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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-7-4	SOURCE ZJL-731 A & B	DATE OF DOCUMENT 11 Oct 1951	ANALYST C	DATE
SUBJECT (See respective reports)			DATE 1 Feb 1954	
CONTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM				
<u>Report A (PD-294)</u>				
Subject: The New "Cooperative Party" (KYODOTO) and East Asia League Revival Activity				
Source: C				
Evaluation: F-3 except as stated, for sub-source				
7. In spite of the fact that <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> was very closely linked with both the late <u>ISHIHARA Kanji</u> and the East Asia League, he was not present at the memorial service, nor does he appear to be connected in any way whatever with the establishment of the Cooperative Party. TSUJI is not an overt member of it, of course, and he appears to be entirely unrelated to it.				
<u>Report B (PD-295)</u>				
Subject: YAMAMOTO Katsunosuke, former East Asia League Member				
Source: A				
Evaluation: C-2				
5. TSUJI Masanobu has no connection to YAMAMOTO whatsoever; they do not care for each other at all, despite similarity of Pan Asian views.				
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(38)

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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11 Oct 51

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Tokyo, Japan

Report No: ZJL-732 A & B\*

ED 297 & 298

Local File No:

No. of Pages: A (3); B (2)

No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By: [ ]

Approved By: [ ]

Distribution:

By copy to: Wash Fox - 2  
Files - 3  
[ ] - 1

Orally to:

Source Cryptonym: [ ]

References: ZJL-731 and its references

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. ZJL-732 A confirms most of the information in ZJL-731A and corrects or adds certain details concerning the new supposedly Pan-Asian-inclined political party. On the points where the two reports are in conflict Source advances the opinion that this latter sub-source is probably more reliable.
2. Newspaper reports of the memorial service of ISHIHARA's death also mentioned formation of a new "Concordia" Party (KYOWATO). We shall use the term "Concordia Party" from now on in referring to it. Use of "KYODOTO" or "Cooperative Party" might confuse readers into thinking that the NIPPON KYODOTO (former KOKUMIN KYODOTO) is meant. It might be pointed out also that "KYOWA" literally means "Cooperative Peace" or "Harmony" or "Concord"; yet some enthusiastic G.O.P. protagonist in an early era apparently got the Japanese convinced of the harmony of republicanism, because "KYOWATO" is the term used also for the American Republican Party and "KYOWAKO" means "republic". Obviously, it would be a mistake, in view of its platform, to call this new party a "Republican Party" just as it would have been erroneous to call KYOWAKAI, the Japanese Imperial government's pseudo-Pan-Asian agency for aiding the Manchurians to govern themselves during wartime, the "Republican Society".
3. We concur in suspecting TSUJI Masaharu's connections to the leaders of the new party, and believe they are probably stronger than the report indicates. In July, Source hinted at strong anti-rearmament influences on TSUJI resulting from Pan-Asian connections, and named SATO Katsuro and WADA Tsuyoshi. It might be recalled that SATO Katsuro of ATO SHOGO was also involved in Concordia in Manchuria.
4. Re para 8 g, 732-A: MIYAZAKI was described in ZJL-686 [ ] as an associate of NISHI Eiichi and TAKAYAMA Yu conferring on joint action with SATOJI Ryosaku (@ Hajime); ZJL-248 [ ] describes him as Pan-Asian-affiliated but "definitely a secret JUF member" and "a member of the Far

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H-7-7-4 (encl)

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Best "uniform". Neither report would fix all inconsistencies and  
inclusion in this Agrarian-Socialist-Pan-African "peace front" report.

In addition, there are many questions in this report as in all other reports  
[ ] which remain to be asked. He has already been reminded that  
that we like data to be included in personal histories. In general, however,  
we feel confident that the questions will be answered in re-interviews  
forthcoming. In the meantime, we qualify our "2" evaluation [ ]  
material to the obvious opinion that it is "probably true" as far as it  
goes, but that it seldom seems like the full story. For this reason,  
[ ] is continued as a "C" source.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: The New "Concordia" (Cooperative) Report No: ZJL-732 A (FD-297)  
Party: Possible Connection of TSUJI Masanobu.

Date of Information: Up to 12 Sept. 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 21 Sept. 1951

Evaluation: C-2; F-2 For Sub-source

Date of Report: 14 October 1951.

Source: ( )

(NOTE on Sub-Source: Information on Sub-source is given in ZJL-732 B (FD-298).)

1. \*EBANA Shisuka, member of the Lower House of the National Diet, asked for an interview with Source on 12 September, 1951, to discuss his impending political campaign. In the course of the interview, however, Source brought up the question of the formation of a new political party known as the "Cooperative Party": KYODOTO. EBANA referred to it as the "Concordia" Party, (KYOWA TO), and gave the following information about it.
2. Former members of the old East Asia League (DAI TO A REMPEI) gathered together on 15 August, 1951, on the anniversary of Lt. General ISHIHARA Kenju's death, at his tomb at Tsuruoka. They conferred and made commitments on the establishment of the Concordia Party, setting up its organization and platform. The initiative or inaugural convention of this party was supposed to have been already held the first week in September, 1951. The Concordia Party is not an ideological organization party, but rather a political one. It is an entirely unique and new type of party. EBANA is no longer a member of the present East Asia League, (he stated), as he assumed Source knew. However, quite a few of the old members of the East Asia League are well acquainted with EBANA's past close relationship with ISHIHARA Kenju. Some of these members, in the Concordia Party, seem to have planned secretly to appoint EBANA to be chief of the Wakamatsu Branch of the Concordia Party, apparently in order to secure a certain amount of campaign funds contributions from EBANA.
3. A young man from the headquarters of the Concordia Party visited EBANA, called for the latter's participation in and aid to the Party, and explained about its platform and the personnel leading it.
4. According to the explanation of this youth, the Concordia Party appears to be quite short of competent and experienced political leaders and also of political campaign funds. It seemed to EBANA from the description given him that there were wide divergencies between the underlying principles of the Concordia Party and the basic tenets of ISHIHARA Kenju. EBANA received the distinct impression that the new party was very strongly under the influence of socialism. Despite its shortage of top leaders and of funds, the youth felt confident that the Concordia Party would not fail to bring the Liberal Party to total defeat in the next general elections and would then seize the

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(PL-297)

reins of government. Ironically enough, he indicated that the Concordia Party is opposed to revision of the Constitution and to rearmament. As long as Japan remains unarmed, the nation would not be plunged into the coming world-wide catastrophe, this young exponent stated.

5. EBANA told the youth that it would be completely impossible and ridiculous that he should bolt from the Liberal Party, of which he is now a Parliamentary member, in order to join the Concordia Party. He added further more, that whereas the Concordia Party might be right from the idealistic point of view in insisting upon opposition to rearmament and to revision of the constitution's anti-war clause, he could not agree as a practical politician; faced with various daily problems of actual politics, EBANA stated that he could not stand by idly (nor could the nation) in the present-day world situation relying upon an empty argument such as the Concordia Party offered. On that point, he continued, his principles and those of the new party were definitely opposed, and for that reason he could not cooperate with it. However, noting that the new party revered the memory of ISHIHARA and that many of its leaders were once beloved by the great Pan-Asian leader, EBANA, feeling similar past ties, contributed (¥10,000) ten thousand yen as a token of his esteem for the memory of ISHIHARA. He sent the youth back with the donation on the express understanding that it was no indication whatsoever that he was in agreement with the principles of the Concordia Party, but was merely for the above-stated reasons.
6. EBANA did not know how closely Source knew TSUJI Masanobu, but indicated that there were rumors of TSUJI's close connections to personalities within the present leadership of the new party. Some members of the Concordia Party have said that TSUJI was in a position to help the party, though only indirectly, since he is still purged and unable to join it. TSUJI has a distant relation by marriage (or by family?) to ISHIHARA Kanju; however, he seems to have no overt connection to the Concordia Party. Among the real leaders of the Concordia Party, there is a man called WADA Tsuyosini (or Kei). He was formerly a lieutenant or captain in the Japanese Army, left it to engage in political work in connection with establishment of the Concordia Association (KYOWAKAI) in Manchuria, and was later promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in the Manchurian Army. Certainly he was one of those closely linked to ISHIHARA. TSUJI and WADA were extremely close, and while TSUJI was carrying on secret operations in Japan, he is reported to have concealed himself at WADA's house for about three or four months. Even considering just this fact alone, it is virtually impossible to believe that TSUJI has no connection at all to the new party. Although the truth of the rumor cannot be ascertained, it is said that TSUJI has promised a financial contribution to the party from the sale of his books and publications.
7. Source Opinion: It is obvious that the Concordia Party ("KYOWAKAI") referred to by EBANA and the Cooperative Party ("KYUO-KAI") described by KAWAMOTO Katsunosuke are the same. EBANA indicated that KYOWAKAI is the correct name; it has become clear that this party was named after the Concordia Association (KYOWAKAI) established in Manchuria by the Japanese government.
8. EBANA commented as follows concerning the other leaders of the party who had

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(FD-297) (ZJL-732 A)

been named by YAHAMOTO to MATSURI Takushiro and Source:

- a. ~~X~~ NAKAYAMA Yu: A philosopher and Pan-Asian organization leader.
- b. ~~X~~ KIMURA Takeo: A worthless and disreputable person. He is not a real idealist or ideologist at all. It is rumored that he is already joining the Liberal Party.
- c. ~~X~~ SUGIURA Haruo: A campaigner for socialistic reforms.
- d. ~~X~~ IWABUCHI Tatsuo: This is probably a mistaken transcription of IWABUCHI Tatsuo (岩波辰雄). If so, IWABUCHI is the well-known reporter for a certain publishing company.
- e. ~~X~~ KOIZUMI Kikue: The correct reading of her name, Kikue, is (菊枝). She has for a long time been on very bad terms with WADA Toyoshi.
- f. EBANA had never heard of the names TAKEDA Hotaro (or Kunitaro) and ~~X~~ ZENIGATA Senkichi.
- g. EBANA believed that there was, in addition to these persons named, an economist from the Concordia Party leaders named MIYAZAKI Masayoshi (宮崎 正義).

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. C J	SOURCE ZJL-736	DATE OF DOCUMENT 16 Oct 51	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT HATTORI Takushiro			DATE 23 Feb 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: C-2	
Source: C J				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
<u>Report: ZJL-736 A (PD-301)</u>				
Subject: Intelligence NETS under Direction of HATTORI				
6. .... When Source was talking with HATTORI at the latter's home last year, in September as it is recalled, a visitor appeared before them. HATTORI introduced the visitor to Source, stating, "This is Mr. UCHIYAMA Kasuya of Nagano, who is cooperating with me"....Then, when Source called at HATTORI's home on the night of 22 August, 1951, in answer to HATTORI's request for a meeting, HATTORI told him, "There is a man named UCHIYAMA who trusts and admires <u>TSUJI (Masanobu)</u> above all persons. He will soon come to Tokyo, because he is worrying about TSUJI's health. He is a very trustworthy and fine person... I do want to introduce him to you."....				
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			C J	

FORM NO. 89-34  
DEC 1952

(30)

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

HATTORI  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

Subject: HATTORI Takushiro: Connection to Major General Willoughby Publicized. Report No: ZJL-7 B (PD-302)  
Date of Information: August 1951  
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date Acquired: 18 September 1951  
Evaluation: C-2 Date of Report: 16 October 1951  
Source: [ ]

1. Sub-source for the following incidental information in para. 2 concerning HATTORI Tak shiro's relationship with Major General Willoughby is HATTORI himself, who disclosed it to Source on 22 August 1951.
2. Just prior to the above date, HATTORI received a letter from a Japanese friend in America. The letter revealed that what TSUJI Masanobu had told to certain American newsmen had been made known in America, and also that TSUJI's notorious speech before the Liberalist Club had been publicized. Furthermore, TSUJI appears to have described to these newsmen the close relationship between HATTORI Takushiro and General Willoughby. As a result, it became common knowledge among American newspaper correspondents that HATTORI had been connected with Major General Willoughby. Newspaper correspondents rushed to Major General Willoughby upon the latter's return to America and among other questions asked him, "Do you know Colonel HATTORI?" In his reply, Willoughby said emphatically, "No I do NOT", according to the letter received.
3. HATTORI gave no explanation as to how he had interpreted Willoughby's answer, but he appeared to be quite satisfied with it and respected the motives behind it. And he was understandably exasperated over TSUJI's lack of security, but viewed it philosophically since similar incidents have occurred before.

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FORM NO. 81-88  
FEB 1954

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ZJL-7B1

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL-737A Local File No: PD-204

No. of Pages: 5 (A) No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By: [ ] Approved By: [ ]

Distribution:  
By copy to: Wash Fax - 2  
Files - 3  
[ ] - 1

Orally to:

Source Cryptonyms: [ ] References: ZJL-689, 696, 714, 724, 725, 736.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. Enclosed is the first in a series of reports on the major figures and groups involved in the rearmament question and in haggling over who will be top dog in the future set-up. We deeply regret the necessity of sending you these piece-meal, and should have most of the following ready for the next pouch, but there has not been time to organize properly into a proper interim report the vast bulk of [ ] material, much less collate and re-interrogate on the basis of it. We finally decided to break Report ZJL-737 down according to the various groups and individuals competing in the rearmament derby, and apply to each [ ] running comments over the past month to each in its proper niche. To give you a preview of that breakdown:
  - a. ZJL-737 A covers three entities, all closely connected and cooperative:
    1. TATSUMI Kiichi and the Clique assisting YOSHIDA.
    2. SHIMOMURA Sadamu, holding nominal support from many various groups.
    3. MIYAZAKI Shunichi and MAKAYAMA Gempu, two SHIMOMURA subordinates.
  - b. ZJL-737 B will outline data on TANIDA Isamu and his subordinates, formerly close to TATSUMI Kiichi.
  - c. ZJL-737 C will describe the anti-HATTORI position of three rival groups which are believed to be closely inter-related and which are using considerable influence at SIB and Police Reserve HQ against HATTORI:
    1. The IMAKURO Hideo Faction.
    2. The position of DOI Akio.
    3. ISUKAMOTO Makoto and HAYASHI Saburo.
  - d. ZJL-737 D will give data on HATTORI and his subordinates, NISHIURA, ISOTO, and that "spy for IMAKURO and TANIDA", HORIBA Kazuo.
  - e. ZJL-737 E will show Source's conjecture of the increasingly retiring Classification

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  - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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-2-

(Cover Letter to ZJL-737)

position of KAWABE Torashiro in between IWAKURO and SHIMOMURA.

2. A subsequent report with a different number will deal with the actual plans advanced by these various groups concerning rearmament. Particularly the now famous "HATTORI Plan", which has caused so much furor [ ] when asked for this plan in detail by letter, on 12 October told us there was little point to his writing it out, since the details of the whole affair plus considerable information on the clique warfare described (in ZJL-737) appeared in the Yomiuri magazine of that week and for eighteen pages in the Asahi Weekly of 21 October (mid-month edition). He conveniently provided us with copies of both and attached a report pointing out differences and errors in the text of the news weeklies. The outlines of the Hattori Plan reappeared in almost exactly the same context in the Nippon Times of 19 October, 1951, broadcast by the Soviets as a charge of American war-mongering. One may now assume in safety that the Soviets are as well aware as we of this rather petty and sordid story of jockeying for control of the future Army. We shall append the news accounts of the HATTORI-IWAKURO-TANIDA feud and rearmament plans as they are translated, along with [ ] current reports on developments.
3. We reserve detailed comment on this report at present until you can see the full picture portrayed by the additional reports. It should be evident, however, that we are getting a fairly full and very interesting inside story of the intrigue involved in the activities of various groups and individuals involved in rearmament activities. It also should be thoroughly evident that a previous study of either Sicilian vendetta or Chicago gang wars of the prohibition era would best qualify one for appreciative enjoyment of this scramble for power; there is every indication that as rearmament approaches closer to reality, and each proud leader imagines himself in a chief of staff's uniform, the competition and double-crossing will merely become fiercer. To get some indications of the line-ups and realignments should be our chief interest in all this.
4. We wish to remind you that this report did not discuss TATSUMI's intelligence efforts in any measure. A later report gives a bit on them, including one minor lateral reference to [ ] which is not clear but which we have not yet had time for which to query. ( ) There is also further data just in on SHIMOMURA which will obviously be of interest when compared with what we get from other sources.

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Subject: Military Figures connected with Report No: ZJL-737A (PD-304)  
Rearmament and Conflicting Intrigues re  
the HATTORI Plan. Date of Information: As stated

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: As stated

Evaluation: C-3

Date of Report: 19 October 1951

Source: ( ) Sub-sources as stated.

1. TATSUMI Eiichi, Premier YOSHIDA's "Military Expert".

- a. (Sub-source for para. a: HATTORI Takushiro; Date of Information: As of 20 Sep 51; Acquired: 21 Sep 51.)

TATSUMI Eiichi (辰巳 栄一) 's address is #61 Keido Machi, Setagaya Ku, Tokyo, telephone number 42-2244. He is a former Lt. General, in the Air Branch, graduate of the 27th class at Army Officers School, graduate of the Army War College, and several times chosen as assistant military attache and then military attache to Great Britain. He was in London when the Pacific War began in 1941, where he had been serving under then Ambassador YOSHIDA Shigeru. After his return to Japan, he was assigned as chief of staff of the East Japan Army as a major general. TATSUMI is a man of fine character, and a good friend of HATTORI Takushiro and SHIMOMURA Sadamu as well, with whom he meets frequently, sometimes as often as twice a week. He is probably the most influential advisor on military matters to Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru, and has also in the past offered assistance and advice to the American Far East Air Forces, and to G-2, GHQ.

- b. (Sub-source for para. b: TSUJI Masanobu; Date of Information: As of 28 September. Date acquired: 3 October.)

It is a matter of common knowledge that TATSUMI Eiichi is on very friendly terms with Prime Minister YOSHIDA, despite YOSHIDA's aversion to some of TATSUMI's military friends such as HATTORI. Therefore, TATSUMI is playing the role of YOSHIDA's military advisor in effect, on the issue of rearmament and is privately aiding YOSHIDA to work out the latter's limited plan for augmentation of the police reserve as the answer to that problem. TATSUMI is aiding the government with advice on the screening of former regular army field officers who are to be depurged and those "desirable" for the National Police Reserve. Aiding TATSUMI in this effort, presumably with YOSHIDA's approval, are the following:

SHIMOMURA Sadamu: Former General of the Army and former War Minister in the SHIDEHARA Cabinet when YOSHIDA was also a Cabinet member.

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(ZJL-737A)

\*  
A certain AYABE (fmu): Former Lt. General of the Army, Chief of Staff  
(綾部) of the "OKABE Butai" (an Area Corp<sup>s</sup> under command of General OKABE in the Manila area at the time of the surrender) and a classmate of TATSUMI.

\*  
A certain KOZUKI (fmu): Former Lt. General in the Army, chief of the  
香月 Demobilization Bureau, HATTORI's present superior.

\*  
HIYAZAKI Shinichi: Former Lt. General of the Army, and suc-  
(宮崎 周一) cessor to TANAKA Shinichi as Chief of Operations and Strategy, GHQ in 1942 (Japanese G-1 - our G-3, General Staff).

\*  
YAMAMOTO Moichiro: Former Major General, Army, Deputy Chief of  
(山本 茂一郎) Staff of the Hokkaido Area Army at the time of the surrender.

The above group works together harmoniously in aiding TATSUMI to prepare lists and records for YOSHIDA.

TATSUMI is not a man, however, who elevates or recognizes his colleagues and subordinates when he has a mission to perform. He is a commander who invariably enjoys doing his work himself, delegating very little authority, keeping his own counsel, and forming almost no close relationships. Usually, generals' aides idolize their superiors and are charmed by their ability and personality. Not so with TATSUMI's aides, who without exception have always considered him a "cold fish" and did not like to serve him. Although TATSUMI is a very modest gentleman of fine character and reputation, he seems to draw a clear-cut line in associating with all his friends: he does not step beyond that line with them, and he makes it very difficult for any to draw any closer than that to him.

(Sub-source elicited the following opinions from TATSUMI on 28 Sep 1951.)

TATSUMI does not oppose HATTORI Takushiro, but in fact hopes that HATTORI will someday be chief of the new Japanese Army, for which post he feels HATTORI to be eminently qualified, even though he deplors some of HATTORI's subordinates such as HORIBA, for their indiscretion. TATSUMI has no particular dislike for IWAKURO Hideq either, except that he considers IWAKURO to be more of a politician than a military man at present, and feels that IWAKURO is merely using rearmament as a political stepping stone. \* DOI Akio, who is associated with certain munitions and arms manufacturing plans of economic interests behind the IWAKURO Group, is even more unscrupulous a person, and some of the people he influences, such as TSUKAMOTO Hakoto and HAYASHI Saburo, are far more active than even the IWAKURO Group in attempting to ruin HATTORI's reputation with the Japanese government. \* TANIDA Isamu is NOT associated with TATSUMI, who despises him, despite what TANIDA may say.

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-3-

(ZJI-737A)

- c. (Sub-source for para. c: \*HARUKE Yoshitane, elicited from TATSUMI on 5 October; acquired on 7 October.)

\*HORIBA Kazuo, former Colonel and HATTORI's subordinate in the Historical Records Section of the Demobilization Bureau, once asked for an interview with TATSUMI through Lt. General TANIDA Isamu, in January, 1951; however, TATSUMI was aware of HORIBA's double-crossing of HATTORI both to TANIDA and to IMAKURO, who refused it because he "didn't want to stir up a hornet's nest of intrigue". Shortly afterwards, TATSUMI broke completely with TANIDA despite the latter's persistent efforts to keep working with TATSUMI. TATSUMI considers TSUJI Masanobu a fine soldier and gentleman, but deplors his stupid and harmful conduct, feeling that it is one of the chief liabilities to HATTORI's waning reputation with the Japanese government, particularly the police agencies. Because of TSUJI's insecure conduct and rash speeches, the government considers rearmament tantamount to revival of the Old Japanese Army and sees the nightmare of a return to militaristic control. This is directed unfortunately not against TSUJI, who has no concrete plan, but against his friend, HATTORI Takushiro, whose cooperation with the Police Reserve idea has been fine despite the unjust and vicious attacks upon him as an arch-militarist.

2. SHIMOMURA Sadamu (下村定)

Former General of the Army, he was War Minister of the SHIDENARA Cabinet in 1945, and came to be closely acquainted with YOSHIDA Shigeru at that time. He was in the General SAITO clique, and greatly opposed to Hideki TOJO. At one period during HATTORI's long tour of duty with the Operational Plans Section of Japanese G-1 (our G-3 General Staff), SHIMOMURA was chief of Operations and Strategy. (Japanese G-1). Largely due to his recommendation, despite HATTORI's field grade rank at the time, HATTORI was made chief of the Operational Plans Section, succeeding ISHIHARA Kanju, in 1937. HATTORI greatly respects and trusts General SHIMOMURA, and has always continued to maintain a very close relationship with him. HATTORI feels that only SHIMOMURA, of all of the former general rank officers of the Japanese Army, is truly qualified to lead the new Japanese Army. HATTORI often calls upon him at present, gives him details of his plans, and asks for General SHIMOMURA's instructions. In short, General SHIMOMURA is former superior, sponsor, and "sensei" (teacher) to HATTORI. The present Prime Minister, YOSHIDA, was Foreign Minister when SHIDENARA was Prime Minister in the first post-war cabinet. SHIMOMURA enjoys the distinction of being the last Japanese Minister of War. YOSHIDA has maintained friendly relations with SHIMOMURA, and confers with him frequently on the rearmament question. However, TATSUMI, who is also friendly with the general, is a closer advisor of YOSHIDA, and to what extent YOSHIDA relies upon SHIMOMURA's counsel is dubious.

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(ZJL-737A)

(Sub-source for the following: HATTORI Takushiro; Date of Information: As of 17 September; Date acquired: 21 September, 1951.)

- a. In the fall of 1950, General SHIMOMURA advised HATTORI confidentially that Lt. General TANIDA Isamu was quite bitter in criticizing HATTORI to himself. TANIDA apparently told SHIMOMURA that HATTORI was trying to become commander of the entire Japanese Army because of his interest in the National Police Reserve command, and was using Mrs. ARAKI's influence with General Willoughby and Willoughby's trust in him to the hilt in order to catapult himself into full power. TANIDA decried HATTORI's monopolistic plans, unfair, biased and ambitious choices of personnel, without conferring with anyone else, even the Japanese government or Prime Minister YOSHIDA, and he insisted to SHIMOMURA that HATTORI's plans were extremely ambitious, in fact, that HATTORI was "another ARISUE". TANIDA showed SHIMOMURA a list of officers HATTORI had rejected whom he felt were excellent men. HATTORI defended himself well, but realized that some one on his staff at the Demobilization Bureau Historical Records Section planning rearmament and formation of the Police Reserve had betrayed him and their secret plans to TANIDA. It turned out to be Colonel HORIEA Kazuo, who has later disclosed HATTORI's secrets to IWAKURO Hideo and the KAWABEs, Torashiro and Shogo, who also oppose HATTORI. Nevertheless, SHIMOMURA was not convinced by TANIDA of HATTORI's duplicity and ambition, and has continued to support HATTORI even to YOSHIDA up to the present time.

3. The Demobilization Bureau Chiefs, MIYAZAKI Shuichi and HAKAYAMA Gempu.

- a. MIYAZAKI Shuichi (see P. 1.).

Former Lt. General of the Army, graduate of the Army War College, he was chosen Chief of Japanese G-1, General Staff, in 1944, soon after SAIJO and YONAI came to power replacing TOJO. He is a "SHIMOMURA" man, and somewhat favorable to HATTORI, but fearful of HATTORI's ambitious reputation. When HATTORI returned to his post of chief of the Operational Plans Section of G-1 General Staff after the fall of TOJO, it was rumored that HATTORI secured the fall of then Major General DOI Akio as chief of G-1 General Staff by causing DOI to lose the respect of all his subordinates in G-1, which brought about MIYAZAKI's elevation to the post. For this reason, DOI hates both HATTORI and MIYAZAKI bitterly to this day.

(Sub-source for the above: TATSUMI Eiichi, as told to TSUJI Masanobu on 28 September; acquired: 3 October 1951.)

(Sub-source for the following: HATTORI Takushiro; date of information: as of 17 September; acquired: 21 September 1951.)

The Historical Records Research Section of the Demobilization Bureau of

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the Japanese Government, the only Army function officially retained by the Japanese Government after 1945, in close cooperation with GMI, was originally known as the Historical Facts Section. Its first chief was MIYAZAKI Shuichi, former G-1 from 1944-1945. Both HATTORI and HORIE Kasuo were assigned under MIYAZAKI, as they had been subordinates of his in G-1, HATTORI as chief of Operational Plans section. When MIYAZAKI was discharged from his position by result of a strict application of the Purge Ordinance (in early 1947) (paren are Source Comment), then he offered to turn the post over to HATTORI. The latter declined, however, and recommended his former operational plans superior, Major General NAKAYAMA Gempu (or Motoo). However, it seemed that NAKAYAMA was also excluded from the post by purge directive, and HATTORI had to take over. In spite of the fact that it was evident at the time that HATTORI had first recommended NAKAYAMA, HORIE Kasuo objected to HATTORI's elevation at first, claiming that he had his own ideas about that affair. Finally, however, he apparently agreed and appeared willing to accept HATTORI's leadership. MIYAZAKI generally adheres to SHIMOMURA's direction at present in rearmament and all other activities.

b. NAKAYAMA Gempu (or Motoo) 中山源夫

He is a former senior officer and superior of HATTORI Takushiro, and an officer of general rank for whom HATTORI has the highest respect. He was graduated from Army War College, and has a very inactive record in post-war activities.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-14-10	SOURCE ZJL-744	DATE OF DOCUMENT 8 Nov 1951	ANALYST C J
SUBJECT Military Figures Connected with Rearmament and Conflicting Intrigues re the HATTORI Plan; TANIDA Isamu and Associates			DATE 28 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: C J sub-sources as stated			Evaluation: C-3
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
<p>9. <u>Source Opinion</u>: In spite of the fact TANIDA was originally responsible for the security breach concerning the HATTORI Plan by his utilization of HORIBA Kazuo, it would appear that his chief function in this rearmament problem is that of a rather addled crank. Even if one does not accept HATTORI's opinion of TANIDA, there is all plenty of confirmatory opinion concerning TANIDA, /of it rather unfavorable, from such individuals as TATSUMI, SHIMOMURA, KAWABE Torashiro, TSUJI Masanobu, and most other regular Army officers. The possibility that TANIDA is able to offer information to any agency whatsoever concerning HATTORI or any other figure connected with rearmament, is a very dangerous factor, chiefly because TANIDA is a person of obviously unreliable nature and reputation.</p>			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. C J

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY	
ZJL-745	9 Nov 1951		
Military Figures Connected with Rearmament and Conflicting Intrigues re the HATTORI Plan: DOI Akio		3 Feb 1954	
Source: [ ] [ ]		Evaluation: C-3	
<p>Sub-source for paras. 4-8: TSUJI Masanobu. Date of Info. as of 3 Oct. 1953. Info. Acquired: 7 October, 1953.</p> <p>There is a general rumor afloat that DOI Akio is extremely well acquainted with OGATA Taketora (岡田 武吉) and with Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru, and that the latter consults DOI frequently and values his opinions highly. MATSUMI Kiichi has denied the rumor, particularly in reference to YOSHIDA, as completely baseless. There is no link between DOI and YOSHIDA Shigeru. However, it is quite definite that a very intimate friendship does exist between DOI and OGATA Taketora. The probable reasons for this rumor are as follows: first, DOI and YOSHIDA are both well-known from the same area, Kochi Prefecture, which many superficial connections are significant; then, OGATA is a very loyal follower and subordinate of KOJIMA Isamu (小島 政一), who acts as one of YOSHIDA's best paid lieutenants. Since (Sub-source knows) KOJIMA Isamu very well, he is aware that KOJIMA does not share OGATA's regard for DOI at all, but in has rather contrary opinions. Therefore, DOI has no direct line to YOSHIDA.</p> <p>5. During the days right after World War II ended, DOI Akio, then Chief of Staff of the 13th Japanese Army, was detained at Nanking at the same time that TSUJI Masanobu was. TSUJI was at that time engaged in underground Sino-Japanese collaboration operations in the South China area, from Nanking. At that time, DOI was leading an amazingly luxurious if not extravagant existence for a person supposedly under detention on war-crimes charges. DOI apparently had had full control over the confidential funds of the 13th Army as its Chief of Staff. During his post-war days at Nanking, it was rumored on the basis of his obvious style of living and entertaining, that he was appropriating approximately ¥300,000 per month for his own living expenses from erstwhile Japanese Army funds.</p> <p>One day, the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army told TSUJI that an investigation and search by the Chinese Mission in Tokyo had</p>			
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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to have by DOI received that five thousand dollars in U.S. money (cash) were hidden in bank linings. The Chinese general indicated that the problem had been relayed to him from the Chinese Mission in Tokyo, who wanted to know what should be done about it. He relayed this to TSUJI, obviously waiting for a comment. TSUJI presumed immediately that DOI could not have such a large amount of foreign currency legitimately as his own by any stretch of the imagination, and therefore came to the conclusion that it was ill-gotten gains or appropriated funds. Yet TSUJI felt that if he told that to the Chinese Chief of Staff, it would cause a great dishonor to Japan and even more, it would cause undue hardship to thousands of poor, righteous Japanese people repatriating from China, who would then be searched, interrogated, and annoyed no end as a result of DOI's selfish acts. Therefore, TSUJI promptly replied to the effect that it was nothing to worry about: TSUJI knew that Lt. General DOI had contemplated aiding in their Sino-Japanese Collaborative Operations after return to Japan, and in fact had told TSUJI that he would send to Japan the money necessary to back those operations. The Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army apparently believed this, thought it was a fine idea, and said that he would advise the Tokyo Mission to replace the money quietly and then would pigeonhole the matter. After TSUJI returned to Japan, he went to DOI to urge the latter to use the money in question for the relief of families who had suffered the loss of husbands and fathers during the war. DOI merely laughed at him and flatly refused to do so.

6. It is a matter of almost universal knowledge in Japanese Army circles that DOI is a man of mean, ill-tempered, and vindictive character. There is no single officer of general rank (to sub-source's recollection) who would be desirous of cooperating with DOI in any project for rearmament because he is so selfish and mean.
7. DOI is one of the persons most violently opposed to HATTORI. This dates from his days as Chief of G-1. He was an extremely difficult chief to deal with, and was extremely unpopular with all of the subordinates and staff officers in the Operational Plans section of G-1. In fact, because of repeated instances of vindictive disciplinary action and complete ignoring of competent staff advice, a movement to boycott and obstruct his orders got underway very shortly after he relieved TANAKA Shinichi. This reached scandalous proportions. Even such a gentle person as KUSUDA Nagao (藤田正夫), a graduate of the 35th class at Army General Staff School, graduate of Army War College, and at that time a subordinate officer (as Lt. Colonel) in the Operational Plans Section of G-1, became furiously angry at DOI on one occasion and struck him. For all of this opposition and insubordination, DOI blamed HATTORI, who was exceedingly popular and intimate with the Operational Section officers even after TOJO removed him to make him his military aide. After DOI was transferred to be chief of the Harbin THKK, which was obviously a command inferior to that of G-1, General Staff HQ, his replacement, MIYAZAKI Shuichi, immediately reinstated HATTORI as his Ops Plans Chief. DOI, without reflecting whatsoever on his blundering errors in strategy nor on his faults of character, blamed HATTORI and accused him viciously of bringing about his own demotion from the post of G-1; he has never ceased to maintain that HATTORI flattered and curried favor with the younger officers in G-1 and led them into boycotting his orders and becoming thoroughly insubordinate. Therefore, HATTORI is one of the persons

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... few subordinates who rated DOI's ability highly and resp  
... HAYASHI Saburo, former colonel, who once worked for DOI in  
... It is quite certain that HAYASHI Saburo is  
... (SI-317)

THIS IS PERTINENT  
TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS DOCUMENT.

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(S-1-74)

Reference is made to report dated 27 September 1951.

- On 24 September 1951, source visited TSUKAMOTO after his absence from seeing him, and talked with him concerning recent matters. The following is a summary of comments made by TSUKAMOTO at that time concerning TSUJI, IWAKURO, IMAKURO, and KAWAMURA Saburo. (Date acquired: 27 September 1951.) (Sub-source: TSUKAMOTO Takoto.)

- a. ~~TSUJI~~ Masenobu is in TSUKAMOTO's opinion a very wonderful person in character as well as ability, but he has shown irresponsibility and complete lack of appreciation of Japan's present circumstances. What TSUKAMOTO has to say against TSUJI is stated with full realization of TSUJI's good qualities. For a long time, TSUKAMOTO very fiercely supported and defended TSUJI's character and actions against persons who maligned him. For example, at a certain meeting held around 1947 or early 1948, IMAKURO Hideo condemned TSUJI and TSUJI's actions very flatly. At that time TSUKAMOTO quarreled violently with his former superior, and fiercely refuted IMAKURO's denunciation of TSUJI. IMAKURO had pointed out that many persons had been put into adversity because of TSUJI's rash statements and careless manner. For example, IMAKURO stated that it was TSUJI's evidence and careless speech which had brought about condemnation of Lt. Gen. KAWAMURA as a war criminal and had achieved the latter's execution. TSUKAMOTO had retorted quite hotly that both IMAKURO and KAWAMURA had been senior officers of TSUJI. They had had every opportunity to express privately to TSUJI their opposition to what he was doing, and if they had, in all likelihood, TSUJI would not have gone ahead and ignored their advice. In spite of the fact that they were predecessors and superiors of TSUJI, they remained indifferent to what he was doing and preferred to stand aloof in private as a bad man who was causing many persons trouble and adversity. TSUKAMOTO maintained that that was not the attitude of a senior officer and that they themselves were guilty of not exercising discipline privately over TSUJI's actions. The meeting at that point came to a deadlock, but it was a good example of the manner in which TSUKAMOTO at one time supported TSUJI even against his own superiors. However subsequently, when TSUJI published his various books, TSUKAMOTO became completely fed up with him. Reading through these books, TSUKAMOTO noticed that TSUJI was completely lacking in reflection over his personal responsibility or his responsibility as a member of the Japanese Army for having thrown Japan into its present status. A soldier is not entirely responsible for waging war, and always carry out orders. On the other hand, TSUKAMOTO maintained that those who have once been regular officers of the Army should be able to introspect regarding their personal and organizational responsibility for disaster and aggression, and should thereafter lead an unassuming and humble life with a modest attitude in the present situation. TSUJI's books show not a bit of such self-introspection and humility. His statements are made in a fashion that indicates that his opinion is that

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(abstract from  
Original which  
is filed in  
44-7-24-15)

...and his reputation with him is wrong. Furthermore, the publications have done a great amount of harm to other persons. ... It is stated. For this reason at the present time ... there is no longer any ... this is a ... he has no sense of pride and he has no sense of ... he presents to the public a facade of nobility and attempts to ... but this is possible only if his past ... and his past political manoeuvres against the govern- ... he has caused to leaders of the Japanese Army in ... Despite his past underground life engaging in Sino-Japanese ... TSUJI called on his good friend KUSUDA Masuo in an attempt ... and through the publication of ... he has succeeded in propagandising the myth that he is one ... The income from these books, he has quite ... has been used for the relief of his unfortunate ... and it has been done after it was clearly ... established by TSUJI that he himself was not a war criminal. If TSUJI ... he should let his actions speak for themselves ... Instead of publicising. Furthermore, in view of the fact that TSUJI's ... name was removed from the war criminal list in a very hasty decision, ... it is quite possible that this is mere "conscience money". ... does not know the detailed circumstances behind the reasons why ... TSUJI's name being removed from consideration as a war criminal. ... is inclined to believe the reason that the wife of ... did the most to achieve this by getting close to Major ... Willoughby of G-2 OH 9.

- b. TSUKAMOTO expressed doubts as to his own wisdom in criticising ... to Source, but stated that if he were to be permitted to ... it would be on the same basis as that for his close friend ... Considered in the light of Japan's historical record from ... TSUKAMOTO could not understand how HATTORI could take public ... attain any responsibility with either the Japanese or American ... He maintained that if HATTORI reflected for one moment upon his ... responsibility for the war and for causing it with any inability ... at all, he could not presumably get into any public office. ... has unashamedly and brazenly accepted public office in response ... with the Japanese and American Governments. ... information for the Police Reserve got underway last year. It was ... decided by Maj. General Sheppard, under General Willoughby, ... to appoint HATTORI the Chief, and to name ... Chief of G-1, ... Chief of G-2, and ... Chief of G-3. ... representative appointment, all four had ... taken a courtesy visit to MASUHARA, who had ... been appointed Director-General of the National Police Agency ... MASUHARA nor his Assistant Chief, ... any such plan made by Major General Sheppard, ... official. Therefore, both MASUHARA and ... were quite surprised.

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The unexpected fall of this group headed by HATTORI. It became quite obvious from the course of the conversation that HATTORI and his henchmen expected to be in a position to start drawing up plans for the military organization of the MRF as soon as expedient. Whether or not former field grade officers should be recruited in the Police Reserve had constantly been a subject of heated discussion. HATTORI quite obviously anticipated being chosen as Chief, as had been tentatively planned by Maj. General Sheppard. However, nothing had been definite, and the so-called "Sheppard Plan" later encountered the opposition of Maj. General Whitney, head of Government Section, SCAP. Through General Whitney's influence with General MacArthur, it was not materialized. As a result, this courtesy visit by HATTORI and his gang ended in a mere comedy. In the light of all this it is hard to understand why HATTORI and his group are even to the present day so desirous of interfering with the formation of the Police Reserve. At that time they might have made a pretext out of the fact that they had no choice but to comply with the directives of the G-2 GHQ; however, even in that case, it is quite obvious that they in no way showed their responsibility by indicating clearly to American authorities that field grade officers of their seniority and age should never have received such a directive because of their past actions. The fact that they unashamedly accepted the responsibility conclusively shows that they lacked in any deep reflection over their responsibility for war guilt as individuals and as officers. In particular the Police Reserve would certainly turn into a rather horrible throwback, if such an incorrigible ultramilitaristic thug as HORIBA Kazuo had anything to do with it. HATTORI has maintained that he has no interest in political activities and has no political ambitions, but both his actions and TSUJI's show that they have similar political ambitions. For what reason should HATTORI seek a pretext to visit MATSUMURA several times and to meet with MATSUMURA Yasunasa in the company of Col. AKAMATSU? As a result, it seems to any observer that what HATTORI says is in complete contrast to what he does. Although TSUKAMOTO does not know the size of the intelligence organization under HATTORI's control, rumor has it to the effect that it is maintained on a very large scale. It is generally reputed in the public that HATTORI is a military strategist and that TSUKAMOTO is merely a tricky politician. However, to TSUKAMOTO, they both seem to be pretty much political tricksters. HATTORI has stood on his fine reputation as a military strategist, but it might be pointed out that anyone is capable of winking out military operations who has a certain amount of common sense, and to use this as a basis for great reputation and authority is a very thin argument. In TSUKAMOTO's opinion, the planning of military operations and drawing up of strategy is not something which requires any great master mind nor any real professional technique, provided staff work has been adequately accomplished.

- c. TSUKAMOTO is supposedly under the supervision and occasional surveillance of the SIB because of the fact he is a purgee. As a matter of fact, the officials from the Special Investigations Bureau and from the MRF often go to see TSUKAMOTO to procure information concerning the activities

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(SUL-217)

...converse with TSUKAMOTO, the usually ...  
...asked the question: What type of ...  
...in carrying out rearmament ...  
...the Police Reserve? TSUKAMOTO ...  
...The formulation of ...  
...study and research. Anyone can do it. The term "rearmament" is not ...  
...The idea of reviving the Army is also wrong. ...  
...Japan is to have a new Army. ...  
...In the establishment of that new Army ...  
...who have been discussed greatly ...  
...of late among the people should be employed. The use of those fellows ...  
...of the same type of militaristic ...  
...To put it in the most concrete terms, no old soldier is necessary ...  
...for the formation of a new Army. The guiding principle of the new ...  
...Army which has been a subject of lively debate should be that it is of ...  
...the people and for the people and not necessarily with the help of former ...  
...military men. People like TSUJI and HAYASHI and TSUKAMOTO are soldiers ...  
...of the past era. They should have nothing to do with the new army.

- d. IWAKURO Hideo often called upon TSUKAMOTO shortly after the Surrender, but he never does these days. TSUKAMOTO does not consult with IWAKURO any more either. TSUKAMOTO claimed that he did not know what IWAKURO was doing at present, but remarked rather sarcastically that IWAKURO was quite fond of attending to other peoples' business and taking care of people. Therefore he presumed that he was still doing "a charity job". Around 1937 or 1938, IWAKURO had MIZUNO Shigeo buy a paper pulp company in Manchuria, through which IWAKURO and MIZUNO were both able to gain their reputations. Therefore, IWAKURO is a great benefactor of MIZUNO. IWAKURO likes to take care of other people for purposes of control, but he does not like to be obligated to any one. For this reason, TSUKAMOTO presumes that in all probability IWAKURO is not receiving very much financial aid at present from MIZUNO Shigeo.

- e. TSUKAMOTO's relations with HAYASHI Saburo are as friendly as ever. HAYASHI has become a distinguished military scholar and is working harder all the time at these studies. While absent in these various researches, HAYASHI writes books and critiques on military matters. In this respect, he is far different from TSUJI. TSUJI produces many publications, but does very little research work. The lecture which TSUJI gave at the Liberalist Club is nothing but an indication of his complete lack of research. At the request of a few members of the Diet from the Democratic Party, TSUKAMOTO introduced HAYASHI to them recently. At that time, HAYASHI made comments on the general military situation which are extremely well received, and considered highly pertinent and intelligent. All of the Parliamentary members who heard the speech were deeply impressed and admired HAYASHI very much.

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17. (Sub-source: TSUJI Masanobu; Date of Info: 5 October; Date Acquired: 7 October 1951.)

HAYASHI Saburo, a former subordinate of Lt. Gen. DOI Akio in the Russian Section at General Staff HQ, is currently cooperating with Lt. Gen. DOI. An article entitled "An Error in What is generally called 'The Mysterious Manner of TSUJI Masanobu'" was carried in the September issue of "Chou Koron" under the name of the Russo-American Problems Research Society (Beiso Mondai Kenkyukai.) It is highly likely that this article was actually written jointly by DOI and HAYASHI Saburo, and information has been received to that effect confirming general impression.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-14-15y	SOURCE ZJLA-1751	DATE OF DOCUMENT 16 Nov 1951	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT Transmittal of Magazine Articles on the NPR and Rearmament			DATE 3 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
Title of Periodical: "Weekly Asahi" (Shukan Asahi), 21 Oct 1951				
Title of Article: "Clatterings of Military Shoes," Subtitled "The Report of Rearmament Discussions"				
-----				
<b>2. Interview between HATTORI Service Members and Head of NPR</b>				
<p>Soon after the establishment of the National Police Reserve last fall, a group of 12 men called on the NPR Headquarters, Etonujima, Tokyo. In an interview with Director-General Keikichi MASUHARA, one of them introduced himself as Takushiro HATTORI, former colonel, and said "Your Excellency, we have paid a visit to him for the purpose of helping him create the National Police Reserve."...The objective of their visit was to assume key posts in the NPR organization... According to the plan, which regrettably vanished like a pipe dream, Mr. HATTORI would have assumed the NPR Director-General's post... Other supporters of the plan were Masanobu TSUJI, former colonel and author of the book "Three Thousand Miles' Travel as a Smuggler," and Sadao AKAMATSU, former colonel and cograduate of Mr. HATTORI, both belonging to the 34th class of the military academy. Mr. TSUJI tried to see Prime Minister YOSHIDA through the introduction of</p>				
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DEC 1952 NAZIS WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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kazuo KIJIMA, veteran politician of the Liberal Party. However, the Prime Minister flatly refused his proposal. Later, Mr. TSUJI met Ichiro HATOYAMA. Now we must explain about the friendship between Messrs. TSUJI and HATTORI. Way back to the time of the outbreak of the Nomonhan Incident, they were members of the Staff of the Kwantung Army, and both advocates of a stronger attitude toward Russia. Mr. HATTORI was the chief of the military operations section of the Staff, and Mr. TSUJI was his subordinate. Mr. TSUJI in one of his best-sellers praised Mr. HATTORI by saying, "I respect him like my elder brother or teacher." By the way, Mr. TSUJI is a graduate of the 36th class of the military academy. Mr. TSUJI has been depurged through the alleged offices of Mr. HATTORI and Mrs. ARAKI.

### 3. Tsuji Advocates Pan-Asianism

Mr. Tsuji also conducts brick activities in line with Mr. Hattori. Mr. Tsuji is a follower of the late Kanji ISHIBARA, former Lieutenant-General and leader of the now extinct East-Asian League based on pan-Asianism. The objective of his movement is to establish a third influence in Asia by making Communist China bolt the Soviet bloc. His influence has infiltrated farm communities due to his untiring efforts. He made lecturing trips across the country. Now he has constructed a nation-wide network among former leaders of the ex-service-men's associations of the Tohoku and Kyushu districts. His influence is especially strong in such prefectures as Yamagata, Niigata and Ehime. The late Ishibara was a believer of the Nichiren sect of Buddhism. Therefore, many followers of Mr. Tsuji are among the Nichiren sect adherents. The number of his followers and fellow travellers are estimated at over 10,000. The movement has received a setback because Mr. Tsuji has been indicted on account of the lecture "The U.S. and Soviet Blocs Compared in War Strength and Strategy" in a meeting recently held at the Industrial Club, Tokyo. He contemplates the plan of creating a militia. He urges each villager to rise to arms to defend his own village in time of emergency. His movement is against Communism. Leaders of his movement consist mostly of former students he taught while he was an instructor in the military academy. They observe his order like an oracle. One of his former students is Katsuro SATO, former lieutenant-colonel and now proprietor of "Toa-shobo" or the Book-store "Far East". All books written by Mr. Tsuji were published by this book-store. Mr. Tsuji has recently received a surgical operation on his stomach ulcer. It is said to have become dilated twice as big as an ordinary stomach. He takes rest for recuperation at home, and is busy preparing for a court struggle. Mr. Tsuji is said to be a supporter of Mr. Hattori's rearmament plan. However, they are not so closely related. Their movements go in parallel. Mr. Tsuji attaches more importance to organizing his network in the rural districts. They agree in the opinion that Japan should be rearmed. Mr. Hattori tried to advocate his idea among politicians such as Ichiro HATOYAMA, Hitoshi ASHIDA, etc. Mr. Ashida's argument on rearmament is said to be under the influence of Mr. Hattori. A certain HIROSE, one of the "Hattori Service", is a member of the National Police Reserve. A group of persons warns that Mr. Hattori will make his influence permeate into the National Police Reserve through Mr. Hirose. The two movements form an under-current of the current national rearmament discussions.

### 4. Comments on Hattori and Tsuji

Messrs. Hattori and Tsuji are held directly responsible for causing the Pacific War. Right before the outbreak of the war, they were members of the General Staff. In comparing Japan and the United States in war strength, they ordered their men to concoct figures in favor of Japan. General Tojo was dragged by these war advocates into the war which resulted in failure. They caused the smash-up. Therefore, a source said, the nation will be in a bad way if they are again spotlighted. Grumbled another source: "Mr. Hattori and his group seek not to have criticized themselves at all for having driven Japan into ruin. They do not know how difficult it is to make a living, or how the new democratic age has set in." Still another source reproached them saying, "These notorious men, who know nothing of the world, are scheming to fan a pro-rearmament sentiment in the nation. The nation will reform its country if it wants to." Whether will Messrs. Hattori and Tsuji go?

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23 NOV 51

Security Information

From:   Tokyo, Japan   Report No:   EJL-753   Local File No:   FD-327  

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Report Made By:   [ ]   Approved By:   [ ]   <sup>102</sup> *my files*

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Files	-	3
[ ]	-	1
AMU	-	1

Source Cryptonym:   [ ]   References:   EJL-721, 724, and earlier Rpts on TSUJI.  

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. The comment contained in para. 2 of the notes at the end of this report indicates the stimulus which dragged this forth from the files.
2. We had been saving this as part of our operational files since April. We then asked for further details, and received the remainder of the report (para. 2 onward.).

23 November, 1951.

Classification

FORM NO. 51-59  
FEB 1949

COPY

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*TSUJI mandarin  
Russian*

*11-6-51 198*

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

Classified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date:   2005

~~SECRET~~

Origination and Plans of KAZUHI  
Kashiwa (Mallan); TSUJI Kashiwa's  
involvement.

LR-753 (11-327)

as stated.

Tokyo, Japan

April, 1951, and  
5 October, 1951.  
23 Nov 1951.

C-3

1. In April, 1951 former Colonel TSUJI Kashiwa approached Source and asked him to assist in briefing KASHIWA Kashiwa of the Ise Trading Company, Ltd. of Tokyo, who was hoping to go to Thailand in the near future. Although TSUJI made it quite explicit that KASHIWA was going in a commercial capacity only, he merely wanted to get to know Source and avail himself of the latter's excellent background knowledge of South East Asia, Source was inclined at the time to consider that KASHIWA had ulterior motives, probably of an intelligence nature. At that time, Source furnished the following information of the incident in documentary form, as the same had been given to him by TSUJI, despite TSUJI's urging on two separate occasions - 16 and 19 April - however, he did not contact KASHIWA. (Field Comment: Copies are translations of the documents furnished Source by TSUJI; Date Received: 21 April, 1951; Eval: Documentary.)

a. (Letter to Source)

19 April, 1951.

Dear Mr. [ ]

I was really happy last night. With regard to the case of Mr. FUJIKO's manuscript, the A. W. H. (or Book-store) has willingly accepted it for publication. So, please come to my house freely in case of sudden need even during my absence.

I wrote a letter addressed to the residence of Mr. KASHIWA Kashiwa. Though I will in due time introduce you to Mr. KASHIWA Kashiwa over the telephone, I want you to discuss necessary matters of briefing directly with him.

Please give my best regards to Mr. TSUJI Kashiwa. I write you to do so in my absence.

Cordially yours,

Kashiwa\*\*

Field Comment\* (Of the Ise Trading Company, which Source uses as a part-time office and contact point.)

Field Comment\*\*: Use of the first name is an excellent indication of only the very closest of and most intimate relationships among Japanese.

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[ ]

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SECURITY INFORMATION

(201-753; FD-327)

b. (Envelope)

"RECEIVED"

Mr. 二 口  
of CHINA  
Eye and Ear Hospital  
HONGKONG.

"Confidential"

Note: The person I referred to wants to see you at his office, s/o ARAKI  
(朝日奈) Building. In order to get to his office, you must take  
a streetcar running from YAMAGUCHI Station of the Government-  
operated electric train and get off at the stop "HONGKONG". (He also  
wants you to give him a telephone call in advance, when you go to see him.)

c. (Card)\*\*\*

KINOSHITA (or KINOSHITA) Kazumi (小倉直)  
President, Nippon Trading Co., Ltd.,  
2-1-1, Nishi-Shinjuku, Tokyo,  
Japan.  
Tel. 33-1111  
Representative: Mr.  
KINOSHITA, Nishi-Shinjuku, Tokyo Co.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

-3-

SECRET

(ZJL-753; PL-327)

d. (card, reverse side)

Dear Mr. KOKURA Naoshi:

I was very sorry about missing you the other day. I have the pleasure of introducing to you my most revered predecessor, [ ] He is my alleged friend who put his high principles and ideals into practice while he was a staff officer of the Japanese Occupation Army in Indochina. Please query him directly on his particular personal background in the area. I should be greatly obliged to you if you will accord him your favor even though you are busy.

Yours respectfully,

TSUJI Masanobu

2. KOKURA Naoshi.

Contrary to the request made by TSUJI in April, source never did get around to brief KOKURA on SEA conditions. Source would like to meet KOKURA at least once. For the present, however, TSUJI's description of KOKURA's activities and past will have to suffice.  
(Sub-source for the following: TSUJI Masanobu; Date of Information: as of late Sept. 1951; Date Acquired: 5 October 1951.)

- a. KOKURA is 55 or 56 years of age, though that is not confirmed. He was once a school teacher. He is said to have stayed in Thailand for a considerable period of time. He has a fine command of the Siamese language. He was also assigned to the Japanese Army Headquarters in Bangkok during the war as its chief Siamese interpreter. He frequently attended conferences between top-flight leaders of the Japanese Army and representatives of the Thai Government in that capacity of interpreter. Accordingly, he is well acquainted with a large number of important persons of the present Thai Government, many of whom were previously in the Thai Government under Japanese Occupation.
- b. KOKURA always assumed quite a friendly and sympathetic attitude toward Siam. It was due to the efforts of KOKURA that the Defense Department of the Thai Government began to trust the Japanese Army and to show a strong pro-Japanese attitude. He was a strong link in the cooperation between Thailand and Japan, both past and present.
- c. His Highness Prince DAMERON is a member of the Thai Royal Family. The son of His Highness DAMURON is Major General DAMERON of the Thai Army, who is at present playing an active part in the Korean War. Prince DAMERON sought a temporary refuge in the Malayan area during the Pacific War. KOKURA played a major role in the release of Prince DAMERON and in the protection of his property assets in Singapore. Therefore, the trust Prince DAMERON places in KOKURA is extraordinarily high. Thus, KOKURA enjoys a wide

SECURITY INFORMATION

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popularity among influential personages of the Thai nation. It is primarily attributable to his noble character. His wit and wisdom are by no means suitable for intelligence and military operations. He would be chiefly useful in the capacity of something like a contact agent to various quarters, or as a trusted high-level informant.

- d. He has not yet sailed for Bangkok. He can not get a travel permit yet. The reason for the delay of the issuance of a travel permit is presumably the lack of goodwill on the part of the U.S. Army toward KOKURA.

3. TSUJI's Ideas on SEA.

While Source was asking TSUJI questions on KOKURA, TSUJI also divulged the following bits of information and comment:

- a. "What worries the Thai Government the most at present appears to be the Communist in Indochina, Burma and CHIENNAI (チエンマイ ??). I think the worry is common either to me or to all the Allied Nations. Should the U.S. Army kindly dispatch me to Thailand by air, I am willing to make a first-hand investigation on the Communist activities in the Southeastern Asian nations myself.
- b. "The Chief of General Staff of Thailand, ARTSU CHARIN SIRWAR (アーツチャリン) is a graduate of the 48th Class at Japanese Army Officer's School. When he was an officer candidate, he used to receive training from me. He will offer hearty support and cooperation to me. During the war, he offered, in conversation to me, to cooperate with the Japanese Army at the sacrifice of everything. I warned him in reply,

"You are a subject of Thailand and, moreover, a soldier. It is really gratifying that you would offer your help to Japan, but you should not forget your position. As a citizen of Thailand, you must give priority to the defense of your homeland rather than to that of Japan. You should never betray your fatherland just because you think highly of Japan."

A large number of the pro-Japanese officers are supposed to be still remaining in the Defense Department of the Thailand Government. Should I be ever sent to Thailand, it is absolutely undeniable that ARTSU CHARIN SIRWAR and other pro-Japanese officers would cooperate with me. As ARTSU CHARIN SIRWAR has a fine command of Japanese, contact would be easily established to him, if I mail a letter and send it safe-hand via KOKURA.

It is also essential to have APHAION (アハオン), the former Prime Minister, cooperate with Japan. Although a contact with APHAION through KOKURA is not secure nor desirable, I think MIAINO (ミアイノ) can do it if he is dispatched there, for he is on good terms with APHAION. MIAINO is supposed to be at present employed by a trading company operated by his former superior, Lt. Gen. MAKAMURU Akihito (マカムル), former Commander in General of the Japanese Garrison Army in Thailand."

4. Source Comment: As the above report indicates, TSUJI still is far more involved and interested in Thailand than even Source presumed.

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INTERNAL SECURITY

(57-759) (P-807)

NY 100-100000

Source told us in September, 1951, that other information leading to him through [redacted] indicated that there was a rumor to the effect that KUMURA had made a trip to Siam during the summer months by plane, had returned, and was again attempting to go to Siam for permanent residence to pursue his business. Source had no means of verifying whether this account or SHUJI's was correct.

Field Command [redacted] : A check sheet from G-2, GHQ, JAG, dated 18 August 1951, forwarded to DS and HSS an anonymous letter (in translation from the original Japanese) received by G-2 regarding KUMURA Moonbi. The letter described KUMURA as a former civil administrator with the Japanese Army in Thailand who was repatriated in 1946. It alleged that KUMURA had "disguised himself" as an employee of the Bangkok branch of the KUMAMORI Trading Company just before the surrender, and had concealed in a "backland warehouse" vast funds and weapons "for the purpose of restoring the Japanese Army." After his repatriation KUMURA established the Siam Trading Company through which, the letter stated, he was obtaining his close contacts with firms in Thailand. It seemed obvious that the letter was a "patron's" attempt to influence G-2 to revive KUMURA's permission to travel to Thailand in the grounds that he was a patriotic observer bent on restoring the old Japanese Army.

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NY 100-100000

SECURITY INFORMATION

23 Nov 51

From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL-756 Local File No: PD-328

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No. of Pages: 2 No. of Enclosures: 0

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Report Made By: [ ] Approved By: [ ]

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Distribution:  
 By copy to: ZACBIN - 2  
 Files - 3  
 JCU - 1  
 [ ] - 1

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Source Cryptonym: [ ] References: ZJL-753; 747

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Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. Information in this report was elicited from TSUJI at the same time as that of ZJL-753. The exact date of the interview is not known even to Source, since TSUJI did not give it, but it is believed to be mid-September.
2. Probably the best title for this report would be "mind of a Japanese 'Bourbon militarist' at work". We feel certain that TSUJI is not alone in the crass, brazenly unrepentant opinions he holds, though few are stupid enough (or frank enough: take your choice!) to express them to foreign newsmen. We personally can hardly disagree as a result with TSUKAMOTO's description of TSUJI given in ZJL-747.

23 November, 1951.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (1) Privacy
  - (2) Methods/Sources
  - (3) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: TSUJI Masanobu: Views on Rearm-Report No: ZJL-756 (PD#328)  
ment and Other Matters.

Date of Information: September, 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 5 October, 1951

Evaluation: C-3

Date of Report: 23 November, 1951

Source: C 2

1. On 27 September, 1951, Source had a lengthy conversation with TSUJI Masanobu, who divulged the following information to him concerning an interview he had had a short while before with an American newspaper correspondent.

(The following is quoted by Source from TSUJI.)

- a. "A North American newspaper Alliance correspondent visited my home the other day with an interpreter. He wanted an interview with me. I did not ask his name, nor did he offer it either. I could see that he was still a young and pure-minded individual, not a trickster. I declined his request for an interview. Since he hung around the gate of my house for some time afterwards, and did not show any signs of going home, however, I finally called him in out of pity and met with him on the condition that the period would not be more than ten minutes. Actually, however, my talk with him exceeded ten minutes and lasted about an hour.
- b. "At first, he asked for my opinions on the arming of Japan. My answer was: 'A variety of opinions are reported not only here but throughout the world on the rearmament of Japan. Such debates are already a waste of time. What steps did Stalin take for Eastern Germany? Did he hesitate over petty arguments? How is the rearmament of Japan treated in the Draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty? Even Stalin has tacitly recognized the necessity of rearmament for Japan. The only question remaining is: what means should be taken for the implementation of prompt and efficient rearmament. The step-by-step reinforcement of the existing NPR (Police Reserve) is one way. To cope with an emergency, however, this course is all but worthless. In view of the slowness of the training program for the NPR, little help is held for the future of it. Approximately six million men of the Japanese Army were mobilized in the late Pacific War. Only 10% of them, it is true, could be promptly made available for defense even if equipped with arms. Nevertheless, I believe it to be far more advisable to raise approximately 600,000 of these old soldiers of strong health and excellent mental ability, organize a "Homeland Defense Volunteers Corps" in each local district, provide them with U.S. arms and equipment, give them a quick re-training, and turn them into a supplementary or auxiliary force to the NPR. However, we must take cognizance especially of the fact that America has never given military aid to foreign countries since the end of the war without dispatching a military mission there also which interfered with

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FORM NO. 81-58  
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even the most petty details of training. Inasmuch as such an interference in many cases disregards the tradition and peculiarities of each country, it is liable to cause unfavorable reactions. As America has once decided to lease its own arms to other countries, it is natural that it should give a sufficient direction and training on the handling of these arms. But if America were to hold to a policy of non-interference in other respects in case of Japan, I think a stronger Army could be established within a short period.'

- c. "What do you think of General Ridgway?" The reporter asked the second question. My reply was: 'I am not particularly concerned with General Ridgway. I think that it was a worthy event that General Ridgway paid a visit to the Emperor the other day. The visit was of great value to establish real understanding of the spirit of the Japanese subjects. But, if I am allowed to voice a candid opinion on this matter, America was too late in having Ridgway call on the Emperor. If the call had been paid a year earlier, its effect would have been greater. I am afraid, however, that such a thing could hardly be understood by Americans unless they had a far more thorough knowledge of the traditional aspect of this country. If General RIDGWAY were to perform a memorial service for the spirits of the war-dead at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, and arrange for the return of the ashes and remains of Japanese soldiers left on South Pacific islands to their families, what a good and immeasurable effect that would have upon the people of Japan is beyond your imagination. We should not sit by idly to see the Japanese politicians, who do not feel shameful in the least to discard war-bereaved families into the lowest stratum of society, do nothing, while wounded soldiers are loitering on the streets like beggars. If America truly wishes to restore an effective Army in Japan, it should recognize these things first of all.'
- d. "To his third question, 'What is your role in the rearmament program of Japan?', my answer was a question: 'I am at present a purgee who is regarded as an undesirable element by both the American and Japanese governments. Moreover, I have been indicted by the Japanese government as a criminal suspect. Such being my present situation, what possible role could be given to me?'"

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST	
44-7-15-1	ZJL-758	29 Nov 1951	C	I
SUBJECT			DATE	
Rightist Organisation and their Activity			28 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
Source: [ ] [ ]			Evaluation: B-3	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM				
<b>3. <u>Movements Concerning Former Military Men.</u></b>				
Efforts toward coordination of the following organizations through efforts of SATOMI has gotten under way:				
a. The TOKA-Kai (or Ten Days Society) founded upon the militant Asianism of <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> and upon the principles of <u>ISHI-HARA Kanji</u> who headed the former East Asia League, comprises approximately 10,000 members.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
SECRET				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
			[ ] [ ]	

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
 (2)(A) Privacy   
 (2)(B) Methods, Sources   
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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 Date: 2005



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2 Jan 52

From: Tokyo, Japan

Report No: ZJL-775

Local File No PD-346

No. of Pages: 2

No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By: [ ]

Approved By: [ ]

Distribution:

By copy to:

ZACABIL - 2  
Files - 3  
JCU - 1  
[ ] - 1

Orally to: 0

MICROFILMED  
APR 23 1963  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Source Cryptonym: [ ]

References: ZJL-753,756; Earlier Rpts on TSUJI.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. We submit this report, and indeed originally asked for the information, primarily because TSUJI is not only a notorious public figure at present but also one who is reported by other sources, particularly [ ] to be currently involved in various underground operations. Therefore a first-hand report on the condition of his health and progress of his indictment case is interesting for checking purposes.
2. It is apparent that even though [ ] has not reported (and perhaps knows but does not choose to report) on other connections and activities of TSUJI's, neither TSUJI's health nor the sympathetic conduct of his indictment proceedings are likely to have prevented or to prevent in the future such activities as have been described by other sources.

4 January, 1952

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INDEX

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FORM NO. 81-59  
FEB 1948

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/ Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

SECURITY INFORMATION  
SECRET

Subject: Activities of TSUJI Masanobu      Report No: ZJL-775 (FD-346)  
Date of Information: As stated  
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan      Date Acquired: As stated  
Evaluation: C-3      Date of Report: 2 January 1952  
Source: [ ]

1. On 15 November, 1951, Source paid a visit to TSUJI Masanobu after a long interval.
2. Around the 10th of November, TSUJI had moved into a new house at #883 Narimune Cho, 2-chome, Suginami Ku, Tokyo, which he had bought from the proceeds of the sale of his previous house at Wakabayashi Cho, Setagaya Ku.
3. The following are the topics in summary which TSUJI discussed with Source on that occasion:

(Sub-source for para. 3: TSUJI Masanobu)

- a. In the hope of having a somewhat untroubled life, TSUJI had moved to his new residence, according to the advice of Source and SAZUJI Tadzo. Since the house at Wakabayashi Cho had a very small garden, he could not potter about in it. The new house, however, has a large garden. So TSUJI would like to raise some vegetables in it and, by so occupying himself, keep away from world affairs for the time being.

He has received only a few visits since he moved there, since that house is located at quite a distance from railway and other transportation facilities. He used to be much disturbed with such a number of visitors at the other house. From now on, he may be less bothered, at least by visitors.

- b. After he had undergone a cancer operation, TSUJI's health proved much more robust than was expected. Now he does not differ at all, at least in appearance, from a normal, healthy man. Of course, he has not yet regained his physical vigor in full, since for example he eats only 1/2 of the food he used to eat before. In appearance, however, he has recovered to a point where people could hardly believe him if he said he were a sick man. Therefore, he reported to the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office and asked for resumption of interrogations under the Purge Ordinance violation case. Since then, he has been placed under files under interrogation, which was to wind up of the case on 1/1/52. The procurator in charge of this case, SAZUJI, is really a very intelligent man. If he had any hidden implications, he would have found them out.

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SECURITY INFORMATION (ZJI-775; PD-346)

he tries to pick it out from the bottom to the best of his ability. He is a fine person. Come good fortune or bad, TSUJI is completely sold on him and is putting full trust in him. For this reason, whether he is going to be declared guilty or not has become of no consequence to TSUJI, and he is disclosing whatever opinions and facts he has, regardless of the verdict. TSUJI is chiefly appreciative that he has come to know an excellent person like Prosecutor SAKUMA thanks to the current case.

- c. TSUJI had promised Major General Willoughby to offer the latter the rights of translation and publication of his book "3000 Ri (or 6000 Miles) of Underground Travelling". To carry out this promise as soon as possible, TSUJI contacted General Willoughby through the Japanese Legation. Willoughby sent a reply to the following effect:

"Allow me to decline your offer of the copyright. Should you be desirous of coming to the United States, I would be willing to refer you to prominent officials of the Defense Department and in other quarters. Or, if you wish to serve us in Japan, I would be also prepared to introduce you to a high-ranking officer of the U.S. Far East Command. I specifically wish you to be discreet in your activity and in the correct interpretation of the world situation".

TSUJI assumes that General Willoughby's life as a military man away from active duty is by no means an easy one. He can not help but have high respect to the General's extremely unselfish attitude. Though TSUJI appreciates Willoughby's kind offer to introduce him to prominent figures in the American Government, TSUJI has no clear-cut idea at the moment as to what mission he should take upon himself in cooperation with the United States officials or army.

NOTES

It appears highly likely that HATCHI Takahiro was one of the three persons. It would be very interesting to know who the other two were, and whether they were American contacts or not.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST	
44-7-14-31	ZJL-789	23 Jan 52	[	]
SUBJECT			DATE	
Rearmament Activities: TANAKA Shinichi			27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
Source: [ ] from HATTORI Takushiro Evaluation: C-3				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
<p>3. At the time of the March 1951 conference, IWAKURO and TANAKA were very close, but since then they have split. TANAKA is cooperating at present with former Colonel OGOSHI Kenji, 36th class graduate of Army Officers School and graduate of Army College. He was assigned to G-2, HQ Staff Office, Kwantung Army and was commander of Kempei Headquarters at the time of the surrender. At the time of the Nomonhan Incident OGOSHI was assigned to Section 2, Staff Office of the Kwantung Army HQ, and therefore was out of contact with HATTORI and TSUJI Masanobu and others who were in G-1 (Strategy) studying the Russian situation. OGOSHI has said that the arrogance of these men caused the disastrous incident, and he has opposed HATTORI, TSUJI, and the G-1 group ever since.</p>				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
			[ ]	

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(15)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

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- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. C    J	SOURCE ZJL-790	DATE OF DOCUMENT 23 Jan 52	ANALYST C    J
SUBJECT Activities and Contacts of HATTORI Takushiro			DATE 1 Feb 1954
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: C    J from HATTORI Takushiro			Evaluation: C-3
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
3. HATTORI and <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> called on General UKEDA Kenkichi at UKEDA's house in Atami. TSUJI appears to be recovering from his series of operations. One of TSUJI's sons has TB and is receiving treatment with streptomycin supplied by KATO Katsuro.			
4. The Tokyo District Procurator's Office requested HATTORI to present his opinions before a group of officials, among them SAKUMA (fnu) who is in charge of interrogating TSUJI in connection with TSUJI's war crimes case.			
5. MIYAMOTO Daishiro, official of the S.I.B. in charge of the TSUJI case, called on HATTORI in early January 1952 and indicated that the S.I.B. would not expend so much of its energies supervising the activities of purged soldiers in the future but would concentrate on following the movements of JCP members.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. TB 465 223
SECRET			C    J

FORM NO. 69-24  
DEC 1952

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. C	SOURCE ZJL-800	DATE OF DOCUMENT 5 Feb 1952	ANALYST C	
SUBJECT HARUKE Yoshitane's Support of TANAKA Toshibaumi			DATE 1 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: C-3	
Source: C, from HARUKE Yoshitane				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
<p>2. Through an introduction by SATOMI Hajime, HARUKE became acquainted with KAJIYAMA (fnu), President of the Hokkaido Products Company, Inc., who told HARUKE that a profit could be made through re-sale of coal mined in the Mitsubishi Mining Industry pits. HARUKE then consulted with FUJIMATSU (fnu), Sapporo branch manager of the Bank of Japan and MIYAZAKI (fnu), branch manager of the Kangyo Bank, having become acquainted with the latter through <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> a mutual acquaintance....</p>				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILED IN: [ ]	

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources

VIA: AIR  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

**SECRET**

DISPATCH NO. SEA 1852

Security Information  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FE

DATE: 8 February 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, [ ]

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational - Project [ ]  
SPECIFIC - Forwarding PB-380

We attach hereto Memo PB-380, reporting a correction to  
ZJL-790.

Attachment

Dist:  
Wash - 2  
[ ] - 1  
Files - 2

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**SECRET**

Security Information  
CLASSIFICATION

15091  
[ ]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

7 February 1952

Check Nr. PD-380

TO : [ ] ]  
FROM : [ ] ]  
GENERAL SUBJECT : Project [ ] ]  
SPECIFIC SUBJECT : Correction to ZJL-790  
REFERENCES : ZJL-790, ZJL-724-B, ZJL-713.

1. Paragraph 3, ZJL-790, states that TSUJI Masamichi's son is being given streptomycin by KATO Katsuro for a T.B. condition. A check on the Imaji for this case has shown that it is SATO Katsuro, rather than KATO. SATO is described in ZJL-724-B as a former subordinate and at that time a close friend of TSUJI, founder of AYO Shobo (in which TSUJI invested \$100,000 and which published TSUJI's books), and a Communist or Communist-sympathizer. According to Source's informant, MATSUI Taduo, SATO is a low sort of person who was using TSUJI's reputation and money to further his own interests.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 74-7-9-297	SOURCE ZJJ-19	DATE OF DOCUMENT 15 Feb 1962	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT Estimates of Soviet Forces in Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands			DATE 27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: B-Opinion	
Source C J, compiled from the sources indicated				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
<u>Field Comment.</u>				
....				
In August 1951, a B source reported that ASAEIDA (ASAEIDA Shige-haru - a former lieutenant colonel in JIGS) was reported to be associated with Colonel <u>TSUJI Masanobu.</u>				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [ ]	

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-14-33	SOURCE ZJL-814	DATE OF DOCUMENT 16 Feb 1952	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT FUJII Takatoshi			DATE 27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
Source: C J			Evaluation: C-3	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
2. HARUKE Yoshitane first met FUJII in October 1951, having been introduced by <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> .				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
SECRET				
CROSS-REFERENCE FORM			FILED IN: [ ] [ ]	

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. C	SOURCE ZJJ-36	DATE OF DOCUMENT 7 Mar 1952	ANALYST C J
SUBJECT HARUKE Yoshitane - Biographical Information		DATE 1 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: Former High-ranking Kempei officer, closely associated with HARUKE			Evaluation: C-3
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
7. <u>Friends and Acquaintances.</u>			
.....			
<u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> , former colonel.			
.....			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM		C J	

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			
FILE NO. C J	SOURCE ZJLA-1909	DATE OF DOCUMENT 4 Apr 1952	CROSS FILED BY ANALYST C J
SUBJECT MIURA Giechi		DATE 1 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
<p>THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM</p> <p>6. In the field of intelligence his contacts and activities are also numerous. His connections with KODAMA Yoshio have continued since China days. The Daito Jiku, in which he was very active, is believed to have been as interested in intelligence as it was in ultra-nationalism. He was the "komon" for the Kyokuto Keisai Kenkyu Kai (Far Eastern Problems Research Society). He has contacts with NABEYAMA Sadachika and is believed to be making use of TSUJI Masanobu. And he is connected with re nascent JIS groups, advising them on financial matters and problems concerning commercial fronts.</p> <p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p>			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-15-5	SOURCE ZJJ-70	DATE OF DOCUMENT 4 Apr 50	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT KOTANI Etsuo			DATE 25 Feb 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: Former Japanese army officer with intelligence background, colleague of KOTANI			Evaluation: B-3	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
6. Although he was in the same class in the Military Academy with <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu they were not on friendly terms.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
<b>SECRET</b>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
			C J	

FORM NO. 50-34  
DEC 1952

(38)

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*2 May 52*

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Report Made By: [ ] Approved By: [ ]

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By copy to:  
WASHINGTON  
[ ]  
FILES

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NONE

Source Cryptonym: [ ] References: ZJJ-72, ZJJ-76

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

This information was received by [ ] from a 3 April conversation with TSUJI.

Attachment A was brought to our attention by [ ] late in March. Attachment B and Attachment C are from the same magazine, to which [ ] subscribes. Relating the information contained in these attachments and that in ZJJ-72, Attachment C, indicates, perhaps incorrectly, that [ ] information on TSUJI has been overt or nearly overt.

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Classification SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

**INFORMATION REPORT**

JAPAN COMPOSITE UNIT

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 2 May 1952

SUBJECT TSUJI Masanobu Activities During April 1952

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo

NO. OF ENCLS. 3  
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. April 1952

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Former Japanese army officer with intelligence experience.

- On the night of 1 April 1952, TSUJI Masanobu, a prominent rightist, and HATTORI Takushiro, head of the Historical Records Department, Demobilization Board, were invited to dinner by CHANG Po-chin (張白謹)<sup>1</sup> of 1728/4101/ the Chinese Mission. The two thought that they would be the only Japanese guests, but found that former General OKAMURA Heiji (or Yasutsugu) (岡村 英次), former Lieutenant General HIRAI Takeo (平井 武雄), and former Lieutenant General DOI Akio (土 光 明 史) were also present. TSUJI is generally on bad terms with DOI and OKAMURA, and HATTORI is on bad terms as well, but the meeting, entirely social in nature, seemed to alleviate the ill feeling which had existed.
- Nothing political was discussed at the dinner. Since DOI had been a classmate of Lieutenant General KAWAMURA Saburo (河村 参 郎), Singapore Kempei commander who was executed after the war, TSUJI described the conditions under which KAWAMURA's widow and family are living and urged DOI and the others present to buy KAWAMURA's posthumous war memoirs, Climbing the Thirteen Steps. This was compiled by TSUJI and was about to be published by Ato Shobo, the publishing concern owned by his close friend SATO Katsuro (佐藤 勝 郎), which has published nearly all of TSUJI's writings. DOI agreed to do so and thereby apparently dispelled TSUJI's previous enmity.
- A number of people have criticized TSUJI for his conduct in the KAWAMURA case. KAWAMURA and OISHI Masayuki, a lieutenant colonel, stood trial and were executed for their part in the killing of Chinese merchants in Malaya. The order to massacre anti-Japanese Chinese was originated by ASaeda Shigeharu (朝 枝 繁 春),<sup>2</sup> then a lieutenant colonel and staff officer with the 25 Army, and countersigned by ASaeda's superior TSUJI. As a result, not only the anti-Japanese Chinese but many neutral and pro-Japanese Chinese were murdered. TSUJI disappeared immediately after the war and did not reappear until he had made his way back to Japan, some four years later, thus escaping trial as a war criminal.
- KAWAMURA and TSUJI were from the same town. Shortly after TSUJI's Singapore was published, Mrs. KAWAMURA, who found that she needed money, came to him for help. TSUJI had kept several articles written by

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ATTACHMENT A

EJ-101

6P

An article on TSUJI appearing in the 1 April 1952 issue of Junika Iomiri.

Concerning an article published by a certain magazine in its January 1952 issue entitled, "TSUJI Masanobu and his Trip Underground in Japan," TSUJI made the following remarks:

"Some of the material in the article comes fairly close to facts which I have disclosed to me one but an official of the SIB who was interrogating me. I believe I laid bare all my iniquities before that SIB official. I cannot but conclude that the SIB has sold its confidential documents to some cheap publication, or else that the documents were stolen. Although I do not intend to sue the SIB, I think it is an indisputable fact that that government office is rotten, and its authority is completely lost if such a thing is allowed to happen. This being the case, there is no wonder that its information on the JCP is tipped off to TOKUDA Kyuichi so easily. I personally warned the Attorney General's Office to be more discreet."

A biographical sketch of TSUJI:

Birthplace: Ase-Inadachi, Higashi Tanokura-mura, Emma-gun, Ishikawa Prefecture.

Immediate relatives: TSUJI was the second son among six children, two of whom were girls.

School and military service: After graduating from the senior class of the Higashi Tanokura-mura primary school, he took examinations for admittance to the Army Officers Preparatory School in Nagoya. While waiting, he was apprenticed to a merchant in Osaka for four months. After graduating from Army Officers Preparatory School, he was admitted to and graduated from Army Officers School in 1924, being presented with a silver watch from His Excellency the Prince for being top man in his class. He was assigned to the 7 Infantry Regiment in Kanagawa, from which he entered the Military College. While attending Military College, he married AOKI Kame (青木 久美). TSUJI graduated from Military College in 1931, second in his class and a member of the Sword Group, after which he returned to the 7 Regiment and participated in the Shanghai Incident as commander of the 2 Company. It was at this time that he was awarded the fifth class decoration of the Order of the Golden Kite. Since that time, he has been appointed to the staff office, GHQ; to be company commander at Army Officers School; and to the staff of the Kwantung Army.

TSUJI was at Nomonhan at the time the battle took place there. During the war he directed important operations in north and central China, Guadalcanal, the Philippines, Burma, and so forth as a staff officer. He received 27 scars and has gained a reputation for immortality.

After the war, TSUJI was a fugitive for five years, disappearing from sight in Thailand. He has published several war books: 3,000 Miles Underground, Nomonhan, 15 to 1, Guadalcanal, and Singapore. His hobby is reading. He has two sons and three daughters. His recent residence is in Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

(NOTE: There follows a series of anecdotes concerning TSUJI's war experiences, taken from TSUJI's books. Items of note are these:

(After he had managed to get back to Japan, he hid in the homes of KODAMA Yoshio and TAKAMIYA Taihei (高宮 太平), vice president of the Asahi Daily News. He worked for a while during 1949 in the

Oct # 1 to 255-101

ATTACHMENT A, page 2


Koshiro Coal Mines in Saga Prefecture, but quit when he found that many of his acquaintances were working there too.)

TSUJI apparently started writing books about the spring of 1949. In August of that year he distributed the manuscript of 3,000 Miles Underground to members of a certain group in Tokyo. He usually chose to write at hot spring resorts.

On 7 January 1950, when TSUJI heard that the war crimes tribunal had closed, he showed up at KODAMA's house and handed him the manuscript of 3,000 Miles Underground. KODAMA made a request that the book be published through TAKAMIYA and OGATA Taketora (岡田 竹虎). YOSHIKAWA Eiji (吉川 英次) was reported to have proof-read the book, but actually he only gave it its title. Asahi Press was reluctant to publish it and only reported that "Staff Officer TSUJI has reappeared!" Just when TSUJI became the focus of attention of the press, MURI Masazo (森 正藏), author of A 20-Year Hurricane, negotiated successfully to have his own war experiences in China published.

Even after he had been cleared of war crimes charges, TSUJI remained in hiding and continued to be a mysterious hero. The lecture TSUJI gave to the Liberalist Club on "The War Potential and Strategy of America and Russia vs. Japan's Stand" brought about the "slip-of-the-tongue case" just at a time when people were trying to take advantage of him.

People surrounding TSUJI:



- NOTE:
- Connected
  - - - Presumably connected
  - ==== Friend
  - Presumably out off at present
  - ===== Probable admirer

A majority of the Army Officer's School graduates below the 40th class.

The people surrounding TSUJI may be classified in four main groups, which may not, of course, include all the important people involved.

First, we will name people who are considered to be definitely connected with TSUJI: Former Colonel HATTORI Takushiro, chief of the Historical Records Department of the Demobilization Bureau, is most commonly rumored to be connected with TSUJI on the rearrangement problem. However, it seems that HATTORI respects TSUJI as his former superior and that their relationship is purely social.

TSUJI has been acquainted with UEDA Kenkichi (榎田謙吉), former general and commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, since he was a staff officer for that army. UEDA likes TSUJI so much that, when TSUJI was operated on during August 1951 for cancer of the stomach, UEDA got out of bed and came from Oiso to see him at the Japan Red Cross Hospital in Asabu, Tokyo.

SATO Katsuro (佐藤勝朗) was a student of TSUJI's at the Army Officers School, where he was in the 49th class. (He is mistakenly called a former lieutenant colonel by some people. Actually he was employed at the Japan Aviation Company at the time of the surrender.) SATO is running Ato-Shobo, which published 3,000 Miles Underground, Moscow, and An Echo of Asia. He is such an admirer of TSUJI that he is thinking of putting out another of TSUJI's works, Self-Defense and Neutrality.

ASAEDA Shigeharu (朝枝繁春), UCHIYAMA Kazunari (内山一也), and SHIOYA Makoto (塩谷誠) were all TSUJI's admirers. In particular, ASAEDA, a former military attache in Russia, forms TSUJI's opinions on Russia. Besides these men, there is an unusually large number of TSUJI's supporters among his subordinates and among Army Officers School alumni who graduated after the 40th class. They are not organized. Former Captain KO Yasuo (小尾靖史) is a survivor of Guadalcanal and has offered material to TSUJI.

Who are TSUJI's financial backers?

GOTO  
GODAMA Keita (五島廉太), president of the T.I.K. Company and former Commerce and Industry Minister, is a former patron of the Sakurai-Kai (Cherry Group) of the former army. NAGASHIMA Ginsu (長島銀道), a penicillin manufacturer, is also looked upon as a probable backer.

Among those who are presumably associated with TSUJI are TANAKA Shinichi, former lieutenant general and chief of the Operations Section, JIOS, and prominent members of the To-A Kenmei founded by the late ISHIBARA Kenju, such as HAKAYAMA Yu (中山健), KIMURA Takeo (木村武雄), and TAMURA Shinsaku (田村真作).

TSUJI was acquainted with KODAMA Yoshio, former chief of the Hanking Tokumu Kikan, in 1944 when he was selected a member of the staff of the China Expeditionary Army. TSUJI was then boosting the East Asia League. When TSUJI was in hiding in Chungking, he heard that KODAMA was a war-crimes suspect in China. TSUJI then went around the city saying that KODAMA was a relative of his and thus saved KODAMA's life. KODAMA, appreciating the kindness, for a time helped TSUJI support his family and got a house for him at Wakabayashi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

IMAI Jin (今井仁) is TSUJI's right-hand man and is president of the Koto-Sha, which published 15 to 1. Through TSUJI's recommendation, one of IMAI's sons was able to get a job with Kokusaku Pulp Company, whose vice-president is MIZUNO Shigeo (水野成史).

ZJJ-101

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There are more than 300 Hinomaru Pyro temples of the Nichiren Sect in Japan in which TSUIJI has hidden during his underground days. It was in Thailand that he first began posing as a Buddhist priest. He calls for a town-killin' argument plan.

Who, then, are the persons responsible for giving TSUIJI so much publicity? HATTORI's treatment policy is reportedly headed by HAYASHI Tokuo and ASHIDA Hitoshi. Like HATTORI, TSUIJI belongs to an opposition group on this problem. He favors the town-killin' principle, supported by HIRAHARA Shiro (平原 四郎) and KUREYAMA Sadachika (久米山 貞吉). TSUIJI's tentative plan would give training to 1,000 men at a time in each prefecture on a rotation system, during the agricultural off-season. The training would prepare the men for the defense of their own home towns, more or less following the "partisan" principle. TSUIJI's plan is said to be based upon the ideal of "Aida for the Aiaties", the theme of the East Asia League.

Is TSUIJI really a charlatan?

He can take a neutral position regarding TSUIJI. His acquaintances make the following comments on him:

1. Is it true that TSUIJI is a genius in operations?

Negative! Despite his position as a staff member, he consistently went to the front, possibly encouraging a partial success, and he thus deprived himself of the necessary objective viewpoint. Most of the operations he directed failed, except in Malaya.

Affirmative! There is a climax to every operation. When the time arrives, it is the duty of every staff officer to go to the front to see the results first-hand. He has a genius for grasping essentials. His operations failed only because the attention was impossible.

2. His character as a soldier.

Negative! Although he may be a flamboyant actor, he is otherwise a very shrewd and calculating person. For instance, he left his subordinates behind and escaped from Bangkok alone.

Affirmative! He is a tough, passionate man of action. He is apt to be misunderstood by others because he does not hesitate to clash with them in the line of duty. He acts on the basis of principles derived from the whole of history. Time will show that he has been misunderstood.

3. Is he insubordinate?

Negative! Because he was born the son of a poor farmer in the Tohoku, he lacks power. He sympathetically listens to his subordinates' complaints. In a way, he is a bolshewik, an ambitious man.

Affirmative! He will fight with anyone, superior, equal, or subordinate, whose acts are unjust. He is a simple, naive man.

237-10A

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

ATTACHMENT A, page 5

4. He is called a man who can be trusted. Is that true?

Negative: He holds to the theme of the "nanivabushi", stressing personal obligations.

Affirmative: There is no perfect man, and it is not fair to mention a man's defects only, especially only generally. TSUJI never compromises with the sophisticated world, has violent feelings of love and hate, and goes his own way in the closest possible union with justice.

(NOTE: More anecdotes about school and military days follow.)

The "tongue-slip case."

The lecture TSUJI delivered to the Liberalist Club in March 1952 constituted a violation of the purge directive. As a result, TSUJI was indicted by the SIB. The contents of the lecture are still being studied by the Special Surveillance Section of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office. The following part of the speech is reported to have been used in JCP propaganda:

"Russia probably has more war material than the U.S. estimates. The U.S. has 500 atom bombs, Russia 50. But U.S. industry is highly centralized whereas Russia's is dispersed. In addition, Russia succeeded in flying in the stratosphere five or six years before America did. If Russia occupies Hokkaido with from 10 to 20 divisions, and China Kyushu with 20 divisions, Japan would be without its two major coal areas. Asia in the Third World War will not be a major battleground, but will be incidental from the strategic point of view. Soviet leaders are considering dropping atom bombs on the U.S. so that the isolationists may take over there and persuade the country to give up the war. America will probably lose the next war. Japan should hold to the MacArthur statement of neutrality and should not become involved in the war. For this reason, maintenance of internal security is necessary, and the Communist problem should be settled through conferences."

TSUJI's income from his books in 1951 is estimated at ¥3,500,000. When he had cancer of the stomach last summer (1951), he sold his house in Wakabayashi, Setagaya-ku, for ¥650,000 to pay taxes and hospital charges. His family consists of two sons and three daughters. Then, how and where does he spend his money?

He claims that he gives half his income to the families of war victims. He sends money regularly to about eight families, including those of Colonel S.M.K. and Captain K.I., and occasionally to about fourteen other families. These people have asked for a larger lump sum rather than small, frequent amounts, but TSUJI replies that, "It is better to sprinkle water on parched soil."

Even the money from the Golden Kite decoration.

He is busy finding jobs for superiors, friends, and subordinates. At present he is looking for employment for a son of General I. who was repatriated from Russia, a daughter of Lieutenant General K., and more than 10 others.

ZJJ-101

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ATTACHMENT A, page 6

213-101

He is usually not concerned with the welfare of his own family. When his eldest son was forced to leave middle school after the second year and become an apprentice, he was sent some money by a friend of his. He still remembers this with deep gratitude.

1 Field Comment. Both are former (?) Communists who are friends of Iokusaki Pulp K.K. leaders MINAMI Kichiro and MIZUNO Shigeo.

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ATTACHMENT B

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From the 12 April 1952 Issue of Shingo: Tokubetsu Tamahin

The Defense Counter-Measures Committee of HAREYAMA and MITAMURA Activated.

The YOSHIDA cabinet is faced with the necessity of constitutional revision for the rearmament of Japan. In an effort to postpone rearmament, Prime Minister YOSHIDA has expressed to Mr. Dulles and General Ridgway the opinion that he could not be sure of success in a plebiscite yet. The American government, on the other hand, is sternly calling for revision of the constitution for rearmament, anticipating the possible rise of worldwide pacifism after the conclusion of a Korean armistice. YASHIDA Hitoshi and KISHI Shinsuke (岸信介), with an eye to the control of the next cabinet, are devising a scheme for alteration of the political situation, bitterly criticizing the weak points of the YOSHIDA administration.

Their maneuvering has gradually affected the Social Democratic League, to which NISHIO Sushiro (西尾末次) is connected. The Social Democratic League, which has made the most of YOSHIDA's recent slip of the tongue in arousing the public opinion for constitutional amendment, is now about to adopt into its line of policy "the militia organization theory" held by HAREYAMA Sadaohika (原山貞彦) and MITAMURA Shiro. Influenced by the new development of the Social Democratic League, the right-wing faction of the Socialist Party shows indications of being inclined to favor rearmament after the effectuation of the Peace Treaty.

MITAMURA and HAREYAMA have formed the Defense Counter-Measure Committee (Boei Taigaku Iinkai (防衛対策委員会)) along with MINAMI Kiichi (南喜一), HARA Iwaoichi (原久一), KATAOKA Fumishige (片岡文重) and KIKUKAWA Tadao (菊川忠久). They are linked to the rearmament group of the Progressive Party and are working on the Liberal Party also. By arousing a popular movement for constitutional revision and rearmament, they are aiming at getting their operational funds from the defense budget.

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ATTACHMENT C

From the 12 April 1952 issue of Shinsei Tokubetsu Tanshin

An Investigation into the Financial Systems of Groups of Former Military Men.

Government Section, GHQ, SOAF, has been watching with considerable interest the actions of groups of former military men and has come to the following conclusions:

1. There is no danger at present of a resurgence of militarism.
2. Even if the militarists regained their former power as soldiers, there is no danger that they might control the actions of the Japanese government.
3. There is something psychologically anti-American in the actions of a group led by TSUJI Masanobu.

In order to get details on the background and history of former military men, SOAF is classifying them simply as army or navy and is making up an extensive list of their names. The Japanese government has been asked to supply detailed and accurate information, and it is reported that secret investigations will probably be made into the source of operational funds for each group of former military men.

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Oct 3 to ZJJ-101

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-18-12	SOURCE ZJJ-106	DATE OF DOCUMENT 9 May 52	ANALYST C J
SUBJECT Organization of former Japanese military personnel		DATE 25 Feb 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: Former Japanese intelligence officer, in contact with many military personnel			Evaluation: B-3
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
6. From the classes of 1928 to 1945 at the Military Academy, an organization had been formed, according to HAYASHI Saburo, and is planning a vigorous program of activities, such as publication of a periodical and establishment of closer contacts among members. The initiative in the group is firmly held by followers of <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> .			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
<b>SECRET</b>			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. C J

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-16-19	SOURCE ZJJ-113	DATE OF DOCUMENT 16 May 52	ANALYST. C
SUBJECT OGATA Taketora			DATE 25 Feb 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: B-3
Source: Former Japanese Intelligence officer, from a Tokyo newspaper reporter			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
3. Among OGATA's contacts are <u>TSUJI</u> Masanobu and <u>HATTORI</u> Tak- ushiro and he is also in touch with <u>TATSUMI</u> Eiichi on the rearma- ment program.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 88679

CD NO.

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 27 May 1952

SUBJECT TSUJI Masanobu's Activities During April 1952

NO. OF PAGES 2

DATE OF INFO. April 1952

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C. X	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3. X	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Former Japanese army officer with intelligence experience.

- On the night of 1 April 1952, TSUJI Masanobu, a prominent rightist, and HATORI Takushiro, head of the Historic Records Department, Demobilization Board, were invited to dinner by CHANG Po-chin (1728/4101/0210)<sup>1</sup> of the Chinese Mission. The two thought that they would be the only Japanese guests, but discovered that former General OKAMURA Keiji (Yasutsugu) (1481/2625/1890/2945), former Lieutenant General IMAI Takeo (0095/0064/2976/7180) and former Lieutenant General DOI Akio (0960/1445/2494/1138) were also present. TSUJI and HATORI are generally on bad terms with DOI and OKAMURA. The meeting, however, which was entirely social in nature, seemed to alleviate the ill feeling which had previously existed. The enmity which existed between DOI and TSUJI was somewhat dispelled because DOI agreed to buy a copy of KAWAMURA Saburo's posthumous memoirs, Climbing the Thirteen Steps, compiled by TSUJI.<sup>2</sup> Nothing political was discussed at the meeting.
- Since TSUJI wrote the article entitled Self Defense and Neutrality, his opinions on rearmament have changed. He is in favor of the Security Pact, rearmament and neutrality. He claims that he warned the Japanese people that the United States will pull out of Japan because he does not want Japanese rearmament to be slowed down by the feeling that the U. S. army would defend Japan whether Japan were armed or not. TSUJI has not yet expressed his new opinions completely. He apparently fears that his inconsistency will bring criticism and will perhaps hurt the sale of his new book. Japanese Communist Party convert MITAMURA Shiro (0005/3944/2625/0934/8745), a close friend of TSUJI, is the man responsible for changing TSUJI's opinions to favor the town-militia theory.<sup>3</sup>
  - Field Comment. This is Dr. CHANG Po-chin, head of the Second Section of the Chinese Mission.
  - Source Comment. Mrs. KAWAMURA came to TSUJI and asked for financial aid. The latter complied by having KAWAMURA's memoirs published and guaranteed Mrs. KAWAMURA a little over \$100,000 regardless of the profit or loss which the book sustained.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRD															
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI															

ASST	X	STC		FDP															
DABSO		STD		FDR		FDR													
STA	X	FDS		FBI		X	TRD												
STG		FDM		FDT		TDS													

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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3. Source Comment. MITAMURA is connected with the Defense Counter-measure Committee, a few members of which are linked to the Parliament group of the Progressive Party and are working on the Liberal Party also.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. [ ] [ ]	SOURCE ZJJ-132	DATE OF DOCUMENT 13 June 52	ANALYST [ ] [ ]
SUBJECT Lt. Col. LIU Chih-chao		DATE 25 Feb 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: Former Japanese intelligence officer, Evaluation: B-3 from a friend of HATTORI			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTED INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
3. Shortly after the Peace Treaty became effective on 28 April, LIU invited HATTORI and TSUJI Masanobu, prominent former army officer, now an author and military critic with a large following, to attend a dinner at the embassy. When they arrived they were surprised to find that former General OKAMURA Neiji, Lt. Gen. KASHARA Yukio, and Lt. Gen. DOI Akio were also present. TSUJI seemed very much annoyed to find DOI there.			
4. LOU has been friendly with TSUJI since the latter was stationed in Nanking. Evidently TSUJI introduced HATTORI to him. LOU also met DOI when the latter was stationed in Nanking, and it is believed that DOI introduced KASHARA to him. As for OKAMURA, he and LOU's father were good friends in the days before outbreak of the China war.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			[ ] [ ]

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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3 July 52

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Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

the source for paragraphs 1, 2, and 5, received the information in the first two paragraphs from   on 20 June 1952 and the remainder from   about 24 May.

submitted the information in paragraphs 3 and 4.

INDEX

Classification

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Declassified and Approved for Release  
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Date: 2005

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

CLASSIFICATION

REPORT NO. ZJJ-149

INFORMATION REPORT

JAPAN COMPOSITE UNIT

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 3 July 1952

SUBJECT TSUJI Masanobu 1.

NO. OF PAGES 2.

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo 2.

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. 13-20 May 1952

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE *					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENTS						
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

\*See below

SOURCE Paragraphs 1, 2, 5: Former Japanese intelligence officer, from a former Japanese general and friend of TSUJI.  
 Paragraphs 3, 4: Former Japanese army officer with intelligence experience from a close friend of TSUJI.

1. Former Colonel TSUJI Masanobu (7-2398/3207), who has the reputation of the lower classes of being the closest thing Japan now has to a general here, visited the Soviet Mission on 14 May 1952 to ask that a letter he had written to his old friend, former Colonel MISHIMA Rakaji (0005/0756/1121) be delivered. MISHIMA is a graduate of the class of 1924 at the military academy of the War College, and a onetime staff officer in political work with the Kantung Army. He was a classmate of TSUJI and the two worked together in Kwantung Army headquarters later. MISHIMA was captured by the Soviets in 1945 and is still a prisoner of the USSR.

2. TSUJI showed the receiving officer at the mission an article which appeared in the 13 May issue of a Japanese newspaper, quoting a remark made by KIRA (0005/1338/0592/747), then in Moscow, to the effect that the Soviet government offered to permit correspondence between persons in Japan and those held in Russia in Russia. Realizing who the visitor was, the receiving officer excused himself and left the room. A few minutes later, Major General P. Kizilko, then head of the mission, entered the room alone, saying that he could personally see that TSUJI's letter was delivered to MISHIMA, and that he had read it. TSUJI's book of interest, and also remarked that he would carry it to TSUJI when he returned from time to time. TSUJI said that he would try to receive a reply from MISHIMA.

As of 20 May, TSUJI had not visited the Chinese Mission since 14 April.

As of 20 May, 5,000 copies of TSUJI's latest work, a pamphlet entitled 'The Situation in Shanghai', had been put on the market and had been sold in Shanghai. It is conjectured that each of the 5,000 copies would be worth 100,000 yen, or an additional 500,000,000 (500 million) yen to the publisher.

[ ]

- 1 Field Comment. Kialenko was recalled to Moscow, and left Japan on 27 June.
- 2 Field Comment. See ZJ-101 and ZJJ-132. One source reported that TSUJI, HATTORI Takushiro, DOI Akio, and others attended a dinner given by the Chinese Mission shortly after the Peace Treaty became effective, but apparently this report was a slightly garbled account of the dinner reported by the source for paragraph 3, who claims that the dinner was held on 1 April. (ZJJ-101)
- 3 Field Comment. This division of receipts seems to give the writer too large a share of the total.

SO-88679 SQB-5A851 ZJJ-132

SANB smg/B

ANA, STC

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. [ ] [ ]	YV-1251	20 March 1946
SUBJECT Shanghai: General Facts on Ishihara Faction		1 Feb 1954
PERTINENT INFORMATION		
Source: Yonkers, New York		Evaluation: C-3
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM		
8. The following is an outline showing the Ishihara Faction's relationship to (a) the political setup of Japan, and this group's relationship with (b) the Central China Army.		
A.		
The Emperor		
Prince Higashikuni (Admirer of Ishihara)		
.....		
Col. TSUJI-	(Chief of Staff of the Burma Army. He returned home after the war. He was a "behind the scenes man" in Higashikuni's cabinet).	
.....		
B. List of those in Central China under Ishihara's Influence		
I. From 1940 -		
2. <u>General Army Headquarters, China Expeditionary Force</u>		
General Army Chief of Staff, Itagaki		
.....		
Lt. Col. TSUJI-	(Transferred to Taiwan Army Hqs; he was attached to Staff Hqs; became Chief of the 4th Section; then Chief of Staff of the Burma Army).	
CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.
<b>SECRET</b>		[ ] [ ]

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(35)

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Espionage
  - (2)(C) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(D) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

**SECRET**

-2-

II. From 1944 to --

2. General Army Hqs

.....

Col. TSUJI (4th Section Chief; later transferred  
to Burma)

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- DDD 4 -

JAPAN  
June 7, 1951

WAR POTENTIAL OF U.S.-USSR COMPARED

Tokyo, RENGO NEWS AGENCY, in Japanese, June 5, 1951--T

(Text)

"Tokyo, June 5--Mr. Masanobu Tsuji, former Japanese staff officer, recently made a speech at a certain club house in Tokyo. Analyzing the fighting power of the United States and the Soviet Union in detail, he stated: 'If a war breaks out between the United States and the Soviet Union in the future, the United States will have no chance against the Soviet Union. In any case, Japan should not become involved in such a war. The establishment of military bases will ruin Japan.'

"It is said that the capitalists and conservatives there were much shocked. The details of the so-called 'Tsuji information' are as follows:

(RENGO Editor's Note: Since the original is very long, excerpts are given here).

"The comparison of military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union:

"The documents concerning the fighting power of the Soviet Union, which the Kwangtung Army surveyed from various angles, were burned at the termination of the war except for a few documents. I precisely examined those for 1½ years. In view of what I learned from them and, in addition, various circumstances since then, I judge as follows:

"Military strength--the Soviet Union can mobilize 20,040,000 men at the minimum, among which 16 or 17 million can be dispatched anywhere. The United States will probably be able to mobilize 16 million, among which she will be able to send 8 million to the front. The Soviet Union has military power more than double that of the United States.

"Foodstuff--It is understood that Russia's yearly production is 159 million tons, among which 70 million tons are for domestic consumption and the rest to be kept in stock. Foodstuffs available at the end of 1950 are likely to last at least 4 to 5 years.

Russia's Coal Production

"Coal--Russia's yearly production stands at 250 million tons. Her coal reserves are the largest in the world.

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- DDD 5 -

JAPAN  
June 7, 1951

"Oil--The production of crude oil during last year was 35 million (barrels). Her oil resources are the largest in the world, but production is small in comparison with oil reserves. Seventy percent is produced in Baku, which is easily attacked from Mediterranean military bases. Although Baku has such a defect, it has oil in stock available for about 2½ or 3 years. Moreover, the Soviet Union is eagerly making efforts for developing oil fields in (Eubaku) Southwest of Ural, and Sinkiang Province. Sinkiang Province is superior to Baku in the quality and quantity of oil.

"Planes--Her yearly production is 75,000 planes, and almost the same as the United States. Russian small planes are superior to American small planes in quality and quantity, but Russian strategic bombers are inferior. From those 75,000, 15,000 can always be maintained at the front.

"Tanks--The Soviet Union possesses 50,000 tanks, while the United States has 5,000. The Soviet Union has 51-ton huge tanks which can run even in the mud. It seems that the biggest American tank cannot be compared with them. Their 34-ton tanks, which were used in World War Two, have been brought to Korea. The running and destroying capacity of the 51-ton tank is splendid. It will be a decisive weapon in World War Three.

"As mentioned above, everything surpasses the prospects of the United States. It cannot be overlooked that everything in stock will be available at from 3 to 5 years. This fact escapes the notice of the United States which undervalues the Soviet Union by seeing only her yearly production. Moreover, all industries in the Soviet Union are collectively established in every district. Therefore, wherever the land is isolated, she can make a living. This is really her strong point, and what is different from the United States.

#### War Strategy

"The expected strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union.

"On the opening of the war, the Soviet Union would take a large-scale offensive in Europe and Asia with its large land and air forces. It would take only 2 or 3 months for it to run from Suez to Normandy. According to newspapers, the United States has 500 atom bombs, while the Soviet Union possesses only 50. Judging by common sense, it would be more effective to drop 50 bombs in the United States than to drop 500 over the scattered industries in the Soviet Union.

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- DDD 6 -

JAPAN  
June 7, 1951

"The Soviet Union has 350 to 500 schnorkel submarines in the 1,000-ton class. In a few years, she will have 1,000 submarines. A battle destroying commercial intercourse could be actively fought with them.

"Japan has the intention of depending on foreign countries for good. It is a silly idea. In this case, how would the United States act? Whether or not she can operate her self-satisfied strategic bombing at the beginning-- this will be turning point of victory and defeat. It is doubtful to what extent such bombing would be effective. If there are no good results from bombing, the United States will naturally dispatch a large expedition to Europe. Is it possible for her to win a victory in Europe when her forces march on land?

"Military value of Japan.

"What would the United States do with Japan, when the front entrance of Europe is set afire? Probably, she would have rapidly to withdraw from Japan. Since the capacity of war industry in Russia is only five or six percent of the whole Russian producing power, it would be no heavy blow to the whole industry if the war industry were destroyed. The question is the main artery west of Baikal.

"Japan is not a base from which the main artery is destroyed. That is the bases in India, Afghanistan, Iran, Suez, the Mediterranean, Britain, and Scandinavia. Moreover, the defense of the huge Pacific Ocean is necessary for protecting the Japanese base. Therefore, the United States cannot stay in Japan for a long time.

#### Destruction of Japan

"Then, what would she do with Japan when she withdrew? She has already declared that it would be terrible, if Japan's industrial power is combined with China's resources. In view of this, I think the United States will drastically destroy Japan's industrial power before she withdraws. We can see such an example in Korea. Then, what are the bases in the Bonins and the Ryukyus for? I think they are precisely the bases for bombing Japan.

"Thus, it seems that the victor of the next war will not be the United States. Both the Soviet Union and the United States will devote their heart and soul to it, and the result will be a long-term war of at least for 5 or 10 years. All civilization on the earth involved in the war will be completely destroyed.

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- DDD 7 -

JAPAN  
June 7, 1951

"As for the attitude of Japan in such a case, I dare to say: 'Do not be involved in such a war.' Japan should never be involved. However painful it is, it will be easier to endure than being involved in the roar of war. Probably, a riot may break out. Public security will have to be protected against it. We should take what the Communist Party says, if it is good. However often theoretical disputes indulged in, we, the Japanese, should not shoot each other.

"As for the problem of military bases, it is silly to consider that the United States will protect Japan by stationing soldiers here up to the last moment so long as she has military bases in Japan. It is impossible in view of her fighting power and military strength. Moreover, in case that there are military bases in Japan, (the enemy of the United States--Ed.) naturally would declare war against Japan. Nothing less than "neutrality" is necessary for Japan.

"If the bases are removed by means of peaceful negotiations, industries will not be destroyed, and at the same time the Japanese people will be able to examine themselves. If we believe in her protection and realize the contrary after the war breaks out, we shall be terribly miserable. Therefore, we should not depend on the military bases, but refuse to have them. If the United States interferes too much, an anti-American sentiment will be stimulated and there will be a countereffect. One of the reasons for the failure of Chiang Kai-shek was such a countereffect."

#### YOSHIDA-HATOYAMA INFLUENCE COMPARED

Tokyo, TOKYO SHIMBUN, in Japanese, June 4, 1951--T/S

(Excerpts)

"As the depurge is slated to be made shortly, a sort of delicate undercurrent has begun to flow in political circles. Which of the two, Premier Yoshida or Hatoyama, would win favor if a vote for surveying popularity were made, has come to be taken up as a serious problem.

"The basic cause of trouble for a Democratic-Liberal .... Even within the People's Democratic Party there are not a few who consider that they can gain more national feeling if they prefer Yoshida to Hatoyama. The problem is what will be the outcome of the Liberal Party if the now-purged Hatoyama gets back to the Party?"

"If we take it for granted that the Liberal Party will split in two on account of an opposition between the Yoshida-Hirokawa faction and the Hatoyama-Ono faction, then we must take a waiting policy as quoted in the Japanese saying: 'Wait until the persimmons get ripe, soft, and mellowed.' Even if the Democrats are affiliated with Yoshida, the reverse effect may be that the Liberal Party will be all the more consolidated.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-733	SOURCE FEC/MIS # 3594	DATE OF DOCUMENT 12 July 52	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intell Summaries			DATE 25 Feb 54	

PERTINENT INFORMATION

The following information is taken from pages J-3 and J-4.

SECURITY BRIEFS

4. Current Developments:

a. Revival of East Asia League: Plans are now underway for the official revival of the nationalistic East Asia League (Toa Renmei), the Japanese press reports. Reported leaders in the move to re-establish Toa Renmei are KIMURA Takoo, wartime Diet member and an official in the League prior to its dissolution in 1946, and ex-Com TSUJI Nagamochi, another former League official and currently well-publicized as a result of his nationalistic best-selling books (INTSUM 3575). According to press reports, KIMURA, TSUJI and other former East Asia League personnel plan to dissolve the Co-operation and Harmony Party (Kyowa To), an indirect successor to the original League, and set up the new League on 15 August 1952, third anniversary of the death of ISHIHARA Kanji, ex-Lt Gen who led the older organization.

The new League's platform reportedly will advocate: neutrality in the event of World War III, acceleration of trade with Asiatic nations, an "Asia for the Asiatics" movement, revision of the Constitution which was "forced upon Japan," an end to the Security Pact and, withdrawal of foreign troops. A preparatory meeting on 20-21 August 1952 reportedly will make definite decisions on the new organization's policies. (f)

Comment: The East Asia League, banned as an ultranationalist organization in February 1946, continued its activities through a number of successor organizations, notably the National Party (Kokumin To) and the Essence Society (Soika Kai). In late summer, 1951, members of the National Party and other former supporters of the old East Asia League dissolved the former and established the Co-operation and Harmony Party. KIMURA Takoo reportedly was one of the persons prominent in that action. Nominal leader of the Co-operation and Harmony Party since its founding has been YAKEDA Kunikida, formerly an official in the Essence Society.

There is reason to question whether TSUJI, KIMURA and their followers will be able to "dissolve the Co-operation and Harmony Party" in their move to reorganize the East Asia League. The party has suffered from factionalism, mainly over the question of its stand on rearmament, the official platform calling for "food instead of armament," but some factions within the party demand support for "defense armaments." TSUJI, an advocate of various schemes of doubtful practicality for rearmament, reportedly has been active in the Kyowa Society (Kyowa Sha) which opposes the official party position. KIMURA reportedly joined the Liberal Party (Jiyu To) in 1951 and little has been heard of him until the recent report that he is a "director" in the Co-operation and Harmony Party. Part of the friction between factions within the party and associated groupings is over the question as to which factions and personalities constitute the "rightful successors" to the old East Asia League.

TSUJI, as a colorful personality, and KIMURA, a politician, might succeed in disbanding the Co-operation and Harmony Party and

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (1) Privacy
  - (2) Methods/Sources
  - (3) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-745	SOURCE FEC/MIS #3615	DATE OF DOCUMENT 2 Aug 52	ANALYST [ ]
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summaries		DATE 27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
SECURITY BRIEFS			
3. <u>Current Developments:</u>			
c. <u>Rightist Speaks in Kyushu:</u> "The Nagasaki Nichi Nichi" newspaper sponsored a public meeting at the Mitsubishi Kaikan, Nagasaki City, on 30 Jul 52 with <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> as principal speaker. TSUJI, a well known nationalist, spoke on the familiar rightist theme, "Asia for Asiatics," according to a CIC report. His speech stressed complete neutrality for Japan, national "self-defense," and included remarks "bordering on" anti-American and anti-Soviet propaganda, according to a usually reliable source. The meeting reportedly drew a large crowd which was "wildly enthusiastic" over TSUJI's lecture. (e) (B-2)			
Comment: TSUJI, whose writings have attracted considerable attention in the past, apparently now is stepping up his speech making schedule; he has appeared as lecturer at several meetings in recent weeks. Although he reputedly has many loyal rightist followers, his ability to appeal to the general public has not been tested in the past. The brand of neutrality and self-defense with which he advocates includes the demand that Japan cease to lease military bases and insistence on withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Nagasaki city lecture may have been part of the campaign now under way to reorganize the old East Asia Comrades League, a campaign in which TSUJI is a leader.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
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(2)(D) Methods/Sources   
(2)(E) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-753	SOURCE FEC/MIS #3625	DATE OF DOCUMENT 12 Aug 1952	ANALYST [ ]	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summaries (daily)			DATE 1 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p>THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM</p> <p>SECURITY BRIEFS</p> <p>3. <u>Current Developments:</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">a. <u>Rightist Group Holds Meetings:</u> The East Asia League Comrades Society (Toa Remmei Doshikai), now in the process of reorganizing, held two meetings in Kyoto City on 10 Aug 1952, according to a usually reliable source. The first gathering was a memorial service for deceased members of the society; the meeting attended by about 50 persons took place in the afternoon at the Manganji Temple. Following the service, the group held a roundtable conference under the leadership of KISHIDA Ryotaro. Discussions reportedly dealt mainly with regulations for the new society, scheduled to be inaugurated formally on 15 Aug 1952. Plans for the meeting reportedly had called for the presence of <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> leader in the organization's revival, as chief speaker, but an early report on the meeting does not mention him.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">In the evening of the same day, the Society reportedly held a rally at the Yasaka High School auditorium, Kyoto; estimated attendance was about 1,000 as compared to the 3,000 which an earlier report said the Society had expected. TSUJI was on hand at this</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
SECRET			[ ]	

FORM NO. DEC 1952 59-34

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
  - Privacy
  - Methods/Sources
  - Foreign Relations

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-2-

meeting and spoke on his favority theme "Self-Defense and Neutrality."  
Chairman of the meeting was KISHIDA and speakers include HAYASHI  
Tadao, TANAKA Naekichi, KAWAKAMI Toshiharu and NISHIZAWA Ryoji.

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TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-766	SOURCE SEC/MIS Intell. Sum. #5639	DATE OF DOCUMENT 26 Aug 1952	ANALYST C J.
SUBJECT Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous			DATE 27 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
CIVIL INTELLIGENCE			
4. <u>Rightist Movements:</u>			
a. <u>East Asia League Comrades Society:</u> The revival of the East Asia League Comrades Society (Toa Remmei Doshi Kai) apparently is progressing slowly, but recent reports indicate that backing for the Society may be somewhat wider than indicated by early information. The date for official inauguration of the Society, 15 Aug 52, passed without any reported activity at the national level, but inauguration ceremonies were held at the local level. Ex-colonel TANAKA Hisashi an associate of <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> and the Shikoku leader of the wartime Toa Remmei Doshikai, reportedly was the sponsor of a 15 Aug meeting inaugurating the Takamatsu City, Shikoku, Society branch. (e)			
TANAKA's backing presumably will be helpful in the Shikoku region, and the reported interest of ODA (ORITA) Masanobu in the Society's revival will also be helpful in that area. As the leading force in the rightist National Salvation Youth League (Kyukoku Seinen Remmei), which has several thousand members in Kagawa Prefecture, ODA may be able to add considerably to the East Asia League Comrades Society's numerical strength if he decides to join forces with TSUJI-			
CROSS REFERENCE FOR <b>SECRET</b>			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. C J.

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

SECRET

-2-

KIMURA Takeo another of the organizers. ODA previously has described the National Salvation Youth League members as "followers of the ideals of the late General ISHIHARA Kanji," but had indicated that the League's support would be thrown to another rightist group the West Japan National Construction League (Nishi Nippon Kensetsu Kokumin Renmei). (c)

The Cooperation and Harmony Party (Kyowa To), which is composed largely of members of the wartime East Asia League Comrades Society, has failed to take a unanimous stand on the question of disarming and joining forces with the new TSUJI-KIMURA led organization....

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TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-775	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intell. Summ. #3848	DATE OF DOCUMENT 4 Sept 1952	ANALYST C J
SUBJECT Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous			DATE 27 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION <p style="text-align: center;">THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM</p> <p><b>CIVIL INTELLIGENCE</b></p> <p>4. <u>Rightist Election Prospects:</u></p> <p>b. <u>East Asia League Members May Run: TSUJI Masanobu and TSUKUI</u> Tatsuo are expected to be candidates. TSUJI, an ex-Colonel and a highly publicized nationalist, is working with KIMURA Takeo in re-viving the East Asia League Comrades Society. TSUJUI is a well known nationalist and rightist critic.</p> <p><u>Comment:</u> .....</p> <p>The candidacy of TSUJI will be the most interesting to watch. During recent years he has made money as an author and may be able to finance his campaign adequately. He has been outspoken in opposing continued presence of foreign troops in Japan. AKAO Bin was badly defeated in a Diet by-election in Mar 52 and seems unlikely to do much better in October. ASAHARA is wellknown in the Fukuoka and Yawata areas, and may have sufficient funds at his disposal. KIMURA earlier had been reported as affiliated with the Liberal Party (Jiyu To), but now is a top figure in the East Asia League Comrades Society. The latter group, having been reorganized only recently, may have difficulty in rallying support for KIMURA or TSUJI, but it was a large organization in the war years and has considerable potential strength....</p> <p style="text-align: center;">THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>SECRET</b></p>			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. C J

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(12)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-16-34	SOURCE ZJJ 225	DATE OF DOCUMENT 10 Oct 1952	ANALYST C J
SUBJECT Military Advisers to HATOYAMA Ichiro			DATE 27 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Source: Former Japanese intelligence officer, from Evaluation: B-3 persons active in the rearmament movement in Japan			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
1. Persons acting as advisers on military affairs to HATOYAMA Ichiro are the following five former army men:			
SAKAI Koji (3155/0064/6964/2945), former lieutenant general TANAKA Shinichi (3944/0022/2450/0001), former lieutenant general HATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/0587/0934/6745), former colonel and longtime head of the Historical Records Section War Demobilization Board TSUJI Masanobu ( /2398/0207), former colonel HORIBA Kazuo (8231/1023/0001/3948), former colonel			
Field Comment. TSUJI was elected as an independent to a seat in the lower House of the Diet from Ishikawa Prefecture in the 1 October 1952 general elections.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 225

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (C)(A) Privilege   
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING-CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
44-7-16-35	ZJJ-281	10 Oct 1952	[ ] [ ]
SUBJECT		DATE	
OGATA Taketora		27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: F-3
Source: Japanese journalist with intelligence experience, a longtime acquaintance of OGATA.			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
5. OGATA is popular with present-day rightists in general. He is in contact with leading members of the pre-war Genyo-sha, in particular with SASAKAWA Ryoichi ( /1557/5328/0001) and KODAMA Yoshio (0546/3768/6235/1807). His contact with former military figures is not direct, but is closely maintained through TAKAYAMA Taihei (7559/1472/1129/1627), and influential but relatively unknown pro-militarist who was active before the war. TAKAYAMA was close to Generals MINAMI Jiro, SUGIYAMA Hajime, and ANAMI Korechika, and has introduced OGATA to former Colonel <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> .			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
SECRET			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.
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FORM NO. 100-38  
DEC-1952

(38)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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REPORT NO. ZJJ-239

DATE DESPT. 31 October 1952

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. 0  
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO. ZJJ-238

Allegedly Being Planned by  
Militarists and Ultrationalists.

Tokyo

to 25 October 1952.

CHARACTER OF SOURCE				COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
CHARACTER OF SOURCE	CHARACTER OF SOURCE	HOW RELIABLE	HOW RELIABLE	DISSEMINATED BY OTHER SOURCES	POSSIBLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	PROBABLY TRUE
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

American observer from:

- (a) Former Chinese general officer with Third Force contacts, and with wide contacts among ex-Japanese Army officers formerly stationed in China and now engaged in intelligence activities. (Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6.)
- (b) Japanese rightist, disciple of well-known ultranationalist leader. (Paragraphs 3, 5, 6.)
- (c) Minor Japanese police official in a position to be cognizant of rightist activities in the Tokyo area. (Paragraphs 3, 5.)

**Field Comment.** Since the practical completion of the depurge of ex-military and rightists in the spring of 1952, there have been many rumors concerning rightist attempts to stage a comeback into Japanese political life. This is the first to mention a definite rightist plan involving violence. The existence of this plan is not corroborated from any other source. ZJJ-238 information indicating that persons mentioned in this report are considered certain police officials as capable of plotting violence at some future date.

Since the beginning of July 1952 plans for a coup d'etat have been initiated by a group of ex-purgees including former military officers. The leader of the group is ex-Colonel HATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/0587/0913/0015), the other members of the group being: YODAYA Yoshio (0348/3768/6235/1807/0160), NAKANO Tatsuo (1131/6851/6591/1133), NOGAMI Kenichiro (2603/0355/2008/0001/6715), and ex-Colonels IMOTO Kuzuo (0066/2509/1966/0180) and YAMAGUCHI (sm) (1167/2005).

2. TSUJI Masanobu (11/2973/0207) had been chosen as the front man for the group. <sup>1</sup> He is reportedly under HATTORI's control. <sup>2</sup> Not a member of the group, but closely associated with IMOTO, is former Rear Admiral SHIBAYAMA Shima (2601/1472/0674/7156), who has close connections with Third Force Chinese. <sup>3</sup> With the aims of the group are: Ex-General UOAKI Kazumasa (1362/2000/0001/0001), KIMURA Taketaru (2606/2625/1705/1132/6715), NOGAMI Taketaru (1472/0155/0155/0155), MORIYA Masao (2773/0244/0112/1133), WATANABE Tatsuo (3256/8703/1603/0155), and an unspecified number of former members of the Sakano Intelligence Group. The group has the backing of 500,000 persons throughout Japan.

5. The original plan of the group was to engineer a coup d'etat, including the assassination of Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru, on account of his hostile attitude toward depurgees and nationalists. <sup>4</sup> The group hoped to replace YOSHIDA with a nationalist.

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TSUJI is not YOSHIDA who is the prime adversary of the group, but of the rightists in general, but rather the Socialist Party.

The group is now amenable to postponing the coup as long as the Liberal Party remains in power, or even if SHIGEMITSU Masuda (0050/000/5205), president of the Progressive Party, should become Prime Minister. Ultimately they hope to succeed in having OGATA Taketora made Prime Minister once the rightists get into power again.

5. The group is considering the possibility of some minor assassination attempt in lieu of a coup d'etat. HIROKAWA Kogen (3686/1557/41/1407) is the likely candidate for assassination, and the agent of assassination might probably be either NAKAMURA Takeshi (0022/2625/2976) or SAGOYA Tomon (0146/6763/1450/2966/7160).
6. The National Safety Agency is to be utilized in the event of the coup d'etat. IMOTO has already been appointed to a post in the Agency, and TSUJI is in control of a faction within the Agency.
  - 1 Field Comment. KODAMA, AMANO, and HOPMA are well-known ultranationalists who have from time to time been mentioned as associates of TSUJI. IMOTO has previously been reported to be HATTORI's colleague (see ZJJ-67, 72, 84).
  - 2 Field Comment. TSUJI does not have the reputation of being under anyone's control. His very successful personal publicity campaign in the summer of 1952 resulted in a landslide vote electing him to the Diet in the 1 October election. Paragraph 3 of this report indicates that TSUJI is capable of infiltrating the HATTORI group.
  - 3 Field Comment. MORITA Masao is the successor to his brother-in-law, the late TORIYAMA Hideo, as leader of the Patriotic Youth Comrades Association (Aikoku Seinen Yushi Kai). (See ZJJ-238)
  - 4 Field Comment. No breakdown is given for this figure, which seems to be an exaggeration. TSUJI, as leader of the revived East Asia League (Toa Renmei), probably has a following of between 50,000 and 75,000 members.
  - 5 Field Comment. ZJJ-238 mentions the animosity of AMANO and SAGOYA toward YOSHIDA.
  - 6 Source Comment. OGATA is reputed to have influential connections in China and other Asiatic countries, and would therefore be useful in any effort made later by the rightists toward an Asiatic sphere.
  - 7 Field Comment. See ZJJ-238 for police opinion concerning the animosity of SAGOYA toward HIROKAWA, and concerning the possibility of violence being staged by NAKAMURA or MORITA.
  - 8 Field Comment. TSUJI is reported to have a faction in the National Safety Agency, comprised in part of members of his own 35th class of the Military Academy.

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-25-1	SOURCE ZJJA-622	DATE OF DOCUMENT 4 Nov 1952	ANALYST <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBJECT JCU Monthly Field Comments			DATE 2 Feb 1954
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM			
Encl. 4			
<u>Japanese Rightist Activities</u>			
1. The significant achievement of the rightists in October was their success in having 25 candidates, chiefly depurgees, elected to the Lower House of the Diet.			
2. Three of the successful rightist candidates bear watching as extreme nationalists with a definite subversive potential they are:			
a. Ex-colonel TSUJI Masanobu - Easily the most prominent Nationalist in post-war Japan; the leader of the current revival of the former East Asia League, which was banned by SCAP, reported to maintain liaison with almost all of the well-known ultra-nationalist of pre-war vintage.			
b. KIMURA Takeo - A colleague of TSUJI's in East Asia League.			
c. TADANO Naosaburo - Head of a small Nationalist party - The Japan People's Party, which so far has been a local, one man affair.			
3. Two of these men, TSUJI and TADANO, have become members of a newly formed Diet group called the Independent Club, whose formation guarantees its members more political influence than they could have as individuals.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. <input type="checkbox"/>

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	NAME	DATE
44-5-3-124	ZJJ-272	28 Nov 1952	C	J
SUBJECT			DATE	
Aims and Expansion of the Japanese Intelligence Service			27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: C-3	
Source: American observer, from a Chinese with extensive contacts among Japanese in Tokyo				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM				
3. OGATA's assistants on Chinese affairs at present are the following:				
HATTORI Former head, Operations and Strategy Section, JIGS. Advises OGATA on general affairs.				
TSUJI Masanobu Well-known former Colonel and ultra-nationalist now a member of the Lower House of the Diet, Advises OGATA on political affairs				
SHIBAYAMA Adviser on military affairs				
and other graduates of the Nakano Tokumu Kikan School.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
<b>SECRET</b>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
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FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(35)

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
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  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

# INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 101887

CD NO.

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 2 December 1952

SUBJECT Relationship Between KIMURA Tokutaro and TSUJI Masanobu

NO. OF PAGES 1

DATE OF INFO. Prior to November 1952

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6. X

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\* Except as noted

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SOURCE Paragraphs 1, 2: Chinese resident in Tokyo.  
Paragraph 3 : Minor Japanese official. .

- F-2
1. KIMURA Tokutaro, State Minister in charge of the National Safety Agency, and TSUJI Masanobu, popular rightist recently elected to the Diet, maintain regular liaison.
  2. KIMURA and TSUJI have been close friends since before the war. Since TSUJI's return from hiding, KIMURA has been visiting him about twice a month.
  3. The policy advocated by the National Defense Study Association (Kokudo Boei Kenkyu-jo), a rightist organization of which KIMURA is an advisor, stresses the organization of self-defense corps in factories and workshops. Because of this it has many points in common with TSUJI's theory of "Self Defense and Neutrality". Therefore it is natural that KIMURA and TSUJI maintain liaison for the good of the nation (sic). It is also possible that TSUJI and his associates looked after KIMURA during the post-war period when he was out of a job.
1. Washington Comment: SO-101886 quoted a Radio Free Japan broadcast of 18 November 1952 which stated that TSUJI was head of the recently organized Kaiko Kai, an organization of former military men open to graduates of all the classes of the Military Academy.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

STATE	BY	X	NAVY	X	NSRB														
ARMY	BY	X	AIR	X	FBI														

ADSO	ADG																		
STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC	STC
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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
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Report Made By: [ ] Approved By: [ ]

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**INDEX**

23 Jan 53

FORM NO. 51-59  
FEB 1948

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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REPORT NO. FJJ-49

**INFORMATION REPORT**  
CONTROLLED AMERICAN SOURCE

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 23 January 1953

SUBJECT Reasons for TSUJI Masanobu's Election Victory

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo

NO. OF ENCLS. 0  
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. Prior to November 1952

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C. Y	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2.	3. Y	4.	5.	6.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

*o Tsuji Masanobu*

SOURCE Japanese publisher

1. TSUJI Masanobu (\*11929/2398/0207), a former colonel who won a Diet seat in the October 1952 elections, seems to have achieved his outstanding victory largely by his own efforts rather than through the support of any organization of former military men. He was elected from the First District in Ishikawa-ken with a total of 64,912 votes out of the 251,411 cast, and with a plurality of 23,408 over his closest opponent.
2. An important source of TSUJI's strength was a large group of voters, who as young men called up for conscription, were trained under him in the late 1920's and early 1930's. When TSUJI was commissioned a second lieutenant about 1925, he was assigned as an instructor for the district's conscripts to the Seventh Regiment at its permanent station in Kanazawa-shi, Ishikawa-ken, his native prefecture. It is estimated that TSUJI trained about 16,000 young men in the eight years he held the assignment. Those who survive are between 40 and 50 years old; some are prominent residents of the district and many others are solid, middle-class citizens.
3. Most of TSUJI's campaign workers are believed to have been men whom he trained in the army. In any case, his supporters worked tirelessly, driving vehicles, putting up election posters, and preparing halls for campaign meetings. TSUJI is said to have spent almost no money on his election campaign.

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23 Jan 53

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Japan	REPORT NO.	CS DB-577
SUBJECT	Reasons for TSUJI Masanobu's Election Victory	DATE DISTR.	12 February 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	Prior to November 1952	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo	REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: European resident in Tokyo with broad contacts in ultranationalist circles (C); from a Japanese publisher whose reliability cannot be judged (F). Appraisal of Content: - 3.

1. TSUJI Masanobu (\*11929/2398/0207)<sup>1</sup>, former Colonel who won a Diet seat in the Lower House in the October 1952 elections, seems to have achieved his outstanding victory largely by his own efforts rather than through the support of any organization of former military men. He was elected from the First District in Ishikawa-ken with a total of 64,912 votes out of the 251,411 cast, and with a plurality of 23,408 over his closest opponent.
  2. An important source of TSUJI's strength was a large group of voters, who as young men called up for conscription were trained under TSUJI in the late 1920's and early 1930's. When TSUJI was commissioned a Second Lieutenant about 1925 he was assigned as an instructor for the district's conscripts to the Seventh Regiment at its permanent station in Kanazawa-shi, Ishikawa-ken, his native prefecture. It is estimated that TSUJI trained about 16,000 young men in the eight years he held the assignment. Those who survive are between 40 and 50 years old; some are prominent residents of the district, and others are solid, middle-class citizens.
  3. Most of TSUJI's campaign workers are believed to have been men whom he trained in the Army. In any case, his supporters worked tirelessly, driving vehicles, putting up election posters, and preparing halls for campaign meetings. TSUJI is said to have spent almost no money on his election campaign.
1. Washington Comment: In this and subsequent reports, an asterisk preceding a number indicates the use of Ueda numbers where the Chinese telecode numbers cannot be determined.

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(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated by "X", Field Distribution by "F")

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NE		MI			FE/TA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	5						
SE		STD			BOM/TA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2	JAOO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		FJJ-49		

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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FORM NO. 88-84A  
FEB 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 92152

CD NO.

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 21 July 1952

SUBJECT 1. Visit of TSUJI Masanobu to Soviet Mission  
2. Interest of TSUJI Masanobu in the East Asia League

NO. OF PAGES 1

DATE OF INFO. 15 - 20 May 1952

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	X							X			

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Japanese military officer with intelligence experience, from a former Japanese general and friend of TSUJI.

- Former Colonel TSUJI Masanobu (31/2398/0207) visited the Soviet Mission on 14 May 1952 to ask that a letter be delivered to his friend, former Colonel MISHIMA Takaaji (Ryuji) (0005/0756/7127/2945), still being held as a war criminal by the USSR. Major General Aleksai P. Kislenko, then head of the mission, saw TSUJI alone, assured him that he personally would see that the letter was delivered and invited him to visit the mission from time to time.
- With the money he has received from the sale of his many books, TSUJI has bought a large house in Harimune, Saginami-ku, Tokyo, and has made loans to finance the political activities of various organizations formed by members of the old East Asia League (Toa Renmei) (2639/0088/5114/4145), founded by ISHIHARA Kanji (4258/0626/1401/3112).

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-873	SOURCE FEC/MIS #3746	DATE OF DOCUMENT 11 Dec 1952	ANALYST [ ]	
SUBJECT Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous			DATE 27 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM				
POLITICAL REPORT				
1. <u>Political Parties:</u>				
b. <u>Independent Club Member's Statement Under Fire:</u> A recent statement by <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> , former Imperial Japanese Army headquarters strategist, has come under severe attack from various members of the Diet. Representative TSUJI on 29 Nov, interpellating on the Prime Minister's administrative policy address as a member of the Independent Club criticized the Government's plan to increase Diet members' salaries "while war-bereaved families are on the verge of hanging themselves," and doubted the Diet's ability to cope with this issue. The Lower House Steering Committee, considering TSUJI's statement to be "defamation of Diet members," is scheduled to consider what action should be taken against the ex-colonel at its next meeting.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
			[ ]	

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(33)

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-4-3-205	SOURCE FJJ-36	DATE OF DOCUMENT 9 Jan 1953	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT Communist Party Potential, Based on Analysis of the 1952 General Election			DATE 22 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: Japanese Government document (edited)			Evaluation: C	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
3. Votes obtained by Independent Party members who advocated "Neutrality through Self-Preservation" should also be considered. Three well-known Independent Party members who were elected are <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> (11929/2398/0207) from Ishikawa-ken; <u>KAZAMI Aldra</u> (7364/6015/4545), Ibaragi-ken; and <u>CHASHI Chuichi</u> (1129/2890/1813/0001) Gifu-ken.....				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
<b>SECRET</b>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
			C J	

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-917	SOURCE FEC/MIS 3801	DATE OF DOCUMENT 4 Feb 1953	ANALYST [ ]
SUBJECT Japan Editorial Comments No. 3801 - 4 Feb			DATE 22 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
CIVIL INTELLIGENCE			
3. <u>East Asia League Activities:</u>			
b. <u>TSUJI Addresses Public:</u> The Nagano Prefectural Headquarters invited <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> , Diet member and national Toa Renmei Doshi Kai leader, to attend the inaugural meeting. Late in the day TSUJI addressed a Public gathering estimated at 2,000. His audience reportedly included a number of National Safety Force members and former servicemen. Theme of TSUJI's speech was, "Don't Make Japan a Second Korea".			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [ ]

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(1) Agency

(2) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

VIA: AIR  
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DISPATCH NO. FJJA-262

SECURITY INFORMATION  
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, FE

DATE: 5 February 1953

FROM: Chief, JCU

SUBJECT: GENERAL Intelligence

SPECIFIC Article on October 1952 Elections by [ ]

REFERENCE: FJJ-49

1. The enclosed article "Japan's General Election and the  
Activities of 'Soldier Candidates'" was written by [ ] and  
received through [ ] We are forwarding it as background infor-  
mation that may be useful, and also as an interesting analysis by  
[ ] showing an apparent lack of activity in the October election  
by organizations of ex-military men.

2. A small portion of the article was disseminated in the  
report.

Encl: (1)

[ ]

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Files -3

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JAPAN'S GENERAL ELECTION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE  
"SOLDIER CANDIDATES"

I

Many Japanese of the leading class (Shido Kaikyū) who had been purged after the war, reblossomed in the recent (1 October 1952) election and won seats; and of these, the results of the (contests involving) former soldier candidates are worthy of notice.

There were two ex-military candidates; one of them won a seat with the largest number of votes in his district, while the other lost, running last in his district. The former was TSUJI Masanobu (#11929/2398/0207), 49, of the First District in Ishikawa-ken; the latter was UOYAMA Yasuhira (or Kohēi) (3282/1557/1660/1627), 40, of the First District in ~~Ishikawa~~ <sup>1703</sup> ~~ken~~ <sup>1712</sup> ~~ken~~. I shall discuss below the connections of these two men with the recent election and their connections, as military men, with organizations of the ex-military; and I shall also give my considered opinion of their future prospects.

II

TSUJI Masanobu was a member of the 36th class of the Military Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakko). He headed his class both in the Military Academy and the War College (Rikugun Daigaku). During the war, as an Army operations staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters he directed the Guadalcanal and Imphal operations, and he became known as the ablest man of the Army (sic). A full colonel at the war's end, he was regarded by the Allied forces as a war-criminal suspect but was successful in remaining free. In the October elections he became a candidate from his native Ishikawa-ken, and of the 251,411 effective ballots cast in his district he received 39.2% (sic) or the astonishing figure of 64,912 votes. This was sufficient to elect him with the highest number of votes and to give him a lead of 13,408 votes over the candidate in second place.

If TSUJI's astonishing success in the election is studied, the reasons for it probably can be listed as follows:

1. TSUJI was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant at the age of 22 and immediately assigned to the Kanazawa 7th Regiment of Kanazawa City as an instructor of recruits. He remained there training recruits for eight years, then was promoted to captain and entered the War College. By that time he had trained a total of 16,000 soldiers. Those whom he trained are now between 40 and 50 years old; some hold important positions in Ishikawa-ken, and many are in that "backbone middle-class" of the prefecture. It is easy to perceive that they came to feel a strong admiration for TSUJI as he became famous. In fact, many of them exerted themselves to the utmost during the elections campaign by driving vehicles, preparing halls for meetings, putting up posters and the like. TSUJI is said to have spent almost no money on the election campaign, and this was possible because so many of his supporters were men who had been trained by him.

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At the same time TSUJI's supporters were consistent in their refusal to back the candidates recommended by the political bosses in the district, or, in fact, any other candidates at all. They helped only TSUJI, who had trained and looked after them when they were army recruits. Historically the people of Ishikawa-ken, including Kanazawa City, were of the MAEDA clan (a "1-million koku" clan), and those who are 40 years old or more retain a deep sense of duty and loyalty. The Ishikawa people also tend to feel strong admiration for notables and heroes. Thus TSUJI had precisely the attributes that would win him the support of those in his native district who were approximately his own age. This is the first reason why TSUJI was able to win in the election with the highest number of votes.

2. TSUJI is strongly opposed to the group which is trying to reconstruct the Japanese army from the National Police Reserve (National Security Force). He thinks along the lines of the East Asia League (Toa Renmei) that was sponsored by the late Lt. General ISHIHARA Kanya, and he is thoroughly anti-American and anti-Soviet in principle. He also advocates "civilian soldiers" — an idea which he has worked out himself. TSUJI's ideas, actions and speeches are winning the support not only of those approximately his own age but also of the younger stratum which opposes rearmament on the grounds that it is being used as a factor in the haggling between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. Thus TSUJI's popularity is basically different from the vague popularity of, for example, MATOYAMA Ichiro. This is the second reason why he was elected with such wide popular support.

In short, TSUJI Masanobu is a military man but he was not elected by any organization of ex-soldiers. The actual fact is that he was elected by the popular support of his native place. (Note: the so-called military (ex-soldier) organizations will be discussed later.)

III

On the other hand, consider the case of YUGAWA Yasuhira, who was a candidate for the First District in Kumamoto-ken. He was unsuccessful, bringing up in the rear with only 0.111% (sic) of the total of 367,310 ballots of which he obtained 3,460.

YUGAWA is 40 years old (9 years younger than TSUJI), and was a member of the 45th class of the Military Academy. A classmate once described him thus: "He is a man of simple mind and it can be said fairly that he is pure-hearted. He is a man of simple mind and it can be said fairly that he is pure-hearted. He is a genuine man of action." As a 2nd lieutenant attached to the 3rd Regiment of Asabu Tokyo, YUGAWA was one of the leading performers in the February 26 (2-26) incident of 1936, which has been called "Japan's revolution." Together with 1st Lieutenant ~~NOMAKA~~ Shiro (6851/0022/0934/6745), one of the ringleaders of the incident, he directed the attack on and occupation of the Metropolitan Police Board Headquarters. YUGAWA thus was one of the leaders of the so-called insurrection force.

However, at that time YUGAWA was so young (he had just been commissioned 2nd lieutenant) that the army judiciary took pity on him and at the courtmartial did not treat him as a ringleader. Consequently, instead of being executed he was

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sentenced to imprisonment for life. As a result of successive amnesties he was released after serving only four years and returned to Kumamoto. So, unlike TSUJI, YUGAWA did not remain a soldier until the end of World War II; his military career ended in fact when he was still a 2nd lieutenant.

The YUGAWA family to which YUGAWA Yasuhira belongs by adoption, is the Kumamoto branch of the family of Dr. YUGAWA Hideki<sup>1</sup> (3282/1557/4423/2885) of Kyoto University, a winner of the Nobel Prize. Dr. YUGAWA's branch is the head-branch of the family. YUGAWA Yasuhira was adopted into the Kumamoto branch of the family on 17 February 1936, just nine days before the 2-26 incident. The YUGAWA family, however, did not disown him but welcomed him back upon his release four years afterward.

After the China incident began and militarism was riding the crest of the wave, the fact that he was a former soldier proved advantageous to YUGAWA. His family being wealthy as well as renowned in the provinces, YUGAWA established an airplane-parts factory during World War II and became its president. He also belonged to the Taisei Yokusan Kai, the only wartime political party, and was a leader of the Kumamoto-ken branch of the Yokusan Senen Dan, which was a department of the Yokusan Kai. In addition he was active in central headquarters of the Yokusan Kai. At the end of the war YUGAWA converted his factory to peacetime industry, and shortly after being depurged he became a candidate in the October elections with the backing of his family's name.

The reasons for YUGAWA's defeat, and with the lowest number of votes, probably were:

1) He did not possess explicit political ideals or convictions as did TSUJI, but had become a candidate aimlessly.

2) He was merely a member of a provincially prominent family, without sufficient personal popularity to win the people of his district. While possessing simplicity and executive ability, he was not able to compete with other prominent figures who were running in the election. (Among the prominent candidates were OASA Tetsuo<sup>2</sup> (1129/7802/0787/3948), a former Cabinet Minister; and MATSUMAE Shigeoyoshi (2646/0467/6850/5030), former president of the Communications Board who, after coming into controversy with TOJI Hideki was conscripted into the army.)

3) Although YUGAWA's connection with the 2-26 incident proved advantageous during the war, it did not have the same popular appeal as a military career and did not win him any support as an individual.

4) From the beginning of the campaign no one, not even among the ex-soldier groups, believed that YUGAWA would be elected.

For the foregoing reasons, there were no supporters willing to work for YUGAWA's election at their own expense, as was the case with TSUJI. To summarize the effect of his military record on his election showing, it can be said that while, strictly speaking YUGAWA was an ex-soldier, his military record was entirely different from that of TSUJI, being limited to participation in the 2-25 incident. YUGAWA did not have the background or the real ability necessary to win him support as a soldier.

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IV

TSUJI was supported by the population of his district because he was a prominent figure and had helped many of his supporters in the past, whereas YUGAWA clearly received no support from any ex-soldier groups. This would suggest that the ex-soldier organizations had no direct relation with the election.

The question now arises, do the ex-military men have a real organization? Some persons believed the ex-soldiers were organized and would move in on the elections. Some thought there was an underground organization of ex-soldiers and that it was pushing TSUJI as its candidate. This idea, of course, proved to be entirely unfounded.

*X* SHIMIZU Sadame (0007/2625/1253), former general and former Minister of the Army, is an example of his age group of prominent surviving army officers, some of whom are listed in Attachment A. He is more than 65 years old and therefore beyond the pre-war retirement age. Thus he is already too old to be a front-line military leader and in addition he lacks the qualifications to lead younger men. It is, in fact, impossible for ex-officers of his age to take open, active leadership. The military profession requires basically a professional technician, but the men of this group have no knowledge whatever of atomic-age military tactics. It may be concluded that top leaders now must be physically fit and less than 50 years old.

*X* The group of ex-officers of the 34th to 39th classes headed by ex-Colonel HATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/0587/0934/6745) would seem to meet the foregoing requirement in regard to age, but since only about 60 members of the 34th to 39th classes are in the National Police Reserve (National Security Forces) the group actually is not very strong. Most ex-officers of the later classes have had no experience as commanders except below the regimental level. Therefore some of the impartial and intelligent ex-officers have commented that the present problem is not one of "rearmament" but of establishing a "new armament"; that is, unless troops are trained in current military tactics they will not become a genuine army.

Both TSUJI and YUGAWA have some of the qualifications to become leaders of a "new armament" Japanese defense force. YUGAWA, as stated before, although termed a soldier does not have the character to establish a military organization or to operate it practically. TSUJI believes that a military force guaranteed by the United States will not be of practical use. He also believes it would be impossible to reconstruct the old Japanese defense forces, and he has no intention of trying to use members of the former service in reconstructing an army. It would seem clear, therefore, that neither YUGAWA nor TSUJI was promoted in the recent elections by former military men on behalf of the ex-military.

The organizations of ex-military men are shown in Attachment B. None of these is a powerful or a nationwide political organization. They are more like social groups, with slogans such as "Make sympathy calls on the bereaved families of the war dead"; "Friendship and mutual assistance"; and "Relief for sick and wounded soldiers." None of the groups has any power, and their activities are limited to the exchange of information.

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As will be noted in Attachment B, the four smaller organizations formed a single group called the Kaiko Kai in September 1951. By November of 1952 it had not even elected officers. It is regarded as very unlikely that positive action to reestablish the army will originate with these ex-military groups. In fact, it seems probable that ex-military men during the seven years of occupation lost the ability to rebuild the service. If ex-soldiers take an active part in reviving the army, they probably will be of the generation younger than that of TSUJI Masanobu.

V

TSUJI's probable course of action in the Diet is a question of considerable current interest. If TSUJI should try to become an influential parliamentary figure it is unlikely that he would succeed, and it is unthinkable that he would be able, single-handed, to bring about a revival of positive activity by the stagnant ex-military men. TSUJI is wise enough to realize this. Therefore he probably will organize the youth of the country and push ahead the former Toa Renmei (East Asia League). Consequently his activities will not center in the diet but become more of a popular movement. TSUJI's activities would thus not be limited to the Diet, although it is probable that he will use his position of Diet member to promote his popular movement.

It is also unlikely that TSUJI will become a Don Quixote by following the same road as HASHIMOTO Kingoro (2390/2609/2946/0063/6745), the A-class war criminal and chief of the right-wing organization Sokisei Kai (6375/6134/2585) who was formerly a Diet member. It is probable that TSUJI will forge ahead on a course equally anti-Soviet and anti-American, thinking in his own way about the old Japanese nation and how the new Japanese should be developed. TSUJI knows that as a Diet member he will be unable to produce big results, because he has a good brain, and both he and his supporters realize that the Diet floor is a battlefield on which a staff operations officer does not need to have any soldiers.

<sup>1</sup>Field Comment. YUGAWA (usually transliterated as YUKAWA) Hideki, is professor of physics at Kyoto University, a member of the Japan Academy, and the first Japanese to receive the Nobel Prize (physics, 1949). According to The Japan Who's Who, 1950-51, he was born 23 January 1907, the third son of the late Dr. Takuji Ogawa, was graduated from Kyoto Imperial University in 1929 and was adopted into the family of Dr. YUGAWA Geryo.

<sup>2</sup>Field Comment. The following data on OASA Tadao are from Who's Who in Japan 1939-40; Born July 1889 in Kumamoto-ken; graduated Tokyo Imperial University (law) 1914; police chief Yamanashi-ken; secretary in Home Ministry; same Foreign Ministry; private secretary to Prime Minister; same to Minister of Education 1929; elected to House of Representatives six times from Kumamoto-ken.

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ATTACHMENT A

PROMINENT GRADUATES OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY

<u>Class</u>	<u>Prominent Graduates</u>	<u>Age</u>
First	UGAKI Kazunari (1342/0997/0001/2052), Gen.	Over 80
Ninth	MASAKI Jinzaburo (4176/1505/3928/0005/6745), Gen.	76
Ninth	ARAKI Sadao (5435/2606/6297/1133), Gen.	
15th	IMAMURA Hitoshi (0093/2625/0971), Gen.	Over 70
17th	TOJO Hideki (2639/5391/2894), Gen. KAWABE Shozo (3109/6708/2973/0005), Gen.	
20th	SHIMOMURA Sadame (0007/2625/1353), Gen.; Army Minister at war's end	66
29th	TATSUMI (6591/1570), Maj. Gen.	60
30th	SAKURAI (2937/0064) and WATANABE (3256/6708)	
34th	HATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/0587/0934/6745), Col.	52
36th	TSUJI Kusanobu, Col.	49
45th	YUGAWA Yasuhira	40
58th	All were 1st or 2nd Lieuts. at war's end	25 to 28
59th, 60th	Were students at Military Academy at war's end	

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ATTACHMENT B

ORGANIZATIONS OF GRADUATES OF MILITARY ACADEMY

<u>Classes</u>	<u>Organization</u>
15th to 24th	One group )
25th to 33rd	Wednesday Society (3055/2656/2585) ) Kaiko Kai (0253/ 5887/2585),
34th to 39th	One group, HATTORI Takushiro Manager ) organized Sept 51
40th to 58th	Ichigaya Society (1579/6253/2585) )

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JAPAN  
Feb. 20, 1953

COMMUNISTS SEE JAPAN ON BRINK OF WAR

Tokyo, HEIWA SHIMBUN, in Japanese, Feb. 19, 1953--T

(Text)

It is very significant that a people's peace rally is about to be opened. No one can deny that the new policy of the Eisenhower Government is dangerous and may expand the war over the whole of Asia. Moreover, it has been disclosed that the Eisenhower policy is to "Let the Asian People Fight with Asians" by forcing Japan to rearm. Policies and ideas to stimulate the Japanese people into war spreading even at home, and aggressive plans are openly discussed in the Diet. The fire of war is about to flare up, and Japan is just about to be involved in such a war.

It is most important at this moment that the peace-loving people to get together to extinguish the fires of war. The people's peace rally is a mass meeting, in which the whole people of Japan can join their strength to save Japan from war. It is only the strength of the people that can protect peace. There are many different views on the causes of war. There are many opinions on "which government is responsible for the present international crisis." However, it is most necessary at this moment to find a common basis for the different opinions in order to save world peace and Japan from the fires of war. The voice appealing for the cessation of the Korean war, the voice that international disputes should be solved not by force but by peaceful negotiations, is spreading throughout the world.

The people's peace rally will determine a method of cooperation for the people having different opinions. Therefore, the people of all classes will gather in the rally. They will freely discuss their different political and ideological views and find the road to cooperation at the rally. For success in the rally, we must make all the people know of the opening of the rally, hold meetings at organizations, workshops, and schools to discuss how the fires of war can be extinguished, and hold a peace conference in each prefecture to elect delegates to the people's peace rally in Tokyo.

Hokkaido, Tokyo, Yamanashi, and other Prefectures have already agreed to the plan to hold people's peace rallies and have started preparations for them. All political parties are requested to try to urge all the people to attend the people's peace rally with the cooperation of peace activists, labor unions, democratic organizations, and notable personages. We have appealed to the nations of the world to send their peace missions to the rally. The rally will reinforce the cooperation of peace camps in the world.

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JAPAN  
Feb. 20, 1953

PARTY ADMONISHED ON ELECTION ERRORS

Tokyo, ZENEI, in Japanese, February 1953--T

(Article by Masabumi Oe: "The Election Struggle Centered Around Masanobu Tsuji")

(Text)

Former staff officer Tsuji won great popularity when he declared, "Truman is the No. 1 war criminal and Stalin the No. 2 war criminal," in his speech before a 30,000 audience at the Kenroku Park in Kanazawa City on Aug. 16 last year. Masanobu Tsuji supports the Emperor system, belongs to the Far East League, and advocates the Greater Asia principle. His financial backer is Tomokichi Nakamura, manager of the Yoshida Paper Store. Tsuji also has a connecting link with the Hatoyama faction of the Liberal Party.

Through his election campaign speeches, Tsuji clarified the following points: He was for the instigation of world war and against Japan's entry into the war; for an anti-American and anti-Soviet attitude and for Japan's self-defense and neutrality; against Japanese becoming a mercenary army and for a militia system; and against converting Japan into a colony and for the revival of the Emperor system.

On the premise that World War III is inevitable, Tsuji predicted that an American-Soviet war would break out by the end of this year or the fall of next year. By listing unfavorable points, he compared the military strength of the two nations and thereby intimated that America would be defeated.

In order to justify his contention that rearmament is necessary for Japan's self-defense, Tsuji said that the military bases in Japan were needed for the American forces to gain time and that their withdrawal would be effected in prearranged operations, thus sounding a warning against Japan's reliance on America and, at the same time, arousing anxiety among the people regarding Communist aggression.

His remarks created the illusion that an American-Soviet war would offer a good chance for Japan to achieve complete independence. Tsuji opposed the American Occupation, but did not offer any concrete measures to effect the withdrawal of the American forces. The slogan that appealed most to the masses was this: "Do not let Japan become another Korea!"

In his campaign speech in Kanazawa City, Tsuji said in part: "If America should bomb Manchuria, bombs would fall on Japan. In that event, America would send Japanese volunteers to Korea to save American blood."

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- FFP 9 -

JAPAN  
Feb. 20, 1953

AKAHATA reported that 1,000 members of the National Police Reserve were sent to Korea. A high Japanese Government official stated that he had no objection to maneuvers being conducted in Korea. What should be done so as to prevent Japan from becoming another Korea? The answer is to defend Japan with the hands of the Japanese people. Do not let Japan become another Korea! Regarding rearmament, Tsuji advocated a militia system, under which military training would be given over a period of 2 to 3 weeks. Those receiving the training would be on military duty only in an emergency and would not be sent overseas.

In regard to Comrade Nishimoto, the Communist candidate, Tsuji praised his naiveness and youthful energy, but regretted that Stalin had strings attached to him. The basic weakness in Tsuji's campaign speech was the lack of economic policy and his failure to take up the daily demands of the people. Yet, his speech was appealing to the masses because of its major theme--war and peace. The Communist and leftist Socialist Parties were the major victims as the large number of ballots went to Tsuji in the First Electoral District of Ishikawa Prefecture. The result also indicated that the two parties had common reason to fight jointly against fascism.

Tsuji was expected to receive support from the medium and small enterprises and businessmen and the farmers, but not from the workers. It is believed, however, that one-third of the workers voted for Tsuji as evidenced by the high percentage of votes he registered in the districts where the workers were concentrated.

For instance, in the Nagata School District, Lanazawa City, where our Party won 31 percent of the total ballots cast in the previous election, Tsuji collected 24.8 percent, while our Party dropped to 6.2 percent. In the Asano School District of the same city, where our Party registered 30 percent in the previous election, Tsuji won 26 percent, while our Party fell to 6.7 percent.

In Ishikawa County, where his countywide percentage averaged 19.5, Tsuji won 24 percent in Matsutao, where a National Railway workshop is located. In Nomi County, where he averaged 26 percent, Tsuji collected 29.3 percent in Nishio, where the Ogoya Mine is located, 37 percent in Nakami, and 33.8 percent in Kaneno, showing the overwhelming support of the workers.

The election results taught us that bourgeois nationalism and the ideology that the Nation, the Government, the National Diet, and the law are absolute, just, and neutral have been deeply rooted among the masses. Tsuji succeeded in gaining the support of the masses by intimating that neutrality is the only way to defend peace and independence.

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- FFF 10 -

JAPAN  
Feb. 20, 1953

We must change the ideology of the masses. Our clamors for peace had been abstract and failed to move the masses. When the Soviet delegate Malik delivered a speech before the U.N. Security Council rejecting Japan's admission to the United Nations, we lacked the keen political sense to understand the implication that such admission would obligate Japan to send its troops to Korea.

What have we done to alleviate the sufferings of the workers and the farmers? Have we shown in a concrete manner the new platform to the masses seeking a new political change? Tsuji easily took advantage of our failure in the masses not serving to win the daily demands of the people in various walks of life. Our task of teaching the people does not end with the printing and distributing of hundreds and thousands of copies of the new platform. The ideology of the people can be changed only through systematic, hard work over a long period of time. Our devotion and efforts to this end are the way to gain the confidence of the people.

The masses failed to see the real nature of Tsuji and cast their ballots, believing that his policy would defend peace and independence. Our Party, and not the masses, should take the blame. We failed to take strict precautions against the revival of militarism and fascism, which should have been nipped in the bud. We did not seriously make use of the unite front tactics by joining forces with the various anti-Tsuji factions, when there was an excellent chance to form such a front against militarism and fascism.

The fact that Tsuji found a large number of supporters among the workers sounds a grave warning to us. This proves that our activities have not yet taken firm root among the working class.

In conclusion, here is an appeal to our comrades and the peace-loving, progressive people in all walks of life: Tsuji won the highest number of votes in Ishikawa Prefecture, but this was not an isolated incident. The revival of militarism and fascism has become a common trend throughout the country. Tsuji's addresses in Kure, Kumamoto, Kagoshima, Nagano, and Sendai attracted audiences of from 20,000 to 30,000 people each time. The American and Japanese reactionaries are making frantic efforts to revive militarism and fascism. The responsibility for driving the people into war or smashing the reactionaries' efforts and winning peace and independence rests on our shoulders. We must make the most of the lessons we have learned from the election in Ishikawa Prefecture.

**SECRET**

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-15-41	SOURCE FJJ-156	DATE OF DOCUMENT 17 Apr 1953	ANALYST [ ]	
SUBJECT Rightist Political Activity			DATE 22 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: <u>Asahi Shimbun</u> (newspaper)			Evaluation: B - Documentary	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
The following is a summary translation of the attached article, which appeared in the 31 March 1953 edition of the <u>Asahi Shimbun</u> :				
.....				
"The well-known militarist candidates now campaigning are:				
b. For the House of Representatives				
<u>TSUJI Masanobu</u>		Colonel. Member, Operations Section, Japanese Imperial General Staff (JIGS).		
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
<b>SECRET</b>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [ ]	

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**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (1)(A) Privacy
- (1)(B) Methods/Sources
- (1)(C) Foreign Relations

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PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo  
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SUBJECT Criticism of National Safety Force, Japan

GRADE OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT						
RELIABLE	POSSIBLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	VERY DOUBTFUL
A	B	C	D	E	F	1	2	3	4	5	6

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Minutes of 15th Session of the Cabinet Committee of House of Representatives

**TRANSLATION**

Report of the 15th Meeting by Members of the Cabinet Committee

**FURUKA** (IN: Chairman of the Committee): The Cabinet Meeting is now in session. We will discuss today the various amendments proposed for criminal regulations as amended in the official gazette.

**ITE** (IN: Committee member): Continuing the questioning of the previous meeting on amendments for the National Safety Force (NSF), I request an accounting of weapons and ammunition received by the NSF from the United States.

**KAMIMURA** (IN: Kantaro, Director of the National Safety Force): I will answer the question and account of weapons borrowed from the United States.

(ITE requests details on terms of loan)

**KAMIMURA**: No official terms. Loans are made by United States military officers in charge of the garrison posts.

(ITE requests terms for return of borrowed weapons.)

**KAMIMURA**: No agreement on return of weapons lost or damaged.

**ITE**: What about repairs?

**KAMIMURA**: Repairs are the responsibility of the United States military in charge. Negotiations are under way to borrow these weapons.

**ITE**: What about expenditures for repairs?

**KAMIMURA**: Parts, etc., are provided by the United States military and are accounted for by the NSF budget.

**ITE**: What about repairs to be made before the weapons are returned?

**KAMIMURA**: The United States supplies the parts and the NSF has the obligation to make repairs.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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... is authorized to borrow weapons under Article 29 of the Financial Law. However they are required to sign a private contract with the lender. Can you produce such a contract?

... No. I felt that a contract was unnecessary because this was not a loan for a consideration.

... That is an unexpected reply. According to Article 29 of the Financial Law, a written contract must accompany any borrowing by a Government agency. We repeat the question.

... I repeat, they were not acquired in exchange for a consideration. Therefore I do not believe that I have acted contrary to the requirements of the Financial Law.

... I believe that your action constitutes a violation of the Financial Law. I suggest that you give the problem further study before replying.

... I believe that a contract is necessary in the event of a loan. However in this case the groundwork for an official loan has not been laid. I believe you there I have acted contrary to the requirements of the Financial Law.

... I can see where a contract might be omitted to expedite insignificant transactions, but common sense should dictate that the use of 130 special trucks and other weapons would require a written contract. From this viewpoint, I believe that this is a case of violation of the Financial Law. While on the subject, I wish to inquire for my personal satisfaction: what would the cost of constructing these 130 special trucks and other weapons in Japan be?

NAKAMURA (SB: Taka, Chief of the Equipment Bureau of MSF): Calculated at the average rate of \$60 to \$1, and based on the standards illustrated in American magazines, etc., excluding expendable items, I surmise that the cost would approximate roughly \$200,000,000.

...uration of expendable items, does it not?

NAKAMURA: Yes.

... Give us an estimate of the expenditure for expendable items during a fiscal year.

NAKAMURA: Although our survey is not yet complete, the figure is estimated to be around \$300,000,000 to \$400,000,000.

OYA Shozo (Committee member): Do we possess any weapons that may be considered solely the product of independent Japan? We have recently borrowed frigates, under contract, I assume. We are obligated to return them in their original conditions. In the event of total loss, we are obliged to reconstruct replicas of them. For my personal reference, what do you estimate as the cost for restoring a frigate to its original form in Japan?

NAKAMURA: None of the injury inflicting weapons are owned by Japan. Our materiel consists of vehicles, communication sets, et cetera. As for the costs incurred in constructing a frigate, recent construction costs have amounted to \$2,542,000 for a PF (sic) and \$552,400 for an LS (sic). However, I venture to surmise that their present values are approximately \$500,000,000 for a PF and \$150,000,000 for an LS.

OYA: That is not my question. Since we are obliged to return the frigate in its original condition, the replacement cost in the event of total loss would be exorbitant. Furthermore, the frigates acquired are weather-beaten ships ready for retirement. Why was the contract made calling for a restoration to their original condition?

KAKIMURA: The contract does not call for restoration to their original condition. It calls for restoration to the condition in which they were received.

OYA: In case of total loss, what arrangements have been made to determine their amount of depreciation to deduct from the construction price?

KAKIMURA: Representatives of both countries are to meet and negotiate terms satisfactory to both.

FURUDA: TSUJI Masanobu (committee member).

TSUJI: Since the leaders are not present today, let us postpone the details to a later date and conduct a brief questioning. First of all, as you are aware, Article Four, NSF Regulations, enumerates the duties of NSF. The distinguishing feature of this article is the phrase "NSF will maintain the peace and order of our country". This phrase is not included in police regulations. NSF is fulfilling a vital mission similar to the task which was entrusted to the former military of maintaining the peace and order of Japan. However, in order for the NSF, entrusted with this vital task, to execute these duties stated in Article Four, I believe that it is axiomatic for them to follow a basic operational procedure. I wish to inquire if NSF is or is not following such a procedure, and also whether or not the substance of the procedure is excluded from NSF Regulations.

YAMADA Makoto (Chief, Safety Section, National Safety Agency): We follow a basic operational procedure.

TSUJI: Is the organization consistent with our defense plan?

YAMADA: Yes.

TSUJI: According to my observations, the organization is consistent with our defense plan. For example, the staff under Commissioner HAYASHI is organized similar to that of an U.S. field army headquarters. Furthermore, although I am unfamiliar with the details, the organization of the First and Third District Units of the Northern Area Forces is similar to that of a U.S. combat division. Do you feel that the organization of the NSF staff and active forces as a replica of a U.S. field army serves the best interests of Japan's peace and order?

YAMADA: I believe that the organization is suitable as is.

TSUJI: Do you feel that the training is adequate for the purpose to which NSF is dedicated?

YAMADA: Yes.

TSUJI: From my observations, their training is directly contrary to the purpose for which they were organized. For example, most of their time is devoted to simulated attacks against an enemy equipped like them. Have you seen the training schedule for the Special Vehicle Regiment stationed in Shim-Machi which was listed in the Asahi weekly? This training serves no purpose for maintaining peace and order in Japan. Do you feel that the above training program is suitable?

YAMADA: Yes.

TSUJI: Have you observed their assault training?

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Security Information

YAMADA: Yes.

TSUJI: What is the nature of their assault training?

YAMADA: They are training for the purpose of fulfilling their mission.

TSUJI: This assault training cannot be taken as training in order to maintain peace and order in Japan. NSP is following methods identical to U.S. battle tactics. Do you still insist that NSP is training for the purpose of maintaining peace and order in Japan?

YAMADA: Yes.

TSUJI: You must be mad if you feel that an assault including the amount of fire power utilized by the U.S. is necessary in order to quell a Communist Party uprising within Japan.

YAMADA: I will study your opinion.

TSUJI: That is not my opinion. Do you believe that tactics similar to U.S. battle tactics are suitable?

YAMADA: Yes.

FURUDA: Please address the chairman before speaking to others.

TSUJI: Mr. KANIMURA, do you have the same opinion as YAMADA?

KANIMURA: Previous mention was made of the Communist Party but the target of NSP is not limited to the Communist Party.

TSUJI: According to Article Four, the duty of NSP is to "maintain the peace and order of our country and to protect human life and property whenever the necessity demands." Is it necessary to undergo the type of training they have been receiving in order to accomplish their purpose?

KANIMURA: Internal disturbances and riots are not limited to activities initiated by an element among Japanese nationals. They may arise with the help of foreign nationals. In an extreme case the possibility of an internal revolution similar to the one that occurred in Spain cannot be discounted. The police can handle ordinary cases, but we are hypothesizing various situations that may occur and planning appropriate measures to counter these situations.

TSUJI: I view the assault training as a rehearsal for participation in the Korean War. I believe that is a far cry from the performance of duty specified in Article Four. I will press the issue again after I have made a study of other units. I will pose the question directly to the Minister. Do you feel that the armaments presently possessed by NSP are adequate?

KANIMURA: They are not absolutely sufficient but adequate for the time being.

TSUJI: Do you feel that the 20-ton tank possessed by NSP is necessary for accomplishing the objectives stated in Article Four?

KANIMURA: I feel that the armaments possessed by NSP are excessive if the present peaceful conditions prevail. However, there remains the need to conduct this training to prepare for the future. In that sense, I feel that the armaments are appropriate.

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TSUJI: The 20-ton tank is no match against the 35-ton Soviet tank. In the event of agitation by the Communist Party and other subversive elements, the use of this 20-ton tank would ruin roads and bridges. 35 - 36 ton tanks are needed in order to cope with an invasion by foreign enemy. In the event of enemy attack from within, light armored tanks are more suitable. What is your opinion on the above?

KAMIMURA: I agree that NSP is not properly armed. However, after due consideration of existing conditions, I believe that present armaments are necessary and adequate. (TW: as good as can be expected under existing conditions)

TSUJI: Concentrating in a smaller area, an infantry company possesses two types of guns--rifles and carbines. They use two different caliber ammunition. Do you consider that situation practical?

KAMIMURA: No. We must alleviate this situation by manufacturing weapons within Japan in the future.

TSUJI: According to my observations, types and numbers of the weapons mentioned previously impressed me as being weapons salvaged from the Americans. They seem to be outmoded weapons which are considered slightly too valuable to junk. We should study our national circumstances, terrain, road network, physical features of our troops, our armament and tactics, and present our requests to the U.S. accordingly. NSP cannot make healthy progress by accepting everything that is offered to it. What is your opinion?

KAMIMURA: I concur with your views and hope to direct my efforts in that direction.

TSUJI: Are you willing and prepared to make a convincing request to the U.S. in order to bear out your efforts?

KAMIMURA: We have been placing requests for various items and not just bowing our heads and accepting anything that is offered to us.

TSUJI: Why then, have you been accepting special vehicles and guns instead of rejecting them?

KAMIMURA: I had accepted the special vehicles because I felt that they were desirable in conducting our present training and maneuvers.

TSUJI: Do you intend to continue utilizing two types of basecocks, heavy machine-guns, light machine-guns, and mortars, or do you intend to make aggressive requests for only essential items?

KAMIMURA: I am presently negotiating only for essential items, as you have suggested.

TSUJI: It appears to me that you are attempting to duplicate the 2500 vehicles carried by a U.S. Division. Japan with her scarcity of gas and undeveloped roads cannot possibly bear the burden of a division consisting of 2500 vehicles. Bicycles are much more appropriate for quelling insurrections. Have you given any thought to the use of bicycles?

KAMIMURA: Yes.

TSUJI: Let me inquire about the military camp. Recently, I inspected the Special Vehicle Regiment at Shin-Machi. I visited the dispensary at noon hours and observed two patients with temperatures hovering around 39.4 degrees. The attending physician was out and although several medical personnel were there, none of them was attending these patients. I called for a military

doctor but he seemed to have left for Shin-Machi for relaxation and apparently would not return until around 2400 hours. About 0900 hours, I visited the dispensary and again took their temperatures. Their fevers had not receded. I called the doctor and he insisted that he had diagnosed their conditions. The patients replied that their cases had not been diagnosed. Strangely enough, there were no fever charts hanging on their bunks. How can we confide our youths to NSF under these unobliging conditions?

**KATO** Yezo (Chief, Personnel Bureau, National Safety Agency): I am unfamiliar with the incident related by you. I fully realize the responsibilities we owe to our youths. However, under the present circumstances, our sanitary organ is critically understaffed. We are presently attempting to arrange a working agreement of some sort with the Ministry of Health and Welfare and various medical groups. Moreover, plans are under way to establish hospitals in Tokyo, Fukuoka, Sapporo, et cetera in accordance with the 1953 budget. I feel that the completion of these plans will alleviate the recurrence of a similar incident. In re the acquisition of other supplies, I intend to exert all my efforts to create improved sanitary conditions for the youths entrusted to our care.

**TSUJI**: Who is the present head of the Sanitation School?

**KATO**: The post is presently vacant and the duties are being handled temporarily by Doctor **MITSUNO**.

**TSUJI**: A person called **KANO** previously held this post in addition to his regular position, did he not?

**KATO**: Yes. **KANO** is head of the Staff School. Due to the difficulties encountered in selecting a head for the Sanitation School, and also because the Sanitation School was located at the same site as the Staff School, **KANO** was given the concurrent position until a Sanitation School head could be officially appointed.

**TSUJI**: If you were sincere in your intent to cure the ill, I see no reason why one or two sanitation specialists could not have been found. Furthermore, in viewing the facilities already acquired, I noticed that the **Harjo Hospital** provided with 100 beds and **Fukuyama Hospital** provides 300 beds, and the **Kurihama Hospital** also provides a vast number of beds. However, these are merely tuberculosis sanitariums and not general hospitals. How many patients are presently assembled in these hospitals?

**KATO**: We are in possession of the above facilities as well as several unpretentious installations in the various garrison areas. I understand that over 100 patients are presently receiving treatment at **Fukuyama**. I do not possess accurate figures on the number of patients presently undergoing treatment at **Harjo**.

**TSUJI**: My investigation of **Harjo** in the latter part of the past year revealed one patient. Furthermore, approximately 1000 tubercular patients were being treated at home. How do you account for the above?

**KATO**: We are exerting every effort to establish collection facilities. It is customary to transfer all tubercular patients to Government hospitals and other designated hospitals. However, when bed space is not available, we permit patients to receive treatment at home by physicians selected by them.

**TSUJI**: Home affairs officials, police officials, regular army officers, et cetera seem to dominate the NSF staff. Are former military personnel also employed by the G-1 Section and the procurement field?

**KATO**: Yes. Former military personnel are being employed by the G-1 Section and procurement.

**TSUJI**: Who are some of the ex-military personnel presently employed by G-1. None are listed in my personal file.

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Security Information

FJJ-205

KATO: ~~Mr. WADA~~, an ex-Army Lt. Col. is assigned to G-1 as assistant section chief.

TSUJI: Each headquarters seems to be supervised by a government official, with the assistant superintendent and chief of staff positions held by the Army and Navy respectively. What is your opinion on this triumvirate management?

KATO: We select our personnel on the basis of efficient operation.

TSUJI: On one occasion when several hundred ex-military personnel were earmarked to enter NSF service, a certain superintendent gathered all the officials and instructed them as follows: "Our number one enemy is the Communist Party. Our number two enemy is the ex-militarists. Soon a group of ex-militarists will be arriving. We must cooperate in order to protect our leadership rights." Do you believe that we can establish an admirable NSF while such differences exist between ex-militarists and internal affairs officials?

KATO: I believe that in order to build an efficient NSF answerable to the people's expectations, they must reconcile their differences and work in harmony.

TSUJI: In that event, an error was made in selecting a superintendent who would give such preposterous instructions. You yourself are disrupting peace. What is the basis for considering ex-militarists as enemies?

KATO: This is the first time I have heard of such insolence. It is difficult for me to answer your question at this meeting.

TSUJI: According to my investigations, 50% of the regimental commanders, 80% of the district superintendents, and 70% of the section chiefs above of the First Staff are complete dilatantes. No wonder YOSHIDA claims that NSF is not a military organization! Do you not feel that it is improper to select top officials in accordance with civil service regulations?

KATO: According to NSF Regulations, those who previously held the positions of NSF staff officers or guard officers are prohibited from being appointed as director general, assistant director, internal bureau secretariats, and section chiefs and above of the various bureaus. However ex-militarists are not restricted from positions of regimental commanders and below.

TSUJI: I have heard rumors of impropriety within NSF. For example, certain top staff officers have been confiscating a portion of the food ration. Those who have been discovered are conveniently rotated from post to post. Next, certain superintendents are rumored as having their mistresses managing the post canteens. A certain intermediate staff officer is said to have a girl-friend managing a restaurant. Local inhabitants proclaim that NSF personnel are inept for battle but skillful in accumulating wealth. Resolute steps must be taken to safeguard the 830,000,000 yen NSF budget in order to prevent its collapse from within. CHIANG Kai-shek's defeat was not because of superior Communist strategy. It was due to internal degeneration. Is the NSF following an identical path?

KATO: I realize that lack of discipline is the singular gangrenous evil prevailing within the organization. I am doing everything in my power to prevent the occurrence of such incidents.

TSUJI: I cannot accept such a simple answer. I expect you to conduct an immediate fact-finding investigation. In addition, I believe that adjustments should be made to conform to Article Four concerning Japan's defense plan, and to Item 1, Article 12, "In Re Basic Plan and Regulations for Guards." These adjustments should be made with NRP and the Autonomous Police for the purpose of maintaining peace and order within Japan. Thus, you must learn to take pride in the various aspects of NSF disposition, organization, training, operations, et cetera.

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Security Information  
SECURITY INFORMATION

ITZ: TSUJI has indicated that impropriety exists within NSF. I feel that this matter should not be treated lightly. I hope that the presence or non-presence of the alleged impropriety will be clearly revealed after the conclusion of a thorough investigation.

KATO: I will determine the proper procedure for conducting an investigation after grasping the true intentions of TSUJI's abstract questioning.

ITZ: I believe that it is the responsibility of NSF to announce the facts as soon as possible. I request that the chairman admonish NSF and also conduct a thorough investigation in re these facts.

FUNADA: I shall comply.

X FUNADA Shigemasa (Committee Member): Next on the agenda, the Decoration Law proposal is soon to be adopted. We are deliberating on the amendments to be added to the Decoration Law providing decorations for those who perform meritorious services during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were awarded the Order of the Golden Kite. This procedure was completely abolished by American decree. We hope to introduce an amendment permitting them to wear these awards again. However, an adequate procedure must be found for supplying the annual pensions that accompany these awards. Veterans of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars are now in the 60-70 age bracket. Would it be possible for the chairman to negotiate with the Minister of Transportation to provide these veterans with free transportation in order to visit YASUKUNI Shrine to pay their respects to their fallen comrades?

FUNADA: I shall comply. If there are no other problems, we will continue with the proposal to amend a portion of NSF regulations tomorrow.

FUNADA: Let us continue with the proposal to amend a portion of the Ministry of Health and Welfare Construction Regulations.

TSUJI: An organ to study the population problem has been established within the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Is this Ministry capable of solving this problem without external aid?

X OUCHI Shigeru (Vice Minister of Welfare for Government Affairs): The population problem is a vital one that appears before the Diet from time to time. We realize that this problem cannot be solved by the efforts of this Ministry alone. We plan to obtain the opinions of the various Ministries and establish a cooperative organ to expedite a solution to the population problem.

TSUJI: I feel that the population problem is one among others--national development, birth control, emigration--that should be handled by an organ staffed with experts assembled from various fields and under the direct control of the Prime Minister's Office. Although I concur with the proposal for the formation of such an organ, I believe that your proposal to establish this organ within the Ministry of Welfare is absurd.

OUCHI: I concur. However, since the population problem is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Welfare, the present proposal is being undertaken by that Ministry.

TSUJI: This problem is a vital problem for the Liberal Party as well as the Government. We should endeavor in cooperation of the Government to propose that this plan be retained in that light.

X OYAMA: The proposal for the formation of this organ within the Ministry of Welfare is not as absurd as suggested by TSUJI. Actually, the Population Problem Research Institute has been in existence within the Ministry for the past 30 years. Experts from other fields have been in constant association with the Institute. Preparations have not as yet been sufficiently made to

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
COMMUNITY INFORMATION  
Security Page 1

PJJ-205

Expand this organ into an independent organ. Although the plan is ideal and seemingly efficient, the organ cannot function effectively without proper preparation.

**TSUJI:** May we then consider the existing organ a temporary organ not concerned with the basic problem in the future?

**OSAMA:** I shall refrain from predicting results for the distant future. However, because of the nature of the problem, the Ministry is not diverting its energies into associated fields. Associate Ministries are also covering their own fields.

**TSUJI:** I will conclude my questions with the hope that this organ will ultimately expand into a responsible and effective machine.

**FUNADA:** Are there any other questions? --If not, the meeting is adjourned for today. We will reconvene at 1000 hours tomorrow.

The meeting was adjourned at 1158 hours.

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MIG NO.		<b>Security Information</b>	
REPORT NO.	7-81-53	WDGS - INTELLIGENCE REPORT	I. D. NO. 1184739
SUBJECT:	Ex-Colonel Masanobu TSUJI		
FROM:	CAWMA, Japan	REFERENCES:	
EVALUATION:	B-2	DATE OF INFORMATION:	Sep-Oct 1952
INCL	PREPAID BY: W. T. Ryder, Col., GS	DATE OF REPORT:	5 August 53
		SOURCE:	Personal observations of Student Officer

**SUMMARY OR SID REPORT:**

In the Fall of 1952, at the time of the general elections, Captain R. B. Waddington, then a student at Detachment "S", completed a field trip covering the Hokuriku and Shikoku areas of Japan. In a recent review of Detachment "S" files, it was discovered that, for reasons unknown, his report on this trip had not been forwarded to this office. Herein are presented extracts of Captain Waddington's personal political observations dealing with ex-Colonel Masanobu TSUJI who was running for a seat in the House of Representatives as an Independent from the First District of Ishikawa Prefecture, i.e., his platform, main points stressed in his campaign speeches, an analysis of his popularity and criticisms of TSUJI expressed by individuals in various fields of endeavor.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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REPORT NO. R-81-53

PAGE NO. 2

1. Source: During the latter and early parts of September and October 1952, Captain R. B. Waddington, then a student at Detachment "S", completed a field trip covering the Hokuriku and Shikoku areas of Japan. In a recent review of Detachment "S" files, it was discovered that, for reasons unknown, his report on this trip had not been forwarded to this office. There follow paraphrased extracts from Captain Waddington's political observations dealing with biographical data on ex-Colonel Masanobu TSUJI, which are believed to be of interest.

2. The political platform of TSUJI, who was running as an Independent from Ishikawa Prefecture in the national general elections of 1 October 1952, included the following:

- a. Japan must not become a second Korea.
- b. Japan must provide for her own self-defense and maintain neutrality.
- c. Japan must reject violent revolution and guard the public peace.
- d. Greater consideration must be given to the problems of rice and electric power.
- e. Japan must establish friendly relations with other Asiatic countries and with them, establish a "third force" in Asia.
- f. Japan must not send her boys overseas.

3. In his campaign speeches TSUJI stressed that:

- a. Japan could do better on her own in providing a defense organization if she were relieved of the burden of supporting U. S. forces in Japan and use that money for her own army.
- b. Although America may find it difficult to forget Pearl Harbor, Japan finds it more difficult to forget Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
- c. Political parties presently in power cannot be trusted which explains why he has no party affiliation.
- d. He confesses to feeling some war guilt and for that reason begs the people to elect him so he can make it up to them.

4. In the October elections, TSUJI received the highest number of votes in his Prefecture despite his status as an ex-militarist without political affiliation or experience. Factors bearing on his success are considered to be:

- a. The publicity and mild hero worship resulting from the publication of his books.
- b. Dissatisfaction with local "career" politicians.
- c. The fact that he was a native son and popular with the 30-40 age bracket. (While a company commander in the Kanazawa garrison he had the reputation of being unusually considerate of his men, many of whom later assisted him in his political campaign.)
- d. His bold anti-American and anti-Russian speeches had the effect of making TSUJI appear deprecatingly indifferent to the power of these world giants, permitting the listening audience to derive a vicarious thrill in denouncing these world giants and give expression to pent-up emotions of sovereignty and rugged independence.

5. Despite his seeming popularity TSUJI has local detractors. For example,

- a. An agricultural cooperative chairman stated: "TSUJI is a war leader, and

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REPORT NO. R-81-53  
PAGE NO. 3

unfit to serve in the Dist. He is obsessed with his own importance and hasn't changed a bit from his Army days."

b. A Kanazawa court employee stated: "He advocates neutrality toward the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. but fails to state how this is to be accomplished."

c. A spokesman for a rayon manufacturer's association stated: "He says we should provide our own defense but are we, in fact, able to do so? Also, he advocates closer relations with other Asiatics, but this cannot be simply accomplished."

**COMMENT:**

1. Detailed background on Masanobu TSUJI and his activities have been adequately covered in other reports emanating from the Far East Command and this office. The observations of the student reporting officer are consistent with the general views reported on this individual. In brief, TSUJI is hanging his political career on the peg of complete Japanese independence from influence of any major world power. His pronouncements calling for the early withdrawal of all foreign troops and the diversion of funds expended for their support to the Japanese armed forces have a particular appeal for the other political elements in Japan who are clamoring for this action. TSUJI has been consistent in taking up the cudgel on behalf of various local communities around the country who are opposing the installation of military bases in their area.

2. In the most recent general elections of April 1953, TSUJI dropped from first to second place in total votes cast in his Prefecture although he was returned to the Dist. While he still commands popular support in his local area, there are no concrete indications that he is rising or will rise to a figure of national prominence and prestige.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM AMCONSULATE, NAGOYA

13  
DEPT. NO.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

August 13, 1953  
DATE

REF

AVN

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12	AUG 21	ATA

SUBJECT: Masanobu Tsuji's Speech in Nagoya

Masanobu TSUJI, ultra-nationalist Dist member from Ishikawa Prefecture spoke in Nagoya on August 8, 1953. His two and one half hour speech, heavily weighted with anti-communist and pro-Tsuji remarks, was received with moderate enthusiasm by an audience of between 1500 and 2000.

The affair was sponsored by the Aichi Branch of the Nippon Defense Association (Nichi-Bo), and was opened by TAMURA, the local head of the Association. The first speaker was NICHITAKA YAMAOKA, former military attache to the Soviet Union, who discussed present conditions in Russia. In regard to Soviet industrial strength, he estimated that the Soviet Union is about 2/5 as strong as the United States. His speech was reportedly ineffective and after three quarters of an hour the audience showed signs of restlessness. After Yamooka rather hastily closed his remarks Tsuji was introduced and received a fairly good ovation.

The audience in the half-filled hall was composed almost exclusively of men, practically all of whom were white collar workers. There was an absence of young men - the percentage of the audience under the age of 30 was estimated at 15%. Thirty percent appeared to be between 30 and 40 and the rest were all older. There is reason to believe that the majority were war veterans.

While Tsuji's remarks can scarcely be described as flattering to the United States they were aimed more at United States' policy than at the United States per se. He attacked America's policy in Asia saying that Americans know Asia as well as Japanese know Mexico but clearly indicated that Communism is the real danger threatening Japan. He criticized the American approach to the defense of Japan as inefficient and maintained that Japan should be allowed to build up its own military establishment in its own way. He characterized the present National Safety Force as American mercenaries. What Japan really needed, he said, was American money and machine tools.

Many of his remarks were personal and revealed a vain, egotistic nature. Thus he showed how he was able to return to Japan from Thailand through China by tricking one official after another. He also glorified his role in organizing the resistance to the proving ground at Uchinada and stressed how he warned the villagers against accepting Communist support.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Page 1 of 1  
Dep. No. 33  
From SECURITY, WAGON

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Page \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_  
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Dep. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_

Troff is a dynamic and dramatic speaker who can hold his audience. He received fairly frequent applause during the course of the speech and at no time was there any heckling. That there was no grand final ovation may be attributed to circumstances beyond his control, such as the uncomfortably hot weather.

It is interesting to note that the press failed almost completely to report on the event.

*J. Robert Wilson*

J. Robert Wilson  
Assistant Vice Consul

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. [ ] [ ]	SOURCE FJJ-300	DATE OF DOCUMENT 10 Sept 1953	ANALYST [ ] [ ]
SUBJECT KODAMA Yoshio			DATE 29 Jan 54
PERTINENT INFORMATION Source: Hokkaido Businessman			Evaluation: F-3
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
KODAMA Yoshio (0438/3768/1807/1133), one of the leading ultra-nationalist figures in Japan, arrived in Hokkaido on 2 Sept 1953 to make a survey of ultra-nationalist groups here. Recently through the efforts of SHIMADA (fnu), President of the Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship Company Ltd., KODAMA gained control of the Hokkaido Construction Company Ltd, ousting SEKINE (fnu), the former president. This construction company is reported to be a major source of funds for KODAMA's ultra-nationalist activities. KODAMA, who is closely affiliated with <u>TSUJI Masanobu</u> , MIURA Gichi and the HAT-OYAMA faction of the Liberal Party, is also reported to be working with former members of the Tokumu Kikan, the "anking Section of which he headed during World War II.			
Field Comment....KODAMA and TSUJI have been associated since 1944 when both men were in Nanking. TSUJI once saved KODAMA's life and KODAMA later concealed TSUJI in his home when TSUJI was in hiding during the war crimes trials.....			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-53-170	SOURCE FJJ-314	DATE OF DOCUMENT 18 Sept 1953	ANALYST [ ] [ ]	
SUBJECT Cabinet Research Chamber			DATE 22 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
Source: Former Japanese intelligence officer			Evaluation: B-2	
THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE QUOTED VERBATIM				
6. ....The Defense Section recently gained two new members, former Colonel MATSUDAIRA Teigyo (Sadatake) (2646/1627/1353/1031) <sup>6</sup> and former Major URA Shigeru (3184/5399).				
6 <u>Source Comment.</u> ....His close friends include MATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/0587/0934/6745), TSUJI Masanobu, and YAMAMOTO Bin (1472/2609/2404).				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. Not Classified	SOURCE FBIS	DATE OF DOCUMENT 9 Oct 53	ANALYST [ ]	
SUBJECT Foreign Broadcast Information Service			DATE 24 Feb 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION  The following information is taken from the desk dossier on TSUJI Masanobu.				
<p>TSUJI, former Army Colonel, and now independent member of the Japanese patrol boat <u>Karasaki</u>, and sailed into the disputed area with on-the-spot conference with ROK authorities on the controversial of two countries. The former staff officer, despite apparent insuperable barrier, accompanied Chief ASAFUJI of the Maritime Safety Board. It is expected that he would negotiate successfully a peace with the Korean. (FBIS Mainichi, 9 Oct. 53)</p>				
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FORM NO. DEC 1952 59-34

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2005





TSUJI Masanobu

DOSSIER

MARU

May Issue, 1954

An Open Letter to American Vice President Nixon

By Masanobu TSUJI, (TN: ex-colonel; member of the House of Representatives, graduated from the Military College; born in Ishikawa Prefecture in 1902)

Paying my respect for your generous attitude, I, as a member of the Diet, would like to ask you the following questions which I think are important for the future of Japan-U.S. relations in connection with your statements in Japan.

The first question:

You recognize the mistake of American policy toward Japan in 1946 and boldly urged Japan to rearm. But I wonder why with all your courage and conscience, you do not further admit that the war crimes trial in Tokyo was a mistake.

Is it ever rational for the victors to try the vanquished? In my opinion, former President Truman, the supreme responsible person of your country, who deliberately killed and injured more than 200 thousand non-combatants in Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atom bombs and hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens in other cities by indiscriminate bombing, is No. 1 war criminal, and the late Stalin of Russia, who committed atrocities unprecedented in history of mankind in Manchuria and Korea and killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese and German civilians and prisoners of war through starvation and maltreatment, No. 2 war criminal.

If you wish for permanent amity between Japan and America, you should frankly admit the mistake of the Tokyo trial and promptly free war criminals related to your country in Sugamo Prison.

The second question:

It is proper for an independent nation to defend itself autonomously. In this sense, Japan's rearmament should not be coerced either by America or by Russia.

Anti-Americanism in Japan has become intensified as a result of the long occupation by American forces. This is especially true of the Japanese who are employed by the American forces in the neighborhood of their bases. If America desires the Japanese to defend their country, I believe it is most advisable for America to withdraw all her armed forces in Japan as soon as possible.

Probably you have not forgotten that among 85 million Japanese, there are still more than two million stout veterans having experiences of fighting on battlefields. Those youths having no experience of fighting, too, are opposed to rearmament coerced by other countries. But I tell you with confidence that they, too, have as much courage and patriotic spirit as exhibited by the Japanese soldiers on the battlefields in Malaya.

America's intervention in Japan's rearmament and demand for a standing army of 325,000 men have given rise to a misunderstanding among the Japanese that your country is planning to use Japan's man power in a war with Russia as a substitute for American troops.

The third question:

America's expectation of Japan should be limited to defending the country not by America but by the courage and efforts of the Japanese and absolutely keeping it from being communized.

- 1 -

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The Japanese are charged with a mission to advise leaders of America and Russia to avert an atomic war in the capacity of the only victims of atom bombs in the world. Should the two countries ignore this advice, they should wage the war at the North Pole. It is an impermissible crime to involve other nations who do not like war in their war in the name of collective defense. If either America or Russia tries to make Japanese youths fight on battlefields abroad, they are sure to meet resistance from all the people of Japan. At the same time, I assure you that the Japanese will not spare cost and efforts so far as they are necessary for Japan's self-defense. If America recognizes the limit faithfully, Japan will pay respect to America and will not spare cooperation in the future, too.

The fourth question:

It is a well known fact that America made Japan conclude a peace treaty with the Chiang Government on Formosa. America should fully reconsider that as a result, the Peking Government has become antagonistic toward America only to please Russia. If you try to establish normal relations between Japan and China by letting Japan to promptly start economic and diplomatic negotiations with the Peking Government, and if America gives through Japan more support to China's construction than Russia, America will be able to grasp a chance to win over China from behind the Iron Curtain to a neutral camp friendly to America.

If America makes it a keynote of her policy toward Asia to separate China from the Soviet bloc, I believe it will result in making Asian nations including India and Britain maintain more friendly relations with America and checking Russia's ambition peacefully.

I hope to receive from you comprehensible answers to the above four questions. Lastly I expect you to accomplish the great mission of saving mankind from ruin by assisting President Eisenhower whom I respect heartily with your youthful enthusiasm, courage and good sense.

J.K.

SHUKAN YOMIURI

April 18 Issue

Nightmare of Hydrogen Bomb War

By Toshikazu KASE (TN: Radio commentator of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation; Left Tokyo Univ. of Commerce without finishing the whole course; Graduated from Harvard Univ.; Was Secretary to the Foreign Minister; Speciality: diplomatic critique; Born 1904 in Chiba Pref.)

An earnest warning against the menace of atomic bombs has long been uttered. But men are unexpectedly easy-going, and no effective counter-measures have yet been devised. Human beings are taking a nap, so to speak, on a time-bomb. It is reported that America has 5,000 atomic bombs, and the Soviet Union, roughly 200. For the time being, America is quantitatively and qualitatively superior to the Soviet Union regarding atomic bomb production. However, the destructive power of atomic bombs is terribly great, so if the Soviet Union comes to have a certain amount of atomic bombs, it will be a fatal menace to America. If atomic bombs should explode over 60 important American cities under a surprise attack, they would be utterly destroyed. According to the American authorities concerned, surprise-attacking enemy planes can be shot down by 20% in the daytime and by 1% in the night. The Air Defense authorities have been trying to make the public understand the menace of atomic bombs, but they have been unable to diffuse the idea satisfactorily, for matters concerned with atomic bombs are top military secrets. The recent Fukuryu-Maru case, however, seems to have given them a good chance to start a positive movement for educating the people on the menace of atomic bombs.

FOR HATTORI Takashiro & TSUJI Masanobu DOSSIERS

The following information was copied from DR-1-221, 22 May 54,

SUBJECTS: 1. Activities of the HATTORI-TSUJI Groups in Defense Planning.  
2. Influence of Federation of Economic Organizations on Defense Planning.

SOURCE: [ ]

1. When asked the question, "What do you know of the activities of the HATTORI-TSUJI groups and other interested in defense planning?" Source stated he knew no details. He recalled that agent reports had been submitted at various times (names and dates unknown) to the MWD group in Tokyo indicating that such a group existed, and alleging that it was American-sponsored. Source has no further information on this subject.

2. When asked the question, "What is your estimate of the probable future influence of the Federation of Economic Organizations on Japanese defense planning and the implementation of these plans?" Source stated he had never heard of such an organization and could not estimate its possible influence on Japanese defense plans.

( DR-1-221, 22 May 54, [ ] )

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<p>14.</p> <p>YCH.17. MACKNOBU /COL/</p> <p>SEX M DOB ?</p> <p>CIT ?</p> <p>OCC ?</p> <p>CLASS OF 36, WAR CRIMINAL WANTED FOR CANNIBALISM, RPTD ALIVE IN SPITE OF PRIOR RPTS OF HIS DEATH, ORGANIZING A GROUP OF CA 1000 JAP DESERTERS NORTH OF BANGKOK. MID-49 INFO THAT FORMER JAP COL HIDING IN PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA IN DISGUISE OF A MONK, A COVER ADMIRALBY SUITED TO SUBJ.</p> <p>WAR ARMY 030-007-011-293Y</p> <p>DAR -04588 08 JUN 54 ARMY P10</p> <p>R 6510112839</p> <p>FILE IN :</p>					
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COUNTRY	Japan	REPORT NO.	CS-45647
SUBJECT	TSUJI Masanobu and KODAMA Yoshio	DATE DISTR.	7 September 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	4 May 1954 except as stated	REQUIREMENT NO.	ROA-5764
PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Hokkaido (4 May 1954)	REFERENCES	CS-24258 CS-42296

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: American observer (B); from an anti-Communist leader in Hokkaido (F). Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. TSUJI Masanobu, leader of the Jiei Domei (Self Defense League), has thus far refused to join the Kyukoku Undo (National Salvation Movement) because of the violent action group within the Movement. However, he may be forced to go along with the Movement in order to maintain his position of leadership among rightists. TSUJI opposes the views of such fanatics as INOUE Missho<sup>1</sup>, who has declared that everyone in his organization, the Nippon Kakushin Renmei (Japan Reform League), is prepared to sacrifice his life for the sake of ridding the Japanese Government of undesirable elements; and TANI Masayuki of the Junjoku Seinen Tai (Martyrs Youth Corps), who made similar statements during a tour of Hokkaido in 1953. TSUJI has always been very popular in those areas which are steeped in Samurai tradition, and it is from those areas that he has drawn support for his election to the Diet. However, if he continues his so-called independent stand in defiance of the ultranationalist groups, he will find himself faced with concerted opposition. TSUJI has indicated that he will hold out, but since he has never before been the target of ultranationalist enmity, only time will tell whether he can maintain his present stand. Followers of TSUJI have stated that they expect TSUJI's prestige to increase this year because so many people are losing faith in the present government but cannot accept either Socialist party as possible alternatives.<sup>2</sup>
2. KODAMA Yoshio, who is the leading figure behind the Junjoku Seinen Tai, is believed to have lost favor with many rightists because of his involvement in the Hozen Keizai Kai scandal and his reported leadership of "goon squads" for the presidents of the Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship Company, Ltd, and the Kanegafuchi Textile Company (Kanebo). Many rightists feel that KODAMA has exploited the ultranationalist movement for personal gain. This loss of prestige has resulted in a decrease of support from his financial supporters. One source of income, the Hokkaido Construction Company (Hokkaido Kensetsu K.K.), is reportedly losing money and its financiers, the Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship Company, is hesitant about giving further assistance because of the recent scandals. There are rumors that KODAMA has been making trips to Hokkaido recently, but these trips are believed to be strictly on business.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Washington Comment. For additional information on INOUE Nissho, his views and activities, see CS-44193 and CS-44210.
2. Field Comment. According to an untested source, TSUJI recently told members of the Jiei Domei that he is the one to lead Japan "out of the depths." For additional information on TSUJI and the Jiei Domei, see CS-35428.
3. Field Comment. Additional information on KODAMA and ultranationalist activities in Hokkaido is reported in CS-24258 and CS-42296.

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TSUJI Masanobu

Ex-Col TSUJI Masanobu Diet member and outspoken critic of American policy, has submitted a request to the Philippine Mission in Tokyo for travel to the Philippines at an early date. His aim, if permission is granted, will be to round up Imperial Japanese Army stragglers still at large in the Philippine countryside and escort them to Japan.

Comment: TSUJI though by no means Japan's leading ultranationalist, is perhaps its best publicized one. His colorful written accounts of his postwar adventures helped gain him election to the House of Representatives in Oct 52 and Apr 53. Since then he has used his Diet position to keep himself in the public eye. In the spring of 1953 he led the ultranationalist East Asia League Comrades Society (Toa Renmei Doshi Kai) into the leftist-sponsored anti-US-base struggle at Uchinada in his home constituency. He countered resultant dissension within the Society by leading his own followers into a Self-Defense League (Jiei Donsi) in Aug 53. Its key principle is withdrawal of USFJ, neutrality and rearmament to fit Japanese, as opposed to US, needs. In the fall of 1953, he capitalized on the dispute with the ROK by touring the Rhee Line, a move which received widespread press coverage. A trip to the Philippines to locate stragglers could receive equally widespread publicity. (INTSUM No. 4284, 2 Jun 54)

Subject was one of the speakers at the first public meeting in the nationwide campaign of the New Party Promotion Council. Has been active in the Council since last April and is a member of its standard committee; however, he is independent in politics and his interest in the movement does not indicate general rightist support. (INTSUM No. 4339, 27 Jul 54)

Subject and NAKASONE Yashiro both Democratic Dietmen declared at a meeting marking the 13th anniv. of Pearl Harbor that Harry S. Truman would be considered the No. 1 war criminal of W.W. II "if God were to give a fair trial" Stalin would be second. (FBIS, 9 Dec 54, NIPPON TIMES, Tokyo)

TSUJI, Masanobu: MHR; leader of the Toa Renmei Doshikai, extreme rightist organization. Ex-Colonel Masanobu Tsuji is currently the leader and Diet spokesman for the nationalist society Toa Renmei Doshikai (East Asia Comrades League), successor to the wartime Toa Renmei of General Kanji Ishihara. Born 1902. A prominent writer and lecturer and the author of three post-World War II nationalist books which have had wide circulation in Japan. He advocates revision of the constitution along ultrarightist lines, neutrality in the cold war between the free world and the Communist states, limited rearmament for self-defense only and the establishment of an independent military force, withdrawal of US troops, scrapping the US-Japan security treaty, and a revival of Pan-Asianism, with the elimination of both Western and Soviet influences from Japan. Tsuji and his Doshikai have achieved wide popularity in Japan because of their avowed neutrality and opposition to war and large-scale rearmament. OOI No. 12037  
20 Oct 54

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AIR

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

DISP. JH NO. TVBA-838

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

01. 25. 1954

TO : Chief, FE

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : Senior Representative,

INFO: Senior Representative,    
Senior Representative,

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational - CE

SPECIFIC— Correspondence of Masanobu TSUJI

1. Transmitted herewith are the following:
  - a. Letter written by Masanobu TSUJI to Identity Able; under separate cover;
  - b. Letter written by Identity Able to TSUJI;
  - c. Business card of Shigeharu ASAEDA;
  - d. Photograph of ASAEDA;

2. All attachments were provided to this mission by Identity A who assumed that KUBARK might be interested in TSUJI's activities and opinions.

3. The Mission has requested Identity A to furnish any further information he may obtain concerning the information TSUJI offers him in paragraph 4 of Attachment A. The Mission would appreciate receiving any pertinent information on TSUJI and ASAEDA which the addressees can provide.

Approved:

21 October 1954

Attachments: Four, by s/c per para 1 above (KAPOK)

Distributions:

- 3 - Hqs. w/all atts. s/c
- 1 - MAC w/atts. a & b s/c
- 1 - ( ) w/atts. a & b s/c
- 2 - Eva. files w/atts. a & b

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

IN COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR 1949

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

Encl. a, FVSA-838

Sept. 23, 1954

Col. Frank O. Blake  
American Embassy  
Saigon, Indo-China

Dear Sir;

Two years have elapsed since I saw you last with Mr. Miyoshi, ex-major-general. It was my great pleasure to hear from him that you already was in Saigon on some important special mission. I heartily wish you good speed there.

Since the fall of 1952, I have been selected to the Diet, as an independent member, and been active in politics of this country, according to my conscience.

I think that the problem of Indo-China in Asia is closely concerned with that of world's peace. And if the present trend of this country further last, they will be under the control of Red power in the near future.

An intimate friend of mine who was a general-staff of Japanese Army during war time privately visited round Thai, Burma, Indo-China and India during May and June of this year. The result of his Asian tours was told me in details. And he made out the information report on the inside situations of these countries with objective view point. I have desired to get an opportunity to meet you and myself deliver this matter into your hand. However, under present circumstances, I cannot do so.

Fortunately, Mr. Shigeharu Asaeda, a close friend of mine is going to visit Thai and then enter into Indo-China. He has worked in Hongkong from July with the business, as a staff of some Japanese company, and will arrive at Bangkok around the middle of next month. So, I entrusted him with conveying the above-mentioned information to you by himself.

During war-time, Mr. Asaeda participated very actively in the Malayan-Campaign with me as an operation-general-staff. Right after the war-end, he did finely the most difficult work in Manchuria, belonging to the Kanto-gun (Japanese Army in Manchuria), and then returned to this country in 1949. Therefore, he is familiar with the inside of the situation of Communist Russia, and moreover has good understanding on the problem of Red China. In this point, I believe he is worthy of trust in advising you in your place.

DESENSITIZED  
per CSN 43-25

SECRET

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- 2 -

Right after arrival at Bangkok, Mr. Asaeda will apply to Thai Government to get visa of Saigon entrance. So, I would like to ask your favour and co-operation to let him get smoothly a permit of Indo-China entry. Enclosed you will find his name card and photo. His address in Bangkok is c/o Sinking Company, Ltd., 1276-1278 Songwad Road, phone: 20063, 21072, Cable add: "SINKING".

Entreating your kindest favour, and with best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Masanobu Tsuji  
A member of House  
of Representative

DESENSITIZED  
REF. CSN 43-26

SECRET

SECRET

Encl. b FVSA-838

Seigon, Vietnam  
5 October 1954

Mr Masanobu Tsuji  
Nagata cho, Chiyoda ku  
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Mr. Tsuji:

Your letter of the 23rd arrived just a day or so ago. It was pleasant to hear from you, as you say it has been over two years since you and I and our other friends had a pleasant evening together at Gajo-san.

I shall be pleased to meet Mr Aseda when he comes to Saigon, or if you or he can give me his time of arrival I shall be pleased to meet him at the airport. I am sure that I can offer him some excellent Vietnamese food, if he should be interested. He will find the weather here quite warm after Japan, but to us it seems quite comfortable.

We still think with pleasure of our years in Japan and hope to visit your beautiful country again - some time. Meanwhile please remember me most sincerely to Mr Miyoshi. I shall look forward toward seeing you again, someplace in the far east.

Sincerely

Frank O. Blake

SECRET

**SECRET**

AIR

738-3774

10 JAN 1955

- Senior Representative,
- Chief,  Division INFO: Senior Rep, RA  
Chief, FE
- Operational/Intelligence
- ASAEDA Shigeharu and TSUJI Masanobu
- REF: PVSA-898

1. Reference dispatch has been read with considerable interest; inasmuch as ASAEDA Shigeharu (mentioned in enclosure A of reference as having information to deliver to Identity A of reference from TSUJI Masanobu) was the  Details of  are available in Headquarters files.
2. Biographical information on ASAEDA and TSUJI Masanobu is included in attachments; however, pertinent data more briefly presented is as follows:

TSUJI Masanobu is one of Japan's leading ultranationalists. A former army colonel, he served in the Japanese Kwantung Army and with the Japanese Imperial General Staff (JIGS) in Singapore, China, Burma and Thailand during the war. After the surrender TSUJI went into hiding to escape trial for war crimes, emerging only after termination of the trials in 1950. Since that time he has devoted himself to writing and to political intrigue. Several publications dealing with his escapades brought him wide publicity as well as solid financial return enabling him to run successfully for the Lower House of the Japanese Diet in 1952. He was re-elected in 1953. TSUJI heads several ultranationalist organizations and is in contact with most important rightist and militarist figures. He has been a vocal exponent of a neutralist, independent program for Japan, which has frequently been strongly anti-American in tone. For that reason and because he has been reported to have contacted the Soviet Mission on occasion, some doubts have been expressed concerning his loyalty. He is generally considered, however, to be anti-Communist and extremely patriotic.

ASAEDA Shigeharu is a former Army Lieutenant Colonel who served under TSUJI Masanobu in the Kwantung Army and with JIGS during the war.

**SECRET**

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(c)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

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TJBA-3274  
Page 2

engaging mainly in intelligence activities in Southeast Asia. T. UJI and A. SAEDA's wartime relationship was very close and they have remained intimate friends up to the present. After the surrender SAEDA was sent to Korea, China and Manchuria with orders for the Japanese commanding generals in those areas to surrender. He was interned by the Russians in Khabarovsk until 1949 when he repatriated to Japan. During his internment SAEDA received special treatment and considerable indoctrination from his Russian captors and upon his return was widely suspected of being an agent for the Soviets in Japan. SAEDA, however, is also known to have contacted numerous American intelligence service units in Japan and is generally considered to have capitalized on his relations with the Soviets by serving as an information broker to both sides. Perhaps the most logical estimate of his loyalties is that SAEDA assumed the role of a Soviet agent for his own protection (he reportedly was under close scrutiny by the Soviets in Japan) with the knowledge and concurrence of some highly placed Japanese intelligence figures. Like T. UJI, he is probably a loyal Japanese. As of August 1954 SAEDA was employed by the Maruichi Seika KK (Maruichi Fresh Foods Company) of Tokyo and was reported to be planning a business trip to Hong Kong and Cambodia.

3. The Japan Mission is very much interested in obtaining information on SAEDA's trip to Southeast Asia and his activities there in view of the strong possibility that he is engaged in some intelligence operation (probably for the Japanese Intelligence Service). Specific points on which information would be appreciated are as follows:
- a) Details of SAEDA's trip: i.e., itinerary, date of arrival in Saigon, mode of travel, name of concern represented, ostensible reasons for the trip, etc. Names and identifying info on persons SAEDA contacts.
  - b) Any assistance requested of Identity A by SAEDA.
  - c) SAEDA's conversation with Identity A; i.e., nature of the information referred to by T. UJI; operational details (if any) revealed by SAEDA re the information; stated reasons for SAEDA's contacting Identity A (why couldn't T. UJI pass the information to someone in Japan?); conditions surrounding SAEDA's disclosure of the information; any terms for disclosing the information; form in which the information was presented (if written, any copy?)
  - d) Biographic or operational data on the original source of the information referred to by T. UJI (the "general staff officer"). Details of his connection with T. UJI. Details of SAEDA's present connection with T. UJI.
  - e) Information on Japanese contacts or connections of the Aikano Company, Ltd.

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3274  
Page 3

4. We will, of course, welcome any other information pertinent to this case and will be happy to follow up any leads that are developed and to provide further information if desired.
5. The attachments in their present form are intended for KRBANK eyes only. There is no objection to transmittal of the substantive information outside KRBANK, but it should be submitted so as not to indicate that portions of it originated with COMINT.

Intelligence Staff

**Attachments:**

Biographical information on TOKI Masamoto  
Biographical information on ASADA Shigeharu  
Interviewed Masada (to address only)

4 January 1955

**Distribution:**

- 2 - SA,   w/attachs (orig only)
- ✓ 1 - Chief, FE w/attachs (1 copy)
- 1 - SA/MA w/o attachs
- 1 - Intel
- 1 - D/FI
- 1 - Chrono

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

10 Jan 55

att F5817  
3274/1

TSUJI Masanobu

10 December 1954

TSUJI Masanobu was a former colonel in the Japanese KWANTUNG Army. When the Japanese army surrendered in August 1945, subject was in Burma, and was wanted by the British as a War Criminal. He escaped to Chungking from Burma and then went to Hanking where he was employed by the Third (Intelligence) Section of the Chinese Defense Ministry, planning Chiang's campaigns and writing tactical manuals based on his own experiences. At this time he was in contact with General OKAMURA Heiji, Gen DOI and Major-General TS'AO Shih-cheng (Chief of first section of the Chinese Mission). Subject returned to Japan in disguise in early 1948 and since that time has been going from place to place in an attempt to frustrate the investigations of various agencies which are attempting to locate him. TSUJI claimed that he has not left Japan since his initial return in 1948. He discussed briefly the rash of sensational articles in various journals which described him as being disguised as a priest and acting as a courier for the Chinese. TSUJI dismissed such stories as blatant falsehoods and claimed that he has merely attempted to evade capture as a war criminal and has not engaged in any nefarious activities. He stated that he had "taken over the position of Gen ISHIBARA Kanji, who died in 1949, in the East Asia League (TOA RENMEI). (Source a meeting between subj and CE agent 6 March 1950)

The British terminated their war crimes trials on 30 Sept 1949 and stated TSUJI Masanobu was no longer wanted by them. When subject heard this, he came out of hiding, and returned to his home. Some sources claimed that Chinese intelligence-collecting in Japan was directed from Hanking under TSUJI's guidance.

In 1949 subject reportedly recruited Japanese mercenaries for Chinese Nationalist Army; also travelled back and forth between Japan and Formosa connected with recruitment program. He visited KUDAMA Yoshio, former Shanghai intelligence agent, and KAGAWA Yoshio, former intelligence agent.

In July 51 subject spoke at the Shinjin (Liberalists) club, Tokyo and stated chances are dim for the USA to win WWII against Russia. He admitted all the statistics he compiled to make the above statement took him one and a half years of painstaking scrutiny of the intelligence before reaching his conclusion. (The above speech was used by the JCF for propaganda purposes.) Subject was indicted by the Atty-General's office for violating Purge ordinance by making the above mentioned speech.

Early in 1951 subject attended several meetings of nationalist groups in Takamatsu city and Kita-gun, Kagawa Prefecture. He reportedly held secret conferences with KIMURA Kakuro, former councillor of the East Asia League for the purpose of discussing reconstruction of the League in view of the approaching depurge of the League members. They allegedly are making plans for the unification of all Right-wing organizations to be affected immediately following the signing of the Peace treaty.

ENCL 1  
10 Jan. 55  
[ ]

On 13 July 1951 SUBJECT while visiting in Nagano, agreed to help KINOSHITA Jozaburo, UCHIYAMA Ichiya and KATEBAYASHI Masaaji form a secret anti-communist organization in Nagano-ken to be used in event of an unspecified type of emergency. The proposed organ is to be made up of 5 or 6 persons in each of as many villages as possible, the persons to be selected by UCHIYAMA from among reliable former members of the IRAA, and the Reservists Association who are capable of using automatic weapons. Structure of the organization is to be kept a closely guarded secret, members of the group in one village being kept in ignorance of the existence of similar groups in other villages. (B-6)

*Handwritten:* Communist, Soviet Union, Liaison with the Chinese Communists is maintained through the following persons: KODAMA Yoshio to KUBITA Jujiro to SUN, Tai. (SUN is sympathetic towards JCP). It is alleged that TSUJI has contact with Communist China direct from Kyushu to North Korea. He has the following men under his command: KOBAYASHI; SEKINE; SUZUKI; SUMIBE and OMURA (all first names unknown). OMURA is employed by G-2 Section and is presumably well acquainted with the functions of G-2 SCAP GHQ. It is believed that the SUZUKI mentioned above is SUZUKI Kyo, a graduate of the 35th class of Japanese Military Academy, former Air Force staff officer and ex-member of the Kawabe organ.

SUBJECT's assignment is concerned with intelligence; however he is also to organize former Japanese military personnel, under the supervision of Communist China for the nucleus of an emancipation army. (Source: Conf Informant dated Aug 51 eval B-6)

NOTE: Major RINALDUCCI opinion of above report is that it is erroneous. CI Div agrees with him at least to the extent that SUBJECT is not believed to maintain liaison or have dealings with the Soviet or Chinese Communists. Sept 51.....

Subject organized the PATRIOTIC FAITH SOCIETY in 1949 (it has been called the ROYAL FAITH SOCIETY) (Jumohm Shisei Kai). The Patriotic Faith Society follows a policy of maintaining strict secrecy. A proposal was made that the Society gather info about the 8 missing Communist leaders and supply the police with this information to as to alleviate the attention of the police toward the Society. Because most of the members of the Society are former military officers their info collecting activity is centered on tactical forecasts of the 3rd WW. Accordingly, special info collectors are provided in the lower echelons, and a great effort is being made to ascertain the movements of the Communists, both in Japan and abroad. It is reported that 27 members of the Society have secretly made their way to Red China and the Soviet Union in order to ascertain the actual conditions in those places. The fact that ex-Maj-Gen WAKURO is an officer in this Society indicates that the intelligence collection system of the former MAKANO group (Jap military Police who were trained at a school in Makano Ward) has been adopted.

Among the persons whom TSUJI seeks personally are former Lt-Colonel ASAEDA, a former staff officer of the Kyantung Army and repatriate from Siberia; and SUN, T'se, said to be a member of the Chinese Communist intelligence organization; and others who are said to be secret Communists. It is believed that TSUJI's reason for contacting such persons may be to exchange intelligence.

It was reported that one of "TSUJI's SPES" was apprehended within the Tokyo Metropolitan committee of the JCP on 25 July 1951. This person freely confessed and even stated that he had been meeting TSUJI or an accomplice in the vicinity of Shibuya station on the 2, 12th and 22 of each month. The JCP is going to use this person as a double agent. (ctd 13 Sept 51. Eval B-2)

KITAHARA Genichiro, a former member of East Asia League is reported to have made the following statement in substance, to an unidentified friend:-  
 "I met TSUJI in Hanking China while I was stationed there as an interpreter with the Japanese China Dispatch Army; I worked with him for about a year. I learned through TSUJI of the POWER of a Chinese secret organization called CHIHBAI-KO (phonetic) led by KU, Yush-shang, and dedicated to the principle of "racial defense."  
 (B-6)

TSUJI is not a Communist, on the contrary, his background is military and ultranationalistic. An army colonel, he was a member of the clique of Lt-Gen ISHIBARA Kanji and of ISHIBARA's nationalistic East Asia League which was banned in 1946. During his army days he worked in intelligence and in strategic planning; he had prestige beyond his rank, presumably due to his connections with higher ranking militarists and because he was at one time an aide to the Emperor's younger brother, Prince Mikasa. His present position is anti-US and anti-USSR favoring a "third force". (apr 52)

Subject was elected to the House of Representatives in Oct 52, as an Independent. He is a Director of Japan-China Trade Promotion Assn as of June 53.

A former Class "A" War Crimes suspect, KODAMA Yoshio, former head of "KODAMA MIKAN", a group of agents serving under the Japanese Navy in Shanghai, is known to be one of SASAGAWA's co-workers. It is rumored that KODAMA has been taking part in a so-called "Troop organizing plan" which is secretly working with the CCP. KODAMA appears to be keeping contact with TSUJI, Masanobu, organizer of the ultra nationalist Patriotism and Devotion Society (June 51).

CIB report dated 10 March 1950 Investigation Report by Maj RINALDUCCI. "This report traces subject's background and activities and adds info concerning attempts made by US Air force Hqs to utilize TSUJI. This report states that KODAMA Yoshio, released war criminal suspect, recommended TSUJI to Col Frank of USAF as "the individual who could represent the best among former Japanese officers". KODAMA is said to have known TSUJI years ago in Hanking. The report states that TSUJI declined to meet Col Frank for the reason that if he were to cooperate with the American Army, he wanted to do so through ABAKI Sadao, under life sentence in Spangon Prison. The report also mentions the Air Force unsuccessful attempts to obtain the book written by TSUJI covering his secret

TSUJI Masanobu

page 4

travels since the end of the War."

SUBJECT has currently been conferring with an undisclosed number of former officers in preparation for the formation of an organization made up of ex-servicemen. These men have expressed a strong interest in the future of Japan and have indicated that former military men with strong nationalistic spirit, should band together and assist in formulating the future of Japan. Subject has revealed his opposition to the acceptance of NSA aid and has urged Japan to create an army of its own. They plan to inaugurate an organization during the Spring of 1954. KISHIMOTO (fnm) former Colonel, in charge of Hokkaido Air base and MIKIKI Satoshi, (lt-colonel), now president of NISSO Company, are two men interested in this newly planned organization, the name of which is Japan Self Disciplined National Army Creation ASSN (NIPPON JISHUKU HOKUGUN KENSETSU KAI). (B-3)

In January 1954 subject formed a Youth action Corps called "SELF DEFENSE LEAGUE" (JIJI DONKI and has withdrawn from the East Asia League comrades Society. (B-3) This Corps is reportedly working toward enlisting members of the NSP into its organization. TSUJI and HATTORI Takahiro are alleged to have among their followers more than ten officers within the NSP.



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From:  Mission

Report No: F31-655

Local File No: LI-326

No. of Agents: 1

No. of Disclosures: 0

Report Made By:

Approved By:

Distributions: Files

Source Cryptonyms:

*17 Jan 1954*

submitted this information in a report dated 17 December 1954. The report was passed to  who submitted it to XAFN on 23 December. Project:

**THIS IS A CE DISSEMINATION**

The material contained herein is forwarded as reference data for inclusion in appropriate CE working files. Dissemination to customer agencies, if any, should be carefully guarded.

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**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

**INFORMATION REPORT**  
CONTROLLED AMERICAN SOURCE

COUNTRY: Japan  
SUBJECT: TANABE Shinshi

**SECRET**  
CONTROL  
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

DATE DISTR. 17 January 1955

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED: Japan, Tokyo

NO. OF ENCLS. 0  
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.: December 1954

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

RATING OF SOURCE				COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT							
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A	B	C	D	E	F	1	2	3	4	5	6
	X						X				

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Former Japanese intelligence officer

1. **Field Comment.** TJB-482 reported the appointment of T.N. BE as a regular member of the TERADA Kikan. **TANABE Shinshi (3944/6708/2450/0037)**<sup>1</sup> has been employed by the Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA), which for some time had been looking for someone to improve the Agency's low-grade code.<sup>2</sup> As it was difficult to hire TANABE as a regular official of PSIA because of his age, health, and the problem of pay, he was placed in the TERADA Technical Research Institute (TERADA Kikan). He will work on improving PSIA codes under the supervision of the chief of the TERADA Kikan, TERADA Takeo.

1. **Field Comment.** TJB-482 reported the appointment of T.N. BE as a regular member of the TERADA Kikan.

2. **Source Comment.** TANABE's name was first submitted to PSIA by KOFANI Itsumi. TANABE was also greatly aided by FUJII Masunobu, who asked FUJII Gōichiro, head of the PSIA, to find employment for TANABE.

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*[Handwritten signature]*

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From:  Mission

Report No: WFB-820 Local File No. EH-323

No. of Pages: 2

No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By:

Approved By:

Distribution: P, O

Source Cryptonym:

18 Mar. 1955

obtained this information from  (see FJS-411)  
and  Director of both the Onoi Kai and the Tokyo Veterans  
Association.  received it from  on 23 December 1954.  
Project:

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(D) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

**CONFIDENTIAL CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY INFORMATION REPORT**

ASSIGNATION

FORM 104-20

COUNTRY Japan  
 SUBJECT Tonkoku Kyuzoku Gunjin Kai (All Japan Veterans Association)  
 PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo  
 DATE OF INFO. 7 December 1946

DATE DISTR. 8 March 1955  
 NO. OF PAGES 2  
 NO. OF ENCLS. 0  
 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

COMPLETION DATE	SOURCE OF INFO.			COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	CLASSIFICATION	EXEMPT FROM DISSEMINATION	PRIORITY			DISSEMINATION		
	US	ALLIED	OTHER				SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	UNCLASSIFIED	SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	UNCLASSIFIED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Former Japanese Intelligence Officer (B), from two Japanese ex-Army Officers (F)

\* The Tonkoku Kyuzoku Gunjin Kai (All Japan Veterans Association) held its inaugural meeting at Hibaya Public Hall in Tokyo on 7 December 1946, with MOGUCHI Sakari presiding as temporary chairman. MIYOTO Hiroshi was elected president of the association and KUROYAMA Hiroshi (0671/117/071) and AKI Ien (1230/2636/127) were elected vice-presidents. The avowed purpose of the organization is to bring the veterans of World War II together in one association. Speakers at the meeting included KATSUMATA Katsumasa, Yasuhiko, Yasuhiko, and a Major SCURLEY (Jnu) of the British Army.

2. No regional units of the Tonkoku Kyuzoku Gunjin Kai are known to exist.

1 Source Comment. Sub-source states that a Tokyo Shinbun article of 7 December 1946 reporting that the Tonkoku Kyuzoku Gunjin Kai and the Osei Kai are opposed to each other is false.

Field Comment. According to the Tokyo Shinbun article of 7 December 1946, the Tonkoku Kyuzoku Gunjin Kai is for prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and is against rearmament, while the Osei Kai advocates rearmament. For a description of the Osei Kai, see FDI-650.

2 Source Comment. MOGUCHI is a former Japanese Army reserve officer and served as an official of a veterans association before World War II. He and his father are engaged in construction contracting work. Early in December 1946, MOGUCHI called on the Osei Kai and asked OKAMURA Yasuji to become president of the association, but the latter declined.

3 Field Comment. MIYOTO is a former Lt. General and an authority on China.

4 Source Comment. KUROYAMA is a former Vice Admiral (technical) while AKI is a former Lt. General (Artillery).

5 Source Comment. KATSUMATA represented the Left Wing Socialist Party.

6 Source Comment. YAMASAKI was representative for the Japan Democratic Party.

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Handwritten initials and date: *12/10/46*

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FJD-020

- 2 -

- 7 Source Comment. KUMAKURA is a supporter of the veterans' movement from the field of religion.
- 8 Source Comment. Major PRINKEY is a supporter of veterans of foreign wars. PRINKEY was born in Shiba in Tokyo. His mother is Japanese. His speech contained the following statements: "Japanese must once again cultivate the Spirit of Bushido (Way of the Warrior)," and "The spirit of the Japanese people during the Meiji Period was commendable."
- 9 Source Comment. The policy of the association is apparently to form a central organization, to strengthen it, then organize regional units.

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44-778-80

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 26 OCT 55

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ( )

ACTION: FE 7

CSDB-35998  
70-281

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, PP/ICD 2, SR 3, DD/1, AD/CI, S/C 2

3915 (IN 23724) 1210Z 26 OCT 55 ROUTINE

TO: DIR INFO: [ ] [ ] [ ] (POUCH) CITE: [ ]

CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

FJB 2418. DIST D. INFO RECD 25 OCT 55 FROM POLESTAR/2, FROM POLESTAR/1 ON 20 OCT, FROM TSUJI MASANOBU ON 19 OCT. DATE OF INFO: OCT 55. EVAL OF INFO: 2 (THAT TSUJI MADE THESE STATEMENTS):

1. DURING DIET MEMBERS TOUR OF USSR, TSUJI MASANOBU HAS SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV, ONE ZHUKOV'S CHIEF OF STAFF (MAJ GEN) AND ON NIGHT BEFORE LEAVING MOSCOW HAD 3-4 HOUR INTERVIEW WITH ZHUKOV AT LATTER'S REQUEST. MAIN POINTS OF CONVERSATION:

A. TSUJI ASKED IF USSR WOULD RETURN KURILES AND SAKHALIN TO JAPAN IF USA RETURNED OKINAWA AND BONINS. ZHUKOV ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY.

B. TSUJI ASKED WHETHER SOVS HAD CONSIDERED PROPAGANDA VALUE OF RELEASING POWS WHILE USA STILL HOLDS WAR CRIMINALS IN SUGAMO. SHUKOV ANSWERED HE AND BULGANIN WANTED TO RELEASE PRISONERS IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY, BUT COULD NOT GET CONCURRENCE OF KRUSHCHEV.

*Carroll*

S-E-C-R-E-T

*TSUJI Masanobu*  
*F-10-11*

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- Privacy
- Methods/Sources
- Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005

SECRET

26 OCT 55

( ) 3915 (IN 23721)

PAGE -2-

2. ABOVE MEETING HELD UNDER CLANDESTINE CIRCUMSTANCES. SPECIAL MESSENGER INSTRUCTED TSUJI TO FOLLOW MAN WITH RED TIE CARRYING NEWSPAPER WHO BE WALKING IN FRONT OF HOTEL. TSUJI, FEARING LIQUIDATION, TOLD KITAMURA TOKUTARO, LEADER OF DIET GROUP, HE WAS BEING TAKEN TO MEET ZHUKOV, THEN MET CONTACT MAN, WHO LED HIM SEVERAL BLOCKS, MOTIONED TSUJI INTO AUTO WHICH TOOK HIM TO ZHUKOV. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS INDICATES MEETING WAS HELD WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF CPSU OFFICIALS.)

3. ZHUKOV SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN ALSO ASKED TSUJI SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON BOOKS TSUJI HAD WRITTEN, INDICATING HE HAD READ BOOKS. ZHUKOV APPARENTLY UNDER IMPRESSION TSUJI WAS ONE OF PLANNERS OF PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, QUESTIONED TSUJI THEREON.

4. TSUJI GOT IMPRESSION RIVALRY FOR POWER IN USSR IS BETWEEN ZHUKOV AND KRUSHCHEV, WITH BULGANIN OUT OF RUNNING FOR POWER. (FIELD COMMENT: ABOVE STATEMENTS MADE AT TAIRIKU MONDAI KENKYU SHO TO [ ] DOI AKIO, ASAI ISAMU, MATSUDAIRA TEIGYO ONLY. [ ] WILL RECHECK STORY BY ASKING TANABE SHINSHI TO INTERVIEW TSUJI, WITHOUT TELLING THIS INFO TO TANABE. IN VIEW APPARENT PRESENT RESTRICTED ACCESS THIS INFO IN JAPAN. ANY HQS DISSEM SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED NO DISSEM ABROAD TO AVOID BLOWING [ ]

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 31 OCT 55

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ( )

ACTION: FE 7

INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/ROM 3, FI/SOD, FI/RI-2, PP 2, PP/OPS, PP/SAC 2, SR 3, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

( ) 3947 (IN 25375)

1316Z 31 OCT 55

ROUTINE

TO: DIR

INFO: ( ) ( )

PRIORITY

CITE: ( )

CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

FJB-2014. DIST D. INFO RECD 19 OCT FROM FORMER JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (B).

DATE OF INFO: SEP 55. EVAL OF INFO: 2 (REPORTORIAL ACCURACY)

TSUJI MASANOBU, MEMBER JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS GROUP TOURING USSR, EVADED SOVIET SCHEDULE, TALKED WITH 300 PERSONS VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS. FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS OF USSR AND CHICOM GIVEN BY HIM AT MEETING 19 OCT TO RESTRICTED AUDIENCE:

A. USSR EVEN MORE IMPERIALISTIC AND ULTRA-NATIONALISTIC THAN EXPECTED, E G, GRADE SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS EMPHASIZE PATRIOTISM MORE THAN COMMUNISM.

B. SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE NOT POLITICAL, BUT NECESSARY BECAUSE 1) SUCCESSOR TO STALIN NOT YET FOUND, 2) PARTY-MILITARY FRICTION EXISTS, 3) USSR NOT PREPARED ALL-OUT WAR; TEN YRS BEHIND WEST PEACEFUL INDUSTRIES, AGRICULTURE, 4) USSR NOT COMPLETELY RECOVERED DEVASTATION WORLD WAR II, 5) HATRED FOR WAR BY FAMILIES WORLD WAR II DEAD EVEN MORE INTENSE THAN IN JAPAN, 6) PUBLIC ANTI-WAR FEELING VERY STRONG, E G, TSUJI TOLD BY LEADERS PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND LABORERS AT LENINGRAD DINNER PARTY THAT NO MORE WARS WANTED. THESE REMARKS NOT SEEM DIPLOMATIC UTTERANCES FOR EARS OUTSIDERS (SIC).

C. IN GEORGIA REPUBLIC, TIFLIS SEEMED OFFENSIVE, NOT DEFENSIVE, BASE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ABSTRACT INDEX

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Copy No. DATE 3

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005

S-E-C-R-E-T

31 OCT 55

( ) 3947 (IN 25375)

PAGE -2-

FOR MIDDLE EAST: FOUR AIRFIELD OUTSKIRTS CITY AND CONSIDERABLE NUMBER (SIC) MIG FIGHTERS SEEN; ONE OF EVERY THREE PERSONS TIFLIS MILITARY. NEW FACTORY USING GERMAN PRECISION INSTRUMENTS TO MAKE STEEL TUBES CONSTRUCTED SOME 50 KILOMETERS FROM TIFLIS. PREMIER GEORGIA REPUBLIC, IN INTERVIEW WITH TSUJI, SEEMED ARROGANT TOWARD JAPANESE, SUBSERVIENT TO ACCOMPANYING SOVIET OFFICIALS FROM MOSCOW. PREMIER'S RESIDENCE HEAVILY GUARDED, TROOPS WITH AUTOMATIC RIFLES.

D. IN RE COSSACKS ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIANS, SEVEN OUT OF TEN PEOPLE IN BAKU QUERIED BY TSUJI REPLIED "ONLY REASON WE, SMALL WEAK RACE, NOT SUBJECTED AGGRESSION OTHERS BECAUSE WE ARE WITH THE RUSSIANS. FOR THIS REASON WE MUST SWALLOW DOWN OUR LITTLE DISSATISFACTIONS".

E. CONDITION SOVIET FARMERS WORSE THAN EXPECTED: PRODUCTIVITY PER TAN (300 TSUBO) ABOUT ONE-FIFTH THAT IN JAPAN.

F. IN RE JAPAN-SOVIET TALKS, NO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE SINCE SOVIETS HOLD 1400 JAPANESE HOSTAGES: TERRITORIES CAN BE REGAINED, BUT NOT HUMAN LIVES. NORMALIZE RELATIONS FIRST, THEN NEGOTIATE TERRITORIES.

G. SOVIET-CHINESE PEOPLES NOT SO HARMONIOUSLY UNITED AS APPEARS. CHICOM VIP IN PEKING TOLD TSUJI "WE PLAY UP TO SOVIETS AND GET AS MUCH OUT OF THEM AS POSSIBLE". SEEMS TRUE SENTIMENT TOWARD SOVIETS.

H. CHINESE PEOPLE COMPLETELY LOST INTEREST CHANG KAI-SHEK. CHICOM CIRCLES SAY ARMED INVASION FORMOSA NO LONGER NECESSARY SINCE SUN LI-JEN. INCIDENT (SIC).

WASH ONLY: SOURCE ABOVE [ ] WHO WITH MATSUDAIRA TEIGYO ONLY OUTSIDERS AT

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

31 OCT 55

( ) 3947 (IN 25375)

PAGE -3-

TSUJI TALK TO TAIRIKU MONDAI KENKYU SHO MEMBERS. (POSSIBLE (BEING SERVICED  
FOR CONFIRMATION) THIS INFO IN VIEW FJB-2008, WHICH APPARENTLY RECD. BY [ ]  
ON SAME OCCASION AS ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

023

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 31 OCT 55

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [ ]

SERVICE

ACTION: FE 7

INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/ROM 3, FI/SOD, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, PP/SAC 2, SR 3, DD/1, AD/CI, S/C 2

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0725Z 1 NOV 55

ROUTINE  
PRECEDENCE

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CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT:

COMPLETE PARAGRAPH H, PAGE 3, LINES 1 AND 2, TO READ:

"... TSUJI TALK TO TAIRIKU MONDAI KENKYU SHO MEMBERS. HQ CABLE

THIS INFO IN VIEW FJB-2008, WHICH APPARENTLY RECD BY [ ] ."

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
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Date: 2005

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [ ]  
UNIT : FE/1  
EXT : 3520  
DATE : 31 OCTOBER 1955

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ROUTING	
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TO : STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, NSA, JCS, SECDEF, ONE, ~~SECRET~~ OCI/B *Tsuji Masanobu*

FROM : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : FE 7

INFO : CI/OPS, CI/IC, F1/OPS, F1/PLANS, F1/ROM 4, F1/STD 2, F1/SOD, F1/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, PP/SAC 2, SR 3, S/C 2, SPECIAL: OCR, OCI 13, ONE

CS PD NO. 348 (OUT 88354) 2256Z 31 OCT 55 ROUTINE PRIORITY

NOFORN/LIMITED/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY : USSR/CHINA/JAPAN

SUBJECT : ~~RE~~ TSUJI MASANOBU'S IMPRESSIONS OF USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA

FROM : JAPAN, TOKYO (19 OCTOBER 1955)

DATE OF INFO : SEPTEMBER 1955

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: PROBABLY TRUE THAT TSUJI MADE THESE STATEMENTS

SOURCE : FORMER JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (B), FROM TSUJI MASANOBU

REFERENCE: PD-281, 26 OCTOBER (CSDB-35996)

1. TSUJI MASANOBU, MEMBER OF THE JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS GROUP

THAT RECENTLY TOURED THE USSR AND VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF THE JAPAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, EVADED THE SOVIET SCHEDULE WHILE IN THE USSR AND TALKED WITH 300 PERSONS OF VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS. THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS OF THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA WERE GIVEN BY HIM AT A MEETING ON 19 OCTOBER TO A RESTRICTED AUDIENCE:

A. THE USSR IS EVEN MORE IMPERIALISTIC AND ~~RECENT~~ ULTRA-NATIONALISTIC THAN EXPECTED; E.G. GRADE SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS EMPHASIZE PATRIOTISM MORE THAN COMMUNISM.

B. THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE IS NOT POLITICAL, BUT NECESSARY BECAUSE (1) THE SUCCESSOR TO STALIN IS NOT YET FOUND; (2) PARTY-MILITARY FRICTION EXISTS; (3) THE USSR IS NOT PREPARED FOR AN ALL-OUT WAR AND IS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(D) Methods/Sources
- (2)(E) Foreign Relations

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OS PD NO. 348 (OUT 8835A)

PAGE TWO

PRECEDENCE

NOFORN/LIMITED/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTINUED CONTROL

TEN YEARS BEHIND THE WEST IN PEACEFUL INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE; (4) THE USSR IS NOT COMPLETELY RECOVERED FROM THE DEVASTATION OF WORLD WAR II; (5) THE HATRED OF WAR BY THE FAMILIES OF THE WORLD WAR II DEAD IS EVEN MORE INTENSE THAN IN JAPAN; (6) THE PUBLIC ANTI-WAR FEELING IS VERY STRONG: FOR E.G., TSUJI WAS TOLD BY LEADERS OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND LABORERS AT A Leningrad DINNER PARTY THAT NO MORE WARS WERE WANTED. THESE REMARKS DID NOT SEEM TO BE DIPLOMATIC UTTERANCES INTENDED FOR THE EARS OF OUTSIDERS.

C. IN THE GEORGIA REPUBLIC, TBILISI SEEMED TO <sup>IMPORTANT</sup> ~~SEEM~~ TO BE AN OFFENSIVE, NOT A DEFENSIVE, BASE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST: THERE WERE FOUR AIRFIELDS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY AND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER (SIC) OF MIG FIGHTERS WERE SEEN; ONE OF EVERY THREE PERSONS IN TBILISI WAS IN THE MILITARY. A NEW FACTORY USING GERMAN PRECISION INSTRUMENTS TO MAKE STEEL TUBES HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED SOME 50 KILOMETERS FROM TBILISI. THE PREMIER OF THE GEORGIA REPUBLIC, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH TSUJI, SEEMED ARROGANT TOWARD THE JAPANESE, AND SUBSERVIENT TO THE ACCOMPANYING SOVIET OFFICIALS FROM MOSCOW. THE PREMIER'S RESIDENCE IS HEAVILY GUARDED BY TROOPS WITH AUTOMATIC RIFLES.

D. CONCERNING THE COSSACKS! (SIC; HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PROBABLY

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CS FT NO. 348 (OUT 88354)

PAGE TEN THREE  
PRESIDENCY

NOFORN/LIMITED/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTINUED CONTROL

Caucasians) attitude toward the Russians, seven out of ten people in Baku queried by Tsuji replied "the only reason that we, a small weak race, are not subjected to the aggression of the others is because we are with the Russians. For this reason we must swallow down our little dissatisfactions."

E. The condition of the Soviet farmers is worse than reported; the productivity per tan (300 tsubo) is about one-fifth of that in Japan.

F. The Soviet and Chinese peoples are not so harmoniously united as they would appear to be. An important Chinese Communist told Tsuji in Peking "we play up to the Soviets and get as much out of them as possible." Tsuji this seemed to believe to be the true sentiment toward the Soviets.

G. The Chinese people have completely lost interest in Chiang Kai-shek. Chinese Communist circles say that an armed invasion of Taiwan is no longer necessary since the Hsu Sun Li-jen incident (SIC).

2. In connection with the Japanese-Soviet negotiations, Tsuji stated that no concrete negotiations are possible since the Soviets hold 1,400 Japanese hostages; the territories can be regained, but not human lives. It is necessary to normalize relations first, then negotiate the territories.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CS PD NO. 348 (OUT 88354)

URGENT PAGE FOUR  
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FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

FORMAL DISSEM FOLLOWS IN CSDB-36037

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ABOVE INFO BASED G ( ) 3947 (IN 25375)

SR REPORTS IN DRAFT

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TE/TL/R

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FJB-2014R1

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S-E-C-R-E-T

NOFORN/LIMITED/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	USSR/China/Japan	REPORT NO.	CS DB-36037
SUBJECT	TSUJI Masanobu's Impressions of the USSR and Communist China	DATE DISTR.	2 November 1955
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	September 1955	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo	REFERENCES	CSDB-35998 (PD-281)
DATE ACQUIRED	19 October 1955		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Former Japanese intelligence officer (B); from TSUJI Masanobu. Appraisal of Content: Probably true that TSUJI made these statements.

FD-348

1. TSUJI Masanobu, member of the Japanese Diet members group that recently toured the USSR and Vice-chairman of the Political Affairs Research Committee of the Japan Democratic Party, evaded the Soviet schedule while in the USSR and talked with 300 persons of various backgrounds. The following impressions of the USSR and Communist China were given by him at a meeting on 19 October to a restricted audience:
  - a. The USSR is even more imperialistic and ultra-nationalistic than expected; e.g., grade school textbooks emphasize patriotism more than communism.
  - b. The Soviet peace offensive is not political, but necessary because (1) the successor to Stalin is not yet found; (2) party-military friction exists; (3) the USSR is not prepared for an all-out war and is ten years behind the west in peaceful industries and agriculture; (4) the USSR is not completely recovered from the devastation of World War II; (5) the hatred of war by the families of the World War II dead is even more intense than in Japan; (6) the public anti-war feeling is very strong: e.g., TSUJI was told by leaders of party organizations and laborers at a Leningrad dinner party that no more wars were wanted. These remarks did not seem to be diplomatic utterances intended for the ears of outsiders.
  - c. In the Georgia Republic, Tbilisi seemed to TSUJI to be an offensive, not a defensive, base for the Middle East: there were four airfields on the outskirts of the city and a considerable number [sic] of MIG fighters were seen; one of every three persons in Tbilisi was in the military. A new factory using German precision instruments to make steel tubes has been constructed some 50 kilometers from Tbilisi. The premier of the Georgia Republic, in an interview with TSUJI, seemed arrogant toward the Japanese.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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CABLE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Section 3(b)

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

- 2 -

- and subservient to the accompanying Soviet officials from Moscow. The premier's residence is heavily guarded by troops with automatic rifles.
- d. Concerning the Cossacks' [sic] attitude toward the Russians, seven out of ten people in Baku queried by TSUJI replied "The only reason that we, a small weak race, are not subjected to the aggression of others is because we are with the Russians. For this reason we must swallow down our little dissatisfactions."
  - e. The condition of the Soviet farmers is worse than expected; the productivity per tan (300 tsubo) is about one-fifth of that in Japan.
  - f. The Soviet and Chinese peoples are not so harmoniously united as they would appear to be. An important Chinese Communist told TSUJI in Peiping "We play up to the Soviets and get as much out of them as possible." This seemed to TSUJI to be the true sentiment toward the Soviets.
  - g. The Chinese people have completely lost interest in CHIANG Kai-shek. Chinese Communist circles say that an armed invasion of Taiwan is no longer necessary since the SUN Li-jen incident [sic].
2. In connection with the Japanese-Soviet negotiations, TSUJI stated that no concrete negotiations are possible since the Soviets hold 1,400 Japanese hostages; the territories can be regained, but not human lives. It is necessary to normalize relations first, then negotiate the territories.
1. Headquarters Comment. Probably this is in error for Caucasians.

LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES--30

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125.3	3L(N)
<del>102.3</del>	N(3L)
173.3	N
780.22	N
451	3IN
172.2	N
890.33	N
890.3	N
722	N
103.1	IL/E(1L)(3L)
122.41	IL/C
<del>122.61</del>	N(CL)
122.161	3L(N)
122.161	N(BL)
179.13	N(3L)

(4)

From:  Base

Report No: WEE-2745 Serial File No: AH-377

No. of Pages: 3

No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By:

Approved By:

Distribution: BD

Source Cryptonyms:

*2 Nov 55*  
*CSDB-36417*

The information contained in this report was obtained by   on 25 October 1955. On that date TSUJI gave a special speech as a guest speaker during the closed session of the Japan Ordnance Association Board of Directors' meeting, which was attended by   Para. 8 should be evaluated in terms of this special audience.

It is requested that headquarters fully control the dissemination of this information because of the very limited number of people who had access to it.

Project:

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
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Date: *2005*

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**INFORMATION REPORT**  
CONTROLLED AMERICAN SOURCE

CSDB-36419

COUNTRY Japan/USSR/Communist China/Nationalist China DATE DISTR. 2 November 1955  
 SUBJECT Observations of TSUJI Masanobu on the USSR and Communist China NO. OF PAGES 3  
 PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo (25 October 1955) NO. OF ENCLS. 0 (LISTED BELOW)  
 DATE OF INFO. Late August - September 1955 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE American businessman with contacts in Japanese defense forces and defense industries (B); from TSUJI Masanobu, Appraisal of Content: 2 (Reportorial accuracy).

Field Comment. TSUJI Masanobu, a former Imperial General Staff colonel, left Japan on 23 August and returned on 2 October 1955 as a Democratic Party member of the Dietmen's tour to the USSR and Communist China. The observations and interpretations given below resulted from that tour. See also FJD-2044 from a different source for information on a talk given by TSUJI on parallel subject matter. DA 56037

1. TSUJI speculates, from information obtained in Hong Kong and Communist China, that the Government of CHIANG Kai-shek will disintegrate in a year or two because of CHIANG's recent imprisonment of General SUN<sup>2</sup>, the famous organizer, leader and spiritual pillar of the Taiwan forces. The officers and men of the Chinese Nationalist forces are secretly discussing a coup d'etat to remove CHIANG from office. These officers and men are covertly and ardently obeying the commands of General SUN, but they will not fight for CHIANG. TSUJI stated that the military leadership of General SUN cannot be equaled by other Chinese Nationalist officers. CHIANG, who has been extremely jealous of SUN's popularity, presented forged charges against SUN and imprisoned him. CHIANG trusts no individual who has any support from segments of his military forces, except his son.
2. The six hundred million people of Communist China are under the strictest food ration, under the control of Peiping. Livestock are also fed under government control. TSUJI attempted to determine the cause of these drastic measures, but was given evasive answers. However, upon visiting the USSR, TSUJI found that a continuous flow of food is being shipped to the USSR from Communist China to alleviate starvation in the Soviet territories.
3. During his flight to Irkutsk, USSR, TSUJI observed that the railroad from Chokoko (Japanese reading)(sic) to Irkutsk was completed and even an express train was operating. The railroad line was guarded by troop installations at intervals of 14 to 15 kilometers. A large number of bulldozers and ground-breaking equipment was in operation at a considerable depth on both flanks of the railroad. TSUJI speculates that pitchblende is being mined extensively and shipped to the USSR.

DISTRIBUTION

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4. Judging from piece-meal information, Baku is estimated to be furnishing 50 percent of the petroleum requirements today.<sup>2</sup> The area is clustered with oil towers; however, only 50 percent seem to be operating. The Soviets are going full force in developing underwater petroleum fields, current developed to the level of supplying 28 percent of the total output of Baku. In the near future, this level will be raised to approximately 50 percent. About 50 percent of the petroleum is refined in Baku and the remainder is shipped to other refineries in the USSR for processing. TSUJI estimates that the refining facilities and technical know-how of the USSR is about ten years behind Japan; thus the gap is still wider when compared with the advanced technology of the United States.
5. Since the defeat of Germany, the USSR has built a new factory city in the Georgian S.S.R. known as "Stalin Factory." Its population is 500,000 and it is the largest industrial center of this region. Over 70 percent of the machine facilities bear the mark of German manufacture in 1941-1943. TSUJI judges that the Soviets' building such an industrial center so close to the borders of Turkey means plans for aggression into the Middle East. The nations of the Middle East have petroleum fields required by the USSR for successful military ventures. The Soviets are softening the Middle East for aggression by fomenting racialism and making tempting offers of arms to the Arab nations at a drastically reduced price.
6. Internal conditions in the USSR are far from normal, especially among the farmers, who are underfed and underclothed and who live in shacks such as are seldom seen in Japan. A very small number of livestock was seen during trips to the countryside. TSUJI stated that this clearly indicates the complete failure of collective farming. Judging from conversations with the common people, TSUJI estimates that 97 percent of the Soviets desire peace, the remaining three percent belong to the USSR Communist Party. The USSR is in no position to wage all-out war until their domestic issues are settled to the satisfaction of the masses. Under Stalin the people were coerced into following the dictates laid down by the Kremlin; however, the present committee system of governing does not have as much force as the dictatorial might of Stalin. For this reason, struggles for power within the Kremlin are sure to develop, with Defense Minister Zhukov and Nikita S. Khrushchov, First Secretary of the USSR Communist Party, as the central figures. Until this leadership is settled, the USSR cannot afford risking an all-out war. In the meantime, the USSR's only alternative is to create indirect pressure on the weak point of the Free World, promoting disharmony and general weakness through the deception and treachery of international communists.
7. The information TSUJI gathered in the USSR indicates that the USSR will be ready to wage all-out war in five to six years, with the "peace offensive" being used only as a means to an ultimate end. The "peace offensive" is disliked by the Kremlin; however, it is the only alternative to gain time to stabilize the domestic situation. Although he tried to do so, TSUJI heard no reports on a resistance movement. TSUJI believes that either the movement is very weak or the MVD has been thoroughly effective in uprooting such groups.
8. After his return to Japan, TSUJI visited leading officers of the National Defense Agency and strongly recommended that total rearmament of Japanese defense forces be completed prior to the five to six years lead time of the Soviets. Post-war Soviet arms development has shown great strides, with the mass production of highly efficient and effective modern weapons. As the Japanese defense forces have been basically armed with outdated and second-hand equipment from the United States, it is now time for the indigenous development of modern ordnance by Japanese engineers and industry. Instead of concentrating on increasing the size of the defense forces as suggested by the United States, Japan should improve the esprit de corps and equipment of the defense forces. The Japanese Government should seriously consider cutting down its personnel strength by 20,000 men and allocate the savings therefrom to the research and development of new ordnance items as well as providing State support for the ordnance industry, which is the backbone of military strength. Defense forces without an indigenous ordnance industrial base are meaningless. A well equipped and highly trained small force with modern weapons is far more capable than a large force without a highly efficient ordnance industrial base. It is time for Japan to improve the defense forces' weapons and equipment instead of increasing its personnel with people who join only to provide themselves with a means of gaining a livelihood.
9. The trip through the two countries took 40 days, most of the time being spent in the USSR. The tours were strictly controlled and guided; however, TSUJI managed to be out on his own occasionally. TSUJI, having a good knowledge of both Russian and Chinese, talked with over 400 common people in attempting to find the true

- 3 -

feelings of the people. His real intention in making the tour was to ascertain the truth of the "peace offensive" program of the USSR. TSUJI's military background assisted him immeasurably in talking to military leaders in the USSR and Communist China, and also made him an outstanding target for constant surveillance.

Field Comments

1. This is presumably CHIANG's former personal Chief of Staff, General SUN Li-jen. According to press reports, General SUN, who has been under house arrest since May 1955, resigned from his position on 20 August 1955 and admitted negligence in a spy ring case. According to information dated July 1955 from another U.S. Agency, about 300 of SUN's supporters were arrested on suspicion of planning a revolt. Recent press releases report that SUN was investigated by a special commission and found innocent of conspiratorial intent, although guilty of negligence.
2. Presumably for the USSR only.

7 Nov 55

S-E-C-R-E-T

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From:  Base

Report No: FJB-2083  
Local File No: AH-392

No. of Pages: 1

Enclosures: None

Report Made By:

Approved By:

Distribution: D

Source Cryptonym:

received this information from   on 27 October 1955 and submitted it to   on 31 October 1955.

The report is based on a conversation which   had with TSUJI Masanobu on 19 October 1955 following a closed meeting of the Tairiku Mondai Kenkyu Sho; TSUJI's remarks during the meeting were reported in FJBs 2008 and 2014.

who had commented that the clandestine circumstances of the TSUJI-Zhukov meeting indicated that it was held without the knowledge of CPSU officials (Cf FJB-2008), stated that he now felt that Zhukov had been trying to avoid meeting other delegates, rather than concealing the meeting from CP officials.

Since TSUJI made these statements to   in a private conversation, any Headquarters dissemination should be classified NO DISSEM ABROAD to avoid blowing

CSDB- 36311

OK  
TSUJI  
Masanobu  
Joss

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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## FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE. A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their cooperation). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to estimated or locally obtained sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

S-E-C-R-E-T

NOFORN/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Japan/USSR	REPORT NO.	FJB-2083
SUBJECT	Meeting between TSUJI Masanobu and Former Col. MISHINA Ryuji	DATE OF REPORT	7 November 1955
		NO. OF PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	FJB-2008

DATE OF INFO. October 1955  
PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo (19 October 1955)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Former Japanese intelligence officer (B); from TSUJI Masanobu.  
Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. While TSUJI Masanobu was in Moscow as a member of the Japanese Diet members group which toured the USSR, he received a message from Marshal Zhukov, prior to their vis-a-vis meeting, inquiring whether he could do anything for TSUJI. TSUJI replied that he would be very grateful to receive Zhukov's permission to meet former Col. MISHINA Ryuji, who was imprisoned on war crimes charges at Ivanovo prison; as TSUJI explained in his message to Zhukov, MISHINA had been a classmate at the Military Academy and a very close friend.
2. The following day MISHINA was brought to TSUJI's hotel room with permission to remain there overnight. TSUJI, noticing that MISHINA's teeth were in very bad condition, called this to Zhukov's attention through one of the messengers; the very next day, MISHINA received dental treatment.

### Field Comments

1. TSUJI's meeting with Zhukov was reported in FJB-2008 from the same source.
2. The Register of Japanese Army Officers lists a Colonel MISHINA Takayuki (0005/0756/7127/0110) as a member of the 36th Class of the Military Academy (25 October 1924), who was born 2 December 1903 in Miyagi Prefecture. ZJJ-149, 3 July 1952, from a usually reliable source states that MISHINA is a graduate of the 1924 class of the Military Academy and a graduate of the War College. At one time he was an officer of political affairs in the Kwantung Army and he and TSUJI worked together in Kwantung Army Headquarters. MISHINA was captured by the

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-2-

FJB-2083

Soviets in 1945. In May 1952 TSUJI visited the Soviet Mission to ask that a letter he had written MISHINA be delivered.

3. FJB-2008 stated that Zhukov sent several messengers to TSUJI during the latter's stay in Moscow.

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44-127-13

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

NOFORN/LIMITED/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Japan/USSR	REPORT NO.	CS DB-36417
SUBJECT	Observations of TSUJI Masanobu on USSR and China	DATE DISTR.	22 December 1955
		NO. OF PAGES	3
DATE OF INFO.	Late August-September 1955	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo	REFERENCES	
DATE ACQUIRED	25 October 1955		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

**SOURCE:** American businessman with contacts in the Japanese defense forces and defense industries (B); from TSUJI Masanobu. Appraisal of Content: 2 as to accuracy of reporting.

**Field Comment.** TSUJI Masanobu, a former Japanese General Staff colonel, left Japan on 23 August 1955 and returned on 2 October, as a Democratic Party member of a delegation of Diet members who made a trip to the USSR and Communist China. The observations and interpretations below resulted from his trip. CSDB-36037, from another source, also reported TSUJI's comments on his trip.

1. During his flight to Irkutsk, USSR, TSUJI observed that the railroad from Kalgen to Irkutsk was completed and even an express train was operating. The railroad line was guarded by troop installations at intervals of 14 to 15 kilometers. A large number of bulldozers and ground-breaking equipment was in operation at a considerable depth on both flanks of the railroad. TSUJI speculates that pitchblende is being mined extensively and shipped to the USSR.
2. Judging from piecemeal information, Baku is estimated to be furnishing 50 percent of the petroleum requirements today. The area is clustered with oil towers; however, only 50 percent seem to be operating. The Soviets are going full force in developing underwater petroleum fields, which are currently developed to the extent of supplying 28 percent of the total output of Baku. In the near future, this level will be raised to approximately 50 percent. About 50 percent of the petroleum is refined in Baku and the remainder is shipped to other refineries in the USSR for processing. TSUJI estimates that the refining facilities and technical know-how of the USSR are about ten years behind Japan; thus the gap is still wider when compared with the advanced technology of the United States.
3. Since the defeat of Germany, the USSR has built a new factory city in the Georgian S.S.R. known as "Stalin Factory." Its population is 500,000 and it is the largest industrial center of this region. Over 70 percent of the machine facilities bear the mark of German manufacture in 1941-1943. TSUJI judges that the Soviets building such an industrial center so close to the borders of Turkey means plans for aggression into the Middle East. The nations of the Middle East have petroleum fields required by the USSR for successful military ventures. The Soviets are softening the Middle East.

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REGISTRY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ABC	<input type="checkbox"/>	DEF	<input type="checkbox"/>	STATE	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/>
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by (X); field distribution by ( ))

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

FE	WE	FE/PP	NA/RED #	FJB-2045	TRR
NE	WN		SUBI #	( )	ADG
SE	NO				DMC

for aggression by fomenting racialism and making tempting offers of arms to the Arab nations at a drastically reduced price.

4. Internal conditions in the USSR are far from normal, especially among the farmers, who are underfed and underclothed and who live in shacks such as are seldom seen in Japan. A very small number of livestock was seen during trips to the countryside. TSUJI stated that this clearly indicates the complete failure of collective farming. Judging from conversations with the common people, TSUJI estimates that 97 percent of the Soviets desire peace, the remaining three percent belong to the USSR Communist Party. The USSR is in no position to wage all-out war until their domestic issues are settled to the satisfaction of the masses. Under Stalin the people were coerced into following the dictates laid down by the Kremlin; however, the present committee system of governing does not have as much force as the dictatorial might of Stalin. For this reason, struggles for power within the Kremlin are sure to develop, with Defense Minister Zhukov and Nikita S. Khrushchov, First Secretary of the USSR Communist Party, as the central figures. Until this leadership is settled, the USSR cannot afford to risk an all-out war. In the meantime, the USSR's only alternative is to create indirect pressure on the weak point of the Free World, promoting disharmony and general weakness through the deception and treachery of international communism.
5. The information TSUJI gathered in the USSR indicates that the USSR will be ready to wage all-out war in five to six years, with the "peace offensive" being used only as a means to an ultimate end. The "peace offensive" is disliked by the Kremlin; however, it is the only alternative to gain time to stabilize the domestic situation. Although he tried to do so, TSUJI heard no reports on a resistance movement. TSUJI believes that either the movement is very weak or the MVD has been thoroughly effective in uprooting such groups.
6. After his return to Japan, TSUJI visited leading officers of the National Defense Agency and strongly recommended that total rearmament of Japanese defense forces be completed prior to the five to six years lead time of the Soviets. Postwar Soviet arms development has shown great strides, with the mass production of highly efficient and effective modern weapons. As the Japanese defense forces have been basically armed with outdated and second-hand equipment from the United States, it is now time for the indigenous development of modern ordnance by Japanese engineers and industry. Instead of concentrating on increasing the size of the defense forces as suggested by the United States, Japan should improve the esprit de corps and equipment of the defense forces. The Japanese Government should seriously consider cutting down its personnel strength by 20,000 men and allocate the savings therefrom to the research and development of new ordnance items as well as providing State support for the ordnance industry, which is the backbone of military strength. Defense forces without an indigenous ordnance industrial base are meaningless. A well equipped and highly trained small force with modern weapons is far more capable than a large force without a highly efficient ordnance industrial base. It is time for Japan to improve the defense forces' weapons and equipment instead of increasing its personnel with people who join only to provide themselves with a means of gaining a livelihood.
7. The trip through the two countries took 40 days, most of the time being spent in the USSR. The tours were strictly controlled and guided; however, TSUJI managed to be out on his own occasionally. TSUJI, having a good knowledge of both Russian and Chinese, talked with over 400 common people in attempting to find the true feelings of the people. His real intention in making the tour was to ascertain the truth of the "peace offensive" program of the USSR. TSUJI's military background assisted him immeasurably in talking to military leaders in the USSR and Communist China, and also made him an outstanding target for constant surveillance.

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- 3 -

CSDB-36417

1. Headquarters Comment. This is presumably the rail line under construction from China to Ulan Bator.
2. Field Comment. Presumably for the USSR only.
3. Headquarters Comment. This city is probably Rustevi, where the Stalin Steel Combine is located. The population figure should probably read 50,000.

8/8-02-0403

12/55 (30)

125.3

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4-5/735.5

1-12/732.16

1-12/732.17

11-12/740.1

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3L (N) (CL)

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32IN

32IN

IL/C

IL/C

3IN

3IN

N (2K) (3L)

6K/A (3L)

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT <small>(Use this form only in accordance with instructions on SR 104-10)</small>		COUNTRY ORIGIN		IS NUMBER	
REPORT NUMBER	FROM	PREPARED BY	COUNTRY	2007584	
R-8-56	ASIA Japan	Capt L.A. KUFFREYS	JAPAN	6 Jun 50	
SUBJECT: Transmittal of book "Alone Across Red China and the USSR" by M. TSUJI (U)			REF ID: R-9-56: 11-56	EVALUATION	DATE OF INFO: Dec 1955
SUMMARY: Inclosure 1 is a book entitled "Alone Across Red China and the USSR" (独りてくやく) by Masanobu TSUJI. TSUJI is a former Japanese regular army officer and a vocal anti-American Diet member from Ishikawa prefecture (See R-7-56 for biographic data). The contents of this book are substantially the same as a lecture delivered by TSUJI to officers of this office, representatives of AFPE/8A, and HAFAG-J on 20 December 1955. Inclosure 2 is a translation of the Preface and Table of Contents.					
COMMENT: Mr. TSUJI's views of the attitude Japan should take in relations with the Communist Bloc are quite widely read today in Japan, and the influence of his thoughts among the Japanese should not be underestimated. A map of the trip is included inside the front and rear covers of the book.					
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DAIR Div G2 AFPE/8A (Rear) (2); CINCPAC					
2 Incls: (UNCL)					
1. Book in Japanese, to DA only					
2. Trans of Preface & Contents					
APPROVED: <i>W. W. Bailey</i> W. W. BAILEY Colonel, GS Army Attache					
REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED					
NOTE: Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited, in whole or in part, except with permission of the issuing office. All requests for copies so reproduced will be directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army.		CLASSIFICATION:		NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.	

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

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From the Book entitled "The Next World War - The Only Avenue Open to the Japanese People for Their Survival" - By Masanobu TSUJI.

PREFACE

We must not permit this land, Japan, to become a battlefield again. It is my belief that to dedicate the rest of my life for this cause is the road, which I can most rightly follow, to apologize for our faults in losing the last war.

Among all human beings the Japanese are the only people who had to face three rounds of atom and hydrogen bombs. From this viewpoint too it should be the supreme task of the Japanese people to save mankind from the danger of nuclear war.

In past wars there was room for the onlooker to watch hostile nations involved in the conflict, but in the age of hydrogen war all the creatures living on the surface of this globe will without exception suffer the ash of death.

If war can be prevented with the signatures of 80 million people this would be a rather easy thing to accomplish. But this approach seems to have no more effect on the leaders of the opposing two camps than "an east wind wafting across the deaf ear of a horse" or "water running off the face of a frog".

I believe that to know how a next world war would look if it ever comes and to learn how horrible its result would provide us with useful data for our efforts in preventing war. I am thus forced to work night and day utilizing my few moments of leisure in the midst of the busy Diet season.

Connected with the Democratic Party, I, as a public figure have responsibility in explaining its policy, but this book is one in which I do not reveal my own position, intending to describe how I see the world and search for the ways and means whereby we may prevent a third world war and peace for our nation without being involved in the conflict. My opinions are based on my experience in the first half of my life in which I seemed to cross the Pacific Ocean more than one occasion.

There are two opposing streams of thought advanced for the prevention of war. One of them favors the maintenance of peace by force and the other the sustaining of peace through a third group by neutralism. The former group of thinkers who are allied with the Anglo-American camp, should seek safety through collective security. The latter, opposing Japan's armament, are crying for non-militarization. Both are wrong and can only be considered as a pipe dream.

Switzerland is not aligned with the orbit of collective security. Her own constitution providing for non-militarization, but since the outbreak of the second world war she has stood along with the eastern nations following a path of neutrality. In World Wars I and II she remained neutral. Her independence and non-alignment is a reality. She is a model for the world.

DA Form 1048-1 (Rev. 1-1955) (Use in accordance with instructions in DA 100-407-1)

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REPORT NUMBER  
R-9-56

AREA Japan

From the Book entitled "The Next World War", by Kusanobu TSUJI

CONTENTS

Chapter I - IN ORDER THAT WE MAY CONTINUE OUR EXISTENCE.

1. Our nation should strive to become the Switzerland of the Orient.
2. What are we to defend? And for whose interests?
3. Those who can assert their rights?
4. Does armament provoke war?
5. Which are we to choose, guns or butter?
6. Obsolete armament in the new age.
7. Leaving Sugamo as it is.
8. Widows are loitering on the street at a loss of light for their life.
9. Those who recommend and those who try to balk.
10. Why do they yell black what is actually white?

Chapter II - A PROTEST AGAINST JAPAN.

MacArthur's orders.

To adopt Japanese uniforms as U.S. Infantrymen?

To turn the Japanese islands chain into an unsinkable aircraft carrier.

To make Japan a second Manchuria?

Japan may be forsaken ultimately?

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

The Russians utilized Chiang Kai-shek.

They then switched the horse over to Mao Tse-tung.

It is just like a duel of a fox and a badger, trying to bewitch one another.

The US is pulling wires from the backstage.

China is the main actor.

It is a struggle of the US and Mao to fight through another.

China is the main actor.

China is the main actor.

China is the main actor.

Where will the last decisive battle be fought?

5. Asia is the backyard.

6. Two NATOs.

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7. What course will the USSR choose?
8. What course will America choose?
9. Which of them will win a game?
10. How to keep us alive amid the vortex of troubles?

Chapter V - TOGETHER WITH ASIA.

1. Japan scored a victory in the war.
2. It is to be hoped from the new-born Burma.
3. Let's answer to their scepticism.
4. The deteriorated yellow rice and the buddhistic prayer "Namuamidabutsu".
5. The Annamese look forward to a unification.
6. We have to make a penitence before Kagayasu.
7. Two bootleggers.
8. He who attempts to make Asia his prey.

Chapter VI - OUR KINGS CAN'T BE DESTROYED.

1. Beyond the rivalry.
2. The road toward war or the road toward peace?
3. Self-sufficiency and isolation.
4. How can she be invaded?

Japan has never experienced a civil war.

They attempted to first form a Kerensky cabinet.

Their trade mission chief was a guerrilla force commander.

It is a sacred crane.

The Red Army is trying to encroach the heart.

What is the result?

It would be only the possible for a direct aggression to find its way.

On the other hand, the possibility of a direct aggression is

It is a sacred crane.

The conclusion of the Mutual Security Agreement should be abolished.

<b>DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT</b> <small>(Use this form only in accordance with instructions in SR 300-305-3)</small>	<b>CLASSIFICATION</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>REPORT NUMBER</b> R-9-56	<b>FROM</b> Area Japan	<b>PAGE</b> 4 of <b>Incl 2</b>
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Tax is walking around.

Do the people fear the military clique?

Mind SDF to reflect upon itself.

To American soldiers.

**Chapter VII - OUR NEW TARGET**

1. The Mission of the new Japan
2. History looks forward to something from our young generation.

From the Book entitled "Alone Across Red China and the USSR" by Masenobu TSUJI

PREFACE

This book is the record of my impressions of Red Asia seen during a period of about 40 days from the latter part of last August. I have taken pains to provide you with as objective a report as possible of the images which I managed to catch and focus them on a colorless mirror, but this is certainly not an easy task to accomplish and I admit that my own peculiar mannerisms find their way into everything in this book.

As an invited guest, I had to respect the schedules set by the hosts, and it would be quite natural for them to be keen on showing their guests only what they consider the best. It would be difficult to grasp the truth through such a vista. During my journey I declined invitations for receptions in dark hours as often as politely possible, and tried to walk on the streets alone. I got up early in the morning and sought to gather as much as possible of what people in every walk and rank of life thought. The people with whom I came in contact unofficially during the whole period of my travel probably numbered far more than 300. I had talks with men and women of all different occupations and ranks, including military men, ranging from generals down to enlisted men. I talked with military officers who had fought during the Russo-Japanese war, with widows, war orphans, factory workers, farmers, students, sailors, fishermen, day laborers - talked with them directly without the help of an interpreter.

The crops which I could harvest through such contacts were probably far greater than through ceremonial exchange of greetings at formal receptions. The contents of this book represent the sum total of what I had gathered from those personal contacts and scenes.

The inside stories of the Red Continents' tightly closed Iron Curtain have been variously reported in Japan by those who have designs of political and ideological nature. I was also one of those who suffered damage at their hands. On not a few occasions during this journey I was obliged to correct preconceptions resulting therefrom, and at the same time I found that I could confirm my prior fundamental study as correct.

My familiarization tour of Red China was not the principal objective of the travel of which I write. Thus I spent only ten days or so in China enroute to the USSR. What I have felt out of my quiet survey over China, with reference to my many years of study on this nation, is that her politicians and people alike take great pride in the fact that they have accomplished the remodeling of China as a new and perfectly independent nation from its previous position of perennial semi-sovereignty, though the new China actually can still be criticized because of shortcomings in her economic and political field. Although China is a victorious nation, her people are leading a far simpler and more modest life than the Japanese people who lost the war. Working hard and united far more solidly the Chinese people are making a positive effort to bring hopes for a better tomorrow. In a sense, what they are doing now largely resembles the attitude which our ancestors had during the Meiji Restoration Period.

As to my conclusive impressions of the USSR I may say that it is no longer a great empire, but is rather a great imperialistic state with the people's revolutionary conditions unparalleled in the history of nationalities and heretics. The people's hatred against war are the cravings that sweep her into a new era. Her government's policy is oriented toward preparation for a new era. Her education and propaganda are all focused thereon.

Communism is common to both countries. Red China and the USSR are now in a position where Communist influence has now been completely eliminated. The political structure as that its present regime is not subject to any change that may be exerted upon it by the camp of the West powers. The ties between Red China and the USSR would be futile. Red China's position vis a vis the USSR is far more independent than that of Japan toward the United States.

<b>JA INTELLIGENCE REPORT</b> <small>(Use this form only in accordance with instructions in SR 580-17-5)</small>	<b>CLASSIFICATION</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>REPORT NUMBER</b> R-8-56	<b>FROM</b> ARMA Japan	<b>PAGE</b> 2 of Incl 2
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If these two great Communist nations should some day face a low ebb of their destiny, feuds among those who are struggling for power on their domestic scenes would perhaps be the major cause responsible for it.

There can be no crisis of this sort in Red China so long as MAO Tse-tung continues in good health and stays in power, but it is rumored that some friction would emerge between CHOU En-lai and LIU Shao-ko if MAO should go out of the picture. In the USSR I felt a chill from an atmosphere which bore a semblance to the vast country of Mongolia when GENGHIS KHAN died.

The peace-diplomacy which is so emphatically advocated by the two nations is designed chiefly for the interests of the two, and it is definitely not an armistice overture put forward to the Western nations at their own sacrifice and concession. It is a strategic gesture designed to avoid a shooting war until they recover themselves from the attrition of war and until they reach the stage where they can concentrate their whole energy on the development of the unexplored resources and finish their planned buildup for this purpose. And many people are agreed that the two Communist countries are thus attempting to alienate the internal unity among the Western countries.

What is still more fundamental is the hate of war among the whole of their people and the vast move among them of seeking peace. It would be particularly difficult for the USSR under its present system of collective leadership to drive her people into the action of initiating war so long as no second STALIN should appear on the stage.

The above appraisal boils down to this: for at least 4 to 5 years to come there is no possibility for another general war unless the United States initiates the war by making a surprise attack on the pattern of Pearl Harbor.

What the two Communist nations are now seeking is not a perpetual renunciation of war, but an armistice and a buildup until they establish a definite advantage for themselves which will enable them to win a war against the Western powers. If one underestimates the strength of the USSR and Red China because the standards of living of their people are much lower than that of the defeated nation, Japan, one risks grave danger. Rather attention should be focused more on the serious effort for war preparations, for which their people are subjected to a life of continued austerity.

Finally I wish to add a few words about the standpoint of Japan as a nation neighboring these two major countries. To seek peace and security for our people by exclusively depending upon the United States is just to follow the examples of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and SYNGMAN RHEE. If our nation strives for safety under the shadow of the USSR we would probably follow the fate of the Republic of Guldja (Georgia?) or the Republic of Outer Mongolia.

It should be the major task of new Japan to consolidate her economy on a self-sufficient basis promptly, to advance a policy of independence by establishing a strong structure which violates the rights of no other nation and which is inviolable by any other nation, to restore our diplomatic relations, first of all, with Red China in order to save mankind from horrible atomic war by bringing the two major atomic powers to friendly terms through the friendship between Japan and Red China.

What this memoir emphasizes is that all through the 40 days of my busy journey I managed to place on record my impressions punctually every day before they became hazy so that I had to throw away my pen with the 500th page of my manuscript when I landed at Hanko airport. I lay stress on lively reproduction of my impressions at the expense of elaborate elaboration. Incidentally, the title of this book was chosen by the proprietor of the publishing house KANEKO Shobo, I, who had travelled to the USSR as a tourist, feel therefore rather gay in presenting this book to the public under such a title, but I shall be happy if the readers will note that I was influenced by no one. I tried to portray faithfully my glimpses not only of the surface but also of the back of anything of interest that came into the vista of my survey during my journey.

2 December 1955.

Masanobu TSUJI

in the plane on my way home from Hong Kong.

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From the Book entitled "Alone Across Red China and the USSR" by Masanobu TSUJI

CONTENTS

Preface

1. An I.O.U. to remember our war defeat.
2. Listen to this cry.
3. From the Yasukuni Shrine to badger holes.
4. The Chinese enshrouded by black curtains.
5. Chiang Kai-shek will kill himself.
6. How does the Communist Party look at it?
7. It indeed is worthy of a Communist country.
8. My first impression of Canton.
9. Young men on the street.
10. A talk with college students on the subject of revolution.
11. Peace offensive and food control.  
Scores of thousands of my friends are still held in the USSR.  
What was left behind in Hanjusan through an oversight.  
It is a difference between an adult and a child.
12. A glimpse to the Farm Cooperative Organizations.
13. I would appeal to Madam Li Teh-Chuan.
14. The rising sun flag and the red flag.
15. I got a kiss from a Russian girl.
16. I made a talk with my comrades-on-arms.  
Peace must be sought.  
A single peace medal will be enough.  
The earthquake felt by us close at hand.  
The peace medal will be enough.
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The peace medal will be enough.

30. The children are Gods, and children alone.
31. Over a railway coach window.
32. Leningrad curses the war.
33. A car driver who has a career of artillery major.
34. Wailing widows are heard everywhere.
35. I had been arrested by GPU.
36. Lenin's alma mater.
37. Lovely attacks.
38. Through an exchange of views over the rising sun flag.
39. How would Peter the Great see it?
40. The chorus-drama of May Day.
41. Soviet department stores look like a government office.
42. Do they dare do it even in this situation?
43. We steamed down the River Volga.
44. The more away from Moscow.
45. The Communist Party Member's Badge.
46. Factory girls take lessons alongside the spell of their work.
47. Fishermen and Farmers.
48. Together with girls school students.
49. Goodbye, Astrakhan.
50. The Baku oilfield betrayed my expectation.
51. Radio recording on a morning street.
52. Schools are military barracks.
53. A Glimpse across the petrolum curtain.
54. Scandalous scenes of dinner parties.
55. Goodnight, troops.
56. ... say in Japan ten years ago.
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62. ...

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REPORT NUMBER

R-8-56

ON

ARMA Japan

PAGE

5 of

Incl 2

- 62. In the interests of peace.
- 63. Buy also from Japan, if you please.
- 64. Dr. Louisenko's lecture.
- 65. 200 million people united in one. 38 men move apart from one another.
- 66. Some abandoned farming villages.
- 67. How can we face it without tears.
- 68. Remember Japan had lost war.
- 69. Well, Goodbye Moscow.
- 70. Again in Irkutsk.
- 71. Pebbles in place of the remains.
- 72. I felt as if I were back home.
- 73. When compared with the two Communist countries.
- 74. Well, Goodbye Red China!

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JAPAN

2007585

REPORT NUMBER R-9-56	FROM Army Japan	PREPARED BY Capt L. A. HUMPHREYS	SOURCE	DATE OF REPORT 9 Jan 56
SUBJECT Transmittal of Book entitled "The Next World War" by M. TSUJI (U)		REFERENCES R-7-56; R-8-56; R-11-56	EVALUATION	DATE OF INFO July 1955
SUMMARY Inclosure 1 is a copy of the book "The Next World War" (次世大戦争) by Masanobu TSUJI. Inclosure 2 is a translation of the Preface and Table of Contents of this book. The book explains the substance of TSUJI's views on the position Japan should take in the world today in order to preserve the country from destruction in the next war. COMMENT: TSUJI, a very vocal Liberal-Democratic Diet member and ex-army officer, has considerable influence in Japan today. His views are neutralist and anti-American as well as anti-Communist. The position he has taken in this book conforms to the ideas he expounded in his lecture to officers of this office reported in R-11-56. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DAIR Div G2 AFSE/SA (Rear) (2); CINCPAC 2 Incls: (UNCL) 1. Book in Japanese - to DA only 2. Trans Preface & Contents				
APPROVED:  W. W. BAILEY Colonel, GS Army Attache				
D434212				
REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED				
NOTE: Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited, in writing or by any means, except with permission of the issuing office. All requests for copies to be made to the Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army.		CLASSIFICATION	NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.	

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REPORT NUMBER R-11-56	FROM Army Japan	PREPARED BY Col W.W. BAILEY	COURSE Pers Contact	DATE OF INFO 20 Dec 55
SUBJECT Notes on Lecture by Masanobu TSUJI (U)		REFERENCES R-7,8,9-56	VALUATION FCMA-6	
SUMMARY Masanobu TSUJI, ex-Colonel and now a Diet member, met with a group of U.S. Army officers, at his request, on 20 Dec 55, for the purpose of presenting to them his observations made during a recent 40-day trip through Communist China and the Inclosure 1 contains composite notes made by R.O. and several of the officers present, which are unclassified inasmuch as they are substantially the same as contained in the December issue of "Asiatic Mainland Affairs" (see DAIR 11-56), and the two books forwarded by R-8 and R-9-56.				
D423501				
SPECIAL HANDLING NOTICE APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS EXCEPT JAPANESE. BY AUTHORITY <i>W.W. Bailey</i> Colonel, GS, Army Attache, 9 Jan 56				
Above Special Handling Notice applies only to Report and not to Inclosure. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.				
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CLASSIFICATION REPORT NUMBER FROM

R-11-56

Area Japan

PAGE

2

1. Transmitted herewith as Inclosure 1 are some notes on remarks made by Masanobu TSUJI to a group of U.S. Army officers on 20 December 1955. These remarks are unclassified because they are substantially the same as an article contained in the December issue of "Asiatic Mainland Affairs" (Tairiku Kenkyu Mondai) which has been translated as Document No. 8901 and forwarded by DAIR 11-56.

2. This interview was sought by TSUJI through an intermediary who made a request to FEC that TSUJI have an opportunity to discuss his observations with U.S. Army officers concerning his recent trip to the mainland. A meeting was held with TSUJI at the Army Foreign Area Specialist Training School in Tokyo and was attended by the senior Army language students, representatives of this office, MAAG-Japan, and Security Group. G2 AFE/EA (Rear).

3. At the conclusion of TSUJI's remarks, R.O. asked TSUJI whether as a result of his trip he had concluded that his former belief that neutrality was the only policy for Japan had been changed. In a very impassioned and lengthy statement, TSUJI stated, in brief, that he was only more convinced that there was no alternative course for Japan and that there was no reason for Japan being drawn into the struggle in the event of a third war because Japan would not serve as a significantly important base for the United States. Japan is too far distant from the heart of Russia, he says, to be a strategically important area. Therefore, his sole desire was to spare Japan from the horrors of a nuclear war and, if possible, see the entire world spared from such a conflict.

"Japan must remain neutral in order to be of benefit to the West, and she must be allowed to defend her own country. As a sovereign nation, Japan has pride that she is capable of fighting for her own defense. This is the same thing I tell our Japanese veterans. The Soviets are not going to attack Japan. Their main target is elsewhere, and the launching point of such an attack is not Siberia or Asia. Japan is relatively safe from invasion. The Siberian half of the Soviet Union is barren and virtually useless, there is nothing to bomb. The heart of the Soviet Union is in and around Moscow, and the next great war will start toward Europe or the Middle East."

4. TSUJI further commented that United States policy with regard to the encirclement of the Communist bloc and increased pressure was wrong because it only served to build up counter-pressure within the Communist bloc. He stated that he felt the better policy would be to penetrate or pierce the Communist bloc at its most vulnerable point, i.e., Communist China. He feels that the United States itself could not directly do this, but believes that through cooperation with the Japanese, Japan could indirectly achieve such a penetration and that the United States would thus be able to puncture the Communist base of political power.

"You are making a great mistake concentrating your forces in the Far East and in training Japanese troops. Instead, you should concentrate on cementing firmer ties between yourselves and the peoples of Asia." (TSUJI expressed the same opinions in speaking to the Army Officers Association on 20 Nov 55 - see AFE IntSum 4498.) "Give the Chinese Communists recognition and give them plenty of money with no strings attached. You will find that much more beneficial than trying to fight them. Communist China is not really communist; they are likened to a red radish - red only on the outside. India is the same. Both of them can be won over to the West as specific neutral nations which will benefit the U.S. more than if they align themselves directly with you."

5. TSUJI was critical of the U.S. AID program for Japan, commenting that the program had been a failure in Manchuria during the 1930's. "Just as the Japanese gave the Army obsolete inferior equipment, the same is true today in providing the Japanese Self Defense Forces obsolescent equipment instead of modern arms required in modern warfare."

6. TSUJI commented that there need be no fear of Communist infiltration into Japan. He stated that former members of the Pro-Soviet Association (Zaigo Bunjin) are getting into the leading civil positions in the hamlets, villages, etc. He said to observe this activity during the next year. With this control, they will be able to drive out communistic influences without difficulty.

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REPORT NUMBER  
R-11-56

TITLE  
JAPANESE

PAGE  
3

**COMMENTS:**

1. The content of TSUJI's remarks is little different from information published in the two books forwarded by R-8-56 and R-9-56, and the document referred to in paragraph 1 above.

2. TSUJI's motives in seeking out this interview are not clear. It may be an attempt on his part to convince the American authorities of the truth of his argument that the Americans should withdraw from Japan. It may be an attempt to bolster his own domestic political strength, or again it may be an attempt to seek some form of collaboration with American authorities in an approach toward Communist China.

3. During the approximately one and one-half hours that he was talking, TSUJI's attitude underwent a small but perceptible change. It appeared at first that he was somewhat on the defensive, not knowing what sort of reception his remarks would have. As the meeting developed and it appeared that we were at least willing to hear him out, his attitude became somewhat warmer and more friendly. He is a very convincing and powerful speaker and seemed to be full of self-confidence and self-assurance. The nature of his remarks indicates that he is a very keen and detailed observer regardless of whether or not the conclusions that he draws from his observations are reliable.

4. The maps of the USSR which are referred to in Inclosure 1 have been referred to G2 AFPE/6A (Rear) for evaluation. G2 AFPE indicates that those maps are of no significant value and are routine, commercial type publications.

5. TSUJI's statement about the attitude of the Japanese guards at Pershing Heights contained in Inclosure 1 is based on a specific incident with a guard which occurred when TSUJI called at FEC Headquarters. There is something to be said for both sides; apparently TSUJI spoke to the guard in a truculent manner when his business was inquired into. The incident is under investigation because it is the desire of the authorities that proper, polite treatment be afforded Japanese guests. Later TSUJI remarked to a U.S. Army officer escorting him, regarding the Japanese guard, "I have taken the name and address of that fellow. He has not heard the last of Colonel TSUJI!"

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1. Notes on Remarks by TSUJI

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REPORT NUMBER PAGE

R-11-56

AREA Japan

PAGE

1 of

Incl 1

Notes on Remarks by Masanobu TSUJI

I recently spent 40 days touring Communist China and the Soviet Union as a member of the Japanese Diet, but my remarks today are made as an Army Colonel and not as a politician. During my Army career I had fifteen years experience in the study of the Russian language and Russia beginning from my Preparatory Military Academy days, and later, due to my experiences in Asia during and after the end of the war, I acquired considerable knowledge of China. The main object of my recent trip to China and Russia was to determine whether the recent Communist bloc peace offensive is true or false.

While enroute we landed in Okinawa and black curtains were pulled shut on the plane windows. This sort of action doesn't conceal anything, because desired intelligence could easily be gotten by other means, and serves only to create ill feeling among Japanese Diet members. Similarly, whenever people of high stature in Japan, such as Diet members like myself, go to places like Perching Heights (site of FEC Headquarters) we are constantly offended by the haughty and overbearing attitude of the Japanese guards dressed in their resplendent blue uniforms and white trim. It makes us wonder whether Japan is really an independent country or is still under occupation controls.

In Hong Kong I learned that much information is available there for the taking. Great repercussions were felt there as a result of the SUN Li-jen incident which was receiving much play in the press and attention by the neutralist factions. I knew SUN Li-jen well and had the best feeling toward him of all the Chinese Generals I have known. While in Hong Kong, I met and talked to five former Cabinet members of HANG Ching-wei's government which was established at the direction of the Japanese Army during the Sino-Japan incident. These men can neither become Communists, because of their ideological background, nor will they support CHIANG Kai-shek regime on Taiwan because of a difference of opinions. In addition, I learned from the meeting that CHIANG Kai-shek is fast losing his prestige and the support of the Chinese people. CHIANG's stock has come down perceptibly following the firing and subsequent confinement of SUN Li-jen. Li is the father of the reorganized Nationalist Army on Taiwan and is a man of trust and true ability. The Li incident, and the subsequent execution of more than 10,000 Taiwanese and officers of the Nationalist forces for non-cooperation with the CHIANG regime, has alienated Taiwanese and pro-Nationalist Chinese throughout Asia from CHIANG Kai-shek. Continued United States support for CHIANG without looking into the true existing situation is tantamount to a complete alienation of Chinese people from the United States. The opinion of this group was that CHIANG Kai-shek could not hold out for more than another year.

The United States puts too much trust in CHIANG Kai-shek at the expense of other areas where her interests would be better served. There are very extensive Communist interests in Hong Kong and they leave it untouched only because of the profit they get from smuggling. If this source of trade were lost, they can take Hong Kong easily. I noticed no fear of the English among the young people. The Chinese believe that England doesn't want the U.S. to recognize Communist China because of the profit they derive from the "secret trade."

I noted the difference in defense posture on both sides at Hong Kong. The English fortifications, barbed wire, etc. are easily visible and their soldiers sleeping in the open. Chinese fortifications were well concealed. To an experienced military eye the contrast provided an interesting contrast. The Chinese troops conceal their positions by wearing rags and looking like peasants, but carrying heavy arms.

Near Shanghai I noticed a complete absence of shops, buildings, etc. The shops were eliminated because of the fear of the Japanese. Also noticed that the Japanese shopkeepers that they were all cashiers. They were not allowed to give them anything. There is always some sort of war on the mind.

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DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT <small>(Use this form only in accordance with instructions in SR 200-375-3)</small>	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	REPORT NUMBER R-11-56	FROM Arma Japan	PAGE 5 of Incl 1
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Beginning in September there was to be a country-wide control of food for three years duration in order to control distribution. The people were to be divided into six classes with a separate ration to each class. Even animal food was to be placed under control. The amounts of food given each type of animal was specified. The reason for this should be examined. It is because of the shortages of food in the Soviet area. China is shipping food to the Soviets to pay for the obsolete machines being shipped to China. The big attention is being given to urban development at the expense of the farmers. Although new apartment buildings are going up, I noticed no new farm houses. The ones I saw were in very poor condition - rotter timbers not being repaired, etc, the peasants were dressed in rags and their ribs were visible (i.e. starving), and there were very few farm animals. The common expression was that the laboring class should have been taken care of yesterday and the young people from tomorrow. The only people who seemed to have any degree of prosperity were the soldiers and police.

Later in Peking, a merchant told me in great secrecy that there is no longer any profit in business and he wished the Japanese Army were back. The Chinese women dress very plainly and simply without cosmetics. My guess is that they are influenced by and imitating the frugality of the politicians. For example, LIU Chao-Chi wears threadbare shirts and pigskin shoes. The officials even wear simple cotton garments. This despite the fact that there are no anti-luxury laws. Despite the Cooperative Associations (Gassokusha 合作社) there is no improvement in methods of farming. There are no longer any large land owners with surplus money to provide for necessary repairs such as roads, bridges, etc.

Peking was an interesting place to notice the attitude toward Soviet-Chinese-Japanese relations. I met for three hours with three Soviet Embassy people. The first thing they asked me was, "Are you Colonel Tsuji?" They said this was because of my appearance and because I can speak Russian. I told them I was not Colonel Tsuji but Diet Member Tsuji. The next thing they asked me was "We hear you have 50,000 friends in the Soviet Union. Is this true?" I said yes, that I had met them at Homonhan (site of Japanese-Soviet border conflict in 1938). The next thing they asked me was "Are you responsible for the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor?" I told them no, that this had been a Navy plan. This question indicated to me that the Soviets are thinking of a second Pearl Harbor - the problem is whether it's one of their own, or the other side. From my observations, there appeared to be a fine line of distinction between the attitude of the Chinese toward the Japanese and that of the Chinese toward the Soviets. The relationship between the Chinese and the Japanese is the same as that between an older and younger brother, whereas the Chinese attitude toward the Russians is that of complete subservience. The Chinese appeared to have a much warmer feeling toward the Japanese than toward the Soviets.

One interesting part of the Chinese scene is the probability that LIU Chao-Chi and CHOU En-lai will fight for the succession to power when KAO Tze-tung passes from the scene. I talked to some of the Communists' leading officials such as LIU Chao-Chi, CH'EN Yu, CHU to, and LIU Pai-Chen, the one-eyed general. I have known LIU Pai-Chen since the Sun Ritsu Jin incident when LIU was Commander of the 16th Army in Shanghai and had an intimate conversation with him. He is now a member of the Military Commission. He boasted of the fact that they had beaten America with one finger in Korea. He said that America is like a paper tiger and why don't you chase the Americans out of Japan? He spoke very frankly and has a very strong anti-American feeling. I asked him why one sees very few posters on the street advocating the attack on KAO Tze-tung, and he said there was no need to anymore. CHIANG will fall naturally so there is no need to attack.

We went from Peking in two 21-passenger airplanes via Ulan Bator to Irkutsk. Despite the expensive plane the accommodations were thoroughly frugal. For example, there was only one drinking cup. When I asked why there was only one cup on such an expensive plane, I was told that there was no need for more since only one person drinks at a time.

We flew along the rail line into Ulan Bator and I noticed for a long distance as we went into Ulan Bator a peculiar pentagon-shaped building located along the rail line at extremely regular intervals, of approximately 8 kilometers each. I guessed that these must be barracks capable of housing about 200 men each or something for

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<b>DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT</b> <small>(Use this form only in accordance with instructions to DA FORM 1045-1)</small>	<b>CLASSIFICATION</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>REPORT NUMBER</b> H-211-56	<b>TITLE</b> AREA Japan	<b>PAGE</b> 3 OF Incl 1
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defence. Just before arriving in Ulan Bator, I noticed an excavation or digging of some sort. The dirt spoil was a peculiar color, not brown but a lightish, almost green color. This might be fluorspar (hoterudshi) and could indicate uranium deposits, I thought.

There was quite a bit of traffic of Soviet personnel through Ulan Bator to the East. The greatest number was going to Peking; the next greatest to Khabarovsk. The smallest number was going to Magadan. These people were all extremely well dressed. The ladies, for example, were dressed in grey fur coats and I believed that they were the wives of officials. Only high-ranking people seemed to be going to Magadan which leads me to believe that it may be the center of some important activity.

There is a large hydro-electric plant, 700,000 KW capacity, being built on the West Coast of Lake Baikal. It has a 150 meter dam and is due to be completed year after next. The workers at this plant have no facilities worthy of the name - no amusement, schools, decent homes, etc. They are almost black from working exposed to the elements but are happy because the minimum pay is 1,000 rubles per month.

The Soviet treatment of us was quite different from the Chinese. In form they were much more correct and complete in the reception they gave us but inwardly the atmosphere was quite different. They were not warm and hospitable but rather looked on us as spies.

In the USSR we had a very tight schedule. They took us to nice places only and every night there was a party with drinking. I had a chance to talk to a great many individuals in the USSR. One reason is because I avoided official entertainments in the evening as much as possible and would walk around the streets talking to whomever I could get to talk to.

At one time I was talking to an Infantry Colonel who was quite friendly and talkative. But when a Lt Colonel of GPU came up and joined us, he shut up completely.

Another time I was talking to an ordinary laborer who was wearing a badge. I asked him what it was and he said he received it for participation in the German war. By wearing it his influence over the others was increased. This man told me that he didn't want another war, but if one came with the United States, he was ready to get two or three more badges.

I saw quite a number of disabled veterans. I noticed that those who had lost legs did not have artificial legs but only wooden peg-legs.

The cleaning of public places like parks was done by women who were war widows.

Novosibirsk is a seat of heavy industry, judged by the great amount of smoke visible. There are troops there of an estimated division equivalent in size but they are for anti-aircraft, not ground defense. I also saw a large number of jet planes there.

Belgorod is a large rail center, but I made no detailed survey. I saw about 4-5 trains with iron material, lumber, and cement. There seemed to be military installations in open fields, and I noted several scores of anti-aircraft artillery in the area. It appears that this is the production center for large caliber guns.

Belgorod is surrounded by several airfields. We landed at the international airport which was set by the usual guards and escorts. A beautiful Russian girl acted as our interpreter. When I told her that I did not speak Russian, she indicated to me clearly that the system is very complete and thorough and they know at every detail. The interpreters and the system was true and complete.

I discovered several interesting things. I made one excursion into the area to evade the daily and nightly schedule of sightseeing and parties which our hosts arranged for us; and for 20 days, I made an independent tour of Moscow.

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DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT <small>(Use this form only in accordance with instructions in DA Form 1048-1)</small>	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	REPORT NUMBER R-11-56	TICOM AIMA Japan	PAGE 4 of Incl 1
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talking to persons from all walks of life. I knew that the radio set in my room was tapped and the maids and houseboys assigned to us were given strict orders to watch over our activities. Everytime I left the hotel, I was followed, but on several occasions I successfully evaded my surveillance. I went to the blackmarket and after some bargaining sold my Japanese Seikocha watch for 1,200 rubles (about the equivalent of 90,000 yen, or \$250) and as a result, I had more than ample funds to spend during the rest of my tour through the Soviet Union. I went out and talked to students, soldiers, and laborers. I did not buy any souvenirs because there is nothing worth buying.

In an attempt to find out which Soviet leader has the greatest influence among the people, I would ask, "How does Khrushchev rate?" "He's No. 1", was the answer. Similarly for the four other important leaders - Bulganin, Malenkov, Zhukov and (another whose name R.U. has forgotten), each was "No. 1". Although I asked over 100 people, no one would say which of the five No. 1's was most important or which he liked the best. In my judgment there is no single successor to Stalin yet apparent. It is my estimate that in such a weak situation, the Soviets cannot start a war.

I bought several children's textbooks to examine them because in a controlled state like the U.S.S.R. the type of education given the children is an important indication. Over 30% of the contents are warlike teachings, praising military leaders, accounts of the army's accomplishments, and the inevitability of the Communist Revolution. Comparing them with Chinese textbooks, in the Chinese ones there are pictures of Soviet leaders, but none of Chinese in the Soviet books. The feeling one gets from the Chinese books is that of hero worship but not that of a Communist state like Russia.

In Leningrad, there were about 300,000 widows, most of whom did not know where their husbands were. These women did much of the manual labor in Leningrad as they do in other Russian cities. I talked to some of them and was told that they have no news of their husbands - where they died, under what circumstances, etc. These people say that they are "like a broken cup", something to be discarded as useless. Food rationing was very strict, each person being limited to 75 grams per day. The only food item on free sale in Leningrad is watermelon. However, it is so expensive - one kilogram, 2 rubles - that it is sold by the slice, something which I haven't seen elsewhere. I had the experience of talking to a drunk party member as well as a young soldier in a torn uniform who had not been home for several months because his meager 50 rubles pay would not permit him to make the trip. I also had the opportunity to stroll around the alleys and byways, and I found that many of the buildings were marred by bullet holes and broken windows which had not been fixed since the war. Many people of the laboring class live in places which are little better than caves and their clothes are very threadbare. I talked to many people there and the general feeling is that they are appalled at the thought of any more war. I also tried to engage in conversation a GPU officer, but as expected, he would not talk. I asked a driver whom he thought was the most important man in Soviet Russia and he mentioned General Zhukov. Apparently Zhukov is the only important official who is well known among the younger people in Russia. My vivid impressions of Leningrad typify my feeling of life in Russia in general. The war widows, the drunken laborer, the soldier in a torn uniform and the squalid slums behind the facade of beautiful public buildings, can be found throughout the country. Everything has an air of severity.

While I was in Stalingrad I went to a movie and saw some movies of the new Soviet Army with the modern equipment and well trained, large number of troops. I considered whether they could make armed forces like these.

At Saratov, I found to be a fishing town of 200,000 people. I noted with interest that their fishing techniques were 20 years behind the times. Another thing that I did notice was that the people were much more friendly than those in other cities. I made one of my spontaneous speeches before a gathering and one of the main points was change of my level. I later found out that this was a Youth Communist League bridge. In the outlying areas there is no racial discrimination and generally the treatment of foreigners is much better.

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In Baku I tried to investigate the extent of the oil facilities there but wasn't able to find out all I wanted to know. I was shown the new oil fields recently discovered beneath the Caspian Sea. The oil is 5,000 meters below the level of the Sea. I was told that 28% of the oil production of the Baku area comes from this new field. I was also told that the Caspian Sea field now has over 300 wells producing from 15 to 20 tons each per day. From this you can see that the Caspian Sea fields produce between five and six thousand tons of oil per day. If the Caspian fields produce 28% of the Baku oil, total production in the Baku area can be estimated. They intend to raise the Caspian Sea field production to 30% of total Baku production next year, and to 50% the year after. There also appears to be development of new oil fields in the Altai Range. I snatched a sample of the catalyst (shokubai) used in their refinery and had it analyzed by a friend in Japan who said that it is ten years old compared with US standards. (I hope this incident will not be revealed because of its effect on the faith the Soviets will have toward the Japanese.)

In the Baku area I noticed a large number of T-34 tanks and anti-aircraft guns. I asked the Governor of the Province, around whose house I noticed a large number of weapons, if this was an evidence of the new "Peace" Army, which made him angry and left him without a reply.

We next went to Georgia which is, of course, the birthplace of both Stalin and Beria. In this border area there are large numbers of soldiers. I saw anti-aircraft emplacements, tanks and jet aircraft in large numbers. One interesting thing I noted were the large number of excellent roads built into areas of little population.

In Tiflis I saw a seamless steel tube factory, employing 10,000 workers. Its machines bear labels indicating they were made in Germany during 1940-43. The guide stated that they were purchased in Germany, but when I asked if there were free trade with the Germans during the war he just grinned.

The presence of a large number of troops here suggests the possibility that Russia may be considering this as the next vantage point from which to launch aggressive warfare. The things I observed there were not for defensive purposes; they were definitely for an offensive movement, possibly toward Iran and Iraq. Their activities toward the civil populace appears to be preparing them for action in the area. I believe that their next target will be in the Middle East, not Denmark or Poland. Another indication that this is not a defensive posture is the fact that they have located heavy industry so far forward toward what would be the front line if the Soviets assumed the defensive in this area. This all can be related to the recent swing of the Soviet leaders through India and the Egyptian arms deal.

In the USSR there is nothing worth buying as a souvenir item - clothing, etc, so I bought textbooks, maps, etc. They wouldn't sell the maps in Moscow but I was able to buy them without difficulty in Tiflis.

My overall conclusions as the result of my trip are as follows:

- a. The Soviets at present lack a single leader. Without one they are unlikely to start a major war.
- b. Soviet farm policies have utterly failed. There is not enough food and their land rehabilitation program is entirely out of balance.
- c. The war damage to the Soviets was very great. About 90% of the produce is gone.
- d. There is too great an imbalance between war and peace industries in the Soviet Union. This indicates a long range preparation for war.
- e. For the next five to six years the Soviets will be unable to start a war. This doesn't mean they have discarded the idea of using war to achieve their ends. Their overall objective is to overthrow the United States and they will be preparing to do this.
- f. The Soviets won't take a chance on the big war but this doesn't mean peace. They will next start to work through the Middle East on down through to India, and fighting is likely next year in Indo-China spreading to Malaya, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan.

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SECRET 0-148

*D/B-59254*

From  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
To

JAN 10 1956

BY COURIER SERVICE

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

Dear Sir:

For your information, I am attaching hereto  
communications which may be of interest to you.

Very truly yours,

*J. E. Hoover*  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director

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SECRET

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

FOR COORDINATION WITH FBI

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(C) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

REF - 59754

FBI-78  
0-4-60

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FORM NO. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT SAN FRANCISCO

REPORT MADE AT <b>SAN FRANCISCO</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>12/15,16,19/55</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>12/15,16,19/55</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>HENRY D. GRUSH glp</b>
TITLE <b>THEODORE TIHOVICH MINENKO, aka.</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>INTERNAL SECURITY - R</b>	
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: <span style="float: right;"><b>SECRET</b></span>			
<p>ROBERT BOOTH, United States citizen, employed GEORGE MINENKO in publishing venture in Japan. GEORGE MINENKO brother of THEODORE TIHOVICH MINENKO, according to records of American Embassy, Tokyo. BOOTH dismissed GEORGE MINENKO from his organization when MINENKO refused to solicit advertising for one of BOOTH's publications which was anti-Communist and had published an article by one Colonel MASANOBU TSUJI, and stated he would not support a magazine whose policies were contrary to "peace" and that he would do his utmost to obstruct the progress of a magazine which supported "war mongers and enemies of the people". BOOTH claimed he later learned GEORGE MINENKO was a Soviet citizen.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">P</p> <p><u>DETAILS</u></p> <p>Records of the American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, disclosed the following information concerning GEORGE MINENKO, a Soviet Russian resident in Japan. Information previously received from the Embassy, indicated that GEORGE MINENKO is a brother of THEODORE MINENKO.</p>			
<b>SECRET</b>			
APPROVED AND FORWARDED:	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
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SF 105-3247  
HDC/rlp

One ROBERT BOOTH, a United States citizen, publisher and radio entertainer, in a statement on application for passport dated August 1, 1954, which he submitted to the American Embassy at Tokyo, indicated that in 1950, he had employed GEORGE MINENKO, a Soviet Russian, among others to work for him in publishing a magazine which was to be an introduction to Japan.

MINENKO spoke good English and Japanese and had been formerly employed by the United States Army by the War Crime Trials, as an interpreter. He was later employed with the A. P. Pattison Company. BOOTH claimed that at the time he hired MINENKO he was unaware that the latter had a Soviet passport. BOOTH stated that later, in December, 1952, he discovered that MINENKO held a Soviet passport and intended to go to Russia. As of the time BOOTH learned of this, he stated that he also heard that MINENKO was an avid Communist who often served in various official capacities in the local Russian Communist cell. Despite his political background, MINENKO did diligent work for BOOTH. In time, however, BOOTH became involved in heated arguments with MINENKO over current events. Among other things, BOOTH believed that Japan must be armed and that the Communist Party must be stamped out and while in the budding stage. MINENKO disagreed with this.

In late 1951, BOOTH prepared and published the first edition of "View", a pictorial magazine which he intended to use as rebuttal to the Communist literature pouring into Japan at that time. In an early issue of the magazine he carried an article by Colonel MASANOBU TSUJI, not because he agreed with TSUJI's policies, but because he felt TSUJI had been and would be a political influence in Japan. It was necessary to make a concerted effort to obtain advertising for the new publication. BOOTH outlined the new advertising plan and policy of the magazine to MINENKO who had been instrumental in gathering many

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SF 105-3247  
HDG/glp

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advertisements for him before. For the following three weeks the advertising staff conducted something similar to a "sit-down strike". When BOOTH called MINENKO in to discuss the latter's refusal to sell advertising for "View", MINENKO stated among other things that he would not sell advertising for a magazine whose policies were contrary to that of "peace" and demanded that the magazine carry only articles of cultural value. BOOTH, realizing that MINENKO's political views were not in agreement with his or the magazine's, asked MINENKO to leave the company, which he did. In a final argument MINENKO said he would do his utmost to obstruct the progress of any magazine which supported "war mongers and enemies of the people".

On leaving BOOTH's organization, GEORGE MINENKO took with him another of BOOTH's employees, one ROBERT GILLESPIE, and with him established an advertising agency known as Gilmin Service. From December, 1952 to February, 1954, BOOTH had no further contact with GEORGE MINENKO.

~~MINENKO~~  
In January, 1953, GEORGE MINENKO's two brothers, PETER and ANDREW MINENKO, whom BOOTH had hired earlier, were still working for him. At that time a younger brother, name unrecalled, was preparing papers for a student visa to the United States, which he later received, and his older brother PETER came to BOOTH for assistance with the documents. It was at this time that BOOTH discovered that GEORGE MINENKO held a Soviet passport, after which BOOTH made an effort to acquire more detailed information concerning the MINENKO family and the older brother GEORGE and the latter's relationship with the Soviet Club in Tokyo. BOOTH learned that while GEORGE MINENKO was very active with the Russian Club, he was also quite religious or at least a regular attendant at the St. Nikolai Church at night for choir practice.

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SECRET

3

VIA AIR  
(Specify Air or Sea Route)

DISPATCH NO. FJBA-8384

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

23 JAN 1956

TO Chief, FE

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

FROM Chief of [ ] Base, [ ] *de*

INFO: Chief of Station, NA

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational  
SPECIFIC [ ] Feeling toward TSUJI Masanobu

REFERENCES: A. DIR-29821  
B. [ ]-3916

While riffling through some old contact reports, I came across a [ ] comment that has application to the above references. In one of our last contacts here (6 October 1953), [ ] noted that the extreme left and extreme right sometimes get together. He then went on to say that TSUJI is the man we all ought to worry about, that his type of propaganda - anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet - will eventually sell a lot better than Communism and is just as dangerous.

[ ] [ ]

20 January 1956

Distribution:  
4 - Addressee  
1 - CCS/NA

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CLASSIFICATION

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FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR 1949

### NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

#### EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2003



C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

- 2 -

CS-3,301,526

the MEI Troupe.

5. During 1956, Socialists have drawn ¥17,000,000 from the Bank of Tokyo against remittances from Communist China.

Field Comments

1. Source said that TSUJI was withholding the names of the Socialist Party member mentioned in Para 1 and the member who received the funds mentioned in Para 4 because he felt that if the Socialist Party were to take action against him, it would be advisable to have the identity of the two members revealed by the Japanese security authorities.
2. This would have been the Leftist Socialist Party of which, in 1954, SUZUKI was chairman. The Japan Socialist Party was established on 13 October 1955 by a merger of the Leftist and Rightist Socialist Parties.
3. KATAYAMA, who is an advisor to the Japan Socialist Party, and ENDO Saburo, visited China in December 1955.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
NOFORN

MICROFILMED  
APR 23 1963  
DOC. MICRO SER.

From: [ ] Station

Report No. FJI-139

No. of Pages: 1

No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By: [ ]

Approved By: [ ]

Distribution: BFG

CS-94489

Source Cryptonym: See below

This information was volunteered by a [ ] officer in a meeting with [ ] and [ ] on 26 April 1956. ISUJI consulted with [ ] before sending his reply, and [ ] is to select the members of the delegation.

Project: [ ]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
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INDEX

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9 May 56  
[ ]

CONTROLLED AMERICAN SOURCE  
**FIELD INFORMATION REPORT**

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
NOFORN

COUNTRY Japan/China

REPORT NO. FJT-139

SUBJECT Chinese Communist Invitation to  
TSUJI Masanobu

DATE OF REPORT 9 May 1956

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. April 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo (26 April 1956)

CS-94489

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: An official Japanese service. Appraisal of Content: 2.

On 25 April 1956 TSUJI Masanobu received a letter from LIAO Cheng-chih (1675/2110/1807)<sup>1</sup> inviting TSUJI to head a delegation of Japanese rightists and ultra-militarists (sic) to visit Communist China in June 1956. TSUJI, after consulting Japanese Government officials, replied to LIAO on 26 April that he would like to form such a delegation, but would like to make the visit in September 1956.

1. Field Comment. LIAO is reportedly Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Affairs Committee and apparently in charge of the Committee's Japanese interests.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  
NOFORN

DISTRIBUTION

BFG

NOFORN

9 May 56

- GGC 1 -

SOUTH KOREA

Aug. 2, 1956

CANAL SEIZURE EXPOSES "NEUTRALISM"

Seoul, in Japanese to Japan, Aug. 2, 1956, 1230 GMT--T

(Anonymous Commentary)

(Excerpts)

President Nasir's sudden declaration to nationalize the Suez Canal surprised the world. His declaration on nationalization had the same effect as would throwing a bomb. Why then did Nasir, President of Egypt, suddenly nationalize the Suez? Egypt led by him is a country advocate to a neutralistic policy supported by Arab countries. It further behaves as if it leads the Arab Nations. President Nasir attended the big-three neutralists conference in Brioni in late July, along with Tito of Yugoslavia and Nehru of India. On Nasir's leaving Brioni, the United States announced its withdrawal of aid to the Aswan Dam project. Nasir was astonished at the announcement. Following America, Britain also informed Egypt that she would withhold aid on the project. Even the Soviet Union, which... (a few words unintelligible--Ed.) said that it could not supply aid immediately.

President Nasir was seriously discouraged. A man of tactics, he contemplated nationalization of the Suez. This was retaliation to Britain and France. The Suez dispute thus caught the attention of the world.

Egypt has gained huge benefits from the Suez. The country could not have been a modern sovereign State as it is today without the ... (one word unintelligible--Ed.) influences and material benefits of the Suez Canal and the world traffic connected with it. Egypt, however, has (strenuously?) tried to get rid of the foreign powers that (dominated?) it. Consequently, its independence movement has steadily gained grounds. A few months ago, Egypt successfully had the British Armed Forces withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone.

The British and Egyptian Governments signed a pact to (authorize and administrate?) the Suez Canal Company, approved a series of international agreements adopted at the (Constantinople?) international conference, and agreed that these treaties would continuously be effective in the future. In defiance of these agreements, however, President Nasir suddenly occupied the Suez Canal and nationalized the Canal Company.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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by the Central Intelligence Agency  
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SOUTH KOREA  
Aug. 3, 1956

As for this action, Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, stated: "The Soviet Union will support Nasir's pledge to keep the canal open to all vessels of the world." So saying, he clarified the Soviet stand toward the issue. This means that the Soviet Union has begun putting its nose into the Canal dispute. There has always been the shadow of the Soviet Union behind the neutral countries. The Soviet Union has exposed its real intent at last.

Nasir talks of independent neutralism on the one hand and asks for Soviet aid on the other. This is very dangerous. Anyhow, (unless Egypt settles the Suez dispute?), it may pose a serious threat to the peace of the world. We must say it is time for us to change our view toward so-called neutralism in the Middle East.

#### PRO-COMMUNIST TREND GROWS IN JAPAN

Seoul, in Japanese to Japan, July 31, 1956, 1230 GMT--T

(Anonymous commentary)

(Excerpts)

According to UNITED PRESS, a U.S. Senate report dated July 23 revealed that the economic offensive of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia is directed at Japan. Although the Soviet Union has offered no economic or technical aid to Japan as yet, she is pressing Japan to normalize relations with Communist countries. Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have certainly been promoted, and exchanges of trade, industrial and fishery delegations have become active. The U.S. Senate (Technical Aid Planning Sub-Committee?) believes that the frequent exchanges of various delegations between Japan and the Soviet Union are paving the way for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

It is a fact that organizations are mushrooming in Japan for promoting trade and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. These organizations include the Japanese People's Congress to Promote Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association, and the International Trade Promotion Association. Also, exhibitions on scientific and cultural achievements of Communist countries are more frequently being held in Japan. Last year the Sohyo promised the Soviet Union to send some Japanese films and a Kabuki troupe to the Soviet Union.

This pro-Soviet trend in Japan has resulted in fomenting anti-American sentiments among the Japanese people. The Republic of Korea, Free China, and the Philippines are naturally gravely concerned about this. Japan is regarded as a member of the free camp. According to papers in Japan, however, traffic between Japan and Communist countries is increasing day by day.

SOUTH KOREA  
Aug. 3, 1956

The Tokyo newspaper ASAHI reported recently that a seven-man party headed by Kobayashi arrived in Pyongyang July 13. The party's purpose was reportedly exchange of opinions on printing and publishing. Takahashi, President of the Japanese-Chinese Trade Promotion Association and Director-General of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, visited Pyongyang on Apr. 13 at the invitation of the North Korean Cultural Exchange Association, according to the same paper. Many more delegations, semi-Governmental, have visited Communist countries. Although the Japanese Foreign Office says that they were private delegations, it is common knowledge that it is the Foreign Office that issues passports. Therefore, it is an undeniable fact that these delegations, whether Governmental or private, talked with the Foreign Office before they visited the Communist countries. (It is not too much to say that once abroad these delegations represent Japan?). Japan must know that it is not only the United States but all other nations of the free camp as well that are warning Japan against approaching the Communist camp.

... arousing interest on the part of the Japanese people (regarding Communist countries' intervention in Japan and in particular in the Upper House elections?). Member of the Japanese Diet Masanobu Tsuji declared before the Lower House that the Japan Communist Party and the Socialist Party were financed by the Soviet Union and Communist China. He disclosed thateking provided the Socialist Party with 166,000 dollars in the name of trade funds through the Bank of Hong Kong and the Bank of Japan, and that ..., member of the Chinese Communist Party, sent to Tokyo 50,000 dollars during the latter part of last year. He added that 15,000 dollars of the sum was given to the Japan Communist Party and the rest to the Japan Socialist Party.

He also laid bare that the Chinese drama troupe now visiting Japan has donated 150,000 U.S. dollars smuggled into Japan to the leftist Japan Teachers Union. Furthermore, the same Diet member testified that Communist China and the Soviet Union furnished the Japan Communist Party and organizations under its control more than 500,000 dollars during the past 12 months.

It is found that these funds flow into Japan through the London Branch of the Chinese People's Bank, the London Branch of the Bank of Tokyo, and the Indo-China-Hong Kong Bank.

Diet Member Tsuji made the same statement before the press. He added that he will be willing to plumb the bottom of this problem in court if the Communist and Socialist Parties sue him for his remarks. In this connection the Communist and the Socialist Parties have made no statements as yet.

Dick

Aug. 3, 1956

Judging from Mr. Tsuji's disclosure and other facts, the United States' warning to Japan is not at all unfounded. As Japanese people know, Free Asia's peoples feel that Japan has stepped up efforts to approach the Communist world since Yoshida handed the reins of Government over to Hatoyama. It is that Premier Hatoyama is using the Okinawa problem (to further his political ambitions?) now that he is charmed by Communist China's policy. He has forgotten ... the defense problem in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

It may be natural for the Japanese people to hold anti-American sentiments and approach the Soviet Union and Communist China since their premier is executing such an insincere policy. However, if Japan wishes to join the United Nations, she is earnestly advised to stick to an anti-Communist policy. We believe that the Japanese people are wise enough to understand this. ... free nations would be forced to adjust their attitude toward Japan.

RELEASE OF ASSEMBLYMAN--Ruling that National Assemblyman Kim Son-tae, detained by the police after being charged with disturbance of the public peace, must be released in accordance with the provisions of Para. 2 Art. 101 of the criminal procedure code, the Seoul District Court on August 1 ordered the Seoul District Procurator's Office to release him. The latter immediately directed the Public Security Bureau to release the detained National Assemblyman. (Seoul, Home, Aug. 1, 1956, 2030 GMT--B)

STATE COUNCIL MEETING--President Rhee, at a meeting of the State Council August 2 ordered that the creation and strengthening of small- and medium-sized enterprises and reconstruction and improvement of houses be promoted in order to stabilize the people's livelihood. Director of the Public Information Office O stated that for creation and strengthening of small- and medium-sized enterprises, 20 million dollars from ICA funds and 9.8 billion won from the sale of former Japanese property have already been appropriated and a 5-year program for reconstruction of one million houses will be pushed. (Seoul, Home, Aug. 2, 1956, 1130 GMT--B)