Prefecture, he started his military career early. In 1917 young Masanobu was enrolled in the Nagoya Junior Military Academy at the age of 14 and a half, and then went on to the Military Academy and later to the Army Staff College.

Wounded Twice

His first combat experience came in 1932 at the time of the first Shanghai Incident. As a company commander he led men from his home division and was wounded twice.

In 1933 Tsuji joined the Imperial Army Staff and was assigned to the Kwantung Army Command in Manchuria in 1938.

Col. Takahiro Hattori, another bright strategist of the defunct Japanese army, says of Tsuji his junior by a year: "As a staff officer, he was always at the frontline, risking danger, and guided operations to our advantage. Few could exceed Tsuji in handling a fouled-up situation and restoring order."

Although Tsuji is apt to be taken for an "extremely reckless character, this is due to his nature which does not tolerate the slightest degree of crookedness," according to Hattori.

Like any other man of quick decision and candor, Tsuji has many critics. But Hattori explains they are those Tsuji mercilessly exposes for what he thinks is wrong.

Sneaked Back to Japan

What really made the fiery colonel famous, however, was his "underground escape" over a distance of 7,500 miles on the Chinese continent following Japan's surrender when he was sought by the Allied Powers as a war crime suspect.

He sneaked back into Japan under Allied Occupation in May 1945 and continued to elude his pursuers for two more years until 1950 when he was dropped from the wanted list.

While living underground, Tsuji wrote his first bestseller "Senko Sanzenri" (A 3,000-mile Underground Escape) based on his unique experience. The dramatic memoirs published also in English were followed by more of Tsuji's literary activities which covered the writer's accounts of the battles of Burma, Guadalcanal, Nomonhan and Malaya.

Ran for Lower House

In October 1952 he ran for the Lower House from Ishikawa Prefecture, garnering 100,000 votes and outnumbering the scores of other candidates from the same constituency.

As an independent, he has advocated in and out of the legislature's legislature "self-defense by neutrality" with the same fervor he showed on the battle ground.

His record as a Dietman during the last two years is al-

most with the characteristics of the daredevil and somewhat erratic colonel.

A year ago when the National Safety Force held its first large-scale maneuver at the foot of Mt. Fuji, Tsuji, as a member of the Cabinet Committee of the Lower House, was among the several Diet men and women to see it.

When the legislative group on the first night of the three-day maneuver met the press at a Gotemba Hotel, Tsuji alone was missing. Wearing an NSF fatigue, he was bivouacking with the troops.

Tried to Reach Korea

During last fall when Japanese fishing boats were being seized by ROK patrol ships off the Korean waters, Tsuji decided to take a personal look at the fishery situation by boarding a Maritime Safety Board ship. But his real motive, as he later admitted, was to be captured by the Koreans and taken to Seoul so that he could conduct one-man negotiations with President Syngman Rhee to tell him to stop the nonsense.

"Unfortunately," Tsuji observed, "the press found out my well-guarded trip to Kyushu, and the news apparently traveled to Seoul fast. For seven days our ships roamed on the Rhee Line, but not a single ROK ship came into sight."

Still anxious to settle the Korean-Japanese problems, Tsuji wrote in a recent open letter to Rhee that if the ROK President so desired he would be willing to meet Rhee in Seoul even by smuggling himself across the channel.

In the early summer of 1953, when the Uchinada firing range issue broke out, the ubiquitous Dietman was in the midst of Red banners and tensed-up local residents and "successfully restored order and forestalled a serious incident."

Deplores Scandals

Tsuji opened a recent interview with the Nippon Times by deprecating the current political scandals. "It is simply appalling," he deplored, "and the situation closely resembles that in Nationalist China on the eve of its collapse under Communist dominance after the war."

Two factors which are peculiar to Japan, however, may yet prevent Japan from following in the steps of the Nationalist Government. They are: 1) that the prosecutors are not yet corrupt and 2) that unlike Chinese Communists, their Japanese counterparts are "juvenile" in their tactics.

Menace Not Unlikely
But Tsuji does not dismiss an "immediate menace" which stares Japan in the face, namely, the possibilities of "Indirect Invasion" by the Communists. By "indirect invasion" Tsuji means a civil war and "objective circumstances for it are 70 per cent

pr." For the remaining 30 per cent the peril may be accelerated by the people's distrust in the Government and the collapse of the smaller businesses due to a deflation."

"And yet the Government is almost indifferent to these conditions," Tsuji lamented. "Nor is the U.S. aware of the situation because she lacks experience of this sort."

Tsuji said he saw the entire process of a corrupt government driven out of power by the Communists. In postwar China and Japan is nearing that stage.

On the basis that Japan is not exposed to the danger of immediate "direct invasion," Tsuji blames the National Safety Force as "completely useless and sheer waste of money." When the time comes, the NSF may be easily taken over by the Reds through their agents who have successfully infiltrated its

rank, according to the ex-colonel.

Bad Parts Adopted

"The NSF," he charged, "has adopted only the bad parts of the U.S. Army, which does have good points, too." An army for a poor country like Japan must be an expensive one but should be engaged in more productive undertakings in peace time as the Army in Red China is.

An argument of his, which paints Tsuji in the eyes of the public as one of the most virile champions of anti-Americanism here is that the U.S. forces should get out of Japan as soon as possible.

Their presence here is the biggest obstacle to Japan's rearmament, according to Tsuji.

His theory of course is based on the premise that there is no danger of "direct invasion" by Red forces unless there is a U.S.-Soviet war. But if and when a full-scale war breaks out, Japan would not and should not be an important battleground for the U.S., Tsuji maintains.

Needs Forces in Europe
"America cannot afford to leave her armed forces in Japan because she must employ all her might on the main battlefields, the Army in Europe and the Air Force in the Arctic."

Japan should remain "neutral" in such an eventuality, he argues, and if Japan successfully resists all foreign armed forces, it would mean victory half won for the U.S.

"I want America to know Japan cannot be made a U.S. base," Tsuji emphasized. "But if the U.S. is satisfied with the prevention of Japan's communization, I will give her full cooperation. On the other hand, if she does not agree to this, I will fight her to the bitter end."

The best solution for abating the anti-American sentiments which have been rapidly mounting since Bikini, Tsuji proposes, is to remove all U.S. forces from Japan.

Can't Defend Japan
"Americans cannot defend anything in and around Japan," Tsuji pointed out. "Japan should be defended by the Japanese themselves and there are still 5,000,000 veterans from the last war. Of them at least 2,000,000 are fit for combat. We can hold our own."

As for himself, the ex-colonel has organized a "Jel Domel" (Self-Defense League), a kind of militia, of his followers that include those who fought under him in actual warfare. Of the total of approximately 3,500 "Jel Domel" men, 2,000 are in his home prefecture, Ishikawa, Tsuji revealed. "In our own prefecture at least, my men can handle the Communists if they try to create a civil disturbance."

An American magazine recently remarked that in view of the current political irregularities and the people's disaffection with the Government, Tsuji might instigate a coup d'état—a fear shared by some Japanese.

But the fiftyish ex-colonel himself laughed at the speculation: "If I were to plan a thing like that, why should I have gone to a lot of trouble to become a member of the national legislature?"

Nippon Times Photo
Masanobu Tsuji

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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REPORT NO. FJS-71

INFORMATION REPORT
CONTROLLED AMERICAN SOURCE

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 2 February 1955

SUBJECT TSUJI Masanobu

NO. OF PAGES 1

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ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo (5 January 1955)

NO. OF ENCL. 0
(LISTED BELOW)

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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE							COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	
A	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	I.	2	X	3.	4.	5.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

Japan
Commenting on articles published by the Yomiuri Weekly (Shukan Yomiuri)¹ in its first issue of 1955 on a quarrel between himself and former Major General KAWAGUCHI Kiyotake (1957/0656/3237/0256), TSUJI Masanobu said on 2 January that it has now become difficult for him to get elected in the coming general election.

1. *Field Comment.* The Yomiuri Weekly carried articles by KAWAGUCHI and his supporters, former Lieutenant General NACHI Takaji and former Colonel MATANABE Saburc, and by TSUJI and his supporters OZAKI Shiro. In his article "An Open Letter to TSUJI, Former Staff Officer," KAWAGUCHI charges that TSUJI issued the order from Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) to execute Jose Abad Santos, Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, countering KAWAGUCHI's efforts to save Santos. It was for this incident that KAWAGUCHI was tried in Manila after the war and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. KAWAGUCHI also accuses TSUJI as being responsible for other killings committed by the Japanese in Singapore. The articles by NACHI and MATANABE depict TSUJI as a man of insidious character who knew how to utilize his position as a staff officer in Imperial General Headquarters. TSUJI, in his reply to KAWAGUCHI, denies the charges, ridicules KAWAGUCHI's leadership in the Guadalcanal campaign, and accuses his opponents of being cowards in-battles.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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CONTINUATION
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COUNTRY OF ORIGIN Japan		REPORT NO. IR 2869-55
AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
AREA REPORT CONCERN Japan		DATE OF REPORT 15 August 1955
AGENCY OF ORIGIN 6004th Air Intel Sv Sq		DATE OF INFORMATION Aug 55
SOURCE OF INFORMATION See Below		EVALUATION B-2
REFERENCES (Central number, division, previous report, etc., as applicable) BAIR Part IV LHL.3; FRAF SRI 1-5-17-E		
SUBJECT		
Biographic Data on Masanobu TSUJI		
SUMMARY (Brief, concise summary of report. Give date/dates in first sentence or paragraphs. List initials of source left. People last, if report on A.P.)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Japan Democratic Party b. Japan Who's Who c. Asahi Yearbook d. KAIKOKAI (Former Army Officer's Association) <p>1. The purpose of this report is to present biographic information on Masanobu TSUJI, a member of the Japanese Diet.</p> <p>2. This report partially satisfies the requirements of FRAF SRI 1-5-17-E.</p>		
APPROVED:		
 GEORGE G. COOK Colonel, USAF COMIN, 6002d AISC		

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

FOR COORDINATION WITH U.S. AF

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Date: 2005

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AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE 2 of 3 PAGES																			
6004th Air Intel Sv Sq	IR 2869-55																				
<p>1. This report presents brief biographic data on Masanobu TSUJI, a member of the Japanese Diet, in response to the requirements of FEAIR SKI 1-5-17-E.</p> <p>2. <u>NAME:</u> Masanobu TSUJI (通 政 信)</p> <p>3. <u>PERMANENT ADDRESS:</u> #883, 2-chome, Narimune, Suginami-ku, Tokyo. Tel. 39-5871</p> <p>4. <u>PRESENT POSITION:</u> Member of the Japanese House of Representatives.</p> <p>5. <u>POLITICAL PARTY:</u> Japan Democratic Party.</p> <p>6. <u>PARTY POSITION:</u> One of the Vice-Chiefs of the Political Committee (In charge of National Defense Problems).</p> <p>7. <u>POLITICAL DISTRICT:</u> First Electoral of Ishikawa Prefecture.</p> <p>8. <u>AGE:</u> 53 yrs. old</p> <p>9. <u>FAMILY:</u> Wife and four (4) children.</p> <p>10. <u>HOBBIES:</u> Fishing and Reading.</p> <p>11. <u>PERSONAL BACKGROUND:</u> Mr. TSUJI was born in October 1902, in the Enuma district of Ishikawa Prefecture. He graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1924. He completed his studies at the Japanese War College in 1935, graduating with the highest class honors. His promotion to colonel came in 1943. Throughout his military career, he held such high posts as being a staff officer in the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and being assigned to the General Staff Office in Tokyo. At the end of WW II, he was the senior staff officer of the ROK Army in Southeast Asia (Headquarters at Bangkok, Thailand).</p> <p>12. At the end of the war, he was cited as a war criminal by the British authorities. Upon learning this, he disappeared. During the next three years, he worked his way from Thailand through China to Japan. He remained underground from 1948 to 1950, at which time, the prosecution of war criminals was discontinued. From 1945 to 1950, TSUJI wrote many books, mainly based on his military experiences. The titles of these books are listed below:</p> <table><thead><tr><th>Japanese Title</th><th>Translation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>a. 1. "Senko Sanzen-Ri"</td><td>(Three Thousand Ri Travel in Disguise)**</td></tr><tr><td>b. 2. "Jugo Tai Ichi"</td><td>(Fifteen Against One)</td></tr><tr><td>c. 3. "Guadal-Canal"</td><td>(Guadalcanal)</td></tr><tr><td>d. 4. "Singapore"</td><td>(Singapore)</td></tr><tr><td>e. 5. "Asia No Kyokan".</td><td>(Common Feeling of the Asian Nations)</td></tr><tr><td>f. 6. "Nomonghan"</td><td>(Battle of Nomonghan at the Manchurian-Russian Frontier)</td></tr><tr><td>g. 7. "Kono Nippon Wo"</td><td>(What About This Japan)</td></tr><tr><td>h. 8. "Tsugino Sekai Taisen"</td><td>(Next World War)</td></tr></tbody></table> <p>** One Ri equals four (4) kilometers.</p>				Japanese Title	Translation	a. 1. "Senko Sanzen-Ri"	(Three Thousand Ri Travel in Disguise)**	b. 2. "Jugo Tai Ichi"	(Fifteen Against One)	c. 3. "Guadal-Canal"	(Guadalcanal)	d. 4. "Singapore"	(Singapore)	e. 5. "Asia No Kyokan".	(Common Feeling of the Asian Nations)	f. 6. "Nomonghan"	(Battle of Nomonghan at the Manchurian-Russian Frontier)	g. 7. "Kono Nippon Wo"	(What About This Japan)	h. 8. "Tsugino Sekai Taisen"	(Next World War)
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13. POLITICAL BACKGROUND: TSUJI has been elected as a member of the House of Representatives three (3) times, since October 1952, from his district. In the first two elections, he did not claim a political party, but, in the March 1955 elections, he entered as a Japan Democratic Party candidate. His views on national defense problems are rather outspokenly presented in his latest book, "The Next World War". The main views he advances are:

- a. Japan should, by its own will and judgement, decide upon the extent of the national defense effort,
- b. Japan should reject any interference on national defense problems by foreign powers, and
- c. Japan should remain neutral as long as possible in the next war. The national defense plan should be "tailored" to fit this pattern.

14. RELATIONS WITH RIGHTIST GROUPS: TSUJI has been sponsoring an association called "TOA JIMI RENMEI" (Federation of Self Defense in the Far East). The latter was founded by the late Lt. Gen. Kanji ISHIHARA in 1940. It was originally called "TOA RENMEI" (Federation of Far East Nations). The organization was opposed by Prime Minister Hideki TOJO.

15. The present association claims to be nationalistic, rather than leftist or rightist. Due to Gen. ISHIHARA's popularity in Ishikawa Prefecture, TSUJI has used this association to foster his political ambitions. TSUJI is popular with the younger members of the Japanese Self Defense Force, but he is criticized by the more educated Japanese citizens as having eccentric and ultra-nationalistic tendencies.

16. POLITICAL INFLUENCE: TSUJI has been easily elected each time to the Dist. He appeals to young people, under-privileged families, and female voters, who seem to feel he can aid them in furthering their rights or privileges. However, not being backed by bankers or industrialists, he lacks the finances to acquire any real stature in the National Japan Democratic Party.

COMMENTS OF THE PREPARING OFFICER:

17. Lt. Gen. ISHIHARA died in 1951 in Ishikawa Prefecture.

18. Paragraph numbering has been provided by the Preparing Officer for ease of reference.

Raymond B. Wood
RAYMOND B. WOOD
Captain, USAF
CIC, ATI Section
6004th AISS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of Biographic Information

TSUJI Masanobu

JA-AN

Member of House of Representatives

Tsuji Masanobu is a member of Japan's leading conservative political organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party, and a three-time member of the House of Representatives. A former army colonel during World War II, he was regarded as one of Japan's most brilliant military strategists. Tsuji was a close associate of the late General ISHIKAWA Kanji, war leader of the ultra-rightist Taikai Renmei (East Asia League), an organization which advocated "Asia for Asians." After the war, Tsuji revived the League under the name of Taikai Doshi-kai (East Asia League Comrades Society) and advocated the revival of the "Emperor System" and "remilitarization" of Japan free of United States and Soviet influences. He is opposed to the United States-Japan Mutual Security Pact and advocates neutrality similar to that of Nehru's "peace principles."

During the war Tsuji was known as the "God of Military Strategy," and was considered the chief planner of the successful conquest of Malaya and Singapore, which was carried out by General YAMASHITA Tomoyuki, popularly known as the "Tiger of Malaya." Tsuji's name was well known among the British, Australian, and United States forces in Southeast Asia, and after Japan's defeat the British listed him as a "Class A" war criminal. He went "underground" at Bangkok disguised as a mendicant friar and in May 1948 secretly returned to Japan via Indochina and China. He was the only major war criminal suspect to escape detention. His name was taken off the war criminals list in December 1950 and Tsuji assumed his real identity.

In 1952 Tsuji's book, Senko Cansen-ri (Underground Escape 30,000 Ri), narrating his post-war experiences, became a best-seller. The book's revelation of his sensational escape from Allied seizure at the war's end put him in the political limelight. Taking advantage of the considerable publicity, he ran for the House of Representatives from Ishikawa Prefecture and was elected by the highest vote, 65,000. Although he fell to second place in the April 1953 election, he again led other candidates in February 1955.

Born October 11, 1902 in the village of Higashitanioku, Emma county, Ishikawa prefecture, Tsuji is the second son of a poor farm family of central Japan. He graduated with top honors from the Japanese Military Academy (1924) and the Military Staff College (1931). In 1932, Tsuji was in Shanghai when the "Shanghai Incident" occurred. In 1933 he was assigned to the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo, and later was appointed instructor at the Japanese Military Academy. From 1935 to 1940 he served as staff officer with the Kwantung Army (Hankow), and the China Expeditionary Forces Headquarters. In 1941 as Chief of Staff of the 25th Army Headquarters under the command of General YAMASHITA Tomoyuki, Tsuji was considered responsible for planning the invasion of

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TSUJI Masanobu

JAPAN

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Malaya and Singapore. In 1943 he led the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Guadalcanal; he was wounded and contracted malaria during this operation. Tsuji returned to Japan, and after his recovery was assigned to lecturing on military strategy at the Military College. He was also promoted to the rank of colonel. In 1944 he was assigned to the Army Expeditionary Forces Headquarters in China. Shortly thereafter, as the end of the Pacific War approached, he criticized Premier TOJO Hideki's incompetence in handling the war with China, denounced the misconduct of certain high military officers in China, and opposed the activities of the Army's intelligence agencies. Probably as a result of these criticisms, Tojo transferred Tsuji to Burma. When Japan surrendered he was listed by the British as a ranking war criminal. Tsuji went into hiding at Bangkok, and for the next three years travelled incognito throughout Indochina and China.

Tsuji returned to Japan in 1948 under the assumed name of KIUCHI Katsuji, professor of Archaeology. Several years later, in an interview with an American reporter of the Nippon Times, Tsuji detailed the highlights of his escape. He stated that he owed his life to his "great Chinese friend," the notorious Chinese General TAI Li, one-time head of a large Chinese Nationalist intelligence network. Tsuji's connection with Tai Li began when he was in Shanghai. Reportedly, Tsuji's intervention had prevented the Japanese gendarmerie from punishing the families of Chinese intelligence agents operating underground during the Japanese occupation. In return, Tai Li assisted Tsuji's escape from Bangkok through French Indochina, Kunming and Chungking to Nanking. During his two-year stay Tsuji stated that he helped write military tactical manuals for General CHIANG Kai-shek.

Thirty months after his return to Japan Tsuji's name was taken off the list of war criminals. On March 3, 1951, Tsuji delivered a speech before the Jinjin (Free People's) Club, in which he compared the military strength of the Communist bloc with that of the United States and the other democracies. He concluded that a major war between the two ideological blocs is unavoidable, that the Communist world will inevitably triumph in such a conflict, and that, accordingly, Japan has no choice but to maintain a strict neutrality if she hopes to survive. As Japan was still under Allied occupation at the time, his remarks created a sensation.

In 1952, Tsuji published his books Senko Sanshū, Guadalcanal, and Jūgo Tai Ichi (Fifteen Against One), which he wrote while in hiding. The books became the nation's best-sellers and Tsuji gained considerable publicity. He revived the prewar nationalist and jingoist society, Tōa Renmei, and named it Tōa Renmei Dōshikai. However, because of differences of opinion on policy matters, Tsuji and his followers later seceded from the Tōa Renmei Dōshikai and organised the neutralist Jiei Dōmei (Self Defense League). The League's major policies apparently are to work for rearmament and fight Communism and Socialism. Tsuji is a very close friend of former Colonel HATTORI Takushiro, a prominent nationalist and a leading advocate of the remilitarization of Japan. It was rumored that Hattori was primarily responsible in getting Tsuji's name withdrawn from the war criminal

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TSUJI Masanobu

list in December 1950. The two men reportedly exercise wide influence over former military personnel.

Tsuzi has long been a leading exponent of the "Asia for the Asians" doctrine, as propounded by the late General ISHIIHARA Kanji. He considers the ties that bind Asians together to be stronger than the ideological bonds that exist between Communist China and the USSR. Following his visit to Communist China and Soviet Russia, Tsuzi stated he did not believe that the U.S.S.R. constituted a war menace at the present time, since its food supplies and industrial power still lag behind those of the United States and Great Britain. While in Moscow, Tsuzi is reported to have had several meetings with Marshal Georgiy K. Zhukov and his chief of staff.

Tsuzi has cleverly exploited issues which have aroused the Japanese national sensitivity, such as the U. S. military bases issues and the Korean-Japanese fishery disputes, to keep himself before the public. Recently, he told a group of former Japanese army officers that Japan should work with India to achieve neutrality and with Communist China to maintain peace. Numerous reports indicate that he is both anti-American and anti-Soviet. He advocates withdrawal of all "foreign" (i.e., American), troops from Japan stating that the "United States garrison forces are in Japan because Japan is an important base from which to attack the Soviet Union," and added that neither Russia nor Red China will attack Japan provided "foreign" troops are removed from Japan. In June 1953, at Kochi city, Tsuzi warned the U. S. that if it continues to fortify Japan into an "Asian outpost of the United States, the friendship of the Japanese people will be lost."

In August 1952, speaking before a large crowd in Kanazawa City, Tsuzi stated that "Truman is the number one war criminal and Stalin the number two war criminal." He also stated that "Truman, Churchill and Stalin do not like me, but I am satisfied so long as I am loved by my fellow Japanese". Also, in one of his pre-election campaign speeches, Tsuzi stated, "Although America may find it difficult to forget Pearl Harbor, Japan finds it more difficult to forget Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Tsuzi also criticised the U.S.-trained Japanese National Safety Forces (now renamed Ground Safety Forces) as being neither an army nor a police force but a "pollywog headed in the direction of a frog."

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TSUJI Masanobu

Tsuji is reported to be a fanatical and intrepid man with a leadership complex. Self-confident, energetic, and highly exitable, he is quite popular with the young and women voters for his opposition to Japan's participation in any future wars. However, he has no standing among the more conservative, reliable, and competent former military leaders, who view him as an extreme opportunist who may have hidden leftist tendencies.

Tsuji is married; he and his wife, Chitose, have three daughters and a son. He is the author of several other books, including Singapore, Asia no Kyukan (Leadership Between Asian Nations), Kononchau, Kono Nihon (This is Japan), and Izumi-no Sakai Taisen (The Next World War).

OLI:BT

February 24, 1956

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June 30, 1959 694.00			

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Translation of Pamphlet Attacking Masanobu TSUJI.			

SUBJECT:

(2)

The attached enclosures are translations of a pamphlet circulated in the Diet by Seikou KAWAGUCHI, former Major General in the Imperial Japanese Army, during the opening week of the Thirty-second Extraordinary Diet session. The object of Kawaguchi's attack, ex-Colonel Masanobu TSUJI, was elected to the House of Councillors elections of June 2, 1959 with the third highest number of votes in the National Constituency. Tsuji, who resigned from his Lower House seat after his expulsion from the Liberal-Democratic Party, ran his Independent campaign on an anti-KISHI platform.

The mutual feud between Kawaguchi and Tsuji dates at least as far back as the wartime era when the two antagonists fell out over a question of strategy in the Guadalcanal campaign. Kawaguchi renewed his attacks on Tsuji when the latter emerged on the political scene in 1952. In the 1955 Lower House elections Kawaguchi campaigned ineffectively against Tsuji in Ishikawa Prefecture.

Kawaguchi's most recent effort to discredit Tsuji was in the form of a demand that Tsuji resign from the Upper House in admission of his alleged responsibility for a variety of particularly horrendous wartime atrocities. In the list of particulars drawn up against Tsuji, Kawaguchi cites his direct or indirect responsibility for 1) the massacre of at least 2,000 Chinese merchants in Singapore, 2) the Bataan Death March, 3) the massacre of 200-300 medical corpsmen and nurses near Singapore, and 4) the murder of Jose Abad Santos, described as a leading Philippines patriot. In addition to these allegations of criminal acts, Kawaguchi charges that Tsuji 1) adopted mistaken tactics during the Manchurian operations on the Manchurian-Siberian border, 2) libeled Kawaguchi in his book "Guadalcanal", and 3) bore general responsibility for the defeat in war.

Tsuji's propensity for gaining headlines has kept him in the public eye both during the war when journalists bestowed on him the title "god of strategy" and in the postwar era when his independent, outspoken views have

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TSUJI 201 ?

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often brought him into conflict with the government party of which he was a member. One recent article in the Shukan Bungaku mentioned recurrent rumors that Tsuji was engaged in espionage activities for the Soviet Union and Communist China which he visited in recent years. It is a well-known fact, however, that Tsuji's inability to get along with others has earned him wide-spread enmity of which Kawaguchi's represents only a small portion.

While it is not possible to determine the validity of Kawaguchi's allegations against Tsuji, it appears likely that they contain more than a kernel of truth. More important, perhaps, is the fact that these charges are currently receiving considerable publicity.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Harlan B. Clark
Harlan B. Clark
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Translation of Remonstrance (1 page)
2. Translation of Explanatory Notes (6 pages)

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Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1498
Anembassy TOKYO

Remonstrance to Mr. Masanobu TSUJI,
Member of the House of Councillors
June 22, 1959

1. You, Mr. Tsuji, were the planner, instigator, or executor of the "massacre of Chinese merchants of Singapore", "the death march of Bataan", "the massacre of medical doctors and nurses of the Alexander British Military Hospital in Singapore", "the atrocious murder of the leading government official Santos of the Philippines" and many other acts of atrocity.

For these acts, many of our superiors, colleagues and men were branded war criminals after the end of the war, and were confined to prison for many years, and in extreme cases they were put to death.

Because of your acts of atrocity, our Japanese Army incurred the shameful reputation in the world that it is atrocious. The lingering evil of this shameful reputation is inflicting baleful effects even today on our nation, visibly or invisibly in such forms as effects on trade, etc.

2. You served as staff officer for many years with the Kwantung Army, the Imperial General Headquarters, and other army organizations. You planned and directed rash operations at Nomonhan and in the Pacific War. They all failed except the Singapore Operation.

Because of this, hundreds of lives were lost on the field, and materials were wasted. They finally led to the defeat of our Japanese Army. You should realize your responsibility for these matters.

3. In your book, "Guadalcanal", you misrepresented and insulted me and my men under my command. This is inexcusable in a military man.

4. Your actions and statements as a politician in recent years are either playing up to the people or publicity-seeking. There can be found no constructive opinions in what you have said or done. They run counter to our nation's traditional political morality and they are to be despised. You are absolutely without qualifications to be a member of the National Diet.

For the foregoing four reasons, you are advised to resign as member of the House of Councillors forthwith and are urged to apologize for your sins to the world.

Seiken KAWAGUCHI,
Former Major General

12, 1-chome, Honcho-dori,
Tsurumi-ku, Yokohama

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Enclosure No. 2
Despatch No. 1498
Amembassy TOKYO

Explanatory Note

Today I advised Mr. Masanobu Tsuji, member of the House of Councillors, to resign immediately. A perusal of the attached remonstrance will make clear the reasons for this advice, but I would like to add a few explanations.

I. Atrocities committed by Mr. Tsuji

(1) Massacre of Chinese Merchants of Singapore

At the time of the commencement of war, Mr. Tsuji was a senior operations staff officer of the 24th Army under the command of General YAMASHITA. Following the fall of Singapore, he drew up an order for the purge of two million Chinese merchants in the Malayan Peninsula and Singapore, claiming that it was necessary for maintaining security, and received the approval of the commanding officer. This order, however, was extremely abstract, and merely ordered the placing of the field military police corps under the command of Major General KAWAMURA, who was the Commanding General of the Singapore Defense Headquarters and under Lt. General NISHIMURA of the Kanoe Regiment stationed near Singapore. Mr. Tsuji, taking this order with him, personally called on Major General KAWAMURA and Lt. General NISHIMURA and gave concrete instructions on the methods of liquidation. Concretely, he divided Singapore into six districts and assigned military police, auxiliary military police (infantry men wearing temporarily the arm-band of the military police) and pro-Japanese Chinese.

All Chinese were made to walk in a single file in front of these military police and pro-Japanese Chinese pointed out those who had joined the British Volunteer Army and members or past members of anti-Japanese resistance organizations, such as the Communist Party or the Blue Robe Association. After a summary investigation, they were taken to the seashore and machine-gunned or were roped together, rowed out to sea, and with weights tied on to them, thrown overboard.

The total of Chinese thus killed is said to be estimated at about 10,000 maximum, and even at a minimum estimate, is said to be 2,000. Staff Officer Tsuji made the rounds of these six military police stations, stepped up the liquidations, and witnessed the executions. If there were some who tried to escape, he admonished and egged on the military police and made them carry out the execution.

After the end of the war, Major General KAWAMURA (had been promoted to Lt. General) and Lt. Colonel OISHI of the Military Police (had been promoted to Colonel) were given sentences of death by hanging by a British military tribunal and Lt. General NISHIMURA was given life

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imprisonment, which, however, was changed to death by hanging by an Australian military tribunal. Besides these three, there were many other Military Police members who were sentenced to life imprisonment and who suffered many years of detention.

(2) The Bataan Death March

Some time after the fall of Singapore, Mr. TSUJI was reassigned as Staff Officer of the Imperial General Headquarters (chief of operations group). Around the time of the fall of Bataan, he arrived in the Philippines to direct the operations. On April 9, he arrived at the 16th Army General Headquarters which was stationed near Mariveles on Bataan. His arrival coincided with the surrender of Major General KING and many other officers of the U.S. Philippine Army, who came down from the mountains to surrender. Mr. TSUJI demanded of the Senior Staff Officer of the 16th Army, Colonel Saburo WATANABE, to kill all the prisoners of war of the U.S. Philippine Army surrendering at the time. Senior Staff Officer WATANABE naturally refused. When the Commanding General of the 16th Army, Lt. General MOEIKO, heard about this, he was extremely angered, and immediately sent Mr. TSUJI packing. Staff Officer TSUJI who regarded this treatment with great dissatisfaction, sent an order to the commanding officer of supplies who was in charge of the treatment of prisoners-of-war demanding their harsh treatment in the name of the Staff of the Imperial General Headquarters.

In May 22, 1959 issue of the weekly magazine Thriller, there appears a conversation between Mr. TSUJI and Mased TOKUGAWA. In this conversation, Mr. TSUJI implied that he, at the request of the Takasago Tribesmen, authorized the brutal chopping off of the heads of about three hundred American soldiers with hunting knives near a mountain gorge (the Panchinga River which separated the bivouacs of the 16th Army and Nara Corps). Mr. TSUJI confessed that this is what is called the Bataan death march.

It should be self-evident, considering the situation which preceded the incident, whether it was the Takasago Tribesmen who requested that they be permitted to brutally kill the white men, or whether Mr. TSUJI on his own initiative issued the order to the Takasago Tribesmen. After the end of the war, the U.S. military tribunal passed a sentence of death by hanging on Logistics Major General KAWANAKA and Colonel HIRANO. At the detention camp in Manila, Philippines (this was before the military tribunal), I was in the same building with Colonel HIRANO, with our bunks side by side, and Colonel HIRANO repeatedly reproached the methods adopted by Staff Officer TSUJI. He, however, was after all executed.

(3) Massacre at the Alexander British Military Hospital

At the time of the offensive against Singapore, a regiment of British artillery corps set up a line of defense near the Alexander British Military

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Military Hospital and caused considerable casualties for the Japanese Army. Greatly annoyed, Staff Officer TSUJI went immediately to the hospital when Singapore surrendered, and accusing the hospital that the "hospital gave protection to British artillery men with its Red Cross mark" massacred two to three hundred medical men and nurses of the hospital.

After the end of the war, Lt. General MUTAGUCHI was detained in a prison in Singapore and was subjected to investigation. According to Lt. General MULAGUCHI, he had paid a visit to the patients of the hospital from a purely humanitarian standpoint, but that it was misunderstood by the British military authorities that he had issued the order for the massacre and had come to see the patients later because his conscience gave him no rest.

(4) Murder of Santos, a leading Philippine Official

This incident involves me personally, and as it is a complicated and mysterious affair, I will leave out the details. It happened that Staff Officer TSUJI, after completing his tour of inspection of Bataan mentioned above, came to the Military Headquarters at Manila on April 10. I recommended by telegram that a high government official of the Philippines, Jose Abad Santos, whom my men had captured, be used for military administration. Staff Officer TSUJI's reaction to the cable I had dispatched was to issue a strong demand to the Military Headquarters in Manila to "kill Santos immediately", and forced them to issue the order. I tried two more times to save Santos and to take steps to get him to cooperate with our country, but I was unable to oppose the three successive orders from the Military Headquarters and was forced to carry out the execution.

This Santos was an extremely fine gentleman, and if he had been alive, he would very likely have become president. No words can express the loss the execution of such a man means. Because of this, I was sentenced to a 25-year imprisonment, and spent seven years and three months in Sugamo Prison and the prison in Montalupa in the Philippines.

(5) Miscellaneous

It is a well-known fact and witnessed by many that Staff Officer TSUJI often killed prisoners-of-war, took out their liver and made his own medicine out of it, and at times encouraged the use of this medicine to others. Around July 23, 1942, I heard with my own ears Staff Officer TSUJI boastfully telling this story at the South Pacific Hotel in Palau and it is something which I shall never forget.

There is another story told about him. At one time, he waved to a Philippine officer, a prisoner-of-war, with his left hand to step up, and when the officer came up to several steps from him, he suddenly shot

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the man with the pistol he held in his right hand and killed him on the spot. He is reported to have boasted that: "This is the way a prisoner-of-war should be treated. I have shown you the correct example."

In short, Mr. TSUJI's acts of atrocity rival those of the Jewish merchant by the Nazis and the Katyn Forest by the Soviet Union (where a large number of Polish people were killed). German and Soviet atrocities were carried out by an organization, but in the case of Mr. TSUJI, he did it on his own initiative. The Germans confined their acts of atrocity to their own territory, but Mr. TSUJI resorted to these acts in every part of Asia, and the variety of his methods has never been rivaled by man. Nero in the West and Gadhafi and Chou of China are regarded as symbols of cruel rulers, but we have not heard that there were any men guilty of such atrocities in Japan at any time in history. There is no doubt that Mr. TSUJI is the man most guilty of atrocities in the whole history of Japan.

It is true that in the last war there were men other than Mr. TSUJI in our Japanese Army who committed atrocities. The major responsibility for the bringing down on the Japanese Army the infamous reputation for atrocities and for destroying the good name and honor of the Japanese Army, however, rests with Mr. Kasekana TSUJI.

Moreover, his past evils are still exerting baleful effects on trade, etc., and the sins that he has committed, for which Japanese leaders must constantly apologize whenever they visit Southeast Asia and for which Japan must expect more than the necessary amount of the people's blood-tax as reparations to Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc., deserve more than a thousand deaths.

II. Responsibility for Defeat in War

Staff Officer TSUJI has been regarded as a "god of strategy", but actually other than in operations against colonial armies as in the case of the Malayan Peninsula operations, he has always lost when confronting the crack troops of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, and he is not a god but a satan.

For example, in the Kowloon Incident, Staff Officer TSUJI drew up a rash operations plan as the Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army and forced the armed forces to carry it out. In this way, he brought about huge human and material losses. Later, furthermore, after the defeat in the battle, he fixed it so that there was no way out for the commanding officer but to take his own life. It is also reported that all non-commissioned officers and the rank-and-file soldiers who had been captured as prisoners-of-war were forced by him to remain in the remote areas of Manchuria and were barred from returning to Japan.

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On Guadalcanal, Mr. TSUJI got himself appointed staff officer of the 17th Army (on-the-spot army) concurrently with staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters. He came to Guadalcanal and sent the front-line troops out to war to their death, and in this way, the greater part of the Second Regiment and the Kusaguchi Corps died ignoble and useless deaths. Staff Officer TSUJI went out to the front-lines personally and was very active. I admit his courage, but the duty of a Staff Officer of the Imperial General Headquarters is to direct the activities of the Japanese Army from a broader and higher standpoint. On reflection, the decision should have been made to abandon Guadalcanal and withdraw the forces around the time the Kusaguchi Corps failed in its offensive on September 12 and 13. Even so, Japan would probably have been defeated in the end, but even if Japan had to lose the war, there could have been other ways of losing the war. However, until the Imperial Council meeting held in the presence of the Emperor on December 31, 1942, when it was decided that the troops should be re-deployed, Staff Officer TSUJI insisted on carrying out a tough policy. In this way, Japan lost 20,000 lives and consumed a large amount of munitions, thus losing her war potential. From then on, Japan's eventual defeat became more and more evident.

There were two direct causes for Japan's defeat. One was the fact that Japan lost the sea battle off Midway and lost almost all her aircraft carriers. The second was the fact that the Japanese Army held on unnecessarily to valueless Guadalcanal and lost her fighting power.

For the sake of the nation, I deeply regret, as a front-line troop commander who fought in the battle, that Staff Officer TSUJI did not fulfill his mission as a staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters by giving cool, dispassionate and wise observations of the general situation but rather ran around the front like a patrol officer.

As a general principle, the concept is right that Mr. TSUJI was only a staff officer and that the final responsibility lay with his superiors. Mr. TSUJI is extremely brilliant and eloquent, both in speech and writing, far exceeding others. In this respect he had charm. As a result, his superiors would succumb to his eloquence and would follow his views. In other words, the superiors became mere robots. Consequently, Staff Officer TSUJI became the virtual commanding officer, the troops would be moved according to his plans, and he was tyrannical over the troops under him. I should add that Staff Officer TSUJI was actually an unusual man and an exception to the norm.

Further explanations will be omitted.

Recently, personality profiles of Mr. TSUJI appeared in the Weekly Bungei Shunjū and in the Weekly Asahi, and are drawing the attention of

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the general readers. These articles are on the whole true, but I regret that they do not really touch on the core of the matter. I received insufferable disagree because of Mr. TSUJI and I have made serious investigations of his past. The more I probed into the matter, the more evidence I found that is a man not to be tolerated.

It should not be permitted that a man like him should be a member of the National Diet. My conscience and my sense of justice will not permit me to tolerate his being elected a member of the House of Councillors through his deception of 680,000 good people with his insufferable words. In particular, I strongly advise Mr. TSUJI to resign as member of the House of Councillors in the name of my past friend Lt. General KAWAMURA who lost his life because of Mr. TSUJI, in the name of the souls of those people who were executed, in the name of the ghosts of my former men who gave up their lives on the southern islands, and in the name of their bereaved families.

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SECRET

PERSONALITY INFORMATION DATA		7 March 1958
<p>Address and Tel No. 1-1-1, Minamihigashimachi, Nakano-ku, Tokyo, Japan (Now 3-1-1, Minamihigashimachi, Nakano-ku, Tokyo, Japan)</p>		Name: TSUJI Masanobu (#11936/2398/0207) <i>TSUJI</i>
<p>Permanent Address</p>		201 No. Subject has Dossier, but no Photo
<p>Present Position Member, Liberal Democratic Party, Member House of Representatives</p>		
<p>Physical Description</p> <p>Balding; wears glasses</p>		
<p>Education: Secondary education of 2nd grade in the Army Officers' Preparatory School in Tokyo; graduated from the Army Officers' Preparatory School in Nagoya; while waiting, Subject was apprenticed to a merchant in Osaka for 4 months 2/</p>		
<p>DOB & POB: Born 1902; Aza-Innachijō Higashitanioka-mura; Minami-gu, Ishikawa Prefecture</p>		
<p>Family: Subject is the second son of 6 children, 2 of whom were girls. 2/ His wife is 1926. Wife - AOKI Keiyo; married sometime between 1926 and 1931 while Subject was attending Military College 2/</p>		
<p>Children - 3 sons and 3 daughters; eldest son - TSUJI Teiho born approximately 1931</p>		
<p>Education: - Graduated senior class of Higashitanioka-mura primary school - Took examinations for admittance to the Army Officers' Preparatory School in Nagoya; while waiting, Subject was apprenticed to a merchant in Osaka for 4 months 2/</p>		
<p>Language: Speaking dialect; understanding of Mainland dialect; could read Chinese; write Chinese poorly; no indication of English 2/</p>		
<p>Previous Career: 2/ Graduated from Army Officers' Preparatory School in 1924; admitted to Army Officers' School 1924 - Graduated from Army Officers' School; 2/ presented with a silver watch by His Excellency the Prince for being top man in his class 1926 - Assigned to the 7th Infantry Regiment in Nanjing 1928 - Entered Military College 1931 - Graduated from Military College; Subject was 2nd in his class and a member of the Sword Group; returned to the 7th Infantry Regiment and participated in the Shanghai Incident as commander of the 2nd Company. At this time (Cont'd on next pg)</p>		
<p>Personality (Habits, use of Money, Hobbies, Literature, Vices, etc.)</p> <p>Subject hobbies include reading. 2/ A report dated 2 May 1952 stated that Subject claimed that he gave half of his income to the families of war victims, and sent money regularly to about 6 families and occasionally to about 14 other families. 2/ Subject appears to be a shrewd, calculating, and at time, a cruel individual, constantly twisting situations to suit his desires, and using individuals to benefit himself.</p>		

SECRET

F-1288-4

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
 by the Central Intelligence Agency
 Date: 2005

SECRET

Intell Activity

Not definitely ascertained. Was connected with ASAEDA Shigeharu in an arms negotiation with the USSR and Communist China. Had connection with KODAMA Yoshio. In 1949 was serving for a while in CHIANG Kai-shek's headquarters, employed by the Third (Intelligence) Section of the Chinese Defense Ministry. In 1951 was seeing SUN Tse, said to be a member of the Chinese Communist intelligence organization. In 1955 Subject was contacting KURIHAYASHI Tetsuro, who was believed to be in Hongkong on some sort of intelligence work.

AIS Contacts

ALS Contacts Attempts were made by the US Air Force Hqs to utilize Subject sometime during or before 1950. KODAMA Yoshio, released war criminal suspect, recommended Subject to Col Frank of USAF as "the individual who could represent the best among former Japanese officers." KODAMA knew Subject in Nanking. Subject declined to meet Col. Frank for the reason that if he were to cooperate with the American Army, he wanted to do so through ARAKI Sadao, under-lifesentender in Sugamo Prison. These facts were revealed in an investigation conducted by Maj. RIMALDUGGI. Subject also had contacts with CIA agents during this period. 75 Subject was in contact with the US Army Attaché in Tokyo in January 1953, and with the Army in Japan after his return from

Other IS Contacts

Miscellaneous

Friends and associates: KODAMA Yoshiro, TAKAMIZU Takehei, KAGAMA Yoshiro, SUN Tze,
HANKEI Yoshitane, KODAMA Tsoen, MITAMURA Ishiro, MIURA Gichiro, MISHIMA Takeji, KIMURA
Takeo, SUIGURA Haruo, WADA Kei, USHIJIMA Tatsukawa, MEDURA Tomitaro, JONIYAMA Kacuya,
(probably SUGIMURA) TANAKA Shinichi

(probably SUGIMURA) TAKAHARA Shinichirō, KONOMI Ujitekihi, KABE Senkichi, OZAKI Shiro, MIKI Takeo, MASUTANI Shūji, TESHIMA-HEIM-AN, TANG Chang-po, ISHIBASHI Tanzan, TAO Hsiaochieh, ASAEDA Shigeharu and HATTORI Takahiro were probably his closest associates.

Books written by Subject: 2,000-Miles Underground, Mononhan, 15 to 1, Panama Canal, 81
Singapore, Underground Escape

and to reduce a 100% safety factor down to 10% and below - 150% exceed and 100% reduction in the density of materials. 100% of the material is now being made.

SECRET

TSUJI Masanobu (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

- he was awarded the 5th class decoration of the Order of the Golden Kite
- Appointed to the Staff Office, GHQ
- Company commander at the Army Officers School
- 1941 - Subject directed important operations in north and central China, Guadalcanal, to the Philippines, Burma, etc, as a staff officer; received 27 wounds/scars and gained a reputation for immortality. During the war, Subject countersigned the orders ASANEDA Shigeharu originated to massacre the anti-Japanese Chinese merchants in Malaya. As a result, not only the anti-Japanese Chinese, but also many neutral and pro-Japanese Chinese were murdered. Subject participated in the Nomohan action and the China Incident, but was particularly noted for his staff work in connection with the capture of Singapore and the defense of Burma, which won him the title of "god of strategy." Although he was made a Colonel in 1943, his influence extended far beyond his rank because of his undoubtedly brilliance in directing intelligence and strategic operations and because of his connections with higher ranking officers. However, Subject's tendency to take control of all phases of operation and his habit of by-passing commanders in centering all decisions in his own hands, did not endear him to his fellow officers. 3/ Subject reportedly was responsible for the execution of Jose Abedes Santos, Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, after his capture in April 1942. 4/ Subject was reported to have urged the chief of staff on Bataan, in 1942, to kill the surrendering American and Filipino soldiers because it would be difficult to feed so many war prisoners. The staff officers refused Subject's advise, and the "death march" of Bataan ensued. 5/
- 1945 - When the Japanese army surrendered in August 1945, Subject reportedly was in Burma, wanted by the British as a War Criminal. In order to escape trial as a War Criminal, Subject disappeared in Thailand, and disguised as a Buddhist priest, made his way to Nanking via Indochina and Chungking. While Subject was in Nationalist China, he served for a while in CHIANG Kai-shek's headquarters, employed by the Third (Intelligence) Section of the Chinese Defense Ministry, planning CHIANG's campaigns and writing tactical manuals based on his own experiences. 3/ At this time Subject was in contact with General OKAMURA Neiji, General DOI and Major-General TS'AO Shih-cheng (Chief of the 1st Section of the Chinese Mission). 6/ Subject returned secretly to Japan sometime in 1948, and hid in the homes of KODAMA Yoshio and TAKAMIYA Thahei (Vice-President of the Keijo Daily News). It was reported that there were more than 300 Nihonzan Myoho temples of the Nichiren Sect in Japan in which Subject had hidden during this time. 2/
- 1949 - Subject worked in the Koshiro Coal Mines in Saga Prefecture, but quit when he found that many of his acquaintances were also working there. In the spring of 1949 he started writing books, and did most of his writing at one of the hot springs. In August of 1949 Subject distributed copies of 3,000 Miles to a certain group in Tokyo. 3/ It was at this time that some sources claimed that Chinese intelligence-collecting in Japan was being directed from Nanking under Subject's guidance. Subject reportedly recruited Japanese mercenaries for Chinese Nationalist Army, travelled back and forth between Japan and Formosa in connection with this recruitment program, and visited KODAMA Yoshio, former Shanghai intelligence agent and KAGAWA Yoshio, former intelligence agent during this period. 7/
- 1950 - After Subject's name was taken off of the "wanted" list by the British, he reappeared in public life with much fanfare, and set about writing a great number of articles and best sellers on his experiences. 3/ On 7 January Subject went to KODAMA's (Yoshio) house and handed him the manuscript of 3,000 Miles. KODAMA requested that the book be published through TAKAMIYA and OGATA Taketora. The

Previous Career: (cont'd)

Asahi Press was reluctant to publish the book, and reported only that "Staff Officer TSUJI has reappeared." 2/ In March 1950, Subject stated that he had not left Japan since his initial return. Concerning the rash of sensational articles in various journals which described him as being disguised as a priest and acting as a courier for the Chinese, Subject stated that such stories were blatant falsehoods and claimed that he had merely attempted to evade capture as a war criminal and had not engaged in any nefarious activities. 2/ 1951-Subject reportedly was seeing SUN T'se, said to be a member of the Chinese Communist intelligence organization; however, it was believed that Subject's reason for contacting such persons may have been to exchange intelligence. In June of 1951 Subject was reported to have been the organizer of the ultra-nationalist Patriotism and Devotion Society, and to be in constant contact with KODAMA Yōshio. On 13 July, while visiting in Nagano, Subject agreed to help KINOSHITA Jōba, UCHIYAMA Ichiya and TATEBAYASHI Masaji form a secret anti-communist organization in Nagano-ken to be used in event of an unspecified type of emergency. It was in July that Subject spoke at the Ji'yin (Liberalist) Club in Tokyo, and stated that changes were due for the US to win World War III against Russia. He admitted that all the statistics he compiled to make the above statement took him one and a half years of painstaking scrutiny of the intelligence field before reaching his conclusion. This speech was used by the JCP for propaganda purposes, and Subject was indicted by the Attorney-General's office for violation of the Purge Ordinance for making the speech. 2/ Income from his books in 1951 was estimated at ¥3,500, 000; however, when he had cancer of the stomach in the summer of 1951, Subject found it necessary to sell his house in Setagaya-ku for ¥650,000 to pay taxes and hospital charges. 2/ In early 1951 Subject reportedly worked on plans for organizing troops for Taiwan. 2/ 1952-In March Subject reportedly gave a lecture to the Liberalist Club called "The War Potential and Strategy of America and Russia vs. Japan's Stand." This speech brought about the "slip-of-the-tongue case," and as a result Subject was indicted by the SIB. The contents of the lecture were studied by the Special Surveillance Section of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office. 2/ Subject was one of those listed as a friend and acquaintance of HARUKE Yoshitane. 2/ Subject was also an acquaintance of KOTANI Etsuo; the two having been in the same class at the Military Academy, but they reportedly were not on good terms. 10/ On the night of 1 April, Subject and HATTORI Takushiro, head of the Historical Records Department, Demobilization Board, were invited to dinner by CHANG Po-chin of the Chinese Mission. The two thought that they would be the only Japanese guests, but found that the former General OKAMURA Neiji, former Lt. General IMAI Takeo, and former Lt. General DOI Akio were also present. At this time Subject and HATTORI reportedly were generally on bad terms with DOI and OKAMURA, but since the meeting was entirely social in nature, the ill feelings seemed to be alleviated. Since DOI had been a classmate of Lt. General KAWAMURA Saburo, Singapore Kempeitai commander who was executed after the war, Subject described the conditions under which KAWAMURA's widow and family were living and urged DOI and the others to buy KAWAMURA's posthumous war memoirs, Climbing the Thirteen Steps. KAWAMURA and Subject were from the same town, and shortly after Subject's Singapore was published, Mrs. KAWAMURA came to Subject for help. Subject had kept several articles written by KAWAMURA and decided to publish them through ATO Shobo, the publishing company owned by his close friend SATO Katsuro, which had published nearly all of his writings, guaranteeing Mrs. KAWAMURA a little over ¥100,000 regardless of the profit or loss the book sustained. Reportedly a number of people had criticized Subject for his conduct in the KAWAMURA case. KAWAMURA and UISHI Masayuki

TSUJI Masanobu (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

stood trial and were executed for their part in the killing of Chinese merchants in Malaya. ASAYA Shigeharu (see GE Notebook on Personalities) had originated the order, which had been countersigned by his superior, Subject. Both had disappeared after the war to escape trial. The 11 April issue of Yomiuri Jinkan carried an article by Subject which was considered anti-American, and as such, would be a second violation of the Purge Ordinance. However, Subject claimed otherwise, and stated that in case he were indicted on the basis of the article, he would use three Americans as character witnesses to testify that he was not anti-American. These three included Joshep Fromm, correspondent for US News and World Report. Subject also claimed that he had warned the Japanese people that the US would pull out of Japan, because he did not want Japanese rearmament to be slowed down by the feeling that the US army would defend Japan whether Japan were armed or not. Subject's opinions on rearmament had undergone a change since he wrote Self-Defense and Neutrality, but Subject still did not express his new opinions completely, apparently fearing that his inconsistency would bring him criticism and perhaps hurt the sale of his new book. Reportedly JCP convert MITAMURA Shiro, a friend close to Subject, was the man responsible for changing Subject's opinions to favor the town-militia theory. ^{2/} Another report stated that shortly after the Peace Treaty became effective on 28 April, Lt. Col. LIU Chih-chao of the Chinese Nationalist Embassy in Tokyo invited HATTOHI and Subject to attend a dinner at the Embassy. General OKAMURA Neiji, Lt. General KASAHARA Yukio and Lt. General DOI Akio were also present. LIU had been friendly with Subject since Subject was stationed in Nanking, and reportedly had asked several Japanese to engage in espionage on behalf of the Nationalist Government. ^{11/} At this same time, following the Peace Treaty, almost all of the staff officers of the pre-surrender East Asia League (To-A Bengsei) were depurged and therefore able to engage in political activities again. A plan to revive the League around these depurges was formulated, and Subject toured the country, visiting former League members. ^{12/} About this time it was reported that KODAMA Yoshio and MIURA Giichi were the "fund raising network" behind Subject. MIURA was also reportedly backing the HATTORI Kikan. ^{13/} On 14 May Subject visited the Soviet Mission to ask that a letter that he had written to his old friend, former Col. NISHIMA Takaji, be delivered. NISHIMA and Subject had been classmate and the two had worked together in the Kwantung Army headquarters. NISHIMA was captured by the Soviets in 1945, and at this time was still a prisoner of the USSR. Major General Aleksei P. Kialenko, then head of the mission, said that he would personally see that Subject's letter was delivered, that he had read all of Subject's books with interest, and that he would be happy if Subject would visit the mission from time to time. ^{14/} On 20 and 21 July, the East Asia League held conferences at the Chuo Kaitaku Kaikan in Tokyo to prepare for the revival of the old League of ISHIHARA Kanji. Subject was the leading figure of the conference, which discussed and decided matters of policy, principle, and internal regulation for the proposed group, which was to bear the name East Asia League Comrades Association (To-A Renmei Doshikai). Other important figures in the conference included KIMURA Takeo, SUIGURA Haruo, WADA Kei, and USHIJIMA Tatsukawa. ^{12/} With the money Subject was collecting at this time from his many books, he bought a large house in Marimura, Suginami-ku, Tokyo, and reportedly had been able to make loans to various member organization of the East Asia League so that the organizations might be able to engage in political activities. ^{14/} Sometime in July plans for a coup d'etat had been initiated by a group of ex-purges, headed by HATTOHI Takushiro, with Subject chosen as the front man for the group, which reportedly had a backing of 500,000 persons throughout Japan. The

Previous Career: (cont'd)

original plan of the group included the assassination of Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru on account of his hostile attitude toward depurgees and nationalists. The group hoped to replace YOSHIDA as Prime Minister with HATOYAMA Ichiro. Reportedly Subject persuaded the group that the time was not right for a coup d'etat, maintaining that it was not YOSHIDA who was the prime adversary of the group and rightists in general, but rather the Socialist Party. The group apparently respected Subject's views, and was in favor of postponing the coup. The group planned to utilize the National Safety Agency in the event of a coup, and INOTO Kumao, one of the members of the group, was appointed to a post in the Agency. Subject was reported to be in control of a faction within the Agency, comprised in part of members of his own 35th class of the Military Academy. 15/ About this the Kaiko Kai was established, holding its first meeting on 23 August. Since this new organization was composed of graduates of all classes of the Military Academy, the Wednesday Discussion Club, of which Subject was a member, decided to dissolve in order to join the Kaiko Kai. 16/ During this period Subject concerned himself mostly with discussions of a military-political nature and speculation regarding the course and outcome of a 3rd World War. His comparison of the US and Soviet war potential led Subject to the conclusion that a protracted indecisive struggle between the two great powers was inevitable and that Japan should endeavor to remain neutral, build up her own defensive power, abolish the Administrative Agreement with the US, and force the withdrawal of US troops from Japan to insure this neutrality. Subject also advocated Japan's cultivation of the friendship of her Asiatic neighbors and the preparation for the day when the Oriental races would become the world's dominant force after the US-Soviet battle had run its indecisive course. Subject's campaign for election from the First Ishikawa District drew large crowds. Running as an Indépendent, he received by far the largest number of votes in his district, and won a House of Representatives seat in the 1 October 1952 election. 17/ The issues on which Subject campaigned, self-defense, neutrality, political and economic independence, and the liberation of Asia, were the main planks of the East Asia League Comrade Society (Toa Renmei Doshi Kai), and one report stated that Subject had won his seat because of the backing of that organization. 17/ However, another report stated that Subject seemed to have achieved his outstanding victory largely by his own efforts rather than through the support of any organization of former military men. This report also stated that an important source of Subject's strength was composed of voters, who as young men called up for conscription, had been trained under Subject in the late 1920's and early 1930's. 18/ Subject at this time was one of the men reported to be acting as advisers on military affairs to HATOYAMA Ichiro. 19/ It was also about this same time that MURAI Jun, Chief, Cabinet Research Chamber, CRC, and OGATA Taketora, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and others were intending to organize a strong intelligence organization for Japan. Subject reportedly was one of OGATA's assistants on Chinese Affairs, advising him on political affairs. 20/ In November it was reported that Subject and KIMURA Tokutaro, State Minister in charge of the National Safety Agency were maintaining regular liaison, and that the two had been close friends since before the war, visiting back and forth since Subject had returned from hiding. Because the policy advocated by the National Defense Study Association, a rightist organization of which KIMURA was an advisor, stresses the organization of self-defense corps in factories and workshops, it had many points in common with Subject's theory of "Self-Defense and Neutrality." Therefore, it was natural that the two should maintain liaison. It also seemed possible that Subject and his associates had looked after KIMURA during the post-war period when he was out of a job. 21/ In December 1952, Subject reportedly

TSUJI Masanobu (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

delivered a speech to an audience of about 350 persons in Akita City. In a question and answer session which followed the speech, Subject reportedly recommended that Communist China be given diplomatic recognition and handled as "an Asiatic problem." He expressed his belief that China would not invade or bomb Japan unless Japan sent troops to Korea, or the US bombed Manchuria from Japanese bases. He reportedly stated that he looked at the Emperor as "only the head of Japan," not as the leader of Asia. ^{17/} Subject claimed that he gave half of his income to the families of war victims, and while he was busy finding jobs for superiors, friends, and subordinates, he apparently was not usually concerned with the welfare of his own family. When his oldest son was forced to leave middle school after the 2nd year and become an apprentice, he was sent money by a friend of his; he still remembers this with deep gratitude. Reportedly during 1952, the Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, was watching Subject's group, having come to the conclusion that there was something psychologically anti-American in the actions of the group. ^{2/}

1953 - Subject reportedly was a committee member of the Cabinet Committee of the House of Representatives, and participated in the 18th Session of the Cabinet Committee, during which he made known his criticisms of the National Safety Force. ^{22/} On 6 October 1953 Subject left Tokyo for Kyushu, and the following day boarded a patrol boat at Hakata and left the port before nightfall. This trip was promoted by Subject's desire to see the Hhce Line with his own eyes. Subject felt that the declaration of the Hhce Line was apparently after the example of the MacArthur Line, and in this sense the US was partly responsible for the Hhce Line issue. ^{23/} After Subject's trip to the Hhce Line, he accused the Maritime Safety Agency official of neglecting to make full investigations of Japanese vessel seizures, claiming that this failure resulted in the ROK "gaining the upper hand" in the disputes. ^{24/} A review of Subject's book, Underground Escape, made in November 1953, stated that Subject documented an extremely low opinion of the Chinese, indicating that they were hopelessly corrupt and incapable of reform. As to the Soviet war potential, Subject felt that the Soviet Union would have achieved superiority to the US in about every military field by 1950, and although Subject did not speak particularly harshly of either the Soviet Union or the Chicom, he did make a number of strong criticisms of the US. ^{25/} Information dated December 1953 stated that until recently, the East Asia League Comrades Society had advocated "self-defense neutrality," in accordance with the theories of Subject, its dominant leader, and like most Japanese rightist organizations it approved the acceptance of NSA aid from the US. However, after charges had appeared in the press that NSA aid was designed to put Japan in a colonial relationship to the US, the League reconsidered and made an official announcement of its opposition to NSA aid on the grounds that it would impair Japan's military and economic independence. At this point Subject organized a Self-Defense League (Jiei Domei). This displeased a considerable number of the members, who presented a resolution attacking Subject's activities as factional and criticizing "self-defense neutrality" as the main plank in the Society's platform. Rumors immediately arose that Subject would be expelled from the Society, but he forestalled this by resigning, calling on those who agreed with him to follow. The only ones who did so were SUGIMURA Haruo and UOHIYAMA Kasuya. Thus there were two organizations, the Self-Defense League under Subject, and the East Asia League Comrades Society, almost intact, with the former advocating an aggressive rearmament movement while the latter still held to "self-defense neutrality." This same report stated that Subject had been getting considerable financial support from KONOMI Ujitoshi, the de facto owner of the Tokyo Onsen (bathhouse). ^{26/}

Previous Career: (cont'd)

1954 - In January Subject's youth action corps called "Self-Defense League" (Jiyi (Jiei) Domei) had withdrawn from the East Asia League Comrades Society, and reportedly was working toward enlisting members of the NSP into its organization. Subject and HATTORI Takushiro were alleged to have had among their followers more than ten officers within the NSP. ^{27/} In early 1954 Subject conferred with an undisclosed number of former officers in preparation for the formation of an organization made up of ex-servicemen with a strong interest in the future of Japan. These men planned to inaugurate an organization during the spring of 1954, the name of which was to be "Japan Self Disciplined National Army Creation Association" (Nippon Jishuku Kokugun Kensetsu Kai). KISHIMOTO (mu), a former Col., in charge of Hokkaido Air Base and CHIKAI Satoshi, Lt. Col., then president of Nisso Company, were two men interested in this organization. ^{28/} About May 1954 it was reported that Subject had thus far refused to join the Kyukoku Undo (National Salvation Movement) because of the violent action group within the Movement. However, it was believed that he would be forced to go along with the Movement in order to maintain his position of leadership among the rightists, since it was expected that he would find himself faced with concerted opposition if he continued his so-called independent stand in defiance of the ultranationalist group. Followers of Subject stated that they expected Subject's prestige to increase during 1954, because so many people were losing faith in the then present government, but could not accept either of the Socialist parties as possible alternatives. ^{29/} On 19 September 1954, at its Third National Convention, the East Asia League Comrades Society officially struck the names of Subject and his henchman in the Self-Defense League, YABE Senkichi, from its roster. ^{30/} In October 1954 Subject wrote to Frank Blake at the American Embassy in Saigon requesting his assistance in helping ASAMA Shigeharu obtain a visa for Indochina on his visit there in October or November 1954. ^{31/} It was at this time that Subject reportedly advocated the establishment of the Sino-Russian Treaty Alliance of Friendship and Mutual Assistance before a peace treaty was signed between Communist China and Japan. Subject stated that the Japanese Government should recognize Communist China rather than Nationalist China; Subject felt that Japan recognized the Government of CHIANG Kai-shek simply because she was ordered to do so by the US; favored a packaged deal in which Japan and Communist China would be admitted to the United Nations at the same time; and thought that Japanese trade with Communist China should be opened although the Japanese economy may not recover speedily through its effects, feeling that if Japan maintained free trade relations with Communist China, Japan would need no aid from the US. ^{32/} Subject reportedly was also against the Government-sponsored anti-Democratic Activities Counter-Measures Council, which was proposed mainly for the "control of Communist activities." Subject's motivation in opposing these measures was to make as much noise as possible in order to attract public attention not against ADAMC, but for himself. ^{33/} On December 8th, Subject addressed a gathering at Hibiya Hall marking the 13th anniversary of Pearl Harbor and the inauguration of the All-Japan Veterans' Association. Subject declared that American ex-President Harry S. Truman "would be the No. 1 war criminal" of World War II "if God were to give a fair trial" and that Japan and the US must share equal blame for the Pacific War. Before condemning Truman for "killing 200,000 to 300,000 civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki," Subject apologized to the audience for having been a "coward who escaped the war crimes trial" which he labeled as "unfair and only a means of the victor punishing the vanquished." Subject also stated that "Stalin would be the No. 2 war

TSUJI Masanobu (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

criminal for starving to death hundreds of thousands of Japanese in Siberia." ^{32/} About this time Subject was appointed to the position of Vice President of the Policy Council of the Japanese Democratic Party. ^{33/} It was also in December that ex-Maj. Gen. KAWAGUCHI Kiyotake, a former Japanese general of the Imperial Japanese Army who had spent 7 years in prison for ordering the execution of a Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, charged that Subject was responsible for his crime. KAWAGUCHI stated that Subject, then a colonel and staff officer at Imperial General Headquarters in Japan ordered the execution of Jose Abad Santos after his capture in April 1942. KAWAGUCHI also stated that he had wanted to save Santos, and that he had sent a cable to Headquarters asking that Santos' life be spared. All returning cables ordered Santos executed, and KAWAGUCHI had no alternative but to obey. Later KAWAGUCHI called on Gen. HONKA Masaharu in Manila and asked the reason for the insistence on Santos' execution; HONKA was greatly astonished, since he had told his chief of staff to take good care of Santos. KAWAGUCHI later learned that it was Subject who specifically demanded that Santos be killed. This incident caused a bitter, postmortem battle between KAWAGUCHI and Subject in December 1954, when KAWAGUCHI repudiated Subject's charges that the General's troops on New Guinea were a "band of thieves" and that he had disobeyed orders from Imperial General Headquarters. ^{34/} Later in December, about the 20th, KAWAGUCHI accused Subject with numerous war time cruelties which resulted in the death of hundreds of Chinese, the Allied sentencing of many Japanese soldiers for war crimes, and other "unnecessary sacrifices." Subject charged that KAWAGUCHI's unit had stolen supplies and provisions intended for other friendly units, to which KAWAGUCHI called Subject "a big liar." KAWAGUCHI issued his first statement on behalf of the bereaved families of those killed under his command, and published a second statement containing fresh charges against Subject at the Tokyo Kaikan restaurant, in which he stated that the massacre of more than 300 Chinese residents in Singapore by the Japanese army between February 21 and 23, 1942 was planned by Subject. A British war crimes tribunal at Singapore sentenced two high-ranking Japanese officers, including Lt. General KAWAHURA Sanro, to death for the massacre. KAWAGUCHI returned home on 19 April 1954 after completing six years servitude at Muntinglupa prison in the Philippines for war crimes charges which he also attributed to Subject. ^{5/}

1955 - In its first issue of 1955, the Yomiuri Weekly carried articles written by KAWAGUCHI and his supporters, former Lt. Gen. WAGI Takaji and former Col. WATANABE Saburo, and by Subject and his supporter OZAKI Shiro. These articles stated the views of both sides in the bitter feud between KAWAGUCHI and Subject. On 2 January, Subject stated that these articles had made it difficult to get elected in the coming general election. ^{35/} In March Subject was reported to be an official and member of the Political Research Committee (Seimū Chōsei Kai) of the Liberal Democratic Party. ^{36/} Subject reportedly left Japan on 23 August as a Democratic Party member of the Dietmen's tour to the USSR and Communist China. The trip through the two countries took 40 days, with most of the time being spent in the USSR. The tours were strictly controlled and guided, but Subject evaded the Soviet schedule, and was able to get about a bit by himself. Subject reportedly had a good knowledge of both Russian and Chinese, and was able to talk with over 400 of the common people in an attempt to find out the true feelings of the people. Subject's real intention in making the tour was to ascertain the truth of the "peace offensive" program of the USSR. Subject's military background assisted him immeasurably in talking to military leaders in the USSR and Communist China, and also made him an outstanding target for constant surveillance. ^{37/} During the

Previous Career: (cont'd)

tour, Subject had several meetings with representatives of Marshal Zhukov, one of them Zhukov's chief of staff (a Maj. Gen.), and on the night before leaving Moscow, Subject had a 3-hour interview with Zhukov at the latter's request. This meeting reportedly was held under clandestine circumstances. A special messenger instructed Subject to follow a man wearing a red tie and carrying a newspaper who would be walking in front of the hotel. Subject, fearing liquidation, told KITAMURA Tokutaro, leader of the Diet group, that he was being taken to meet Zhukov, and then met the contact man, who led him several blocks, motioned him into a car which took him to Zhukov. Zhukov showed great interest in US Forces in Japan, asked questions on the books Subject had written, and questioned Subject about the attack on Pearl Harbor, being under the impression that Subject was one of the planners of that attack. ^{38/} Prior to Subject's meeting with Zhukov, Subject received a message from Zhukov asking if there was anything he could do for Subject. Subject replied that he would be very grateful to receive Zhukov's permission to meet former Col. MISHINA Ryuji, who was imprisoned on war crimes charges at Ivanovo prison. MISHINA had been a classmate of Subject's at the Military Academy and a very close friend. The following day MISHINA was brought to Subject's hotel room with permission to remain there overnight. Upon noticing that MISHINA's teeth were in very bad condition, Subject called the fact to Zhukov's attention through one of the messengers, and the very next day MISHINA received dental treatment. ^{39/} Subject returned to Japan on 2 October 1955, and on the 19th of October, he gave a speech on his impressions of the USSR and Communist China to a restricted audience. ^{40/} After his return, Subject also visited leading officers of the National Defense Agency and strongly recommended that total rearment of the Japanese defense forces be completed prior to the five to six years lead time of the Soviets. Subject felt that the post-war Soviet arms development had shown great strides, with the mass production of highly efficient and effective modern weapons. Since the Japanese defense forces had been basically armed with outdated and second-hand equipment from the US, Subject felt that now was the time for the indigenous development of modern ordnance by Japanese engineers and industry. Instead of concentrating on increasing the size of the defense forces as suggested by the US, Subject advocated the improvement of the esprit de corps and equipment of the defense forces. Subject further stated that the Japanese Government should seriously consider cutting down its regular personnel strength by 20,000 men and allocate the savings therefrom to the research and development of new ordnance items as well as providing State support for the ordnance industry, which Subject considered the backbone of military strength. Subject's ideal was as follows: A well equipped and highly trained small force with modern weapons is far more capable than a large force without a highly efficient ordnance industrial base. ^{37/} A report of November 1955 stated that Subject had recommended Former Lt. Col. ASAEDA Shigeharu to AKEAWA Yoshiyuke (both as the man able to handle negotiations with Egypt for the purchase of arms. (For details of this deal see ASAEDA's consolidation filed in the JIS CB Notebook on Personalities). ^{41/} It was reported that the Japanese authorities were investigating allegations that five members of the Japanese Diet delegation which visited the USSR were recruited by the Soviets. The Japanese intelligence services later suspected that Subject might have been recruited. These suspicions were based on the fact that Subject left the group on two occasions, at Kiev and on the Volga, and on one occasion was separated for two days from the rest of the group. When Subject was questioned about these visits on his return to Japan, Subject would say nothing. ^{42/} Subject was also asked if he had ever been a member of the Japanese Communist Party and if he had ever been a member of the Japanese Socialist Party. Subject replied that he had never been a member of either party.

TSUJI Masanobu (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

1956 - In a reported May, information revealed that Subject had received an invitation from LIAC Cheng-chih to head a delegation of ultra-militarists and rightists to Communist China in June. Subject consulted Government officials, and it was decided that Subject should go, but in September instead of June. ^{43/} Another report dated May 1956 stated that it was felt that KURIHAYASHI Tetsuro's recent trip to Hongkong was merely a cover for some sort of intelligence work, since he was not an experienced businessman and would not normally be given an assignment of that sort. KURIHAYASHI and Subject had been in contact in 1948 and 1949 when Subject had first returned to Japan from hiding. It was not ascertained what deal these two may have been concerned with. ^{44/} On 15 June 1956 Subject, then Chief of the Self-Defense League Headquarters, delivered a speech to approximately 300 audiences at the election speech campaign of HAYASHIYA Kamejiro, (advisor of the Self-Defense League) House of Councillors Liberal-Democratic Party candidate. In his speech, Subject stated that 720,000,000 yen had been furnished to the Japan Communist and Socialist parties by the Soviets. Both of the parties protested, stating that Subject violated the Public Election Law since he had publicly announced false facts regarding the parties. A later report stated that Subject could not prove the accusations which he had made during the campaign speeches; however, another source flatly contradicted this statement, reporting that Subject had photostats of documents supporting his contentions. When the Socialists threatened to sue Subject for having made the statement, Subject challenged them to do so only because he knew that litigation on such a suit would be prolonged for years before a verdict could be reached. ^{45,46/} It was also in June that it was reported that Subject had influenced the Foreign Ministry to take a more cautious approach to the question of ENDO Saburo taking a delegation of former Japanese military and naval officers to Communist China. The Foreign Ministry originally intended to authorize the travel of the delegation. ^{47/} In the summer of 1956 Subject recommended HATTORI as councillor of the National Defense Council; however, the selection was strongly opposed by Defense Agency Chief FUJIMADA. Consequently, HATTORI did not get the position. ^{48/} Subject reportedly was working closely with KIKI Takeo at this time, and was attempting to finance his organization, the Self-Defense League, by soliciting contributions and popular support. ^{49/} Subject was instrumental in choosing the members of the ENDO Group going to Red China. Choice of the members was made by the Liberal Democratic Party on the recommendation of DOI Akio and Subject. Those who were disapproved blamed DOI for being turned down, and in order to alleviate the situation, a notional second group was planned; however, the second group was considered notional because the LDP and the Government had no intention of allowing a second group to go. ^{50/} On 1 August Subject gave a report to the Executive Board of the LDP concerning the information he had on funds received from Communist China by various groups and individuals in Japan during the past three years, ^{51/} and on September 5, he gave a report concerning Southeast Asia at the #1 Diet Members Building. ^{52/} A report dated 20 November 1956 stated that Subject resigned from his Diet post to take responsibility for his eldest son's act of violence against his divorced wife. Subject stated that "One who cannot manage a household well, is unfit for the task of ruling the country. My conscience does not allow me to remain in the Diet post." Subject son, TSUJI Tohru, had visited his former wife, whom he divorced on November 5, and asked her to return to his home for the happiness of their child. When she refused, he inflicted injuries that required one month of medical treatment. Consequently Tohru was arrested. ^{53/} A report of November 26 stated that

Previous Career: (cont'd)

Subject had withdrawn his resignation, 54 and a later report stated that, according to reliable information emanating from newspaper circles, the real motive behind Subject's attempt at resignation from the Diet was that he had been invited by South Vietnam's Govt to become the commander-in-chief of its army. It was also stated in this report that Subj had revealed this fact to Lower House Speaker MASUTANI Shuji, who discouraged him from accepting the job. MASUTANI was from the same prefecture, Ishikawa, as Subj. 55

1957 - Subj reportedly was a member of the Foreign and Military Affairs Committee of the Diet, and left Japan in January for a tour of the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Subj had a talk with the US Army Attaché in Damascus, Syria on 21 January. During the interview Subj stated that he was on a mission for the Japanese Prime Minister to survey middle east problems, particularly the Suez Canal situation and the magnitude of the Communist threat in that part of the world. Subj also stated that the results of his survey would have a bearing on Japanese relations with the Afro-Asian Bloc in the United Nations. Subj was to leave Damascus for Cairo on 22 January, where he expected to talk with Nasser, who he reportedly saw on January 30. 56, 57. Another source stated that Subj got along splendidly with Nasser, since both were nationalists, national socialists, radical army officers, anti-American, and in a sense, anti-Soviet. Nasser sent word ahead to Tito, commanding Subj, and Subj received a fine reception from Tito. This same source stated that although Subj was not pro-Communist, his anti-American feelings and versions of neutralism inclined him to the USSR and Communist China. 58 At this time Subj appeared to be partially involved in the arms operations that his friend ASAYADA was involved in with the USSR and Communist China. ASAYADA was also abroad, and the two met on their return trips. ASAYADA persuaded Subject to make a side trip to Communist China during which Subj had an interview with Premier CHOU En-lai. 59 When Subj arrived in Peiping and requested an interview with CHOU, he was informed that CHOU was ill. Subj was then entertained by LIAO Cheng-chih (member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party) at a welcoming dinner, during which Subj infuriated LIAO by refusing to retract his derogatory statements published in a Summer 1956 issue of the *Hokkoku Shimbun*. LIAO left the table, and Subj expected to be placed under "house arrest" because of his breach of étiquette. However, four days later Subj had an interview with CHOU in the latter's bedroom, at which both Subj and CHOU ~~steakhouse~~ ^{met}. Subj asked permission to make public the notes, and CHOU stated that he wanted the notes compared before any disclosure was made. 60 It was reported that one of the items Subj discussed with CHOU was the establishment of an Asian Bloc, an item of extreme interest to Subj, who had continually advocated the theory of "Asia for the Asians." The source of this information stated that Subj's daughter had recently married the son of a wealthy man, tentatively identified as Mr. HORENSTEIN (fmu), a former officer in the Japanese Imperial Army, and reportedly the richest man in Yamanashi Prefecture; the owner of vast interests in the Prefecture (included among his interests was being principal stock holder of the Fuchi Railway Co., Ltd.). It was believed that Subj possibly obtained additional funds from his son-in-law's father to pursue some of the projects he reported had under consideration and to further his personal aims. 61 On Subject's return trip to Japan he stayed one night in Hong Kong, i.e., 1 and 2 March, at which time he had a discussion with two Chinese friends named TSENG Hsin-shu (1473/1800/0647) and TANG Cheng-po (3282/3397/3134), both formerly connected with the WANG CHING-WEI Puppet regime in China, who were known to be in touch with CHANG Shin-chao (4545/1102/6856) an "unofficial" C.P.C. envoy in Hong Kong. Subj reported his trip to these two friends. 62 In March Subj was listed as

TSUJI Masanobu (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

one of the members of the Kaiyo Kai (Tuesday Society), an organization of supporters of former Prime Minister ISHIBASHI Tanzan. 63/ Subsequent to Subject's return to Japan, the Naval Air Technical Council and the Nanika Kai (Seventh Day Society) both shunned Subject because he was considered somewhat of a lame-brain and was continuously spouting good things about Communist China. 64/ Subject stated on his return that the United States' insistence upon a ~~quid pro quo~~ in extending aid to foreign nations was hurting the US, particularly since the USSR had been handling the same problem much more skillfully. 65/ Since Subject had been for some time a strong supporter of ISHIBASHI that was probably the reason ISHIBASHI had made the arrangement for Subject's tour of the Near East and Europe. It was reported that Subject undoubtedly reported to KISHI Nobusuke on his return to Japan, but KISHI reportedly did not regard Subject too highly, and it was considered extremely unlikely that KISHI would be influenced by Subject's statements except possibly adversely. When Subject addressed a meeting of wives of LDP Diet members after his return, he indicated in clear strong language that he was disappointed that ISHIBASHI had been replaced by KISHI. 66/ About 8 April Subject requested that R. O. (Army) arrange an interview with the American Ambassador or someone from the Embassy in order that he might report the results of his meeting with CHOU. On 15 April Subject and R.O. met with the Chief of the Embassy Political Division and one other Embassy officer for an interview. Subject discussed his trip and left a lengthy document which contained the shorthand notes taken by ASANEDA, who was also present at the meeting with CHOU. Subject also stated that he had proposed to CHOU that another military group visit Communist China and that Subject select the appropriate individuals to make the trip. Subject said that CHOU agreed, and that with the support of FUJITA, Chief of the Cabinet Research Office, this visit had been approved, over Foreign Office opposition, for mid-May. Subject stated that he had hand-picked the members of the group to insure that they were not Communist tainted as were the members of the EDDO Group. 67/ At the 15 May meeting of the Kaiyo Kai, Subject gave a lecture on his recent trip, and stated that the contents of his talk with CHOU couldn't be released yet, because he hadn't received CHOU's approval. EDDO accepted Subject and demanded that he retract the statements he had made, that EDDO had received funds from Communist China; Subject refused. 68/ At this time Subject reportedly was Chief of the Central Headquarters of the Self-Defense League. The League sent rosters to Communist China of the 184-man delegation led by Subject which was scheduled to visit Communist China on an inspection tour. The delegation was rejected by Communist China, since that country wanted to send a delegation to Japan at the end of September 1957. The source of this information believed that the rejection was caused by KISHI's friendly attitude toward the Formosan Government during his Southeast Asia tour. 69/ In September Subject revealed that he was at odds with KISHI on the question rearmament. Subject felt that Japan should rearm significantly, and with weapons that had atomic capabilities. Subject was also irritated that Admiral HOSHIMA had been selected to accompany KISHI on his recent trip to the U.S.; Subject had wanted to go. Subject was also unhappy that many U.S. officials (Subject didn't specify which ones) in Japan considered him to be anti-American, which Subject claimed was only true in part. Subject stated that in some cases he did not agree with U.S. policy, but, realizing that Japan would be tied in with the U.S. for years to come, was willing to meet and work with

TSUJI Masamitsu (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

1941 - At this time Subject was in the Ultra-Rightist Group and belonged to the Control faction (TOSHI HA), which was headed by TOJO Hideki. The other faction was the Imperial Rule faction (KODO HA), headed by ARAKI Sadao. In 1941 Subject's group, including HATTORI Takushiro, TANENURA Sakio and others, with WADA Hiro's group (known as the KIKAKU IN Group), protested strongly against ARAKI's Imperial Rule faction which advocated that Japan should proceed North instead South. Subject reportedly convinced TOJO that Japan should invade southward, which resulted in the war with the U.S. 76

1949 - Subject organized the Patriotic Faith Society in 1949(it has been called the Loyal Faith Society) (Junchu Shisei Kai). The Society followed a policy of maintaining strict secrecy. Because most of the members of the Society were former military officers their information collecting activities were centered on tactical forecasts of the 3rd World War. Consequently a great effort was made to ascertain the movements of the Communists, both in Japan and abroad. It was reported that 27 members of the Society had secretly made their way to Red China and the Soviet Union in order to ascertain the actual conditions in those countries. 77

1962 - A representative of TBS, a private Japanese radio and TV broadcasting co. (an organization searching for TSUJI), stated that TSUJI presumably is presently in a small town called PEU LANG THUONG (2116N/10611E) located approximately 30 miles northeast of HANOI (2102N/10551E). Prominent landmarks of this town include a cross-road located between a first class highway running north and a second class road running east, a large industrial bridge (type unknown), and a large mental hospital. The TBS rep added that TSUJI also had been in Communist China recently. FIELD COMMENT Credibility of info reported cannot be established. Informal check with USDF members resulted in negative reply to query whether they were in receipt of confirmatory data. TSUJI's son recently went on a trip to SEA to trace the whereabouts of his father; he reportedly uncovered no evidence which indicated that his father had gone to Com China. (500th Intel Corps Gp, Rpt No. 1785/62, 20 Jun 62)

MISSING JAPANESE A YEAR-OLD PUZZLE

Point to Communist China Clues to His Whereabouts

TOKYO (AP)—One of Japan's most intriguing mysteries is a year old. It concerns what has happened to Massanobu Tsuji, Member of Parliament and World War II military strategist.

Mr. Tsuji, then 58 years of age, left Tokyo about a year ago for what ostensibly was a 40-day tour of Southeast Asia. A month later his wife received a package from Bangkok, Thailand, containing his business suit, other clothing and personal effects.

There have been nothing but rumors since.

One unconfirmed report said Mr. Tsuji reached Vientiane, Laos, April 14, 1961, and left for Communist-held northern Laos five days later en route to Communist China.

The Tokyo Times recently published a report, which could not be confirmed, that Mr. Tsuji was teaching guerrilla warfare at a Communist military academy in Kirin in northeastern China.

It has also been rumored that Mr. Tsuji is under arrest in Communist China. The Japanese Red Cross has been in touch with Peking officials in an attempt to confirm this. But a Red Cross official said "there has been absolutely no information."

"I've had no word at all," says Mr. Tsuji's wife, "and can hazard a guess."

Though only a Lieutenant colonel during World War II, Mr. Tsuji was credited with planning the Imperial Army's conquest of Malaya and Singapore, and the unsuccessful defense of Guadalcanal.

He was accused by a former Imperial Army general of having planned the massacre of more than 300 Chinese in Singapore in February 1942. The Allies termed him a war criminal. When Japan surrendered, Mr. Tsuji disappeared. It later was learned that he had disguised himself as a Buddhist monk and wandered for years through Southeast Asia and China, returning to Japan after the charges against him were dropped.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 13, 1962

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

SECRET

Box 8, APO 94
San Francisco, California

EX 1537

10 May 1962

SUBJECT: TSUJI Masanobu (辻 まさのぶ)

TO: Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Ralfe
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

Set forth below, for your information, is a gist of background information on TSUJI Masanobu (辻 まさのぶ), a former Colonel of the defunct Japanese Imperial Army and presently a member of the House of Councillors of the Japanese Diet.

1. Name: TSUJI Masanobu (辻 まさのぶ)
2. Date of Birth: 11 October 1903.
3. Permanent Domicile: ISHIKAWA Ken, ENOMA Gun, YAMANAKA Cho, IMADACHI Machi, RO, 12 Banchi (糸川県 江の島郡 山中町
今立町口ノ下ノ馬場) (1938)
4. Present Address: TOKYO To, SETAGAYA Ku, MATSURARA Cho, 3-1094 (東京都 渋谷区 駒沢町三丁目一〇九四)
5. Education:
 - a. 1 Sep 1917: Enrolled in the NAGOKA District Army Preparatory School.
 - b. 18 Jul 1924: Graduated from the Military Academy of the defunct Japanese Imperial Army.
6. Brief Military History:
 - a. 25 Oct 1924: Appointed 2d Lieutenant, Infantry, and assigned to the 7th Infantry Regiment.
 - b. 25 Oct 1927: Promoted to 1st Lieutenant.
 - c. 28 Nov 1931: Graduated from the War College.
 - d. 2 Feb 1932: Appointed Company Commander of a company of the 7th Infantry Regiment.
 - e. 20 Feb 1932: to 3 Mar 1932: Participated in combat operations in the vicinity of SHANGHAI, CHINA.
 - f. 1 Sep 1932: Assigned to duty with the General Staff Office for duty.

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DATE 10 May 1962	

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2000

SECRET

- g. 1 Aug 1933: Appointed Captain, Infantry.
- h. 20 Dec 1933: Assigned to duty with the General Staff Office.
- i. 1 Aug 1934: Appointed company commander of the Cadet Unit at the Military Academy.
- j. 2 Apr 1935: Assigned to duty with the 2d Infantry Regiment.
- k. 4 Aug 1937: Assigned to duty as staff officer of the Japanese Occupation Army in CHINA.
- l. 25 Aug 1937: Assigned as staff officer, North CHINA Army Group.
- m. 1 Nov 1937: Assigned as staff officer, MANCHURIA Area Army (KANTO GUN 關東軍).
- n. 1 Mar 1938: Appointed Major, Infantry, participated in the Battle of NODOMAN.
- o. 7 Sep 1939: Assigned to duty at the 11st Army Headquarters.
- p. 6 Feb 1940: Assigned to duty at the General Headquarters of the Expeditionary Force in CHINA.
- q. 1 Aug 1940: Appointed Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry.
- r. 6 Nov 1940: Assigned to duty with the Research Department of the TAIWAN Army.
- s. 1 Jul 1941: Assigned to duty with General Staff Office.
- t. 26 Sep 1941: Assigned to duty as staff officer with the 25th Army.
- u. 8 Dec 1941 to 15 Feb 1942: Landed on MALAYA and participated in the invasion of Northern, Central and Southern MALAYA and in the SINGAPORE operations.
- v. 16 Mar 1942: Assigned as army staff officer at the Imperial Headquarters; participated in the battle at GUADALCANAL Island.
- w. 1 Feb 1943: Assigned as instructor of military science at the War College.
- x. 2 Aug 1943: Appointed Colonel, Infantry.
- y. 20 Aug 1943: Assigned as staff officer with the expeditionary force in CHINA.
- z. 3 Jul 1944: Assigned as staff officer with the 33d Army (in BURMA).
- aa. 24 May 1945: Assigned as staff officer with the 39th Army (The 39th Army Headquarters was located in BANGKOK.)

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- bb. 17 Aug 1945: Commenced his travels in disguise through the Asian continent.
- cc. 3 to 10 Nov 1945: In VIENTIANE, LAOS.
- dd. 14 to 23 Nov 1945: In SAVANNAKHET, LAOS.
- ee. 29 Nov 1945 to 9 Mar 1946: In HANOI, North VIETNAM.
- ff. 9 Mar to 19 Mar 1946: In KUNMING (2504N/1021E), YUNNAN Province.
- gg. 19 Mar to 1 Jul 1946: In CHUNGCHING (2934N/10635E), SZECHWAN Province.
- hh. 1 Jul 1946 to 15 May 1948: In NANKING (3203N/11848E), KIANGSU Province.
- ii. 16 May 1948: Departed from SHANGHAI.
- jj. 25 May 1948: Landed on SASEBO (佐世保), began his travels in disguise in JAPAN.
- kk. 1 Jan 1950: Terminated his underground activities.
- ll. Aug 1951: Was indicted on the charge of suspicion of improper speech and behavior. However, the authorities later decided not to prosecute him.

7. Political Career:

- a. Oct 1952: Ran as an independent candidate in the 25th General Election and was elected to the House of Representatives from the First District of ISHIKAWA Ken. He polled the highest number of votes, a total of 64,912, which placed him in first place.
- b. Apr 1953: Ran as an independent in the 26th General Election and was re-elected as a member of the House of Representatives. He obtained over 50,000 votes which placed him in second place.
- c. Nov 1954: Joined the Democratic Party (MINSHUTO 民主党).
- d. Feb 1955: Ran on the Democratic Party ticket in the 27th General Election and was re-elected to the House of Representatives. SUBJMTT polled the largest number of votes obtaining 83,690 votes, which again placed him in first place.

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- a. Nov 1955: Joined the Liberal-Democratic Party (自由民主党), a coalition party of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party.
- f. May 1958: Ran on the Liberal Democratic Party ticket in the 28th General Election and was re-elected to the House of Representatives. SUBJECT obtained 45,822 votes which placed him in third place.
- g. 10 Dec 1958: Charges were preferred against him before the Party Regulation Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party for making anti-Party speeches, etc.
- h. 30 Apr 1958: As a result of charges preferred against him before the Party Regulation Committee, SUBJECT was expelled from the Liberal-Democratic Party. He immediately thereafter resigned as a member of the House of Representatives and decided to run as an independent for the House of Councillors.
- i. Jun 1959: Ran as an independent candidate in the 5th Ordinary Election and was elected to the House of Councillors. SUBJECT obtained 683,256 votes, which placed him in third place.

8. Family Status:

- a. Name of Wife: Chitose (千歳); Date of Birth: 1914
- b. Children:
- (1) First Son: Tooru (透)
 - (a) Date of Birth: 1931
 - (b) Operates an apartment house at IZUMI-Cho (和泉町) at SUJINAMI-Ku, TOKYO (東京杉並区). - (2) First Daughter: Eiko (variant, Hideko [英子])
 - (a) Date of Birth: 1933
 - (b) Housewife; married to Mitomo (光雄), first son of HORIUCHI Kasuo (堀内一雄). - (3) Second Daughter: Mitoko (美登子)
 - (a) Date of Birth: 1935
 - (b) Housewife; married to Yasuhisa (泰久), second son of UEMURA Kogoro (植村甲午郎). - (4) Third Daughter: Noriko (規子)
 - (a) Date of Birth: 1938
 - (b) Employed as an office worker.

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(5) Second Son: Takeshi (勝)

(a) Date of Birth: 1942

(b) Student, Tokyo University.

c. For chart on Family Lineage, see Tab No. 1.

9. Political Affiliations:

a. In October 1952, SUBJECT was an independent, with no party affiliations.

b. On 8 November 1954, SUBJECT joined the Democratic Party.

c. In November 1955, SUBJECT joined the Liberal-Democratic Party.

d. On 30 April 1959, SUBJECT was expelled from the Liberal-Democratic Party for making anti-party speeches and reverted to an independent.

At the present time, SUBJECT is an independent with no party affiliations, and holds a seat in the House of Councillors, Japanese Diet.

10. Character:

a. SUBJECT is practical, possesses high ideals and is a hard worker.

b. SUBJECT is cheerful, alert, strong willed, warmhearted and sympathetic. He possesses a strong sense of responsibility and is a clear thinker. He possesses strong nationalistic tendencies.

11. Attitude Towards Government and Country:

SUBJECT is extremely loyal to his country. However, he is very critical of the policies of the Government.

12. Leadership:

SUBJECT possesses excellent qualities of leadership. He is considered a capable leader and has disclosed superior qualities of leadership in both military and political affairs.

13. Strong Points:

SUBJECT possesses a strong sense of justice and morality. He has great powers of observation, is a clear thinker, and excels in creativeness.

14. Shortcomings:

SUBJECT places a great deal of confidence in his intuition capabilities, and at times is apt to rely on his intuitions rather than in making proper observations and give a problem the required consideration that it deserves. At times SUBJECT is apt to make a big issue out of insignificant matters.

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15. Weak Points:

Although SUBJECT has strong rational faculties and will-power, he at times is extremely emotional. His affection for his family and kinsmen often cause him emotional stress.

SUBJECT lacks a fundamental knowledge of economics and law, which affects him as a politician.

16. Attitude Towards Superiors:

If SUBJECT considers his superior a man of excellent and fine character, he is loyal to him and serves him wholeheartedly without regard to the superior's ability and capabilities. However, if SUBJECT feels that his superior is a person of undesirable character and/or corrupt, he fiercely denounces and rejects him. He very seldom effects compromises with such superiors.

17. Attitude Towards Subordinates:

SUBJECT is very fair with the subordinates and well liked and respected by them. He gives them the same degree of guidance and protection as for the members of his own family. He is considered by his subordinates as a warmhearted person.

18. Attitude Towards Foreigners:

SUBJECT's attitude towards foreigners is determined by the foreign countries' current national policies. Although SUBJECT appears to be anti-foreign, he is not considered as an exclusionist and believes in international cooperation.

19. Hobbies:

Fishing, reading and writing. SUBJECT has written a number of books. For list of principal books written by SUBJECT, see Tab No. 2.

20. Likes and Dislikes:

SUBJECT is very fond of Japanese swords. He personally cleans and cares of approximately 10 swords daily. He is also very fond of dogs, tea cups, sake jugs, etc.

SUBJECT dislikes untidiness and undisciplined living. He is a firm believer in discipline.

21. Interests:

SUBJECT has a keen interest in nationalism. He is also deeply interested in his popularity among the Japanese masses, particularly the voters. He also takes great interest in public affairs, especially military affairs, public peace and order and foreign diplomatic affairs.

22. Personal Habits:

Generally speaking, SUBJECT is not fastidious about food. He especially likes sukiyaki, sake and other alcoholic drinks. Although he consumes large quantities of sake, he does not become inebriated.

SUBJECT smokes less than 15 cigarettes daily.

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23. Persons with Whom SUBJECT Eats and Drinks:

SUBJECT eats and drinks only with members of his own family and guests who visit him at his private residence. SUBJECT very seldom utilises restaurants to entertain his friends.

24. Sensitiveness:

SUBJECT is very sensitive about irregularities. He does not tolerate irregularities particularly amongst government service personnel. He mercilessly censures public officials who become involved in irregularities. He possesses a strong sense of justice.

25. Religion:

SUBJECT is a member of the JODO SHINSHU (浄土真宗) sect of BUDDHISM. However, he is not considered a very religious person.

26. Health:

As a result of ulcers, SUBJECT had practically all of his stomach removed by surgery in 1956. Since his surgery, he has been in fairly good health. However, his physical strength of late has been declining.

27. Language Qualifications:

SUBJECT reads, writes and understands Russian fluently. He also reads, writes, speaks and understands Chinese fairly well.

28. Family Relationship:

a. SUBJECT's family relations are not harmonious. He has much difficulty with his wife and eldest son, who has become a problem.

b. SUBJECT is living with his wife, his third daughter, Noriko, and second son, Takeshi, at his TOKYO address. The first son and first and second daughters are married and maintain their own household.

c. His first son, Tooru, possesses an inferiority complex and is one of the main causes of all the domestic troubles prevailing in the TSUJI family. On 19 November 1956, his son was arrested for inflicting bodily injury on his wife. As a result, SUBJECT filed an application for resignation from the House of Representatives. However, his friends prevailed on him to withdraw this application.

d. On numerous occasions, SUBJECT has been forced to expend money for settlements of scrapes in which his son Tooru became involved. In order for SUBJECT to get away from his domestic troubles, he often takes trips to various sections of the world.

29. Family Personalities:

a. There are no prominent personalities among SUBJECT's kins. SUBJECT was born the second son of TSUJI Kamekichi (住吉亀吉), a poor farmer of a poor agricultural district. One of SUBJECT's two younger brothers graduated from the Naval Academy of the defunct Japanese Imperial Navy. He was killed in action during World War II. Another younger brother became a member of the Army reserve.

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b. SUBJECT's first daughter Eiko married the first son of HORIUCHI Kanso, a member of the KOSHU (甲州) financial clique and a former Major in the defunct Japanese Imperial Army as well as an ex-Major General in the Manchukuo Army, who is presently a member of the House of Representatives, Parliamentary Vice Minister of the Ministry of Construction, an influential member of the Liberal-Democratic Party, and Chairman of the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

c. SUBJECT's second daughter Mitoko married the second son of UEMURA Kogoro, a leader in Japanese financial circles, a former Deputy Chief of the Cabinet Planning Board, presently Vice President of the Federation of the Japan Employers' Organizations (NIHON KEIEISHA DANTAI RENMEI [日本経営者団体連盟]), President of the Nihon Broadcasting Company Limited (NIHON MOSO KABUSHIKI KAISHA [日本放送株式会社]), President of the Fuji Television Company, Limited (FUJI TELEVI KABUSHIKI KAISHA [フジテレビ株式会社]), and plays an important role in the procurement of political funds for the Liberal-Democratic Party.

30. Supporters:

SUBJECT has the full support of General UKDA Kenkichi (竹田謙吉), who is considered the only prominent person wholeheartedly and fully supporting SUBJECT. However, SUBJECT has a considerable following among the common masses, as is indicated by the number of votes cast for him in the various general elections.

31. Friends:

Although SUBJECT is considered a famous man, he has relatively few intimate friends. SUBJECT has difficulty in establishing close relationship with intimate friends because of his extreme intense idealism.

32. Political Inclination:

SUBJECT's political activities have been centered on the theory of demanding self-discipline, self-examination and rapid progress and improvement in conservative influence. The principal aim of SUBJECT's political activities is centered on the independence of the Japanese people and the prevention of a Third World War.

33. Political Factions:

SUBJECT joined the Democratic Party in November 1954. During the period from November 1955 to April 1959, SUBJECT was a member of the Liberal-Democratic Party. Since April 1959, he has no political party affiliations. In the House of Councilors, he belongs to the "Independent Club", which is composed of independent members of the House of Councilors.

34. Social Relations:

SUBJECT is more or less negative in-so-far as social affairs are concerned. He does not maintain an especially close relationship with any one at the present time.

35. Evaluation of SUBJECT:

a. SUBJECT is considered very capable and competent in military operations.

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b. SUBJECT is considered a top rate military officer. His abilities, character, temperament, common sense, judgment, etc., make him well suited for combat duties as well as for various types of military operations.

c. SUBJECT is eloquent and persuasive, qualities which have enabled him to gain many votes in his various candidacies in the House of Representatives and House of Councillors elections.

36. Referential Data:

a. Visits to Foreign Countries:

(1) During the period 15 August to 1 October 1955, SUBJECT visited Communist CHINA and the SOVIET UNION.

(2) During the period 1 January to 2 March 1957, SUBJECT visited the Middle East, Near East and East ASIA.

(3) During the period 20 August to 22 October 1960, SUBJECT visited Southeast ASIA, the Middle East, the Near East and various West European countries.

(4) On 4 April 1961, SUBJECT left on a trip to observe conditions in South VIETNAM, THAILAND, LAOS, etc., from which trip he has not, as yet, returned. There is great public interest in JAPAN as to his whereabouts and/or cause for his disappearance. The House of Councillors' Steering Committee on 25 April 1962, asked House President MATSUMO Tsuruhiko (松本 鶴彦) to take necessary measures for further investigations to determine the whereabouts of SUBJECT, a member of the House of Councillors.

TSUJI, an ex-Colonel of the former defunct Japanese Imperial Army, has been missing since last June when he disappeared from LAOS under mysterious circumstances.

TSUJI Tooru, the SUBJECT's eldest son, left on 4 May 1962, for SAIGON in search of his father. He intends to begin his search in SAIGON and then visit BANGKOK and VIENTIANE in an attempt to locate his missing father. He will be accompanied by OSHIO Shoei (小糸 勝), President of the Meiji Pearl Company, who was formerly SUBJECT's secretary. SUBJECT's son will remain in South VIETNAM for about three weeks to meet people who have been in contact with his father.

b. Motivation for Trip to Southeast ASIA in April 1961.

(1) From the early part of 1961, the Southeast Asian issues, particularly the Laotian problem, drew SUBJECT's attention. SUBJECT believed that the Laotian domestic situation might touch off a Third World War because of American aid to LAOS, which in turn would force the SOVIET UNION to increase aid for the pro-Communist forces. He also believed that such aid might possibly result in a direct clash between the UNITED STATES and the SOVIET UNION. SUBJECT was of the opinion that the UNITED STATES lacked knowledge of the actual situation in ASIA and that its Asian policy lacked political flexibility. Hence, SUBJECT was seriously concerned with the Laotian situation.

(2) In order for SUBJECT to obtain the necessary intelligence for him to formulate his own policy on the elimination of a Third World War which might be caused by the Laotian problem, he decided to proceed to the area of conflict to obtain the necessary data.

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(3) SUBJECT first planned to inspect the route connecting VIENTIANE, THAKHEK, SAVANNAKHET and TOCHEPOME. However, subsequently, SUBJECT realized that this route was of slight political and military value and therefore, planned to inspect the route connecting VIENTIANE, XIENG KHOUANG, NONG KHAI, VINH and HANOI. SUBJECT was particularly desirous of inspecting the Communist aid supply depots, which he estimated to be located along the Vietnamese-Lao border and within North Vietnamese territory. He felt that an accurate estimate of the situation could not be made without observing the status of the Communist supply depots.

(4) Prior to his departure, political operations were not on SUBJECT's agenda. However, he stated he might engage in political operations during his trip if he found that such would decrease tension in the area between the East and West blocs.

(5) SUBJECT had in mind prior to his departure that he would like to meet with Captain KONG LE in order to negotiate the release of US military and civilian personnel held captive by the pro-Communist forces.

(6) Prior to his departure, SUBJECT was of the opinion that it would be very difficult to prevent LAOS from going Communist. He was of the opinion that LAOS could not be saved from Communism, but felt that all necessary measures should be taken to keep THAILAND from the same fate.

(7) SUBJECT firmly believed that military and ideological strong bridgehead should be established in VIENTIANE, THAKHEK, and SAVANNAKHET in order to protect THAILAND from the threat of Communism. One of the purposes of his trip was to collect data for its realization.

(8) Prior to starting on his trip, TSUJI stated that he was very pleased with the attitude of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with his obtaining the necessary documentation for his trip. Prior to his application to travel, SUBJECT advised the Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister IKEDA (池田) about the nature of his trip.

c. Travel Schedule:

(1) At 0930 hours, 4 April 1961, SUBJECT departed HANEDA Airport aboard an Air France Line for SAIGON. SUBJECT stated before his departure that his trip through the Indochina Peninsula would end in HANOI and from there he would proceed to HONG KONG. He planned to return to JAPAN by air on or about 20 May 1961.

(2) SUBJECT believed that he would find responsible Russian, Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese personnel in HANOI, which he considered the center of Communist military and political operations. He believed that there might be a joint Headquarters established in that city by the Soviets, Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese.

(3) SUBJECT left in early April to avoid the rainy season. He believed that he could hitch a ride at VIENTIANE in government vehicles going to the front lines, where he desired to observe Communist operations and/or activities. He stated that he would try to reach the main highway quickly and be captured by the pro-Communist forces, which forces would no doubt send him to the rear area by vehicle or plane, and in this manner he would have the opportunity to get to HANOI.

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SUBJECT planned to utilize both government and pro-Communist transportation. He further stated that although he did not know the Lao-tian language, he knew Russian and Chinese and that as there were many Chinese in the Indochina Peninsula, he would have no difficulty in making himself understood.

He carried with him a photograph taken with NASSER, TITO, et al., and felt that this photograph would be an entree in meeting some Russian personnel.

d. Estimate of Present Status of SUBJECT's Whereabouts:

(1) One of the letters written by TSUJI to his family and friends, is dated 19 April 1961, which contained, inter alia, as follows:

"On 20 April, I will go to the interior region. Fortunately, no one up to now knows my identity. It appears that the rainy season will arrive a little earlier this year."

(2) Based on the above-mentioned letter, it is believed that SUBJECT commenced his full scale inspection tour from 20 April 1961.

(3) The route which SUBJECT studied before his departure from JAPAN was one leading from VIENTIANE to XIENG KHOUANG via VANG VIENG and SAIA PHOU KHOUW. Based thereon, it is estimated that SUBJECT left VIENTIANE on 20 April for this route.

(4) There is no reliable information concerning the whereabouts of TSUJI after his departure from VIENTIANE. Hence, it is not known whether he is captured or dead.

(5) The area of contact between the pro-Communist main strength and that of the rightist on 20 April 1961, was the northern region of VANG VIENG, approximately 130 kilometers north of VIENTIANE. At that time, a rightist army headquarters was located in VANG VIENG.

(6) It is estimated that SUBJECT first proceeded to VANG VIENG where he arrived on or about 22 April, at which time a fierce battle was being fought in that area. The pro-Communist forces occupied the town of VANG VIENG on 24 April, at which time he could have made himself available for capture as he anticipated.

(7) During all his previous travels, SUBJECT never neglected to correspond with his family, even while traveling incognito during the early days of the end of World War II. As his family has not heard from him since 19 April 1961, it is estimated that SUBJECT has been captured.

(8) In November 1961, there were rumors to the effect that SUBJECT had been captured and taken to PEIPIN. Based thereon, the Japanese Red Cross on 2 December 1961, requested the Communist CHINA Red Cross to investigate whether or not TSUJI was being held in Communist CHINA. In January 1962, the Communist CHINA Red Cross notified the Japanese Red Cross that TSUJI was not in Communist CHINA and that the rumor that he was in the country was utterly groundless.

(9) According to unconfirmed reports, SUBJECT was disguised as a Buddhist monk when he left VIENTIANE. If such is the case, and SUBJECT fell into native hands, it is possible that he could have met with foul play because of such deception.

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(10) According to members of TSUJI's family, TSUJI sent a preliminary report on his trip to Prime Minister IKEDA through the Japanese Embassy in THAILAND.

(11) Available information also discloses that when SUBJECT reached BANGKOK, he requested Colonel ITO Chikashi (伊藤千賀), Japanese Military Attaché and a former student at the Military Staff College of the defunct Japanese Imperial Army when SUBJECT was an instructor thereat, to cooperate with him. As ITO concurrently serves in the Japanese Embassy in LAOS, he proceeded to VIENTIANE with SUBJECT. However, ITO has not been able to shed any present light on the whereabouts of SUBJECT.

(12) Extracts from a letter sent from KADOWAKI Minoru (川内実), serving in the Japanese Embassy in LAOS in response to queries from a friend concerning news of TSUJI follow:

"***Although the diplomatic staffs of the various Embassies in LAOS took refuge in THAILAND when street fighting broke out in December 1960, the Japanese staff remained behind. As a result, they won the confidence of the Laotian people. Japanese are very popular with the Laotian people and only the Japanese are permitted to go as far as 70 kilometers from the suburbs of VIENTIANE. It is dangerous for a white man to approach that area***.

"***We, too, are anxious about Professor TSUJI. However, I believe that the reports in the newspapers relating to his disappearance are approximately 70 per cent correct. I think that the story in the HUNCHUN is incredible***. Concerning TSUJI's activities in LAOS -- when I have an opportunity, I will tell you about them***.

"***When I was with Mr. KAWASAKI Hideji (川崎秀次) one evening, I asked him about TSUJI. He was at a loss to give me an answer***.

"***I am deeply impressed with the motive of TSUJI's trip***. With reference to an article that appeared in a certain weekly stating that when TSUJI was in VANG VIENG, he had contact with me -- I am sorry that I cannot comment on it at this time***. When the opportunity presents itself, I think I can give you some information on Professor TSUJI's activities in LAOS. Off hand, I can say that we have no information beyond the statement of the Foreign Minister that TSUJI disappeared in XIENG KHOUANG***. I believe that the Japanese Embassy on-the-spot is probably keeping certain facts secret***.

37. For photograph of SUBJECT, see Tab No. 3.

38. Contained in Tab No. 4, is a copy of a CIC agent report relating to SUBJECT which was prepared on 13 September 1951, which maybe of some interest.

39. Contained in Tab No. 5, is a summary of investigation of ex-Colonel TSUJI Masanobu, prepared on 10 March 1950 which also maybe of some interest.

40. Contained in Tab No. 6, is a summary of information prepared on 22 March 1950, which also maybe of some interest.

41. Regarded Confidential when Tab No. 4, is withdrawn herefrom.

RALPH J. RINALDUCCI
Lieut. Colonel, AI/Inf.
CO, Box S

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Family Lineage Chart of TSUJI Masanobu

Father:
TSUJI Kamekichi
(辻 亀吉)
(deceased)

Mother:
Moto (もと)
(deceased)

Elder Brother:
Hiroski (弘之)
(deceased)

Younger Brother:
Name unknown
(killed in action)

Younger Brother:
Masayoshi (政良)

Younger Sister:
Name unknown

SUBJECT:
Masanobu (政信)
DOB: 1902

Wife:
Chitose (千歳)
DOB: 1914

First Son: Tooru (徹)
DOB: 1931

First Daughter: Eiko (variant, Hideko) [英子]
DOB: 1933

Husband: Mitae (光雄)
DOB: 1930

Second Daughter: Mitoko (美登子)
DOB: 1935

Husband: Yasuhisa (泰久)
DOB: 1935

Third Daughter: Noriko (夫見子)
DOB: 1938

Second Son: Takeshi (泰史)
DOB: 1942

Tab No. 1

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List of Principal Books Written
By TSUJI Masanobu (辻 まさのぶ)

Name of Book	Number of Pages	Date Published	Publisher	Price
Vicissitude (経済)	Unknown	1950	Unknown	Unknown
One Against 15 (15対1)	Unknown	1950	Unknown	Unknown
2,000 Re Journey in Disguise (隠行)	318	10 June 1950	The MAINICHI Newspaper	150 Yen
NOMONHAN	342	27 Aug 1950	ATO (アオ) Book Store	160 Yen
GUADALCANAL	294	23 Dec 1950	YOTOKU (ヨトク) Book Store	150 Yen
Common Emotions Throughout ASIA (多様な感情)	292	23 Dec 1950	ATO(アオ) Book Store	160 Yen
SINGAPORE	350	11 Feb 1952	TOZAIHAN- BOKU (トサイハン- ブク)	260 Yen
Neutral Self- Defense	214	1 Apr 1952	ATO(アオ) Book Store	190 Yen
My Election Campaigns	184	10 Nov 1952	ATO(アオ) Book Store	170 Yen
This JAPAN	164	20 Feb 1953	HYOGO (兵庫)	150 Yen
The Next World War	224	Unknown	Unknown	170 Yen

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Solitary Tour in Communist CHINA and the SOVIET UNION	274	30 Nov 1955	KAWADE (河出) Book Store	150 Yen
Year 1960	246	20 Oct 1956	TOTO (東都) Book Store	180 Yen
A Brief Glance at The Powder Magazine of the World	286	12 Apr 1957	TOTO (東都) Book Store	240 Yen
Eyes of Upheaval	238	30 Oct 1958	The MAINICHI Newspaper	250 Yen
Are Politics In Satisfactory Conditions?	34	5 Jan 1959	SHINKOKUMIN (新国民)	30 Yen
Are Conditions Satisfactory?	266	30 Jan 1959	YUKI (有紀) Book Store	260 Yen
An Honest and Bold Talk	248	12 Sep 1959	TOTO (東都) Book Store	280 Yen
Conditions of Neutrality	316	23 Feb 1961	KINSKI (金錦正) Book Store	290 Yen

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AGENT REPORT and Interim Report 10/1/2000

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
TSUJI, Masanobu	6/20/47 (10 MAY 47) CIA-202465 (10), 07-1993
4. REPORT OF CASES	
<p>In the Spring of 1949, TSUJI returned to Japan via Taiwan. Before that time, in order to escape from the British (T.M. who were seeking HIS) as a war criminal, HE travelled in disguise throughout the (T.M. Asiatic) continent with the aid of the East Asia League. However, with the announcement of the discontinuance of pursuance of war criminals after HE had returned to Japan, HE appeared in public.</p> <p>Even on that occasion, TSUJI planned carefully. HE contacted persons connected with the press in order to ascertain the true intentions of war criminal prosecutors. Also, HE stabilized HIS finances by asking publishers to print HIS books. The following are the main activities which were noted during the course of investigating HIS return to Japan:</p> <p>(1) In about May 49, SUBJECT visited Ishihara, Kenji, adviser to the former East Asia League, who was sick, (at that time, Ishihara was in a critical condition) and received last instructions. SUBJECT attended the funeral of Ishihara who died on 15 May 49.</p> <p>(2) SUBJECT changed HIS name to Onshin(5), disguised himself as a priest, and travelled to various places:</p> <p>a. SUBJECT concealed himself in Shizuoka Prefecture with the aid of Watanabe, Katsuo(6), former Major General.</p> <p>b. SUBJECT visited Kotani, Yoshio(7), former Shanghai intelligence agent who was once connected with the National Character League(8).</p> <p>c. SUBJECT stayed temporarily at the home of Igarashi, Yoshio(9), a former intelligence agent, in Niigata Prefecture.</p> <p>Although SUBJECT was beyond our (T.M. CCP's) view, it seems that HE visited HIS former subordinates, classmates, and superiors. It seems that during this period, HE planned to organize a Patriotic Comrades Society(10) of former military personnel, for the purpose of rebuilding an anti-Communist and anti-Capitalistic Japan. At that time the rearmament issue was discussed by only a few persons, but it seems that HIS intention was to assume leadership of the Society in the future.</p> <p>Thereafter, objective situations forced the enlargement of the Society because of strong opposition of America and the Soviet Union and the appearance of Communist China within Japan. Furthermore, after the Korean conflict began, the problem of Japan's defense became a national political issue and the Japanese people became more interested in that problem.</p> <p>It seems that SUBJECT's interest in the Patriotic Faith Society is to develop the formerly planned Patriotic Comrades Society in accordance with both internal and external conditions. In order to keep the Patriotic Faith Society a secret, it has been called the Loyal Faith Society(11).</p> <p>Objectives of the Society and its Recent Activities</p> <p>1. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION AGAINST CIC Detachment</p> <p>2. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT /s/ Lawrence F. Ledetar</p> <p>13-4081</p>	

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AGENT REPORT End Interim Report 10/1/1950

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
TSUJI, Kansabu	10/1/1950 (10/3/50) 44-201465(10); D7-793
4. REPORT OF MEETING	
<p>Many points concerning the Society have not yet been revealed. A certain person (name not revealed) who was present at a national meeting of the Society last year made the following conjecture concerning the Society's objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. It shall carry out recruiting activities in cooperation with the direct followers of Chiang, Kai Shek(etc)(12). b. It shall trade with Formosa, China, and Korea. c. It shall organize a Japanese Warlike Army to combat the Red menace. d. It shall prepare in advance for the rearmament that is to be written into the pending peace treaty or which will be realized following its conclusion. e. It shall overthrow pro-Americans and pro-British. <p>As to its ultimate objectives: "We, who are directly responsible for Japan's defeat, summon up a second exertion to push our nation on to win her glory once again." As TSUJI advocates, "We side with neither America nor the Soviet Union, but have in contemplation and concrete execution of ideology that looks forward to prosperity through the independence of our country." However, it can be surmised that organizing activities within the framework of the purge ordinances may be very difficult and that they may be conducting an extremely flexible guidance to the subordinate organizations. At the delegate meeting, on 28 Nov 50, former Major Aoki, Kanno(U)(13) mentioned the following items with the statement, "Although I have not been formally notified by headquarters yet":</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The peace treaty is in the offing, but we cannot leave it to the authorities alone. We must exercise political pressure upon them in order to build a healthy and capable fatherland. b. As for the rearmament problem, we must now push our underground operations in its favor. <p>Putting this and other information together, the objectives of the Society can be roughly judged to be as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. To plan the return of able ex-soldiers to their former positions. b. To call together all anti-Communist organizations and to seize the initiative. c. To foster the organization of action corps as the "backbone" of the political right to free speech. d. To make these action corps the nucleus of rearmament. e. At a time of national confusion (for example, a Communist riot), an effort should be made to carry out a coup d'etat and to seize political power or a close connection with it. <p>On the other hand, their ingenuity has been taxed in raising funds. There is even a tendency not to hesitate to take illegal action in sending aid to Chiang.</p>	
5. APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT 44-let CIC Detachment	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT /s/ Lawrence P. Leedler

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AGENT REPORT and Interim Report 7/17/2000

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT THUJI, Minnesota	2. DATE SUBMITTED 11-22-98 (100-1998) 11-22-98 (10), 07-29-98
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4. REPORT OF RECEIVED
End Sheet's volunteer army on the pretext of a moral obligation. This is SUBJECT's
idea.

They seem to have approached men of note in various circles, directly and/or indirectly, in order to collect information on a broad scale, based on TSUJI's view of the world and military science. TSUJI seems to have analyzed the information in order to direct local masters. Main points of TSUJI's guidance seem to be:

At the time of the visit to Japan of Dulles(14), TSUJI forecast the immediate future, based on a personal letter from former Lt General Eichelberger to the former Japanese General Waki, Kusunoki(15) which was as follows:

"American public sentiment towards Japan has changed favorably. The United States will support Japan's rearmament."

At the headquarters of the Patriotic Faith Society, a joint meeting was held with members of the War History Research Society (16). At this meeting the following policies were decided upon:

- a. Establishment of an anti-Communist policy.
 - b. Establishment of a central organization.
 - c. A legally conducted fund collection campaign shall be carried out.
 - d. The national organization shall be strengthened, even at the expense of old members.
 - e. Connections between members throughout the country shall be made as close as possible.
 - f. National organizers shall be selected from among members of the action corps. The organization of the action corps shall be reorganized, and its members shall be increased for that purpose.

Based upon the above policies, local branches issued the following direc-

- a. Select special staff members and collect information concerning JCP activities.
 - b. Strengthens the union of organization in the prefectures.
 - c. Create a reserve machine for the action corps in preparation against accidents.
 - d. Do not carry out an individual fund collection campaign in each prefecture.

These directives indicate that reorganization has become inevitable, due to the question of de-purging. Directives issued thereafter by the Society's headquarters apparently reflect the above-mentioned circumstances and are intended to prevent the activities of the central organization from bursting into the open

46166 SIC Department

7. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report July 1944

AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 10/1/70	
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
TSUJI, Hasemaru	10-2781 (10 Jul 70) 441st GIC Detachment 10-201465 (10); DT-1593
1. REPORT OF MONEY by giving independence to the local organizations.	
Items of instructions from the Society's headquarters are:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. To disband the organization of branches and units, both central and local. b. To create an organization particular to each prefecture and to act in close contact with the central organization. c. The prefectural organization will be free of intervention by the central organization. d. Campaign funds will be given by the central organization to the prefectural organs at the latter's request. e. Action corps will be left as they are and will be put on a national basis. Specialized departments will be established within it. 	
Latest information indicates that in a secret meeting held on 27 Mar 70, at the Society's headquarters, the following decisions were made:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. According to the expectation that former military men will soon be depurged, former military men of ability will sponsor a national movement aimed at directing public opinion in favor of rearmament. b. In recognizing that we are purpose and doing more preparatory action for a peace treaty, we must keep free open activities and do our best to continue behind-the-scenes activities. c. We must lead organizations with a similar goal to unity and combination with our organization. d. When the time is right, a maneuvering unit will be sent to Siberia in order to let the Japanese units there realize that to shake hands with the Soviets is not good. 	
Regarding the campaign funds for the Society, most of the royalties from TSUJI's book are probably among the monetary sources. This conjecture is based upon a statement from an acquaintance of TSUJI's who said that TSUJI would never spend the royalties for HIS exclusive benefit.	
Other activities in connection with fund-raising follow:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. On 24 Sep 70, Sato, Katsunichi (U)(17) and Matsuda, Yosuke (U)(18) of Higata, called at the home of Shimoji, Daizo (U)(19) where they received from Shimoji, Kenzo (S)(20) \$1,000,000 as a campaign fund for members of the Higata branch, and \$200,000 for their private use. b. On 18 Oct 70, out of the money earned by selling about 60 kilograms of medicine (name of medicine unknown) which had been sent from unidentified quarters \$200,000 was given to the Society's headquarters and the remaining \$300,000 was put aside as campaign funds. 	

441st GRC Detachment

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
/s/ Lawrence F. Lederle

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AGENT REPORT and Reference Report 100/100

1. NAME OR NUMBER OR CODE OF INCIDENT

REF ID, References

2. DATE REFERRED

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4. REPORT OF REFERENCE

a. Report of Reference
b. Report, References
REF ID, References

On 16 Dec 50, Shiroi, Renshi, in the annual meeting on 16 Dec 50, stated that
many would be given from Headquarters to the members in order to stimulate the
branches' activities.

d. Add. Renshi, Renshi, at the 16 Dec 50 meeting in Elliptical Prefecture, stated
that an was very about the goods the Society "travel reporter" claim that are
legally authorized articles. However, it can be expected that this Society will
deal in unauthorized goods, as add additional discretion on the part of the members.

Thus, at first, activities connected with company funds were omitted. However, as the Imperial funds did not well fall, each branch has been forced to
obtain funds by its own efforts, despite resistance from the Headquarters.

Relationship of Society and the Collection of Intelligence

The Patriotic Path Society follows a policy of maintaining strict secrecy. Thus PAPL proceeded to Elliptical for the purpose of expanding a district organ, the
Kilosa Daily Press reported the incident in its issue of 16 Sep 50. Since that
time, PAPL has taken the utmost caution and it appears that it engaged some
intelligence work.

4. A proposal was made that the Society gather information about the right
of the Communist League to be held and that they should be secretly killed.
b. Reporting organizational action
d. No liaison relations shall be established between members.
(a) The central Headquarters and the branches shall not inter-
fere.
(b) No uniform name shall be given to the various branches.

4. A proposal was made that the Society gather information about the right
of the Communist League and supply the police with this information so as to
arrest the members of the Society.

Because most of the members of the Society are former military officials,
their information collecting activity is confined on battlefield command of the
Villa Guard War. Additionally, special information collectors are provided in the
long distance, and a great effort is being made to stimulate the members of the
Communist Party in Japan and abroad. It is reported that 17 members of the Society
have already made their way to the United States and the Soviet Union in order to stimulate
the cultural conditions in those places.

The fact that certain General Inspector (hai) (b) (2) is an official of the
Society indicates that the intelligence collection system of the former National
Army (U.S. referring to the Japanese Military Police, who are treated as a branch
in Japan, Japan) has been adopted.

5. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

REF ID, References P. Reference

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AGENT REPORT and Interim Report 100/100

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED

TSUJI, Masanobu

100/100
01-2781 (10) 100/100
01-203465 (10) 07-5993

4. REPORT OF INCIDENT

Among the persons whom TSUJI meets in person are former Lt. Col. Asanuma, Onna (U)(22), a former staff officer of the Kuomintang Army and a repatriate from Siberia; Sun, T'ien (S-CP)(23), said to be a member of the Chinese Communist intelligence organizations; and others who are said to be secret Communists. It is believed that TSUJI's reason for contacting such persons may be to exchange intelligence.

TSUJI is holding secret lecture meetings, among which have been the following:

a. A meeting held in the auditorium of the Toto Industrial Building at Ueno in Tokyo on 19 Aug 50. Attendants were those persons connected with the Patriotic Rebirth Movement Headquarters(24), and HIS lecture concerned Japan's defense. TSUJI stated that the former Army system was not needed in the rearmament of Japan. He said that in modern warfare the allotted tasks of the nation are clear; a war being directed by the politicians, and the operations by experienced militarists. TSUJI claimed that the present economic conditions in Japan prohibited her rearmament to the extent which she enjoyed formerly, but that a militia, trained for some six months, could be sufficient to repulse one or two Communist armies if they landed on Japan's coast, providing that good officers were available to conduct training. For that purpose, said TSUJI, old Army officers are best suited.

b. A study meeting held from 1700 to 2000 hours, 27 Feb 51, at the Toto Industrial Building, by some 20 former Army officers who graduated from the Japanese Military Academy after the 40th term. TSUJI discussed the defense of Japan, dwelling upon (1) the reconstruction of Japanese forces, (2) anti-Communist measures, (3) the prevention of civil disturbances, and (4) the pending peace conference.

c. On 3 Mar 51, TSUJI made HIS highly controversial speech at the Free People's Club(25).

d. On 27 Mar 51, TSUJI spoke at the home of Matsukawa, Matsutaro (S)(26). Present were ex-Lt. Col. Uchiyama, Namizaki (S)(27), responsible person for the Nagano Prefectural Branch of the Society, and other former officers. Matters discussed were primarily concerned with Society activities.

e. A meeting of the Friendly Cross Society(28) with former Japanese junior officers, at which time TSUJI discussed plans for activities "after the demobilizing."

The Patriotic Faith Society is under the leadership of SUBJECT and HIS intimate military seniors who are mostly influential former generals. To facilitate fund raising and anti-Communist movements, it seems that some financiers and politicians, as well as leaders of anti-Communist organizations, have been given advisory positions. The action corps of the Society is controlled by TSUJI and HIS fellow ex-officers. Charts showing the organization of the Society are attached to the original copy of this report only as Exhibits II and III. Names of persons mentioned in these charts are

LAWRENCE P. LEADERER, Vice-Chairman
441st CIE Detachment

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
/s/ Lawrence P. Leaderer

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 7/2/1952

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
THEJI, Massanobu	1. SUBJECT NAME OR TITLE 2. DATE OF INFORMATION 3. SOURCE OF INFORMATION 4. DATE SUBMITTED

3. REPORT OF PERSONS
<p>a. THEJI, Massanobu. b. Iwahashi, Takeo (U) (29). c. Sato, Genichiro (U) (30). d. Nakachi, Hayao (U) (31). e. Tabuchi, Tetsuji (U) (32). f. Nakano, Yuzo (U) (33). g. Nagano, Mamoru (U) (34). h. Shibusawa, Endo. i. Honda, Shinzo (U) (35). j. Hashimoto, Seisaburo (U) (36). k. Kuroda, Daido (U) (37). l. Kobayashi, Shozaburo (U) (38). m. Iida, Teigo (U) (39). n. Komatsu, Aigi (U) (40). o. Denaga, Hisao (U) (41). p. Ohnuma, Genkichi (U) (42). q. Matsunaga, Tetsuro.</p>

A chart of an organization allegedly connected with the Society is appended as Exhibit IV to the original of this report only. Persons mentioned in this chart are:

- a. En-It Gen Yamazaki, (Pm) (U) (43).
b. En-It Gen Ariono, Seizo (U) (44).
c. En-General Shibusawa, Seisaburo (U) (45).
d. En-General Iwao, Tetsujiro (U) (46).
e. En-It Gen Sakuma, (Pm) (U) (47).
f. En-It Gen Fukahashi, Kameo (U) (48).
g. En-It Gen Nakayama, (Pm) (U) (49).
h. En-It Gen Hideto, Takashi (U) (50).
i. En-Haj Gen Inou, (Pm) (U) (51).
j. En-It Gen Matsuo, Kisechi (U) (52).
k. En-General Okamura, Seiji (U) (53). (D-9)

8. On 1 Aug 51, Confidential Informant A-140 submitted a roster of persons present at the meeting of the Free People's Club at which SUBJECT made the speech which has caused considerable comment recently. This meeting was held on 3 May 51, at the Industrial Club, Marunouchi, Tokyo-to. Persons present were:

- Sakai, Akio (U) (54), official of the Free People's Club.
Uda, Masanori (U) (55).
Hirao, Ujirō (U) (56).
Naguchi, Katsuhiko (U) (57).
Hidemitsu, Shigeo (AdC) (58).
Noda, Takeo (U) (59).
Goto, Sinsaburo (U) (60).

4. SIGNATURE OF INFORMANT OR OTHER AGENT	4. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
441st CIC Detachment	/s/ Lawrence F. Ladd Jr.

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 10/1/51

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT TSUJI, Masanori	2. DATE SUBMITTED 1 COMINT 10/1/51 CIS-2781 (10 Jul 51) 441-201465 (10); 07-7993
3. REPORT OF INCIDENT 9. On 6 Aug 51, Confidential Informant 2-400 submitted the following information: SUBJECT distributed 59 copies of the speech which HE made on 3 Mar 51 to various persons. One of these 59 copies was obtained by Horie, Maruichi (JCP-CP) (107) chief of the Investigation Department of the JCP. Horie passed the contents of the speech to JCP Headquarters for use as propaganda. The JCP in turn, transmitted the speech to the Tass News Agency, the Union Press (108), and the Peace Newspaper (109). Persons to whom TSUJI gave copies of the speech were: Hakuba, Maruji (S) (110) Fukuda, Haruo (S) (111) Fujimoto, Susumu (S) (112) Takemoto, Shiro (S) (113) Kihara, Midori (S) (114) Ito, Tomoji (S) (115) In addition, the speech was given to the 53 persons listed in paragraph 8, above, who attended the meeting at which TSUJI spoke. It was also reported that one of TSUJI's "spies" was apprehended within the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee of the JCP on 23 Jul 51. This person freely confessed and even stated that he had been meeting TSUJI or an accomplice in the vicinity of Shinjuku Station on the 2nd, 12th, and 22nd of each month. The JCP Central Committee, in an effort to locate other spies within the Party, has promised this person additional pay to act as a double agent. Since the Party intends to make use of this person, no publicity will be released by the Central Committee. (D-3) AGENT'S NOTE: Information contained above and relating to the JCP capture of a TSUJI "spy" could compromise source. Request that this information be handled with utmost discretion.	
10. On 11 Aug 51, Confidential Informant 1-20 submitted the following information: SUBJECT has recently been suffering from a stomach ailment and has been recuperating at a hot spring in Shizuoka Prefecture. However, on 1 Aug 51, when HE learned of HIS indictment for purge violation by the Attorney General's Office, HE hurriedly returned to Tokyo. This haste aggravated HIS illness and on 7 Aug 51, HE was hospitalized at the Kibuchi Hospital, 44, Yotsuya, Meguro-ku, Tokyo-to. HIS illness was diagnosed as an early stage of gastric ulcer, requiring surgery. (D-2) CS CDR	
4. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Asst CIC Detachment	5. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT /s/ Lawrence V. Ledebur

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 103/100

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
TSUJI, Kenzabu	103/100 10-13-51

3. REPORT OF INCIDENT

11. On 20 Aug 51, Confidential Informant 1-20 submitted the following additional information:

On 9 Aug 51, TSUJI underwent a stomach operation, and, two days later, was again operated on for appendicitis. The patient is recovering, but is allowed no visitors. (b-2)

4. MEMBERS

- (1) Patriotic Faith Society(Jinkaku Shinkai Kai)(爱国至誠会).
- (2) East Asia League(Yea Hui Kai)(東亞同盟).
- (3) "Theory of the World's Final Days"(Kokai Sosai Shuumi)(世界最後年齋論).
- (4) Ichihara, Kenji(一原 芹次)(Japanese)(b)(b)(b)(b)(b).
- (5) Gomoku(元德), a name which TSUJI adopted.
- (6) Nakano, Sakae(中野 崇)(Japanese)(b), former Japanese Major General, address unknown.
- (7) Itoh, Isamu(伊藤 勲)(Japanese)(b), address unknown.
- (8) National Character League(Nihonjin Denshi)(国民粹同盟).
- (9) Nagoya, Yosuke(名古屋 勇介)(Japanese)(b), address unknown.
- (10) Patriotic Comrades Society(Aiheka Doshi Kai)(爱国同志会).
- (11) Legal Faith Society(Jinkaku Shinkai Kai)(爱国至誠会).
- (12) Chiang, Kai Shek(蔣, 蔣介石)(Chinese)(b)(b).
- (13) Ando, Kenzo(高木 一夫)(Japanese)(b), address unknown.
- (14) Dallas, John, American Ambassador without Portfolio.
- (15) Ogaki, Isamu(小垣 一成)(Japanese)(b), address unknown.
- (16) New History Research Society(Nihon Kenkyu Kai)(新史研究会).
- (17) Sato, Kenzabu(佐藤 健三)(Japanese)(b), address unknown.
- (18) Nakano, Tora(中野 虎)(Japanese)(b), address unknown.

5. INFORMATION FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
441st CID Detachment6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
/s/ Lawrence F. Leibler

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 10/1/2000

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
TSUJI, Masanobu	2. CONTROL SPECIES OR NO. NO. C18-2781 (10 Jul 01) 443-302465 (10), 07-6993
4. REPORT OF PERSONS	
(19) Saito, Daizo (斎藤 大二) (Japanese) (U), residing in Onishi, Yamagata- shi, Yamagata Prefecture.	
(20) Suzuki, Kenzo (鈴木 健三) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(21) Iwahashi, Tokuji (岩橋 徳二) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(22) Ando, Tokuji (安藤 徳二) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(23) Sun, Tien (孙, 善人) (孫 善人) (Chinese) (S-OF), address unknown.	
(24) Social Rebirth Movement Headquarters (Minshin Shinkai Undo Shinkai) (反核新生運動本部) (Japanese).	
(25) Free People's Club (Nyujin Club) (自由人俱乐部).	
(26) Matsuda, Katsujiro (松田 勝三郎) (Japanese) (U), 21671, 1-chome, Nishi- Kameido-cho, Ome-ku, Ota-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(27) Uchiyama, Mamoru (内山 马场) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(28) Friendly Cross Society (友の会) (友の会).	
(29) Iwahashi, Tokuji (岩橋 徳二) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(30) Saito, Genichir (斎藤 元一) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(31) Matsui, Kogen (松井 京根) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(32) Takahashi, Tokuji (高橋 徳二) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(33) Matsuda, Tokuji (松田 徳二) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(34) Nagano, Masumi (永野 麻美) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(35) Honda, Kiyoko (本田 きよ子) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(36) Nakajima, Seisuke (中島 勝助) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(37) Kuroda, Sadao (黒田 作道) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(38) Kobayashi, Shunichiro (小林 順一郎) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(39) Iida, Tokuji (飯田 徳二) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	

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*1. REPORT TO COMMANDER OF CINCPAC
443rd CIC Detachment4. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
/c/ Lawrence J. Leibler

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 10/3/1968

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT TENJI, Masanobu		2. DATE SUBMITTED 10-10-1968 1. COMINT 1000-00-0000 100-0701-00-0000 441-001445 (10), 27-5993
3. REPORT OF NAMES		
(40) Kuroda, Aigi (久 松 廉 義) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (41) Suzuki, Hisao (田 中 久 雄) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (42) Ohnuma, Genshichi (大 釜 淳 七) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (43) Yamazaki, Tzu (山 崎 俊) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (44) Ariane, Seizo (有 木 精 三) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (45) Yamamoto, Sakae (下 村 駿) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (46) Kurobe, Teruchiro (沢 田 伸 一) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (47) Saitama, Tzu (斎 田 久 雄) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (48) Takahashi, Kuni (高 橋 伸) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (49) Nakayama, Tzu (中 山 伸) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (50) Mitaka, Takanobu (三 田 高 伸) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (51) Izai, Tzu (今 井 伸) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (52) Nomoto, Hiroshi (木 本 博) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (53) Chikuma, Naishi (国 村 奈 久) (Japanese) (U), address unknown. (54) Onishi, Shinsuke (佐 伯 秋 南) (Japanese) (U), 512, 3-chome, Ogikubo, Suginami-ku, Tokyo-to. (55) Ma, Masanori (馬 一 順) (Japanese) (U), c/o the Nippon Shimbun, Shinjuku-ku, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to. (56) Kuroi, Tzu (幸 月 伸) (Japanese) (U), 4430, 2-chome, Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo-to. (57) Nagashita, Katsujiro (長 下 一 二 伸) (Japanese) (U), Chief of the Nagashita Branch Office of the Japanese Socialist Party. (58) Kitamura, Shiro (三 田 伸) (Japanese) (Inc), 524, Nakadairacho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo-to. (59) Noda, Taku (野 田 勝 夫) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.		
4. INFORMATION AND OBSERVATION OF SUBJECT 441st CIC Detachment		5. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT /s/ LOWELL F. Ledbetter

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AGENT REPORT and Interim Report 202/Jan

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT		2. DATE SUBMITTED 1-1-68
TAKI, Masanori		6-10-1967 (10-51-10) 44-201465 (10), DT-7993
4. REPORT OF SUSPECTS		
<p>(60) Setsu, Hiroshi (佐藤 ひろし) (Japanese) (U), a/c the Industrial Club, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(61) Do, Kideo (佐藤 きよし) (Japanese) (U), #293, 1-chome, Nishi-ochi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(62) Sakurada, Kiyoshi (桜田 きよし) (Japanese) (U), a/c the House of Representatives, Palmyra-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(63) Ito, Kazuo (井藤 一郎) (Japanese) (U), a/c the Tokyo Railway Bureau, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(64) Yamada, Toshiro (山田 利次) (Japanese) (U), 2 of 190, 9-chome, Takao-cho, Utsunomiya, Tochigi Prefecture.</p> <p>(65) Shiroi, Kenchiro (白井 健次郎) (Japanese) (U), #2, 2-chome, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(66) Oizumi, Kintomo (萩住 金徳) (Japanese) (U), #1, 3-chome, Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(67) Kobayashi, Shigemura (小林 重蔵) (Japanese) (U), Horan-cho, Nishidōri-cho, Minamitama-gu, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(68) Iimura, Tomoji (井村 トモジ) (Japanese) (U), a/c the Katchure Building, 4 of 2, 3-chome, Kyobashi, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(69) Mori, Kanji (森 乾二) (Japanese) (U), #1, 1-chome, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(70) Hayashi, Munetoshi (林 重文) (Japanese) (U), #107, 4-chome, Shirokane-takanawa, Minato-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(71) Kitahara, Komo (北原 久之) (Japanese) (U), #31, 2-chome, Higashimachi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(72) Mori, Saburo (直井 三郎) (Japanese) (S-C7), #309, Ryukyu-cho, Otaru, Tokyo-to.</p> <p>(73) Abe, Isamu (阿部 勝三) (Japanese) (U), #1, 6-chome, Kotomiyashiro-cho, Kitaibaraki-cho, Kitaibaraki-gu, Kyoto Prefecture.</p> <p>(74) Shiba, Takemoto (繩本 成足) (Japanese) (U), #6 of 1, Yamakawa-jiin-cho-cho, Daishi-ku, Kyoto-to.</p>		
5. PERSONNEL OF ORGANIZATION FROM WHICH REPORT 441st GIC Detachment		6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT /s/ Lawrence F. Ledder

WD 100 FORM 241

16
FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64) 10-68

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 08/1954

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
TSUJI, Naonobu	2. CONTROL NUMBER OR REF. NO. C13-2782 (16 Jul 54) 441-201465 (10), D7-T959
4. REPORT OF PERSONS	
(75) Yamada, Issei (山田 稔) (Japanese) (U), #215, Chofu-machi-machi, Ota-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(76) Sakai, So (坂井 作) (Japanese) (U), Kobayashi, Hidemitsu, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(77) Hashimoto, Kenji (橋本 伸) (Japanese) (U), #23, Sengenjaya-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(78) Iuchiwa, Ryo (内川 亮) (Japanese) (U), #12, 1-chome, Inokashira-ku, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(79) Ichihara, Daizji (市原 大治) (Japanese) (U), #224, Tomita, Tama-machi, Saitama Prefecture.	
(80) Ando, Jiro (安藤 二郎) (Japanese) (U), #1, Nakamachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to	
(81) Furukawa, Isao (古川 勲) (Japanese) (U), #155, 1-chome, Ogikubo, Suginami-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(82) Yamamoto, Naoto (山本 勝) (Japanese) (NS-CP), #8, Komai-cho, Asaka, Saitama-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(83) Hashida, Kishinaga (橋田 喜尚) (Japanese) (U), of the Labor Policy Division of the Economic Department, Iwakura Prefectural Office.	
(84) Tsuchihara, Yoshimori (土川 義守) (Japanese) (U), #103, Nagoya-ku, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan.	
(85) Inoue, Naotakuro (井上 朝徳) (Japanese) (U), #459, 2-chome, Akiba, Taito-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(86) Shirogane, Tatsuo (白根 達) (Japanese) (U), #364, Haga, Suginami-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(87) Akizawa, Toyoshi (秋澤 豊) (Japanese) (U), address unknown.	
(88) Onuki, Junzo (大貫 仁三) (Japanese) (U), a/c the Economic Newspaper, Kobayashi, Hidemitsu, Chuo-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(89) Nakajima, Hidemitsu (中島 伸) (Japanese) (U), #370, 2-chome, Nakamachi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo-to.	
(90) Yamamoto, Kenosuke (山本 健介) (Japanese) (U), 3rd floor, Yone Station, Ochiai-ku, Tokyo-to.	
5. APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT 44-1st CIC Detachment	
6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT /s/ Lawrence F. Leddy	

WD 100 FORM 341

1954-1955 FORM 1-100-1000

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 103/200

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT		2. DATE RECEIVED SEP 12 1951
TANJI, Norimichi		3. COMINT NUMBER GLB-4743 (10 Sept 51) 441-201445 (10); 57-4393
4. REPORT OF VICTIMS		
(98) Shimura, Yoshinobu (木下義信) (Japanese) (M), a/c Ueno Railroad Station, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(99) Endo, Kuro (元 三 黒) (Japanese) (M), a/c Ueno Station, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(100) Endo, Saburo (エンドウ 三郎) (Japanese) (M), 532, Karyozawa, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(101) Sugawara, Saburo (菅原 三郎) (Japanese) (M), a/c the Standard, Chiyoda-ku, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(102) Kiyosawa, Tane (清澤 喬) (Japanese) (M), address unknown.		
(103) Nakamura, Shigeo (中村 重吉) (Japanese) (M), 4324, 9-chome, Nakano-ku, Nakano-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(104) Horikoshi, Chizo (堀口 志蔵) (Japanese) (M), address unknown.		
(105) Ueno, Akira (上野 明) (Japanese) (M), 41, 2-chome, Bunkyo-ku, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(106) Imai, Kenzo (今井 健三) (Japanese) (M), 574, Nakano-ku, Nakano-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(107) Hashida, Kenzo (橋田 健三) (Japanese) (M), 41, 1-chome, Bunkyo-ku, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(108) Gotoh, Saburo (後藤 三郎) (Japanese) (M), 57, Meguro-ku, Meguro-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(109) Imai, Kenzo (今井 健三) (Japanese) (M), 544, Meguro-ku, Meguro-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(110) Itoh, Saburo (伊藤 三郎) (Japanese) (M), address unknown.		
(111) Itoh, Saburo (伊藤 三郎) (Japanese) (M), address unknown.		
(112) Andou, Shinsaburo (安藤 伸三郎) (Japanese) (M), a/c the Interpretation Office, International, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(113) Imai, Saburo (今井 三郎) (Japanese) (M), 5324, 9-chome, Nakano-ku, Nakano-ku, Tokyo-to.		
(114) Saito, Norimichi (斎藤 重道) (Japanese) (M), 442, 4-chome, Saito-ku, Chiba-ku, Tokyo-to.		
5. DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION		6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT P/C Lawrence P. Laddister CS COPY
4-Block COMINT Department		

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AGENT REPORT 2nd Interim Report 12/1/49

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

TSUJI, Kenzo

2. DATE REPORTED

DEC. 3, 1951

DDA-378 (10 Dec 51)
ADL-202465 (10) D7-3593

4. REPORT OF PERSONS

- (108) Union Press (Ringo Tomochi) (通 信 作), now defunct.
(109) Peace Newspaper (Seiwa Shinbun) (平 和 新 聞).
(110) Fukuda, Kenji (福 田 伸 一) (Japanese) (S), address unknown.
(111) Fukuda, Kōki (福 田 国 大) (Japanese) (S), of the Tōkyō Station Bureau
of the National Railroad.
(112) Fujisawa, Susumu (藤 田 伸) (Japanese) (S), address unknown.
(113) Nakamya, Shūin (中 田 伸) (Japanese) (S), address unknown.
(114) Kubota, Kidoji (木 本 伸 一) (Japanese) (S), address unknown.
(115) Kato, Tomoaki (木 友 駿) (Japanese) (S), address unknown.

5. ACRONYMS
KCP = Known member of Japan Communist Party.
S-CP = Sympathizer or possible member of Communist Party.
U = Communist affiliation unknown.
A-C = Anti-Communist

1. INFORMATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS
441st CID Bureau

2. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
/s/ Lawrence T. Leibher

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WD 102-709 341

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DDA-378 (10 Dec 51)

Doc No 2077

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INVESTIGATION REPORT ON EL-CHI TSUJI, MARSHAL

10 Mar 59

I. Start of the Investigation

General Tsuji is one of the ablest anti-communist officers. He is pre-eminent for his character, knowledge, and ability. He is well-versed in the art of military operations and the handling of military organizations. He is also one of the greatest authorities among the Japanese on Chinese affairs.

Since the end of the war, he had been sought as a war crimes suspect, but had never been arrested, until December 1949, when he was excluded from the designation as a war crimes suspect. The Headquarters of the UNITED STATES Air Force (USAF: Sta.) is trying to utilize him for intelligence and other purposes, but so far he has not complied with its requests.

II. Findings

A. Brief Life History

1. He graduated from the Wu College in 1931, was assigned to the General Staff Headquarters and engaged in organizational and operational duties for several years.

2. He was on duty in MANCHURIA for three years, being engaged in operational planning against the SOVIET UNION and communists connected with the guidance of MANCHURIA.

3. He was on duty on the China Front for three years, being engaged in operational and supply duties as well as the guiding of the Wang Jing-wei Regime. Furthermore, he secretly traveled through CHINA for three years after the war, observing the conditions in CHINA, and assisting the Nationalist Army in the fight against the Chinese Communist Forces.

B. An Outline of His War Record

a. After his graduation from the College, he participated in the Shanghai Incident as an infantry company commander, was wounded three times, and was awarded the Order of the Golden Kite.

b. Immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident, he was appointed staff officer of the North China Area Army. He participated in front-line operations in SHANXI Province, was wounded once, and was awarded the Order of the Golden Kite again.

c. As a staff officer of the Beiyang Army, he took part in the Hunan Incident, directing the military operations.

d. As an officer attached to the headquarters of the 11 Army, he participated in the First Guangxi Operations.

e. During the Pacific War, he was an operations staff officer for the 33 Army, and planned and directed operations in the Hainan area. He was wounded once.

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f. As an operations staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters, he directed various operations in such areas as the PHILIPPINES, SOLOMONS, and CHINA. He was wounded once.

g. As a staff officer for the China Expeditionary Forces (chief of 3 Section), he was engaged in the guiding of the Wang Regime. He was in charge of rear area supply duties during the Kweilin Operations.

h. He directed operations in the Burma front as a staff officer of the 33 Army; was wounded once; was given an individual citation.

i. While he was serving as a senior staff officer of the Area Army in THAILAND and planning operations, the war ended.

5. His Activities after the War

a. First, he hid himself in THAILAND, disguised as a Buddhist monk.

b. He set out on a secret trip north and observed the inside conditions of the Annamese Revolution. He went to CHONGKING and studied the actual conditions of the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists. He then went to KANLIK, served under the National Defense Ministry of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and assisted the Nationalist Forces with regard to operations and intelligence.

c. He returned to JAPAN in May 1949.

d. He was being sought as a war crimes suspect, but was excluded from the suspects' list in December 1949.

6. The Circumstances of the Attempt Made by the United States Air Force Headquarters to Utilize Col TSUJI

1. KODAMA, Yoshio, who was released from SUGAMO Prison toward the end of the year before last after being held there as an A-Class war crimes suspect, came to be highly regarded by American prosecutor Col FRANK for his character while he was at SUGAMO, and, since his release, has been on very friendly terms with the colonel. Consequently, KODAMA also has a deep understanding (TH: sic.) with CARPENTER, chief of the Legal Section.

2. Col FRANK is a good personal friend of the Chief of Staff (TH: sic.) of the United States Air Force. Said Air Force has asked the colonel to utilize former officers of JAPAN for collection of intelligence.

3. Col FRANK then asked KODAMA to select and recommend persons suitable for the task.

4. KODAMA has, from long ago, trusted and admired Col TSUJI. He therefore recommended TSUJI to Col FRANK as the individual who could represent the best among the former officers in JAPAN.

CC: GOF

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Service, General Staff

CI Div

APO 500
22 March 1950

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Ex-Col TSUJI Masanobu

TSUJI Masanobu, former Colonel of the Japanese General Staff, is about 48 years old, a native of Ishikawa-ken. A leading figure in the pre-war militarist clique, TSUJI became noted as a brilliant staff officer and tactician. He directed part of the fighting against the Russians in the Nomonhan Incident in 1939 and as a result of that fiasco, he was transferred to HQ of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China. Later, under Gen YAMASHITA, TSUJI was said to have been largely responsible for perfecting operational plans for the capture of Singapore, and for ordering what amounted to a massacre there in 1942 of so-called "anti-Japanese Chinese elements." Later he took part in the Guadalcanal campaign where he was wounded, and from 1943 to 1945 served as senior staff officer in various Japanese Army HQ in China, Burma and Siam. He disappeared from Bangkok at the time of the Surrender. TSUJI was placed on SCAP's apprehension list as a suspected war criminal on 11 September 1946 at the request of the British.

TSUJI is described by a contemporary as a high-principled disciplinarian, and as one of the most brilliant, though also the most arrogant, hot-headed and puritanical officers in the Japanese Army.

In China TSUJI was concerned with political as well as operational activities. He is said to have worked energetically to bring about peace negotiations with the Chungking Government and in so doing won over the admiration and sympathy of many Chinese.

Although the Japanese Demobilization Bureau listed TSUJI as dead by hara-kiri, reports from China in 1946-47 indicated that he was in Nanking acting in advisory capacity to Chiang Kai-shek, along with Gen OKUMURA and others. Some sources claimed that Chinese intelligence-collecting in Japan was directed from Nanking under TSUJI's guidance. A recent report states that TSUJI arrived in Nanking in late 1946 at the request of Chiang Kai-shek.*

This same source heard that TSUJI returned to Japan in October 1948. If this is true, his presence here was a well-kept secret until after July

*Source of this information is one SAKAI Yoshisuke, a repatriate from Formosa in December 1949. SAKAI was a former associate of Col OKUBO Toshijiro (see below) when they were both employed by the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanking in 1946, and later in Formosa in 1949.

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Tab No. 6

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CI Div, S/I, subj: Ex-Col TSUJI Masanobu, dtd 22 Mar 50

1949 when rumors began to circulate that he was in Japan in connection with the Chinese Nationalist recruitment program. Since that time all kinds of rumors have been rife, both in magazine articles and in intelligence circles. Among other things it was said that TSUJI was in Japan disguised as a priest; that he had made several trips between Japan and Formosa; and that he had attended conferences concerning recruitment with members of the Chinese Mission and influential Japanese. Well-known personages whose names have been linked with TSUJI include Col WANG Wu, formerly of the Chinese Mission, KODAMA Yoshio, and ex-general officers ARISUE Seizo, UGAKI Kamechige and WATANABE Wataru, the latter of whom is said to have made arrangements for TSUJI's hideouts. Reports infer (with some credibility) that TSUJI was under protection of those persons mentioned.

A SCAP memorandum dated 12 December 1949, directed the Japanese Government to delete the name of Col TSUJI Masanobu from the suspected war criminals apprehension list. The British Mission had informed SCAP authorities that he was no longer required in view of the termination of all British war crimes trials on 30 September 1949.

In early February 1950, TSUJI reportedly visited the Tokyo home of the wife of Col OKUBO Toshijiro, former Chief of a Special Intelligence Section of the Japanese Kwantung Army who has been with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanking and who is now in Formosa. TSUJI reportedly asked Mrs. OKUBO if she had any message to give Col OKUBO as he (TSUJI) would soon see him in Formosa.

On 6 March 1950, an agent of Tokyo Area CIC was introduced to TSUJI by CHU Chang-liang, a Chinese intelligence agent. Also present was a Japanese named KAWAKUBO Jiro who is personal secretary to WANG Wen-cheng of the Chinese Mission, one of TANG En-po's representatives in Japan. (This Japanese is believed also to be an agent for KODAMA Yoshio.) In the ensuing conversation, TSUJI did not make detailed explanation of his activities but implied that by working for WANG Wen-cheng, he was committed to serve Gen TANG En-po. The CIC agent stated that TSUJI's identification was positive, complete with distinctive scars. He said TSUJI spoke in an emotional, almost fanatical manner, and professes utmost devotion to the cause of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
16-5-3-11	ZCS-1586	2 Aug 1948	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Possible Revamping of Second Bureau			29 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION		Evaluation: B-2	
Source: YPX-4		THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM	
Possible Revamping of Second Bureau, MND (Ministry of National Defense)			
6. Source believes that HIDAKA is of the opinion that Colonel <u>TSUJI</u> is connected with the planning in some way. (The Chinese cover name of TSUJI is "Shih", and he is the former staff officer in the general headquarters of the Japanese army in China who was in charge of intelligence services in the headquarters.).			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO.	DOC. NO.	DATE OF DOCUMENT	NAME	
200-7-25-396	FEC/MIS #3250	3 Aug 1951	2 3	
SUBJECT	DATE			
FEC/MIS Intell. Summaries Daily		27 Jan 54		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
<u>SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS COMMUNIST TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES</u>				
MISCELLANEOUS				
<p><u>Commentary: The Misguided Speeches of TSUJI:</u> Whatever purpose they are intended to serve, the mouthings of ex-Japanese army officer TSUJI Masanobu definitely do not serve the interests of Japan. "It is because of idolizing such misguided mentality as TSUJI's that Japan today finds herself confined to four small islands". A repetition of such idolatry and "Japan will find herself completely eliminated." TSUJI makes the mistake of the former imperial army headquarters of "exaggerating the Soviet strength and underrating the American." It may not be an unconscious mistake. His "fascistic neutral" theories are evidently suiting Communist Party purposes. Communist cells distribute copies of his speeches throughout the country. And though he professes "equal aversion" for both the United States and the Soviet Union, "sometimes, in the heat of his speechmaking, he lets slip the phrase: 'Out USSR'. (Tokyo Shimbun, 1 July)</p>				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
44-5-3-4y2	ZJTA-461/10	20 Apr 1949	C -
SUBJECT Japanese Intelligence. Penetration of USSR			29 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
<p>In a report by KOTANI Etsuo entitled "Causes of the Failure of the Nomonhan Incident" subject is mentioned in connection with the Operations Section of the Kwantung Army General Staff...." In the Operations Section of the Kwantung Army General Staff were three vigorous, high grade officers whose names, I believe, were Lt. Col. HATTORI, Major <u>TSUJI</u> and Major SHIMANUKI".</p>			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			C 7

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DEC 1952

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	DOC NO.	DATE OF DOCUMENT	NAME
44-7-2-27y	ZJNA-62	31 Oct 1949	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT			274
Smuggling (?) or Secret Recruiting (?)			29 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<u>FORMER LT. GEN. NEMOTO IN FORMOSA: BUT NO FURTHER ENLISTEES HAVE FOLLOWED.</u>			
<u>Foreign Reports</u>			
The plan to send Japanese pilots to Formosa was discussed at the Supreme Council of the Nationalist Government in Hangchow on April 20.			
The plan was put into effect from the 21st, but at 11 pm of that day, a secret directive from Shanghai was sent to a Japanese man, who was at one time in custody in Sugamo as a war criminal suspect. On the 23rd, CHU, Shih Ming arrived as a representative of the Chinese Mission to Japan to carry out this plan..			
General OKAMURA, Yasuji, formerly in command of Japanese Forces in China, and Colonel <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu, Chief of Staff of Japanese Forces in Burma also took part in the planning. The volunteer corps was to be called the "Japan Volunteer Corps" and was to be composed of air, ground and sea forces. Other persons in Japan involved in the plans included KODAMA Yoshio. (as reported by Wenjun)			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM		SECRET	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- (1) EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-8-9y	SEARCH NO. ZJL-222	DATE OF DOCUMENT 17 Nov 1949	ANALYST
SUBJECT JIS			DATE 29 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: C		Evaluation: B-3	
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p>The main leadership of the Japan Government's Japan-China Friendship operations organ is being strengthened by the 3 faction joint operations of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. OKAWA Faction OKAWA Shumei OKAMURA Neiji, a former colonel2. KODAMA Faction OKADA Naomasa, a former colonel3. ISHIHARA Faction <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu, a former colonel			
<p>JIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. C

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(35)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-5-3-69	SOURCE ZJL-229 T/S-37436	DATE OF DOCUMENT 1 Dec 1949	ANALYST C -
SUBJECT JIS		DATE 1 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p><u>Report D</u></p> <p>Subject: JIS Source: C - Evaluation: B-2</p> <p>The China Defense Staff Section (Chukoku Boei Sanbo bu): Former Col. TSUJI Masanobu, along with former envoy to China HORIUCHI Chiaki, are key figures in the East Asia League (TOA Renmei). As such they are main strength of the China Defense Staff Section.</p> <p><u>Report G</u></p> <p>Subject: JIS Source: C - Evaluation: B-2</p> <p>According to reliable information former Lt. Gen. ISHIHARA Kanji's East Asia League (TOA Renmei) activities have been in the hands of former Col. TSUJI Masanobu since 1945; activities in China have been brisk since the war's end...TSUJI Masanobu has been quite active in dispatching former Japanese Army personnel to Taiwan from Japan. The aforementioned are East Asia League's extreme rightist activities.</p> <p>DIV: EEL DATE: 26 Feb 54</p>			
SECRET		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
CROSS REFERENCE FORM		C -	

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	DATE	NAME OF DOCUMENT	
44-7-8-9y(Encl.) ZJLA-657		12 Dec 1949	
REASON			DATE
Background information on Personalities Mentioned in Intelligence Reports ZJL-222 and ZJL-229			29 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p><u>TSUJI Masanobu</u></p> <p>Army Staff Officer, Imperial Headquarters, 1941; Singapore, 1942. Source: SCAPIN 1192, 10 September 1946</p>			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. (35)	

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	44-7-10-1 ZJLA-828	3 Mar 1950
(1) Japanese in Formosa (2) Coalition between Chinese Communists and Japanese Communists		28 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION		
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM		
<u>ASAHI SHINBUN</u> , 13 February 1950		
A Truth of the Rumor Regarding a Japanese Volunteer Army. Conversation with Ex-Lieutenant Colonel YOSHIKAWA Upon His Return from Formosa.		
Reporter: Do you think that it true that ex-Colonel Mananobu TSUJI of the staff of the former Japanese headquarters, it taking charge of organ- izing a volunteer army?		
YOSHIKAWA: I have heard a rumor of it, but I am not certain whether that is true or not. I don' think he is doing that under command of the Nat- ionalist Government, but he is only doing that on his own accord. At any rate I believe that many smuggling dealers are taking an advan- tage of the volunteer army rumor for their excuse. For instance, the Kairetsugo incident was just a put-up job of the rightists for a money making in order to make it appear as if it was done for a good cause of helping the CHIANG Kai-shek Army in the fight against the Communist Army. The fellow who persuaded me in that is now be- ing thrown in a prison in Formosa.		
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Dispatch No. 4JHA-136

3 July 1950

From: Chief, C 21

subj: ASANO, Shigeru and TSUJI, Masanobu

1. ... has recruited TSUJI to engage in trade with Korea and communist-held China as well as Formosa. ... seems to have his contact to POUNCI through TSUJI, a relation of his, formerly a Colonel, JIIS, who works in the historical research Section, G-2, GH, and who was formerly an attache of the Japanese embassy in Washington.

2. The vehicle for this trade organization is the YAKUO BUSSAN KK whose president is IMAMUJI Seiichi, an apres-guerre businessman. ASADA has set himself up as Chief of the Trade Section and the assistant Chief of this Section is TSUJI, Toru, who is TSUJI Masanobu's son. TSUJI, Masanobu, together with KOBAYASHI Yoshio, a notorious professional Rightist once suspected of major war crimes, will handle the KUO-LIN-WANG and Formosa trade. ASADA is supposed to be the contact between Korea, Communist-held China and the U.S.A.

3. This is indeed an unholy alliance. MUJI is uncontrollable. ASALDA is suspected to be working for the Soviet.

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5. Active Structure of UGAKI's Organization

(Check Nr. PD-077)

General UGAKI

Headquarters

Lt. Gen. IWABATA*
NABEYAMA

~~FURUYA,
Tatsuo
for Maritime
Safety Agency
and raising
funds.~~

~~Lt. Gen.
IWATANABE,
Wataru -
intelligence~~

~~Lt. Gen. OIKAWA Senshichi
intelligence~~

~~Minister TSUCHIDA,
Yutaka of the
Independence and
Peace Committee~~

~~Admiral
YOKOSURA,
Yoshisaburo
for liaison
with GHQ~~

~~Lt. Gen.
ISUGAWA
directing
liaison~~

~~Soviet Union:
Lt. Gen.
SHIMIZU~~

~~North Korea:
Lt. Gen.
MATO~~

~~Chinese Communist:
Lt. Gen.
NISHIMURA Yasuharu~~

~~Indochina:
Col. TSUJI
Masanobu~~

~~Formosa:
Lt. Gen.
NEMOTO~~

Hakujiro (prob)

* Alias IWAAZE, Goyu
* preferred reading IWAKURO Takeo

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Z JL 369

19 July 50

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 16-7-30-14y	DATE OF DOCUMENT ZJL-382	25 July 1950	<i>L</i> <i>—</i>
SUBJECT Japanese Troops Still Active on the Mainland		28 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: BABOON/7		Evaluation: B-3	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
3. <u>Japanese Soldiers in Indo-China</u>			
.....			
Source believes that if the Japanese soldiers are allowed to fight for HO, U.S. economic and armed assistance in Indo-China will be futile. The simplest way of destroying HO's influence would be to repatriate the former Japanese Armed Forces personnel. To this end Source recommends that former high ranking Japanese officers of known ability be secretly dispatched to contact the leaders of the group. It is believed that no general officers are involved with HO; however, a number of supposedly dead field grade officers are heading the group as HO's military aides. For such a mission Source recommends former Maj. Gen. Tokujiro SAKURAI, well known in the Japanese Army for his military exploits; former Colonel Masanobu <u>TSUJI</u> , also known for his exploits and the author of "Traveling in Disguise for 3,000 Ri"; and former Lt. Colonel Genji KIKKAWA, who recently made headlines on account of his secret visit to CHIANG Kai-shek in Formosa.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM <i>SECRET</i>		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. <i>L</i> <i>—</i>	

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY																	
FILE NO. 44-5-3-33y	SOURCE ZJL-404	DATE OF DOCUMENT 7 Aug 1950	ANALYST E																	
SUBJECT Military and Intelligence Plans of the Japanese Rightist Underground			DATE 29 Jan 54																	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: C D except as stated		Evaluation: B-2 except as stated																		
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM																				
5. General NEMOTO will return to Formosa in August 1950 on one of the ships and will supervise disposition of Japanese volunteer troops there. Colonel <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu went back to Indo-China in early June, stopping at Formosa a few days en route for conferences with NEMOTO.																				
6. In addition to the current voyage, the Japanese leaders themselves, apart from Chinese Nationalist support, are planning to make the following liaison trips as soon as sufficient capital can be accumulated to insure more independent action:																				
<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Area</th><th rowspan="2">Area Commander</th><th colspan="2">Present Troop Strength Estimates</th><th rowspan="2">Method</th></tr><tr><th>C</th><th>D</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>.....</td><td>.....</td><td>.....</td><td>.....</td><td>.....</td></tr><tr><td>Indo-China</td><td>?</td><td>2,500</td><td>2,500</td><td>Clandestine shipping, Japan to Vietminh; MATSUMOTO Shunichi and TSUJI Masanobu in charge.</td></tr></tbody></table>				Area	Area Commander	Present Troop Strength Estimates		Method	C	D	Indo-China	?	2,500	2,500	Clandestine shipping, Japan to Vietminh; MATSUMOTO Shunichi and TSUJI Masanobu in charge.
Area	Area Commander	Present Troop Strength Estimates				Method														
		C	D																	
.....																
Indo-China	?	2,500	2,500	Clandestine shipping, Japan to Vietminh; MATSUMOTO Shunichi and TSUJI Masanobu in charge.																
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.																				
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. C D																		

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Subject: JIS - TSUJI Masanobu

Report No: ZJL-599 (D)

Date of Info: 30 July 1950

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 31 July 1950

Evaluation: B-2

Date of Report: 10 August 1950

Source:

Former Colonel TSUJI Masanobu (信 旗 佐) of the
Japanese Underground Government is reported to be currently residing
in a place belonging to KODAMA Yoshio.

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44-110-1542

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY
44-5-3-39y	ZJL-444	13 Sept 1950
Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups		3 Feb 1954
Source: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Evaluation: B-2 except as stated	
<p>3. <u>Operations into Korea and Korean Connections</u></p> <p>c. Colonel TSUJI Masanobu, previously reported incorrectly as having returned to Indo-China, is now planned to serve as one of WATANABE Wataru's assistants in future operations into North Korea. Reasons for this switch of plans and for the previous erroneous report are outlined below. TSUJI has his own CIC contacts for whom he has been working since his return to Japan in the latter part of 1949.</p>		
<p>5. <u>Southern Operations - Indo-China</u></p> <p>The original plan formulated early this spring for operations into Indo-China entailed the use of Col. TSUJI Masanobu as chief of those operations to both Vietminh, Vietnam, and the French government. While at Imperial General Headquarters, TSUJI was the protege of Lt. General ARISUE, then staff intelligence as a Major General; ARISUE continues to think very highly of TSUJI, and the plan was ARISUE's. It was so definitely slated that when NEMOTO went back to Formosa in June, 1950 after a brief trip to Kagoshima, TSUJI was reputed to have been on board. It was TSUJI and WATANABE Wataru who met NEMOTO at the Kagoshima Conference. He was later reported as having gone on from there to Indo-China, (according to information elicited from BABELE/4). The actual facts and mistaken identity came out much later: KUMAMOTO of the ARISUE Kikan, who supervised the third expedition to Formosa in June, took with him not TSUJI but a former Lt. Colonel and Commander of the Shanghai Tokko Kempeitai, YAMADA, ^{YAMAZAKI} they picked up NEMOTO at Kagoshima. It seems that not everyone shared ARISUE's and WATANABE Wataru's enthusiasm for TSUJI, especially personnel from the Southeast Asia theater of operations. Major General KIMURA, former Commanding Officer of Japanese Military Government for the Burma Theater, and MATSUMOTO Shunichi, former Minister Plenipotentiary to Indo-China and later Vice-Foreign Minister, were the two most influential objectors. MATSUMOTO, as a member of TSUCHIDA's Committee and chiefly through TSUCHIDA and FURUYA personally, had been assisting for some time in placement of intelligence operatives from various Japanese Kikans on ships of his friends going to Indo-China and to Malaya legally and illegally. In the past, he had also had excellent connections to operations of the special Kempei (the Tokko Kempei) in both Indo-China and South China and had maintained a fairly accurate contact system to individual ex-Kempei operatives up to date. When FURUYA approached him on the matter of several ships for the KAWA-GUCHI Kikan's forthcoming fourth expedition in early July, MATSUMOTO agreed, but by earlier discussion with both FURUYA, TSUCHIDA, YAMAZAKI, and others, he had made it quite clear that TSUJI was in his opinion quite unsuitable for work in Indo-China, as were most former military men; he demanded introduction of former Kempei special operations officers and Tokumu Kikan men instead of the personnel TSUJI wanted. In early June, KIMURA, a newcomer to the ARISUE Kikan whose chief task it was to "fix" the Maritime Safety Bureau, the Board of Trade and other Japanese government agencies with bribes from the profits, also flatly objected to TSUJI being involved in any Southeast Asia operations. TSUJI, while an Imperial GHQ G-2 representative from Singapore in Burma, had apparently made himself thoroughly obnoxious to many of the local commanders as well as to the "political officers" such as KIMURA. KIMURA favored ASADA Goro, former special operative at Bangkok. The general</p>		

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consensus of former Southeast Asia staff opinion was that (a) TSUJI was too closely identified with the French; (b) TSUJI was insecure, operationally incompetent, and not liked by natives of the area; (c) TSUJI was thoroughly known and "blown" to the Chinese Communists, who did not like him either. MATSUMOTO introduced professionals such as former Indo-China Tokko Kempei (Colonel) HAYASHI Hidesumi, former Kempei (Military Police) (Colonel) TOMIMURA, and Lt. Col. TOMITA to the federation as well as others. IMAZE Takeo, as a former Nakano School man, threw his weight against ARISUE's man; at the last minute, the central advisory group ordered replacement of TSUJI by Lt. Colonel TOMITA and the latter went as advance contact agent for about twenty agent personnel to be sent on the fourth expedition.

Although the failure of the fourth expedition delayed dispatch of those agents, they will go about the end of October with the fifth Formosa expedition and will be re-mounted from Formosa with the cooperation of the Chinese Nationalist RAINSHA. ASADA Goro, now with the Foreign Office, TOMIMURA, and possibly HAYASHI Hidesumi will go. HAYASHI is apparently in charge of most Indo-China operatives for the group, but there appears to be someone above him who will supervise all operations in that general area as far as professional intelligence operations are concerned. NEMOTO will be their liaison man unless a better means can be devised. MATSUMOTO Shunichi will continue to aid in the logistic support, and in the overall recruiting policy.

The general plan for Indo-China operations entails playing both sides in the struggle, with the ultimate objective of those operatives on the Vietminh side of securing liaisons into the Chinese Communist connections of the Vietminh. Some information on the Vietminh will be given to the French by those operatives who are aligned on the French and Vietnam side; some information on the French will be used to further the cause of those operatives working for HO Chi Minh.

- CCC 3 -

JAPAN
Sept. 20, 1950

PURGE ACTIVITY--Former Army Col. MASANOBU TSUJI, one of the foremost strategists of Japan during the Pacific war, has not gone to Korea despite rumors to that effect, Director MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA of the Special Examination Bureau of the Office of the Attorney General told a meeting of the Lower House Judiciary Committee on Sept. 19. He said he had reports that Tsuji held a meeting with graduates of the now-defunct Military Academy in Niigata City a week ago but that the matter is still being investigated and no official announcement can be made at the present time. It has been definitely established, however, that Tsuji has not gone to Korea, he said, and told the meeting further that his bureau is investigating the alleged political activities of YOSHIIICHI MIURA, ICHIZO KOBAYASHI, MAMORU NAGANO, YONEZO MAEDA AND DADAO OASA, purged business leaders. The Special Examination Bureau, Yoshikawa reminded the committee, is exercising vigilance over the activities of rightist organizations just as it is closely watching the movements of extreme leftist elements. Chief NOBORU SAITO of the National Rural Police told the session that members of the National Police Reserve have been closely screened so that there are no Red elements in the new police set-up. (JIJI, Sept. 19, 1950--1)

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			
FILE NO.	SEARCHED	DATE OF DOCUMENT	CROSS FILED BY
44-5-3-40	ZJL-485	13 Nov 1950	C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT	Plans and Activities of JIS and Rightist Groups		
PERTINENT INFORMATION		Evaluation: B-2 except as stated	
Source: C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p>B. <u>Relations with the Chinese Nationalists</u></p> <p>2. Operations are planned for WATANABE Wataru, ARISUE's subordinate Kikan chief, who went during September to Kagoshima, Kyushu, to take over establishment of external operations to Formosa and South China as well as to Korea and Manchuria, under the close supervision of ARISUE of course. Since <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu is closely connected to both ARISUE, WATANABE Wataru and to a couple of unidentified American agencies, and since he also was in Kyushu for conferences about the end of September and the beginning of October, it is presumed that both TSUJI and some form of American backing are involved as well.</p>			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-7-3-190	ZJL-521	4 Jan 1951	C -
SUBJECT			DATE
List of Travelers by Air in the Far East as reported on 27 Dec 1950			1 Feb 1954

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM.

Name	Passport No.	Nationality	Age	Sex	Destination	Air Line
TSUJI, M.	2547	Japanese	?	?	Tokyo to Okinawa 12/14/50	NWA

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-5-3-45	SEARCHED ZJL-539	STAFF DOCUMENT 26 Jan 1951	SEARCHED C DATE 28 Jan 1954
SUBJECT Current Secret Activities of the JONAN-N.P.I.P.C. Syndicate.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: <u>C</u> <u>7</u>		Evaluation: B-2 except as stated	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p>3. <u>Liaison to Other Japanese Intelligence Groups.</u></p> <p>e. <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu was politely refused admission to the group (SATOMI) in the first week of January, 1951 despite his continued interest. The excuse used was that the publicity concerning TSUJI's celebrated book about his exploits in Southeast Asia after the war and the overt nature of his efforts to aid re-birth of Nationalism had made him too well known a figure. Inclusion of such a figure in their group would merely serve to spotlight their very quietly hidden activities. SATOMI remarked further that ARISUE's recent activities since the failure of JIS groups to merge underground have only drawn him closer to the Popov camp; in ARISUE's case this is merely self-interest because ARISUE has now reached the point where he has no future except under protection of Popov and/or related agencies and must operate now on their behalf fairly sincerely in order to retain their trust...and the vitally needed support. Neither KAWARE nor his subordinates or IWAAZE is in such a position. In TSUJI's case SATOMI feels that that former ultra-militarist has childishly sold himself on his own propaganda (that Japan and America must work</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
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1320 J. M. HARRIS

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together to stop Communism in Asia) to the point that his naive sense of feudalistic commitment impels him to deal far too sincerely with American contacts. In the case of both individuals, further cooperation seems virtually impossible.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	TYPE	DATE	NAME
44-5-3-50	ZJL-551	8 Feb 1951	C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT			DATE
Personnel Involved in Underground Research on Rearmament (Report C)			28 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION		Evaluation: C-6	
Source: C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p>The Japanese Underground Government, considering it inevitable that Japan will be given permission to rearm just as Western Germany has been allowed to rearm, is conducting research on rearmament. Among others, the following are doing research on this problem:</p> <p>.....</p> <p>Former Colonels</p> <p>.....</p> <p><u>TSUJI Masanobu</u></p>			
THIS IS THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
SECRET			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
		C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL- Local File No: _____
No. of Pages: 3 No. of Enclosures: _____
Report Made By: C Approved By: C A.R.C.
Distribution: 17 Feb. 51
By copy to: Wash - 2
Files - 2
Orally to:

Source Cryptonym: C References: _____

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. The subject of the attached report is a man of interest: 1) as typical of the more successful of the "operators" among the purged higher army officers; 2) for his connections with SATOMI Hajime whom C dubs the "eminence grise" in the JONAN Enterprises-National Peace and Independence Committee intelligence combine; and 3) for his contact with FEAF (see para 7).

2. In reference to paragraph 7, MIYOSHI's connection is probably with the 6001 Special Investigations Unit or with FEAF OSI. He was beaten up in 1948 by some drunken 6001 officers who were subsequently court-martialed.

3. In April 1949, C told C that subject was "a man of integrity" in whom full confidence would be placed. The decidedly unfriendly tone of the present report indicates a radical shift in opinion possibly based on closer acquaintance. C apparently obtained a portion of the attached material in a personal interview, probably at the same time as the report forwarded as ZJL-523.

44-5'3.

19 February 1951

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Date: 2005

Subject: MIYOSHI Yasuyuki, Former Major General	Report No: ZJL-
	Date of Information: See Below
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan	Date Acquired: 27 Dec 1950
Evaluation: B-3	Date of Report: 14 Feb 1951
Source: <u>C</u> <u>—</u>	19 Feb 1951

1. Former Major General MIYOSHI Yasuyuki (三吉泰之), once an Army Air Force Officer, is a purged officer of the Japanese military who according to Source hopes to see himself installed once again in the top echelon of a revived Japanese Army and who believes that the inevitable rise of the Japanese Army is Japan's only chance to regain her former status and power among the nations. In post-surrender Japan, MIYOSHI has advanced his personal fortunes by capitalizing on connections with high Occupation officials and local "bosses" in Kyoto and Tokyo.

2. MIYOSHI was born in a village in Hiroshima Prefecture and received his early education in the primary and middle school attached to the Hiroshima Normal School. After graduation from the Army Staff College, he served in the early 30's as an Assistant Military Attaché in Washington, D.C. Source knows little of MIYOSHI's military career except that he was one of the pioneer pilots in the Japanese Air Force.

3. After the surrender MIYOSHI was sent to Kyoto as head of the Army Liaison Office charged with the duty of demobilizing Japanese military personnel in the area in cooperation with General Kreuger's Sixth Army. He quickly established excellent relations with the Occupation officers and earned the reputation among the Japanese as a good "fixer" with the Occupation. According to a CIC source, he also made a small fortune black-marketing the material cached by the former Japanese Army in the Kyoto area which he was charged with liquidating. A part of this money he invested in one of the Japanese hotels in Kyoto, the KINTA RYOKAN, which is one of the largest in Kyoto and serves as his headquarters there.

4. Some of MIYOSHI's contacts in Kyoto are:

A. Kyoto Fish Market, Ltd. (The real boss is ITAKURA Manjiro,* younger brother of Mrs. TSUJI, wife of the owner of the KINTA RYOKAN). MIYOSHI was rewarded with a cash payment and a position as permanent adviser to this firm for blocking, through his intercession with the

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Kyoto Military Government Team, the efforts of purgee FUKUYA Shunichi to absorb the Kyoto Fish Market into his Hokkaido Fisheries Co. (Operated only in Kyoto)

B. Kanebo Cotton Mills, Inc. MIYOSHI quashed a case of cotton and silk black-marketeering and thereby earned a half a million yen's worth of the company's stock and an advisory position with a guaranteed annual bonus.

C. SASAKI Kyo.** Chairman of the Kyoto Branch of the Japan SUMO Association and an admirer of TOJO. When TOJO was in Sugamo SASAKI paid a monthly remittance to TOJO's family. Connected with a certain Japanese-Syrian jeweller named ANTAKI (fmu) in a firm called the Towers, Inc. which recently went out of business.

D. WATSUJI Haruki, first post-war mayor of Kyoto and unsuccessful candidate for the mayoralty in the last election, and MIURA (first name not given), first director of the Kyoto Procurement Board. WATSUJI and MIURA were indicted in the Kyoto District Court for illegal activity in the 1950 Upper House elections. MIYOSHI, despite his status as a purgee, was virtually one of WATSUJI's staff officers in his election campaign.

E. MATSUMOTO Shigeaki, Okinawa-born, a war-time profiteer in Shanghai and elsewhere in China. When MIYOSHI was Army Liaison Office chief, he and MATSUMOTO are said to have made a number of profitable business deals. MATSUMOTO for a few years after the war published in Kyoto a magazine called the JIHO-SHA, similar in content to the monthly SHINSO.

F. ISHIWARA Koichiro, ex-tycoon in South-East Asian exploitation (rubber and tin in Malaya and Indonesia) who encouraged TOJO and his followers in their scheme for southern expansion. MIYOSHI wrote a lengthy petition requesting ISHIWARA's exoneration from war-guilt and the purge. When ISHIWARA was finally released from Sugamo, MIYOSHI maintained that he was the major instrument and was given an ample cash award.

G. HAYASHI Shunji, a "financial magician" who has been labelled the "marathon-borrower". MIYOSHI served HAYASHI as "foreign affairs advisor" for a few months after he got HAYASHI out of CID detention late in 1947.

5. At present MIYOSHI spends two-thirds of his time in Tokyo, the remainder in Kyoto. In Tokyo he entered into a partnership with a Madame KOMATSU and later made her his mistress. Madame KOMATSU is the proprietress of the GAJO-EN restaurant-hotel which MIYOSHI now runs as he does the KINTA RYOKAN in Kyoto. MIYOSHI and Madame KOMATSU met when the latter was running an army-protected geisha house in Singapore called the "Komatsu".

6. MIYOSHI has reportedly succeeded in inviting the Dutch Shell Company to invest in the SHONA Oil Co., Tsunohazu, Shinjuku, Tokyo.*** He also claims to have established the Aiafia Strait Pearl Cultivation Co., in cooperation with Australian interests. According to MIYOSHI this firm is headed by SAKADA Renzo, a former veteran diplomat. MIYOSHI is also

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closely linked with SATOMI Hajime, **** notorious China narcotic gangster and an ambitious ultra-nationalist. SATOMI has been FUKUJI Shunichi's (see para 4.A. above) boss since their China days.

7. For the past two years MIYOSHI has reportedly boasted of his work for Far East Air Forces' "CIO". He maintains he procured a score of able former Japanese airmen for FEAF who are now working as ground personnel. He also claims that FEAF invites his opinions on air strategy.

Field Comments:

* Characters for this name and those that follow not given by Source

** In a previous undisseminated report dated 22 May 1950, Source reported that SASAKI and ANTAKI immediately after the surrender went into a business partnership with a Colonel LONGINO, then with the 6th Army in Kyoto. LONGINO is said to have returned to the U.S. with "quite a quantity" of jewels and established the Massachusetts Bay Co. in New York. While waiting for the return of LONGINO, whom Source believes was denied entry by SCAP, SASAKI and ANTAKI set up the Tower's Inc.

*** See ZJL-468-J for a report on a transaction apparently identical with the one mentioned here. [] Economic Office reports that as far as is known negotiations between SHOWA and the Shall Company are underway but it is believed that no contract has yet been signed.

**** aka SATOMI Ho, SATOMI Ryosaku. See ZJL-538 and 539. Given in these two reports as chief of liaison for the JOMAN Company, key JIS cover company.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
44-5-3-49	ZJL-571	9 March 1951	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Japanese I.S. Personalities			3 Feb 1954
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Evaluation: C-2	
(a) It is definitely felt that Colonel TSUJI Wasanobu works for POPOV through HATTORI. Reasons for this opinion being strong enough to be considered fact, by Source are personal.			
(b) Source is a very close friend of Colonel HATTORI and also of Colonel TSUJI, and was a class behind HATTORI (who is about 45) at the Imperial Officers' School. TSUJI visits HATTORI regularly and frequently; Source keeps in fairly close contact with both. One time when visited, TSUJI was engaged in work concerning maps of Korea and North China which he covered hastily on Source's approach, claiming it was some work for Colonel HATTORI. Since TSUJI is well aware that Source is on excellent terms with HATTORI, he would probably not have kept this secret if only HATTORI were involved.			
(c) In mid-January, 1951, TSUJI received a letter from a Chinese Nationalist leader at Taipeh, Formosa asking him to do the CHIANG Government a favor. Approximately two divisions of Chinese Nationalist troops sought safe-haven in Indochina when the Communists swept into the south provinces of China in 1949. These troops were promptly interned by the French authorities in Indochina, and at first received very unkind treatment. However, since fortunes of war went against the French and Vietnamese in 1950, treatment of the interned troops improved, and there has even been some discussion of using them against the Vietminh rebels and/or Chinese Communists. The Nationalist leader on Formosa, knowing TSUJI's great reputation among the Japanese troops, wanted TSUJI to write a letter to those Japanese serving with the Chinese Nationalist divisions in Indochina asking them not to desert the cause despite adversities, and to other Japanese in Indochina exhorting them to enlist with the Nationalists. TSUJI is deeply and sincerely anti-Communist, but he has no particular love for nor faith in the Chinese Nationalist regime. In addition, he has been in Indochina only twice and has no detailed knowledge of the area nor of the Japanese Army personnel there. He came to Source with the problem. Source advised him to present it to American authorities, to which TSUJI replied that he could easily do that, and probably should, but that still left him with the problem of how to answer this Chinese Nationalist general, who was a personal friend. Eventually, by the end of January, TSUJI's distrust of the CHIANG regime won out over his naive inability to refuse a friend's request, and he wrote back that he could not write such a letter because he had no knowledge of the Japanese in Indochina and did not wish any unprincipled individuals among the Japanese community there to make ill use of his name and reputation.			
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(d) TSUJI has many foreign visitors and many correspondents from countries all over East Asia because of the trek he made in Southeast Asia and South China and the book he wrote about it. Until recently, his work with HATTORI seems to have concerned mainly the Korean problem, but whether it involves the placement of agents in North Korea or not is not known.

(e) The last week of January, 1951, TSUJI visited Source and stated that he had been asked for an opinion, backed up by research, on the question of whether an invasion of South China by Chinese Nationalists, aided from within by

Chinese anti-Communist guerrillas, stood good chances of success. Source professed his ignorance of such matters, but pointed out that if aided from within, it would probably go as badly as did the Japanese invasion of the same area. TSUJI stated that it was a matter of great consequence and yet he felt that the Americans could not rely on CHIANG Kai Shek and that the authorities in Tokyo should not consider backing such a venture. He appeared to be using Source as a sounding-board for his ideas concerning the problem. About a week later, TSUJI made an unexpected and hurried visit to Source. He asked the latter if he had talked about their conversation to anyone. Source said he had not. TSUJI then insisted that Source promise not to reveal the nature or subject of their earlier discussion to anyone because it was a "top-secret" matter. A few days later, Source was not too surprised to received a much less naive warning by implication on the same topic from HATTORI, which topic HATTORI approached deviously but rather obviously from a discussion of TSUJI's danger from reputed assassination by fanatical ultra-Nationalists. POPOV had requested the original project of HATTORI and TSUJI, and then had heard from a Chinese source of a security leak on this highly secret topic; TSUJI probably told HATTORI that he had discussed the question with Source, and both became unduly concerned; without a warning from POPOV, it is unlikely that either one would worry at all about sharing secrets with Source.

(f) TSUJI has received warnings and threats several times from what appears to be a wide variety of ideological crackpots, but even his best friends doubt that he is in any real danger; it is merely that to some people he is sort of a symbol of old-style militarism, and to certain Rightist fanatics, he is a symbol of subservient cooperation with Americans, as opposed to the violently anti-white wing of Pan-Asianism. TSUJI himself is definitely Pan-Asian in his thinking, but along the lines of Japanese cooperation with the other Asian BLOC nations PLUS extremely close and friendly cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers to stem Communism and develop Asia.

(g) Between the fame of TSUJI as a patriotic and loyal Japanese soldier and old-style gentleman of the highest tradition and the almost equally widespread stories of his incompetency and childishness, it is difficult to find the true middle ground. Despite a certain naivete, he is considered to be a reasonably capable strategist and operations officer, and there is no question that for a Japanese officer, he is a kind, honest, and loyal gentleman to all. However, in either politics or intelligence work, he is hopelessly lost both by reason of personality and lack of experience.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-5-3-53	ZJL-521	29 Mar 1951	C -3
SUBJECT			DATE
Diary of Activities of "Jonan" Group 17 Feb-19 Mar 1951.			1 Feb 1954

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Evaluation: B-2

Source: C -3

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED
VERBATIM

5. 21 February

13:00 : Mr. SATOMI called on TSUJI Masanobu at his home.
details of their talk are unknown...

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-7-0-150	ZJL-596	13 Apr 1951	C
SUFB			DATE
Rearmament—"Japanese Underground Government" Plans and Policies			22 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: ()		Evaluation: C-3	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
<u>Report B</u>			
1. The Japanese Underground Government (JUG) has decided to undertake the rearmament of Japan, under the leadership of UGAKI Kazushige as Commander-in-Chief and KAWABE Torashiro as Chief of the General Staff..			
2. A KIKAN of the JUG is planning the "reconstruction of Japan" (NIHON KAIZO) centered about Prince CHICHIBU, KUHARA Fusano, and KODAMA Yoshio. KODAMA and <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu are absorbed to the utmost in the JUG's current rearmament plans.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-7-14-8	ZJL-609	4 May 1951	()
SUBJECT			DATE
Japanese Underground Government--Rearmament Activities			28 Jan 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Source: See Below

Evaluation: C-3

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM

2. The following former officers have studied jointly and given their critique of UGAKI Kazushige's "Japan Rearmament Proposal" (NIPPON SAIGUMBI AN):

KAWABE Torashiro
IWAKURO Takeo
OKAMURA Neiji
TSUJI Masanobu

(Source: [] date of information: 26 Mar 1951; received 27 Mar 51)

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-7-0-157	ZJL-614	8 May 1951	C D
SUBJECT			DATE
Rearmament - Former Army Officers Contacting G-2			22 Jan 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Evaluation: C-3

Source: C D

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM

5. Other persons concerned with rearmament are:

TSUJI Masanobu. 36th Class of the Military Academy and 43rd Class of the General Staff College.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-5-3-56	SOURCE ZJLA-1473	DATE OF DOCUMENT 11 May 51	ANALYST <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT Transmittal of <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Report			DATE 25 Feb 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<u>THE J.I.S. GROUPS AND JAPANESE NATIONAL REVIVAL - PRESENT AND FUTURE</u>			
IV. <u>Post-War Intelligence Activity to Date</u>			
A. <u>The Main Kikans to Date</u>			
(1) ARISUE SeizoARISUE was responsible for the introduction of Colonels <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu, OKADA Yoshimasa (or Isao), and HATTORI Takushiro to American G-2....			
(10) <u>The New Field Officers' Clique</u> This is a new group within the ranks of the former mili- tarists working for G-2, GHQ. Three former ARISUE proteges, Colonels HATTORI Takushiro, TSUJI Masanobu, and KOTANI (Hiroshi??) who comes from Yamaguchi Ken, are its principal figures. In addition to work on the rearmament question and strategy research, they are engaged in operations against JCP targets. Neither HATTORI nor TSUJI is a former intelligence officer. The group evolved because of the objections on the part of certain Army field officers to the top- heavy numbers of general officers in the KAWABE Kikan, which did			
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not give the rising field officers the opportunities the future Japanese Army should have. Mutual recriminations between his group and the "Generals' Clique" (the KAWABE Kikan) have increased with the rapid rise in importance of HATTORI and TSUJI since the beginning of the year.

C. 1951: The Change in the Character of Leading Organizations.

.....

The other powerful groups? They are those which could adapt and already have adapted themselves to clandestine activity designed to advance them in the military or political field:..... There is one more possibly strong element: The new Field Officers' Clique of HATTORI Takushiro and TSUJI.

VI. Present Combines Which will probably have a Strong Voice in the Government and will therefore control the Future Intelligence Agencies.

A. Control of the Army.

.....

In the field of strategy, if KAWABE is chief, SAKURAI Tokutaro and TANAKA Shinichi are likely candidates as Staff Strategy Officers. However, one of the main reasons why KAWABE is a likely choice is his reputation for securing the cooperation of diverse cliques and personalities; therefore, there are good indications that high positions on the staff will be offered to the new "Field Officers" Clique", specifically to HATTORI Takushiro and TSUJI Masanobu... Thus we see that future control of the Army and its subordinate intelligence agency will probably rest within the loosely organized

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group of General Staff officers affiliated with KAWABE, but with considerable concessions probably being made to rising field grade officers such as HATTORI, TSUJI, and others, and certain high posts being controlled by compromise with the Army generals within the JONAN Group...

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	44-7-0-151	ZJL-626	21 May 1951
SUBJECT	Former Japanese Army Officers engaged in Rearmament Activities		22 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION		Evaluation: C-3	
Source: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM	
<p>1. It is reported that for the past five years, certain former Japanese Army Officers, particularly in the field grades, have been working for the creation of a Japanese Army. It is believed that many of these field grade officers are members of the 1st and 2nd Demobilization Bureaus. Among them are HATTORI Takushiro and <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu.</p> <p>2. TSUJI reportedly has been in recent contact with HATOYAMA Ichiro. TSUJI's speech at the Liberal Club on 3 March 1951 in which he voiced opposition to rearmament is far from being the truth. He later told IMOTO Kumao (former Colonel), working under HATTORI, that it was necessary to "deceive the ally prior to the enemy." IMOTO, not a classmate of HATTORI's group, nevertheless remained at the Demobilization Bureau, Chiba, to the end, surveilling the activities of former servicemen. He is presently president of SHIZUOKA Hall. IMOTO is assisted by a former Major KOMURADANI who was a subordinate of IMOTO's in an operational section.</p>			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	REF ID	DATE OF DOCUMENT	SEARCHED
44-4-13-77	ZJL-670	13 July 1951	C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT JCP - Activities of KOMATSU Yuichiro, Chief of JCP Cultural Department			SEARCHED 28 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Evaluation: B-3			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
4. According to KOMATSU, his recent activities have been concerned with exploiting the propaganda value of the speech delivered recently by former Staff Officer <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> *** Immediately after his speech, the JCP turned out hasty copies of its text and distributed them to members of the House of Councillors, House of Representatives and others. The party added the opinion that the Japanese had heretofore heard only the American side of the story and that it was necessary to hear also the Soviet side before forming any conclusions. After a JCP conference with the Soviet Embassy, it was decided to invite members of the Diet to a party. Such a gathering was held at the Soviet Embassy recently, with more than three hundred Councillors and others attending. Movies and other propaganda media were exhibited, and the Party was extremely successful in provoking discussions designed to change the guests' attitudes toward the USSR.			
<u>Field Comments</u> *** This is a reference to a remarkable speech given by TSUJI in early June 1951 before "a certain" conservative club in Tokyo. It was picked up by Rengo News Agency in a release of 5 June 1951 copy of which was furnished by FBIS through C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ..TSUJI made a de-			
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
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tailed comparison, unfavorable to the United States in almost every respect, of the military strengths of America and the USSR. Although there is no accounting for the provenance of his data, it was presented in a most convincing way, and provided a beautiful and presumably gratuitous propaganda opportunity for the JCP. Rengo reported that "the capitalists and conservatives" who heard TSUJI speak "were much shocked;" the same effect can be anticipated for those who read the JCP's version, particularly when considered in the light of TSUJI's post-war notoriety as a master strategist..

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Subject: Rearmament - TSUJI Masanobu's Report No.: ZUL-699, Report A
Position and Influence Date of Information: August 1951
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date Acquired: See Below
Evaluation: C-3 Date of Report: 24 August 1951
Source:

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(Paragraphs 1 and 2: date acquired 17 August 1951)

1. TSUJI Masanobu has become a tool of rightist MIURA Michi, under whose patronage and manipulation he is spreading falsehoods throughout Japan and bolstering the Rearmament movement. TSUJI's recent comparison of U.S.-Soviet strength* is strongly colored by information from former Kwantung Army documents.

2. TSUJI actually advocates rearmament, but his rearmament proposals call for self-defense based on Japan's own strength. His real motive is to preach anti-rearmament while hurrying to form alliances with his ex-comrades throughout Japan. He intends to go over to the Soviets after the peace treaty and assume the role of a "bridge of reconciliation" between the United States and the USSR.

(Paragraph 3: date acquired 10 August 1951)

3. There is a group firmly rooted in the former members of the Second Section, Army General Staff, which concurs with TSUJI's belief that the Soviet camp would emerge victorious from a Third World War. They are convinced that the Soviet Eastern European bloc would defeat the American Western European camp. This conclusion has been arrived at after study of the respective productive capacities, mobilization capacities, transportation facilities, etc.**

Field Comments:

* See ZUL-670.

** According to the MIS Summary #3251, 4 August 1951, and the Japanese press, TSUJI was indicted on 1 August by the Attorney-General's Office for violation of the purge ordinance by his now-famous speech. in a report received 10 August 1951, states that Japanese government action was based on a GHQ request.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
█	ZJL-685	9 Aug 1951	█
SUBJECT			DATE
SUGII Mitsuru and His Probable Connection to TSUJI Masanobu			2 Feb 1954
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: █		Evaluation: C-3; F-3 where sub-source was stated	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
2. There is a strong probability that there were fairly close relations between SUGII Mitsuru and Colonel <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu during the late war. Since the former was assigned to the SUZUKI Kikan during the war, a "kikan" with which TSUJI had fairly close relation- ships in the course of his duties, SUGII came to be acquainted with TSUJI in that manner.			
(Sub-source for para. 2: █ formerly president of the Ensuiko Sugar Refining Co., and at present an advisor to the Hitachi Manufacturing Co.)			
3. Prior to his departure early this year for Burma, SUGII had been granted a three month permission to stay by his visa..			
4. Since SUGII is acquainted with TSUJI Masanobu, as the above sub-source stated, (and he knows both men well), it can be assumed that SUGII did not fail to contact the latter before his departure. If so TSUJI probably expressed various hopes and desires to him concerning his trip. There is know information available from peri- pheral sources concerning SUGII's conduct and activities in Rangoon, nor whether he engaged in the collection of information on TSUJI's behalf. However, judging from the fact that he returned in the			
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company of THAKIN Chitten, there is some question as to the propriety of his actions and activities.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-406	SOURCE FEC/MIS #3257	DATE OF DOCUMENT 10 Aug 1951	ANALYST <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summaries			DATE 23 Feb 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Excerpted from page J-2

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE

3. JCP Explicits Anti-U.S. Speech of Ex-Army Officer (Second of Two Articles):

a. Posters, Pamphlets Used: hampered by banning of its numerous press outlets, the JCP in publicizing TSUJI Masanobu's anti-U.S. speech has, however, made use of posters, leaflets and pamphlets to make known his views which are so readily adaptable at this time to Communist uses. In addition to publicity given the speech by the pro-Communist press, JCP committees all over Japan reprinted the speech in the form of special propaganda leaflets and posters for dissemination to party members and the general public. By the end of June such propaganda material, intelligence sources stated, were found in such widely separated areas as Nagano, Aichi, and Shimane Prefectures, Tokyo and Hokkaido. Reportedly, the party has put out small pamphlets at 10 yen a copy for distribution to the public in Kanagawa Prefecture.

The flexibility of JCP propaganda methods brings up the question of whether TSUJI's speech has been reported accurately, or distorted for Communist ends. Although it was claimed that pro-JCP journals contained only those portions of the speech which would add further weight to Communist propaganda for an over-all peace and non-militarization of Japanese territory, and that many portions of the speech were omitted or altered, a comparison of such versions with Japanese police reports indicated that the several versions put out by the JCP, in general, followed the original. (1)

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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(35)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-13-3y	SOURCE ZJL-676-B	DATE OF DOCUMENT 16 Aug 1951	ANALYST C -
SUBJECT Diary of JONAN-GENYOSHA Activities			DATE 28 Jan 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Evaluation: B-2

Source: C -

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM

From Source Comments -

5. Re para. 12A of ZJL-676 A: It is possible that this TERAKAWA is id/w the TERAKAWA described earlier by C - as involved in French Indo-China operational plans and underground work; as such, he would be id/w. C - subordinate. This would fit logically with the fact that this TERAKAWA mentioned here is collaborating with the close associate of TSUJI Macanobu, Colonel SADAKE.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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Subject: [REDACTED] Report No: ZR-687 (1B-313)
[REDACTED] Date of Information: July, 1951.
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date Acquired: 18 JUL., 1951
Evaluation: G-F [REDACTED] Date of Report: 20 August, 1951.
Source: [REDACTED]

NOTE: The following are alleged by [REDACTED] to be statements made by MATSURI Takanobu, former Colonel, Japanese Army, to [REDACTED] as a result of direct conversations on the topics concerned. The following wording is allegedly MATSURI's.

1. I have met with Major General C. A. Willoughby several times, but the number of meetings which I have had with him is by no means unduly great. I cannot help but pay the highest respect to his personality and I feel completely grateful to the deepness of his consideration for me. He was indeed a great general and superior. It is entirely attributable to the assistance of Maj. Gen. Willoughby that I have come to win the understanding and trust of the United States Army. To my satisfaction, I was really able to work well.
2. Regardless of the articles which we have been provided for in the Potsdam Declaration, ever since the surrender of Japan I have been resolutely of the belief that the future world situation would not leave Japan defenseless. Therefore, even since the end of the war, I have been a firm advocate for the rearmament of Japan. I am not a man who availed himself of changing times in which everyone has begun to talk considerably in public about rearmament; ever since the surrender I have been holding firm to the opinion that Japan should be re-armed, and I believe that is an absolute necessity. When it occurred last year that a plan was to be drawn up for the formation of a National Police Reserve, I was called by Maj. Gen. Willoughby to formulate such a program and plan. I took it over. At that time, [Colonel] TSUJI Masaharu advised me, "Don't accept my work. It is not the right time to be doing this." However, I did not conform to TSUJI's suggestion and proceeded with the plan for the formation of a National Police Reserve to the best of my ability, always with the aim in mind of the rearmament of Japan. In TSUJI's opinion, it was very difficult to recruit capable men under the circumstances then prevailing (August-September, 1950), even if the Reserve were to be organized. Consequently, TSUJI believed that no honest and competent Police Reserve would be formed. He argued with me that I brought such a makeshift organization into being despite the attendant circumstances at the time, dishonor might be brought upon me and he told me I should not make a laughing-stock of myself over such an issue of the Reserve force. Thus, his advice was in that way full of favor. I took his considerations for my personal position. Since I was aware of the trust accorded to me by General Willoughby, however, and since

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FORM NO. 61-58
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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231-629 (IN-157)

advocating the cause of rearmament for a long time, I accepted Maj. Gen. Willoughby's request with willingness. I did not give in to TSUJI's kind and thoughtful workings, as I considered that this project was my destiny, and believed that it should be the way of the Japanese people to go along with such directions and to perform the assigned mission, even though it would bear a dishonor to me personally.

However, as it happened, I was not permitted to take the initiative in establishing the Police Reserve and leading it myself, in spite of my efforts. I do not know whether that was good fortune or bad.

3. Since then, the report and resultant rumors that I was concerned with the National Police Reserve issue have gradually come to spread among the people. As an echo to the public advocacy of Japanese rearmament which became intensified since the end of 1950, voices of accusation and recrimination have been raised against me, becoming more and more intense. My name has appeared in both the TASS News Agency press and in newspapers following the Chinese Communist line. They alleged that my group was unilaterally plotting the re-militarization of Japan. They slandered me quite maliciously, saying, "This man is one who was a great wartime anti-American leader and was General Minister FUJI's protégé; he has now turned into a spy and tool of America since the termination of the war. This man, moreover, is plotting the rearmament of Japan! If Japan is to be rearmed by a man like him, we shall stand silently by. In the event that Russia should come into Japan, he will probably cooperate with the Soviets too." Quite recently, again, another baseless and slanderous rumor is being spread about, that "Generals OKAMURA (Naiji okuhyōtanen) and SHIBATA (Sedamu) are using me to make preparations for rearmament, and are thus dangerous militarists. Both General OKAMURA and General SHIBATA are men of fine character. I have had almost no chance to meet with General OKAMURA. However, I sometimes do pay a visit to General SHIBATA, who is my senior officer and my former operational strategy chief under whom I once served. None among the former military men of Japan could equal him in the performance and observation of justice. It is indeed regrettable that I am at present in circumstances which do harm to the name of such a fine and noble superior.

I have never thought in terms of effecting the rearmament of Japan by the efforts of my group alone, nor have I advocated excluding other groups. I believe that it is wise policy to rearm Japan; but I know full well how difficult a process those persons responsible for rearmament will be obliged to undertake before it can be realized. I did not undertake the project of the National Police Reserve of my own volition, but rather did it because of the instruction of Maj. Gen. Willoughby. Subsequently, I have entertained no political ambitions whatsoever. I do not have any demands as to my future position either. My earnest desire is merely to recruit and weld together fine men who are eligible ~~and~~ from a military point of view and to create an army of Japan really capable of contributing to world peace. It is extremely difficult to understand the reasoning of those former Japanese ~~men~~ men, fortunate enough to enjoy considerable confidence and trust of the U.S. Army and contact with the latter, who not only do not try to aid us but who even denounce and exclude us.

Evaluation for para. 3 and 4, excepting news quotes: C-(a-propaganda)

As known to you (Source), TSUJI himself and I have long been in touch

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The rumor is rampant among the people, nevertheless, that he and I are cooperating closely in working out a plan for Japanese rearmament. TSUJI is a very naive person and he is greatly concerned about me. Therefore, if he hears any malicious slander concerning me, he would investigate and confirm its source and then directly accuse the person who blurted it out of his irresponsibility. The other day, when ~~SHIBURO~~ (Wideo) spoke ill of me, TSUJI went to ~~SHIBURO~~ and stormed at him. I am indeed grateful for TSUJI's devoted friendship to me. However, when TSUJI castigates other persons in the cause of friendship, the people around the person attacked misunderstand me and speak as if I am urging TSUJI to make such charges. From this they devolve acre propaganda. Therefore, some day in the not too distant future, I intend to ask TSUJI kindly for my own benefit not to operate in such a radical and heated fashion.

I was several times invited by Mr. MATSUOKA (Ichiro) to visit him, and I never him. I went to see him because he indicated that he was anxious to hear my opinions. I certainly never asked him to undertake any activities for us. When I saw him, I was impressed with his fine character. He was a very gentle and courteous man. Concerning the problem of rearmament, he regarded me, his potty junior and subordinate figure, as if I were an expert, and he showed a serious and respectful interest in my opinions from beginning to end. Although I have no idea as to how much he appreciated of my viewpoint, I am definitely looking forward to the day when Mr. MATSUOKA leads the cabinet.

Judging from the recent activities of the SHIBATA (Shibusawa) Cabinet, it does not seem that the present cabinet members are even dreaming of the possible emergence of a HATTORI Cabinet. The present cabinet appears to be making every attempt to hold down the influence of the powerful HATTORI clique.

With the replacement of General MacArthur and the return to America of General Willoughby, the attitude of the U.S. military authorities towards the Japanese Government has relaxed to a certain extent. At the same time, however, the forces of retribution against us appears merely to have become stronger. I feel that even the existing YOSHIDA Cabinet is attempting to get rid of us. (In that connection,) my acceptance of the invitation of SATOUEI Ichiro is said to be causing much uneasiness.

As I stated above, I am at present in a tough spot. Some people urge me to take resolute and vigorous counter-measures toward the malicious propaganda and slander (I recollect one.) Other people say that T.S.D.J.'s close connection personally to me is not doing my reputation any good, and that, were we again to say further accusations with him, I do not have the slightest intention of having to make any corrections.

any public counter-measures, it would only boomerang. My enemies who are blinded with self-interest and avarice would certainly twist and make ill use of my excuses and would merely fire back another blast of slander.

I have no desire at all to see old soldiers quarrel and split up on such a picayune matter. However much I may be rebuked and slandered, I should like to keep silent and non-resistant and to bear it. Reflecting back upon my past actions, I have done nothing of which I should be ashamed, though there are some who are casting slurs at me. That is all that consoles and relieves my mind. Nor do I intend nor even dream of breaking up with TSUJI.

10. In my judgment, there seem to be two different groups of former soldiers who are now concerned with rearmament and which are also entertaining animosity towards me. One of these groups is headed by former Lt. General IWAKURO (Mideo) and the other is a group primarily formed and directed by Lt. General TANIDA Isamu. 田中 伊作

- a. Mr. IWAKURO seems to be operating on an extremely large scale in political, economic, and news publication circles. He also appears to be making a plan for the creation of a new political party. The central power of this new group will probably be reinforced by the group of ~~YOSHIO~~ Gushiro (吉代 久志) and others who are right-wing leaders of the Socialists, ~~SHIBATA~~ Keisai (柴田 喜斎), former Finance Minister and present president of the Japan Steel Works Inc. (NITTEISU). Mr. IWAKURO seems to be utilizing the argument for rearmament just as a tool for political purposes. In his group, there appears to be no one who is seriously planning the mechanics of rearmament. The principal military men of IWAKURO's group are ~~YOSHIO~~ Yoshio (吉代 由一), a former colonel, a certain ~~YOSHIO~~ TATE (田代 由一), ~~NAKAYAMA~~ Juichi (小林 九一), a former lieutenant colonel, ~~NAKAMURA~~ TANAKA Masanori (中村 田中 駿郎), a former lieutenant colonel, and a few others. These persons are by no means acting in a staff officer capacity to Mr. IWAKURO; to Mr. IWAKURO, who is so gifted with abundant talents, advisors, staff officers, and aide-de-camp are not necessary for consultation. All these persons, therefore, are operating at the crack of his orders and under his dictatorship. For this reason, very few mature and experienced persons come under IWAKURO; in the ranks of those who are gathered together around IWAKURO, an extremely large number are not yet forty years of age.
- b. Lt. General TANIDA is considerably trusted by Prime Minister TOEWIDA. TANIDA claims that he is formulating a plan for rearmament in cooperation with Lt. General TSUBET Eiichi (土井 延一). However, in reality there seems to be no relationship nor cooperation between the two. It is reported, nevertheless, that many persons who do not know the truth and who believe in Lt. General TANIDA's statement are to rally about him.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-14-5 (Encl.)	SOURCE ZJL-699	DATE OF DOCUMENT 24 Aug 1951	ANALYST C
SUBJECT Rearmament - UGAKI Kazushige's Followers and Opponents			DATE 1 Feb 1954
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: C		Evaluation: C-5	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<u>Report B</u>			
5. The ex-SAKURA KAI members who currently compose the anti-UGAKI faction are: Former Colonel <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST	
27 In 28554	8 Sept 1951	27	
SUBJECT Trace on DOI Akio and FUSE Katsuji			DATE 1 Feb 1954

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THE FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASED

1. DOI Akio was reported to have worked with the Third Section, Chinese Nationalist National Defense Board after the war and was replaced by TSUJI Masanobu....

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL-713 Local File No: PD-268
 No. of Pages: 9 No. of Enclosures: 0
 Report Made By: Approved By:
 Distribution:
 By copy to: Wash Fax — 2 Orally to:
 — 1 10 Sept 51
 Files — 3

Source Cryptonym: References: ZJL-689; 685; PD-226.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. In between the receipt of the 10 August report and that of the 25 August report, a rather snide note (which was returned by courier, sealed) was sent to on the subject of the 10 August report concerning TSUJI's remarks and the report used for ZJL-689 concerning HATTORI Takushiro's remarks. The note paralleled the attitude expressed in PD-226 by concerning what to do about
2. Apparently the rasp contained in that note had some effect, because — promptly compiled the 25 August report which contains the real meat of this report, and has not stopped yet. His subsequent reports have not been processed fully as yet, but are uniformly good in quality and detail. Even this report, though it gives us details on TSUJI's tribulations rather than his activities, concerning which we get mainly hints, certainly gives us a close-up of TSUJI. Furthermore, it is followed up by another recent report which gives more details on the items discussed in paras. 4p and in 6 of this report and on SATO Katsuro's alleged "mis-use" of TSUJI.
3. Re para. 3: A report of this week, not yet processed, identifies the NIPPON YUKAN SHA as a subsidiary interest of the prominent Rightist, MIURA Gichi, who is a good friend and recent collaborator of SATOMI Hajime and who is the backer of the NIPPON KOKUMIN MINSHUSHUGI DANTAI of HANADA Binji, HOMMA Kenichiro, SASAKI Takeo, OYAMA Ryoshi and others of the SHIMPEITAI Incident fame. NIPPON YUKAN SHA is one of the sources of funds for the former God's Troopers.
4. Re para. 10: This is the most clear of many references throughout the report as to TSUJI's actual picture of himself as a spiritual descendant of the Army and Navy mutineers of the pre-war "Incident" days — his firm desire, not to evade arrest or trial, but rather to use it, whether obviously guilty or obviously not (we choose the former obviously), to broadcast his political views and play the martyr. TSUJI's application of this time-honored Japanese Rightist device for gaining public sympathy is not quite so comic-operatic as it appears at first glance to the untrained Western view; in fact, we can be very grateful, as probably the prosecuting attorney was also, that his illness prevented it.

FORM NO. 51-59
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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-2- (ZJL-713: COVER LETTER; PD-268)

5. This more-or-less diary form of account on the activities of his good friends HATTORI and TSUJI has been continued by [] and will appear in later reports. Details on HATTORI's organization are now appearing.
6. In [] quaint way, he appears to be trying (a) to save his job by producing desired information on his friends (b) to vindicate or at least alleviate the suspicion concerning his friends and (c) to show that he recognizes the need his friends have for help and to heed them —simultaneously. [] KNOWS that TSUJI was guilty of violating the [] Ordinance, and no reports TSUJI as tacitly admitting it; however, [] puts up a good red-herring case for TSUJI's blunt frankness and even indicates that such was the intended basis for his defense in court. Yet [] quite definitely does NOT condone all of TSUJI's views, and quite deitly steered TSUJI away from the "martyr"-style defense of himself in court which would have been ludicrous but also effective propaganda too. We feel certain that [] is being honest at least in saying that he did not and does not want to see the "TSUJI Case" (from which he nevertheless tries to absolve TSUJI of direct blame by claiming it is TSUJI's ATO Publishing Office subordinates who are the real villains) used for political purposes, NOR does he agree with TSUJI's political views as TSUJI has himself stated them (but [] claims those views, if irresponsible, are due to bad influences around TSUJI) (in a later report there are details on this.) There is something akin to a conflict of loyalties - personal and ideological - in which the ideological wins out a bit, fortunately for us. A thorough study of this report will reveal many more interesting personal angles which we do not feel need to be pointed out to you here.

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Subject: Activities of Former Colonel Report No: ZJL-713 (PD-268)
TSUJI Masanobu

Date of Information: 3 Mar - 21 Aug 51
Background Info: As stated

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date Acquired: 10 and 25 Aug 51

Evaluation: C-2, except as stated Date of Report: 10 September 51

Source: [redacted] [redacted]

(Field Note: This report is based upon two reports received from Source. The first, received on 10 August, purported to give the main points of TSUJI Masanobu's alleged account on 25 July of his activities and attitudes (para. 4a-p below); the second, written by [redacted] in the first person, was rec'd on 25 August and consisted of a running account of daily developments in the TSUJI Case plus operational data concerning background of the case. Since the developments in the TSUJI Case are almost inseparably connected with Source's own part in it and his relations with HATTORI Takushiro and TSUJI, and since the pertinent operational details are therefore in themselves [redacted] information to us, we have preserved in the following report [redacted] own account in the first person, with a minimum of editing. Our comments appear in the cover letter.)

1. Very few persons in Japan knew of the intimate relationship between TSUJI Masanobu and myself, which began when I was an Army Engineer captain (about 1930). We seldom met in pre-war days, but we trusted and liked each other very much nevertheless. Our longtime intimacy was publicized through inclusion of brief anecdotes concerning me in TSUJI's two books, "Three Thousand Leagues (RI) of Secret Escape" and "One to Fifteen". Shortly after my return to Japan last year, an article in the left-wing magazine "SHINSO", in the August 1950 issue, I believe, stated that TSUJI and I were plotting the rearmament of Japan. That article was later reprinted in the Chinese Hongkong weekly, "Newspaperdom" (新闻天地). According to TSUJI himself, even then the Attorney General's Special Investigations Bureau had begun to investigate him, even putting a surveillance around his own house. Not wishing to be caught in the surveillance nor to draw public notice, I tried to minimize my contacts to TSUJI. From late March until 25 July 1951, I did not meet him directly anywhere. (Last sentence: C-4.)
2. The lecture that TSUJI delivered before members of the Liberalists Club (JIYUJIN KURABU) on 3 March 1951 attracted public attention in early April 1951. At that time, some of my friends told me they hoped I would caution TSUJI. Others asked me if TSUJI would be arrested or not on the charge of violating the Purge Ordinance. Although I was not fully familiar with the contents of his lecture, I personally entertained little anxiety, because TSUJI had once told me that he checked closely in advance with officials of the Special Investigations Bureau to insure approval of his actions by

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that agency. (C-3) When I heard that the Communist Party was making ill use of TSUJI's remarks, I relaxed even more, feeling certain that TSUJI, an ardent anti-Communist, could hardly say anything which would be favorable to the JCP. I concluded, therefore, that TSUJI's lecture was merely being misquoted and a grossly distorted version of it being publicized. (C-3)

3. The rumors and opinions concerning TSUJI's lecture are still rampant, and in fact, the voices in opposition to TSUJI in July 1951 seem to be stronger. In its 22 July 1951 issue, the NIPPON YUKAN (Japan Evening News) boldly attacked TSUJI's speech with a strong rebuttal against it. Until that time, I had been very reticent concerning my own attitude and non-committal concerning the comments of friends on the TSUJI question. But I began to wonder if those persons who have long held strong dislikes for TSUJI might not be working out a malicious plot against him purposely, using TSUJI's indiscreet speech as a basis.
4. (Date of Info: 25 July 1951). When I had met TSUJI in March 1951 he told me to phone him at the ATO (アト) Publishing Office if contact were desired, since he was usually there during the daytime. Therefore, on 25 July 1951, I made a phone call to that office, for the first time (last phrase: C-4), and asked if TSUJI were there. The person answering the phone demanded my name and address and then attempted to brush me off, telling me TSUJI was not there and was expected to be hospitalized for an ulcer that day. I felt certain that TSUJI was at the ATO Publishing Company office and the receptionist of the phone call did not want me to see TSUJI without knowing my connections to TSUJI. I immediately went to TSUJI's home, and his wife told me that he was at the ATO office, which I then visited for the first time (C-3). The man who answered the phone earlier, SATO Matauro (佐藤 雅郎), excused his previous lie by saying that TSUJI had just returned, even before I introduced myself. TSUJI was in a drawing room at the rear. At first glance, I could see that he was greatly debilitated and urged him to go to bed immediately. Afterwards I talked with him for about four hours as he rested. The main points of TSUJI's remarks were as follows:

(Date of Info for the following: 25 July 1951; Sub-source: TSUJI Masanobu; Evaluation: C-3)

- a. The lecture which TSUJI delivered on 3 March 1951 to the Liberalists Club seems to have aroused undue criticism from various circles and to have been misused widely as a topic for fomenting social gossip.
- b. The purpose of the lecture which he made before the Liberalists Club has been variously interpreted and misunderstood by the public. Inasmuch as he had often been requested by the club chairman to give a lecture to its members, on the condition that it would be kept off-the-record and not publicized, TSUJI finally acceded to that request. He did not volunteer to make the speech nor solicit the opportunity for any purposes. There has never been any connection between TSUJI and

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the Liberalists Club except that its chief comes from TSUJI's native country. TSUJI prepared three alternative themes or topics, leaving the final choice up to the members. Consequently, he did not actually choose the lecture topic himself. (C-4)

- c. Since he rankled at the constant close watch of the S.I.B., he usually contacted that Bureau in advance deliberately to tell them whenever he was making a trip, much less a speech. (C-4) He told the S.I.B. that he was going to make this speech too. (C-3) However, afterwards, TSUJI was approached by a man from the S.I.B. who told him that a certain ~~NAOI~~ Takeo (野井武男) had secretly informed the S.I.B. about his lecture, describing it as "outrageous" and urging the S.I.B. to definitely punish TSUJI. The S.I.B. investigator inquired and was furnished full details of the speech. After that, the investigator reassured TSUJI that if such were the contents of his lecture, there was no case to prosecute.
- d. Soon after this, the JCP and affiliated leftist organs began to draw public attention to TSUJI's speech, which was spot-quoted in pamphlets and JCP wildcat newspapers.
- e. When the Club first asked TSUJI to make the speech, he declined it because of restrictions upon him as a purgee and because he feared misinterpretation of the lecture, causing grave repercussions for the future. However, the Liberalists Club is a private group of persons who are all cultured, no one but club members could attend, and TSUJI had been promised that there would be no publicity of the speech. So he delivered it.
- f. NAOI Takeo proved to be a member of the Liberalists Club. TSUJI wrote NAOI a letter stating that he desired to take action against NAOI if the report were true that the latter had maliciously informed S.I.B. of TSUJI's lecture subject. NAOI replied that the report of his informing S.I.B. about details of the speech was completely groundless and false. Yet, TSUJI found out from S.I.B. contacts that NAOI had secretly brought them TSUJI's letter to NAOI, which the latter termed "a letter of intimidation."
- g. Unknown to TSUJI, his speech was apparently taken down in shorthand. Since the stenographic copy of his speech was later circulated among the members, it seems quite likely that some of the members are either Communists or are closely connected to the JCP, which later used excerpts of this text. (C-4; a wild counter-accusation at best.) The Liberalists Club seems to be absolving itself of blame for publicizing TSUJI's speech using the remark in the speech as an alibi: "Because what I am discussing is my own firm conviction, I would feel no shame whereever it might be presented." As a result, TSUJI was startled by the lowness of their intelligence and morality.
- h. Five months after the speech was given, TSUJI heard constantly the rumor that he will be arrested momentarily; in fact, on 24 July he was told

that the National Rural Police would arrest him the next day, but his own query of the S.I.B. and the N.R.P. as to their plans proved this false. All sorts of rumors have been spreading concerning TSUJI's activities and ideas which annoyed him very much: rumors that he was engaged in secret political activities and building up an ultra-nationalist or Rightist group, or most typically, that he was planning formation of a nation-wide Armed Action Unit or other operations preparatory to rearmament. At first TSUJI worried about these, fearful that persons ignorant of the true circumstances would misjudge him, but the situation had developed so badly to date that he was in a despairing mood, even unwilling to defend or explain himself. As a result, he would welcome arrest by the police or other (GHQ) authorities and a conclusive interrogation so that the true facts might come to light and people could judge him by the facts and not by gossip. TSUJI's opinions are based, he states, upon the Japanese Constitution and General of the Army MacArthur's encouragement of Japan to become the "Switzerland of Asia." Since TSUJI was acting for no ulterior political purpose (C-4), a fair investigation would reveal his innocence. Also, because of a suspected ulcer of the stomach, he would welcome arrest as affording a bit of peace and quiet while awaiting trial. However, since S.I.B. stated it was not going to arrest him, TSUJI planned to consult in a few days with a noted doctor on the Izu Peninsula and undergo a dietary cure, both recommended to him by former Maj. Gen. MIYOSHI Yasuyuki (三好泰之). (C-2)

- j. TSUJI had already been asked for interviews by Mr. Joseph FROMM, American representative of U.S. News and World Report, Mr. Robert MARTIN, "ONA" (sic) special correspondent, and representatives of Canadian and Australian newspapers. With the permission of S.I.B., TSUJI aired his views and defense arguments to them. (C-2) The reporters all listened attentively and unanimously expressed their appreciation of his frankness, indicating to TSUJI that it was the first time they had heard such opinions (C-4) and that many Japanese might very naturally feel similarly but not be truthful in stating their views. (C-2) TSUJI felt that they might have been flattering him to some extent but that they genuinely appreciated his blunt truthfulness more than his own countrymen. The Canadian newspaperman happened to be a War Crimes Investigator who had worked on apprehension of TSUJI in 1945, but even he was impressed. (Cf. Cover letter)
- k. TSUJI wants to clear up the case of his Liberalists Club speech and to vindicate himself and to obtain the opportunity to voice his opinions officially as well. Therefore he will never avoid arrest. (C-2)
- l. Concerning SUGII Mitsuru, TSUJI did not even faintly recall such a person, though admitting that he might have met him a few times since they were both in the Burma Area during the war, but denied any current connection to him. Any rumor that TSUJI is using SUGII as an operative would be the result of false boasting on SUGII's part.
- m. When TSUJI heard in mid-July that Lt. General IWAKURO Hideo had reproached HATTORI Takushiro and TSUJI, he visited IWAKURO to scold him about this.

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IWAKURO looked most embarrassed but stated that he had never spoken anything but good of TSUJI to other people, which TSUJI did not believe. (C-2) TSUJI felt it disgraceful that former superiors and senior officers should make irresponsible derogatory remarks about their one-time subordinates; it was most ungentlemanly and unmilitary to defame a person without saying a word directly to the man himself. A similar case occurred recently when ailing General OKAMURA Yasutsugu (or Naiji), former Commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Army, warned the police that Lt. Colonel ASAGI (阿佐木) should be investigated as a Communist. ASAGI was a staff lieutenant colonel, and TSUJI's subordinate. Since he was greatly concerned with Russia, he was probably doing research on Russia or might have discussed Russia, and a portion of his discussion may have praised certain points about Russia. That does not make him a Communist. TSUJI visited OKAMURA and upbraided him for his accusation, asking for evidence, of which OKAMURA gave none but rumor. (C-4)

- n. TSUJI has no knowledge of HATTORI Takushiro's rearmament plans, which has nothing to do with TSUJI's work. (C-4). Despite a longtime intimate personal relationship, HATTORI and TSUJI are separate in their work, and unless HATTORI explained about his work or asked TSUJI's opinion on something, the latter would not inquire about it. Therefore, it is quite possible that TSUJI might be opposed to details of HATTORI's rearmament plans. (C-4, entire para.)
- o. TSUJI does not feel that either the present Police Reserve nor any other rearmament plan to date is sufficient to defend Japan. He feels that the revival of the ideals and guiding principles of the Japanese Army is the main problem. Only when dire need for defense of the fatherland by the Japanese themselves, in the form of a Russian invasion or a JCP revolution, will true patriots gather and full rearmament might be affected. (C-4) The revival of a military organization would be a waste unless there is actually danger to Japan herself. Yet reliance upon the National Police Reserve would be foolish. Rearmament can only be seriously considered in the imminence of an enemy.
- p. Under present circumstances, the ~~East Asia League~~ (TOA REMKEI) of General ISHIHARA should be revived and reorientated. It should not be left as it is now. The Japanese must make a detailed and serious review of Asianism as it is advocated by the various present Asiatic countries and then establish a union and policy common and acceptable to all of the countries concerned. The reason why ISHIHARA's East Asia League was not acceptable to the other countries of Asia was that he advocated it from the standpoint that Japan, as a nation superior to the others in Asia, should be the leader of Asia. (End of account with TSUJI as Sub-source.)
- 5. As TSUJI and I were talking, a Metropolitan Policeman came to the bedroom and asked for an interview with TSUJI. After a few words, the policeman left, taking with him several books from the ATO Publishing Office output. The policeman's visit seemed to be merely to confirm whether TSUJI were at home or not.

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6. A man whom I thought I recognized in the ATO Office was described by TSUJI as TANABE Shinshi (or Arayuki: 田中 春之). TANABE is in charge of editing the ATO Monthly Report (ATO SHOBO GEPPO). TSUJI gave no further explanation concerning this publication, but it seems that this monthly report is put out by SATO Katsujiro and TANABE to publicize TSUJI and increase his following. The articles in it are written anonymously and propagandize and play up TSUJI's books and political articles and opinions. These are hardly the functions of a normal book store running a small publishing office on the side, and it seems obvious that the ATO SHOBO (Publishing Office) is involved in some kind of political operation or activity, using TSUJI's relationship to it to gain popular support. TSUJI's connection to it needs further scrutiny. (C-opinion)
7. (Date of Info: 27 July 1951). TSUJI went to the hospital on the Isu Peninsula specializing in a dietary cure which had been recommended by (General) MIYOSHI Yasuyuki. It did not seem to be a very modern medical treatment, but what could one expect from MIYOSHI? (NOTE: We admit that this last remark is "out of place" here, but it does show Source's consistency in applying personal prejudices any way he possibly can.)
8. (Date of Info: 28 July 1951). I called on SATO Katsujiro at the ATO SHOBO (Publishing Office) in the afternoon and asked about his relationship with TSUJI in the course of talk. It was as follows: (Following, Sub-source:
[] Evaluation: F-3)
 - a. In 1934, when SATO was attending Army Officers School, TSUJI was his instructor and company commander. SATO's name appears in records of the so-called "October Incident," as "Cadet-Officer SATO". A group of those officers who later provoked the February 26 Incident in 1936 were working upon the Army Officers' School cadets already in 1934, in order to recruit fellow-conspirators. SATO was one of those approached. After many contacts and agreements with these officers, SATO came to perceive that they were plotting a conspiracy for armed revolution and to get the cadets involved in its execution. He then tried to warn his fellow-students not to participate in such a campaign, but did not succeed. Firm in his ideas, SATO related the whole affair to TSUJI, who immediately took counter-measures which resulted in a major re-shuffle of Army School personnel. However, SATO finally was subjected to dismissal from Cadet School himself. He joined the Manchurian Army later, and became an officer. SATO began the publishing business at ATO in 1950, and at first received considerable aid from TSUJI.
9. (Date of Info: 2 August 1951). The ASAHI Shimbun (Newspaper) reported that the S.I.B. had indicted TSUJI on the charge of violating the Purge Ordinance, TSUJI had returned to Tokyo on this very day. Reading about the indictment, I contacted a friend of mine, YOSHIE Chiyo (shi), a lawyer, and requested him to prepare the brief for defense of TSUJI in the indictment in case TSUJI would agree to retain him. YOSHIE agreed. YOSHIE Chiyo(shi) (吉江千代) stated that TSUJI's case was supposed to be handled only by the Special Surveillance Section of the Tokyo District Attorney General's office.

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Moreover, it was originally planned that the case should be handled as a closely-guarded secret session. However, since the ASAHI News had scooped the case, the authorities were in a quandary as to what to do. (Sub-source: YOSHIE; Evaluation: F-3). YOSHIE was formerly a criminal prosecutor who was sent to Shanghai in about 1940 by the pre-war Justice Ministry. My association with him started at that time. I could see that he was a man of fine intellect and character. After 1942, he served at the Tokyo Court of Appeals as prosecuting attorney for ideological cases. Our friendship grew very strong. In 1944, he was appointed the Chief Public Procurator of the Aomori District Court, and later transferred to Maebashi District Court in the same capacity. Purged after the war, he set himself up in private law. He belongs to the Tokyo Dai Ichi Lawyers Association (TOKYO DAI ICHI BENGOISHI KAI). His address is #703, 2-chome, Denenchofu Machi, Tamagawa, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, phone number 02-3537.

10. (Date of Info: 3 August 1951). Early in the morning I called on TSUJI and urged him to hire a lawyer, but TSUJI appeared determined to fight the case all by himself. I advocated Mr. YOSHIE and tried to make TSUJI see common sense; TSUJI seemed more interested in Mr. YOSHIE's background than in hiring him as a lawyer. He stated he would visit the highly-recommended YOSHIE that afternoon. I advised YOSHIE of TSUJI's plans. In the evening I again visited TSUJI at his home to hear the outcome. TSUJI's statements to me were as follows: (Sub-source for the following (a & b): TSUJI Masanobu; Evaluation: C-3)
 - a. TSUJI was not particularly desirous of being sentenced guilty, but neither had he been too anxious to claim his innocence. His chief desire had been to appear in court as soon as possible, namely, prior to opening of the peace treaty conference in early September, in order to give forth with his beliefs and opinions in full. (C-2) TSUJI felt that his bold statements in court would be of great help to deepening public attention and consideration to the articles of the peace treaty, and that he could make at least that meager contribution to the Japanese people. For that purpose, he could see no point in getting a lawyer to help him. (C-2)
 - b. Until he had met Mr. YOSHIE, he had not any intention of asking for help in his defense, but merely wanted to know the man. TSUJI felt that YOSHIE was as great and fine a man as I had said, and was grateful for the recommendation. TSUJI had entrusted his defense to Mr. YOSHIE and asked him for the quickest possible opening of a trial.
11. (Date of Info: 4 August 1951). TSUJI met YOSHIE again and signed the documents making YOSHIE his attorney in the case. I asked YOSHIE privately for his version of the talk with TSUJI. YOSHIE indicated that he was basically opposed to defending individuals who are not resolutely determined to and prepared to defend their own innocence from the beginning but who have ulterior motives; nevertheless, he added, since he liked TSUJI's determination to face this charge and felt friendly toward TSUJI, he accepted the case. He planned to defend TSUJI by basing his plan upon the fundamental ideas advocated by TSUJI and proving the innocence of the ideas themselves. (C-2)

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12. (Date of Info: 7 August 1951). I went to the ATO Publishing Office in the evening and met with SATO Katsuro. TSUJI had told him that he was very grateful to me, and had also told him that I had secured YOSHIE's help for him and was handling the defense fee and bonus fee payments to that SATO should keep out of that entire affair. TSUJI had met with Mr. Joseph FROMM on 6 August at the Tokyo Correspondents Club. TSUJI was expected to have an examination that evening by a medical specialist at his own residence. TSUJI had been quite adamant in refusing medical treatment earlier, but SATO had arranged for a doctor to go there and examine him by force if necessary. SATO had had a sub-poena from the S.I.B. and had been interrogated as a witness in the TSUJI Case. (Sub-source for para. 12: Evaluation: F-3)
13. (Date of Info: 8 August 1951). I called on TSUJI and SATO at the ATO Publishing Office in the afternoon. When SATO had reported to the S.I.B. at 10:00 that morning, the prosecuting attorney for TSUJI's case, Mr. SAKUMA, had asked him about TSUJI's physical condition, which SATO described in detail as very grave. The prosecutor had then stated that no matter how anxious TSUJI might be to get the case straightened out, it would be absolutely out of the question for the prosecutor to deal with a sick person. He therefore asked SATO to advise TSUJI that the questioning would be postponed until TSUJI was completely recovered. TSUJI was then receiving treatment at the Tokyo Red Cross Hospital (SEKI JUJI BYOIN), where SATO informed him of this. Already the press was on to the news of TSUJI's hospitalization—a Mainichi Shimbun reporter there mistook SATO for TSUJI and was given the brush-off by the former without ever recognizing TSUJI right there. SATO was again interrogated by the prosecutor's office that afternoon. (Sub-source: SATO Katsuro; Evaluation: F-2). (Sub-source for the following: TSUJI Masanobu; Evaluation: C-3) The diagnosis of the highly suspected case of ulcers revealed not only ulcers but also cancer of the stomach and on 9 August TSUJI was to be operated upon at the Red Cross Hospital. HATTORI wished to let me know that he was very grateful to me; (TSUJI did not state "why") TSUJI had met Joseph FROMM on the afternoon of 6 August. FROMM, scheduled to return to America shortly, had asked TSUJI to put his views on current affairs in writing, which TSUJI anxiously had completed before his operation, not knowing the outcome. The views were written on 150 pages, had been translated into English, and were given to FROMM on 6 August under the title of "Message to Those of the Ages of Twelve to Forty-Five" (the number "45" may be an error). FROMM was quite worried about the recent indictment case against TSUJI and offered to appear in court himself as a witness for TSUJI's defense. TSUJI merely answered that he would have to visit him the next time in jail and refused FROMM's offer with gratitude. FROMM again offered to help in any event in any way possible. A Canadian newsman was present during all of that interview.
14. (Date of Info: 9 August 1951). TSUJI was sent to the Japan Red Cross Hospital for his series of operations. SATO was again interrogated by the public prosecutor, SAKUMA, concerning his relations with TSUJI.

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15. (Date of Info: 11 August 1951). TSUJI had his entire stomach removed. HATTORI asked me to have a talk with him on 13 August concerning the case and other matters.
16. (Date of Info: 12 August 1951). TSUJI had his appendix and his caecum removed in a double operation.
17. (Date of Info: 13 August 1951). I met with HATTORI Takushiro at his home. We discussed the TSUJI Case and then talked about his rearmament operations for about four hours.
18. (Date of Info: 15 August 1951). I visited the lawyer, YOSHIE, and presented him with \$30,000 which I furnished him for case expenses. YOSHIE did not want to accept the money but finally did so at my persuasion.
19. (Date of Info: 21 August 1951). TSUJI wanted to see me, and I visited him in his room at the hospital for the first time since he had been entered. He was very weak, though protesting his good health, and could eat nothing and had to be fed intravenously. The doctor stated that it may be a full year before they find out for certain if TSUJI will recover or not. TSUJI requested me to make arrangements for a place for him to stay at ATAMI at a rest hotel beginning a week from that date.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
13 -5-6-1	ZBRW-475	13 Sept 1951	<input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT			DATE
SUGII, mitsuru, (aka OKA, Minami)			27 Jan 54

PERTINENT INFORMATION.

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM

2. There is a strong probability that there were fairly close relations between SUGII and Colonel TSUJI Masanobu during World War II. (F-3) TSUJI, who was prominently identified with Japanese intelligence throughout the war and had a pre-war background in the JIS, is known to have had fairly close relationship with the Suzuki Kikan, to which SUGII was attached in a civilian capacity. SUGII and TSUJI were acquainted at least as early as the Suzuki Kikan began operations in Burma.

4. When SUGII returned to Japan, he was accompanied by Thakin CHIT TIN, who purportedly is/was director of the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce and Industry (sic). CHIT TIN is reported to hold strongly to the well-worn motto chanted by the Japanese apologists for a Greater Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere - "Asia for the Asiatics," and is strongly opposed to both the western concept of democracy and the Soviet concept of Communism. This happens to be the theme which TSUJI still strongly adhere to in various articles which have appeared in semi-underground publications recently in Japan, and presumably is the view shared by SUGII.

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	SECRET	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		
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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(38)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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-2-

6. It must be assumed, in view of the known relationship between SUGII and TSUJI, that SUGII did not fail to contact TSUJI prior to his departure for Rangoon to inquire if the latter had any particular desires or possible instructions concerning the trip. A possible substantiation of this feeling arises from indications in the referenced report of SUGII's "hand on the pulse of Burmese politics" while in Rangoon, and the possible impropriety of SUGII's actions and activities when considered solely from a business sense, which resulted in the return to Japan with him of Thakin CHIT TIN-- a known political malcontent who apparently still harbors strong pro-Japanese feelings.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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20 Sept 51

From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL-724 Local File No: _____
No. of Pages: 7 No. of Enclosures: _____
Report Made By: Approved By:
Distribution: By copy to: Wash - 2 Orally to:
[] - 1 [] - 3
Files - 3
Source Cryptonym: References: ZJL-689; ZJL-713

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. Ordinarily, the material in ZJL-724-A concerning MATSUI Tadao would be considered "source information." However, in a broad but thoroughly sensible interpretation, we feel that this addition to the cast of characters in the TSUJI-HATTORI complex as well as the type of information herein contained is personality intelligence under circumstances already outlined. Please note that MATSUI is apparently not without some intelligence experience in the past, and that his probable involvement in HATTORI's rearmament lobby plans is again contemplated by the latter. (Cf. ZJL-689 for details of HATTORI's views on that; a later report will give more concrete and accurate data on HATTORI, his plans, and his group by [].) Again, (cf. para 4) it is obvious that HATTORI's mission from ~~the~~ ~~to~~ plan organization of a para-military Police Reserve was hardly kept secret; MATSUI and Source are now also indicated as definite confidants to the projected plan, as well as TSUJI.
2. Re ZJL-724-B, the most interesting points are as follows: (a) TSUJI's amazing financial ventures and apparent access to large sums of money, considered far greater than profits from his books would provide; (b) the unmistakable impression, from the wording of the original Japanese text of the report, that [] deliberately put MATSUI up to asking many of the questions herein answered in order to obtain desired information concerning TSUJI and the ATO Publishing Office on our behalf; (c) Source's continuing desire and attempt to place the blame for TSUJI's recent irresponsible actions upon bad influences close to him, principally SATO and the ATO Publishing Office crowd, but Source's reluctant admission that TSUJI's connection to the ATO Publishing Office to political maneuvering and operations, and to the radically Pan-Asian views expounded by that group (and recently by TSUJI) is more definite than TSUJI admits; (d) [] definite attempts, both by his own efforts and by importation and clever use of MATSUI, to get TSUJI out of politics and to undercut the influence of TSUJI's ATO

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FORM NO. 51-50
FEB 1948

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
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(2)(C) Foreign Relations

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friends by isolating him from them--the long lectures and exhortations delivered to a man in TSUJI's condition and the rush to get him out of the hospital hardly leave us with the impression that TSUJI's personal comfort is the only objective of this.

3. It may well be that this lengthy close-up portrayal of the quixotic TSUJI Masanobu will be considered a waste of time and effort by some officers. However, Peabody firmly believes that this almost tragi-comic figure will be just as important to reviving Japanese racialist Nationalism dead as alive: to wit, he will become the martyr if he dies, which is probable; if he lives, he will be a hero who suffered through both physical torment and political persecution to fight back. The situation has all the potential elements of a hammy political melodrama in the best Japanese Rightist tradition. Therefore, for the future, this present close insight into the man and his associates could be very worthwhile, we feel.
4. A forthcoming report gives further data on TSUJI's Pan-Asian associates and projects. In this later report, [] re-emphasizes clearly that he does not believe TSUJI's assertions of lack of connection to the ATO Publishing Office group and to underground Pan-Asian political circles.
5. Re ZJL-724-B, para. 12: It is interesting to note that TSUJI went home 7 September and was receiving callers, in view of a report from [] on 11 September that contacts by SATOMI Hajime and TSUGANO [] to TSUJI were planned on 7 September for the following week. [] was amazingly enough not aware of TSUJI's hospitalization, despite its write-ups in local newspapers.

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Subject: Information on TSUJI Masanobu, Report No: ZJL-724-A (FD-284)
Friend, MATSUI Tadao Date of Information: Up to 23 Aug 1951
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date Acquired: 8 September 1951
Evaluation: C-2 Date of Report: 20 September 1951
Source: []

1. On 20 August 1951, MATSUI Tadao (松井忠雄) came up to Tokyo from his home at Nara to visit TSUJI Masanobu at the hospital. MATSUI stayed until the morning of 23 August, when he returned home. During this period, MATSUI had talks every day with TSUJI at the hospital, giving him advice and asking him to reflect upon the future.

2. MATSUI's Relation to TSUJI Masanobu and to Source.

- a. MATSUI entered Army Officers' School one class ahead of Source and two classes ahead of TSUJI; he was initially a classmate of HATTORI Takushiro. However, illness caused him to lose a year, so he graduated with the 35th Class (Source's class). He has always been a very studious person, gifted with sharp critical sense even in student days. He often aired extremely scathing opinions opposed to training methods and educational system of the various Army schools. Extra-curricularly, he studied all things in his spare time he believed to be essential for the preparation of an officer. He mastered German, and has done considerable research on the technique, training, and tactics of artillery in warfare and on military history written in German textbooks. He often devoted more time to his own study than attention to the Army examinations; for this reason, he failed to enter Army Staff College, which was based upon competitive examination.
- b. Around 1927, TSUJI was a student of Army Staff College, and was assigned to the 4th Field Artillery Regiment for practical study of artillery tactics. MATSUI had been attached to that unit, and the two came into contact and became fast friends. TSUJI greatly admired MATSUI's personality and profound knowledge of military affairs; after graduation from Army Staff College, TSUJI was promptly promoted, all through his career, to ranks which were higher than MATSUI's, but he has always retained that attitude of a "disciple" towards MATSUI.
- c. Source had never met MATSUI until about January 1933, even though they were known to each other at IAOCC as classmates. In December 1932, they lived next door to each other in an apartment house at

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Osaka, and their contact and mutual respect for each other's capabilities resulted. MATSUI aided unofficially in certain Kempai projects of Source's while at Osaka. Later, in 1939, the Japanese Defense Department of the War Office was attempting to establish a clandestine counter-espionage organization in Shanghai. They sought Source's opinion as to the appropriateness of the project and the possibilities for Kempai cooperation with the new organ. Source approved of the idea, and vouched for Kempai TOKKO (Special Operations; especially the "Thought Investigations" Section) collaboration to the fullest. At the same time, Source suggested that since cooperation depended upon the Kempai TOKKO Chief and the chief of the new counter-espionage unit, appointment of MATSUI to be chief of the new organization would facilitate future cooperation. After a prompt review of MATSUI's ability and record, the War Office approved his appointment. He had been a commander of a mountain artillery battalion in the Hangchow area northwest of Shanghai, but became chief of this new "TOKKU KIKAN", which was set up for security reasons in a small section of the Kempai Detachment compound at Shanghai, and of which Source was assigned temporary additional duty as a member. Friendly relations and cooperation between them continued from that time.

3. TSUJI had notified MATSUI by letter early in August of his indictment case. Source later notified MATSUI of TSUJI's physical condition and hospitalization. MATSUI lost no time in coming up to Tokyo.
4. About August 1950, TSUJI told HATTORI Takemiro that it would be necessary for the latter to get cooperation of other field grade officers in order to effect rearmament properly. He called MATSUI to Tokyo, introduced him to HATTORI, and recommended him for HATTORI's assistant, even though he himself did not give direct support to HATTORI's program. MATSUI also declined to enter HATTORI's group, despite high esteem for HATTORI personally, because his opinions were widely divergent with those of HATTORI's group on various matters at the time. MATSUI felt that his opinions would be unwelcome in that group and that cooperation with HATTORI's group against his own better judgment would be futile. He believed that no effective rearmament would be possible in view of the situation of Japanese society in 1950, nor indeed in view of that in the world at large. He wrote for HATTORI an exposition of his views, with historical references to the rearmament of various countries in the past and to armament races, and warned HATTORI and the latter's group against taking an optimistic view of rearmament by means of establishment of a National Police Reserve. HATTORI viewed the ultimate consequences of a "Police Reserve" type of step towards rearmament as of little importance; he was just determined to exert himself to the best of his ability in utilizing any chance provided in order to effect rearmament. Source, in complete agreement with HATTORI, promised to cooperate in every way possible. The issue, of course, never came up, because it was later decided that former regular field officers would be banned from the Police Reserve, and in September 1950, Source severed his contact on that problem with HATTORI. However, at HATTORI's request, Source

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paid a call upon TSUJI together with MATSUI on 22 August 1945. The three discussed a wide variety of topics for several hours. The following day, MATSUI inquired after TSUJI at the hospital, and visited the latter's bedside. He was deeply impressed by TSUJI's superb reasoning and ideas, and he reportedly told TSUJI that his assistance in his (MATSUI's) rearmament program in the future would be essential.

5. MATSUI is now living at Nara City, c/o (Mr.) KIMURA (fam), #16, Ryogoku. He does not apparently have any fixed employment, but is officially absorbed in a study of military science and tactics.

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Subject: MATSUI Tadao's Advice to
TSUJI Masanobu and Related
Information on TSUJI Report No: ZJL-724-3 (FD-207)
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date of Information: Up to 7 Sept 1951
Evaluation: C-2 Date Acquired: 8 September 1951
Source: C Date of Report: 20 September 1951

1. On 20 August 1951, MATSUI Tadao came up to Tokyo from his home at Nara in order to visit TSUJI Masanobu at the Tokyo Red Cross Hospital. He stayed until the morning of 23 August, and during this time, had talks every day with TSUJI, which included considerable advice as to TSUJI's future.
2. MATSUI urged TSUJI, after discovering some of the background of the situation from Source and from TSUJI's wife, to clarify his relationship with the ATO SHOBO (ATO Publishing Office), to sever the relationship between himself and the publishing company which had existed until now, and if possible to dissolve the entire ATO Publishing Company and store. TSUJI maintained, in explaining the situation to MATSUI, that the ATO SHOBO had been founded not by himself but by SATO Katsuro (佐藤勝郎), without any exhortation on TSUJI's part to SATO to do so. SATO Katsuro had initially made a request, in 1950, for investment by TSUJI in the foundation fund for the company. This request from his former subordinate TSUJI did not dare to turn down. Consequently, TSUJI informed MATSUI and Source, he loaned SATO 5100,000 on the condition that it would be promptly returned as soon as profits were shown. TSUJI stated that since his life at home was interrupted by large numbers of callers every day, he was finally put in a state of complete fatigue from receiving guests all day long. Therefore, he thought it would be a convenient alternative to occupy the room next to the main office of the ATO SHOBO staff during the daytime and avoid going home until evening. This routine brought him into daily contact with SATO. (Evaluation for TSUJI's remarks: C-4; Source shares in that evaluation.) In response to SATO Katsuro's repeated requests, TSUJI decided to publish his two books from the ATO SHOBO, which left the general impression with the public that the ATO SHOBO was operated by TSUJI. Mrs. TSUJI told MATSUI that SATO has earned a considerable amount of profits from publication of TSUJI's books, and has built a new house from his earnings, but has not yet repaid the initial 5100,000. TSUJI still is very friendly with SATO, but Mrs. TSUJI's attitude towards SATO has rapidly deteriorated into complete enmity.

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3. The ATO SHOBO has been planning to publish a magazine called ATO GEMPO (The ATO Monthly), and has put out a trial issue. (Source claims he has nothing to do with this magazine himself. (Source's evaluation also C-4.) However, MATSUI nevertheless blamed TSUJI for the latter's passive attitude, and demanded that TSUJI should order suspension of the publication, for which TSUJI's protege, SATO Katsuro, was responsible. MATSUI demanded that TSUJI either ban the publication of the ATO Monthly immediately or drastically revise the contents of its articles. MATSUI's charges were focussed upon the following points:

- a. Since each article is run anonymously, without by-lines, the publication is a most irresponsible one, with considerable suspicion of its legality.
 - b. Vast spaces are devoted to letters from readers which have congratulations or kind praises for TSUJI's efforts and publications.
- MATSUI insisted that at a time when the general impression is that TSUJI is the man actually operating the ATO Monthly, such points will only deepen that belief. It is quite likely that people will merely consider that the articles of the Monthly have either been written or editorially advocated by TSUJI. They will further surmise that TSUJI has embarked upon political operations with the ATO Monthly as his organ. Particularly, with that impression existent, the articles and letters from readers appearing in the Monthly are not only foolish, but are harmful to the dignity and intelligent personality of TSUJI as well.
4. TSUJI spoke not one word to refute MATSUI's warnings and apparently accepted them. He passed on this warning immediately to SATO Katsuro on the spot.
 5. (Sub-source: Mrs. TSUJI to MATSUI Tadao; Evaluation: F-3) SATO's main accomplishment and method of business is to cater exclusively to TSUJI and win TSUJI's favor. SATO has, in the past year, attempted to monopolise TSUJI for his own business interests and he has tried to prevent TSUJI's intimate friends and even the latter's family from close approach to TSUJI. He has also filled TSUJI's untrained political mind with the dangerous ideas which TSUJI has come to expound publicly. Since they are both Pan-Asian ideologists, and since TSUJI is a good-natured man, he cannot see SATO's ulterior motives but rather estimates SATO highly and defends him strongly. Nevertheless, it is widely rumored that SATO is a Communist or at least a Communist sympathizer; the current indictment case came up entirely because of the radical views which SATO encouraged in TSUJI. For these and even more personal reasons, the TSUJI family hates SATO intensely. SATO is contemplating the publication of "A History of the Malay War" written by TSUJI. TSUJI's family opposes this idea too in the midst of all the present political squabble, and they feel that further association of TSUJI with SATO Katsuro, against whom they are now already very antagonistic, will only lead to TSUJI's and their complete downfall.

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6. MATSUI did not bear out Mrs. TSUJI's comments on SATO's political inclinations, nor was he familiar with the "History of the Malayan War". However, he strongly opposed publication of that book or any book by TSUJI at the present, which he felt would only add more strength and speculation to the dangerous situation at present regarding TSUJI. He therefore used these arguments also in demanding that TSUJI break up the ATO SHOBO immediately.
7. TSUJI, on the other hand, claimed that he could understand MATSUI's viewpoint very well, but denied that he had any intention of publishing the "Malay War History", no matter how often SATO might request him to print it. (Sub-source: TSUJI; Evaluation: C-4) The ATO SHOBO is now in such a difficult situation as a result of the indictment case, however, that its eventual dissolution is inevitable anyway. TSUJI's idea is to break it up at the end of this year completely; (C-4) but in order to insure a livelihood for present employees of the ATO SHOBO after its dissolution, TSUJI is planning to sell approximately 10,000 copies of his books returned from book stores which are now piled up in storage at the ATO offices. In principle, TSUJI therefore agreed to MATSUI's suggestion concerning ATO SHOBO.
8. Afterwards, TSUJI explained to SATO what he intended to do. SATO declared that even if it should be necessary to break with TSUJI in the future, and even if the ATO SHOBO is in very difficult circumstances, he would try to work out some means of continuing it without depending upon TSUJI for aid.
9. MATSUI feared that his friend TSUJI might very possibly die soon as a result of his various ailments. Therefore, in view of TSUJI's extensive financial commitments, he questioned TSUJI closely concerning the financial condition of the TSUJI family. TSUJI's reply to him was as follows: (Evaluation: C-3)
 - a. In addition to his own family, TSUJI is supporting temporarily the surviving members of the families of at least ten friends or former subordinates, either partially or in full. In the cases of five other families of deceased subordinates, he plans permanent support. He claimed that since money for expenses of these families has already been saved and put aside, it is no matter for concern.
 - b. He has loaned a total of approximately £140,000 to other individuals since 1950. However, since the income and living conditions of these individuals is quite unstable, early repayment of these loans cannot be and is not expected.
 - c. Since TSUJI has already deposited approximately £240,000 to £250,000 in the bank as a budget for this year, expenses for his recent operations and for medical treatment will be withdrawn from those funds.
 - d. Living expenses needed for his family are about £25,000 per month. He has saved enough money already to cover expenses for about three months.

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- e. He intends to have his eldest son, Toru, emigrate to Argentina next year. His travel expenses would be defrayed by sale of TSUJI's present residence. Should TSUJI ever be hard pressed for money in the coming year, he will abandon the plan for his son's trip to Argentina and sell his house for living expenses.
10. MATSUI urged TSUJI strongly to leave Toru's emigration to Argentina till some later date and to bother himself less about trivial matters of society about him or with support of other individuals. He asked TSUJI to devote his entire strength to recuperation for at least a year and to abandon all other projects, living as secluded a life as possible, preferably in the mountains. TSUJI promised to do so.
11. When MATSUI left Tokyo, he observed to Source that it was quite unusual that TSUJI had accepted his advice completely this time. However, he indicated that in his opinion, TSUJI was a good-natured, rather easily influenced person whose decision is apt to change very easily and quickly, and he was quite worried that TSUJI would soon forget his promises. He implored Source to keep strong TSUJI's resolution to retire to seclusion and to give up political activity, noting that Source's influence with TSUJI was also great and that the latter shared MATSUI's opinions on what TSUJI should do.
12. TSUJI's Condition Subsequent to 23 August 1951.

The doctors still cannot diagnose accurately whether his case was ulcers or a cancer of the stomach. If it was cancer, the doctor in charge stated that TSUJI probably would not live more than another year. TSUJI does not know this, and judging from the doctor's attitude and conduct, Source conjectured that the doctor is more or less convinced that it was a cancer case. For the time being, however, TSUJI's condition after his several operations is relatively good. He can now eat anything he wants, but can eat only approximately one-third the amount of what he used to eat. As he began to recover his health towards the beginning of September, at least two persons called on him every day, gradually increasing. This meant that TSUJI was not even able to get a quiet rest. After consultation with the chief doctor on 1 September, Source got the hospital authorities to move TSUJI to another room the morning of 2 September, and to announce that TSUJI had left the hospital for home. However, this stratagem did not succeed, because the various people desiring to visit TSUJI refused to believe that he could leave the hospital in his condition that soon, and searched for his new room and found it. Finally, on 7 September, he was given permission to leave the hospital provided that both medical care and rest were to be continued. TSUJI planned to rest at the hot springs at Hakone for several days, which cheered his family and intimate friends, who hoped he would thereby be free from many visitors. On 7 September, in the evening, TSUJI left the hospital for his home by car, but the journey was such a painful one that he canceled his plan for a trip to Hakone on 8 September because car travel was too painful. He will rest at his home for a time.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
C (Encl. 1)	ZJL-725	20 Sept 1951	C
SUBJECT	IWAKURO Hideo: Background on IWAKURO and His Associates in the New Political Group		DATE 1 Feb 1954

PERTINENT INFORMATION
Source: C with Sub-sources indicated Evaluation: C-2, or as stated where identified by Source

THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM

Report B- (PD-287) (Encl. 2)

3. FUKUYA Shunichi

....Up until 1943, FUKUYA was exceedingly friendly with TSUJI Masanobu too, but because of a minor squabble, they became estranged. At present, he appears to be openly antagonistic towards TSUJI....

10. ASAHARA Kenzo

....When TSUJI Masanobu decided to undertake the task of reconciling TOJO and ISHIHARA (i.e. the ultra-militarist and Pan-Asian army blocs), he asked Source for assistance. Source suggested use of ASAHLARA if the chance occurred. It did not ever materialize, because TSUJI's effort ended in failure. FUKUYA was well acquainted with the situation at this time.

Report C- (PD-288) (Encl. 3)

Subject: IWAKURO Hideo: Background Information IWAKURO's Military Associates - The "Iwakuro Kikan"

Source: C
Evaluation: C-2 except as stated
Date of Report: 9 October 1951

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(b)(1)(B) Privacy

(b)(1)(C) Methods/Sources

(b)(1)(D) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2-005

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4. KOBAYASHI Tomoichi (or Yuichi):

KOBAYASHI Tomoichi used to revere TSUJI Masanobu and used to visit him quite frequently. When KOBAYASHI heard that TSUJI was intending to publish his books through the ATO Publishing Office (ATO SHOBO), he offered his aid in purchasing the necessary paper. He provided paper for these TSUJI publications to the ATO Shobo, but at about that same time there was a quarrel over an underhanded business trick used by KOBAYASHI, TSUJI severely reprimanded him. KOBAYASHI then broke off relations with TSUJI and after that time, in early 1950, he joined up exclusively with the IWAKURO Group. (Sub-sources for the above information: TSUJI Masanobu and HATTORI Takushiro, independently. C-3.)

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT

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